



# Senate

General Assembly

**File No. 15**

January Session, 2021

Senate Bill No. 269

*Senate, March 4, 2021*

The Committee on General Law reported through SEN. MARONEY of the 14th Dist., Chairperson of the Committee on the part of the Senate, that the bill ought to pass.

## **AN ACT CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS.**

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

1 Section 1. (NEW) (*Effective October 1, 2021*) For purposes of this  
2 section and section 2 of this act:

3 (1) "ANDA" means abbreviated new drug application.

4 (2) "ANDA filer" means a party that owns or controls an ANDA filed  
5 with the Food and Drug Administration or has the exclusive rights  
6 under that ANDA to distribute the ANDA product.

7 (3) "Agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim"  
8 includes any agreement that is entered into not later than thirty days  
9 after the resolution or the settlement of the claim, or any other  
10 agreement that is contingent upon, provides a contingent condition for,  
11 or is otherwise related to the resolution or settlement of the claim.  
12 "Agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim" includes,

13 but is not limited to, the following:

14 (A) Any agreement required to be provided to the Federal Trade  
15 Commission or the Antitrust Division of the United States Department  
16 of Justice under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and  
17 Modernization Act of 2003.

18 (B) Any agreement between a biosimilar or interchangeable  
19 biological product applicant and a reference drug product sponsor that  
20 resolves patent claims between the applicant and sponsor.

21 (4) "Biosimilar biological product application filer" means a party that  
22 owns or controls a biosimilar biological product application filed with  
23 the Food and Drug Administration under subsection (k) of section 351  
24 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 USC 262, for licensure of a biological  
25 product as biosimilar to, or interchangeable with, a reference drug  
26 product or that has the exclusive rights under the application to  
27 distribute the biosimilar biological product.

28 (5) "NDA" means new drug application.

29 (6) "Nonreference drug filer" means (A) an ANDA filer, or (B) a  
30 biosimilar biological product application filer.

31 (7) "Nonreference drug product" means the product to be  
32 manufactured under an ANDA that is the subject of the patent  
33 infringement claim, a biosimilar biological product that is the product  
34 to be manufactured under the biosimilar biological product application  
35 that is the subject of the patent infringement claim, or both.

36 (8) "Patent infringement" means infringement of any patent or of any  
37 filed patent application, extension, reissue, renewal, division,  
38 continuation, continuation in part, reexamination, patent term  
39 restoration, patents of addition and extensions thereof.

40 (9) "Patent infringement claim" means any allegation made to a  
41 nonreference drug filer, whether or not included in a complaint filed  
42 with a court of law, that its nonreference drug product or application

43 infringes any patent held by, or exclusively licensed to, the reference  
44 drug holder.

45 (10) "Reference drug holder" means:

46 (A) A brand holder that is any of the following:

47 (i) The holder of an approved NDA for a drug product application  
48 filed under subsection (b) of section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug and  
49 Cosmetic Act, 21 USC 355,

50 (ii) A person owning or controlling enforcement of the patent listed  
51 in the Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence  
52 Evaluations, commonly known as the "FDA Orange Book" in connection  
53 with the NDA, or

54 (iii) The predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates  
55 controlled by, controlling or under common control with, any of the  
56 entities described in this subparagraph or subparagraph (B) of this  
57 subdivision, with control to be presumed by direct or indirect share  
58 ownership of fifty per cent or greater, as well as the licensees, licensors,  
59 successors and assigns of each of those entities; or

60 (B) A biological product license holder, which includes any of the  
61 following:

62 (i) The holder of an approved biological product license application  
63 for a biological drug product under subsection (a) of section 351 of the  
64 Public Health Service Act, 42 USC 262,

65 (ii) A person owning or controlling enforcement of any patents that  
66 claim the biological product that is the subject of the approved biological  
67 patent license application, or

68 (iii) The predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates  
69 controlled by, controlling or under common control with, any of the  
70 entities described in this subparagraph or subparagraph (A) of this  
71 subdivision, with control to be presumed by direct or indirect share

72 ownership of fifty per cent or greater, as well as the licensees, licensors,  
73 successors and assigns of each of those entities.

74 (11) "Reference drug product" means the product to be manufactured  
75 by the reference drug holder and includes branded drugs of the NDA  
76 holder and the biological drug product of the biological product license  
77 applicant.

78 (12) "Statutory exclusivity" means those prohibitions on the approval  
79 of drug applications under subsection (c) of section 505, section 527 or  
80 505A of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC 355, 360cc  
81 and 355a, or on the licensing of biological product applications under  
82 subsection (k) or (m) of section 262 of the Public Health Service Act, 42  
83 USC 262.

84 Sec. 2. (NEW) (*Effective October 1, 2021*) (a) (1) Except as provided in  
85 subdivision (3) of this subsection, an agreement resolving or settling, on  
86 a final or interim basis, a patent infringement claim, shall be presumed  
87 to have anticompetitive effects and shall be a violation of this section if  
88 both of the following apply:

89 (A) A nonreference drug filer receives anything of value from another  
90 company asserting patent infringement, including, but not limited to,  
91 an exclusive license or a promise that the brand company will not  
92 launch an authorized generic version of its brand drug; and

93 (B) The nonreference drug filer agrees to limit or forego research,  
94 development, manufacturing, marketing or sales of the nonreference  
95 drug filer's product for any period of time.

96 (2) As used in subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of this subsection,  
97 "anything of value" does not include a settlement of a patent  
98 infringement claim in which the consideration granted by the brand or  
99 reference drug filer to the nonreference drug filer as part of the  
100 resolution or settlement consists of one or more of the following:

101 (A) The right to market the competing product in the United States  
102 before the expiration of either:

- 103 (i) A patent that is the basis for the patent infringement claim, or
- 104 (ii) A patent right or other statutory exclusivity that would prevent  
105 the marketing of the drug;
- 106 (B) A covenant not to sue on a claim that the nonreference drug  
107 product infringes a United States patent;
- 108 (C) Compensation for saved reasonable future litigation expenses of  
109 the reference drug holder but only if both of the following are true:
- 110 (i) The total compensation for saved litigation expenses is reflected in  
111 budgets that the reference drug holder documented and adopted at least  
112 six months before the settlement, and
- 113 (ii) The compensation does not exceed the lower of the following:
- 114 (I) Seven million five hundred thousand dollars, or
- 115 (II) Five per cent of the revenue that the nonreference drug holder  
116 projected or forecasted it would receive in the first three years of sales  
117 of its version of the reference drug documented at least twelve months  
118 before the settlement. If no projections or forecasts are available, the  
119 compensation does not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars;
- 120 (D) An agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim  
121 that permits a nonreference drug filer to begin selling, offering for sale  
122 or distributing the nonreference drug product if the reference drug  
123 holder seeks approval to launch, obtains approval to launch or launches  
124 a different dosage, strength or form of the reference drug having the  
125 same active ingredient before the date set by the agreement for entry of  
126 the nonreference drug filer. A different form of the reference drug does  
127 not include an authorized generic version of the reference drug;
- 128 (E) An agreement by the reference drug holder not to interfere with  
129 the nonreference drug filer's ability to secure and maintain regulatory  
130 approval to market the nonreference drug product or an agreement to  
131 facilitate the nonreference drug filer's ability to secure and maintain

132 regulatory approval to market the nonreference drug product; or

133 (F) An agreement resolving a patent infringement claim in which the  
134 reference drug holder forgives the potential damages accrued by a  
135 nonreference drug holder for an at-risk launch of the nonreference drug  
136 product that is the subject of that claim.

137 (3) Parties to an agreement are not in violation of subdivision (1) of  
138 this subsection if they can demonstrate by a preponderance of the  
139 evidence that either of the following are met:

140 (A) The value received by the nonreference drug filer described in  
141 subparagraph (A) of subdivision (1) of this subsection is a fair and  
142 reasonable compensation solely for other goods or services that the  
143 nonreference drug filer has promised to provide, or

144 (B) The agreement has directly generated procompetitive benefits  
145 and the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the  
146 anticompetitive effects of the agreement.

147 (b) In determining whether the parties to the agreement have met  
148 their burden under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, the  
149 factfinder shall not presume any of the following:

150 (1) That entry into the marketplace could not have occurred until the  
151 expiration of the relevant patent exclusivity or that the agreement's  
152 provision for entry of the nonreference drug product before the  
153 expiration of any patent exclusivity means that the agreement is  
154 procompetitive within the meaning of subparagraph (B) of subdivision  
155 (3) of subsection (a) of this section,

156 (2) That any patent is enforceable and infringed by the nonreference  
157 drug filer in the absence of a final adjudication binding on the filer of  
158 those issues,

159 (3) That the agreement caused no delay in entry of the nonreference  
160 drug filer's drug product because of the lack of federal Food and Drug  
161 Administration approval of that or of another nonreference drug

162 product, or

163 (4) That the agreement caused no harm or delay due to the possibility  
164 that the nonreference drug filer's drug product might infringe some  
165 patent that has not been asserted against the nonreference drug filer or  
166 that is not subject to a final and binding adjudication on that filer as to  
167 the patent's scope, enforceability and infringement.

168 This subsection shall not be construed to preclude a party from  
169 introducing evidence regarding subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of this  
170 subsection and shall not be construed to preclude the factfinder from  
171 making a determination regarding said subdivisions based on the full  
172 scope of the evidence.

173 (c) In determining whether the parties to the agreement have met  
174 their burden under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, the  
175 factfinder shall presume that the relevant product market is that market  
176 consisting of the brand or reference drug of the company alleging patent  
177 infringement and the drug product of the nonreference company  
178 accused of infringement and any other biological product that is  
179 licensed as biosimilar or is an AB-rated generic to the reference product.

180 (d) (1) The provisions of this section shall not modify, impair, limit or  
181 supersede the right of any drug company applicant to assert claims or  
182 counterclaims against any person under the antitrust laws or other laws  
183 relating to unfair competition of the federal antitrust law or state law.

184 (2) If any provision of this section, an amendment made to this section  
185 or the application of any provision or amendment to any person or  
186 circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this  
187 section, the amendments made to this section and the application of the  
188 provisions of this section or amendments to any person or circumstance  
189 shall not be affected.

190 (e) (1) (A) Each person that violates or assists in the violation of this  
191 section shall forfeit and pay to the state a civil penalty sufficient to deter  
192 violations of this section, as follows:

193 (i) If the person who violated this section received any value due to  
194 that violation, an amount up to three times the value received by the  
195 party that is reasonably attributable to the violation of this section, or  
196 twenty million dollars, whichever is greater.

197 (ii) If the violator has not received anything of value as described in  
198 subparagraph (A)(i), an amount up to three times the value given to  
199 other parties to the agreement reasonably attributable to the violation of  
200 this section, or twenty million dollars, whichever is greater.

201 (iii) For purposes of this subdivision, "reasonably attributable to the  
202 violation" shall be determined by the state's share of the market for the  
203 brand drug at issue in the agreement.

204 (B) Any penalty described in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision  
205 shall accrue only to the state and shall be recovered in a civil action  
206 brought by the Attorney General against any party to an agreement that  
207 violates this section.

208 (2) Each party that violates or assists in the violation of this section  
209 shall be liable for any damages, penalties, costs, fees, injunctions, or  
210 other remedies that may be just and reasonable, as determined by the  
211 court.

212 (3) If the state is awarded penalties under subparagraph (A) of  
213 subdivision (1) of this subsection, it may not recover penalties pursuant  
214 to subdivision (2) of this subsection. This section shall not be construed  
215 to foreclose the state's ability to claim any relief or damages available in  
216 subdivision (2) of this subsection, other than those that are penalties.

217 (4) An action to enforce a cause of action for a violation of this section  
218 shall be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued.

This act shall take effect as follows and shall amend the following sections:		
Section 1	October 1, 2021	New section
Sec. 2	October 1, 2021	New section



**GL**      *Joint Favorable*

*The following Fiscal Impact Statement and Bill Analysis are prepared for the benefit of the members of the General Assembly, solely for purposes of information, summarization and explanation and do not represent the intent of the General Assembly or either chamber thereof for any purpose. In general, fiscal impacts are based upon a variety of informational sources, including the analyst's professional knowledge. Whenever applicable, agency data is consulted as part of the analysis, however final products do not necessarily reflect an assessment from any specific department.*

**OFA Fiscal Note**

**State Impact:**

<b>Agency Affected</b>	<b>Fund-Effect</b>	<b>FY 22 \$</b>	<b>FY 23 \$</b>
Resources of the General Fund	GF - Revenue Gain	Potential	Potential
Attorney General	GF - Potential Cost	At least 100,585	At least 104,105
State Comptroller - Fringe Benefits <sup>1</sup>	GF - Potential Cost	At least 42,014	At least 43,485

Note: GF=General Fund

**Municipal Impact:** None

**Explanation**

The bill facilitates the process for the state to bring an antitrust action for “pay-for-delay” agreements between pharmaceutical companies in which one company compensates another to delay the introduction of a generic drug into the market.

To the extent this increases the number of antitrust cases handled by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), there may be costs to the state of at least \$142,599 in FY 22 and \$147,590 in FY 23, including fringe benefits, to hire an additional assistant attorney general to handle any significant caseload. The assistant attorney general would perform litigation (i.e. negotiate settlements and carry-out appeals). Additionally, external consultants such as an economist or industry expert may be retained by the Attorney General's Office to work on

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<sup>1</sup>The fringe benefit costs for most state employees are budgeted centrally in accounts administered by the Comptroller. The estimated active employee fringe benefit cost associated with most personnel changes is 41.77% of payroll in FY 21 and FY 22.

these antitrust cases.

Please note that costs for additional staff, if incurred, may be offset by revenue generated from negotiated settlements.

***The Out Years***

The annualized ongoing fiscal impact identified above would continue into the future subject to inflation, the number of antitrust cases filed, and the value of negotiated settlements.

**OLR Bill Analysis****SB 269****AN ACT CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS.****SUMMARY**

This bill makes it easier for the state to bring an antitrust action for “pay-for-delay” agreements between pharmaceutical companies in which one company (the “reference drug holder”) compensates another (the “nonreference drug filer”) to delay the introduction of a generic or biosimilar drug into the market. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that these agreements can violate antitrust laws (see BACKGROUND).

The bill establishes a presumption that the transfer of value from a reference drug holder to a nonreference drug filer to settle patent infringement litigation, combined with a delay of entry into the market, has an anti-competitive effect. A patent infringement claim is an allegation that a nonreference drug filer’s nonreference drug product or associated application infringes a patent held by, or exclusively licensed to, the reference drug holder.

The bill provides various exceptions to the presumption, including agreements that directly generate procompetitive benefits that outweigh the agreement’s anticompetitive effects.

Generally, a violation of the bill’s provisions (i.e., entering into an anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreement) is punishable by a civil penalty paid to the state. For parties to the agreement, the penalty is the greater of up to three times the amount of compensation provided for delayed market entry or \$20 million.

The bill specifies that it does not modify, impair, limit, or supersede a drug company applicant’s right to assert antitrust claims or

counterclaims. It also has a severability clause specifying that if part of the bill is held unconstitutional, the rest remains enforceable.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 2021

## **SCOPE OF THE BILL**

### ***Covered Agreements***

The bill applies to agreements resolving or settling a patent infringement claim on either a final or interim basis. These include agreements that are (1) entered into within 30 days after a claim's resolution or settlement, or (2) contingent upon, provide a contingent condition for, or are otherwise related to the claim's resolution or settlement. They also include those that are:

1. given to the Federal Trade Commission or Department of Justice's Antitrust Division under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which allows for a review and challenge of anticompetitive settlements, or
2. between a biosimilar or interchangeable biological product applicant and a reference drug product sponsor to resolve patent claims.

### ***Parties to an Agreement***

The bill applies to agreements between "reference drug holders" and "nonreference drug filers."

"Reference drug holders" are certain brand holders and biological product license holders. Specifically, these holders are the:

1. holder of an approved (a) new drug application (NDA) for a drug product application or (b) biological product license application for a biological drug product, as filed under federal law, or
2. person owning or controlling enforcement of (a) the patent listed in the "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations" ("FDA Orange Book"), in connection with the

NDA, or (b) any patent that claims the biological product that is the subject of the approved biological patent license application.

A “reference drug holder” includes the predecessors, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by, controlling, or under common control with any of the above-described brand or biological product license holders, as well as these entities’ licensees, licensors, successors, and assigns. Control is presumed by directly or indirectly owning at least 50% of shares.

Under the bill, “nonreference drug filers” are filers of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA) or biosimilar biological product applications (BBPA) with the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Specifically, “ANDA filers” are those that own or control an ANDA or have exclusive rights under that ANDA to distribute the ANDA product. (They seek approval of generic drugs.) “BBPA filers” are those that own or control a BBPA or have the exclusive rights under the BBPA to distribute the biosimilar biological product.

### ***Drug Products***

Under the bill, a “reference drug product” is the product manufactured by the reference drug holder and includes a (1) holder’s branded drug and (2) biological product license applicant’s biological drug product.

A “nonreference drug product” is the (1) product to be manufactured under an ANDA that is the subject of the patent infringement claim or (2) biosimilar biological product to be manufactured under a BBPA that is the subject of the patent infringement claim, or both.

### **PRESUMPTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS**

Under the bill, an agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement claim is presumed to have anticompetitive effects if the nonreference drug filer:

1. receives “anything of value” from the company claiming patent infringement, such as an exclusive license or a promise that the

brand company will not launch an authorized generic of its brand drug, and

2. agrees to limit or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales of their product for any period of time.

### **REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION**

Parties can rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that either the:

1. value received by the nonreference drug filer is fair and reasonable compensation solely for other goods or services that it promised to provide, or
2. agreement directly generated procompetitive benefits and these benefits outweigh the agreement's anticompetitive effects.

### ***Factfinder's Presumptions***

***Required Presumptions.*** Under the bill, when determining if the parties have met their burden, the factfinder must presume that the relevant product market is the market for:

1. the brand or reference drug of the company alleging patent infringement,
2. the drug product of the nonreference company accused of infringement, and
3. any other biological product that is licensed as biosimilar or has a therapeutic equivalency rating of AB-rated generic to the reference product.

***Prohibited Presumptions.*** The bill lists several conditions that the factfinder cannot presume when determining if the parties met their burden. But it allows parties to introduce evidence on these conditions and the factfinder to decide based on the full scope of the evidence.

Under the bill, the conditions that cannot be presumed are:

1. entry into the marketplace could not have occurred until the relevant patent exclusivity expired or that the agreement's allowance for the nonreference drug product's entry before expiration means the agreement is "procompetitive," as required to rebut the presumption;
2. a patent is enforceable and infringed by the nonreference drug filer absent a final judgement binding on the filer of those issues;
3. the agreement did not delay the entry of the nonreference drug filer's drug product because of the lack of FDA approval of that or of another nonreference drug product; and
4. the agreement caused no harm or delay from the possibility that the nonreference drug filer's drug product might infringe a patent that (a) has not been asserted against the nonreference drug filer or (b) is not subject to a judgement on that filer as to the patent's scope, enforceability, and infringement.

#### **"ANYTHING OF VALUE" EXCLUSIONS**

Under the bill, "anything of value" does not include an agreement to:

1. resolve or settle a patent infringement claim that permits a nonreference drug filer, before the agreement's date for entry of the nonreference drug filer, to begin selling, offering for sale, or distributing their product, if the reference drug holder seeks or obtains approval to launch, or launches a different dosage, strength, or form of the reference drug having the same active ingredient, but a different form does not include an authorized generic version;
2. not interfere with or facilitate the nonreference drug filer's ability to secure and maintain regulatory approval to market their product; or
3. resolve a patent infringement claim in which the reference drug holder forgives the potential damages accrued by a nonreference



drug holder for an at-risk launch of the nonreference drug product that is the subject of that claim.

The bill also excludes from “anything of value:”

1. the right to market the competing product in the United States before the expiration of either (a) a patent that is the basis for the infringement claim or (b) a patent right or other federal statutory exclusivity that would prevent marketing the drug;
2. a covenant not to sue on a claim that the product infringes a United States patent; or
3. compensation for the reference drug holder’s saved reasonable future litigation expenses, subject to certain parameters.

To qualify as excluded consideration, compensation for saved litigation expenses must be:

1. documented and adopted in the reference drug holder’s budgets at least six months before the settlement; and
2. capped at the lesser of (a) \$7,500,000 or (b) 5% of the nonreference drug holder’s projected revenue for the first three years of sales that is documented at least 12 months before the settlement but if no projections available, then the compensation does not exceed \$250,000.

## **LIABILITY**

The bill’s ban on anticompetitive agreements to resolve or settle a patent infringement claim is enforceable against any party to the agreement and those who assist in the violation. Under the bill, the statute of limitations for bringing a claim is four years.

A violation is punishable by a civil penalty, paid to the state. The bill’s penalty amount, which is “sufficient to deter violations,” is the greater of (1) up to three times the value received or given as a party to the agreement that is reasonably attributable to the violation, based on the

state's market share for the brand drug at issue, or (2) \$20 million. This penalty is recoverable only in an action brought by the Attorney General against a party to an agreement.

Violators and those who help them are also generally liable for damages, penalties, costs, fees, injunctions, or other remedies that the court determines are just and reasonable. The state cannot recover these penalties if it is awarded the bill's primary penalty, described above.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***Related Case***

In a case concerning pay-for-delay agreements between name brand manufacturers and prospective generic manufacturers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that while these agreements are not presumptively illegal, they could have anticompetitive effects and a brand manufacturer's reverse payment settlements may violate antitrust laws (*FTC v. Actavis, Inc.*, 570 U.S. 136 (2013)).

## **COMMITTEE ACTION**

General Law Committee

Joint Favorable

Yea 13    Nay 6    (02/16/2021)