JUD Committee Hearing Transcript for 03/06/2017

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Good morning. I'd like to convene the Judiciary Committee Public Hearing. If someone could close that back door. Rathe [phonetic], will you close that back door for me. All right before I start I just have to read an announcement.

In the interest of safety, I would ask that you note the location of and access to the exits in this hearing room. The two doors through which you entered the room are the emergency exits and are marked with exit signs.

In the event of an emergency, please walk quickly to the nearest exit. After exiting the room, got to your right, and proceed to the main stairs, or follow the exit signs to one of the fire stairs. Please quickly exit the capitol building and follow any instructions from the capitol police. Do not delay, and do not return unless and until you are advised it is safe to do so.

In the event of a lock-down announcement, please remain in the hearing room and stay away from the exit doors until an all-clear announcement is heard. Thank you, and we are starting today's public hearing. How our procedures work, traditionally we have the first hour signed up for state agency head, legislators, and chief elected municipal officials, and then starting on the second hour, 11 a.m., we have members of the public begin.

All people testifying, whether in the first hour or the second, are limited to three minutes. So, in the thought of -- we keep it to three minutes so people can have an opportunity to speak in a timely basis. You many think three minutes is short, but oftentimes legislators can ask you questions, do follow-up questions, so you can further provide us details and thoughts about your testimony.

So please -- we ask you to please adhere to the three-minute rule, and at this point I'm going to start with the first members of the state agency heads, legislators, and chief elected municipal officials. The first person to speak and sign up is Tanya Hughes, then Joan Barere, and then Natasha St. Pierre. Is Tanya Hughes here? Tanya? No, okay. Next is Joan Barere from the Commission on Women, Children, and Seniors. Is Joan here? I guess not. Is Natasha St. Pierre for the State Victim Advocate here? I guess not. Is Cara Pavalock-D'Amato, state representative? Is she here -- nope. Is Kim Rose, state representative? Is Susan Story chief public -- she's here, beautiful. So, you're the winner. [Applause] I must admit that's the first time in my career that I've ever had five in a row not be here. So, Susan Story, please start. [Background voices] Yeah, so we're even, we're even. Thank you. So, it's a good Monday for you Ms. Story?

SUSAN STOREY: We'll see how this goes.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): We won't have any final conclusions today.

SUSAN STOREY: Okay, thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

SUSAN STOREY: Well, thanks for having me. I'm really happy to be here. I'm Susan Storey, I'm the chief public defender for the State of Connecticut, and I'm here to speak about Raised Bill No. 7216, which is an act concerning family impact in the cases of defendants with dependent children.

Since 2011 our public defender office has also been responsible for all the child welfare matters that were formerly under the office of the chief child protection attorney. So, even though our office has trained our attorneys on collateral consequences of incarceration and conviction for three decades, it wasn't until we took on child protection responsibilities that I became much more aware of the collateral consequences of conviction for children of people who are incarcerated.

This is a national awareness now. Connecticut is just one state that is looking at this issue. Basically, the family -- a family impact statement would just enhance the ability of defense counsel to talk about the ramifications to the children of a primary custodial parent, often a single parent, who is -- the judge is deciding whether or not to incarcerate this person or fashion an alternative to incarceration that would also, you know, be -- promote public safety.

It does not -- the bill does not remove a judge's discretion to reject or find unpersuasive the information offered by the defense on their client's behalf, but it would -- when it -- when brought forward in appropriate cases it would be in conjunction with the probation officers' PSI, a victim impact statement, and the prosecutors' recommendation.

Basically, what it really does is put forward more complete information for the court to decide whether or not the person in front of him or her really needs to be incarcerated or whether there's a cost benefit to find some kind of alternative to incarceration considering the collateral consequences for the person's children.

This really cuts across all socio and economic lines. I mean every -- it's not just public defender clients that would be, you know, have the ability to submit something. There are many families who are single-parent households who have children, some may be disabled, some may be on an autism spectrum, there may be sibling groups that would be separated, and sometimes there is really no viable alternative or guardian, or family member to take care of those children when someone's incarcerated.

This is also -- parental incarceration also marginalizes families for generations. Especially -- even though this crosses all socioeconomic lines, poor people have a lot harder time of it when they're released to bounce back from being incarcerated. What we found is approximately 65 percent of families with an incarcerated member cannot meet basic needs, and they're -- the other issue is the sources of trauma for children, other than the loss of the parent due to incarceration, issues of homelessness, academic, behavioral, health impediments, economic instability, anxiety, depression, all these issues are very primary for children with an incarcerated parent[ringing]

The other issue is termination of parental rights [ringing] -- can I sum up?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, please summarize --

SUSAN STOREY: With your permission?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, please summarize, yeah.

SUSAN STOREY: Thank you. Connecticut policymakers throughout Connecticut are now looking for safe ways to ensure family integrity without impacting public safety. Nationally, this is an issue. Some states have legislated family impact statements as well, and I'd be happy -- if you look at my testimony it's more complete --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, we'll

SUSAN STOREY: -- it gives you more information, and I'd be happy to answer any questions you might have.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any questions from the committee? Mr. Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chair, and thank you Ms. Storey for being here to testify. The chief states attorney has submitted testimony in opposition, and as I read their opposition it's basically that we don't legislate this because what you're advocating for is already happening in the courts. I'm wondering if you want to respond to that?

SUSAN STOREY: Yes, I'd be happy to answer that. Yes, this -- we're not prevented from doing that. However, I -- it does not have the impact of -- this gives it more weight, more legitimacy, and I think it's an issue that is not well understand, especially in the criminal courts. As I said collateral consequences -- I'm not sure, possibly the judges are trained on this. I'm not sure if the prosecutors are at this point. When I talk to the Deputy Chief, John Russotto at one point, they were not training on collateral consequences.

I think what it does bring to bear is more thoughtful sentencing for people who really don't necessarily need to be incarcerated. So, it gives the judge more information and also raises the practice bar for criminal defense attorneys and other attorneys who are not really aware of this issue.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): So, I guess, just ask this a little more directly then. So, does a judge -- and I practice civil law and criminal law, so does a judge typically have this information available to them as we sit here today when they -- when they're passing a sentence, or is there some additional information that would be available to a judge if this legislation became law?

SUSAN STOREY: My hope is that it would be additional information. I think oftentimes, if you look at a PSI or you go to a sentencing it will be brought up that a person may have, you know, three dependents or whatever, but sometimes even, you know, even when I was practicing I'm not sure I asked, you know, are any of your children -- do they have a disability? Does anyone have a major health issues?

I mean, children across Connecticut have major health issues. Some have cancer, some, you know, are -- you know, have -- are on the autism spectrum, some -- it's just sometimes hard to place children with a relative who's going to, you know, be able to handle some of the issues that children have in Connecticut, and I think that we haven't done a good job of making courts aware that sometimes there are alternatives that can keep the public safe, that not everybody has to be incarcerated, and it's really, you know, dependent on, you know, criminal defense attorneys to develop a plan that could be acceptable to the court instead of incarceration.

Especially for when they're considering incarcerating somebody for like two years or less because two years of incarceration can result in termination of parental rights for a single parent, and right now when I got a point-in-time count from corrections at York, there were 289 children impacted by parental rights' terminations of women at York. So, I think that's a number to look at it.

I think without this, you know, we have status quo, and I think we're marginalizing families for generations that just can't recover from incarceration and from -- and children that are either in foster care or with a relative, but not with their parents.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Great, thank you very much.

SUSAN STOREY: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any further questions from the committee? Okay. Let me ask, so what -- this were to pass, what -- in your opinion, what's the direct benefit?

SUSAN STOREY: The direct benefit I think is what I said to Representative Stafstrom is that the courts more full -- have more information to decide how to mete out justice, and to know the implications of sentencing somebody that may impact a family far behind a sentence of incarceration.

Usually it's not the period of incarceration that really devastates a family, it's all the collateral consequences that flow from that sentence once they get out. Because they're destabilized, they may, you know, they may be homeless, they're no longer employed, education has been disrupted, medical care for children has been disrupted, and it's really hard even for families that have the means to do so to sometimes recover from that, and I think when you look at the societal benefit, this is not for every custodial single parent with a child, this is for those cases where I think the court needs to, you know, have the information to take into consideration, I -- and it doesn't tie their hands.

They can find it unpersuasive, they can reject, but I think it more fully empowers courts to make good decisions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): But it, I mean I'll be honest, if it's a serious criminal offense, it probably would not have as much impact. Do you agree?

SUSAN STOREY: That's true, absolutely.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): I mean if it's a murder case, I don't think it's going to --

SUSAN STOREY: Right.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, you agree, and then you -- and obviously this information to me, it's your -- from your testimony you seem to say that if I'm in prison for a year, say I'm woman, I'm in prison for a year, that's grounds for termination of parental rights and that's common practice?

SUSAN STOREY: It's not grounds -- incarceration in and of itself is not grounds for termination of parental rights. What we find happening is that the incarceration -- the period of incarceration disrupts families so much that when the person gets out then if they don't have a place to live, they have to -- and if their kids are in foster care, the person has to find a place to live, they have to meet with DCF, they have to meet requirements that DCF and the court have for them to get their kids back, and it's a struggle, I can tell you.

If you have to have a certain number of bedrooms, and you're not employed, and your children are in foster care, then the time period can keep running, and I think it's very overwhelming, especially for parents who don't have the means or have the issues, mental health issues, or substance abuse issues. A lot of women have trauma backgrounds as well.

So, there are a lot of things that a court wants to know before they give children back to a family, and if you don't -- if you're already fractionalized it's really -- it's very difficult. I think that some people who practice of seeing this happen, so I don't think it always has to happen. I think in serious criminal cases, it's going to happen, but I think what it does is make people pause and think about, you know, whether, you know, the person, you know, really is a public safety risk and whether or not it's better to leave the family intact.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, well going back I just want to -- I'm focused on the termination so --

SUSAN STOREY: Okay.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- it's not your -- I mean, because I am concerned if there was any, do we have to reform those statutes? Because I do not think a person being sentenced to prison should be any basis or any grounds for termination of parental rights, and I appreciate that your saying, when I get out of prison, it may be difficult, I'm not minimizing it, but the key is I don't want that to be a means to have my parental rights terminate --

SUSAN STOREY: Right absolutely.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- so you're saying --

SUSAN STOREY: No.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- it's not. So, it's just -- this would assist you, but I just want to clear -- take that off the table because that would greatly trouble me if that's the basis.

SUSAN STOREY: Yes. It's not grounds and it's assist. Now, for people with a longer stent of incarceration, it's still difficult to maintain that parental involvement with your child so that when you do get out you have that relationship.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, and I understand that, no that's real world. Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for clarifying through your questions regarding the termination when someone goes into prison, because I think I was concerned too the way it was raised. I guess not so much a question as much as just to put a thought out there.

Certainly, as I'm hearing your testimony and the testimony that has been provided in fact this is information and more often than not is already provided to the court through the PSIs, certainly through family statements and things of that nature, and any good defense attorney would want to highlight that information that is correct.

What I also want to just make sure that we keep in mind is all too often we think of offenders as well, and really do have to also reflect on the victims because many times that information on the victim's side doesn't always get heard in court. So, in other words if you've got two individuals that commit the same crime, but the victim one is a single individual, never married, probably minimal impact arguably to a family. On the same crime, another victim can certainly have five dependent children, that being a victim in that crime the impact would be ten-fold because of the, you know, let's say a financial burden or a physical burden as a result of being a victim of the crime.

So, it is a balance, and you know on its face I certainly have supported the proposal that's in front of us, but I do take pause. I do take pause because of the fact of we do have this information being provided. There's nothing that prevents this information from coming into a court on a criminal matter when it comes to the sentencing, but I do think that at the same instance then we should be considering the victims, and then should we also be proposing legislation that would allow a victim if so the victim wanted to have the same statements regarding what kind of an impact on their family.

I guess arguably victims also do have a voice, however, we've learned on many occasions, many occasions that it falls very short in our court system, the victim's voice.

So, it's just more of, just some thoughts regarding the topic in and of itself. Thank you for your testimony.

SUSAN STOREY: Could I comment just briefly? Because I agree with you there. I think everybody needs to do a better job, whether you're representing victims in court or you're representing a defendant in court. Everybody should do the best they can to give that information to the court. Absolutely, I totally agree with you on that. I do think though that the one issue I have is when somebody does a PSI, it's not done -- it's done by probation officers who are very thorough, but often the probation officers do not look at more of the clinical impact.

For instance, our social workers have some clinical training, so that they understand some of the issues for the children from a clinical standpoint as well, and I think that's important to add some times when it's relevant. Thank you.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you for your response, and I would agree that's very important, and I think that certainly also where the sentencing portion and individuals can come in and provide their additional information would supplement the PSI. Unfortunately, we don't even have victim advocates representing victims in courts in many cases as well. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Representative Gonzalez.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Thank you Mr. Chair, and good morning.

SUSAN STOREY: Good morning.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): I came early -- I came late, so I apologize for that, but I'm very interested in this bill, and one of my questions is that how long it'll take a person, a parent, to lose the parental rights?

SUSAN STOREY: I think the clock starts running -- I think it's some time over two years, but I think it's 15 months without a relationship it starts to get more decisive by the court. I think that that's when, you know, there's the Federal Law and the Safe Families and Adoption Act starts to kick in. So, it's not a really long time and then -- but once the person comes out then they have to do the, you know, specific steps, substantial steps towards reunification that the court may require, and sometimes if, you know, sometimes there may be a disconnect.

This is one thing that we're working with Commissioner Semple on, because he's also very interested in the issue of the women at York that he's responsible for, is making sure that they get programs while they're at York, if they're parents so that when they -- that the court might require and might be helpful for them when they get out to get their children back more easily, such as parenting skills, anger management, trauma informed therapy. Sometimes, there's a disconnect, and that doesn't always happen. So, if those things are more in place that person has a much better chance if they want to reunify with their children to be able to do so.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Well, I'll say that in my community there's a lot of complaints about parents that got custodial rights, and they go to jail, and when they come out of jail I think that DCF get really involved, and these parents they are now losing the kids, and it's a lot, a lot of parents complaining about that.

What is the condition, like, let's say that a parent -- one of the condition for the release is that they need a job, what happened -- how long they need -- they have by the court to have a job before they lose the parental right?

SUSAN STOREY: I -- I'm not sure that's always a condition, but they have to be able to take care of their children and have things set up, even with some DCF help. Usually a filing against a parent -- incarcerated parents, when reunification is delayed beyond 15 months, federal -- that's especially problematic. So, you know, a two-year sentence, even though the person has, you know -- incarceration in itself is not a condition for termination.

Let's say the parent hasn't been in contact with that child at all while they're incarcerated, or they haven't been visiting, or there's no contact, there's no relationship, that's a problem. So, it's individual depending upon what's happened during that time period that, you know, makes a difference. If that parent has, you know, been visiting the child, sending the child letters, and has a relationship, that makes it easier, but I -- it's not necessarily a job.

It depends upon the circumstances and what the court feels is necessary, and what DCF feels is necessary for that parent to reunify with those children, or to have them retain custody. It could be, you know, housing, it could be mental health supplemental. It could be a lot of other things that are required.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Well, in a way this bills going to help a lot of those parents because as far as I know DCF put a lot of pressure on these parents. They are in jail, and some of these parents, even though they don't want to, the pressure they put on them to sign the parental rights away because they are, you know, in jail is -- I heard that almost every day in my community. So, I would like to ask more questions but I would like also to meet with you personally and discuss this bill.

SUSAN STOREY: Okay, thank you.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Thank you very much. Thank you.

SUSAN STOREY: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Attorney Storey can you -- I mean this is opening my eyes. I just mentioned a 15-month rule. That's not a statutory rule of termination or nothing is it?

SUSAN STOREY: No, there's a Federal Law, it's in my testimony --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay.

SUSAN STOREY: -- just so you can take a look at it.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yep, thank you.

SUSAN STOREY: It was 1977 Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act requires states to file a petition to terminate parental rights on behalf of any child who has been abandoned, and that's a term of, you know -- or who has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.

The law provides exception to this requirement in the following cases. At the option of the state the child is being care for a relative, and I think that's -- you've seen DCF try to do some more kin care. At the option of the -- the state has documented a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would not be in the child's best interest or the state has not provided the child's family with services that the state deems necessary for the safe return of the child to his or her home.

So, lots of times you'll see in a child welfare case that parents are saying DCF is not giving me the assistance I need to reunify with my child, I mean, and then, you know, the court decides, you know, who's, you know, who's doing what here, and is the parent making steps towards trying to reunify or is the parent, like not visiting when DCF arranges visits.

Is the parent, you know, not calling the child. These are things that come up in the court for a judge to decide whether or not this parent is really invested in getting their children back, or maybe they're not invested as the court thinks that they should be for getting their children back, or is DCF not helping them enough to get their children back.

So, it's a very difficult process. I think, you know, anything that we can do to shine more light on these issues I think is very important. I know, as I mentioned before, Commissioner Semple is interested in this as well, and we've been trying to propose with him to try to have some reunification efforts inside as well as outside so that this is a process when a parent is able to parent -- safely parent children, they can get them back.

It's harder for -- it's much harder for the clients that we serve who have struggled to get out of poverty so it makes it harder for them, but, as I said, it goes across socioeconomic lines, so I do not want it to say it's just about our clients.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): I also can see a person in prison where, for whatever reasons, bad intention, that the children are not brought to the prison, so the gap of contact is not even the prisoners fault --

SUSAN STOREY: Correct.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- the prison parent, so there's a lot of --

SUSAN STOREY: Correct.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay. Any further questions? Senator Winfield.

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): Thank you Mr. Chair. Good morning.

SUSAN STOREY: Good morning.

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): I'm sharing another committee, so I walked in a little bit late, and I heard there was conversation going on dealing with the PSI. Could you just briefly explain to me how that relates to what we're talking about right now?

SUSAN STOREY: Sure. When probation does a PSI usually they're extremely thorough. Probation officers do a lot of background information, but how this would be different is if there are special circumstances in the family that involve the children. For instances, I had one case where the children's biological father had recently passed away and then for the custodial mother to go to prison, it would be another significant loss within six months, and so that -- because of the ages of the children, it would be significantly, you know, traumatic.

So, I -- nobody really goes I think deep enough to look at -- it's not -- the financial impact, the generational impact, and the emotional impact, and the mental health impact.

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): So, help me to understand because I thought I had looked up the statute that deals with presentence investigations, and my understanding was that the statute doesn't require a lot of what we're talking about here, right? So, I just want to make sure that I'm not just talking about the practice, but what the statute actually says.

SUSAN STOREY: Right.

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): So, does the statute comport with what we're -- cause you're suggesting that by practice it -- the practice comports with what you're trying to get at in some ways, but the statute --

SUSAN STOREY: Well, you know actually I don't have the statute in front of me, so I wish I could answer that off the top of my head, but I -- but what I can tell you is it -- this information usually in it -- well, I wouldn't say usually, in a lot of cases is not brought forward, and I -- and probation officers are not, I know I'm dealing with generalizations in here, I think that a lot of probation officers are not clinically trained to really explain to a court what the impact may be, the trauma on the children, and I don't think we look at, you know, I don't think we look at all the collateral consequences that flow, and lots of times, to tell you the truth, I don't think a lot, you know, some -- there -- sometimes people don't care because sometimes what you will hear in a courtroom here is, well the parents should have thought about, you know, not doing this crime --

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): Sure.

SUSAN STOREY: -- you know, and thought about their children, and, you know, that's a very hard, you know, thing to argue with, but this happens, and we have more than 18,000 children in Connecticut with incarcerated parent, and I think that's -- I don't think that we really need to get that many children, I think that's kind of an astonishing figure, and I'm not sure that everybody necessarily needs to go to prison to protect public safety, and when I look, especially at the women's population, you know, it's -- I've been looking deeper into that, why they're there, why they're being held on bond, because even being held on bond for a period of time and you can't make that, can have the same impact. Although, conviction itself, there are other collateral consequences that flow from that other than pre-trial incarceration.

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): Right. I appreciate your response. It's just that over the weekend, you know, in preparation for this hearing, I went back and looked at the statute that deals with presentence investigation, and it actually seemed to me that it deals with the other part of this conversation more than what we're talking about right now, which is the impact of the crime on those who the crime was acted upon.

So, it seemed to me that if your concern is about sides and you're concerned about the impact on the defendants' family, that you would be looking to do something like this because PSIs don't necessarily get it, so when I heard the conversation, and it appeared that the conversation indicated that PSIs comport with what we're trying to do, I was trying to elicit whether that was true or not.

SUSAN STOREY: Yeah, I -- what -- in my testimony what I said that it -- that a family impact statement would be introduced as well as a PSI and as well as a victim impact, so the court would have as much information as possible to make a decision that he or she feels is the right decision and a just decision.

SENATOR WINFIELD (10TH): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

SUSAN STOREY: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Monday is your lucky day. You got five people pass, so now I have to go back. Thank you, Attorney Storey. I'll go back to. I'll start at the beginning. Again, we have until 11 before we get alternating with public, but the first person, and I'll just -- again for the record everyone please, three people are here now apparently, but we'd ask you to limit your testimony, anyone, your testimony to three minutes, and then we can ask questions. So, we'll go back to the top of the public officials list. Tanya Hughes, Joan Baere, and Natasha Pierre. Is Tanya Hughes here? Yes, she is. Good morning.

SHERYL SHARP: I am actually Sheryl Sharp. I am here for Tanya Hughes. I'm the Deputy Executive Director of the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. Good afternoon, well actually good morning Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong, vice-chairs, and members of the Judiciary Committee.

The Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities is grateful for this chance to provide testimony regarding several bills. On the sheet, just to draw your attention to the bills I will be testifying regarding S.B. No. 366, which is number one. Number two S.B. No. 929, an act extending whistleblower protection to certain employers. S.B. No. 933, an act requiring an employer to adhere to equal employment opportunity commission guidance related to the use of arrest criminal charge and conviction records, when making employment decision, and then number 14 on your sheet, H.B. No. 7214, an act concerning harassment of a guide dog or assistance dog or the handler of such dog.

The mission of the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities is to eliminate discrimination against members of protected classes. In the state of Connecticut, we have 26 protected classes, which includes individuals who have a criminal record or criminal background and individuals with disabilities. We have provided extensive testimony, and I'm going to give you my quick two-minute summary right now of all three -- all four of the submissions we've made.

First with respect to H.B. No. 7214 guide dogs and assistance dogs are not mere luxuries for individuals who are disabled who use them. Although most people understand that guide dogs or assistance dogs are commonly used among the blind community, many don't recognize their widespread use among various other disabled individuals, including diabetics, epileptics, and military veterans suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder.

For a landlord to deny a guide dog or assistance dog user or a dwelling place on the basis of a no-pet policy, is not a mere lack of knowledge or understanding of the legal obligation to do so, but it in some instances is tantamount to cruelty. A simple search of service dog harassment reveals even more startling examples of how service dogs are harassed right here in Connecticut, and there's very real suffering.

Shifting my attention now to S.B. No. 929, it brings Connecticut law in line with laws of state such as California, Florida, Maine, Minnesota [ringing] may I wrap up?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yes, please summarize. Thank you. I'm sure there'll be questions.

SHERYL SHARP: Okay. All these states protect not only persons who report illegal activity but persons who refuse to participate in it, and so that is the intent of 929. With respect to S.B. No. 933, EEOC or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued an enforcement guidance. What we submit to you is that we support the guidance. However, Federal law can change and if we enact into our state law federal law that is just -- federal guidance, and that guidance can change, then that means that our state law will be then subject to the whims or changes in federal law.

We already have our 46a-80, which talks about criminal records and how they can be used when you're looking for state employment, and we submit that you change it to private.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Okay, thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none -- sorry, Representative Porter.

REP. PORTER (94TH): Thank you Mr. Chair. Just because you got cut off, could you just finish what you were stating about private?

SHERYL SHARP: Yeah, so we would just submit that in 46a-80 it now applies to individuals seeking employment with the state of Connecticut. It could just be extended and amended to include also private employers. That is a statute that has been there, and last legislation session we talked about the fact that that's already in the law, and there's great guidance there in terms of how the law could be structed to just include private employers, and the use of that criminal background or record in making employment decisions.

Can I point out one other thing that I think is critical just for your consideration?

REP. PORTER (94TH): Yes.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, Representative Porter has the floor.

REP. PORTER (94TH): Yes, that'd be fine then I do have a question.

SHERYL SHARP: Okay, so for S.B. No. 366, which is the fees for individuals being suspended to testify, that would greatly impact the investigations that are conducted by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities. State employees can file complaints of discrimination and oftentimes we work with the attorney general's office to make it so that individuals who need to testify a procedural complaint, can be made available to provide that testimony, and here with adding a fee for -- or making the CH role or the complaining party the person whose filed the complaint have to pay for those fees, that makes, will make the investigation process, and the public hearing process much more costly, much more difficult, and it's probably, as state agencies OE budgets are shrinking, it's going to be a very difficult proposition. So, and I just -- draw your attention to the testimony, which explains it in more detail and depth.

REP. PORTER (94TH): Okay, and as the Deputy Director question back on 933, do you feel that this bill would hinder an employee -- an employer in any way, fashion, or form when it comes to providing a safe workplace for their other employees?

SHERYL SHARP: Do you think that this bill -- no the EOC guidance is important and we support that guidance. The state law 46a-80, which refers to individuals with a criminal record have exceptions built right into the law, and so obviously if someone has a criminal background, which includes endangering children, then the State of Connecticut is not going to employ them to work in a state daycare, because there are exceptions built into the law, which is why we submit that you look at 46a-80 and just extend the definition that's already there to include private employers, because all of the exceptions are also there as well, and it's very comprehensive and it was enacted many years ago, and it withstood the test of time.

I have personally tried these types of cases and settled these types of cases where someone had a criminal conviction many, many years ago. They, you know, went to college, and they bettered themselves, and they hadn't not had any more incidents involving breaking of the law, and they wanted to have a successful life, and it was a hindrance, their record and criminal record was used against them, even though they had actually served in the job as they were in college for four years, when they went to get permanently, they were unable to secure it permanently, but -- this guy had a clean, you know, record for all of those years, and so the hindrance is not passing a law that actually protects people who actually have rehabilitated themselves, and isn't that the purpose of the criminal justice system is to -- for rehabilitation of individuals?

REP. PORTER (94TH): We would hope so. So --

SHERYL SHARP: Yes.

REP. PORTER (94TH): -- thank you for your testimony, and thank you for that clarification. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Are there further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

SHERYL SHARP: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Joan Barere, I may pronounce it Barere, sorry about that Joan.

JOAN BARERE: Good morning Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide testimony today on behalf of the Commission on Women, Children, and Seniors. My name is Joan Barere, I'm the senior policy analysis for children and family for the commission, and I'm here to talk to you only about two bills and briefly.

They would be Raised Bill No. 933, and also raised Bill No. 7216, and the commission favors both. They are both family friendly in their intent, and by that we mean that they would benefit the welfare of children. In terms of 933, an act requiring an employer to adhere to the EEOCs guidelines -- guidance, this is a title XII Civil Rights Act provision here, and we're in favor of preventing any sort of discrimination against families for the loss of their civil rights, but in the case of the guidance, the EEOC has issued this written guidance for well over 20 years, based upon the longstanding case, indicating that an employers use of an individual's criminal history in making employment decisions, may in some cases violate Title VII and therefore violate their civil rights.

Within the current guidance document, the EEOC notes that a violation may occur when an employer treats criminal history information differently for different applicants or employees based on their race or national origin, and that may disproportionately impact some individuals protected under Title VII and may violate the law.

The national data supports a finding that criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national origin. We have no reason to believe that Connecticut figures are different from the national figures, and here in Connecticut we're concerned about this across the board, and I think a prior testimony about 7216 brings this up, it's the same for any family at any socio-economic level, every race, it's not that kind of an issue.

There has been support in recent years for easing the path of all reentering citizens, because it's a logical and consistent step to insist that employers be vigilant against any unjust actions, which might rob these citizens of their civil rights, but further supporting citizen reentry is a family-friendly policy, as was mentioned in prior testifying. More than 18,000 children in Connecticut have a parent who has been incarcerated.

Children need to have their parents with them, they need to be supported by their parents, and the parents need to work to support their children. So, any policy that promotes that aim and protects the integrity of those families so that they can protect their children [ringing] and raise them, deserves our approval, and for that reason the commission supports 933.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you very much.

JOAN BARERE: I'd like to finish up just with a little comment on --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, just do a quick summarize.

JOAN BARERE: -- if I may.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

JOAN BARERE: For similar reasons, the commission supports Raised Bill 7216. There's a longstanding practice of submission of family impact statements in criminal proceedings in our state, but there's no absolute requirement that judges take them into consideration in sentencing. There has been discussion and prior testimony about the loss of parental rights, but by the time you get to 15 months, these children have been traumatized. They've been traumatized by the initial rupture of having their parents sentenced and taken from them on day one, and they've been doubly traumatized or perhaps triply traumatized because of the other effects. So -- but the commission strongly, strongly supports this bill because the early traumas negatively affect children's physical and mental health perhaps through their adulthood, so that they're damage from the parent being incarcerated is almost in effect an incarceration of children too.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here. Just one quick question --

JOAN BARERE: Yes.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): -- I just -- I'm perusing some of the other testimony on 933, and it seems the only opposition -- or the opposition I've seen is from the CBIA, the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, and I -- what they're position is that there were discussions last year, which lead to a good piece of legislation we passed, which was the ban-the-box that we passed last year, and that that only took effect in January, and that sort of any further action at this time is premature. I'm not sure I quite agree, but I'm wondering if you want to -- I wonder if you want to comment on that criticism of this bill?

JOAN BARERE: I'm not an expert on how the business community views this, so I'm not sure that I can say. I am a little bit concerned about the comments that we had from CHRO about the procedural issues arising in the event that there's a change in the guidance at the federal level, so perhaps it might be premature for that reason, that would be my only thought.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay, thanks.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Further questions from the committee? See none. Thank you.

JOAN BARERE: All right. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Natasha Pierre, and we're getting to the 11, so we'll -- after this we may potentially start alternating with the people, and Ms. Pierre I apologize, but the list had Saint Pierre --

NATASHA PIERRE: I know I just noticed that, and --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- and that was an error on someone's part --

NATASHA PIERRE: -- and last week I kept saying to Senator Kissel, Pierre, and I'm like he knows this, but I see now --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yes --

NATASHA PIERRE: -- it's on the list.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- we'll try to improve in the future. Thank you.

NATASHA PIERRE: Thank you. I'm Natasha Pierre the State Victim Advocate for the office of the victim advocate. I'm here in support of H.B. No. 7198, and in opposition to 7216, and 5541. The last two, if I don't get to it, I have written testimony, but I hope to get to it.

So, for section 4 of, I'm sorry, section 4 of -- okay, so first H.B. No. 7198, we'd like to first thank the Judiciary Branch for working with OVA on this bill, on certain provisions of it, and as a result we can say we support most of this bill except section 4. Section 4 of the house bill establishes new procedures and guidelines for a victim of a delinquent act to obtain information and other records related to the juvenile delinquency proceedings. The new subsection 4, which the OVA does support, provides for the access to basic information about the juvenile proceedings without having to obtain a court order.

Subsection b we also support, requires a court order for the victims to obtain records or other information such as police reports, and -- but we strongly opposed subsection d, which will allow a party to object to the victims obtaining the basic information provided above. It completely undermines the free flow of information basic -- getting information as we just fully support it without a court order.

Currently, there are only three victim service advocates assigned to juvenile court locations leaving seven juvenile courts without a victim advocate. Therefore, victims require this basic information free from obstacles in order to have a fighting chance at engaging in the process. During our conversations with the judicial branch regarding this subsection, their concerns were primarily around matters where there are rival gang members involved and trying to limit access or someone is under witness protection in trying to limit the access.

Of course, in those cases that would not workout, and that's why we have included some amended language, which we discussed with them previously, throughout this process that would specifically target what they're trying to get to rather than putting a blanket order in that will take away rights from every other crime victim, which by the way is not always a relationship where people know each other. It's not always what you just may think ok. I mean, basic burglary is a crime or shoplifting is a crime, you might have a victim there. So, these aren't always the horrendous cases we think of. So, when we do these blanket laws, we need to think about all kinds of victims, and we think what we propose will satisfy the concerns.

Sections 18 through 20, we support. It deals with restitution -- order of restitution issued by the criminal court as a condition of a defendant's probation, and the defendants [ringing] subsequently violated. In many cases a defendants probating will terminated along with the order of protection. This will fix that so that no matter what happens with the defendant's future case, victims will be able to still get the restitution that was ordered in court, and finally --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, yeah thank you please summarize.

NATASHA PIERRE: -- we fully support all the reforms to the Office of the Victim Services.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and good morning.

NATASHA PIERRE: Good morning.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you so much for the work that you certainly do in advocating for victim's rights. I'm very much interested in H.B. No. 7198, and your statements in regards to the section 4 that you object. I mean I certainly think that you've made some very good points, and certainly it sounds like judicial has highlighted what their concerns are in allowing the objections, but they may be so narrowly tailored, that we could still get to what they've raised, and yet not make it a blanket right that people can object to information that otherwise would be allowed, and that's where then you can walk into one courthouse, be before one juvenile judge, and get one decision, and walk across the street to another juvenile judge and get a deferring decision --

NATASHA PIERRE: Yes.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): -- so I think clarity in the law should be done as much as possible. So, I'd be very much interested in the further discussions between you and the judicial branch in order to see if we can certainly reach language that everyone can agree to, and I know, you certainly said that you've submitted amended language, so I will certainly be looking at that closely as well.

I'm also interested in 7216 that you indicated that you opposed. If you wouldn't mind just highlighting your reasons for that.

NATASHA PIERRE: Yes. When we -- if we implemented this, we can now add an additional party to the conversation, the defendant's family, and right now we believe that that's unnecessary that victims have -- I mean that defendants have the opportunity, and some of the procedures that were discussed previously, I won't go into details, to do so, and we -- from the victim's perspective, it leads to avoidable delays and sentencing hearings, and getting the case done in a timely manner.

Additionally, right now, you know, we keeping throwing out that victims get to make a statement, victim's right to make a statement is routinely violated, especially in juvenile court, and when it is violated, by the time we're able to file a motion and get to court and get it heard, we always hear, well thank you very much but that wouldn't have changed the decision we made.

So, if we do something like this at minimum it needs to be a balance. We need to allow victims to have statements and also their families because there's an impact on them. Families only get to make -- people think families get to be involved way more than they do because those are the cases highlighted in the press. Family only get to be involved if the victim is dead, a child, or intellectually disabled.

So, if we start doing this, we have to consider -- and again, looking at equity and including victims in all the process throughout. It doesn't have to be adversary if we look -- if we started out as a non-adversarial process.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you for that testimony, and I guess I'm going to throw something out and get your opinion on it. Certainly, this would not be something that would fall on the victim advocate services because we already know that they're completely understaffed. So, with that regard, if this legislation were to pass, any individual or department that would be responsible at putting this family impact statement together, if that same individual department was equally responsible to reach out to the victims and the victim's family and put forth an equally substance statement, would that be an equalizer for you?

NATASHA PIERRE: Yes, if we had the services that went along with the information, however we have a huge gap in services right now. I mean as we said --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): I absolutely agree.

NATASHA PIERRE: -- it would require victim advocates in every court --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Yeah, and that's why I made certain to say it would have to be the same department if not the same exact person or someone from that department doing it equally because it couldn't fall on the right of the victim's advocate because we completely don't have victim advocates as you --

NATASHA PIERRE: Yes.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): -- eloquently stated in every case or even in every courthouse.

NATASHA PIERRE: And actually I have not thought of that, and we haven't, to my knowledge with my little circle of advocates, haven't had that discussion. That might also be a way to equalize it and make it less adversarial.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you. So, if you -- and I know this is certainly on the spot, but if you could go back, consider it, think about it, and if it's something that you would support then possibly submitting -- proposing language in that regard as well. If it's something you guys support.

NATASHA PIERRE: Okay. I'll consider it.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you for your testimony.

NATASHA PIERRE: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. You mentioned, you know, the rights aren't -- the victim advocates are not having proper input, is that because of purely resources or contact? Could you please just further elaborate for me? You mentioned somebody, you know, in the courts, you know, is it purely a manpower lack of resources or is it worse than that?

NATASHA PIERRE: It sometimes -- it's lack of resources. You don't have a victim advocate there to get the note -- like if they're in our -- if this is a routine case, and they're in our staffing notification system, which you have to opt in, so one they need to get the information from somebody that they need to opt in to this notification system, but if they do that, it usually works.

The problem happens when we start moving the timeline fast. We're trying to move this case along. It has been on the docket too long, so the case could get called, but two days later, we've had cases where people -- people rarely have attorneys, and we do actually end up getting a lot of the cases with attorneys, because the attorney will say, no there's somebody that's supposed to do something about this, but understand that 98percent of them don't have attorneys, but -- so -- in one case we had -- the attorney had made it aware a month ahead of time that this one week period, nobody was available, he was going to be out of the country, and know he wouldn't be available. They had an error on -- they had to move quickly because they made a court error, and so they planned it knowing -- he's texting back and forth to the prosecutor that he is not going to be there. His client is not going to be there, and they still go forward with the date.

In that case, it was a sex assault case of a minor, and eventually because of that day that the attorney and client missed, he ended up getting no sex assault charges at all, nine months in prison, and his charges were assault and resisting arrest, which he did none of. He came and turned himself in. When we got to court, we tried to file a motion against it, got to court, and we got -- the judge apologized on the bench because they didn't have all the information at the time, things were moving quickly. They apologized, great, but that did not change that sentence because you can't go back and appeal a sentence, but we have -- in the constitution there are ways to have enforcement. There's wording in there that says legislation can have enforcement mechanisms, but we keep confusing that enforcement mechanism with appeal to the defendant's sentence.

Often the person violating the victim's rights, unless we're talking about safety concerns, is not the defendant, it's the system.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you for your testimony. Any further questions? I see none. Thank you very much. Okay, we're going to now start switching -- we're going to switch to the public and we're going to alternate. So, at this point I'm going to the first member -- I'm sorry the first person on the public line up, it's Shirley Pripstein of Greater Hartford Legal Aid. Is Ms. Pripstein here? Yes, she is. Okay, thank you, and then after that it will be Representative D'Amato if she's here.

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: Okay. Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, and members of the committee, my name is Shirley Pripstein. I'm an attorney with Greater Hartford Legal Aid. This April it will be 37 years. I am a specialist in family law. I'm here to testify on behalf of legal services in opposition to sections 3 and 4 of H.B. No. 7196. These sections would allow for default divorces. Legal services is adamantly opposed to the concept of default divorces. We're not opposed to the idea of allowing a plaintiff to go forward unopposed if there's been no appearance by the defendant, but we think there needs to be a hearing. I just can't emphasize that too strongly.

There are particular parts of the bill in lines 109 to 112 addressed -- a waiver of allowing the defendant to waive service. We think that would be appropriate as long as there weren't appearance filed with the waiver that would allow a couple of limited means to avoid, who are communicating with each other, to avoid having to pay a Marshall's fee. We think there's no place at all for section 4, which would allow a divorce without a hearing, and we note that in the conditions set forth for a divorce without a hearing, it says it wouldn't apply if there were no children, but it doesn't even seem to be -- it doesn't require that there have been enhanced service on the defendant. It doesn't even seem to have been requiring a financial statement.

It requires a certification that neither party is pregnant, but if the plaintiff is male, how would he necessarily know whether the wife is pregnant, especially if it was in the first three months. So, that's our position, and I'd be happy to answer any questions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Okay, so I'll ask you a question. So, what harm do you see? I mean, I just want you to further extrapolate in terms of -- give us -- give me some examples. Like if were to go -- this is typical default in like a civil case, so -- cause you -- there would be an objective -- there'd be a hearing on the motion that appearance -- in theory the non-appearing spouse could attend. You think it's better to have the typical hearing?

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: Well, a typical hearing when -- if -- a typical hearing when the opposing party doesn't appear is you turn in your financial affidavit, you turn in your proposed orders, and the judge looks at the financial affidavit and ask questions. We could have a situation here where there's been a marriage of 25 or 30 years, and one spouse is in the hospital and has had a stroke, and the other spouse says, oh there may be a $300,000-dollar estate, and one spouse says, oh I better run and file a divorce case now, 14 days there's not going to be an appearance if somebodies in the hospital.

There may be an appearance before 90 days, but there's not going to be an appearance 14 days, and there may be adult children involved, they don't need to know what's happening. So, you could get something run through there and then what would happen is you'd have a default divorce, and then the courts to be inundated with motions to open judgment.

We have cases now where people complain, and they said they never got served. The defendant put an address on it for a bold service, and I haven't lived there for three years at that address. The court has no way of knowing when plaintiffs put fraudulent addresses on a writ, and sometimes -- takes a while, but people eventually do find out about a case, but they don't find out within 14 days.

So, we strongly, strongly feel that there needs to be a hearing the where the judge can question plaintiff on the financial affidavit, and the fact -- and the surrounding facts and circumstances, which may be very different.

I had a case where the parties had been separated for 20 years, and there were no children, they were elderly people, and yes I would have been very happy to take the case to judgment before the 90 days because my client needed the divorce, so he could get remarried, so he could move into subsidized elderly housing with the woman that he had been living with, but I think the court needs an opportunity to hear the surrounding facts.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Well, I see in lines 131 and 140 in that block, it does say there's going to be hearing if you move from no fault to default, there'll be a hearing, and the plaintiff shall file a completed financial affidavit, and the judge sets forth the condition. It seems to me you're saying you want to have two hearings then I guess, is that --

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: No just one --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- cause I mean --

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: -- section -- subsection c -- subsection b provides for a hearing --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Right.

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: -- subsection c, there's no hearing.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): The alternate, so maybe -- okay, you want to prohibit any type of -- there's an affidavit approach that can avoid the hearing is what you're saying. You want to get rid of any approach to avoid any hearing whatsoever?

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: Right. It -- we have no - -file a motion, get rid of the word default, file a motion for an opposed hearing. I use the word unopposed instead of default, and have the hearing. Not 14 days, 60 days perhaps, but have a hearing. Don't do it based on papers with nobody in front of the court where you may be missing a lot of circumstances, and we're actually looking out -- we're trying to avoid numerous motions to open judgment, and that's burdensome.

If you try to open a judgment that was in essence a judgment where a party wasn't represented, you have to show that you were prevented from appearing by good cause, and that you have a credible defense, and it's purely discretionary upon the court whether to grant that motion. So, it puts a burden on the defendant to get a judgment opened, and, you know, they're saying here, oh no joint property.

You know, Connecticut is not a community property state. The court has the authority to move assets from one party to the other. It shouldn't be whether there in the name of the husband or the wife, it should be what's the size of the estate. Do we have assets here, and if we have assets what's equitable about dividing those assets, and we should be looking beyond the -- whether they're in the name of party A or party B.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): You think this -- so this bill is focused to try to get like an immediate or much more prompt completion of the action in avoiding the waiting period?

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: I think that is the intent, I think the intent is to move it fast for those cases that are simple where people want only a divorce, but I think the court needs to -- you know, there are some cases where it's clear that the defendant is never going to be appear, like this defendant has returned to India or the defendant has been deported, and it's clear that there's not going to be an appearance, but the court wouldn't have knowledge of that just based on what is being required here, and again there needs to be a hearing for the court to be able to inquire if the court has questions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay. All right. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you for your -- oh sorry. Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Would it help at all in terms of your concern about the difficulty of doing a re-opener if in this particular case a motion to reopen the judgment -- let's say somebody made a motion within, I don't know, 90 days of -- and maybe that's not the right term, maybe time should be 120 days, but in this case, if they made that motion in a relatively short time, it would be granted automatically.

You didn't -- you wouldn't have to show that you were unable to attend, or, you know, you have a good defense just -- because of the expedited nature of the original judgment, have an expedited opportunity to reopen.

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: I think that would help in some way. I think that would create, in a sense, a different can of worms in terms of property distribution where you might have something done with property in the intervening. I mean we have something now where we have automatic orders that you can't encumber property or transfer or alienate property, and if you had a judgment, you could then make assets disappear. So, even a motion to reopen that was subsequently file, even if it had to be granted automatically, it could be too late. So, the property aspects I think are an important consideration.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Representative O'Neill, all set? Okay, thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

SHIRLEY PRIPSTEIN: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, we'll go back to -- we're alternating as I said, so now we'll go back. Is Representative D'Amato here? Please come forward, and Representative we try to keep the testimony to three minutes and then people can ask questions. Thank you.

REP. D'AMATO (77TH): Thank you Co-Chair, Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Ranking Member Rebimbas, and distinguished members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Representative D'Amato, and I am here to testify in support of Raised Bill 7214, an act concerning harassment of a guide or assistance dog or the handler of such dog, and rather here from me, I'd actually like to yield my time from Christine Elkins so you can hear firsthand some of the inspiration behind this bill. Thank you.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Thank you. Good morning members of the Judiciary Committee. Thank you for allowing me to speak to you this morning. My name is Christine Elkins, and I am here to speak to you about bill 7214, an act concerning the harassment of service animals. I'm here today with my own service dog, Gretel, and I feel it's important for me to tell you that I've been a court recording monitor for the judicial branch for 28 years, and Gretel and I are the first and still the only service dog team to be employed in the branch, and together we conceived, wrote, and presented the first stand-alone service dog training and etiquette program of any judicial branch in the United States, and my disability is a balance and mobility disability.

I have a weakened leg as a result of being attacked by my next door neighbor's dog. I also have chronic Lyme disease and fibromyalgia, all of which makes me somewhat unsteady when walking. I also have chronic pain in my joints and stiffness, and at times tremors in my extremities, but I'm here for everyone who has a service dog today, whether it's a physical disability like MS or Parkinson's or an injury, or a neurological disorder like ALS, brain injury, autism, epilepsy, or autoimmune disorders, like chronic fatigue syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, or psychiatric service dogs, all of which can be helped by service dogs under the ADA.

Unfortunately, people don't understand that these dogs are providing a very important service to their person, which is keeping them safe, and we have no protection under the law in Connecticut for this. The office of legislative research has already looked into this situation in 2010, and I did put a link in my own testimony for you to be able to review it, but it shows that 28 states have a law enacted that protect service dog handlers, and I wish I could say that people understand not to harass or pet our dogs, or walk up to them, try and give them food, various other things that they do.

In my personal instance, if somebody distracts my dog and she kind of wanders away from me and I fall, I could end up in a wheelchair for the rest of my life. A very good friend of mine who has a seizure disorder, if her dog misses that alert instead of getting to a safe place she will fall and end up very injured or possibly killed [ringing]. In summary, I would just simply urge you to recommend passage of this law, and I can promise you this, if passed I will personally contact every police officer, every chief of police, and every state's attorney in the state of Connecticut to make sure that they are aware of this law, and I'm open to questions if you have any.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman and good morning. Not so much a question as much as just a compliment, a compliment to you and also Representative D'Amato to bringing this to our attention, and certainly I thought your testimony was very thorough in letting us know what other states are doing in that regard as well. L

I think there is, unfortunately, a lack of knowledge and training, even for the general public, who naturally for many of them who absolutely love animals and love service dogs, are just naturally pulled to them and towards them and wants to acknowledge them, but unfortunately they are providing a much needed service that there could be some negative consequences as a result of that. So, thank you for being here this morning and sharing your story.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Representative Smith.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, good morning, and good morning Representative, good morning ma'am. I guess the only concern I had is, you know, dog lovers are inclined to go up to other dogs and pet the dog or say hello to the dog, and just be friendly to a dog. I understand your concerns in the potential difficulties that that may cause, but I'd hate to see a situation, and maybe I just misheard your testimony, so if you could clarify this -- I'd hate to a see situation where somebody who was just being friendly to the dog, not harassing the dog, but just being friendly, inadvertently causes and injury because the dog reacted or did something that caused the dog to react. So, with this bill as proposed incorporate just harassment or does it also incorporate just a friendly gesture for someone going over to the dog?

CHRISTINE ELKINS: I believe it only incorporates with an intent to harass. I've talked to several service dog handlers all over the state and all over the country, and what they would interpret -- what we would like to see is just say please don't distract my dog please, and if they continue then that would be the intent that we would see, and that's why I think we would make our concerns known. I don't think that just the normal every day, you know, hi puppy type thing, we're not going to be able to stop that, but I'm talking about the people that actually set out to harass our dogs, or tell us oh it's okay, every dog loves me, which is something we hear all the time, and it's not okay.

In a perfect world, you know, we would get $30,000 dollars and do a public service announcement to air on all local new stations, we're not going to get that unfortunately, but like I said, we want to make the public aware, and we're willing to do that.

REP. D'AMATO (77TH): I have to say that I -- of all the stories I've listened to, Christine, and others that, you know, they -- they're very experienced in this, and as in my testimony, my written testimony, you know, going to the grocery store, they do, of course, when somebody comes up and says, oh can I pet your dog, they'll of course say first, no please don't, the dog is working, but the reactions after that and the stories that I've heard from Christine and other people are just astounding, because people get really offended and upset and actually, you know --

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Violent at times.

REP. D'AMATO (77TH): -- yeah, react just in ways that you definitely -- it's completely surprising to me, and it's shameful.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Well thank you for the clarification, it's helpful. I guess it's just something we have to look at as a committee to make sure that we're not overreaching, but at the same time protecting your interest and those who use the guide dogs, so thank you for bringing it to our attention.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, thanks. Just to followup Representative Smith, I think as written it may be problematic along the lines of Representative Smith because I -- to be honest, I love dogs, and I could be foolish too, and I would hope I would -- if you said to me it's not a good idea under the circumstances, but it says in line 50 any person who interferes with a blind, deaf persons use of their dog, and it says, including but not limited any action to harass, to me that means if I foolishly -- before you even said to me stop, I'd drop down and start petting dog your dog and scaled up things, clearly my intent was not to harm. So, I think we might have to tighten up the language. Do you concur with that? Is that --

REP. D'AMATO (77TH): I actually specifically asked Christine about that, and was -- we did discuss adding intentional into that line, into line 50, although we also agreed that we wanted to keep it as far as interfering, because I was discussing, or I mentioned possibly assault, you know, something a little more specific than interfere, but she notified me that, you know, sometimes people will do things to purposely distract the dog after of course that she has asked them not to.

So, she didn't necessarily want to limit it to specifically assault, but definitely intentional I think is something that would help tighten up the language.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah. So, we're on the same page. Maybe if you guys want to look at it and provide us some suggestions, and we'll take into account, because I think the bill itself, it seems reasonable, but I just don't want a person prior to your warning, you know, to be charged with a class C misdemeanor.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: And I don't think any of us would want to either --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, good, okay so if you get a chance, take a look at it, and we'll try to work on it too. Representative O'Dea.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Thank you very much Chair. Just briefly as a followup to that, Connecticut dog bite statute is 22-357, and basically that's a -- creates a negligence per se by a dog for any damage they do to anyone. Would you foresee this, like, in essence the bill your proposing if your guide dog then or companion dog lashed out, would this supersede the 22-357? The dog bite statute in any way?

CHRISTINE ELKINS: I don't think it would. No. Regardless, we are responsible for the behavior of our dogs either way. Do I see a situation where somebody let's their dog go, and the dog clashes with ours? It's a possibility. Its happened, I know, but I wouldn't see that as something being completely intentional because, again, their dogs are not robots. They react.

REP. D'AMATO (77TH): Your question was regarding negligence though, that negligent actions of the dog, and I think an affirmative defense would be, you know, anything the other individual, the other party did to cause such action that --

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Like if for example, not in this scenario but in a regular scenario, if a kid approaches a dog and starts to pet it, and the dog bites the child, that -- that's not a harassment or annoying to the dog, so the dog bite statute would apply, and the child would have to be reimbursed by the owner of the dog --

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Yes.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): -- my question is simply in this scenario it looks like there may be some interaction between the dog bite statute and this statute that we'd have to look at, that's all I'm saying.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Quite possibly, and I'll -- and I can take a look at that and see how they would interplay.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? Seeing none. Thank you very much.

REP. D'AMATO (77TH): Thank you.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, we're going back to the public list now. We have Lew Chimes. Is Mr. Chimes here? Yes, he is okay, and the next public official I have is Representative Rose, if she's around. Mr. Chimes.

LEW CHIMES: Good morning Senator Kissel, Senator Doyle, and members of the committee. My name is Lewis Chimes, and I am the chairman of the employment section of the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Associations. I'm here on behalf of Raised Bill No. 929, which seeks certain expansions of whistleblower protection under existing statute 31-51m.

We currently have a statute, a whistleblower statute, which proports to protect people who object to illegal conduct in the workplace, but the statute as currently enacted is a paper tiger, it doesn't do what it intends to do, mainly because it has a short statute of limitations, very limited damages, and most importantly because it only protects people who actually go to public agencies, and in my experience, in 30 years as an employment lawyer, many people object to illegal conduct in the workplace, very, very few of them end up going to public agencies. The reason for that is they go to their employers first, try to remedy it internally, as they should, and they are retaliated against or fired before they do that, so they don't get the protection of this law.

We suggest three changes, the first is that the current deadline for filing is 90 days, that's far too short in the real world. Somebody who has been fired from their job has a lot of new change in their life, a lot of drama in their life, and not -- and quite a bit of stress. Many times people won't think about their remedies or get advice from counsel until the 90 days has gone by, 180 days extends the deadline to the same deadline that we currently have for discrimination cases, and there's frankly no reason that this statutes deadline should be much shorter than the same statute that we use for victims of discrimination.

The second is that this statute extends not only to people who actually go to public agencies but people who object or refuse to engage in illegal conduct in the workplace. Now I -- in my written testimony I've given you many, many other anti-retaliation statutes, Connecticut and Federal, but also whistleblower statutes from surrounding states. All of them protect these types of internal complaints. We're the only one who does not protect internal -- some form of internal complaints in the workplace, so that's something -- again the external whistleblower is a very rare case, most people are retaliated against or lose their jobs when they go directly to their employer [ringing].

Finally, the third things we're ask for expansion of remedies in this. At the -- for the present time the only remedy for someone who uses this statute is they get their pay back or they're reinstated to their job --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Please summarize, thank you.

LEW CHIMES: Yeah. Summarize?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, no, just summarize it, yeah.

LEW CHIMES: Okay.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Are you done or --

LEW CHIMES: Yeah, well just -- right -- just that we're asking for punitive damages or compensatory damages. This is the same as many of the other state and Federal retaliation statutes that I provided to the committee in my written testimony. I think that's important because this is a remedial statute. We want to deter employers from retaliating against individuals who object to or refuse to engage in illegal conduct.

So, again, we think this is an important statute. There will be several other members of the Connecticut Trial Lawyers who will come forward and talk to you about victims and specific incidents. If you have any questions --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative Smith.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Mr. Chairman, thank you. Yeah, I'm looking at the bill quickly, and it look -- I thought I saw 180 days in here, and you mentioned you're looking for a change from 90 to 180, but as I'm reading it, it says 180, so --

LEW CHIMES: That's the new bill.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Right.

LEW CHIMES: Right, that's what we want. That's what we're proposing. We're going from 90 to 180.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Right.

LEW CHIMES: Yes.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Same thing for punitive damages, this bill allows for punitive damages as well.

LEW CHIMES: That is -- that's the new -- that's new in the bill.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Okay, just wanted clarification, because what I'm reading today it seems to have what you're looking for.

LEW CHIMES: I'm sorry.

REP. SMITH (108TH): I said what I'm reading today seems to have what you're looking for.

LEW CHIMES: Yes. Oh no, that -- the proposed bill is what I'm here and supporting, R.B. No. 929.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Thank you, my confusion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? Seeing none. Thank you very much.

LEW CHIMES: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, we're going -- at this point the last public official is Representative Rose. Is Representative Rose in the room? No, she isn't. Okay, we'll go back to the public list now and wait, if Representative Rose comes, we'll let her testify at some point. Sylvester Salcedo, Vicky Hutchinson, Thomas Welsh. Sylvester Salcedo, yes, he is.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Good morning members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Sylvester Salcedo. This morning I'd like to share with you that I've had the honor and privilege to serve the people of the state of Connecticut as a small claims motor vehicle infractions magistrate for the past six years, and like my colleague, magistrate Paul Ruszczyk, who anticipated would actually testify for me, because he was able to submit his testimony in a written form by the Internet, and I will do so right after this, but I am also a member of the Connecticut Magistrates Association and a board member.

However, my appearance here this morning is strictly as an individual, and I'm not speaking as a board member, or -- nor on behalf of the Connecticut Magistrate Association. I'd like to take this opportunity to share my personal opinion and perspective regarding H.B. No. 7197. A bill that proposes to increase the jurisdictional limit in small claims cases from $5,000 dollars to $7,500 dollars. Personally, I have no strong position regarding the proposal to raise the jurisdictional limit to $7,500 dollars per se, and I believe you will hear Magistrate Rustic share with you some very illuminating statistical and comparative data based on the consumer price index why this proposal makes sense, and is a logical step in some way.

However, as a magistrate for the past six years, my greatest concern about this proposal is two-fold. First, by increasing the limit to $7,500 dollars, from my way of thinking, I can already anticipate that there will be a general rise in the number of cases that will involve engaging the services of an attorney for a party or both parties. While it's not prohibited nor discouraged, it will have an immense effect on the number of cases that can be heard in a small claims magistrate session of three hours.

Cases that involve participation of an attorney in my experience, almost always means the evidentiary phase of these cases take twice the amount of time and almost always means that -- excuse me, compared to the testimony and evidence presented by pro se parties.

Second, my raising the jurisdictional limit along with the current high price of filing a small-claims case, which currently stands at $95 dollars, this may begin to depress the public's interest and ability to seek help from our judicial system in the people's court. Accordingly, I would like to encourage the members of this committee to consider the possibility of designing a two-tiered or perhaps a three-tiered system whereby cases under $2,000 dollars will have a fee of about $30 dollars, cases under $5,000 dollars, a fee of $75 dollars, and cases up to $7,500 a fee of $125 dollars, and again, as I said, I would like to support keeping the people -- the concept of a people's court alive --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: -- and responsive and accessible, and I will end --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: -- here and just submit my written testimony unless anybody has any questions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative O'Dea.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just a comment. I like the idea of a staggered. AAA the Arbitration Associating does that and staggering it, $2,000 dollars then $5,000 dollars and $7,500 would actually make sense to me. So, I'll maybe speak with some people and see --

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: I think this was initially an idea that came from Representative Rose. I was hoping that she would be here before I came up, but that's my perspective. Again, as somebody in the front lines, listening to litigants come in. Anytime, obviously one party is represented by an attorney, it's always a struggle because obviously they're well-schooled and trained, and lots of evidence, and procedures, and the pro se litigants, and I think that's who I would like to be able to somehow advocate for today is that they should really have that opportunity to be able to have their day in court, and if you're just arguing about a $250 dollar leather coat that was burnt by the dryers cleaner, I don't think you should really have to pay $125 dollars for a fee to get into court to have your case heard, and for those who have cases that are more complicated, and as I said, I will defer to my colleague, Magistrate Rustic, who will be able to explain a little bit more of the history and perhaps some comparative statistics from other states like Kentucky whose limit is $2,500 dollars for small claims, while Tennessee I believe is on the higher end at $25,000 dollars.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): What percentage of your cases is debt collectors? Like these third parties that purchase the debt --

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Quite, yes, I'm sorry, yes quite, depending on the day and depending on the location where I am assigned to, there is quite a robust number of debt collection cases that come up, and again those are cases where perhaps advocates can better inform the public as far as what their options are, and certainly this proposal of a two-tiered or possibly three-tiered system could help all parties.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Well, thank you for your testimony and your services.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Thank you.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Anyone else?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): And Representative Day just -- Representative Day keep in mind, there could be a fiscal note involved in these difficult financial times. In your review, please keep that in mind.

REP. O'DEA (125TH): Understood that's why I'm thinking about the higher pay, yes.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Thank you all.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions? Seeing none. Thank you. Sorry, Representative Smith. Sorry about that.

REP. SMITH (108TH): That's okay, thank you Mr. Chair. Good morning sir.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Good morning.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Just the -- I have a -- I saw this bill. I'm somewhat concerned by it raising the limit to $7,500 dollars, although I understand it's difficult to retain a lawyer for a $7,500-dollar case because by the time you get through with the case, you know, $7,500 dollars can go like that. So, I understand perhaps the need for it, but I'm also concerned about whether we really want to go that high.

How many now do you see at the -- is the limit now $5,500 dollars, is that what it is?

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: $5,000 dollars --

REP. SMITH (108TH): $5,000 dollars?

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: -- at this point, yes.

REP. SMITH (108TH): And how many do you see at the $5,000 dollars range now, roughly, percentage wise?

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: A little rough, let's say last year I probably would have seen about 20 cases to 30. Well, the other thing too Representative is that when an attorney is involved sometimes some creative approaches can come in.

For example, I can remember a case somewhere in New Haven County, I won't mention the court, but you will have an attorney bring in a car accident let's say that had four passengers, and then all of a sudden, every person has $5,000 dollar claims, so that up to $20,000 dollars, and if you're bringing up to $7,500 dollars, and if there's six passengers plus the driver -- those kinds of cases come up, and complicate the docket.

My main concern really is that -- it's not so much that the limit -- the amount of the jurisdictional limit, I mean you can make it a million dollars, but what happens is I think as a small claims magistrate, I would like to bring to your attention just the emphasis on small. The whole reason why we have small-claims court is that it's really just the average person who is not a professional litigate who can bring their case that they would like to have heard by a neutral arbitrate or magistrate in this case, I think that's really the -- my main reason for coming up this morning.

REP. SMITH (108TH): And I share your concern. The question becomes what is small these days. So, $7,500 dollars 10 years ago, probably wants small, $7,500 dollars today may be small, I mean just in today's economic.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Well, I think it really is based on the nature of what people are feeling passionate about. I mean I just heard the testimony about the service dogs, and I can remember a case in Manchester just last week where the argument was about billing for services provided by a vet to a pet owner, and it was really less than $500 dollars, but the pet owner was very upset and really just wanted her perspective to be heard by a neutral magistrate and have her side of the story be considered of why she should not have to pay that bill or why it was too much in her opinion.

Now, obviously if the pet had a different set of circumstances like -- something like surgery, it could have exceeded $7,500. It could have been $20,000 let's say. So -- but the key here I think is that we -- I'm promoting that we should maintain the idea of the accessibility, and the fact that small-claims court should remain small while acknowledging the need perhaps of inflation and what exactly -- as you said, what is the definition of small?

So, this case I think gives everybody a little bit of flexibility while maintaining the small-claims court, people's court character of this very valuable service that we provide to our citizens.

REP. SMITH (108TH): And I would assume most of your cases are heard without lawyers?

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: When the amount is relatively small. I think that certainly as you increase the amount, there's an accompanying incentive to just basically turn it over to attorneys, and --

REP. SMITH (108TH): And your decision is final, correct? There's no appeal of your decision.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Correct, yes, and it's simplified, and that's -- again as I said, one of the -- with an endearing -- but one of the best characteristics about small-claims court is that it is small, it is simple, it is not too complicated, but as you raise the jurisdictional limit, I think as I had mentioned, especially when I hear cases where one side has an attorney representing that party, I always have to reign in the attorneys because they try to hold the other party to strict standards and procedures of the courts, and as magistrate I've learned -- I allow a lot of leeway to pro se litigants taking into consideration that they are neither trained nor accustomed, nor -- I mean that's usually the first time they've ever had an actual personal experience in our court system. So, I try to be sensitive to that. I try to accommodate and give a lot of leeway so --

REP. SMITH (108TH): What -- let me just interrupt you for a second, what are the rules of evidence then in the small-claims court? Are they applied or are they just --

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Well, there supposed to be the same rule in any other court, but again, at least in my -- the way I do it is I consider the parties in terms of make an assessment, their level of competency, their level of sophistication. Some people may have been -- had some law school experience and never practiced law let's say, and they bring their own cases, so they tend to be a little bit more knowledgeable and --

REP. SMITH (108TH): You adhere to the rules of evidence in your court?

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Again, I try to do as much as possible, but considering who's in front of me, I allow a lot of leeway. A lot of it is a lot of hearsay like, you know, the barber said this, that this would like, or my cousin Joe told me the other day that that was wrong, and so obviously you could easily exclude that as hearsay evidence, but again I bring this courts -- this committees attention to the fact that it is small-claims court, and we -- or at least I try to be sensitive and try to be considerate, and give a great -- give quite a bit of leery to whoever's in front of me, and then the other day I had two 90 year old, well couple, husband and wife, had a dispute with a party that was represented by an attorney, and the attorney was screaming and yelling at this elderly couple, and I had to tell the attorney to really let up a little bit on the rules of evidence because the other party is just not equipped at the same level, but try to keep true to what's being presented to me. I try to be a good listener and make an assessment as far as what the arguments are being presented in front of me.

REP. SMITH (108TH): All right. Thank you.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Thank you, sir.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions? I see none. Thank you very much.

SYLVESTER SALCEDO: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Vicky Hutchinson. Ms. Hutchinson here? Does not look like it, okay. Next speaker Thomas Welsh. Mr. Welsh is here. After Thomas Gregory Zigmont. Thomas Welsh.

THOMAS WELSH: Thank you honorable chairman and members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Thomas Welsh, and I'm testifying with support with a qualification on S.B. No. 931, an act concerning the fraudulent filing of records. I'm an attorney practicing at Updike, Kelly & Spellacy here in Hartford, and -- but I'm testifying as a member -- as a past chair in the legislative liaison of the commercial finance section of the Connecticut Bar Association. I'm also a member of the law revision commission appointed by the speak, and have over -- since 2000 testified before the Judiciary Committee and co-chaired panels on article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

So, I've been here a number of times through a number of sessions. The proposed act creates a criminal penalty for false or fraudulent filings on the land records or the UCC filings, which is fine. However, it then goes on to amend the UCC, and the land record statutes to create an expedited judicial remedy for determining that these filings are invalid, if that's the case before the Tax and Administration Appeals Session of the superior court.

Well, I'd like to first of all support this. We think that it'd be helpful to have this statute, and we applaud the judicial method, cause there have been prior sessions of the general assembly and other states who have made this an administrative mechanism. The Secretary of State is supposed to go out and root out evil and false statements, so this works for better because all the parties can be there and determine, in a judicial proceeding, whether or not a filing is effective or not.

The problem is that the statute as proposed before us doesn't have any requirement that secured parties of records, debtors, and other parties on the filings, and the UCC land records receive any notice of the petition. This is an expedited petition with a hearing within 60 days, and there's -- and I think that we think that it would be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to have a requirement of mailed notice at least two weeks before the hearing put in the statute to the secured parties of record, debtor, or other parties that have an interest.

With that modification and recommendation, we support this statute, and we'll take any further questions. We've also submitted testimony with citations, and --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative Smith.

REP. SMITH (108TH): So, I'm thinking of a lis pendens. So, if a lis pendens gets filed on the land records, you know, I'm assuming you know what lis pendens is, so I won't go find it for you. I'm concerned though if someone were to file a lis pendens and then have a potential criminal charge brought against them, I don't know, it's a whole new world to me. To me about -- to me some examples where you'd see that playing out?

THOMAS WELSH: Well, a lis pendens actually has its own procedure for determining whether or not the lis pendens is adequate or should be discharged or not. So, there's a -- as I recall, there is a statutory procedure especially for that. The criminal penalty for the criminal part of this is for a filing with intent to defraud, delay, harass a party. New York, I might point out has a similar process, but it's only for public officials. So, perhaps a criminal -- the criminal part of this statute, section 1 of this bill, is appropriate -- would be appropriate in a lis pendens situation where you -- where someone has filed those pendens without due cause for one of those purposes.

REP. SMITH (108TH): So, maybe you could give me an example, especially with the land records where there would be some type of intentional wrongdoing. Obviously if it was a deed that was filed where the person who filed the deed was not the property owner and did so fraudulently, I could see that playing out. Can you give me some other examples?

THOMAS WELSH: Well -- and sometimes we've seen creative things in the land records filed, but occasionally someone will attempt to file a lien against a party, something that purports to a lien on the land records against a neighbor or an attempt to harass. We -- that's -- and we've seen it with respect to public officials, judges and others, in cases where sometimes miscreants or people who have been filed -- who have been incarcerated have filed liens on the -- UCC records I am familiar with because that's where I practice more so than the land records, but as I understand it they also -- things have been filed on the land records in the past, in the last 10 to 15 years against judges and -- that have incarcerated people, and I'm aware of that.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Okay, thank you. I'll continue to listen to testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

THOMAS WELSH: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Gregory Zigmont then Eric Gjede, then Stephen Bayer. Mr. Zigmont, is he here?

GREGORY ZIGMONT: Morning Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong, and members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Gregory Zigmont, I'm a police inspector in the division of criminal justice. I'm submitting this testimony in support of H.B. No. 7215, an act concerning courthouse security, indemnification of law enforcement professionals, and aggravated assault of a public transit employee.

For the past several legislative sessions, my union CSEA, SEIU, Local 2001, has requested a change to address what we believe is an oversight in Connecticut general statute Section 53-39a. While this statute indemnifies virtually every other state and municipal police officer in Connecticut for economic loss, including attorney fees for a criminal prosecution resulting from a line-of-duty incident, for which the officer is later exonerated or the charges are dismissed, the statue does not include inspectors in the Division of Criminal Justice.

The change we saw and continue to seek is very simple, add inspectors in the Division of Criminal Justice to the list of those who are indemnified by their employing agency. It is very rare for a Connecticut police officer to be charged with a crime. No DCJ inspector in my memory has ever been criminally charged for on-duty conduct.

However, our duties have evolved over the past several years. Our inspectors now more than ever working on the streets of Connecticut in partnership with other law enforcement agency on Shooting Task Force, investigating criminal complaints, executing search warrants, and making arrest. It is dangerous work, which is why we are classified as hazardous duties state employees. We are merely asking that we be treated the same as any other police officer in the state of Connecticut when it comes to indemnification when we acted appropriately as determined by the criminal justice system.

We ask that inspectors of the Division of Criminal Justice be added to the list of police officers who are indemnified by their employing agency as stated in 53-39a. All we want is to be afforded the same rights and protection as any other Connecticut police officer is afforded. I thank you for your time, and your attention.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none. Do you -- on section 1, did you take a position on the issue of permitting judicial marshals to carry firearms?

GREGORY ZIGMONT: No sir.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, all right, thank you. Others well I'm sure. Any -- okay, that's it. Thank you. Next speaker is Eric Gjede. Is Mr. Gjede here? Yes, he is. Then we have Stephen Bayer, Ralph Monaco. Mr. Gjede.

ERIC GJEDE: Good afternoon. As you said, my name is Eric Gjede. I'm here on behalf of the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, and I'm here today to oppose S.B. No. 933, regarding the EEOC guidance documents related to background checks, and I'm not here to oppose on the substance of the bill itself, I guess it's more a process opposition.

As you can see in my testimony, I talked about last year's bill, Public Act 16-83, this came out of a lot of meetings and negotiation between CBIA, the NFIB, the ACLU, and the African American Affairs Commission, and we worked very hard, and I know a lot of people think that maybe last year's ban-the-box bill didn't quite go far enough, and I understand that there are some things about the bill that I didn't particularly either, but in the end I think a good compromise came out of those negotiations.

So, that Public Act only actually took effect within the last 65 days, and in further -- in that bill we created the fair-chance employment taskforce, and this group is put together, it's a combination of background checks -- or it will be a combination of background check experts, advocates for employees, and while the group has not yet had an opportunity to meet, in fact, it's still being formed, we do anticipate a lot of good work coming out of this committee -- or out of that taskforce.

So, because of that we're simply asking this committee for a little patience on the background check issue and let this taskforce have some time to do its work, and I think this area of law and these restrictions will continue to be developed going forward. So, with that happy to take any questions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Senator Gomes.

SENATOR GOMES (23RD): I just got one for you Eric. Are you a member of the taskforce?

ERIC GJEDE: I -- no I'm not a member of the taskforce.

SENATOR GOMES (23RD): Do you have any people from CBIA who are members?

ERIC GJEDE: We will be recommending an individual who works in the background check industry, and I believe there's probably some employer representatives we may weigh in on that, but we're fully committed to making sure this taskforce gets off the ground and begins its work.

SENATOR GOMES (23RD): I just was asking because you know I'm very interested in fair-chance bills. All right, thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you Senator Gomes. Any further -- Representative Smith.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Good morning Eric.

ERIC GJEDE: Good morning.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Just so, just to make sure I understand your testimony, the basis for your objection to this bill before us today is about this taskforce to be able to do its thing first before we make any changes to the law. Is that what you're saying?

ERIC GJEDE: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, you know, you -- you've got a lot of smart people in this room, but you also, just on this public hearing agenda alone, you've got 16 items here, and you've had a lot of other public hearings with a lot of other items -- a lot of other bills there.

We have a rare opportunity here where you have a taskforce coming together to look at just one issue. Their sole focus is on background check issues, and I would suggest that while there are, like I said, very smart people in the room here today, we let that group start to do its work and focus on the bill or on this issue.

REP. SMITH (108TH): And did you say when the taskforce would be finished?

ERIC GJEDE: There was a little bit of delay getting the group together. First of all, it's supposed to be an ongoing group. So, they may never be finished. The formation was delayed a little bit because of some of the consolidations of the commissions last year, but we have continued to ask for updates and those -- that new consolidated commission is working right now to get this task force off the ground.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Okay, so basically what I'm hearing, you really haven't met yet to discuss the issue, it's just in the formation stages.

ERIC GJEDE: Yeah, that -- it's an unfortunate delay but, yes.

REP. SMITH (108TH): Government moves slow, unfortunately. All right, thank you Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

ERIC GJEDE: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Stephen Bayer then Ralph Monaco then Marcellius Edwards. Mr. Bayer.

STEPHEN BAYER: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I've asked the members of my team to join us, although I will be the sole speaker.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): We like consolidation, that's a good idea.

STEPHEN BAYER: Yeah, I know, I know.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you very -- you can send a message for everyone. Thank you.

STEPHEN BAYER: Okay, thank you, sir. My name is Stephen Bayer, and I'm joined by my fellow teammates Baaghi Machubhani [phonetic] and Charles James, and there are several others who couldn't be with us today. We're a volunteer team formed as part of a leadership -- Greater Hartford Leadership Development and Community Engagement Program for, shall I say, mature people, and our team chose to focus on the impact of parental incarceration on young children.

There are an estimated 15,000 people in Connecticut prisons, and as you heard approximately 18,000 children impacted by those incarcerations. For a child having a parent incarcerated is a stressful traumatic experience similar to abuse, domestic violence, or divorce. There is an increased risk of attachment disruption, trauma, shame, and stigma that predisposes the child the poor health and development outcomes in educational delays.

Many will suffer throughout their entire adult life. Some of this can be alleviated through passage of H.B. No. 7216. Working closely with the Public Defense Office, our group believes that a dependent child impact statement should be considered by the courts prior to imposing a sentence in any case in which a custodial parent may be incarcerated.

Such an impact statement specifically looks at the needs of each individual child at the time of the parent's incarceration to determine how to mitigate the impact on the child and lessen the chance of the parent's sentencing becoming a shared sentence with their child.

A recent Annie E. Casey Foundation report entitled, A Shared Sentence - The Devastating Toll of Parental Incarceration on Kids, Families, and Communities, concludes as follows, without a doubt people who break the law should be -- should face the consequences. Still parents who are incarcerated do not live in isolation, they are fathers, mothers, partners, caregivers, breadwinners, and community members, and their kids inevitably end up sharing their sentences'.

Built into the very essence of the American dream is the belief that children can and should have the opportunity to forge their own path to reach far and stretch wide, regardless of where they grow up or who their parents are. The confinement of the parent should not doom a child to a lifetime of closed doors. Our hopes and dreams for children of incarcerated parents should be no different from the limitless horizon we seek for all our children.

They too deserve a blank page in our nation's great storybook, and a chance to shape their part of the till as it continues to unfold for themselves, their future families, and our whole country, and again I just would urge the passage and support of H.B. No. 7216 [ringing]. Thank you very much.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you for your concise testimony. Any questions from the committee? Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman and good morning, still morning, a few minutes. Thank you for your testimony. Would you have any objection if equally submitted with the family impact statement was a victim statement?

STEPHEN BAYER: Probably -- I would say we would not, in general, have an objection to that. As I said, our group looks specifically on the impact of incarceration on kids, and there's a lot of data out there that suggest that there is a substantial impact.

I'm not sure just exactly, you know, the issue as it relates to victim's rights. I've heard testimony here today, I don't have an objection to it, but what I would say is that we still have to take a very close look at what happens to these kids of parents who are incarcerated. They suffer substantial harm.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): And I personally, certainly, and I think that probably the majority of everyone would agree with you that there are serious negative impacts when parents are separated from their children in that regard, and thank you for your input regarding the victim's statement.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Earlier I was raised by other people testifying the impact of prison on termination of parental rights. Through your efforts, have you found that there's a negative impact? I mean, I -- because that shocks me. What have you found in that word? In the real world? Have you guys discovered --

STEPHEN BAYER: Well, we've came into this about 18 months ago absolutely knowing very little, and we've gained a great deal of knowledge about the impact of incarceration. I'm not sure, and I didn't, when I heard the testimony, and I don't think anybody, our group here, got that drilled down that deeply as it relates to the loss of parental rights.

What we're convinced is that these kids are severely stigmatized. I think the loss of parental rights just adds one more burden on these kids, and it just adds to the pain.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, well if you in the future, in the short -- in the near term, if you guys do further investigation and find some evidence or concerns about that, you can bring it to our attention because it was presented and then we asked questions, and Representative Gonzalez is going to look into that issue. She's going to provide me information because she said she learns in her district too, but that's -- but if it's true, that's very troubling to me --

STEPHEN BAYER: Right.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- so I would just have you guys think about it over the next few weeks because the sessions going, and we'd appreciate it. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you, and thank you for consolidating your testimony. Next speaker is Ralph Monaco, then Marcellius Edwards, then Carolyn Naylor Flynn. Mr. Monaco.

RALPH MONACO: Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong, and other members of the committee. My name is Ralph Monaco, I'm an attorney in New London at the Law Firm on Conway, Londregan, Sheehan & Monaco, and I'm appearing today in support of Bill 7194, an act concerning the exception to the 10-year repose period for certain product liability claims.

Instead of hearing from me, I want to share with you a story of Ms. Danita King. Ms. King has worked for my law firm as a paralegal for 25 or more years, and her husband tragically died in an accident back in 2014, a construction accident. The purpose of the bill before is to avoid the unfair application of the repose period to certain individuals, such as Mr. King. So, I'd like Ms. King to just share her story with you.

DANITA KING: Thank you. Members of the Judiciary Committee, my name is Danita King and for many years I lived in Waterford, Connecticut with my husband Danny King. My life was forever changed on May 30, 2014 when my husband Danny died while working on a construction crew in Windsor.

Danny was installing a water main in Windsor on May 30, 2014 when a large metal bucket fall off an excavator, rolled into him, pinned him against a trench box, and crushed him. The warning light and siren in the cockpit of the excavator had gone off indicating to Danny's coworker who was in the cockpit that the machine was safe for operation.

Unfortunately, when the warning signal went off it tricked the operator into thinking that it was safe to use, it was a false positive because the bucket did not always properly lock in place.

Danny died from internal injuries later that day. He was 51 years old, and we would have been married for 31 years. Our only daughter pre-deceased Danny after dying an automobile accident a few years prior. I am now left without my husband, and my only child.

The manufacturer of the excavator involved in Danny's accident knew about this danger. They had memos on it, however, they never bothered telling people like Danny or make modifications to prevent such a tragedy. They kept profiting and selling these machines for hundreds and thousands of dollars each.

I am pursuing a product liability claims against the manufacturer and seller of the defective excavator because I want to prevent this from happening again. However, the manufacturer of the defective machine is trying to be dismissed from the case because of Connecticut Statute of Repose. They argue that they sold the machine 14 years before this accident.

They claim that they should be off the hook after 10 years from the date of the sale. I totally and completely disagree. These machines are made to last more than 10 years. There are many pieces of heavy equipment that are older than 10 years old and still in use.

The machine that was involved in Danny's accident was otherwise in good shape. It had one terrible defect, which caused my husband's death. If Danny was an ordinary passerby at the time, the 10-year limitation could not be argued against him, and that's unfair. He was a wonderful man and a hard worker. Connecticut workers, especially like Danny who build our infrastructures, should be able to [ringing] pursue these manufacturers of dangerous machines so that these machines are made safe. I want to pursue the manufacturer of the dangerous machine that took Danny's life so that other spouses don't have to endure the pain that surrounds me day and day -- day in and day night -- out.

I cannot begin to explain the emptiness that I have felt from losing my husband. When I found out about Raised Bill No. 7194, I knew I had to come here and speak in favor of it. I want to do everything I can to prevent another woman from living through the horror that I have experienced. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your -- sharing your story, and certainly my condolences for the experience that you've gone through, and I guess maybe it's -- I don't know if it's a legal question, but if either one of you can response. If we were to make a change now, would there be any impact to the pending -- any pending matters? So, in other words, would this only affect from the date of injury moving forward or if there was a prior injury but pending matters currently, how that would affect it?

RALPH MONACO: As I understand the current state of the law, Representative Rebimbas, is your -- any legislation would be prospective not retrospective unless you stated otherwise.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you for your response. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Representative Gonzalez.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Thank you Mr. Chair. You said that if you -- want to go after the manufacturer, what is the responsibility for the company that he was working for?

DANITA KING: Could you restate that please?

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): The responsibility for the person -- for that -- for the company that he was working for. Because here you are after the manufacturer, right?

RALPH MONACO: Right, so I can speak to that Representative. The product had been in use for 14 years and had never -- there had been prior incidents but no injuries or fatalities. So, you know, the employer is protected by Connecticut's Worker's Compensation statutes, and the issue here I think that is raised is whether the law should fall on the employer and their insurance or the manufacturer of the defective equipment. This would, by the way, apply for example to state workers.

Right now, if a state worker is injured or killed on the job, and the machine was more than 10 years old, the state would be stuck paying that. There would be no redress for the state to collect its medical bills or any other payments that it makes. The statute, as it is now, distinguishes between two groups, it treats workers and non-workers in a different way.

If someone is injured when they're not working, they -- this provision doesn't apply to them, but if they are injured or killed while working, it would apply to them. So, for example a state DOT worker injured by -- in the same scenario here there was construction -- road construction going, the state would be stuck, you know, paying that, and the employee would have no recourse, nor would the state be able to recoup its payments made under the worker's compensation statutes.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Thank you. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you for being patient.

RALPH MONACO: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Marcellius Edwards, then Carolyn Naylor Flynn, then Frank Kolb. Is Marcellius? Mr. Edwards? Yes, he is. Thank you.

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: Good afternoon Chairman Doyle, Chairman Kissel, and Chairman --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Sir, please push the button there. Yeah, please start from scratch. Thank you.

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: Oh, I'm sorry. Good afternoon Chairman Doyle, Chairman Kissel, and Chairman Tong and members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Marcellius Edwards of the Association of Commuter Rail Employees, and with me this afternoon I have the local chairman on the Connecticut side, Mr. Michael Bernard.

We represent the organization today in support of H.B. No. 7215, section 3, an act concerning courthouse security, indemnification of law enforcement professionals, and aggravated assault of public transit employees. The Association of Commuter Rail Employees, ACRE, respectfully request the Judiciary Committee to support section 3 of Raised Bill No. 7215.

Section 3 provides enhanced protection for public transit employees against acts of aggravated assault, which a person uses or is armed with or threatened the use of, or displays or represents by such persons' words or conduct that such person possesses a knife or box cutter or pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun, or other firearm. A similar aggravated assault proposal was introduced in New York state legislator, New York Bill 9083 to address aggravated assault with a firearm against public transit employee.

ACRE is very appreciative that both New York and Connecticut are recognizing the need to provide serious penalty against people who commit acts of aggravated assault against our railroad employees. Two years ago, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a law to include railroad employees into the protections of the assault statute, section 53a-167c, public act 25 -- 215-211 section 15.

During the past two years in New York and Connecticut the ridership on railways has increased dramatically, and along with this increased ridership there has been an increase in money transactions on our train and in and around our stations causing greater risk for crimes and serious assaults. Of course, the overwhelming majority of passengers who ride our trains are good people who depend on our conductors and the team to get them to and from their destinations each day.

It might be the dad going to work from Stamford to Wall Street in Manhattan, or it might be the mom doing the same from Milford to New Haven. It could be kids riding to and from school, maybe it is family going together to a Yankee game. Whatever the reason, tens of thousands of people use Metro-North New Haven Line every day, and the number keeps growing.

Our job is to get our passengers to their destinations safely and on time. We maintain that our members do this job well, and they do it with a very high degree of professionalism [ringing]. This is happening despite one of the most difficult times in our history. Unfortunately, we continue to see the uptick in the number of unruly intoxicated or disturbed passengers who refuse to pay their fares, both other passengers, swear or act in a disorderly, harassing, or even violent manner.

These individuals scare our riders and make their trip uncomfortable. Just five months ago, on October 4, 2016 the Poughkeepsie Journal reported that Metro-North assaults of conductors were rising. We are asking that you send a message that severe violence against our members will not be tolerated. Section 3 of H.B. No. 7215 sends a strong message, commit an aggravated assault on a public transit employee with a dangerous weapon, and you could do some serious time, up to 20 years in prison under a class B felony pursuant to section 53a-35b.

We reiterate the vast majority of our customers, 99.9percent are good and decent people. Section 3 of H.B. No. 7215 will help protect our members and our passengers and help make the riding experience safe and enjoyable for everyone.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: It is only our deterrent -- it is only a deterrent that we have. Thank you for your consideration.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions -- Chairman Tong.

REP. TONG (147TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today --

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: Thank you.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- and I just want to say a word of thanks to you, and all of your colleagues for all of your work --

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: Thank you.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- on Metro-North and our railways. For folks that don't live in our neck of the woods down in lower Fairfield County, but really, I mean, it effects so many people across the state, New Haven, Shoreline East and, you know, Metro-North, Bridgeport, Stamford, you only need to be on that train at, you know, 11 p.m. on a Saturday night, and maybe not even at that time --

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: Absolutely.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- to see what you're dealing with. So, many of us appreciate and understand what you go through, and we want to be as helpful as we can be. So, thank you for being here.

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: Thank you Chairman Tong.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further comments from committee members? I see none, and Chairman Tong's point is well taken because I'm from Greater Hartford and to be honest we don't use it too much, so it's important for us to be -- appreciate it.

REP. TONG (147TH): I'll be inviting Chairman Doyle to a Yankee game this summer [laughter]. So, we'll come home at 11 o'clock at night.

MARCELLIUS EDWARDS: We'll set up an excursion [laughter].

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. Next speaker is Carolyn Naylor Flynn, then Frank Kolb, Marshall Collins. Is Ms. Flynn --

CAROLYN NAYLOR FLYNN: Good afternoon Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, and Representative Tong and the other members of the committee. I'm here with Mary Kate Smith. We will both be giving some testimony today. I am attorney in Connecticut and my practice primarily represents employees and employment matters including whistleblower retaliation matters, and I'm here in support of Raised Bill No. 929, and just part of -- I'm also part of the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association and vice-president of the Connecticut Employment Lawyers Association.

I'm here to present testimony that was written by people who've been affected -- residents of Connecticut who've been affected by whistleblower retaliation in their lives. This will be written testimony, and I'll read portions of it. Unfortunately, they were not available today, so I will read portions of it for you.

The first is from a Jacqueline Peoli. Ms. Peoli was employed as a loan processor for an FDIC approved bank, and she was employed immediately preceding the crash of the real estate market in 2007. During the time that she was employed for this bank, she noticed banks -- the bank's loan officers were committing fraudulent acts including falsifying signatures on loan applications, altering financial information provided by proposed lender, and falsely filling out blank income documentation forms signed by the loan applicant. This was done in order to get approval for high-risk loans, and she reported this activity to her immediate supervisor.

She had also observed these fraudulent practices and reported them to the executive officers of the bank. Nothing was done about it, and she was harassed daily and soon after her complaints, discharged from her employment. After being discharged from her employment, she was black listed from working within a close distance from her home and family, and her supervisor was demoted and subsequently forced to leave the company.

Her efforts to report the illegal conduct that she observed fell on deaf ears, and she paid heavily, both personal price, in terms of her financial situation, for her efforts. Unsurprisingly many of these loans went into default and the bank failed, and as you know this widespread practice led to many bank failures and an economic collapse.

If more individuals had the courage to stand up to these widespread, unethical, and illegal practices in the residential lending industry, people like Ms. Peoli might have had more of an impact and maybe prevented the economic collapse. So, she is in strong support of strengthening the whistleblower protections that are included Raised Bill No. 929.

I'm also speaking and will provide a statement from a John Hart. John Hart was a respiratory therapist. He was working for a medical supply company, and he observed activities, billing, that violated Medicare and Medicaid guidelines. He reported those activities to the Connecticut [ringing], and I'm going to pass this off to Mary Kate Smith. I'm sorry I took too much time, but he --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, please summarize, and we can ask questions.

CAROLYN NAYLOR FLYNN: Gotcha. Thank you.

MARY-KATE SMITH: Good afternoon members of the Judiciary Committee. We're trying to consolidate our testimony. I'm also an attorney -- I'm Mary-Kate Smith also an attorney of Stamford Connecticut representing primarily employees. I'm here to tell the story quickly of Kristina Lawson who really wanted to be here today, but she couldn't. We did submit some written testimony.

In 2010 she was hired as the director of English language learners for Stamford Public School. She oversaw the EL programs, which were to help students who don't speak English as the first language --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, yeah, let me interrupt for one second, just please be brief because typically one person goes up and one person gets three minutes. So, one person was signed up, two people went up, and I'll be honest we do -- the whole process of three minutes is so everyone can speak in a timely basis. So, just please summarize. No disrespect, but please summarize.

MARY-KATE SMITH: Thank you, I'm sorry. I was -- I'm signed up later, just wanted to consolidate it quickly. Essentially what she does was she reported -- so the -- Stamford received funding from the Federal Government for these programs, they weren't -- they had improprieties. She reported it internally, and she was demoted, isolated, and she wanted to fix it and couldn't because -- so instead of reporting it externally she reported internally and was demoted, and so with the proposed Raised Bill No. 929, she would have been protected.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Let me just ask. So, what did -- what -- and getting to the impact and the language of the bill, what do you got -- do you have opinion on the actual content of the language of the bill? Why would that benefit your clients you think?

MARY-KATE SMITH: Well, the new bill -- well let me say this, the way the bill currently or the -- sorry the statute is currently written, it only protects those employees who whistleblower or exposed illegal or unlawful conduct externally to external agencies not within their -- like to their employers or to their supervisors. The proposed or the Raised Bill No. 929 fixes that and so she would -- Kristy Lawson would have been protected under this statute --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay.

MARY-KATE SMITH: -- had this language been incorporated.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

CAROLYN NAYLOR FLYNN: And regarding Mr. Hart's story, he at the time of -- that he experienced whistleblower retaliation his wife was a cancer survivor, but they were in a desperate financial situation. The expanding of the damages for someone who sticks their neck out to speak up against what they believe is unethical and illegal conduct, if they're retaliated against, they lose their job, they lose their income, so expanding the damages if very important in terms of it acknowledges -- the compensatory damages acknowledge the emotional distress that can come along in the circumstances, what they experience, and the punitive damage is to protect this from happening in the future.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

MARY-KATE SMITH: Thank you.

CAROLYN NAYLOR FLYNN: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Frank Kolb. Is Mr. -- yep Frank's here, then we have Marshall Collins, then we have Bob Kocienda. Mr. Kolb, and I'm sorry if I mispronounced your name.

FRANK KOLB: Actually Senator you didn't mispronounce it, it's spelled wrong. It should be Kolb, not D. Thank you. Members of the committee, Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear here today in support of S.B. No. 366.

S.B. No. 366 is essentially a modification and an updating of the current statute 52-260. A little bit of history why I'm here today. Three and a half years ago, I was appointed as the town labor attorney for the town of East Haven. Being an attorney, I noticed that there were many officers and firefighters just hanging around the courthouse on a daily basis. They were there by virtue of subpoenas being issued. Lawyers, such as myself, frequently abused the process because they're not paying for the officer to be there in court.

Hence, subpoenas are issued, as I said in my written testimony, which I won't go over again, they're subpoenaed to appear in court at times when there's absolutely no way that these officers would be called to testify, such as 9:30 in the morning when court won't start until at least 10. When there's jury selection, when jury -- the selection of the jury is not going to take place, and the trial is not going to start until a week later.

Noticing that, I looked at 52-260, and I found out that 52-260 was originally enacted in 1949. It provides witness fees in the amount of 50 cents per day for regular non-witness to appear. It also provides for the normal fee -- for a reasonable rate for healthcare professionals, certified public accountants, and surveyors, but it left behind our first responders such as police and fire, 52-260 says that they only get paid $100 dollars a day.

Now, 52-260 as written and the S.B. No. 366 as proposed, the real target is civil suits not criminal actions or the opposition that was heard earlier this morning for the administrative agencies of the state of Connecticut to perform their investigations. I'm not talking about going there with this, we're talking about private attorneys, subpoenaing police officers or other members -- other employees of the government, and by the way, this does apply to state police, local police subpoenaed, and we're on tight budget times as I'm sure you know better than I. This would shift the burden, make those who want the services pay for those services.

There was one opposition testimony that I read on-line, and that person addressed family court, well there's already mechanisms in family court for waiver of fees and cost should the person not be able to afford. We're talking about those people that can afford, large law firms subpoenaing police officers to sit for hours without reimbursing the town less to back fill the position.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, thank you. Any questions from the committee? Mr. Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chair. Just real quick, and maybe this was asked of a previous witness and I missed it, but do we have any idea of what the fiscal impact to the state this would be?

FRANK KOLB: To the state? No, but I can tell you what its been in the town East Haven in the last three and a half years as an example. Most -- what --- the procedure that has been followed is when a town employee, whether it be the first responder or somebody such as the town clerk gets a subpoena it gets forwarded to me, and I send a letter out telling the attorney who issued the subpoena that we will comply with the subpoena, however, the town wants to charge them for our out-of-pocket costs in having that person appear.

With the policemen or a fireman, as I said in my written testimony, we have to pay them for five hours, whether they're there for an hour or not because the Collective Bargaining Agreement in control, we have to pay them for five hours. I can tell you that in at least 75 percent of the cases that I send a letter that says you're going to pay, they say we don't want them. So, that really sends home the idea of abuse of process.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): No, I certainly can appreciate that and can understand that, and, you know, certainly on behalf of my municipality Bridgeport, I'm sure the costs are exponentially more than they would be in East Haven, but I guess the flip side to that is that this is sort of one of those classic situations of -- does the municipality foot the bill or does the state. I mean because the flip side to that is every time the public defender's office tries to subpoena somebody to testify in court, now all of sudden the public defender's officer is going to be on the hook for that, or every time the state's attorney tries to subpoena somebody to testify --

FRANK KOLB: Focus is not on criminal cases.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): But would it apply in criminal cases?

FRANK KOLB: I think not, and I think if you look at 52-260 as it current exist, it addresses criminal cases. So, I would suggest to this committee that 52-260 and S.B. No. 366 be made to work together to come up with something that would exclude criminal matters. Quite frankly when we have -- the officer receives a subpoena for a criminal case, the letter never goes out requesting payment.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Right. So, how -- so break that down for me then. So, in the town of East Haven, the circumstances in which a police officer or firefighter would be subpoenaed, I mean, are we typically talking traffic accidents then? Is that the typical case --

FRANK KOLB: Usually it is a traffic accident, or recently I had a case where the attorney subpoenaed a police officer to attend a motor vehicle hearing wherein that person's license was subject to suspension at a motor vehicle hearing, and I sent the letter to the lawyer. The lawyer called me and said frank, you know, I use this as a free disposition, which they couldn't get on the free side, to be used when he got to his criminal court. So, I think that sends home the abuse of process that we're seeing, that they had no intention of really needing him, and by the way if the Motor Vehicle Department has subpoenaed a request for an officer to appear, which happened just a short time before that, the officer went and no letter.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): But that motor vehicle case would be -- is generally a quasi-criminal proceeding, because usually that's a situation where somebody has been charged with driving under the influence, and they have a hearing on whether their license should be suspended and for how long --

FRANK KOLB: That is correct.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): -- and as a part of the underlying criminal case. So --

FRANK KOLB: I guess it depends on who subpoenas him. If the state wants him, they get him free, if the individual wants him for a free disposition, that's when they get the charge and that's what we're asking for in S.B. No. 366.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay, all right well maybe we'll look at the language moving forward.

FRANK KOLB: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

FRANK KOLB: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Marshall Collins, Bob Kocienda and Paul Ruszczyk. Paul I apologize. Marshall Collins.

MARSHALL COLLINS: Thank you very much. My name is Marshall Collins. Taking your request to consolidate together, I am appearing on behalf of the three Chambers of Commerce, Greater Danbury, Northwest Connecticut, and the Milford Chamber of Commerce, and the Connecticut Coalition of Property Owners, which is the largest, small, and mid-sized landlord group in the state. We support H.B. No. 7197.

It clearly -- both organizations, both groups have filed testimony, which you should have. A couple points, one this certainly is time for an increase. The last increase was nearly 12 years ago. Historically the legislator has increased the jurisdiction due to inflation and so forth every five years, but again last increase was 12 years. This remains a small amount, $7,500 dollars sounds like a lot, but the consumer price index alone justifies something over $6,500 dollars, but again if you look at things like rent and medical expenses, the rate of inflation for those has far, far exceeded the CPI.

It's important to note in this, this is a court of equity, small claims court. I should point out that I served on the taskforce to reform small-claims court along with various -- with the magistrates, the judicial department, my good friend Mr. Podolsky who will testify later.

No rights have changed in this process, and this doesn't do that. The goal is equal access to justice in this proposal, this does that. When you talk to businesses and landlords they will, you know, they know, they understand. This makes it easier for a bad landlord or a bad business to be sued just as it does for a small business or a small landlord, somebody who owns a duplex, to sue -- to collect some money owed to them. It cuts both ways. That's what equal access to justice is about.

I wanted to comment on some of the other things that were in here. The judicial department didn't oppose it and suggested changing the effective date to January 1. We absolutely agreed that makes sense, hadn't picked that up in the draft. The magistrates seem to be support it, the only people that seem to be opposing it I guess kind of are the Bar Association, and they had a suggestion of, well they might be willing to go to $6,500 dollars if you could limit the number of cases.

I really have some questions about the constitutionality of that, and the wisdom of limiting access to a small business who may have a number of collections that they need to do. The idea again is equal access to justice, this does that. This is an old issue, this idea of limiting the number of cases, and I can tell you that the taskforce, when we consider that, and it was a real treat to spend my summer in those meetings trying to reform small-claims court, but that issue was not supported. It was rejected, nothing came out on limiting that.

It makes fiscal sense to increase this jurisdiction [ringing], and I'll summarize. We had -- we heard that there's -- Representative Smith I think commented on, there's been some creative approaches to filing multiple cases. This would allow -- this would eliminate some of those multiple cases being filed, and it makes sense to move these things out of superior court into small-claims court, which is cheaper.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from committee members? Mr. Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chair. Just real quickly for our recollection on the small claims process. Is there -- does the defendant have a right removal in the small claims process? Can they transfer to superior court?

MARSHALL COLLINS: It's my understanding that the answer to that is yes. You can move that. Anybody -- you can do that.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay. Okay thanks.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Chairman Tong.

REP. TONG (147TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. So, just a question about the volume. You touched on that volume issue. So, do we have any sense of what the impact would be in terms of case load and how an increase in cases would be administered if any? Have you had those conversations? I know Marshall that we've worked on this issue over the last couple of years --

MARSHALL COLLINS: Correct.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- there have been various negotiations and discussions about it. So, I just wanted to --

MARSHALL COLLINS: It's a good -- no, it's a good question. The -- I don't have, you know, I can't tell you that it would mean five percent or two percent or any number like that. We do -- obviously your right. There was a bill in last year to take this to $10,000 dollars, we thought that was too high, didn't support that. Before we did go down the road with asking to see if this bill would be introduced, we did ask the judicial department if they had a problem with the transfer, especially because of the -- we know the budget constraints that their facing, your facing, and certainly it's going to be something less of a case, of a workload for the superior court, and it'll be something more for the small claims court, and at $200 dollars a day for magistrates, it seems to make fiscal sense to do that, and I don't think there's going to be any massive backlog, because you will see some of that -- the creative approach that we talked about, where people will file a $5,000 dollar case and then another $2,000 dollar case, you'll see those consolidated. So, it's a hard one to get a handle on.

It's a nice way of -- it's a long answer to your question sort of saying I don't know.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Actually, let me ask you a question where I'm confused. I -- maybe I -- there's not two cases filed on the same situation?

MARSHALL COLLINS: What you could have is if let's say a small landlord, somebody with a duplex, is owed several months of rent. They could sit there and file a case for $5,000 dollars for back rent or something like that and then they could file another case for $2,000 dollars or $2,500 dollars for damages or something that was done to recover a security deposit.

There's -- Representative Smith I think was the one who commented earlier, there are some creative things done -- or somebody commented whether it was Mr. Salcedo or whatever, but sometimes you'll see, you know, $4,000 dollars or $5,000 dollar claims in a motor vehicle thing. This would allow some consolidation, and it would eliminate some workload, but again, I can't put a handle on it --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah.

MARSHALL COLLINS: -- I'm not going to try to quantify --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): But also, I'm not sure that's legitimate either. If your -- if it's a tight -- what -- I think there could be an argument made that one lawsuit is appropriate, not two, depending on the circumstances.

MARSHALL COLLINS: I'm not disagreeing with you on that at all, but it does happen.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, in the real world it happens, yeah.

MARSHALL COLLINS: Sure.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Representative Gonzalez, do you have a question?

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Yes, thank you Mr. Chair. Good afternoon.

MARSHALL COLLINS: Thank you, yes.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Right now, and help me understand this, right now if I'm unemployed came in small court -- in small claim court, the fees are what $95 dollars?

MARSHALL COLLINS: I think it's $95 dollars, yes.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Okay --

MARSHALL COLLINS: I don't practice that kind of law --

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): I, yeah, I think it's $95 dollars. So, if I -- let's say that I take my coat to the laundry and let's say they messed it up, so I -- let's say my -- and the value of the coat let's say is $250 dollars. Okay, so I got to pay $95 to go and claim for $250 dollars. If I end up losing, I will lose $250 dollars plus $95 dollars, right?

MARSHALL COLLINS: Correct.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Right. So, you're saying that you supported this bill to increase --

MARSHALL COLLINS: You raise a -- someone earlier floated the idea of variable fees, and I haven't really looked at that. Obviously there could be a fiscal note on that. We really don't have a position on the idea of staggered fees for different amounts. It's something that could be talked about, but I don't know what the fiscal note on that would be so that's why we haven't talked about that.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): So --

MARSHALL COLLINS: But it gets to your point Representative Gonzalez.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Yeah, because if -- okay let's say that all that I will pay is $95 dollars for a claim, but let's say that I have -- I'm going to -- I'm claiming maybe more, let's say $2,000 dollars, still the payment is what? It's $95 dollars for me to -- for a small claim? $95 dollars?

MARSHALL COLLINS: Yes ma'am.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): So, you don't think that maybe we can check on the value of whatever we put the claim for because I don't think that it's fair for me to pay, you know, a lot of money if I'm going -- if I end up losing my claim then I'm going to lose a lot of money.

MARSHALL COLLINS: Some of my small landlords and small business people aren't happy about having seen the fees increase over the years either because they do try and collect on some small amounts owed to them, but -- so -- but again we don't have a position on that, but I --

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): And right --

MARSHALL COLLINS: -- we could talk about it.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): -- right, and right now it's not a lot of lawyers taking those cases because there's not a lot of money involved. As soon as we raise this, then we're going to have a lot of lawyers out there. Is that correct? That's possible?

MARSHALL COLLINS: I don't think you're going to see a flood of lawyers, you know, because you increased from $5,000 dollars to $7,500 dollars. It -- there's still, when you think of the amount of time, and even if they take a third of the fee, it's not -- it's still not worth it.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Well maybe for -- maybe you say it's not worth it, but right now I think that there's not a lawyer taking those cases, but if we raise this I think that we'll see maybe more lawyers out there.

MARSHALL COLLINS: Knowing what attorneys charge per hour, I can't imagine a lot are going to want to jump in for the difference. It's not going to be -- some, yes, but most no.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Okay, thank you. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you Representative Gonzalez. Any other questions for Mr. Collins. Seeing none, thank you.

MARSHALL COLLINS: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): I'd just like to point out Representative Gonzalez from my experience, these cases' lawyers, for a person to hire me or another lawyer for these small things are not worth it. I tell people do it yourself because it's just not worth -- lawyers have to, you know, earn a living, and if it's going to take 10 or 15 hours for a claim of $5,000 or $6,000 dollars, it's not fair to the person, so I don't think this is going to be a big significant change because I personally just, it's not fair to the potential client to have to pay the lawyer a lot of money, because the lawyer has to prepare, so it's probably best to do it yourself, you know. Thank you.

Next speaker is Bob Kocienda then Paul Ruszczyk, then Danielle Carter, and Mike Rigg.

AMANDA BARKER: Bob Kocienda is actually the advisor of our activism organization, and the three of us are here to testify on behalf of our organization. Hello Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong and members of the committee. My name is Amanda Barker, and I'm here with Portia Faroque, [phonetic] Melina Dunawah [phonetic] and we are members -- we're all members from two youth activism groups in Norwalk and Stamford. We would like to thank you for allowing the three of us to testify together.

On behalf of our combined 200 members, we are testifying in support on H.B. No. 5442, an act concerning the legal age to marry in the state, especially given the committees decision to eliminate the exemptions of child marriages as outline in section 46b-30 of the statutes.

Promise them heaven and they'll fall you to hell is the quote we use with some frequency during our work on a number of issues. We're reminded of it when we adopted child marriage as one of our causes, and it's something that our friend, Bushra, can attest to from personal experience.

BUSHRA FAROOQ: My story may not be as dramatic as others, but I came this close to a hell that I would not wish upon anyone. When I was 13, just four years ago, my mother married for the second time, we met my entire step-family in Bangladesh soon after the wedding, and I was content with the idea of new members growing my extended family.

Once I returned home to the states to start my freshmen year of high school, however, my step dad questioned my future. What I was to do, who I was to spend it with. I thought he was genuinely concerned about me. I could not have been more wrong. He was looking to marry me to one of his nephews. My mother knew but didn't say anything as to not jeopardize her marriage.

At first I was able to fight off the idea of marriage, acting like a child does, rebelling and proving that I couldn't -- that if I couldn't watch out for myself, how was I going to watch out for a family of my own, but my stepfather kept pushing. He even offered to pay my college tuition if I married his nephew. That episode passed, but the stress took a toll on my emotions.

When I turned 16 my mom expressed support for my getting married. She has always wanted to keep me safe, and the idea of a man protecting a woman was gold. That was when I started to become even more secretive. I wouldn't tell my mother about any guy I liked, because I was afraid that she would try to get me married to them. It stressed me out. I lost control of myself and ended doing terribly in school.

My mom has since backed off the idea of my marriage. Our relationship is healthy again, and I'm focusing on school and my own individual future. I cannot help but think though that the experiences over the past four years have shaped my life forever.

AMANDA BARKER: Unfortunately, Bushra's experience is far too common for far too many girls in the United States. Granted the number of girls married before the age 18 in America does not compare to the number of underage girls married in developing countries, but there is cause for concern, and fortunately a call for action per H.B. No. 5442.

According to Save The Children International each year 15 million girls worldwide are married before the age of 18. In developing countries, one in three is married before 18 and one in nine before the age of 15. This and other examples lead the U.S. State Department to declare child marriage a human rights abuse and one of the most extreme violations of children's rights.

MILCENA DONOMA: The United States is not immune from child marriage in two ways, one the number of minors who marry, many under duress, and two state laws that allow such marriages [ringing] may I continue?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yes, please summarize. Thank you.

MILCENA DONOMA: State laws that allow such marriages to take place. According to Unchained At Last, a non-profit based in New Jersey, the total number of children who are wed in America between 2000 and 2010 is estimated at nearly 248,000. In Connecticut from 2000 to 2014 there are 1,140 child brides under the age of 18.

While most states set 18 as the minimum marriage age, exemptions in every state allow children younger than 18 to marry, typically with parental consent, which can hide coercion or judicial approval. Some states even include pregnancy, which can be evidence of rape. As an exemption, the laws in 27 states, including Connecticut, do not specify an age below which a child cannot marry.

Regardless of one's country of origin, the consequences of child marriage can be devastating. It starts a cycle of disadvantage that denies girls the opportunity to learn and develop. U.S. research shows that children who marry have more mental health issues, are much more likely to live in poverty, and that teen girls in particular are extremely vulnerable to physical, emotional, or verbal abuse.

Furthermore, American girls who marry before 19 are 50percent more likely than their unmarried peers to drop out of high school and four times less likely to graduate from college, thereby affecting their ability to maximize their earning potential and provide for their families. You are fortunate to have with you today Fraidy Reiss, the founder and executive director of Unchained At Last. Her organization is at the forefront of child marriage research and legislative action especially in New Jersey, New York, and Maryland.

We encourage you to take advantage of her appearance.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Chairman Tong.

REP. TONG (147TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you so much, the three of you for coming up here and really having the courage to testify on this issue, for taking responsibilities for yourselves and your lives and for your peers and for standing up for them, and as someone from Stamford, we're incredibly proud of you for your activism, particularly Bushra, I want to take you for speaking up. I can only imagine how difficult this was for you and for your family.

I haven't had the same experience but for many of us trying to balance between our cultural traditions and the norms in our families and the rights that we have as Americans can be difficult sometimes. It's a constant tension, but I think you've handled it really well with great maturity and grace, and I want to commend you, and I will say if your mom's watching right now, she clearly has done something right in raising such a strong young woman. So, thank you for speaking out and for standing up for yourself and many others like you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I have a comment. So, let me -- I haven't really thought too much about it, but let me ask you this. Do you think there's any circumstance where someone under 18 should be permitted to get married? I mean the bill says none, do you guys -- and clearly what's outline here is horrible, but I guess my thought is, is it appropriate, and I don't know, and what if we just said -- took parental consent out of it and you -- a court -- a probate court judge could authorize it, or is that not good? Absolutely no ability to have a minor get married?

AMANDA BARKER: We still feel that they should not be able to get married because the research shows that they're more likely to be abused and go into poverty and experience mental health issues if you get married under the age of 18.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): So even if the court had a hearing to review it, you still think -- okay, thank you. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you for coming up [applause]. Next speaker is Paul Ruszczyk. I apologize again Paul, you'll have to correct me, then Danielle Carter, then Mike Rigg, then Stephen Rich. Paul -- and then please give me the proper pronunciation of your name. Ruszczyk okay, easy, Ruszczyk.

PAUL RUSZCZYK: Yes. My name is Paul Ruszczyk. I'm a Connecticut state magistrate, and I've been practicing law in Connecticut since 1986. I'm here speaking on -- in behalf of H.B. No. 7197 regarding the increase of the monetary limit in small claims cases from $5,000 dollars to $7,500 dollars.

I'm a member of the Connecticut State Magistrates Association, and I'm also on the board, but I do not speak for the board or for the Magistrates Association. There's no consensus on the board or in the Magistrates Associations regarding this bill, so I speak strictly on behalf of myself. I've also submitted written testimony. I noted in that testimony that the current $5,000-dollar limit was put into place in 2005 and just by inflation alone a come up with, and I'm not the greatest in math, but I come up with the fact that just mathematically the rate ought to be increased to about $6,394 dollars or about $6,500 dollars, as the gentleman earlier spoke.

I cannot tell you how many times over the years' people have come to me in my law practice and said I've got a claim of $5,000 dollars or $6,000 dollars or $7,000 dollars or $8,000 dollars, and I have to say to them, there's no reason for you to hire an attorney to do this case. The best thing for you to do would be to go to small claims case -- court, waive any claim over $5,000 dollars and just seek the $5,000 dollars, and a lot of times they just do that.

I also believe that the court's fee structure -- so therefore I think that raising the limit would allow more people to go -- more people to get more of their claims heard and more justice in small claims court. I also believe that the fee structure of $95 dollars discourages many people from bringing their claims.

Yes, if you win your case, you get your $95 dollars, but a lot of times people they get the -- they win their case, but then it turns out that their defendant is out of state, they can't collect it, and so that $95 dollars is a factor in these claims. What I would recommend rather than a three-tier system would be that anybody who brings more -- less than two or few cases a year would pay something like $30 for a case. Whereas people who bring more than two cases a year, and that would include things like hospitals, credit card companies, major companies, they would pay the full $95 dollars, and I think that would not affect the economics of it, in terms of the court, but it would -- very small claims to bring their cases.

I don't have anything else to say. If you have any questions, please let me know.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): You're right on time, perfect. Any questions from the committee? Thank you very much. Oh, sorry, Representative Gonzalez. You got to raise that hand for me, thank you.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Yeah, thank you. Thank you. You said that less than two cases will pay, you said $30 dollars?

PAUL RUSZCZYK: Two or less -- two or fewer cases, $30 dollars. I mean this would incur -- this would be -- take into consideration the people with a code or the people, you know, who have some kind of small claims, but yet the thousands and thousands and thousands of cases that are filed by credit card companies every year, they would pay the full $95 dollars, that would be my suggestion.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Okay, thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): And your suggestion would be -- now in the real world you have to figure this out. So, it can't be done -- because of volume of the prior year, because, you know, once you start January 2nd, when I do my one and, you know, Acme credit card company does number two, you probably have to do it for the prior year figures.

PAUL RUSZCZYK: No I think you do it that year. You have -- if I file a case on January 1 and I filed on January 2, the courts would have the records of my filings. My third case, I'd pay $95 dollars.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, well I'm sure I'd hear from judicial, that'd probably --

PAUL RUSZCZYK: I don't think it would be that hard.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Well, I've heard -- Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thanks. Where -- we've been sort of bantering about this up here, and we're trying to think of an analogous situation because I -- it just -- it strikes as sort of almost, I don't want to say constitutional, but it seems like sort of an access to justice problem that you sit there and say, okay it's cheaper for the first couple of filings, but after that we're going to jack up the filing fee on you.

PAUL RUSZCZYK: There's a couple of states that do that. There's at least one state that does that. There's -- and also even in our superior court we charged a lower filing fee for a claim less than $2,500 dollars than we do for a claim that's more than $2,500 dollars.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Right, no, I get that in terms of the amount of the claim and that makes a lot of sense to me. I think we've -- its been suggested on this committee before that we should actually have an increased filing fee and a separate docket for higher-end cases and the like, that's fine, but I guess there's a difference between sort of the amount in dispute, and the filing being based on the amount in disputes, as opposed to sort of the number of times you file -- the number of filings in a particular year.

PAUL RUSZCZYK: I don't know about the constitutional, but I just think from a practical perspective, that would capture the vast -- the $95 dollars would capture the vast majority of the cases that are filed while allowing the poor person with a burned coat to file their claim and pay only $30 dollars.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): All right. Thanks.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions? I see none. Thank you very much. Next speaker is Danielle Carter, then Michael Rigg, Stephen Rich, Louise DiCocco. Danielle Carter.

DANIELLE CARTER: Good afternoon Judiciary Committee. Thank you for allowing me to speak to you today concerning bill H.B. No. 7214. I have a lot of health issues, and these issues make it -- significantly affect everyday life. Simple things like taking a shower can be difficult and sometimes impossible. My service dog, Zeva, helps me do everyday tasks. In doing this, she has given the ability to function more normally than was ever thought possible.

My whole family and I rely on Zeva to keep me alive and uninjured. This means there are times that she can't -- has to be completely focused on me. Zeva is taught to ignore distractions, so it can be hard when people try incessantly to distract her.

One of the most important ways Zeva helps me is by performing the task balance and brace. People don't seem to know or care that by trying to get Zeva's attention when she is doing this, they can make me fall. Even when I try and explain why it's so important for them to ignore Zeva, they will still attempt to distract her.

A common method of distraction includes trying to call her over and when that fails using food to solicit her attention. I also have a tendency to get very dizzy, and this can lead to me passing out. Zeva helps me get to a safe place and sit down, and then she sits in my lap. While she does this, she monitors me, and if I need help, she will get a family member or friend who knows how to handle these issues.

One time she was helping me because I was dizzy, while she was doing her job someone asked to pet her. I politely explained that she was working and couldn't be distracted at the moment. Instead of ignoring Zeva like she should have, the person then went on to make kissy noises trying to get Zeva to go over to her.

Thankfully, Zeva knew not to get up, which would have caused me to fall. I would also like to add that I often lose my ability to speak, which makes communicating do not pet my dog very difficult. I'm not the only one who can hurt if someone harasses Zeva. She can get hurt as well.

Zeva has a special harness she wears to make balance and brace work easier for the both of us. If this harness is used incorrectly, Zeva can suffer severe injuries that may lead her to no longer being able to act as a service dog. I have people come over and grab or pull on this harness. I always make it very clear to them that they cannot do this, but that does not always stop them. If Zeva is injured and cannot work, this means that not only she is very unhappy, but it also stops me from doing my daily activities.

The last time she was injured, I had to stay home until she was able to function as a service dog again. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak here today. I hope I have helped to prove to you that the -- the importance of passing this bill.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none. Ms. Carter, we did have a discussion earlier with another person testifying. An issue arose in the situation like, you know, clearly, I mean, you've kind of described some of the situations where you tell a person, you know, please don't distract my dog because it's on the job, and people ignore and that's the situation we're addressing. However, the concern of some is if before you say anything a person walks up and, you know, before you figure it out the person is petting the dog, and you did not direct them not to, we want to try to avoid a criminal penalty on that.

Does that happen much or is usually can tell the person to, you know, before they get involved you tell them to please back off?

DANIELLE CARTER: Most of the time I ask them to stop petting the dog or I ask them to ignore the dog, and they completely ignore me and continue.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Most of the time, really?

DANIELLE CARTER: Yeah, or I've also a lot of times I get them petting the dog while saying I know I shouldn't pet you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Well that's -- so, you -- it happens -- so most of the time people ignore you really. Is that what you find?

DANIELLE CARTER: Yeah.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Really? That's too bad. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you, and thank you for taking the time to come up and testify.

DANIELLE CARTER: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Mike Rigg and Stephen Rich, Louise DiCocco, Justin Baldwin. Mike Rigg.

MIKE RIGG: Good afternoon. My name is Michael Rigg. I am a defense attorney. I primarily represent hospitals and physicians who are sued for medical malpractice. I'm here today to testify in opposition to S.B. No. 932, an act establishing a statutory cause of action for injury to person or property based on negligent infliction of emotional distress. Primarily the reason why I'm testifying in opposition to 932 is that it's unnecessary. The law in Connecticut is already that a plaintiff can sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

This bill appears to expand the ability of plaintiffs to sue for emotional distress claims that would greatly expand the scope of risk I believe to hospitals and physicians, which is an area that I'm familiar with, where they could be sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Such as if a physician has to tell a patient something that may be troubling about the care that they're receiving some other aspect of it, the physician would be exposed or nurse would be exposed to being sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the same would be the hospitals.

In addition to that simply the fact that not only does it expand the scope of the ability to sue for emotional stress, it also expands the kinds of damages that can be claimed. Traditionally, when a defendant is sued for negligence, the only type of damages that can be recovered are compensatory damages. This would allow plaintiffs to also seek to recover both punitive damages and then separately attorney's fee for the cost of bringing such claims.

I did read the trial lawyers written testimony on this. They appear to be saying that the rationale for doing that is that lawyers will not have the economic incentive to bring such claims unless it's at least potentially possible for them to claim punitive damages and attorney's fees, but I've just listened to testimony about a bill that would expand the ability to bring small claim actions by pro se litigants. That sounds like a better compromise than expanding the kids of damages that can be recovered in claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and it would lead to pretty much an absurd situation where, at least according to the trial lawyers that if a person suffered such a severe injury, let's say the lost the use of their arm. They wouldn't be allowed to claim punitive damages or attorney's fees, but if their car was damaged somehow that they could. That's a strange anomaly to adopt in the case law, and of course it conflicts with over a century of jurisprudence that punitive damages and attorney's fees are not awarded in negligence actions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? Representative -- Dr. Srinivasan.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon Mr. Riggs, good to see you here.

MIKE RIGG: Good afternoon.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): You began your testimony by saying that this bill, 932, was unnecessary and plaintiffs can already -- that it can all -- sue already for emotional distress. So, could you expand on that and tell us where they can sue as it is without any changes?

MIKE RIGG: Yeah, and this is actually outlined by the trial lawyers who support this bill is that it is already the law in -- under Connecticut common law to sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but I would point out that Connecticut law on this area is probably the most favorable in the country.

Most states limit the ability to sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress where the person has to prove outrageous or extreme behavior, not so in Connecticut. It's a much lower bar already that exist in the law to be able to sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and so what this bill does is it expands it even further to say that if your car was damaged or there was some kind of property damage that you can sue for that, and at least currently the decisions are not to allow that so that -- that's, I'd say the principal, difference between Connecticut and other states is that our law already is very plaintiff-friendly.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): In your testimony you mentioned that you have expertise with hospitals, physicians, and that group, but in this law, as you see this in 932, would it apply only to those areas of your expertise or would it be across the board?

MIKE RIGG: No. This applies across the board. I have a particular interest with respect to hospitals and doctors, but this would apply particularly in the employment context. Let's say you have an employer who disciplines and employee, which of course is inherently stressful, now the employer has exposed himself or herself to a lawsuit for negligent infliction of emotional distress under this law the way -- at least the way that it's written. Because it doesn't create any sort of exceptions for anyone, and so based in Connecticut is what we call a plain language state, meaning that the courts are supposed to interpret law as based on the language in the law, and this would clearly apply in the -- in that particular context where you could have employees claiming that suffered emotional distress in the way that they were terminated or the way that they were spoken to by their boss or any superior, and I can see how that would have a really dramatic chilling effect on employment in Connecticut. That's pretty easy to see.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): In your testimony you mentioned what's happening in other states, neighboring states, other states in the union. So, if you could expand on that? Where do we in Connecticut fall with this or without this?

MIKE RIGG: Right. Lawyers rely on something and so do judges, something called the restatement of torts, and in the restatement of torts and in the majority of states in the country, in order to bring a claim for emotional distress, the plaintiff, whether it's a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff has to satisfy something, show that the behavior that they say caused their emotional distress was extreme and outrageous, and that's a very high bar in those states.

It has to involve behavior that is just socially unacceptable. I think of one Connecticut -- older Connecticut case where it involved a grocer who sent a dead rat to a customer instead of a loaf bread as a joke, as an attempt at bad humor. That's the type of behavior that traditionally you had to establish throughout the country and even in Connecticut, but Connecticut case law changed where they've relaxed that standard.

So, there's a case at the appellate level where it was a wedding planner, made a mistake and the bride-to-be, her location was canceled, and she was allowed to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, what this bill would do is expand upon that and say that she could get punitive damages and attorney's fee in addition to the money that she recovered.

So, already Connecticut is much more, like I said, plaintiff-friendly in this particular area as compared with the vast majority of states.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): We know where we are, unfortunately, in our business climate, and with the business climate in our state being the way it is, be it large or small businesses, and saying that this is going to be expanding it even further, would it be a further concern for all of us as to how it could negatively impact our business climate?

MIKE RIGG: Well, yeah, because it's just sort of a further, I mean I guess the perception of Connecticut is that it's not business friendly, this would be another basis for -- to make Connecticut less competitive, less attractive to businesses. If it appears that employees can bring claims based on behavior that they don't -- you know, that they feel is rude or disrespectful towards them, and so that's going to make it less desirable for businesses either to stay in Connecticut or to locate -- relocate and come to Connecticut.

It would seem to me given -- the law would be clear that that would be exposed to significant liability in employment matters.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): And my final question to you is, it is generally felt that it is very difficult to retain the physicians in our state and healthcare providers for multiple reasons, and do you feel that a comprehensive look at it will perform if this were to move forward, it would further impair the availability of physicians and healthcare providers who come out of institutions in our state, but choose not to stay back in our state?

MIKE RIGG: Right, there has been some recent reports in various publications in Connecticut, I can think of the Hartford Current, that has talked about how young physicians, they'll get trained in Connecticut, but they leave, that Connecticut is having real difficulty keeping young doctors in Connecticut, they're leaving, and I think one of the reasons for that is that Connecticut is commonly viewed as one of the worst states in which to practice medicine because of the litigation climate.

So, I think that while lawsuits -- medical malpractice lawsuits benefit me personally, because the more lawsuits means more business for me, what I've seen is that I think it would be a good idea to have a comprehensive review of what Connecticut could do to try to stem the tide of young physicians leaving Connecticut because older physicians, of course, are beginning to retire, and we are seeing in certain practice areas we just don't have doctors and hospitals, who I primarily represent, are having a hard time, especially the smaller community hospitals, are having a very hard time having certain types of specialist available to treat patients, particularly patients who are seen on an urgent or an emergency basis, they just don't have certain specialist, especially at the small community hospitals.

I can think of two that have had a very difficult time attracting certain kinds of specialist.

REP. SRINIVASAN (31ST): Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? Chairman Tong.

REP. TONG (147TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your testimony today.

MIKE RIGG: Thanks.

REP. TONG (147TH): Just a question about the comment you just made about young doctors and the litigation climate. Are you aware of any data around that? I'm interested to know whether there's any data, empirical data, that shows that young doctors are, as a group, concerned about the litigation climate, and frankly what litigation climate they're concerned about and how that is impairing their practice.

I must tell you, I've asked for that information, I've not seen it. So, I'm wondering if you because those are pretty important claims that people make.

MIKE RIGG: Yeah. There's the general data having to do with, and I can give you the -- I didn't bring it with me, I can give you the reports that were recently issued on the difficulty Connecticut is having in retaining young physicians, but as I understand your question, you're asking something a little bit more specific, that is are they not staying specifically because of the litigation climate.

I'm not aware of a particular study that's been done on that. I can't think of anybody who has a -- like an institutional interest in doing that. What I will say though is that as we've all learned in law school. Lawsuits are supposed to affect behavior. In fact, that's the Connecticut Supreme Court has said, is there are two purposes to lawsuits, one is to compensate the innocent toward victim, the other is to affect behavior, and so, for example, we don't allow negligence lawsuits against police officers or prosecutors because of the chilling effect that would have on their professional activities or myself.

Lawyers enjoy what is called a litigation privilege, even if you're a private attorney, and that's based upon the common-sense notion that lawsuits can affect professional behavior, and the -- what I see is that because there is anecdotally an atmosphere, like for example I had a trial finish about two or three weeks ago. It was against a pediatric gastroenterologist, and he got sued several years ago, and he decided to leave Connecticut because of the lawsuit, and he went to another state.

So, I can tell you about instances anecdotally, but I'm not aware of an organization that decided to do a study, but I also don't think that an organization, if it were to ask doctors particular questions, you know, did you do this specifically because of lawsuits that you've heard about or that you've been involved in. My hunch is that it would be many reasons, including -- but I think including that and just --

REP. TONG (147TH): But I thought, I think I heard you say that in your opinion there was a primary reason or driver, and I'm trying to get to the bottom of that because you're asking us as policy makers to make a decision based on the information you provide in your testimony. I'm not sure I'm hearing any -- I should also, just for the record I think it's important to note that as a practicing lawyer and a member of the Bars of two states, you know, I'm subject to sue in both states for malpractice and any other place frankly where I practice law.

I should also note that state law enforcement officers and federal law enforcement officers are, you know, they are accountable to various statutes that hold them accountable for their misconduct. For example, section 1983 suits against state law enforcement officers and state officials, so we're not immune in any sense of the word from liability for our misconduct, so I wanted to make that clear.

MIKE RIGG: Well, if --

REP. TONG (147TH): I'm sure you would agree with that, that you're not immune from malpractice in your negligence in the performance of your duties.

MIKE RIGG: I'm not immune, I'm immune from certain --

REP. TONG (147TH): I know you're not immune, and neither am I.

MIKE RIGG: -- I'm immune -- yes, I am immune from certain types of activities that I engage in, it's the litigation privilege, for example --

REP. TONG (147TH): You're immune from, for example, certain forms of libel or slander in a litigation context because it's a privilege for us as advocates to speak on behalf of our clients, but if you, I mean I'm sure you carry malpractice insurance. The reason why we carry malpractice insurance, which is very expensive, is because we're exposed to malpractice liability. Is that not true?

MIKE RIGG: My malpractice insurance pales in comparison as to the expense that doctors have to pay, that's one of the reasons why --

REP. TONG (147TH): That may be true, but --

MIKE RIGG: -- they are leaving the state.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- the comment that we're immune is factually inaccurate.

MIKE RIGG: No, I disagree that it's factually inaccurate because the -- first of all in 1983 actions that you referenced with respect to police officers, it provides them with qualified immunity, they cannot be held liable for negligence actions, they're not allowed to -- to be held liable for negligence actions. I think doctors and hospitals would be thrilled if this legislator were to adopt the same exact protections that police officers have, but with respect to me as a private attorney, yes, I do enjoy immunity from, let's say the foreseeable consequences of my actions.

Recently, the -- or about three years ago, the supreme court that an attorney even was accused of engaging in fraud in a divorce action, and that that fraud caused the opposing damages, and the supreme court said, no you can't have your day in court. The litigation privilege is going to apply even to a claim of fraud against an attorney, and the idea was that the threat of litigation in that circumstance has a chilling effect on the attorney.

My point to you is that lawsuits are intended to have an effect on behavior, and sometimes the law recognizes that the effect is a bad effect, it's a chilling effect, and so as to you're asking me about what data there is, that's why I'm suggesting, strongly suggesting that there be a committee to look into this area to see how, if at all, lawsuits are impacting Connecticut doctors and the ability to retain doctors rather than, you know, brief moment, hey can you tell me this, or -- why don't we look at it and have a committee that really does a deep dive and look into this and hear from the various physicians and others as to how this may or may not be impacting on Connecticut's health delivery --

REP. TONG (147TH): My thing is --

MIKE RIGG: -- anecdotally I think it does.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- it's my understanding that the current laws that we are operating under with respect to medical malpractice and tort liability were the result of a large-scale effort, study, reform that happened a few years ago and that that effort produced the current regime that we live under.

I would also disagree that there isn't an institution that is invested in getting to the bottom of this and collecting data. You know, I -- in my capacity as chairman on this committee, I have regular conversations with the medical society about the data that they collect, and the information that they analyze.

The other thing I would say, again though, is you're not suggesting that private practice doctors or lawyers for that matter should have anywhere near this sort of official immunity that a law enforcement officer has, right? We're not in the same business as police officers.

MIKE RIGG: No, I'm not, but the reason why certain types of people, like for example witnesses at a trial or even at an administrative hearing, they can't be sued either, even if they're accused of perjury. They have absolute immunity. The reason why is there's certain types of things where we don't want the behavior to be adversely effected.

I think what doctors do is one of the most important jobs in society. I mean, there is an argument to be made that what doctors do is at least as important as what police officers do. I mean, they're in the business of healing the sick and saving lives, that's what they do, and we know that the cost of healthcare is escalating, and the basic theory of all negligence actions, whether it's a car accident or any other type of negligence action is that the defendant did not act cautiously enough, but there's a real detriment to society when doctors are overly cautious, that's what we see in ordering more and more test or being overly cautious, that's what drives cost of healthcare.

I can't think of any other reason why the United State of America has the most expensive health system in the world. Why is it that our healthcare is so much more expensive than Canada or Great Britain or France or Spain? Perhaps one of the reasons is because those countries don't allow the kinds of claims that we do.

REP. TONG (147TH): That's one possible explanation. I suspect, or I would pose to you that the answer to that question, you know, people are always looking to this committee for an answer to that question. I think it's a much larger answer and it doesn't rest solely on this amorphous concept of a litigation client that you and I are having trouble quantifying right now or expressing in terms of data and numbers and facts, and we also, as Chairman Doyle remarked, we also have the best healthcare system in the world, and there clearly is a cost to that.

I guess what I would say is nobody on this committee would disagree that doctors are incredibly important to all of us and to our families, but they make mistakes as do all professionals and there is a legal regime and a system for holding them accountable, and when we make policy decisions on how that system operates, it makes better sense for us, and is more effective when people come here with facts and data to help us drive those decisions and broad proclamation that the litigation climate is driving young doctors out of the state. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions? Representative O'Neill.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): When you started testifying, I thought you were testifying about the negligent infliction of emotional distress, and --

MIKE RIGG: Yes.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): -- okay, cause it seems like we've drifted into a whole other thing. I mean is this legislation, in your opinion, specifically directed at the medical profession?

MIKE RIGG: I think it will impact on the medical profession. I don't think that it's only directed at the medical profession.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Because it, I mean -- the way I understood the bill it seemed to, for example, not tie this to a physical contact between the tortfeasor or -- and the victim, which my recollection was how we started with intentional infliction or negligent infliction of emotional distress was, it was like an accident, you bumped into somebody, something like -- physical contact with someone, and that seems to have gone away as a prerequisite in order to make a claim, and then you pointed out in your earlier testimony that, again, what started out as, in effect, a tort of outrageousness, and now it's kind of become more of the tort of emotional distress reaction on the part of the victim rather than the conduct on the part of the tortfeasor, but doctors when they get sued, I mean, they generally have, except for perhaps for psychologist or psychiatrist or somebody who, you know, who's just talking to people, have physical contact, and that's kind of what it's all about.

You take someone's pulse or you cut someone open, but you do something where you actually have physical contact with them, and so you have a whole normal set of torts that you have to deal with. Have there been claims of emotional distress that you've seen raised that have been getting swatted out that would survive a motion to dismiss or a motion for some re-judgement if this passed? I mean is -- is that where you're coming from?

MIKE RIGG: Yes.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, so, and what's the -- I mean is it the action of the doctor? Is it something the doctors says? I mean what's it -- what is it?

MIKE RIGG: Yes. The -- if the doctor says something that the patient -- perhaps about their condition that upsets the patient or if the doctor doesn't cooperate with say a billing decision by the patient. Like I can think of one case that I had where the doctor went ahead and ordered certain tests that the patient didn't agree with, and then the patient felt that they had to pay extra money for that, I can -- I remember defending against -- a lawsuit base upon that, and so if you have an economic loss now that you can now sue for emotional distress and tie that in, that will expand that claim and it'll -- and they will also be allowed to seek attorney's fees and punitive damages if this bill passes.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, and under current case law of emotional distress -- because I don't think there's an existing statute, is there?

MIKE RIGG: No.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, so under the current case law of emotional distress, can you recover attorney's fees?

MIKE RIGG: No.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, and punitive damages, are they available?

MIKE RIGG: No.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay --

MIKE RIGG: For intentional infliction of emotional distress it is.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay.

MIKE RIGG: And it would be Connecticut Common Law limits punitive damages to actual attorney's fees.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay.

MIKE RIGG: So, if you sue for intention -- so that's the other strange anomaly here. If the person is guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress, they're exposed only to attorney's fees, but if it's negligent infliction of emotional distress, they're exposed to punitive damages and attorney's fee. That's very odd, it seems to me, and also the oddity is -- so if somebody suffers a serious physical injury, that person can't recover punitive damages or attorney's fee, but if you suffered, say property damage or some sort of economic claim that you feel also caused emotional injury, yeah you can recover those.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, and the way this statute is worded is it, I mean if a person -- if a doctor walks in or -- cause we seemed to have started something and got into talking about doctors -- walks in a says you've got disease X, and that really upsets you a lot, and it turns out that he's wrong, you have disease Y, under this -- first of all is there currently a tort for telling someone or giving a misdiagnosis like that? Can you sue the doctor for that as things stand right now?

MIKE RIGG: You can, certainly information that's incorrect that's imparted to a patient by a doctor could potentially result in harm by the patient. Let's say the patient chooses not to seek a certain type of treatment and then later, you know, if the cancer could've been prevented, and the doctor's misinformation caused the person, that's a -- that would be a traditional medical malpractice action, but in terms of just the doctor said something that was incorrect that caused the patient to feel upset, typically doesn't result in a, you know, lawsuit against the doctor, although I suppose they could. I do recall one many years ago where somebody brought a small claims action for something like that.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, so it would only be if the patient then reacted in some way or took action or failed to take action as a result of being given the misinformation, but if the -- let's say the patient then went to another doctor or the doctor re-examined the tests or ran a second test, no you don't have disease X, you've got disease Y, that would probably not be actionable.

MIKE RIGG: It might be actionable, but I just don't think that people would bother to pursue it.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, because I'm trying to think of a circumstance under which if there's no, in effect, what I'd call physical malpractice --

MIKE RIGG: Right.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): -- a person would be able to make a claim under this statute that they can't otherwise make.

MIKE RIGG: Well, I think what you just described is a hypothetical that you gave. I mean one of the reasons the trial lawyers give is to give themselves an economic interest in bringing these claims so that there's punitive damages and attorney's fees. So, in the hypothetical that you gave, then that -- then yes. We would see claims like that being brought.

Like today they wouldn't -- they just -- it would be so trivial, why bother bringing it, but if this bill passes, yeah, those types of claims will definitely be brought because they can claim punitive damages and attorney's fees.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): And punitive damage aside from the attorney's fees, as I understand it, is essentially a policy. The objective is to really discourage that kind of conduct --

MIKE RIGG: Right.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): -- that's why the punitive damages are brought.

MIKE RIGG: Which is why, historically, it's not allowed in negligence actions. It's allowed for malicious, intentional, reckless behavior, it's just -- historically the idea of punishing somebody for just a mistake for negligence just is unheard of, and honestly, I suspect it would be unconstitutional under a U.S. Supreme court case, but that hasn't been tested yet, so I certainly feel --

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): I thought you were going to tell us a case, okay.

MIKE RIGG: Well, there is a case I can think of. It was a -- it's where the supreme court held that generally only behavior that's deemed to be "reprehensible" is worthy of punitive damages under the due process clause of the 14th amendment.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay, and you have seen an uptick in efforts to make emotional distress claims over the last say five or 10 years? Is this something that's a new trend?

MIKE RIGG: Yeah, I mean, not necessarily for -- in the context of negligent infliction of emotional distress but now bystander emotional distress claim is now the big thing, yes, yeah, because of the Supreme Court reason decision. In fact, I just litigated one case right now on a claim of bystander emotional distress, and again arguably the way that this bill is written, perhaps this actually expands the ability to sue for bystander emotional distress, just the way that this bill is worded.

So, yes, there will be a big explosion for bystander -- for -- they'll call it negligent infliction of emotional distress. That's one of the oddities to say, well if you see damage to your property, you can sue for emotional distress, but if you see damage to your best friend or your aunt or somebody who's a close loved one, you can't sue. That was one of the rationales for why the Connecticut courts don't allow emotional distress claims as a result of damage to property.

If you can't sue for damage to a love one, why should you be allowed to sue for damage to property, that doesn't make sense, and so the way that this bill is written is written is it's saying injury in person or property. It doesn't define who the person is, it doesn't make sense that it would have to be you, the individual, that you suffered a physical injury, because that's been the law for over 100 years that you can recover emotional distress in the context of a physical injury.

So, what does it mean? So, does it mean that if you see the latter effects of an injury to your son or your spouse, well spousal consortium claims I think covers it, but to a spouse -- or to a loved one like a son or a father or a grandmother, does that mean now you can sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress? I mean it does seem to at least have the potential to widely expand the number of claims that are going to be brought, and it -- so it's of very much concern that it's going to increase the number of claims and the size of claims against healthcare providers, but I would say -- I would argue that not -- it's certainly not limited to healthcare providers for sure.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay. Okay, cause, you know, I brought this kind of claim myself, you know, as a plaintiff. I've also defended on these emotional distress claims, and it seems like I have, personally perhaps, a higher threshold of what I think rises to the level of justifying a claim of emotional distress than somebody else. I -- that's just -- so, I remember one particular case where my -- we filed a lawsuit for negligence, property damage, and there was a counter claim claiming emotional distress because of the lawsuit.

I mean, it strikes me that this thing has got -- moved a long way since I first started reading about emotional distress and seeing it as a tort and even bringing cases years ago. So, that's why I was asking about -- it seems like there's a changed attitude about the level to which something needs to rise before you start bringing actions on it.

MIKE RIGG: Yeah, there is, certainly in the case law, like you may have a defense saying, well you can't sue over, you know, the distress of the lawsuit. I just mentioned to Representative Tong, I enjoy a litigation privilege, okay. Now I don't know if the litigation privilege survives this bill or not, but, you know, you can't -- an attorney who either brings a lawsuit or defends a lawsuit can't be sued for the consequences of the lawsuit, in general. The only exception to that is vexatious litigation, but certainly the types of behavior that form the basis for an emotional distress claim -- there's an appellate court decision, I can get you the site, I don't have it at my fingertips where -- it involved a wedding planner or a wedding location, and the -- they canceled the location just a couple of weeks before the wedding date, and the bride-to-be suffered emotional distress and won and prevailed, and the appellate course said, yes, that's a legitimate basis to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress is the breech of a contract of a wedding plan.

So, it's not the type of, at least in Connecticut, as compared to most other states, it's really not the type of really bad behavior that previously was required.

REP. O'NEILL (69TH): Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Representative Harding.

REP. HARDING (107TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just -- it's interesting, I often think that -- this may be superfluous in some regard because cases with merit generally have a remedy in which you can litigate currently, and I fear in cases where this particular law may apply, there may already be a remedy in regards to negligence. If you have a duty, there's a breach of that duty, and if there's damages, you can prove there's damages, you can win. Any thoughts on whether or not this law really would have any effect in bringing forward cases that already have remedies?

MIKE RIGG: Yeah, just based on what the trial lawyers have said in their written testimony, which is they want to give an economic incentive to lawyers to bring more of these types of claims by adding in the right to recover, attorney's fee, and punitive damages, so that it makes it more attractive to litigate these kinds of claims, as opposed to what current law is, which is you can only recover compensatory damages, and so what often happens, and I think you've kind of heard this in the context of the small claims bill, is it's not really worth it. The attorney is not going to brought it, just say go to small claims court.

So, the smaller, say emotional distress claims, like I see, you know, the one about, you know, the loss of property, I think it was grandmother's rings. Well, you could bring a small claims action for the value of the rings, I mean you can do that, but this idea that, you know, I mean how many possible plaintiffs are there when grandma's rings are lost. I mean is it the entire family that gets to talk about the emotion and get to litigate the issue of their emotional distress because their grandmother's rings were lost at the hospital?

I mean that's the -- and is it really the loss of her rings or is the fact that she passed away at the hospital that's really the cause of the emotional distress. So, that's what you get into is what's really one of the reasons why emotional distress, historically, were not really favored is because it's very difficult to determine the ideology of emotional distress, and it's -- it's just going to mushroom the aspect of this area of litigation, and as I said before I am concerned with respect to the types of clients who I represent.

REP. HARDING (107TH): And --

MIKE RIGG: But you're right, there's already a remedy, it's already the law.

REP. HARDING (107TH): -- I share the same concerns, and part of it I think you breeched from, so that's my next question is, is there's a tangible -- it's tangible for property damage. There's tangibility to it. There's tangibility to breaking an arm, and there's medical bills involved with that. I think, what I feel with emotional distress is it's really hard to nail down what truly is emotional distress, and unfortunately what I see oftentimes in my practice is when is it down to client. A lot the times the cases that lack some merit, emotional distress is always, seems to be the damage that the client has, and I do have some fear as well and similar concerns of the uptick in possible litigation based upon this law on cases that truly don't have merit, where there is no other property damage, there is no really medical cost or medical bills involved with the negligence except the individual simply says, well I have emotional distress. Do you have any thoughts on that?

MIKE RIGG: Well, yeah, I mean the main thing is, I mean if -- I did plaintiffs work many -- not many years ago, and when you, you know, it would just come down to well why not. We'll just -- we'll file the suit, and if it works out, great, and we'll try to extract a settlement because settlements are based on potential risk. So, if, even if it's only at 10 percent that you'll get -- that the defendant will get nailed with punitive damages and attorney's fees, that's worth something to settle.

So, there will be more -- so, so the potential of getting more settlements is of course going to attract more lawsuits. It is going to happen, that's the business. You know, attorneys are first and foremost businessmen and women, and that's -- if there's a potential to get some recovery, then it's an area that will produce more lawsuits, even if ultimately, you know, they may not win at trial, what defendant is going to say, I'm going to spend money litigating the case instead of litigating it.

They wouldn't -- as a matter -- as a business decision they'd have to consider not litigating the claims and settling. That's the way most lawsuits are dealt with, and so if you create another avenue for suits, then there's going to be more lawsuits.

REP. HARDING (107TH): Thank you for your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? Vice Chairman.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I wouldn't -- we've sort of beaten this to a pulp, so I'm going to keep this quick, but I just have a couple of quick things that I just want to clear the record up and just make sure I understand. First, on this question of damages, so in an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, can you recover attorney's fees for intentional infliction of emotional distress?

MIKE RIGG: Yes.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay. So, how is the damage award under the proposed bill different than damages that could be awarded here? You make it sound like you can recover punitive damages -- or you can recover more in the negligent infliction context than the intentional infliction context, but of course punitive damages is sort of a misnomer in Connecticut because we don't have punitive damages.

The measure of punitive damages in Connecticut is reasonable attorney's fees, so there really no such thing as punitive damages other than recovery of your legal fees.

MIKE RIGG: Well, that's not entirely correct. Under the common law, punitive damages are limited to attorney's fees, by statute it's not. So, for example under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, because the -- that statute allows in a word a separately "punitive damages" and then separately attorney's fees that means attorney's fees are separate from punitive damages --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Well, I mean -- well that's, we're getting a field here a little bit, but I mean I think there's, actually the caseload goes both ways. I think that's actually something this committee needs to look at outside of today is whether you actually can recover punitive damages and attorney's fees, but I think the case law is very split on that as the current state of the law.

I think there are a lot of judges out there who just says, to cut the statute is drafted in-artfully and that the measure punitive damages are reasonable attorney's fees. So, I guess I'm trying to figure out -- so, assume that's the case. Assume that the law is and should be that the only punitive damages recoverable in Connecticut is reasonable attorney's fees, and the way I read the proposed bill for us it says the court shall award damages, which may include -- and may include costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

So, I -- you know -- and of course this is just the first draft of the bill, it's probably something for LCO to clean up if this moves forward, but I'm not sure there -- I'm not sure I'm seeing the distinction you're trying to make.

MIKE RIGG: Well the, first of all, the torts are different under the law currently. It's intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove a more difficult case. So, the justification for awarding punitive damages, whether it's -- whether we measure it as simply attorney's fees or something separate, is that the behavior is very bad behavior. In particular, that the defendant intended to inflict this damage --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): No, I understand that, and I, you know, irrespective of somebody's position of whether they think, you know, the underlying bill is a good bill or bad bill or should move forward or shouldn't move forward, I think from a -- from a purely practical standpoint I think you're right. It's hard to argue that the damages available for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be more severe than the damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress --

MIKE RIGG: Or even the same.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): -- but it seems, well -- but it seems to me the way this bill is drafted, based on your testimony, that they are the same.

MIKE RIGG: What's the -- the damages?

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): The damages available under the current stated law for intentional infliction of emotional distress and what is being proposed for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

MIKE RIGG: So, the bill essentially eviscerates intentional infliction of emotional distress because if the damages are the same, what lawyer would ever try to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress. You would just go with the lower standard, and you could get the same damages.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Right okay, and then the other --

MIKE RIGG: And assuming that the bill gets fixed --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): -- and then the other comment that I just wanted to make was, you know, we -- you keep -- we keep coming back to sort of this litigation of privilege issue, and I just think we need to note for the record that, you know, if an attorney says or does something in court, you know, there is a litigation privilege because we don't cases to go on and on and on forever. We don't one lawyer to start suing the other lawyer, suing a witness, that's why we have litigation privileges so that there's an end to it, but that does mean that that conduct is not governed or otherwise sanctionable or the like. I mean you're subject to the rules of professional ethics, I am as well --

MIKE RIGG: And so are doctors.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Right, so I'm saying, but there are other consequences other than sort of this cross suits against each other.

MIKE RIGG: But that's the same with doctors and hospitals, and I would argue that the Department of Public Health is much more vigorous in enforcing standards against doctors and hospitals than the grievance committee is in enforcing standards against attorneys, and in fact the burden of proof is much higher for the grievance committee to bring a claim against an attorney. They have to prove their case by clear and convincing evidence. Doctors are subject to the lower preponderance of the evidence standard, and the Department of Public Health is very active in bringing claims against doctors. So, by that rationale we should say well then, you know, the same should apply to doctor that don't worry about it even though they can't be sued for damages, they can be disciplined by the Department of Public Health in the same way that attorneys can be disciplined by the grievance committee.

My point, I happen to agree to the litigation privilege, just so that the record is clear, my point is that the law recognizes many instances in which lawsuits, just the mere threat of litigation, is a bad thing, and -- because, why? Because it will impact on professional judgment. Now it's not every type of professional. It's those people who are engaging in what we regard as a public service. Even if they're private attorneys. There's a public aspect to it, that's the justification for it.

I happen to agree with that, but doctors are -- they -- doctors -- what doctors do is way, way more important than what I do.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay. All right. Thank you for your testimony.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you very much. Any other questions from members of the committee? Thank you very much.

MIKE RIGG: Thank you.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Next Stephen Rich. Okay if there's more than one person, you're still limited to the three minutes. As long as everybody knows the rules, we're okay. Thank you.

STEPHEN RICH: I'm having Christy Elkins read a statement I have prepared on my behalf.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: I'd like to start by giving you my thanks for the opportunity to speak to you in favor of bill S.B. No. 7214. My name is Stephen Rich, and I have a psychiatric service dog referred here on -- out -- in this statement as SD. I've chosen not to share her name for reasons I will explain later.

I have a disability that my SD aides me with, and -- okay -- with so I may function a fairly normal life. There are many tasks that my service dog performs, but I shall limit it to three task to save time. Those three task include bringing me back to the here and now, guiding me away from the situation that has caused me to become distressed, and alerting to others approaching from outside my range of vision.

There have been many instances where a person distracting my service dog has caused me to become lost and disoriented, and when that happens there is only one individual who is aware of my condition, and has the ability to work with my service dog in order to bring me back to reality.

In these instances, if it were not for people distracting my service dog, I probably would not have become lost, disoriented to start with. Although service dogs are trained to ignore distractions, they, like us, are not perfect, and their attention can waiver when confronted with persistent distractions.

If people know my service dog's name, they'll try to -- they'll use that to try to get her attention. This has happened so often that I now only share her name with close family and friends. There are patches clearly visible on her vest that state do not pet, but even after seeing these patches people will proceed to pet her anyways.

These actions are what I would urge you to help correct by passing this law. It is a self -- a safety concern for myself and others like me that are aided by service dogs to keep a semblance of a normal life. Once again, I would urge you to vote in favor of this bill that makes the distraction of a service dog a criminal offense, and thank you for giving me your time to speak to you today.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you. Thanks to both of you. I think a lot of us have learned a lot about folks with these dogs and how important they are to your lives, and how even people who have the best of intentions can make mistakes.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: This is true.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): So, we'll look into this. Any questions from members of the committee? Yes, Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman and good afternoon, and again not a question, just a compliment for being here all day. I know it's certainly not easy, and specifically sharing your story, which is so educational and important to us. So, I just want to extend a thank you again.

CHRISTINE ELKINS: Thank you very much.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you. Representative, any other questions or comments? I see none. Thank you. Next is Louise DiCocco.

LOUISE DICOCCO: Good afternoon members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Louise DiCocco and I am counsel with CBIA. I submitted written testimony, so I'll keep my comments brief.

I'm here today in opposition to three bills on the agenda. I'm going to hit -- touch on two of them because I think it's take a little while longer. I'll start with S.B. No. 929, and that's an act extending whistleblower protections to certain employers. The bill expands the states whistleblower laws in ways that will subject an employer to potentially huge compliance and liability cost. The bill also broadens the circumstances under which employees can bring a whistleblower action to include situations where an employee objects or refuses to participate in an activity that the employer reasonably believes constitutes a violation of suspected violation.

Last but not least, the bill sets forth new penalties available in civil actions for the violations, and those include compensatory damages, future economic damages, punitive damages. CBIA opposes that provision of the bill and would like to see it stay with just reinstatement and back pay. In addition, I believe current law allows the court to award attorney's fees and cost to the prevailing party.

I move along to H.B. No. 7194, an act concerning exceptions to the 10 statutory repose period for certain product liability claims. This bill essentially seeks out to eliminate the requirement that a claimant not be entitled to worker's comp under chapter 568 of the Connecticut General Statutes, in which the claimant claims injury during useful safe life of the product when determining the period for liability.

Bill -- this bill will do away with the longstanding statutory authority addressing the current statutory repose for cases involving product liability. The current statue of repose is an important limitation on when lawsuits can be filed. It brings certainty, predictably and balance in the system.

Under current law, which I believe is 52-577a, it sets out a 10-year period with one exception. It says claimants not entitled to the worker's comp who can prove harm occurred during safe life of the product, though now seeks to open up this exception to those that are entitled to worker's comp.

This expansion will raise issues with the interplay of the exclusive remedy of worker's compensation system and litigation system in Connecticut, and is likely to substantially increase the cost of businesses and manufacturers. For that reason, CBIA is opposed. I'll stop there and thank you for your consideration. I'll take any questions if there are any.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you. Representative Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chair. Thank you, Louise, for being here. Just one question on the whistleblower bill, I think -- a lot of the justification for this bill has been -- if I'm an employer, I'd rather have my employee airing the dirty laundry to me internally before sort of going outside, and under the current whistleblower set up we have, it almost encourages that employee to go and sort of air the dirty, you know, make the complaint public because then they're protected as opposed to sort of making the complaint internally, and so I guess from an employer from a business perspective, you know, I struggle sort of with whether this bill is "pro-business or anti-business in the sense of, you know, I think if it was me, and it was my employee, I'd rather them come to me and say, hey, you know, there's that drain over there and it's leaking in the creek and there's all this oil that's leaking down from the drain in to the creek. I would rather know that than somebody go tell DEP.

You know, so how do you reconcile that for me?

LOUISE DICOCCO: You brought up a great point, but I think sometimes when it is an independent agency they can do valid investigation on it. A lot of times too I get that if you're business you want a heads up and things to be corrected before it becomes an issue. Same token though, I mean arguably, maybe an employee -- if it's -- nobody wants to be -- an employee to be fired for doing the right thing, trying to correct a grievous situation, but maybe the employee would feel like geez, my employer down the road is pissed off at me for saying that, and I get fired.

I think the independent -- and I get your point, and I see where the balance is, but I think that by having to file it, it provides maybe appropriate balance between protecting the employee, employer, but I get what you were saying on that.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Is some of the concern I guess on your part that, I think as the bill is currently drafted, you know, an employer could sort of report to any supervisor. Would it alleviate some of the concern if you sort of, you know, if an employer had to designate somebody internally, such as the director of HR, be it the shift manager, whatever that somebody had to go to report these sort of complaints or to refuse to take action that they believe to be contrary to law. I mean is there sort of a compromise there in your mind, because like I said it just, it just strikes me as, from the employer perspective, you'd rather have somebody internally who hears about this stuff before some state or federal agency does.

LOUISE DICOCCO: If I can, like I said, I've gotten several members that have contacted me on this bill. If I can bring that back to them to see if that's indeed the case and get back to you. Like said, I'm going on by what our members have said, and I also did forget, I apologize, to mention one other thing we took exception to was extending. I believe this bill extends the period from 90 to 180 days, is that -- they kind of said it would be preferable to go back to the 90, but I would like -- if I can, I will go back to them dealing with that and see what they think.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Yeah, that would be good. I mean I think -- I agree with you, I mean, there's some details and some semantics regarding, you know, on the other stuff, but I think the overriding concept of should we be encouraging employee to report up the chain of command within their organization or to report out as a first instance, the current scheme seems a little perverse to me, so maybe take it back to them and see whether --

LOUISE DICOCCO: Okay, thank you. I will.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you. Any other questions from members of the committee? Seeing none. Thank you.

LOUISE DICOCCO: Thank you.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Next is Justin Baldwin, and again the same three-minute rule applies.

JUSTIN BALDWIN: Good afternoon members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Justin Baldwin. I'm a sergeant with the Marshalls here in Hartford. Joe Gaetano and I have consolidated our statement. He'll be speaking on our behalf.

JOE GAETANO: Good afternoon distinguished members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Joe Gaetano, and I'm the president of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers --

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Can you just make sure that your mic is on, or it's like as close to you as possible?

JOE GAETANO: Is that better? My name is Joe Gaetano, and I am the president of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers local 731. IBPO local 731 represents the judicial marshals of the state of Connecticut.

The members of unit respectfully request for H.B. No. 7215, which in section 1 sets forth a process for firearms training for judicial marshals. Section 2 is equally as important. It will ensure various law enforcement professionals are provided indemnification protection.

The following comments are provided with respect to section 1. We live in a time where threats against judges and acts of violence in courthouses and courtrooms are occurring throughout the country with greater frequency than ever before. By their very nature, courthouse operations entail a heightened degree of risk. Every working day courthouses are visited by a large number of our citizens, and our courthouses represent the ideals of democracy in American society. They must be as safe as possible.

This bill is all about safety for everyone in Connecticut courthouses, visitors, judges, courthouse staffers, attorneys, and judicial marshals. In today's society, many public buildings have armed law enforcement personnel at the entrances and exits, including the legislative office building, the state capitol, the Connecticut Supreme Court, and state library, state colleges and most recently our state community colleges.

Judicial marshals are full-fledged peace officers in the Connecticut General Statute section 53a-3 subsection 9. As peace officers our judicial marshals already receive substantial law enforcement training, which will now be enhanced with vital firearm training and certifications.

As judicial marshals, it is our job to be as much as humanely possible to protect the people inside and outside of our courthouses. H.B. No. 7215 would provide us the tools to better be able to do so. I would also like to add that Sargent Baldwin in November 2015 was sent to POST certification training to be a firearms instructor by the judicial branch. He has been a POST certified firearm instructor for the last two years.

In closing, I would like to add that many courthouses nationwide have armed law enforcement personnel managing its interest and transporting its prisoners. Arming our courts is not a new concept to Connecticut. Under the state's former sheriff system, many of our special deputy sheriff weren't back armed. I'd like to thank you for your support.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you, and I appreciate the fact that you stayed under the three minutes. Senator McLachlan.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Thank you Marshals for your testimony today. As I'm sure you're aware, the judicial branch has voiced opposition to this idea, and I guess their concern, which seems pretty logical is that they have far too many vacancies right now for judicial marshals because of the budget constraints in the last couple of years. Do you have any thoughts on those comments?

JOE GAETANO: I would agree with him that we're severely understaffed. We're probably about 190 to 200 marshals understaffed right now, but I think the firearms would only enhance the security, even if we were a full staff, and more as a deterrent for anybody else.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Thank you, and what is your understanding of our neighboring states, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, how do they operate?

JOE GAETANO: Everybody that I'm aware of, with the exception of Massachusetts who's currently negotiating firearms, is armed. Although Massachusetts their transport teams are armed, they're done by the sheriff's department. We do that function here without the firearms.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Thank you, and it's my understanding in some states there are just a limited number of judicial marshals, or are they equivalent in courthouses that are armed, most are not, but some are? Is -- are you familiar with that?

JOE GAETANO: Correct, correct, and we would actually be looking for a similar system. We don't feel that everybody should be armed. They should not be in the courtrooms or in the lockup areas, but they should be at the front doors and on our transport teams.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Thank you for your input. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you Senator. Mr. Vice Chair.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Just real quick on this issue of the objection from the branch. Have you asked sort of through collective bargaining process or something whether to make this change?

JOE GAETANO: We have.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay, and you haven't been able to get there?

JOE GAETANO: No, sir.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay, thanks.

JOE GAETANO: But they did, as I mentioned before, send Sergeant Baldwin and another individual to be certified as a firearm's instructor through POST, which is the same training that all local police departments receive.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay, thanks.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you. Other questions from members of the committee? Seeing none. Thank you.

JOE GAETANO: Thank you.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Next up is Audrey Blondin. Welcome.

AUDREY BLONDIN: Welcome. Thank you. Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. My name is Audrey Blondin, and I'm an attorney in Torrington. I've been practicing since 1980. I also help my husband in his optometry practice, and he and I are part-time MPH students at UConn, and as part of our MPH curriculum, my husband and I asked Representative Cook to submit this proposed legislation, H.B. No. 5442, raising the age of marriage with no exception to age 18, and we're asking for your support of this bill because child marriage, as you're aware, is a serious problem with devastating lifelong consequences, and laws in 27 states including Connecticut's do not have a minimum age below which a child can marry, so in theory here in Connecticut a judge of probate could authorize a marriage of an elementary school child, and here in Connecticut between 2011 and 2015, 28 boys and 159 girls between the ages of 14 and 17 were married, and girls that marry before 18 are more likely to experience domestic violence than their peers.

Child brides often also show signs of symptomatic sexual abuse and posttraumatic stress, such as feelings of hopelessness, helplessness, and severe depression, and girls who marry before age 19 are 50percent more likely to drop out of high school and four times less likely to graduate from college.

Marriage is a legal contract that should be resolved for adults. The dangers of child marriage are very clear. Children who marry have more mental health issues, are much more likely to live in poverty, and are extremely vulnerable to physical, sexual, emotional, and verbal abuse.

Ending child marriage will help protect families and communities, give girls the opportunity to build skills and knowledge, help them to understand their rights and develop support networks and promote change for the better in the lives of children all over the world. I really thank you for the opportunity to consider your support and passage of this bill, and I encourage and hope that you will pass this bill so that here in Connecticut we can take the lead in protecting our most important and valuable citizens, our children. Thank you very much.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you, and I appreciate your succinctness. Questions from members of the committee? Senator McLachlan.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Attorney, Blondin for your testimony.

AUDREY BLONDIN: Thank you.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Are you -- knowledge of how many underage marriages occur in Connecticut annually?

AUDREY BLONDIN: I have, just again the statistics that we got from the department of public health, between 2011 28 boys ages 14 to 17, one was 14, one was 15, five were 16, one was age 17, and then with the girls it was the same thing between -- in the last five years, one was age 14, one was age 15, 55 were age 16, and 102 were age 17, and I believe the statistics are between -- since 2000 it's over 1,100 children, and I'm just, you know, speaking as a mother, as a grandmother, you know, they always say like, you know, 60 is the new 50, so, in -- you know, my word like 20s the new 10, 30s the new 20, so it -- to me it's just -- I had no idea that this law even existed here in Connecticut along a judge of probate to approve a marriage of a child under the age of 16 until I saw a similar legislation being proposed in New York and then researched Connecticut, went to Representative Cook, she had no idea, and that's how we came about to, as I said, introduce the bill as part of our public health practicum.

SENATOR MCLACHLAN (24TH): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you. Are there questions from members of the committee? Yes.

AUDREY BLONDIN: Hello senator.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just quickly, what are the conditions under which a person under the age of 18 can now be married? They just can't do it, right, themselves. They need some kind of approval. Would it be their parents, a court -- could you educate us about that?

AUDREY BLONDIN: Yeah, so they have the Connecticut law currently exist. Between the age of 16 and 18 you have to have parental consent, below the age of 16 you have to go to your judge of probate. Now our judge of probate in Litchfield County, our judge of probate isn't even a lawyer, and so in theory you have someone who isn't even a lawyer allowing a marriage under the age of 16 with no floor. So, again it could be a five-year-old, I'm sure it doesn't happen, but, I mean, I think even a 14 -- I mean the -- we've had here in Connecticut 14 year olds, judge of probates approving 14 and 15 year olds to get married.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): Now if the proposed bill passes, let's say someone is 16 years old, and let's say the female is 16, the male is 17, just for argument sake, neither one has reached the age where they can legally be married without parental permission, right?

AUDREY BLONDIN: Yes.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): So, do you think that the parental permission puts into play adults who can help make that decision and advise their children, or do you think that parents would actually approve the marriage of their children, their minor children without having their best interest at heart?

AUDREY BLONDIN: I think cultural morays have changed to the extent that perhaps if there was like a pregnancy involved, you know, back in the day you would say, oh well, you know, we're going to do the right thing and get married. Honestly, I don't -- I think the statistics are in Hartford more than 50percent of the children are born to unmarried women.

So, I think it might have been an issue in the past, but coming forward you also have to take in to account Senator the idea that we have statutory rape laws here in Connecticut, and that underage 18, according to the law -- and that's where -- what we have here, what they call that marriage exception, so what would ordinarily be considered statutory rape here in Connecticut is allowed to have an exemption because -- under the guise of marriage. So, I don't really think, to summarize the answer to your question, I think if someone is 16 or 17 in this day and age, they can wait until 18 and make their decisions, but I'm an attorney -- that under 18 you don't have the legal right to make a legal decision for yourself, so I think that should include the contract of marriage.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): No, I appreciate your point of view, I hadn't thought about this until [laughter] one of things when you become a legislator you get exposed to issues you didn't even think about. It makes it interesting.

AUDREY BLONDIN: [Laughter] at our age, right.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): But I -- again I'm just thinking about this for the first time, and I'm thinking, well generally speaking, yes, I agree that I'd be reluctant to see someone under the age of 18 getting married. On the other hand, to the extent that adults who have their -- supposedly have their best interest at heart are involved and need to give permission for that to happen, makes me feel at least a little more comfortable about it. There might be circumstances in which, and don't forget you requiring -- I presume you require actually the approval of both sets of parents to both the bride and the groom --

AUDREY BLONDIN: If they're under 18, yes.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): -- so to speak. So, that that -- for, well adults responsible for each child would have to be involved in helping them through the decision-making process. I'm just a little concerned as I initially think about it about a blanket prohibition against it under any and all circumstances. Would there be any exceptions that would contemplate might be legitimate should this law pass?

AUDREY BLONDIN: The way that the legislation is currently proposed, there is no -- there are no exceptions. The problem with a 16 to 17 year old, if you want to make that an exception, is the potential for abuse is so relevant and so much in the forefront that it becomes very hard to distinguish what might be an individual circumstance of a good intention as opposed more of a general process of this potential for what -- of abuse, and primarily with girls taking 15 or 16 year old girls and sending them overseas to be married or within a culture here in the United States. So, how do you make that distinction of what might actually be, in limited circumstances, a good idea versus the general concept of abuse, and, again with the statistics of the poverty, the stress, the inability to cope, that's across the board statistics for marriage under age 18 as opposed to just waiting a little bit until you're a legal adult, and, I mean, there's no -- there's nothing to prohibit you from "living together" being together. We have very generous laws here in Connecticut recognizing the rights of partners to be together. So, it just eliminates that ability of parents who in their minds might have good intentions, but in reality, it doesn't work out like that.

SENATOR SUZIO (13TH): Well, I certainly I think most people would share with you the concern about the maturity or lack of maturity of young people entering into what's one of the most profound commitments of their life. Seeing -- and, at least my gut reaction is I'm a little reluctant to make a carte blanche blanket denial under any and all circumstances, especially at least the state does require that mature adults, presumably mature adults, the parents, who have the best interest of the child in mind, are -- have to give permission for this to happen currently. So, I would just conclude by saying, you've got me thinking about it right now. I'm not quite certain how I feel, but it's an interesting and provocative question, and thank you for bringing it to the committee. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

AUDREY BLONDIN: Well, thank you very much. I would just like to add, again, you know, being an attorney for decades and understanding how this works. I think you can look at that two-fold. I think the judge of probate below 16, with all due respect who aren't judges of probate, that needs to go. So, I would encourage your consideration of, you know, certainly half a loaf is better than no loaf, but I thank you very much for your comments and your thoughts. Thank you.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Chairman Tong.

REP. TONG (147TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, Attorney Blondin, thank you so much for being here today.

AUDREY BLONDIN: Thank you Representative Tong for your help and support in this, thank you.

REP. TONG (147TH): And Dr. Blondin as well, and I want to thank you for your advocacy in bringing this to the committee and for pushing so hard on it. I must admit that I was having a hard time getting my head around this issue, and the urgency of it until Bushra's testimony earlier today, and I think that helped to crystalize where for a lot of people, which is why you have a public hearing, the importance of this bill and what it means to people, in particular young people. When she said she was 13 --

AUDREY BLONDIN: Right.

REP. TONG (147TH): -- my daughter is 11, I can't believe she's 11, it's unbelievable that she is knocking on the teenage door, but just to think of a 13-year-old facing that kind of decision is very difficult to conceive of. So, I want to thank you both for being here and for pushing this, and for bringing it to our attention.

AUDREY BLONDIN: Thank you for the opportunity to be heard. Thank you again.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you very much Mr. Chair, and I hope you get college credit for coming here today, and for what it's worth, I have a 13-year-old, and he is not ready for marriage, that's for sure. Cheryl Sharp. Is Cheryl here? Okay, Judge Elizabeth Bozzuto? Welcome your honor.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Thank you, thank you. Good afternoon members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Beth Bozzuto, and I'm the chief administrative judge for family matters. I'm before you today on behalf of the branch in support of H.B. No. 7196, an act concerning nonadverserial dissolution of marriage.

The branch has submitted written testimony that provides the specific details of the bill. I want to take these few minutes that I have to put this bill in context of the family court and family court users.

I often analogize family court, the process, as a highway. You start at the beginning of the highway married and come out the other end divorced. We know universally the sooner parties get off the highway and the less time they spend on the highway, the better it is for the family. By statute the very first possible exit off the highway is at least 90 days past the return date, otherwise known as the case management date.

It was clear to the branch that there are thousands of divorcing couples each year that want nothing more from the court than a divorce, yet we're trapped for 90 plus days without any option to exit. To address this, two years ago you placed legislation that allows divorcing couples who have a complete agreement on all the issues to get off the highway well before this first exit, in some instances without ever having to appear before the court.

Since passage of the non-adversarial legislation in 2015, one in six divorce cases exit by way of the non-adversarial process. This 2017 legislation before you builds on that process to make it more available to a wider group of family court users. Additionally, this legislation builds new exits for default judgments.

Currently approximately one in four cases in the family court go by way of default. A default or unopposed judgment is when the defendant, although probably served notice by the plaintiff, never appears. Despite there being no controversy before the court, these plaintiffs are stuff waiting more than three months before they can move on with their lives.

This legislation allows these plaintiffs to file a motion with the court 14 days after the return date and serve the defendant with a motion asking to go to judgment without having to wait the 90 days. This motion is put on hold for an additional 14 days. If the defendant has still not appeared, the court will consider the motion.

This, like the 2015 legislation, supports the goals of the family court re-engineering that being reducing unnecessary time spent in court, reducing cost, and/or reducing conflict. Additionally, the benefit of the 2015 legislation and this proposed legislation is that its parties are permitted to exit family court earlier and more efficiently.

Court resources can focus on those cases that require the courts greater attention. I thank you for the opportunity to quickly explain the legislation to you, and I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you your honor, and as always, it's a pleasure to have you before the Judiciary Committee.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Thank you.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Earlier in the day, and I don't know if you were in the room, I believe it was Attorney Pripstein that had some concerns with this proposal and the timeline and some of the notice requirements or -- I think she pointed out lack thereof, and I'm just wondering if you were here, if you could respond to some of those concerns.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Sure, thank you, and I think we already did. You'll see there is an amendment to the original proposal. So, we do defaults already. It's process we already have, and as I indicated one in four, almost 3,900 cases a year go by way of default.

The only notice defendants currently get is on the original summons, which actually says that they could proceed to get divorced within two days of the return date, which is universally the standard for defaults. That survived despite the fact we have this 90-day waiting period, which is not for defaults at all. That was the cooling off period for couples who come before the court.

So, we are trying to build a real default process, which enhances what we currently have. So, the statute or the legislation that's proposed requires a new notice. On every writ of summons and complaint in family cases, letting the defendant know that if you do not appear within 14 days the return day, that the party -- the plaintiff could proceed to default.

Additionally, we're requiring that a motion be filed, which we never required before, and that motion has to be served on the defendant saying that it's stayed or can't be acted on for an additional 14 days. So, these are all new things in the default practice, which we already have that build in to guarantee or at least fortify that someone's not getting divorced behind someone else's back, and just by way of example, Monday's case management in Hartford, there's 56 cases on the docket.

Case management, the first day they could possibly get divorced if they haven't gone already by one of the non-ad processes, which many do, but nonetheless we have this group left that for whatever reason haven't -- either they haven't reached an agreement or they're there all alone, and they've been waiting 90 days for this date, and they're probably still there because the line was out the door this morning, and we have at least one judge if not two processing these non-defaults for a good part of the day.

So, it takes a judge, a court reporter, a clerk, and a marshal to kind of get these people through the process who are asking for nothing from the court and have no one on the other side opposing them.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you, and just last week I was at an appropriation sub-committee meeting with Carroll, and he said that there's a lack of temporary assistant clerks and monitors, so I'm guessing that doesn't help the process move any quicker either.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: It doesn't. It really doesn't, and sometimes we don't have marshals to staff the courtroom. So, we've really felt the impact, and we're trying to be creative, not only with the problems that we've addressed in family court, but also now with the budgetary cuts, and that's why we've carved out one small population of the default.

If they are no children, no joint assets, no joint debts, and the plaintiff is looking for nothing, that that particular default, after all the times it expired, can be considered by the court on the papers. You know, we already do some divorce on the papers. We got a call from Massachusetts that they're very much interest in that process, and I think, you know, as people look at Connecticut, that's going to be a process that other states are going to grab hold of and move. We've had that for a year now, a little more than a year, and there was some concern about doing that without people being in court, and we've encountered no issue with that as of date.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you, and so, just in sum, the people that had expressed concern that was with an earlier iteration of this proposal, and you believe those concerns have been addressed with new language?

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Timing was differently concern, and we addressed that time, but also built into this process is something we don't even have now and we have default. It's an initial notice with a complaint. It's a motion that actually is served on the party that we don't do now, and also requiring with a default, if they go all the way to default, but after the default the plaintiff has to send or serve the defendant notice of the judgment. All of those requirements we don't currently have. So, it bolsters the process but also truncates it, so they aren't waiting that 90 days, which was not intended for defaults at all. Anyone who practices, it's two days after the return date, is the universal standard for defaults. These folks are waiting 90 days after the return date, and the return date is 14 to 30 days after it's even served. So, it really sometimes works out to four months, and if I could just add one more thing quickly, I don't mean to take your time.

You know, as we're building and reforming family court, this is a piece that we're hoping you'd consider, and if passed the idea is that by case management with this legislation, the only thing we'll have left are those people who have yet to reach some sort of resolution, and the branches intention as of, say the fall, that many other jurisdictions if not statewide, we're going to move family to individual calendaring at the time of case management.

So, we have -- we get rid all the ones where people aren't looking for anything from us, and what's left for the family court are those cases that really require our attention, and they'll be assigned to individual judge by the time a case -- of the time of the case management date.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Okay, thank you. Chairman Doyle, and then Representative Rebimbas. He was closer [laughter].

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Good afternoon judge. I apologize, I was out of the room briefly, and you may have already addressed it, but could you do it again if you have. Another person testified earlier today when I was in the room during the meeting that the concern was that if we did this default that there was a right to a hearing whatsoever, and I guess that's the current practice, and I'm sorry if you to reiterate your position, but they basically were saying they were concerned there'd be no hearing, and there was an ability to have a no hearing and judgment entered for default.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: No, it absolutely -- as long as the defendant shows up, they get a hearing.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): No, but -- their question -- sorry, their question was they didn't even want a default judgment to enter without a hearing. They wanted -- under current law their position was if your -- if the defendant does not show there at least is a good-faith hearing before a judge where the judge then considers and all the finances, and there's a free -- there's a -- basically a judge is really reviewing it, at a hearing default approach there will be no hearing, and the judge will just kind of do it on the papers, and it was -- I think it was legal aid thought it was important for you -- for the court to consider it.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Okay, so there's -- it's really there's two processes, so let me break it down. There's the regular default process as we do today, so if the defendant never shows up, there's going to be a hearing, and the plaintiff alone will appear before the court, and the court will have an opportunity to inquire. Those are for all cases that -- where the party share children.

We carved out a much smaller population of people who are married, no children, no joint assets, no joint debts, and the plaintiff is not looking for any sort of support, that population, which is obviously a much smaller subset, after all the notices to the defendant, can be taken on the papers by the court.

So, it's a subgroup that there would not be a hearing for that particular subgroup.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Unless, of course, after filing the motion for default, the defendant appears --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Right of course.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: -- then everything stops.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Then everything stops. Okay, I apologize if you reiterated it.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon your honor.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Good afternoon.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Your honor, just for clarification purposes, I believe in your testimony you'd indicated there would be a requirement for notice of the judgment, so that would be going to the defendant. Would that be something that the party serves on the defendant after the judgment or that the court would be responsible for doing?

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: The way the legislation is currently written is it's the plaintiff's requirement to make sure the defendant gets that, and then certify to the court within 14 days if that has been accomplished.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): And that's the clarification I wanted. So, then the plaintiff would still have the burden to file something with the court to show that that actually was accomplished then. In regarding -- is it conceivable because I'm trying to think of when the initial paperwork goes out for the summons and the complaints, abode service usually is completely fine, and usually at the time of hearing if that wasn't sufficient notice, and it's determined through the dialog between the party and the judge, certainly then additional service could be required.

With the, let's say it's abode service for the summons and complaint, and then there's the new requirement, the motion for default would have to be filed with the court, if that too was a abode service and still no defendant is appearing in the case, would that satisfy the court or would there conceivably be a requirement for enhanced service, let's say if the defendants address is known and the defendant is known to be in this state, and things of that nature?

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: So, Representative Rebimbas, we have those already today. So, if there is a case where the persons served abode and the defendant still living there, and after inquiry from the plaintiff as to whether that person received the papers or they don't know, it's oftentimes that the court in the abundance of caution would either issue a subpoena or have another service effectuated because they aren't satisfied if they're living together that that defendant actually received the proper notice.

So, we already encounter that, this would just be moving that date up a little bit.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): And would that dialog take place then when the motion gets scheduled or would it then be a new date for the actual judgment? Or is it conceivable that the date of the motion will be the final judgment?

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: So, once the motion is filed, the court cannot hear it before 14 days. So, it gives time for that defendant obviously to receive that motion, for that defendant to make arrangements to come into court, and as I indicate, the legislation provides for two types of defaults. One where the defendant wouldn't appear in court at all, but we would still have the opportunity to review the file, check where the people are living, check service, and if the court is not comfortable, it'll go on the calendar for hearing.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): I want to thank you for your testimony and for those clarifications. Certainly, I would absolutely agree any time we could streamline the process and provide additional time for those who truly need the assistance of the court, that would be a better target for our resources. Thank you for taking the time.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Thank you.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Thank you Representative. Other questions from members of the committee? Seeing none. Thank you your honor.

ELIZABETH BOZZUTO: Thanks very much.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): And I'll turn it back over to Chairman Doyle.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Next up is -- I never heard -- Mr. Raphael I guess Podolsky, then we have -- know your name is spelled right, I was joking -- Kate Haakonsen, John Souza, Deb McKenna. Raphael Podolsky.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: My name is Raphael Podolsky. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, all -- members of the committee. I'm -- I am a lawyer with the legal aid programs in Connecticut. I'm here to speak on three bills. I'll try and be very brief on each one. H.B. No. 7198 is one of the judicial branch operations bills. We are concerned about sections 12 and 16, both of which deal with how housing matters are handled in Ansonia Milford.

The bill -- there are two things that concern us about these provisions. First of all, it takes the towns of West Haven, Milford, and Orange and moves eviction cases and other housing cases out of the New Haven housing court into, I presume, Derby. We think that is not a good idea. It is not convenient for the litigants, and it also means they don't get full housing court services anymore, including access to a full-time housing court judge. In addition, there's an existing -- there's a peculiar provision that's existing that says for the rest of Ansonia Milford, which is again towards Waterbury that the plaintiff can choose to move a case out of Ansonia Milford into the Waterbury housing court, but there is no right of the defendant to do that, and the way to approach it for that group of towns would be if either party wants it moved, the case can be moved.

The second bill is H.B. No. 7197, which is the one that deals with small claims jurisdiction. We oppose that bill. It would raise the jurisdiction to $7,500 dollars. The starting thing that's very important for the committee to recognize is in small claims the overwhelming percentage of consumers are defendants. They are not plaintiffs, and that to a large extent and increasingly over the years' small claims court has been means -- has become a means of collecting debts. In business related debts and increasingly the plaintiffs in those cases are debt collectors, people who've bought up old debts and are suing on them. What the bill does is it further moves the small claims court in that direction of being a collection court.

First of all, $7,500 dollars is not a small amount. It's an informal court. There are not the regular rules of evidence. There is no right of appeal, so it's a lot of money. There are a large number of defaults by consumer defendants. It's a very large percentage in that in small claims court the defendants don't appear at all.

The other thing is that this increase far outstrips the rate of inflation. It's interesting if you look back the jurisdictional limit went up to $1,000 dollars in 1981, it used to be lower. Since then inflation is 160percent, you apply that, the jurisdictional maximum would be $2,600 dollars, it's already $5,000 dollars. If you go back to 1995 when they raised to $2,500 dollars, 58 percent inflation increase since then, you apply that, it would be $3,950 dollars, it's already up to $5,000. There is no need to further this trend of pushing it higher and higher in what's largely a business collection.

One of the other witnesses made a comment about having a differential price for [ringing] based on the number of actions you bring. I think that's actually an interesting idea to explore, and if I could at least say briefly --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, third bill.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: The third is H.B. No. 7196, which is the one that deals with default divorce. For you, I want to say that I very much endorse the testimony earlier in the day of Shirley Pripstein. We are particularly concerned, as Representative Rebimbas asked questions about having divorces in which a judgment is entered, in which no one is in court, in a case that is not an agreed upon case between the parties. No one is in court for the judge to do what's essentially a canvas, to make sure that the address that was given for the defendant, somebody in front of them says, yeah that's -- we know that person was there --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- because otherwise you have a situation where you have -- the service may have been abode at an address last known three years before, and the judge has no way of knowing that that was not a recent address.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any questions for Raphae? Vice -- Mr. Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chair. Raphae just one question on this jurisdictional limit of small claims. I get your concern sort of about the consumer appearing in court and being in a situation where they're facing collection on some sort of debt. Now whether that debt be $5,000 dollars or $6,000 dollars, right now it sort of depends, you know, whether you're going to be in superior court or the small claims docket, and I guess my concern is, if you're that person and you're facing a collection debt, say it's your Cable Vision Bill or whatever it is, and you're going to have to appear in court to defend against that collection action, would you rather be in the small claims docket or would you rather be in the superior court? I mean, unless and until this legislator adopts, you know, the civil Gideon proposal or something else to guarantee access to counsel, these folks by and large end up in court unrepresented either way, and I guess as a pro se litigant, is it easier on you to be in the small claims docket where the rules of evidence are relaxed, where maybe the trial referee will be a little more lenient with you, it's not quite as intimidating, you know, it's more of a cattle call as opposed to sort of a short calendar call type of phenomenon.

I just have -- guess, one question to ask, in your experience, why is it better that that person who's facing a $6,000-dollar collection action against them would appear in superior court unrepresented by counsel than they would in the small claims docket unrepresented by counsel?

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: I think that's a very reasonable question, and I think it's hard to give clear answers on that because there's -- for some litigants under some circumstances in small-claims court, they would rather be there. So, I'm not going to disagree with that. I think you have to look at the total picture of what the impact is, that the whole notion of the small-claims system is that it's meant for small claims. The large number of consumer defendants are going to default. So, when you say, well if you are participating in the case, would you rather be in small-claims court or would you rather be on the regular docket? You might well prefer to be in small-claims court, but that's not the typical case in small-claims court, and in fact it's not even close to being the typical case in small claims court.

The typical case in small-claims court is the person is not there at all. So, a lot of this actually is I think impacted by the decision-making process of the plaintiff, and what has happened is that there are a lot of plaintiffs who probably don't know much about whether they're going to be able to collect the judgment or not. Their hope is the person's working, they're going to find them, they're going to have a job, they're going to put a wage execution on, and they're going to be able to collect, or maybe they'll go after a bank account, but they don't really know all that much about it.

They are often people who have bought the debts from somebody at a discount, they don't really know much about the circumstances of the original debt. They don't -- they may have very little information to even know if the debt -- if there have been payments coming on the debt over time, but they do know that statistically the odds are very, very high that that defendant will not show up. That is the reality of the system, so that --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): But wouldn't that --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- you encourage them, you encourage them to bring the action. You encourage them to add cost -- collateral cost if you don't try and hold --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): No.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- the maximum they can bring down to a modest --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): No, because -- I mean I guess if the fear is that defendant is going to be default, what makes you think that they are less likely to default on a $6,000 dollar case that's currently brought in superior court than the $5,000 dollar case that's brought under the small-claims docket, and at the end of the day if there is a default judgment entered, presumably that collection agency is going to seek cost -- seek recovery cost and the like, and the filing fee in the small claims docket is about a quarter of what it is in superior court. So, that's going to get tacked back onto the bill that's already owed.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Well, I guess part of what I'm saying is that the plaintiff, the entities that are the common plaintiffs, I'm not saying every entity by any means in small claims court, the entities that are the common plaintiffs. How much they sue for? How progressively they choose to proceed in their collection work may make a difference as to whether they go into small claims court or the regular docket.

They like going into small claims court because it's easy. They may be in a position, they may not even be using lawyer time. When people talked about, well a lawyer --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): They better be because, I mean, at last I checked it's still illegal in the state of Connecticut for a business entity to be represented by anybody other than an attorney. So, if there are business entities that are appearing, whether that be in the small claims docket or the superior docket that are not represented by counsel, I hope you will notify the grievance committee of that forthwith.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: My understanding is in small claims court a business -- because it's not considered -- it's not a court of record, I believe that an employee or at least certain employees of a business can actually represent the business. They can't represent somebody else's business, and they can't be an attorney for someone else or a non-attorney for someone else, but just as you can go pro se -- it sort of goes to the concept of within small claims court as distinct from the regular docket --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Well, if that's --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- what does pro se mean?

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): -- case I'm mistaken. If you could get --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Well, okay.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): -- me the statutory site on that, I would appreciate it.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Well, let me double check. Well, I think it might be in the practice book, but we should double check that, but the part of what I'm saying is, is that from -- I mean there was some discussion before about -- I think Senator Doyle said, well, you know, for a $5,000 dollar or $6,000-dollar case, what's a lawyer going to say to you? They're going to say go do it yourself. I -- you know, it's not worth my time, but the cases we're talking about are cases that, to a large extent, are being churned out in quantity on mass, at essentially very, very low cost to the --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): No, and I understand that from -- and I believe other states have this, but it's news to me that if -- if that's the law in Connecticut. My understanding was always that, you know, yes in a small claims case, okay I've got a claim against my neighbor, I can represent myself, but if I'm, you know Joe Smith Landscaping LLC, Joe Smith can't represent Joe Smith Landscaping LLC in court. He needs to hire an attorney to represent him.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Joe Smith -- well, no, no that's not true. Joe Smith can represent himself. Oh, you're saying --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): He can't represent Joe Smith LLC --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Yeah, I think yes -- I think you're right, yes. I think that -- I think you're correct about that. The -- so yes, that's true, but I'm not sure where that, I guess I'm not sure where that leads you in terms of sort of the caseload of the claims -- of the courts that we're talking about it.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Where it leads me is assuming that's true, and I guess maybe we do need to check the statute see whether that applies in small claims or not, but if it does I'm saying I don't see the distinction. Sort of if you've got a company out there that's going to be aggressively collecting on $6,000 dollar debts, they're going to have to spend the same amount of lawyer time in superior court as they will under the small claims docket, which is just a docket of the superior court, and so I, you know, I'm not -- I don't know that you would see sort of that many more or less filings just by increasing or decreasing the limit a little bit, and I actually -- the way I look at it is it's actually more consumer friendly, that if I'm that consumer representing myself in a $6,000 dollars collection case, and I'm not going to be able to hire an attorney to defend me for that $6,000 dollar collection case, to me it seems less intimidating to go into the small claims docket than it does to have to show up at a calendar call on a Monday morning for short calendar in Bridgeport.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: I'm not disagreeing with you about that. What I'm saying is though, for example if it's going to cost $90 dollar or $95 dollars to bring a small claims case, and it's going to cost -- and it was up to $300 plus dollars to bring the case on the regular docket, I think that actually makes some difference in the way in which the collection company, the collect, the debt collector who owns the debt --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Okay.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- makes his decisions about what kind of litigation --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): So, they're going to be less likely to file that $6,000-dollar case because --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: They may be or maybe they'll make the case, they'll bring it down to get it under small claims, and I think the consequences all down the road for the consumer in that, again, because the consumer is the defendant here, and the -- it impacts for example the ease of adding on collateral costs. Maybe they will waive some of those collateral costs, some kind of late fees or interest or other things because they see the convenience of small claims court, but the more you keep pushing that maximum amount up and bearing in mind who the typical users are, not the atypical users, then you see the way it incentivizes them to do that, and ultimately it impacts how the court is perceived. It impacts the way the judicial branch has to manage the courts, should they be giving court days to lawyers who come in with loads and loads of cases, give them a whole docket, because the court -- that's correctly perceived as being such a large portion of what the case does.

Even from the dollar perspective, that's why I said it was interesting, the proposal saying well if you only do two cases or fewer a year, we'll charge you less -- we'll charge you $30 dollars, but for somebody else, in fact I'm saying not just charge $95 dollars, maybe you should charge $150 dollars or $175 dollars because they're using the court in a very different way than is the person who uses it because, you know, once in three, four, or five years they bring a small claims case because they had some dispute with their neighbor.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): So, okay --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: So, the thing that you think --

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): I think I get the point, thanks.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Thanks.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Raphae let me follow it up. So, you're -- I'm trying to crystallize your opposition, and is your opposition is if it was raised to $7,500 dollars your opposition would be more consumers would be hurt basically. More consumers would be hauled in, that's your main opposition to the legislation, is that fair to say or --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Well, it's one of the -- I call it one of -- it is a principal, I don't know if I want to say -- could I just --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, sure.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- I'm going to answer the question in slightly a different way, that there are people who, I mean we all at some level like the informality of small claims court, but the reality is there are no appeals, and people in theory you could -- I think a question was asked earlier, can you move the case out of small claims court? Yes, you can, but the question is when can you move it out. You can move it out at the very, very beginning of the case before you have any idea how well you're going to do in the case. What you cannot do is go to trial at small claims, decide you don't like -- you felt that the magistrate was completely off base that took -- heard, you know, didn't take any evidence from you, you thought should have been in, you believe there were errors of law, too bad. You opted to stay in the small claims court.

So, most people are not going to move their case out early. It can happen, but that's not the typical pattern. So, that you are into this case for whatever dollar amount the judgment turns out to be because you, sort of in good faith figured it's a simple, easy, fair way to do it, and then you may discover that you feel that, you know, the magistrate listened to the other side, he didn't listen to what you had to say, or you didn't really come with all the evidence, you were pro se, you didn't understand what sort of evidence you needed.

The plaintiffs are mostly represented by attorneys in small claims court, not -- so, in any event, so I think that's also a factor. The informality is really good, as long as everybody is comfortable. I, you know, years ago I was a small claims commissioner before they had magistrates, I loved it. It was tremendous fun to be able to like play judge, and I think people got very fair decisions, but I put in a lot of time. I mean there was no pressure on me to churn out decision after decision.

So, you just have to be aware of that, and again I agree with you, there are consumers for whom it definitely would be better to be in small claims court than anywhere else, but they do not represent at least in our present court system even anything more than a small percentage.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Although it would benefit a plaintiff consumer in theory too. I know you say there's not many of them, but it would benefit a plaintiff consumer --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: I think that --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- but it's a small percentage.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- I -- yeah, the courts benefits plaintiffs generally and to the extent their consumers, it benefits them. Yes.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah. Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman and good afternoon. I think there's been a lot of good points raised. I guess I have some serious concern that we would not expand small claims then to individuals who could utilize it because of the fare that it's become a collections court. I think there was an individual who testified earlier that called it the people's court.

Whether or not it's being used to collect on judgments that concerns have failed to pay and have a responsibility to pay on those, I still see it as a people's court, and I would agree with Chairman Doyle that when clients come to you as to whether or not you would like to represent them in small claims, because of the fact it's been set up as a people's court and informality, I usually put them at ease to go to small claims depending on their matter, but I don't think we should, you know, shy away from an attorney who would like to take a pro bono case and appear small claims court. They certainly have the right to do so, and the client has the right to ask the attorney to do so.

So, again, I guess I just want to remind that there are other individuals that avail themselves of small claims court that it does make a financial, you know, incentive to go from $5 to $5,000 dollars to higher. I mean you've got, not a company, but you can have a landlord that out of the kindness of his or her heart allowed a tenant to continue to default in rent payments and then truly do have damages, and I think we heard testimony earlier today that they've been savvy enough, unbeknownst to me, but savvy enough to file multiple small claims matters in order to truly address the problem that the landlord was having with the expenses, whether it's damages and rent and late payments or no payments and things of that nature.

So, I'm not convinced that the bad debt collectors that are utilizing the court system now is a deterrent to raise for all the other consumers that are using it, and I guess arguably I could see the other side of it that if they're in our superior courts now and even if they're paying slightly more than $200 dollars, they're certainly taking up a lot more of our services in a superior court than they would in small claims court, and again I don't know how much the small claims magistrate is making, although I believe we had testimony earlier that it's $200 dollars a day, I don't know if that's correct or not. Conceivably then that's a great savings whether or not we would have to even get additional magistrates to handle if there was an influx.

So, again I, you know, I think the focus should be the people's court. I think the focus of people's court doesn't anymore diluted because there's additional, you know, debt collections that are happening there. I think, in fact I'm being more and more convinced that there's a serious cost savings to the judicial branch, to the state of Connecticut, if we did increase the $5,000 dollars.

So, I don't -- maybe that was just more of a statement than a question, unless Raphae, you wanted to respond anything that you may disagree with what I said.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Well, we made this -- I think we may disagree on that aspect, but it suggest something that I do want to say that really relates to what Senator Doyle said, and that is to say, there's no magic number for what the jurisdiction of small claims court could be. I mean some states it's around $3,000 dollars. There are some states that -- I think one state has $25,000 dollars, and so it's not like you can say, well we can objectively determine exactly what that number should be.

So, to me to some extent -- and I'm certainly not against lawyers being in small claims court on either side, but it does seem to me what you end up saying is, what are the consequences and the impact, which is exactly what you're saying. What are the consequence and impact of the number -- that dollar amount going up and where -- I mean, if you ask me, I would say we're too high already. We ought to be down probably around $3,500 or $4,000 dollars, but other people can defer, but if you say, well why can't we go up to $7,500 dollars? Because there may be some consumers out there with a claim for $6,000 dollars, well why not go up to $10,000 dollars? There may be a complainant -- a consumer with a claim of $8,000 dollars or what about $15,000 dollars. It's like there's no magic number, and so you want to kind of look at the way the whole system works, and then weigh those different factors, and so I'm not disagreeing, or maybe I'm disagreeing with the way you're weighing, but I'm not disagreeing with the underlying question, because that's a fair question to ask.

I think we're -- but I have seen over the years the way in which small claims court has moved I believe as a result of the maximum jurisdiction going up far, far higher than the rate of inflation. This is no longer the kind of court system that was designed for small cases -- well it is designed for small cases still, but the smallness is very, very significantly changed if you do nothing more than go back say 30 years and apply an inflation adjustment. We're way, way above that.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): On a different bill for 7196, nonadverserial dissolution of marriage, you reiterated what was previously said about a concern regarding the service aspect. I believe in our questions with the judge in that regard, and it's just unfortunate we can't have both of you up at the same time and have a dialogue back and forth, but my understanding was that even at the filing of the motion, there's still going to be an analysis done by any judge to see what the history was in the sense of how service was made.

So, there's nothing that would stop a judge that saw abode service for the initial summons and complaint, abode service again for the motion that gets filed, to then decide not to proceed with the default judgment, and then again there's still that requirement that the ultimate judgment, again, needs to be served on the defendant.

So, I'm guess I'm trying to illicit what exactly is your concern in that regard.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: I guess I'm not understanding some pieces of what you're saying. First of all, as I understand -- I understand that you have received a revised version of the bill, which I've not -- I'm not sure what's in the revised version of the bill. So, I'm speaking to the bill as a raised committee bill, and I guess I don't know for sure what a subsequent version of the bill says.

So, in regard to the bill that at least I'm testifying to, the -- I don't see any place for the things that were being called a default judgment, which is really not a default judgment in the usual sense. It's really more an accelerated decision, but for what's being called a default judgment, it says no hearing.

It says -- the person gets a notice that says, if you don't respond in 14 days and appear we will enter a default, and the judge will enter orders, and in section 4 of the bill it talks about within in five days after it would normally be calendared for a hearing, it won't be calendared for a hearing. So, I don't understand at what point the judge would be in a position, really to review anything.

So, there's abode service is acceptable form of service in Connecticut, so it's not like someone -- a judge would look at the papers and say, oh wait a second this is abode service, I'm not going to enter the judgment. The judge would have no way of knowing whether abode service actually reached the person or not. The judge would have no way of knowing, of verifying that the plaintiff gave -- I don't think a judge would know how recent the address was --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): So --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- if the plaintiff provided in good faith honestly and address, but if it was a year and a half old --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Let me propose this hypothetical to you. If the summons and complaint was abode service, and then the motion that got subsequently filed was in-hand service, and the defendant still fails to appear and still fails to appear or file an appearance, which would be essentially the same thing, would you then agree that it should be -- it could be an expedited process then because they actually have actual notice?

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: I think that --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): And they don't have to wait the 90 days' statutory period?

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- two things. Yeah, first of all I think -- so your saying there's the service of the complaint and then there's the service of a notice of the date, of a hearing date --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Yeah, so it would be the service --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: -- and you're saying the service of the notice of the hearing date by abode -- by hand -- by in-hand service --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): -- so my understanding is the summons and complaint, and that would be by abode service, and then there is a motion that needs to be filed in order to ask for a default judgment, and let's say that that motion was then served in hand, would you then conceive that that would be proper service, and if the defendant does not respond within the allowable time and does not appear, file an appearance or appear ultimately on that date or a later date that that individual, the plaintiff, would not have to wait the 90 days and an expedited process would conceivably be reasonable in that regard?

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: I'd want to look at that a little bit more, but in principle getting abode service -- getting in-hand service into the process prior to the time that you're entering any kind of a judgment would be very helpful, and would certainly help justify expediting the process.

I'm also not against a process that's expedite as long as it's reasonable. So, for example it's important to -- assuming the service is good, it's important to recognize that people may need a reasonable amount of time to either try to get to a lawyer, try to understand what's going, to react, talk to friends. We deal in the legal services community with people who may not be as familiar with the judicial process, may not be -- may not read well, may not handle the language well. There are a whole number of things that may make them say slower at dealing with this and more difficult from lack of funds that respond.

That doesn't speak to any particular timeline, and so it does not mean that you could not have an expedited process if people in that situation don't respond. I'm reacting initially at least to a 14-day process. What would be appropriate? I guess at this point I would leave open, but I certainly think it would longer than 14 days.

So, if you were combining some of these things, you were saying that we're going to inject -- if we're going to do some kind of accelerated resolution that reduces the 90 days in those cases where no one appears, and we're going to combine it with in-hand service, so we have some confidence that the defendant actually received the papers, and we're not talking 14 days, we're talking a longer period. Yeah, I mean that might be, some version of that, might be a reasonable way of working that out, and it might meet some of the things that the judicial branch seems interested in.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): So, thank you for your testimony here today, and certainly I know you didn't have an opportunity to review the amended language, and I believe it does -- did change at least the original timeline. So, I would just encourage, if you could --

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Sure.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): -- just reach out to the judicial branch, have some conversations, because it certainly, if there's language we can all agree upon, that's always beneficial.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Okay, and we have had actually -- had some conversation, but not precisely about that.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions for Mr. Podolsky? Seeing none. Thank you.

RAPHAEL PODOLSKY: Thank you very much.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): And I -- and Raphae I see the judge and your representative talking, so maybe they're going to discuss the status. Thank you. Next speaker is Kate Haakosen, sorry, then John Souza, Deb McKenna, Elizabeth Bossoli. Kate if you could pronounce your name properly for the record for me, and I apologize.

KATE HAAKOSEN: I would be happy to and good afternoon Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong, and members of the Judiciary Committee. I'm Kate Haakosen. I know you can't possibly guess that, so all is forgiven.

I'm here on behalf of the family law section of the Connecticut Bar Association to testify concerning Raised Bill 7196. As you saw, we've been chatting with Judge Bozzuto, and I was very happy to find that my very low -- very high lottery number put me after her testimony because we had not seen the changes that they'd proposed from the judicial branch.

However, there are still some things that would worry us, and I will comment on Judge Bozzuto's testimony in a moment. We still have a concern that 14 days is a very short period of time. It's a very short period of time for someone who has received some sort of defective service, got served abode, and the plaintiff hid it or the defendant doesn't live there.

It's a very short time for the grapevine or whatever that finally gets people the actual notice to happen, and the other thing is that in my 38 years of practicing divorce law, I've met an awful lot of people who feel that they were surprised by being served with the divorce, whether they should have been surprised or not we could discuss, but they feel surprised, they feel upset, they feel betrayed, they're emotionally paralyzed, and sometimes it takes them weeks to show up in my office, and that doesn't even count the all the ones who never show up in anybody's office because they can't afford to or can't manage to do it, and -- so I think the people need more than 14 days to digest that something big is happening in their lives and to react to it, and so I just would think that time period could be a problem, and we'd like to see something longer than that.

We're not married if you will to 90 days on the other hand. It doesn't have to be that long, and I have happily taken advantage of the ability to waive the 90-day waiting period in many if not most of my cases since that bill got passed a couple of years ago, but this -- the bill -- the Raised Bill gives people less time than do -- than they would have for civil suit.

The other thing that we want to raise that in section 4, the section that would allow the court to enter a default judgment, we'd rather it was just called a judgment, if the people do not own any joint property or any property jointly -- the concern I have about that is that rather than limiting the value of the property, it just says not jointly.

We're an equitable property division state. The family court can divide and assign [ringing] is it okay if I finish?

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, please summarize. We'll probably have some questions anyway.

KATE HAAKOSEN: Regardless of title, and so the fact that only one party may own a lot of property but it's not joint, I don't think should leave the court to feel sanguine about entering a judgment in the absence of the party, and in fact in the absence of a hearing. So, that is a concern. There are certain other requirements rendering a default judgment that aren't mentioned in the bill, but presumably one would have to comply with, like, filing a military affidavit. The statue is silent about parents attending parenting ed. and -- so those are things that certainly we can discuss with Judge Bozzuto.

It's true that the present summons telling people they have three days to appear or two days to appear, just not true, so a better notice would certainly be an improvement, and the -- Judge Bozzuto's new language about sending out a notice of the entry judgment and the certification that was served, that was -- that's a big improvement.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none. I would just ask maybe you can work with Judge Bozzuto and try to -- because I think there probably is some merit. It was defined by me by Judge Bozzuto, this is a narrow few people. It's not really a broad spectrum of litigants, so if you could try to work with them and see if you can come to a consensus if it's possible. If it isn't -- maybe isn't it, maybe it, but communication would be helpful.

KATE HAAKOSEN: Well, if I may one of the things that struck me about this is Judge Bozzuto mentioned how many people, I think a quarter of the people, end up with a default judgment, and so, you know, the theory is why can't we get them their default judgment a lot sooner. The problem is when they file their writ of summons and complaint, we don't know which ones they are, and so to -- I think we're assuming too much to think we can just, you know, if we push back enough those 25 percent are going to somehow get shook out of the process, and we may catch some people who really shouldn't have been in that group.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Well, to be honest, both of you know this area of the law better than me, so I'll ask you guys to try to work out, and Doreen is nodding their head, maybe you can get back to us with your thoughts. Okay, further comments from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

KATE HAAKOSEN: You're welcome.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is John Souza, the Deb McKenna, then Elizabeth Bossoli, and Kaitlyn Fydenkevez, I apologize, John Souza. Is Mr. Souza here? John Souza is not here. Deb McKenna, is Deb McKenna here? Yes, she is.

DEB MCKENNA: Good afternoon Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel and Representative Stafstrom. My name is Deborah McKenna. I'm an attorney at the Hayber Law Firm in New Haven, Connecticut. I practice on the plaintiff's employment side, and I'm here today testifying on behalf of the Connecticut Employment Lawyers Association in support of Raised Bill 929.

For those of you who aren't familiar with CELA, we're a voluntary organization where members are attorneys who practice throughout the state of Connecticut, and have to devote at least 51 percent of their employment practice to representing plaintiffs.

As such, we represent plaintiffs in many types of actions including whistleblower claims. CELA supports Raised Bill 929 for three main reason. First if it's passed it will expand the type of complaint that's currently covered under 3151m. Second it will improve the statute of limitations under 3151m, and third it will expand the range of potential damages, and I know that my colleagues have spoken about this earlier today, both from the CTOA and we had some testimony from folks who had whistleblowing claims, so I will be try to be somewhat brief.

CELA believes that the changes to 3151 are important, particularly expansion of the type of the complaint that is made to include complaints that are made internally both about a violation or a suspected violation, because there are many employees who first raise their concerns internally before they go to any type of an outside entity to raise a complaint, and often when an employee does decide that they're going to raise these concerns, whether it's a supervisor, a manager, an ombudsman person, whoever the case may be within their employment sector, then that employee is putting themselves at risk for retaliation by their employer.

Under the current law there really is no protection for those folks, and we -- you know, without having that type of protection I think it really limits folks from raising those complaints internally. Some people will go to the outside agencies, and others may not raise the concerns at all out of fear for their jobs, and so -- we believe, I mean this is really the type of conduct that we want to encourage employees to raise internally, and we certainly think that since they are in the best place to have knowledge about any types of violations or suspected violations within their workplace, they should be able to raise their concerns without any fears for losing their jobs for doing so.

It also will make this -- the 3151m consistent with other Connecticut whistleblower claims, particularly that under 33-1336, which covers whistleblowers at certain publicly traded corporations.

The second reason CELA is supporting the changes to 3151m is the increase of the timeframe to file a claim from 90 days to 180 days [ringing], and I will -- I understand my time is up. So, I can very quickly sum up. Ninety days is simply too short of a period. Most folks don't even realize they have a claim within 90 days, it takes them a very long time to understand their rights if they've been terminated, find a lawyer, and decide if they want to pursue a claim.

In my written testimony, which we submitted, it did identify other statutes to have a 180-day time period, and this would make the 3151m whistleblowing statute consistent with our other employment laws that we have currently on the books, and financially the additional remedies available for whistleblowers will really get to some of the needs of employees who find themselves fired after raising these types of concerns.

It can be truly devastating for an employee who think -- you know, tries to do the right thing and finds themselves out of a job at the hands of retaliation by their employer, and so to allow for compensatory damages and punitive damages would greatly expand the protection.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, thank you. Any questions? Vice Chairman Stafstrom.

REP. STAFSTROM (129TH): Thank you Mr. Chair, and I don't know if you were here earlier when I sort of had this conversation with a representative from the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, but to me I think, and maybe there's some tweaking that needs to go on here, but this should -- can and probably should be seen as sort of a pro-business piece of legislation in the extent to which it encourages or supports employees to report abuses or to report violations of law to their -- internally before reporting externally, and gives an employer an opportunity to rectify a situation.

So, while we're in a realm of compromising, I know the CBIA had said they were open to that conversation, so you guys want to loop back in with them at some point on this bill and see whether there is a way to work with them maybe on who notice has to be provided to, or who you have to register your complaint with, but it seems like there's grounds to get everybody behind us, and maybe we should work on that moving forward.

DEB MCKENNA: Okay, we'll do that thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further comments or questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much.

DEB MCKENNA: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next person to testify is Elizabeth Bossoli. Is Elizabeth here? Yes, she is, and then we have Kaitlyn Fydenkevez, sorry Kaitlyn if I -- Sally Zanger, Jim Pickett, Naila Amin. Elizabeth's here. Thank you.

ELIZABETH BOSSOLI: Good afternoon members of the Judiciary Committee. My name is Elizabeth Bossoli, and I'm speaking in support of bill 7214. For the past eight years, I have had the pleasure of learning about the dynamics between service dogs and the general public, both through my efforts to educate the public about service dog teams and through my firsthand experience of training and handling my now retired guide dog.

Second to the ever-present risk of being denied access to a public establishment on the basis of having a service dog or a disability, is the risk prevented by the sometimes well intended general public as we share -- we share those public establishments with. As a visually impaired woman, the independence I gain from the reliable assistance from my guide dog was invaluable.

My guide dog, a happy go lucky golden retriever named Bradley, was an attentive worker who performed his job skillfully and enthusiastically. His outgoing affectionate personality worked to our detriment when distracted by unwanted attention from others. A distracted guide dog can make mistakes. Some of the mistakes they could make may be relatively benign. However, others could very easily put the handler at risk for serious injury or death.

A distracted guide dog who fails to indicate the stairs in the path, could result in a handler falling down a flight of stairs. A distracted guide dog could make an even more dangerous mistake when traffic is involved. Some members of the general public seem to treat successfully distracting a service dog as a challenge to be accomplished. Some people will go to great lengths to break through the -- to ensure the reliable performance of their highly-trained partners.

They will do things like bark at the service dogs, try to scare the dog into spooking, offer the dog food, or refuse to stop touching the dog when asked to. All of these are examples of people who have malicious intent. They are not well-intended dog lovers who don't realize that they're doing something wrong.

I'm in full support of the proposed bill that would offer people with disabilities and added layer of protection against unwanted interference with their service dogs. It has remained my philosophy that proactive education should be our first line of defense in combatting ignorance among the general public and owners of public establishments.

I maintain that the education and proactive advocacy is crucial, and in this case I believe that legislation will serve as an added measure of support. Service dog handlers can certainly use all the support we can get. I'd like to add my support for the state of Connecticut to extend all existing protection, as well as the proposed protection to the handlers of service dogs for all disabilities as well as the handlers of service dogs -- as well as the handlers of the dogs being trained as service dogs by individuals not employed by our associated with a guide or assistance dog organization. Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

ELIZABETH BOSSOLI: I welcome any questions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Just be aware, other people have testified, so we've talked at length about this bill. Maybe you were here, so --

ELIZABETH BOSSOLI: Yes.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any questions from the committee? Senator Kissel.

SENATOR KISSEL (7TH): Yeah, I just want to thank you for taking the time to come here and testify on this bill. Chairman Doyle's correct, we did discuss it at length. I think it needs a few little changes, but I think overall the committee's reaction to the proposal has been very positive, and so your testimony is worthwhile, and I just want to say thank you for participating in the process.

ELIZABETH BOSSOLI: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions from the committee? Seeing none. Thank you very much.

ELIZABETH BOSSOLI: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Again, now I have to apologize, it's Kaitlyn Fydenkevez, is Kaitlyn here? Kaitlyn, you got to correct -- for the record put your name on there, and I apologize, then we have Sally Zanger, Jim Pickett, Naila Amin, and Matt Blondin. Kaitlyn.

KAITLYN FYDENKEVEZ: Good afternoon, and it's -- my name is Kaitlyn Fydenkevez, so very close. I appreciate -- the effort was great. Senator Kissel, Senator Doyle, Representative Tong, and members of the committee my name is Kaitlyn Fydenkevez, I am the director of policy and public relations at the Connecticut Alliance to End Sexual Violence, formerly known as CONNSACS. For over 35 years the alliance has been a voice to end sexual violence, and last year our certified sexual assault counselors at our nine-member programs provided advocacy services to 6,300 child and adult victims of sexual violence, many of those who had cases in the Connecticut court system.

You have my written remarks regarding H.B. No. 7198, concerning court operations and victim services, so I'll just touch on the relevant provisions that I feel weren't covered earlier. The Alliance supports the intent behind changes made to section 2, lines 82 through 88 regarding civil protection orders adding specific language instead of statutory references to crimes of stalking.

Available to Connecticut residents since January 2015, CPOs are a new protective order developed through a multidisciplinary taskforce, which included law makers, representative from the judicial branch, and the alliance with the aim of ensuring that victims of sexual assault and stalking whose perpetrator is not a family or household member, would be afforded the same protections as a restraining order.

In order to streamline the CPO process and provide clarity for victims, judges, attorneys, and victim advocates a like, it's important for the legal standard to include clear language about what constitutes the basis for granting an order. To provide that clarity, we propose adding language that specifically permits a respondent threatening or harassing communications with an applicant as grounds for that order.

It's increasingly common for people in this day and age to communicate through phone-based messaging services, text messages, social media, e-mail and adding messages to line 85 specifically would mean that two or more acts of surveilling, monitoring, sending unwanted gifts or messages could constitute actions that would necessitate the granting of a civil protection order. We feel that this provides a more inclusive opportunity for victims to put a stop to stalking behavior at all times -- of all kind, acknowledging the ways that people communicate in this day and age.

The Alliance supports section 19 of the bill starting at line 827 regarding the filing and enforcement of orders of restitution. For a victim of sexual assault receiving restitution from a perpetrator plays an important role in the victim's ability to plan for the future and to move on and heal from the assault. Currently with no filing or enforcement mechanism, perpetrators are given an incentive to violate their probation our parole in order to shed those financial orders, leaving the victim awaiting restitution promise that never arrives.

Providing a direct avenue for the registration enforcement of these orders will alleviate this issue and promise that the justice that has been promised to the victim will be fully delivered.

Finally, the bill makes changes to the OVS Victim Compensation Program, which we support. Section 22 expands the definition of personal injury to include emotional harm, and this expansion would allow person to experience emotion harm, but no [ringing] bodily harm to apply, and I'll just briefly conclude. My last point --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

KAITLYN FYDENKEVEZ: -- is that we also support section 26b, which would waive the consideration of health insurance as a collateral source in cases where a victim of sexual assault or child abuse is concerned that a family member, who is their perpetrator would be finding out information about them potentially under the program.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you very much. Thanks for your patience today. Next speaker is Sally Zanger, then Jim Pickett, Naila Amin, Matt Blondin, and Mary Kate Smith. Sally Zanger.

SALLY ZANGER: Good afternoon Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Todd -- Tong, Representative Rebimbas and other distinguished members -- better, better? Good, okay thank you. I'm Sally Zanger, I'm a staff attorney with the Connecticut Legal Rights Project, which is a statewide non-profit legal services organization that provides services to low-income adults with serious mental health conditions.

We advocate for people living with mental health conditions in many areas, including protecting civil rights and access to housing. We have concerns about section 2 of proposed H.B. No. 7198, an act concerning court operation, and that's the section that defines stalking, which we think this definition is a bit vague and broad, and historically when this civil protection order for non-domestic issues was enacted, we worried that it might become a way for a neighbor to effectively evict a fellow tenant, and that has happened occasionally, and I also had a client who was unable to see a therapist because such an order was -- which was eventually dismissed, was enacted, but I'm especially concerned and CLP is especially concerned about the one phrase, disturbing manner, which could permit all manner of bigotry, prejudice and stereotyping to prevail.

I think I put in my testimony a copy of the -- as used in the section stalking means two or more willful acts performed in a threatening, predatory, or disturbing manner. Some people find it disturbing when other people's manner includes being African-American, or being Jewish, speaking any language other than English or being on the autism spectrum, talking to themselves. I feel like a definition that includes harassing, following, lying in wait for, surveilling, monitoring, sending unwanted gifts should be sufficient without the disturbing manner language.

Manner is by its nature subjective, but threatening and predatory should be enough. I mean I have clients who because of their fear have taken photos of the cars in the parking lot, that would be disturbing, but that shouldn't be a reason to be able to kick someone out of their house or get a restraining order.

The other bill I wanted to comment on was the -- it's proposed bill 7214, an act concerning harassment of a guide or assistance dog. It's a great statute, it's got a good purpose. The testimony today was I think really powerful about the stuff people do that can really harm other people, but there are -- many people use -- many different kinds of people use assistance dogs, not just people with visible physical impairments like visual impairments, hearing, or physical impairments, and this statute as it is written doesn't protect those people.

It was the young man who testified who uses the dog for a mental health condition, his dog wouldn't actually be covered under the way the statute is written. People use assistance dogs to warn them when they're about to have a seizure, if they have PTSD, to get them back home. So, I would just urge the committee to extend the protection from harassment, as the previous witness testified, to all service dogs and their handlers, and also to emotion support animals.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, thank you. Any questions for -- I see none. Thank you very much.

SALLY ZANGER: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker is Jim Pickett, Naila Amin, Matt Blondin, Mary Kate Smith, Fraidy Reiss. Jim Pickett.

JIM PICKETT: Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. My name's James Pickett, I'm a 1987 graduate of UConn Law School, so I'm in my 30th year of practicing law. I'm here today on behalf of the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association to offer testimony in opposition to S.B. No. 932, an act establishing a statutory cause of action for injury to person or property based on negligent infliction of emotional distress.

I also emailed to the committee our written testimony in the form of a letter from our President, Stuart Johnson. My comments are really based on that, so I'm going to be very brief and try not to repeat those.

Just by way of background, the CDLA is comprised of 100s of Connecticut's civil defense lawyers whose firms represent many thousands of defendants, both individuals and businesses in Connecticut state and federal courts. This bill seeks to codify the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and it's something that doesn't really -- it's not needed because we already have a common law cause of action for that.

So, the judiciary -- there's nothing to indicate in any of the case law or recent events in the press that would indicate a need for this statute, but even if there was a problem that needed to be fixed, we think that the statute is flawed in two respects. One, it expands liability for emotion distress damages resulting from injury to property, and the second thing is the provision of attorney's fees for plaintiffs and only plaintiffs.

In Attorney Johnson's written comments, he posits a number of situations to which this statue, if enacted would most likely apply. Additionally, it's questionable whether existing auto and homeowner's insurance policies would even provide coverage for this type of thing, so it could have a direct impact, you know, on people's pocketbooks, and it would almost assuredly increase the cost of insurance as insurers modify their policies to provide that type of coverage, and just to give you an example, if you think about the ad you see on TV from Liberty Mutual where the actress says, you had a car, you loved your car, you named your car Brad, nothing will replace Brad, well if you have this statute enacted, everybody got a Brad, and everybody could have emotional distress based on a car accident case where they have no physical injury, and that's really the definition of opening the floodgates.

One thing that came to my mind if I was reading that statute and I was an enterprising young lawyer, I might put up a billboard and advertise for those cases, because I could get attorney's fees. So, it's a solution [ringing] in search of a problem.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. I was just saying also old lawyer too, it doesn't have to be a young lawyer [laughter].

JIM PICKETT: Even an old lawyer, yes.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any questions? I see none. Thank you. We had a lengthy discussion on this earlier --

JIM PICKETT: I was here for it, yes.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- yeah, so we had. So, you're off the hook counselor. Thank you. Next speaker is Naila Amin, is Naila here? Yes, she is, then Matt Blondin, Mary Kate Smith, Fraidy Reiss, and Sun Nijen [phonetic] Naila [phonetic].

NAILA AMIN: Hi --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you, thanks for your patience, its been a long day, thank you.

NAILA AMIN: No problem. Hi, my name is Naila Amin. I am currently 27 years old, and I'm a survivor of a child forced marriage. At the age of four I came to the United States with my parents for a better and opportunities, and I went back to Pakistan when I was 8 years old, and I found out, it was my other cousin's wedding, that I had gotten engaged while away on that trip.

All of a sudden I was in my dad's brother's house, and I was playing with -- I remember they had a baby calf, and I was playing with, and these teenage girls they started laughing, they were like, oh you better start taking care of the house because you're going to be the woman of the house now, and I'm sitting there 8 years old, you know, American girl, like, what in the world is going on. I just kind of brushed it off, and I came back to America, and I remember I had a crush on a boy in the 4th grade, and he was Greek, because I grew up in Astoria Queens, and I said to myself Naila, why even bother because you're already called for, you're spoken for, and as a 8 year old that is very sad to have to feel and go through that, and I couldn't really explain to anybody because who in the world would understand that.

So, at the age of 13 I was taken back to Pakistan for my brother's wedding, and they did a ceremony called a nikah, which is Sharia law, Islamic law, I'm considered married. They dressed me up like a bride, they dressed my husband up, my ex-husband up, and they took pictures, and you know why they took those pictures? So, they could bring it back here and put it in immigration and apply for him to come here, so I was the pathway to America, and I want to know why didn't a red flag not come up in immigration at the time. Why didn't somebody do anything about it then? Why did my life have to get ruined in order -- why did I have to go through what I have to go through, and now I'm becoming an activist to help other people. That could've been prevented if a red flag went up, and someone said, wait she's 13, he's 13 years older, what in the world's going on. He's my first cousin.

At 14 I started dating a Spanish boy here in high school. I -- my parents found out, my dad beat me, I went to the social worker, and they called child protective services, I entered foster care, and they had no idea on what to do with me. They had no cultural competency. I was eating pizza from Trader Joe's for 6 months straight because they had no halal food, and nobody understood me. They couldn't find me a Muslim foster home. I went from home to home to home. I ran away a lot. I ended up running to my parent's house, and -- because I didn't live in that life, structured life, 8 a.m. go to bed, you know. I came -- I was pretty spoiled. I had everything materialistically, but I didn't have my parent's support, and [ringing] I'll summarize it up quickly.

I went, they took me to Pakistan, I was kidnapped and my uncle called Child Protective Services here. Someone from the U.S. Consulate came to my village to make sure I was there. My mother was arrested here, and then I was returned to the United States and I went from home to home again.

I turned 18, I became an EMT. I just finished my associates in human services, and I just opened up the Naila Amin Foundation, which will be the first to house girls under 18 that will -- that are escaping forced marriages, because right now, since it's legal to marry your child in a lot of states, 18 year olds shelter -- 18 an up shelters cannot take those girls because it'll be considered kidnapping.

So, now I'm just collecting grants and doing stuff to open up a home. Thank you for having me.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any questions from the committee? Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman and good afternoon. Certainly, not a question but just an amazing young lady that I see before me with so much courage, that I'm just completely in awe. Thank you very much for sharing your story. I think, you know, your story is one that's going to educate many of us, but everybody else too that's going to hear about your story, and I just want to continue to encourage you to, you know, continue to pursue your future, and continue to help others because I think you'll get ten-fold in return, and we'll seriously consider this legislation that's before us. I think you -- I knew you were in the room. You've been here patiently all day, and I do know that, you know, people have certain questions regarding different types of exceptions and things of that nature, but hearing firsthand how, you know, you've been personally impacted or how others may be impacted is definitely very educational. So, thank you again for sharing your story and continue doing everything that you're doing because you are certainly an inspiration.

NAILA AMIN: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Representative Porter.

REP. PORTER (94TH): Hi, and thank you for your testimony. I just really want to echo what Representative Rebimbas just said. You touched me. I can't even imagine. I have a daughter, and I'm just sitting here and imagining something like that happening to her or any other girl that has a bright future and big dreams, so I want to applaud you for what you've done, what you're doing, what you're going to do.

There are so many girls out there counting on you, so thank you for having the courage to come and share your story with us, because I know it wasn't easy, but continue to tell your story because there's power in that, and it's not about you, it's about the girls that you'll set free, all right?

NAILA AMIN: Thank you.

REP. PORTER (94TH): God bless you.

NAILA AMIN: Thank you for having me.

REP. PORTER (94TH): You're welcome.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you, and I'll just comment -- one sec -- I'll comment, you know, to follow up the two representative comments before, for me, to be honest, the complexity of your case where you're dealing with multi-countries and culture, I mean it's tough for me to follow to be honest, never mind living through it. Just comprehending your testimony because of the complexities involved in the cultures.

I just wish you well, and I -- you're definitely a strong person. Any further questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you for being patient today also. Thank you.

NAILA AMIN: No problem. Thank you for having me [applause].

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): The next speaker is Matt Blondin, then Mary Kate Smith, Fraidy Reiss, Sun Nijen [phonetic], and Christine Elkins. Matt Blondin.

MATT BLONDIN: Good afternoon. Dear honorable committee, co-chairs, Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong, and all the distinguished members of the Judiciary Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to present testimony and express my views regarding proposed H.B. No. 5442. My name is Dr. Matthew Blondin. I was born and raised in Connecticut, in New Haven and Orange. I've been a practicing doctor of optometry since 1979. I have a private practice in Torrington. I currently reside in Litchfield. I also serve as the Chairman of the Connecticut state board of optometry, and I'm President of VOSH Connecticut, a charity organization providing free eye care over the past 16 years to the poor of Nicaragua.

Currently, I'm also a student at UConn in their MPH program, and as part of our MPH curriculum my wife Audrey and I decided to bring forward legislation regarding the age of marriage in Connecticut, and I'm very grateful to Representative Michelle Cook for helping to propose that bill. I encourage you to support H.B. No. 5442 because child marriage is a serious problem with lifelong consequences.

In Connecticut in the past five years, as was said before, 20 boys and 159 girls were married below the age of 18. The current legislation in Connecticut on the books has no minimum age to marry, and children as young as age 14 were among those married during the last five year. Now that's age 14, holy cow.

Child marriage has negative effects on the children involved. They have an increased risk of both mental and physical health problems as well as an increased vulnerability to physical, sexual, emotional, and verbal abuse. These young children also have reduced educational opportunities and a great risk of living in poverty.

At a conference on July 25, 2015 President Obama stated there is no place in a civilized society for the early or forced marriage of children. These traditions may date back centuries, but they have no place in the 21st century. They are issues of right and wrong in any culture. I agree, and I encourage you to start right here, right now in Connecticut to end the injustice caused by allowing child forced marriage, and thank you for allowing me the chance to discuss my views on this issue, and I really urge you to support proposed bill 5442.

If I can make one quick comment, Senator Suzio asked about exceptions, and, you know, nowhere in the current statute does it say anything about asking permission of the child who's getting married, it's just -- I think that in Connecticut what's the success rate of marriages where both the bride and groom give consent to get married, let alone someone who's forced against their will as a child to get married. So, it -- this whole issue, it just touches my heart, and I hope it will yours too. Thank you very much.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Any questions from the committee? Seeing none. So, sorry -- I mean -- doctor I can ask you, do you --

MATTHEW BLONDIN: Sure.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- some issues have been raised about, whether you had an exception where I judge could make a decision. Do you like an absolute ban or do you think it's reasonable to have a judge?

MATTHEW BLONDIN: My opinion is, and I have great respect for probate judges, but I don't think that in this particular instance that they're capable of deciding whether a 14 or 15-year-old should get married. You know, they don't have any expertise in child psychology or, you know, anything along that -- in fact, as my wife stated, our probate judges aren't even an attorney --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Soon will be, soon will be.

MATTHEW BLONDIN: -- and she agreed with us that this bill was a good idea. So, I don't mean to take any thunder away from probate judges, but I think this is really issue where the people involved in something as serious as marriage need to be able to give consent on their own, as adults.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay.

MATTHEW BLONDIN: So -- and that's age 18.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, and the next -- your next probate judge will be an attorney as you probably --

MATTHEW BLONDIN: Yes, yes --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- that person grandfathered in -- whenever the next person takes over it'll be an attorney.

MATTHEW BLONDIN: That's true.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you for your testimony and your patience.

MATTHEW BLONDIN: Thanks so much for allowing me to speak.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Next speaker Mary Kate Smith, Fraidy Reiss, Sun Nijen [phonetic], Christine Elkins, Aileen Keays, Mary Kate Smith, is Mary Kate Smith -- no she's not here. Fraidy Reiss, is Fraidy here? Yes, she is.

FRAIDY REISS: All right. Well, thank you co-chairs and distinguished committee members. I am Fraidy Reiss. I am a forced marriage survivor, and the founder of Unchained At Last, which is a non-profit that helps women escape forced marriages. We are usually able to help women age 18 or older who call us and ask for help in a forced marriage situation, but the sad truth is we are rarely able to help those under age 18 who call us begging us for help to avoid a forced marriage. That is the reason that I have written op-eds in the New York Times and the Washington Post about child marriage, and that's the reason that I've worked here in Connecticut and in several other states to help write and pass legislation to end all child marriage without any exception.

Currently, the law in Connecticut sets 18 as the minimum marriage age, but with the two exceptions, parental consent and judicial approval, effectively the minimum marriage age is 0. This puts Connecticut on the same page as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in terms of child marriage. It is shocking.

We retrieved data from the state Department of Public Health and discovered that between 2000 and 2014, more than 1,140 children as young as 14 were married here in Connecticut. More than 88 percent of them were girls married to adult men, so this is a serious gender violence issue.

Two really important reasons to end child marriage, one, a child before the age of 18, as I see all the time, is -- faces overwhelming legal and practical barriers when trying to avoid a forced marriage or leave an unhappy or abusive marriage, in terms of leaving home, accessing a confidential shelter, retaining an attorney, bringing a legal action in his or her own name, these are very difficult for a child, and the second really important reason is the many devastating consequences of marriage before age 18 on a child, undermining a girl's health, education, and economic opportunities and increasing a girl's risk of experiencing violence.

The U.S. State Department considers marriage before 18 a human rights abuse, partly for this reason. The same legislation to end all marriage before 18 without any exception is close to passing in New Jersey, it's also pending in Maryland and Massachusetts and about to be introduced this week in Pennsylvania. Weaker versions of the bill are pending in other states as well, but I urge you to end all child marriage, and if I have time I'd like to talk about why it's so important not to allow a judicial approval exception, if I still have any time, I'd like to get to that.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): You might get that question asked.

FRAIDY REISS: Okay, so then I will end by urging you on behalf of forced and child marriage survivors here in Connecticut and across the U.S. please pass H.B. No. 5442.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Sure. Any questions? Representative Rebimbas.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your testimony, and I think again, you know, a lot of very good points have been raised, and I think, you know, one of the struggles that we always have as a committee, whether it's this topic or any other one, is really cultural sensitivity as well, and respecting the beliefs and, I guess, practices and traditions that others exercise that maybe we, specifically, don't ourselves. So, that is always something that's a factor, at least certainly in my mind when we ponder many of these proposals.

With that said, do you know whether the marriages in the last year that were under 18 or prior to that, do you know the statistics as to whether or not they're still intact?

FRAIDY REISS: Well, the data that we retrieved from the state did not include any identify information about the children. So, I couldn't tell you about all of them. I can tell you thought that studies -- and I can tell you based on the children and women who reach out to me, and there are studies that show age at marriage has always been the most accurate predictor of marital failure. The younger you are when you get married, the more likely you are to get divorced, and the older you are, the less likely, that's just how its always worked.

Marriage before 18 has a shocking, between 70 and 80 percent, chance of ending in failure. So, while I don't know exactly what happened to each one of those children who was married recently in Connecticut, overwhelming statistic -- statistically speaking overwhelming likelihood is that they're no longer married --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): And I can certainly appreciate the general statistics. I think most of probably are well aware of those, and I guess, I'm just trying to get a sense of the exceptions that we have in existing law in Connecticut, how that has been doing. If its been successful and -- I don't even know if we can say successful, but if it's been curtailing, you know, the real abusive type relationships in that regard --

FRAIDY REISS: Well, that's a good question, and the answer is it has not, and this is true not only in Connecticut -- because parental consent and judicial approval exceptions are very common across the U.S., what we have seen is that parental consent is often parental coercion, and as Matthew Blondin testified before, there's no process in place to ask a child are you marrying willingly or is this coercion? I know of situations in other states where girls showed up at the clerk's office sobbing while her parents signed the marriage license application, and there was nothing that the clerk could do.

There have been clerks in many states who have stood up and said, this makes us really uncomfortable. These children are oftentimes being forced, and we can see that, but there's nothing that we can do to intervene.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): And I think -- and just on that point, I think that's duly noted. I mean I'm shocked that that wouldn't even stir an investigation if a child is showing up sobbing and vehemently saying this is against my will. Don't get me wrong, we're not talking about asking a child to wear a blue shirt versus a pink shirt, I mean this is a lifelong decision. So, I'm actually kind of shocked and certainly something I know will probably be a topic of discussion, but I do want to thank you then for your testimony.

FRAIDY REISS: But if I can continue, judicial approval also has not been protecting children here in Connecticut and elsewhere. If you look at the statistics in -- here in Connecticut, so for example in 2013 there was a 14-year-old girl who was married to an 18-year-old man, that would have had -- that would've required judicial approval, that means if everything went according to plan, that went in front of a judge. That's an age difference that constitutes statutory rape, and a judge approved that marriage effectively legalizing rape, and that's one of the shocking things here in Connecticut is that marriage is a defense in a statutory rape case.

So, what you're in essence doing is you're giving an incentive to a predator to force a child into a marriage --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): I understand, but I don't know if I would agree with your characterization that the judicial branch in some way is fostering or allowing that kind of illegal action, but I understand. Your points well taken, thank you.

FRAIDY REISS: Yeah, but I'm talking that -- that we do see that. That happened also in 2010, a 14-year-old girl married to an 18-year-old man, a judge who approved that marriage basically approved statutory rape.

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): Again, I think -- I'm going to have to respond to that because we have judges who are following the laws on the books. To suggest that any one judge in some way is allowing statutory rape or condoning statutory rape, that's not a fair characteristic.

FRAIDY REISS: Well, but that's --

REP. REBIMBAS (70TH): I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay, all right. Any further questions from the committee? Well, I'll let you -- Representative Gonzalez please.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Thank you very much. A lot of women they call you -- can you help a lot of those women? How many womans -- you know do you, you know, they're not women because they're young, so -- from out of this country?

FRAIDY REISS: From our clients at Unchained At Last, so we help both adults and children who are in or facing a forced marriage, and most of our clients are right here in the U.S. We help those overseas only if they are originally from the U.S., and were taken overseas for a forced marriage, or if they're from overseas and were brought to the U.S. for a forced marriage.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): So, it is a lot of young girls from overseas?

FRAIDY REISS: Well, most of our clients are over age 18, but from the ones -- both -- in both age groups, it's both, you know, those who are brought from overseas, and there's a human trafficking component to this as well where they're brought from overseas for a forced marriage.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): And you getting funds for your organization from where?

FRAIDY REISS: Only private foundations. We're a fairly new and small organization. We don't yet get any government funding.

REP. GONZALEZ (3RD): Well, thank you very much for what you're doing. I think it's really -- and I honestly believe your point that a judge shouldn't allow a, you know, a 14-year-old to get married. I think that you right on the point. Thank you.

FRAIDY REISS: Well, thank you, that was a good reason to reform the laws and take that option off the table.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any further questions? All right, so I'll just follow up. So, it's clear to me you said you want -- under no condition should anyone under 18 get married, and then you also, your position is that -- because its been -- it doesn't mean people support it when we pose questions -- you're saying in those situations should a judge authorize it either?

FRAIDY REISS: That's right. Judges are not social workers, they're not trained to spot forced marriage, and I can tell you from the forced marriage survivors that I've worked with what a judicial review process does is it puts the onus on a child to try to find some safe way to communicate to the judge that she or he is being forced into a marriage.

Even if the judge is required to interview that child without the parents in the room, what I've seen is children are afraid to be honest with the judge because if they tell the judge, please I'm being forced into this marriage, the judge then later says I'm not allowing this marriage, those parents are going to know exactly what that child said to the judge behind closed doors, and that child then has to go home with those parents and his or her life could be in danger.

So, the children that I've spoken with who have gone through the judicial review process in various states have said that even an interview with the judge without parents in the room would not be an --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Okay.

FRAIDY REISS: -- a child to be able to tell the judge --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): And just keep in mind, it's not the judge, I mean it could be, but judges are applying the law. So, this -- from your perspective in your educating us, it's really the flaw of the legislator to ever permit this. So, really judges apply the laws of the legislator. If we pass this legislation then judges won't, so -- I mean unless a judge acts, you know, or makes decisions outside of the law inappropriate, he's applying -- he or she's applying the law that maybe legislator should have never passed, so -- but your, the fact that you came today with the other advocates who are raising a knowledge of me personally, and I suspect other member of the committee. So, thank you for coming today.

FRAIDY REISS: Thank you, and I don't mean any disrespect to judges. I'm not saying judges are doing anything wrong. I'm sure these judges have interviewed these children's parents and think, okay this is -- this -- you know, the parents are going along with this, this is probably the right thing to do, and I'm sure that -- that, you know, this is why it's so important to take the laws off the books --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Yeah, no --

FRAIDY REISS: -- it's not up to judges to try to --

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): -- you -- the message was sent today strongly.

FRAIDY REISS: Thank you.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. All right, next person up is Sun Nijen [phonetic]. Is Sun Nijen [phonetic] here? Doesn't look like it. Christine Elkins, is Christine Elkins here? Does not look like that, no. Aileen Keays? Aileen Keays -- oh sorry, you're Aileen?

AILEEN KEAYS: Yeah.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): For the record -- thank you.

AILEEN KEAYS: Thank you. Good afternoon Chairman Doyle, Chairman Kissel, Chairman Tong, Representative Rebimbas and Representative Stafstrom. My name is Aileen Keays Yeager, and I'm the project manager for the Connecticut Children with Incarcerated Parents Initiative within the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy at Central Connecticut State University, and I'm here to testify in support of Raised H.B. No. 7216, an act concerning family impact statements in the cases of defendants with dependent children.

As many of you know, bills similar to this have been raised in years prior. The difference this year is the research that has come out nationwide and locally on the impact of parental incarceration on children. It is our opinion that the outcomes of this research implore the committee to consider legislation again, which would ensure judges are provided relevant information to impose the appropriate sentences for public safety and behavior modification while also minimizing the potential for harm imposed on Connecticut's children.

In 2014 Dr. Christine Turney released findings from her research that demonstrated when demographics, socioeconomic status and familial characteristics were controlled for, parental incarceration was independently associated with learning disabilities, developmental delays, and speech and language problems in addition to other things. As the author stated in her report, the result of the study suggest that children's health disadvantages are an overlooked and unintended consequence of mass incarceration.

Having an incarcerated household member has also been recognized as an adverse childhood experience by the centers for disease control and prevention, which significantly increases the likelihood of long term negative outcomes for children. However, it's distinguished from other by its unique combination of trauma, stigma, and shame. In the last year, the Justice Policy Journal published findings from a study that we performed at Central Connecticut State University. The purpose of the study was to explore the extent to which an arrested caregiver absence may create needs in the lives of children.

We performed this at the New Britain Courthouse. Our results -- there's a chart included in my testimony, I certainly won't go over everything. The results, in short, show that more than 85 percent of the children included in the study received at least 3 types of support from both male and female caregivers and both legal and non-legal guardians, and more than 90 percent of children received at least three types of support from their arrested legal guardian.

The findings of the study capture the multiple different and important types of support children are vulnerable to lose if that arrested caregiver is incarcerated, and as you can see in the chart just to point out a few, 87 percent of the children received financial support from that arrested caregiver, 86 percent received help with homework and personal problems, and 74 percent had been supervised by that caregiver when no other adult was around.

Studies show that a child separation from their parent alone, just the separation from that parent, can cause trauma, and that trauma can cause toxic stress early in life, which can disrupt brain architecture. These changes negatively impact child development and have been shown to effect impulse [ringing] a series of health consequences. I'll leave it at that. It's certainly in my testimony.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you.

AILEEN KEAYS: And, just real quick, we do understand -- I'll just say the last thing -- parents are of course responsible for their children in their role as parents, we do obviously recognize that and appreciate that, however, we argue that the state is also responsible for ensuring the safety, well-being and education of children, and feel that basically this is an extension of that. So, when the parent is unable to care for the child, the state has a responsibility to protect children, making sure that judges are given as much information as possible so that they can make the best decision to ensure public safety and behavior modification, but also prevent unintended negative consequences on kids. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you. Thank you for hanging around all day. Next speaker -- Is Maureen here? I may have mispronounced Maureen's -- okay, and then I have Glen Terlecki. Is Glen Terlecki here? Yes, he is.

GLEN TERLECKI: Thank you very much Senator Doyle, Senator Kissel, Representative Tong. My name is Glen Terlecki, I'm the President of Connecticut Police and Fire Union. I represent 900 public safety officials employed by the state of Connecticut, and I'm here today to speak in favor of Raised Bill 7215. I've submitted testimony, so at your leisure I'd appreciate it if you take a look at it. I'll just summarize and keep my speaking under three minutes.

The bill in general is looking to clarify the language found in 53-39a, and what this does -- it defines what type of police officers or defines police officers that are going to be covered for indemnification in the event that they commit some type of an action or a crime, and then they are tried and found either not guilty or their charges dismissed that would allow the -- them to recoup any legal fees or be indemnified by their employing agency.

The current definition right now for the police officers defines the police officers as the state police, members of the state capitol police, and local police departments. I have 400 members who are police officers employed by the state of Connecticut that do not fit that definition at all, and we could sit and talk about legislative intent, and what the intent of the inclusive parties are, but my concern is that my 400 members -- and there are other members outside of my bargaining unit employed by the state, that are not going to be covered under this particular statute.

Now we feel that the language that says local police -- and it has been tested in a case involving two of my former members, and it was found in their favor, but the definition of location -- of local police, I think needs to be clarified, and we're proposing an amendment that would clarify this by including all certified police officers under 7294a, which is the statute for police officer certification.

On top of that, I also want to speak in favor of another section of the bill that includes judicial marshals and arming them in certain capacities under the judicial branch. These men and women are highly trained individuals, and in the courthouses nowadays the security is limited based on what they have on their duty belts, which is pepper spray and baton, and in the event of a more serious incident that involves the use of force, it would nice to have armed people in this department that is trained and certified and equipped to the accurate and most responsible way to kind of have any type of threat taken care of before it escalates.

So, that's my testimony. I'd appreciate if you take a look at it. I'm also reached -- available by phone, and I appreciate you taking the time.

SENATOR DOYLE (9TH): Thank you. Any questions from the committee? I see none. Thank you. Thank you for your patience. At this point that's the last person that signed up. Is there anybody else in the room that would like to testify, a member of the public? Mr. Speaker would like to? The floor is yours Mr. Speaker [laughter]. Okay. All right with that being said, there's nobody else who wishes to testify? I declare the public hearing closed. Thank you.