Topic:
DEATH; LITIGATION; ANIMALS;
Location:
CRIME AND CRIMINALS;

OLR Research Report


December 3, 1999

 

99-R-1228

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF A COMPANION ANIMAL

 
 

By: George Coppolo, Chief Attorney

You asked whether any states allow a cause of action for the loss of the company of a companion animal.

SUMMARY

Most states treat companion animals as personal property and limit damages for an animal's death to its market value when it died (4 Am Jur 2d Animals §162; 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1059 (1995)). Fair market value depends on such things as purchase price, age, health, breed, training, usefulness, and any special traits of value including some of the animal's special qualities.

But courts in Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, New York, and Texas have allowed damage claims for the owner's emotional distress. In a very unusual related case, the Oregon Supreme Court allowed damages for emotional distress for the wrongful taking of a pet by a veterinarian. And courts in Florida and Minnesota, have also allowed punitive damages for intentional or malicious misconduct.

FLORIDA

In Laporte v. Associated Independents, (163 So. 2d 267(Fla.1964)), the defendant, a sanitation worker, killed the plaintiff's miniature dachshund, by hurling a garbage can at her. In calculating damages for the malicious infliction of emotional distress, the court included sentimental value. The court concluded that the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover. The court upheld a verdict of $2,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages.

In Levine v. Knowles, a Florida court of appeals allowed damages for emotional distress resulting from the malicious destruction of a Chihuahua's dead body (197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The court expressly stated that deterrence required a measure of damages beyond market value, including punitive damages when appropriate.

In Knowles Animal Hospital v. Wills, the court upheld a $13,000 award against the defendant animal hospital (360 So.2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1978), cert.denied, 368 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1979)). A dog had to be put to sleep after he was severely burned by a heating pad on which the defendant veterinarian, without care or attention had left him for a day and a half.

HAWAII

In Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, the Hawaii Supreme Court allowed a family, in a negligence lawsuit, to recover for emotional distress cause by their dog's death (632 P2d 1066 (1981). The court did so even though the family was not present at the time of the dog's death, did not witness any part of the incident and were not themselves in any danger. In upholding a $1,000 award, the court stated “An individual's interest in freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protection” (at 1068).

IDAHO

In Gill v. Brown, the trial court disallowed the plaintiff's claim for mental anguish suffered as a result of the death of his pet donkey (695 P2d 1276 (1985)). The Court of Appeals agreed that the measure of damages for a pet's death is market value. But, it held that the negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress could be asserted as an independent cause of action. The standard is extreme or outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress.

MINNESOTA

In Wilson v. City of Eagan, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a $500 punitive damages award for intentionally killing a pet cat. The court concluded that punitive damages are necessary when compensatory damages are unlikely to be small and will not deter similar conduct (297 NW2d 146 (1980)).

But a more recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision casts doubt on the continued viability of this holding (Soucek v. Banham, et. al., 524 N.W2d 428 (1995)). Citing more recent Supreme Court holdings the Appeals Court concluded that punitive damages are no longer available in Minnesota for killing pets.

NEW YORK

In Brousseau v. Rosenthal a trial court expressly included loss of companionship as an element of damages in a dog's death (443 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (Civ. Ct. 1980)). The court acknowledged that market value is the general measure of a pet's death. But, it concluded that when market value is unascertainable, the court must assess the dog's actual value to the owner in order to make the owner whole. In determining actual value the court considered the plaintiff's relationship with her dog and the pain and trauma of a companion animal' death. The court held that loss of companionship must be included as an element of the dog's actual value to the plaintiff.

In Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hospital (415 N.Y. S2d 182 (Civ. Ct. 1979)) the court explicitly rejected the classification of companion animals as only property. The plaintiff sued to recover damages for the mental anguish that she suffered when she opened the casket of what she thought was her poodle and instead found the remains of a dead cat. The court allowed mental distress damages concluding that a “pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere between a person and a piece of personal property” (at 183).

These cases might be the exception rather than the rule in New York. More recently reported cases have not allowed damages for a pet owner's emotional or mental distress (Fowler v. Town of Ticonderoga, 516 N.Y.S., 2d 368 (1987)); Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc. 844 F. Supp. 151 (1994)).

OREGON

In Fredeen v. Stride the jury awarded a dog owner $4,000 in damages for mental anguish caused by the loss of her dog. The Oregon Supreme

Court unanimously affirmed (525 P2d 166 (1974)).

Fredeen left her dog with her veterinarian, Dr. Stride, instructing him to destroy him. The dog needed surgery but Fredeen could not afford it. Stride's employees became fond of the dog and, with Stride's permission, helped him regain his health. Stride did not inform Fredeen but instead gave the dog to someone else. About six months later, Fredeen saw the dog with its new owner. She contacted Stride to get her dog back but he referred her to the new owner.

Fredeen sued Stride for conversion of her property. The court allowed the jury to consider her mental distress as an element of damages.

TEXAS

In City of Garland v. White, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a $200 damage award for mental anguish a dog owner suffered because of his dog's death (368 SW 2d 12 (1963)). The court found the police had intentionally killed the dog without justification. The court pointed to evidence that the owner was nervous and upset because of the pet's death. But in Zeid v. Pearce, (953 SW 2d 368 (Tex. App. El Paso 1997), the court held that one may not recover damages for mental anguish for the loss of a pet.

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