Connecticut General Assembly

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH

February 11, 1998 98-R-0018

TO:

FROM: Laura Jordan, Research Attorney

RE: Warrantless Searches of Automobiles

You asked how Connecticut law concerning warrantless searches of cars differs from federal law.

SUMMARY

State law gives individuals slightly greater protection than federal law from warrantless searches of cars by prohibiting police from searching cars that they impound without a warrant. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state constitution, article first, § 7, prohibits warrantless searches of impounded cars even when the searches are supported by probable cause (State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363 (1993)). In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a car impounded at a police station, if supported by probable cause, does not violate the Fourth Amendment (Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)).

Except for this difference, federal and state law concerning warrantless car searches are similar; both recognize (1) the general rule that a warrantless search of a car is per se unreasonable and (2) four exceptions to this rule. The Connecticut Supreme Court only recently adopted the fourth exception, which the federal courts recognized earlier. This exception allows a warrantless protective search of a car based on an officer's “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that it contains weapons (State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489 (1997)).

FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures.” The Connecticut Constitution, article first, § 7 states “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”

The federal constitution establishes a national minimum standard of individual rights and state constitutions can provide broader protections. As a result, state courts can independently determine whether to follow a federal decision as a matter of state constitutional law. (State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 649 (1992)).

WARRANTLESS CAR SEARCHES

Both federal and state law require police to obtain a warrant from a neutral judge or magistrate before searching an individual's car. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court have recognized four exceptions to this rule under which a warrantless search of a car may be permissible: (1) where the search takes place incident to a lawful arrest; (2) where the officer had probable cause to believe that a car in transit contained evidence of a crime; (3) where the police, in accordance with standard office procedures, inventory a car's contents; and (4) where the officer had a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that the car contained a weapon and the officer conducted a limited protective search of the car. The fourth exception was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)); the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized it in its 1997 session.

Searches Incident to an Arrest

Federal and state law permit a warrantless search of a car incident to an arrest as long as the search occurs at the same time as the arrest and the arrestee is present (New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258 (1989)). The courts allow these searches based on the rationale that police officers need to ensure their safety by checking areas that an arrestee might reach. This initially involved areas within physical reach but expanded to include a car's glove compartment and hatchback and the contents of any closed or open containers. It does not include areas of the car that can only be reached by leaving it. The rule applies even where the arrestee poses no danger to the officer, as when he is handcuffed and outside of the car, but the arrestee must remain present at the scene of the arrest in order for the search to be valid.

In State v. Badgett (200 Conn. 412 (1986)), the state Supreme Court interpreted the federal constitution as allowing a warrantless search of a car incident to an arrest only if it occurs at the time and place of the arrest and the defendant is present. In Badgett, the Court ruled that the search was invalid because the police searched the car after the arrestee was taken away from the scene of the arrest.

The Automobile Exception

Both federal and state law recognize the automobile exception and apply it similarly (U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98 (1988)). This exception allows officers to search a car in transit without a warrant when officers have probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime. Probable cause must exist at the time of the search; it exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe a particular item is connected to criminal activity or will help in a particular apprehension or conviction and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the sought item will be found in the place to be searched (State v. Dechamplain, 179 Conn. 522 (1980)).

Two rationales for this exception are: (1) because cars are inherently mobile it is necessary to search them when possible; delaying a search gives suspects an opportunity to remove criminal evidence from the car and (2) individuals have less of an expectation of privacy in their cars than other possessions such as their homes because of the degree to which governments regulate cars and the fact that they are driven in public areas.

Protective Searches Based on Specific and Articulable Suspicion

In Michigan v. Long (463 U.S. 1032 (1983)), the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the federal constitution as permitting a warrantless search of a car's passenger compartment, limited to the areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, if the officer has a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons” (463 U.S. 1032, 1049). Long expanded the rule established in Terry v. Ohio (398 U.S. 1 (1968)) that when a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, an officer can conduct an investigative stop of the suspect in order to confirm or dispel his suspicions.

In State v. Wilkins (240 Conn. 489 (1997)), the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted Long's reasoning in interpreting the state constitution. The Court adopted the new exception even though in an earlier case, State v. Dukes, it noted in dicta that an “officer's ability to search the vehicle is not to be justified as any continuation of his authority to conduct a pat-down search specifically for weapons in order to protect himself, but is justified on the ground that the escalation of the defendant's involvement had … risen from that of a mere traffic violation to probable guilt of a “crime”' (209 Conn. 98, 126).

Inventory of an Impounded Automobile

In general, police may search a car without a warrant in order to inventory an impounded car's contents. The inventory must be conducted pursuant to reasonable, standard police procedures (Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970); State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363).

The Connecticut Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution as providing greater protection than the federal constitution against warrantless searches of impounded cars. In State v. Miller (227 Conn. 363 (1993)), the Court held that a search of an impounded car was invalid even though the search was supported by probable cause. In so ruling, the Court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chambers v. Maroney (399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970)), which held that the federal constitution permitted such a search. The Court gave article first, § 7 a broader reading than its companion Fourth Amendment under the federal constitution.

LJ:pa