

EXHIBIT 10

Recusal

(Disqualification of Judicial Authority)

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

- “A judicial authority shall, upon motion of either party or upon its own motion, be disqualified from acting in a matter if such judicial authority is disqualified from acting therein pursuant to Canon 3 (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct or because the judicial authority previously tried the same matter and a new trial was granted therein or because the judgment was reversed on appeal. A judicial authority may not preside at the hearing of any motion attacking the validity or sufficiency of any warrant the judicial authority issued nor may the judicial authority sit in appellate review of a judgment or order originally rendered by such authority.” CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 1-22(a) (2004 ed.).
- “A judicial authority is not automatically disqualified from sitting on a proceeding merely because an attorney or party to the proceeding has filed a lawsuit against the judicial authority or filed a complaint against the judicial authority with the judicial review council. When the judicial authority has been made aware of the filing of such lawsuit or complaint, he or she shall so advise the attorneys and parties to the proceeding and either disqualify himself or herself from sitting on the proceeding, conduct a hearing on the disqualification issue before deciding whether to disqualify himself or herself or refer the disqualification issue to another judicial authority for a hearing and decision.” CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 1-22(b) (2004 ed.).
- “[General Statutes of Connecticut] Section 51-39 disqualifies a judge both for relationship and for interest. If the judge comes within the statutory criteria, the disqualification is mandatory. The objective of the statute is to assure that the person who participates in any judicial proceeding in a judicial capacity is disinterested.” Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 184 Conn. 21, 26, 441 A.2d 49 (1981).
- “The defendant's claim of judicial bias must fail because he did not file a motion for disqualification in the trial court. We have repeatedly refused to consider claims of trial court bias in the absence of such a motion.” Bieluch v. Bieluch, 199 Conn. 550, 552-553, 509 A.2d 8 (1986).

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Motion for Disqualification of Judicial Authority

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

- SCOPE:** Bibliographic resources relating to the motion for disqualification of judicial authority (recusal).
- SEE ALSO:**
- § 10.2. Disqualification for bias or prejudice
- DEFINITIONS:**
- “A motion to disqualify a judicial authority shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the facts relied upon to show the grounds for disqualification and a certificate of the counsel of record that the motion is made in good faith. The motion shall be filed no less than ten days before the time the case is called for trial or hearing, unless good cause is shown for failure to file within such time.” CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 1-23 (2004 ed.).
- STATUTES:**
- CONN. GEN. STAT. (2003).
 - Chapter 872. Judges
 - § 51-39. Disqualification by relationship or interest. Judge or family support magistrate may act with consent of parties
 - Chapter 872a. Removal, suspension and censure of judges
 - § 51-51s. Disqualification of judge, compensation commissioner or family support magistrate
 - Chapter 882. Superior Court
 - § 51-183. Substitute judge
 - § 51-183a. Judge’s inability to hold court
 - § 51-183c. Same judge not to preside at new trial
 - § 51-183d. Disqualified judge; Proceeding not void
 - § 51-183f. Expiration of term, disability retirement, death or resignation of judge
 - § 51-183g. Retiring judge; unfinished matters
 - Chapter 902. Civil actions
 - § 52-268. New trial when judge, stenographer or court reporter dies or becomes incapacitated and review of errors not possible
- COURT RULES:**
- CONN. PRACTICE BOOK (2004 ed.).
 - § 1-22. Disqualification of judicial authority
 - § 1-23. Motion for disqualification of judicial authority
- CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT:**
- CONN. PRACTICE BOOK (2004 ed.).
 - Canon 3. A judge should perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently
 - (c). Disqualification

FORMS:

- 15 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PL. & PRACT. *Judges* (1997).
 - Disqualification and disability (§§ 3 to 67)
 - § 7. Motion—To disqualify judge—General form
 - § 17. Motion—To disqualify judge—Prejudice of judge and undue influence of adverse party
 - § 19. Motion—To disqualify judge—Dissolution of marriage
 - Motion—To disqualify judge—Bias in custody matter
 - § 34. Motion—Disqualification of judge—For interest
 - § 35. Affidavit—In support of motion to disqualify judge for interest—General form
 - § 46. Motion—To disqualify judge—Relationship to attorney
 - § 63. Affidavit—Affirming disability of judge and requesting designation of substitute judge
 - 50 AM JUR PROOF OF FACTS 3d 449 (1999).
 - § 35. Sample letter to judge
 - § 38. Motion for disqualification for cause (mandatory grounds)
 - § 39. Motion for disqualification for cause (discretionary grounds)
 - 8B AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PL. & PRACT. *Divorce and Separation* (1996).
 - § 451. Motion—Child custody—Disqualification of judge on grounds of bias

CASES:

- Consiglio v. Consiglio, 48 Conn. App. 654, 661, 711 A.2d 765 (1998). “When the trial judge decided to recuse himself from all future matters involving Chiarelli, this should have ended any concern for either Chiarelli or the trial judge over his hearing of cases involving Chiarelli. It was inappropriate for the presiding judge to instruct the trial judge to hear this case. The presiding judge does not have the power to tell a trial judge when he or she may or may not recuse himself or herself. The matter of a judge’s recusal is in the reasonable discretion of that judge, and is not to be overruled by a presiding judge. The decision to recuse oneself is an intrinsic part of the independence of a judge. Any attempt to instruct or order a judge to hear a matter after recusal, violates the independence of judges individually and the judiciary as a whole.”
- Bieluch v. Bieluch, 199 Conn. 550, 552-553, 509 A.2d 8 (1986). “The defendant’s claim of judicial bias must fail because he did not file a motion for disqualification in the trial court. We have repeatedly refused to consider claims of trial court bias in the absence of such a motion.”
- Cameron v. Cameron, 187 Conn. 163, 170-171, 444 A.2d 915 (1982). “Proof of actual bias is not required for disqualification The appearance as well as the actuality of impartiality on the part of the trier is an essential ingredient of a fair trial.”
- Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Association, 184 Conn. 21, 27, 441 A.2d 49 (1981). “The relationship clause disqualifies a judge whenever he bears so near a relation to a party to a proceeding before him, as between father and son, brothers or uncle and nephew, by nature or marriage, or landlord and tenant. The specified relationships are not all inclusive; “as” here denotes similitude rather than definition.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

- *Judges* # 39-56. Disqualification to act.
- *Appeal and Error* # 185(3). Disqualification of judge
- *Judgement* # 9
- *Venue* # 49

DIGESTS:

- ALR DIGEST: *Judges* §§ 14-25
- DONALD H. DOWLING, DIGEST OF CONNECTICUT DECISIONS (1990).
Judges § 2. Disqualification

INDEX TERMS:

- JUDGES, Disqualification

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 46 AM. JUR. 2D *Judges* (1994).
§§ 86-236. Disqualification to act in particular case
- 52 AM. JUR. 2d *Mandamus* (2000).
§ 319. Disqualification of judge
§ 320. —Compelling judge to recuse self or certify disqualification
§ 321. —Automatic disqualification of judge
- 48A C.J.S. *Judges* (1981).
§§ 98-160. Disqualification to act
- 15 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PL. & PRACT. *Judges* (1997).
Disqualification and disability (§§ 3 to 67)
- *Disqualification Of Trial Judge For Cause*, 50 AM JUR PROOF OF FACTS 3d 449 (1999).
§ 5. Mandatory recusal
§ 6. —Personal interest in litigation
§ 7. —Financial interest
§ 8. —Familial relationship
§ 9. —Prior association with case
§ 10. —Former law clerk
§ 11. —Judge as material witness
§ 17. Exclusions
§§ 18—25. Procedures for disqualification
§§ 26-29. Tactical considerations
§§ 30-32. Elements of proof
§§ 33-42. Model correspondence, motions and discovery
§§ 43-65. Proof that judge should be disqualified
- See [Table 1: ALR Annotations on Recusal](#)
- Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, *Annotation, Disqualification Of Judge From Having Decided Different Case Against Litigant—State Cases*, 85 ALR5th 547 (2001).
- Marjorie A. Caner, *Annotation, Disqualification Of Judge As Affecting Validity Of Decision In Which Other Nondisqualified Judges Participated*, 29 ALR5th 722 (1995).
- *Annotation, Affidavit Or Motion For Disqualification Of Judge As Contempt*, 70 ALR3d 797 (1976).
- *Annotation, Propriety And Prejudicial Effect Of Suggestion Or Comments By Judge As To Compromise Or Settlement Of Civil Case*, 6 ALR3d 1457 (1966).
- JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL. JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (3rd ed. 2000).
Chapter 4. Disqualification and conflict of interest
§ 4.01. Introduction
§ 4.02. Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct
§ 4.03. The rule of necessity
§ 4.09. —Contempt proceedings
§ 4.10. —Prior knowledge of the facts
§ 4.11. Family relationships—Relative as party
§ 4.12. —Relative as an attorney
§ 4.13. Judge or relative as a witness

TEXTS & TREATISES:

- § 4.14. Judge as party
 - § 4.15. Social relationships
 - § 4.16. Professional relationships—Prior service as attorney in the matter
 - § 4.17. —Previous association with attorney
 - § 4.18. —Judge’s attorney appears before the judge
 - § 4.19. Business relationship
 - § 4.20. Financial and other interests
 - § 4.21. —Ownership of a financial interest
 - § 4.22. —Interest in a party
 - § 4.23. —Interest in the subject matter in controversy
 - § 4.24. —Any other interest
 - § 4.25. Other instances of disqualification
 - § 4.26. Waiver and remittal of disqualification
 - 1 WESLEY HORTON AND KIMBERLY A. KNOX, *CONNECTICUT PRACTICE. PRACTICE BOOK ANNOTATED* (1998).
Authors’ Comments following Canon 3, pp. 132-135.
 - RICHARD E. FLAMM, *JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES* (1996). [Available at the Hartford, New Haven and Stamford Law Libraries].
 - DAVID M. ROTHMAN, *CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK* (1999). [Available at the Law Libraries of Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, Stamford and Waterbury.]
- Chapter 7: Disqualification
- §§ 7.20 – 7.27. Grounds for disqualification
 - §§ 7.30 – 7.63. Common disqualification problems
 - Relations with those before the court
 - § 7.30. Financial relationships generally
 - § 7.31. Financial interest in a party
 - § 7.32. Doing business with attorneys or parties
 - § 7.33. Relationships with financial institutions
 - § 7.34. Relationships with insurance companies
 - § 7.35. Judge’s future career opportunities
 - § 7.36. Judge as a party or witness
 - §§ 7.37-7.44. Relationships of judge as an attorney or with attorneys
 - Activities or involvement in proceedings of those whom judge has relationship
 - § 7.45. Spouse
 - § 7.46. Family members
 - § 7.50. Romantic involvement
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 - § 7.52. Other judges and staff members
 - § 7.53. Public officials
 - § 7.54. Other relationships
 - Out-of-court activities, § 7.57
 - Expressing opinions, § 7.58
 - Personal knowledge and ex parte contacts, § 7.59
 - Attacks on the judge by participants in pending proceeding, § 7.60
 - §§ 7.70 – 7.72. Avoiding disqualification problems
 - LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, *JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT* (1986). [Available at the New Haven Law

Library].

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Table 1 Rule of Necessity

<i>Rule of Necessity</i>	
<p><u>Betensky v. Opcon Associates, Inc.</u>, No. 421034 (Apr. 15, 1999), 24 CONN. L. RPTR. No. 10, 327, 329 (June 21, 1999).</p>	<p>“Given the fact that courts have an institutional obligation to hear and decide the cases brought before them, the common law long ago created what is referred to in judicial disqualification cases as the Rule of Necessity. Stated succinctly, the Rule of Necessity is that if everyone is disqualified, no one is disqualified. Thus, in a judicial salary case, where all judges by definition have an interest in the outcome of the case, the judge assigned the case has a duty to hear and decide the case, however disagreeable that task might be. <u>United States v. Will</u>, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980). This rule is grounded in '[t]he concept of the absolute duty of judges to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction.' Id. at 215.” (emphasis added).</p>
<p><u>Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Association.</u>, 184 Conn. 21, 23-24, 441 A.2d 49 (1981).</p>	<p>“While there is language in Dacey I concerning the non-disqualifying effect of either a pecuniary interest which is de minimis or mere membership in a state bar association, to the extent that a discussion of these issues was unnecessary to the holding in the case the language is mere dictum. <i>Diamond National Corporation v. Dwelle</i>, 164 Conn. 540, 544, 325 A.2d 259 (1973). The law of the case principle applies only to those matters essential to the appellate court's determination, not to mere dictum. <i>Barney v. Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co.</i>, 117 U.S. 228, 231, 6 S.Ct. 654, 29 L.Ed. 858 (1886); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error 753. The Dacey I court having determined the disqualification issue on the basis of necessity, the additional discussion was merely passing commentary. The rule of necessity would still obtain whatever the extent of the pecuniary interest of the individual justices and whether or not membership in a state bar association was a disqualifying element in every case where the association was a party. Because at the second trial other judges who were not members of the state bar association could have been assigned to the trial of the case there was no compelling reason for a bar association member to preside. In these circumstances, in addressing the disqualification issue on this appeal, we write on a clean slate.” [emphasis added].</p>

Table 2 Statutory Disqualification

Statutory Disqualification

Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 184 Conn. 21, 26-28, 441 A.2d 49 (1981)

Section 51-39 disqualifies a judge both for relationship and for interest. If the judge comes within the statutory criteria, the disqualification is mandatory. The objective of the statute is to assure that the person who participates in any judicial proceeding in a judicial capacity is disinterested. Groton and Ledyard v. Hurlburt, 22 Conn. 178, 191 (1852). The relationship clause disqualifies a judge whenever he bears so near a relation to a party to a proceeding before him, as between father and son, brothers or uncle and nephew, by nature or marriage, or landlord and tenant. The specified relationships are not all inclusive; "as" here denotes similitude rather than definition. Cf. Morgan Bond Co. v. Stephens, 181 Okla. 419, 421, 74 P.2d 361 (1937); Bolton's Estate, 13 Phila. 340, 346 (1880) (Penrose, J., dissenting).

An examination of some of the relationships which are not included in 51-39 but which are disqualifying nonetheless makes it clear that the statutory list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Husband and wife are not specified in the statute but no one would seriously argue a judge's disqualification where his spouse was a party. Nor could it be contended that those relationships such as master and servant and attorney and client, which would conclusively disqualify a prospective juror; McCarten v. Connecticut Co., 103 Conn. 537, 542, 131 A. 505 (1925); would not also disqualify the judge. "It is a well-recognized principle of natural justice that a man ought not to be a judge in his own case. Irrespective of any proof of bias or prejudice, the law presumes that a party to a dispute is not disinterested and does not possess the impartiality so essential to proper judicial action regarding it. This absolute disqualification to act rests on sound public policy. Any other rule is repugnant to a proper sense of justice." Ellis v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 150 Conn. 501, 505-506, 191 A.2d 546 (1963).

With respect to corporations, the relationship of a stockholder to a private corporation is such that a judge who owns stock in a corporation appearing before him is disqualified to act. Windham Cotton Man'g Co. v. H., P. & F.R.R. Co., 23 Conn. 373, 384, (1854). A judge who stands within the prohibited degrees of relationship to a stockholder is also disqualified. Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 202, 211 (1839). In the case of public corporations such as towns we have held that a judge, as a town taxpayer, was disqualified to act in a case in which the town was a party. Hawley v. Baldwin, 19 Conn. 585, 590 (1849). This disqualification was removed by the legislature in 1863. Public Acts 1863, c. 36. We have also held that for some purposes members of ecclesiastical corporations are to be treated no differently than inhabitants of towns. Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223, 228-29 (1826), overruled on other grounds in Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116, 130 (1869). When the disqualification statute was amended in 1871 with reference to ecclesiastical corporations, it retained disqualification in cases where the corporation is a party. Public Acts 1871, c. 52. For the purpose of disqualification membership in a non-stock corporation should be treated no differently than membership in an ecclesiastical corporation. In short, when applying 51-39 we treat stock and non-stock corporations alike. In both cases we look under the corporate carapace and view the stockholders or members as the real parties in interest.

Disqualification for Bias or Prejudice

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

- Bibliographic resources relating to bias or prejudice as the basis for disqualification of judicial authority

DEFINITION:

- “(1) A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
 - (A) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
 - (B) the judge served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it” CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1).
- **Extrajudicial Source Rule:** “The alleged bias and prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” *United States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966).
- “It is a well settled general rule that courts will not review a claim of judicial bias on appeal unless that claim was properly presented to the trial court via a motion for disqualification or a motion for mistrial.” *Gillis v. Gillis*, 214 Conn. 336, 343, 572 A.2d 323 (1990).

COURT RULES:

- CONN. PRACTICE BOOK (2004 ed.).
 - § 1-22. Disqualification of judicial authority
 - § 1-23. Motion for disqualification of judicial authority

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT:

- CONN. PRACTICE BOOK (2004 ed.).
 - Canon 3. A judge should perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently
 - (c). Disqualification

FORMS:

- 15 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PL. & PRACT. *Judges* (1997).
 - Disqualification and disability (§§ 3 to 67)

- § 7. Motion—To disqualify judge—General form
- § 10. Response—To motion for disqualification of judge for bias, or prejudice—By opposing party
- § 17. Motion—To disqualify judge—Prejudice of judge and undue influence of adverse party
- § 18. Motion and notice—Disqualification of judge—Personal bias or prejudice
- § 19. Motion—To disqualify judge—Dissolution of marriage
Motion—To disqualify judge—Bias in custody matter
- § 20. Affidavit—To disqualify judge for prejudice—General form
- § 21. Affidavit—In support of motion to disqualify judge for personal bias or prejudice
- § 22. Affidavit—In support of motion to disqualify judge for personal bias or prejudice—With certificate of counsel
- 50 AM JUR PROOF OF FACTS 3d 449 (1999).
 - § 35. Sample letter to judge
 - § 39. Motion for disqualification for cause (discretionary grounds)
- 8B AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PL. & PRACT. *Divorce and Separation* (1996).
 - § 451. Motion—Child custody—Disqualification of judge on grounds of bias

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DIGESTS:

- ALR DIGEST: *Judges* §§ 14-25
- DONALD H. DOWLING, DIGEST OF CONNECTICUT DECISIONS (1990).
Judges § 2. Disqualification

COURT CASES

- *L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank*, 53 Conn. App. 524, 544, 732 A.2d 181 (1999). “Here, the LeFoll parties twice informed the trial judge that they had no objection to his presiding at trial. The parties were represented by counsel and LeFoll, who is himself an attorney, was present in the courtroom when the trial judge made his disclosure. Once they waive their right to disqualify the trial judge, the parties are bound by their waiver. See General Statutes § 51-39. The trial judge, therefore, did not improperly fail to recuse himself.”
- *Joyner v. Commissioner Of Correction*, 55 Conn. App. 602, 608, 740 A.2d 424 (1999). “Any factual disputes involved in a claim of judicial bias may require an evidentiary hearing and, if so, it should be conducted before another judge.”
- *Abington Limited Partnership v. Heublein*, 246 Conn. 815, 820, 717 A.2d 1232 (1998). “We use an objective rather than a subjective standard in deciding whether there has been a violation of canon 3 (c) (1). ‘Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for the judge's disqualification. Thus, an impropriety or the appearance of impropriety . . . that would reasonably lead one to question the judge's impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within the scope of the general standard. . . . The question is not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply

whether another, not knowing whether or not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his . . . impartiality, on the basis of all of the circumstances. . . .’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Conn. 725, 745-46, 444 A.2d 196 (1982); Dubaldo v. Dubaldo, 14 Conn. App. 645, 649, 542 A.2d 750 (1988).”

- Churchill v. Alessio, 51 Conn. App. 24, 38, 719 A.2d 913 (1998). “A party's failure to raise a claim of disqualification has been characterized as the functional equivalent of consenting to the judge's presence at trial.”
- Felix v. Hall-Brooke Sanitarium, 140 Conn. 496, 501, 101 A.2d 500 (1953). “No more elementary statement concerning the judiciary can be made than that the conduct of the trial judge must be characterized by the highest degree of impartiality. If he departs from this standard, he casts serious reflection upon the system of which he is a part.”

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 46 AM. JUR. 2D *Judges* (1994).
 - §§ 146-171. Bias or prejudice
 - § 150. Origin of bias; requirement that bias be extrajudicial
 - § 151 —Requirement that bias be personal
 - § 155. Effect of bring action against judge
 - § 157. Bias against attorney for party
 - § 161. Judge's impartiality might reasonable be questioned
 - § 165. Judge's past background and experiences
 - § 169. Ex parte communications
 - § 171. Managing trial; questioning witnesses
- 48A C.J.S. *Judges* (1981).
 - §§ 98-160. Disqualification to act
 - § 108. Bias or prejudice
 - § 109. —Nature or character
 - § 110. — —Origin of bias or prejudice and against whom directed
 - § 111. —Particular application of rule
 - § 112. — —Contempt proceedings
- 15 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE PL. & PRACT. *Judges* (1997).
 - Disqualification and disability (§§ 3 to 67)
 - § 16. Bias and prejudice. Introductory comments
- *Disqualification Of Trial Judge For Cause*, 50 AM JUR PROOF OF FACTS 3d 449 (1999).
 - § 12. Discretionary grounds
 - § 13. —Personal bias
 - § 14. —Appearance of bias
 - § 15. —Animosity toward counsel
 - § 16. —Extrajudicial Source Rule

TEXTS & TREATISES:

- JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL. JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (3rd ed. 2000).
 - Chapter 4. Disqualification and conflict of interest
 - § 4.04. Personal bias or prejudice
 - § 4.05. —The extrajudicial source rule
 - § 4.06. —Acts calculated to create bias
 - § 4.07. —Judicial remarks and comments as indicative of bias or prejudice

§ 4.08. —Bias or prejudice toward attorneys

§ 4.09. —Contempt proceedings

§ 4.10. —Prior knowledge of the facts

- 1 WESLEY HORTON AND KIMBERLY A. KNOX, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE. PRACTICE BOOK ANNOTATED (1998).

Authors' Comments following Canon 3, pp. 132-135.

- RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES (1996). [Available at the Hartford, New Haven and Stamford Law Libraries].

Chapter 4. Disqualification and conflict of interest

- LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1986). [Available at the New Haven Law Library].

- DAVID M. ROTHMAN, CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK (1999). [Available at the Law Libraries of Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven, Stamford and Waterbury.]

Chapter 7: Disqualification

Affidavits of prejudice

§ 7.10. Preemptory challenges

§ 7.11. Challenges for cause

§ 7.12. Improper judicial reactions

§ 7.13. Limits on powers of disqualified judge

§§ 7.30 – 7.63. Common disqualification problems

Relationships with those before the court

§ 7.55. Persons against whom judge is biased

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Table 3 ALR Annotations on Recusal

ALR Annotations on Recusal	
Assault or threat made against judge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge Because Of Assault Or Threat Against Him By Party Or Person Associated With Party</i>, 25 ALR4th 923 (1983).
Bias against counsel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge For Bias Against Counsel For Litigant</i>, 54 ALR5th 575 (1997).
Constitutional law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, <i>Laws Governing Judicial Recusal Or Disqualification In State Proceedings As Violating Federal Or State Constitution</i>, 91 ALR5th 437 (2001).
Contempt, punish	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge In State Proceedings To Punish Contempt Against Or Involving Himself In Open Court And In His Actual Presence</i>, 37 ALR4th 1004 (1985).
Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elaine Marie Tomko-DeLuca, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge Based On Property-Ownership Interest In Litigation Which Consists Of More Than Mere Ownership Of Stock—State Cases</i>. 56 ALR5th 783 (1998). Herbert B. Chermiside, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge, Justice Of Peace, Or Similar Judicial Officer For Pecuniary Interest In Fines, Forfeitures, Or Fees Payable By Litigants</i>, 72 ALR3d 375 (1976). Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge Because Of His Or Another's Holding Or Owning Stock In Corporation Involved In Litigation</i>, 25 ALR3d 1331 (1969).
Legal Associations (previous)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anne M. Payne, Annotation, <i>Judge's Previous Legal Association With Attorney Connected To Current Case As Warranting Disqualification</i>, 85 ALR4th 700 (1991).
Memberships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, <i>Membership In Fraternal Or Social Club Or Order Affected By A Case As Ground For Disqualification Of Judge</i>, 75 ALR3d 1021 (1977).
Political Associations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge Because Of Political Association Or Relation To Attorney In Case</i>, 65 ALR4th 73 (1988).
Prejudicial remarks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, <i>Prejudicial Effect Of Trial Judge's Remarks, During Civil Jury Trial, Disparaging Litigants, Witnesses, Or Subject Matter Or Litigation—Modern Cases</i>, 35 ALR5th 1 (1996).

ALR Annotations on Recusal [cont'd]

Previous case	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge For Having Decided Different Case Against Litigant—State Cases</i>, 85 ALR5th 547 (2001).• Herbert B. Chermside, Annotation, Disqualification of original trial judge to sit on retrial after reversal of mistrial, 60 ALR3d 176 (1974).
Relation to Attorney in case	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge Because Of Political Association Or Relation To Attorney In Case</i>, 65 ALR4th 73 (1988).
Witness in the case	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Annotation, <i>Disqualification Of Judge On Ground Of Being A Witness In The Case</i>, 22 ALR3d 1198 (1968).

EXHIBIT 11

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Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 - Supreme Court 2000

530 U.S. 57 (2000)

TROXEL et vir
v.
GRANVILLE

No. 99-138.

United States Supreme Court.

Argued January 12, 2000.

Decided June 5, 2000.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

O'Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., *post*, p. 75, and Thomas, J., *post*, p. 80, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., *post*, p. 80, Scalia, J., *post*, p. 91, and Kennedy, J., *post*, p. 93, filed dissenting opinions.

Mark D. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.

Catherine W. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Howard M. Goodfriend.¹

⁶⁰ *60 Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.

Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington permits "[a]ny person" to petition a superior court for visitation rights "at any time," and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest of the child." Petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Respondent Tommie Granville, the mother of Isabelle and Natalie, opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.

⁶¹ Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship that ended in June 1991. The two never married, but they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents, and thus the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought his daughters to his parents' home for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and Natalie on a regular basis after their son's death, Tommie Granville informed ⁶¹ the Troxels in October 1993 that she wished to limit their visitation with her daughters to one short visit per month. *In re Smith*, 137 Wash. 2d 1.6. 969 P. 2d 21, 23-24 (1998); *In re Troxel*, 87 Wash. App. 131, 133, 940 P. 2d 698, 698-699 (1997).

In December 1993, the Troxels commenced the present action by filing, in the Washington Superior Court for Skagit County, a petition to obtain visitation rights with Isabelle and Natalie. The Troxels filed their petition under two Washington statutes, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.09.240 and 26.10.160(3) (1994). Only the latter statute is at issue in this case. Section 26.10.160(3) provides: "Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances." At trial, the Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of visitation each summer. Granville did not oppose visitation altogether, but instead asked the court to order one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. 87 Wash. App. at 133-134, 940 P. 2d at 699. In 1995, the Superior Court issued an oral ruling and entered a visitation decree ordering visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays. 137 Wash. 2d at 6, 969 P. 2d at 23; App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a-78a.

Granville appealed, during which time she married Kelly Wynn. Before addressing the merits of Granville's appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 137 Wash. 2d at 6, 969 P. 2d at 23. On remand, the Superior Court found that visitation was in Isabelle's and Natalie's best interests:

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"The Petitioners [the Troxels] are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in this area, and the Petitioners⁶² can provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music.

". . . The court took into consideration all factors regarding the best interest of the children and considered all the testimony before it. The children would be benefitted from spending quality time with the Petitioners, provided that that time is balanced with time with the childrens' [sic] nuclear family. The court finds that the childrens' [sic] best interests are served by spending time with their mother and stepfather's other six children." App. 70a.

Approximately nine months after the Superior Court entered its order on remand, Granville's husband formally adopted Isabelle and Natalie. *Id.*, at 60a—67a.

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's visitation order and dismissed the Troxels' petition for visitation, holding that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under § 26.10.160(3) unless a custody action is pending. In the Court of Appeals' view, that limitation on nonparental visitation actions was "consistent with the constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children." 87 Wash. App., at 135, 940 P. 2d, at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having resolved the case on the statutory ground, however, the Court of Appeals did not expressly pass on Granville's constitutional challenge to the visitation statute. *Id.*, at 138, 940 P. 2d, at 701.

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The Washington Supreme Court granted the Troxels' petition for review and, after consolidating their case with two other visitation cases, affirmed. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision on the statutory issue and found that the plain language of § 26.10.160(3) gave the Troxels standing to seek visitation, irrespective of whether a custody action was pending. 137 Wash. 2d, at 12, 969 P. 2d, at 26-27. The Washington Supreme Court nevertheless agreed with the Court of Appeals' ultimate conclusion that the Troxels could not obtain visitation of Isabelle and Natalie pursuant to § 26.10.160(3). The court rested its decision on the Federal Constitution, holding that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. In the court's view, there were at least two problems with the nonparental visitation statute. First, according to the Washington Supreme Court, the Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child. Section 26.10.160(3) fails that standard because it requires no threshold showing of harm. *Id.*, at 15-20, 969 P. 2d, at 28-30. Second, by allowing "any person" to petition for forced visitation of a child at "any time" with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child, the Washington visitation statute sweeps too broadly. *Id.*, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30. "It is not within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a 'better' decision." *Ibid.*, 969 P. 2d, at 31. The Washington Supreme Court held that "[p]arents have a right to limit visitation of their children with third persons," and that between parents and judges, "the parents should be the ones to choose whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas." *Id.*, at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31. Four justices dissented from the Washington Supreme Court's holding on the constitutionality of the statute. *Id.*, at 23-43, 969 P. 2d, at 32-42.

We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1069 (1999), and now affirm the judgment.

II

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The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household. While many children may have two married parents and⁶⁴ grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are raised in single-parent households. In 1996, children living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children under age 18 in the United States. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, 1997 Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998). Understandably, in these single-parent households, persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing. In many cases, grandparents play an important role. For example, in 1998, approximately 4 million children—or 5.6 percent of all children under age 18—lived in the household of their grandparents. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1998 (Update), p. i (1998).

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The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States' recognition of these changing realities of the American family. Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those children form with such third parties. The States' nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a recognition, which varies from State to State, that children should have the opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons—for example, their grandparents. The extension of statutory rights in this area to persons other than a child's parents, however, comes with an obvious cost. For example, the State's recognition of an independent third-party interest in a child can place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child relationship. Contrary to Justice Stevens' accusation, our description of state nonparental visitation statutes in these terms, of course, is not meant to suggest that "children are so much chattel." *Post*, at 89 (dissenting opinion). Rather, our terminology is intended to highlight the fact that these⁶⁵ statutes can present questions of

constitutional import. In this case, we are presented with just such a question. Specifically, we are asked to decide whether § 26.10.160(3), as applied to Tommie Granville and her family, violates the Federal Constitution.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." We have long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." *Id.*, at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993).

The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923), we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." We explained in Pierce that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." *Id.*, at 535. We returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary *66 function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." *Id.*, at 166.

In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. See, e. g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' " (citation omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[t] . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one's children" (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.

*67 Section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family in this case, unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamental parental right. The Washington nonparental visitation statute is breathtakingly broad. According to the statute's text, "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time," and the court may grant such visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest of the child." § 26.10.160(3) (emphases added). That language effectively permits any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review. Once the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is placed before a judge, a parent's decision that visitation would not be in the child's best interest is accorded no deference. Section 26.10.160(3) contains no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the Washington statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge. Should the judge disagree with the parent's estimation of the child's best interests, the judge's view necessarily prevails. Thus, in practical effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests. The Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity to give § 26.10.160(3) a narrower reading, but it declined to do so. See, e. g., 137 Wash. 2d at 5, 969 P. 2d at 23 ("[The statute] allow[s] any person, at any time, to petition for visitation without regard to relationship to the child, without regard to changed circumstances, and without regard to harm"); *id.*, at 20, 969 P. 2d at 30 ("[The statute] allow[s] 'any person' to petition for forced visitation of a child at 'any time' with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child").

*68 Turning to the facts of this case, the record reveals that the Superior Court's order was based on precisely the type of mere disagreement we have just described and nothing more. The Superior Court's order was not founded on any special factors that might justify the State's interference with Granville's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters. To be sure, this case involves a visitation petition filed by grandparents soon after the death of their son—the father of Isabelle and Natalie—but the combination of several factors here compels our conclusion that § 26.10.160(3), as applied,

exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause.

First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. As this Court explained in *Parham*:

"[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is the mere creature of the State and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations. . . . The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." 442 U. S., at 602 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

69 Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (*i. e.*, is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children. See, e. g., *Flores*, 507 U. S., at 304.

The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests. More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption. In reciting its oral ruling after the conclusion of closing arguments, the Superior Court judge explained:

"The burden is to show that it is in the best interest of the children to have some visitation and some quality time with their grandparents. I think in most situations a commonsensical approach [is that] it is normally in the best interest of the children to spend quality time with the grandparent, unless the grandparent, [*sic*] there are some issues or problems involved wherein the grandparents, their lifestyles are going to impact adversely upon the children. That certainly isn't the case here from what I can tell." Verbatim Report of Proceedings in *In re Troxel*, No. 93-3—00650-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 19, 1994), p. 213 (hereinafter Verbatim Report).

The judge's comments suggest that he presumed the grandparents' request should be granted unless the children would be "impact[ed] adversely." In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of *disproving* that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters. The judge reiterated moments later: "I think [visitation with the Troxels] would be in the best interest of the children and I haven't been shown it is not in [the] best interest of the children." *Id.*, at 214.

70 The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child. See *Parham*, *supra*, at 602. In that respect, the court's presumption⁷⁰ failed to provide any protection for Granville's fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters. Cf., e. g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in child's best interest if parents agree that visitation rights should not be granted); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, § 1803(3) (1998) (court may award grandparent visitation if in best interest of child and "would not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent's rightful authority over the child"); Minn. Stat. § 257.022(2)(a)(2) (1998) (court may award grandparent visitation if in best interest of child and "such visitation would not interfere with the parent-child relationship"); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802(2) (1998) (court must find "by clear and convincing evidence" that grandparent visitation "will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship"); R. I. Gen. Laws § 15-5—24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999) (grandparent must rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, presumption that parent's decision to refuse grandparent visitation was reasonable); Utah Code Ann. § 30-5—2(2)(e) (1998) (same); *Hoff v. Berg*, 595 N. W. 2d 285, 291-292 (N. D. 1999) (holding North Dakota grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional because State has no "compelling interest in presuming visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are in the child's best interests and forcing parents to accede to court-ordered grandparental visitation unless the parents are first able to prove such visitation is not in the best interests of their minor child"). In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination.

71⁷¹ Finally, we note that there is no allegation that Granville ever sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the present dispute originated when Granville informed the Troxels that she would prefer to restrict their visitation with Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit per month and special holidays. See 87 Wash. App., at 133, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 12. In the Superior Court proceedings Granville did not oppose visitation but instead asked that the duration of any visitation order be shorter than that requested by the Troxels. While the Troxels requested two weekends per month and two full weeks in the summer, Granville asked the Superior Court to order only one day of visitation per month (with no overnight stay) and participation in the Granville family's holiday celebrations. See 87 Wash. App., at

133, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 9 ("Right off the bat we'd like to say that our position is that grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the children. It is a matter of how much and how it is going to be structured") (opening statement by Granville's attorney). The Superior Court gave no weight to Granville's having assented to visitation even before the filing of any visitation petition or subsequent court intervention. The court instead rejected Granville's proposal and settled on a middle ground, ordering one weekend of visitation per month, one week in the summer, and time on both of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays. See 87 Wash. App., at 133-134, 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 216-221. Significantly, many other States expressly provide by statute that courts may not award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation to the concerned third party. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-3(2)(a) (1994) (court must find that "the parent or custodian of the child unreasonably denied the grandparent visitation rights with the child"); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.121(1)(a)(B) (1997) (court may award visitation if the "custodian of the child has denied the grandparent reasonable opportunity to visit the child"); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-5—72 24.3 (a)(2)(iii)—(iv) (Supp. 1999) (court must find that parents prevented grandparent from visiting grandchild and that "there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or her grandchild without court intervention").

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Considered together with the Superior Court's reasons for awarding visitation to the Troxels, the combination of these factors demonstrates that the visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters. The Washington Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material weight. In fact, the Superior Court made only two formal findings in support of its visitation order. First, the Troxels "are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in this area, and the [Troxels] can provide opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music." App. 70a. Second, "[t]he children would be benefitted from spending quality time with the [Troxels], provided that that time is balanced with time with the childrens' [sic] nuclear family." *Ibid*. These slender findings, in combination with the court's announced presumption in favor of grandparent visitation and its failure to accord significant weight to Granville's already having offered meaningful visitation to the Troxels, show that this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville concerning her children's best interests. The Superior Court's announced reason for ordering one week of visitation in the summer demonstrates our conclusion well: "I look back on some personal experiences . . . We always spen[t] as kids a week with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it works out." Verbatim Report 220-221. As we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a "better" decision could be made. Neither the Washington nonparental visitation statute generally—which places no limits on either the persons who may petition for visitation or the circumstances in which such a petition may be granted—nor the Superior Court in this specific case required anything more. Accordingly, we hold that § 26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, is unconstitutional.

73

Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of § 26.10.160(3) and the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court—whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. In this respect, we agree with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best "elaborated with care." *Post*, at 101 (dissenting opinion). Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a *per se* matter.¹¹ See, e. g., *Fair- '74 banks v. McCarter*, 330 Md. 39, 49-50, 622 A. 2d 121, 126-127 (1993) (interpreting best-interest standard in grandparent visitation statute normally to require court's consideration of certain factors); *Williams v. Williams*, 256 Va. 19, 501 S. E. 2d 417, 418 (1998) (interpreting Virginia nonparental visitation statute to require finding of harm as condition precedent to awarding visitation).

74

Justice Stevens criticizes our reliance on what he characterizes as merely "a guess" about the Washington courts' interpretation of § 26.10.160(3). *Post*, at 82 (dissenting opinion). Justice Kennedy likewise states that "[m]ore specific guidance should await a case in which a State's highest court has considered all of the facts in the course of elaborating the protection afforded to parents by the laws of the State and by the Constitution itself." *Post*, at 102 (dissenting opinion). We respectfully disagree. There is no need to hypothesize about how the Washington courts *might* apply § 26.10.160(3) because the Washington Superior Court *did* apply the statute in this very case. Like the Washington Supreme Court, then, we are presented with an actual visitation order and the reasons why the Superior Court believed "75 entry of the order was appropriate in this case. Faced with the Superior Court's application of § 26.10.160(3) to Granville and her family, the Washington Supreme Court chose not to give the statute a narrower construction. Rather, that court gave § 26.10.160(3) a literal and expansive interpretation. As we have explained, that broad construction plainly encompassed the Superior Court's application of the statute. See *supra*, at 67.

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There is thus no reason to remand the case for further proceedings in the Washington Supreme Court. As Justice Kennedy recognizes, the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be "so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated." *Post*, at 101. In this case, the litigation costs incurred by Granville on

her trip through the Washington court system and to this Court are without a doubt already substantial. As we have explained, it is apparent that the entry of the visitation order in this case violated the Constitution. We should say so now, without forcing the parties into additional litigation that would further burden Granville's parental right. We therefore hold that the application of § 26.10.160(3) to Granville and her family violated her due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her daughters.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.

76 I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, whose facial invalidation of its own state statute is consistent with this Court's prior cases addressing the substantive interests at stake. I would say no more. The issues that might well be presented by reviewing a decision addressing the specific application of the '76 state statute by the trial court, *ante*, at 68-73, are not before us and do not call for turning any fresh furrows in the "treacherous field" of substantive due process. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.).

77 The Supreme Court of Washington invalidated its state statute based on the text of the statute alone, not its application to any particular case.^[1] Its ruling rested on two independently sufficient grounds: the failure of the statute to require harm to the child to justify a disputed visitation order, In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 969 P. 2d 21, 29 (1998), and the statute's authorization of "any person" at "any time" to petition for and to receive visitation rights subject only to a free-ranging best-interests-of-the-child standard, *id.*, at 20-21, 969 P. 2d, at 30-31. *Ante*, at 63. I see no error in the second reason, that because the state statute authorizes any person at any time to request (and a judge to award) visitation rights, subject only to the State's particular bestinterests '77 standard, the state statute sweeps too broadly and is unconstitutional on its face. Consequently, there is no need to decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope of the parent's right or its necessary protections.

We have long recognized that a parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997). As we first acknowledged in Meyer, the right of parents to "bring up children," 262 U. S., at 399, and "to control the education of their own" is protected by the Constitution; *id.*, at 401. See also Glucksberg, *supra*, at 761 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).

78 On the basis of this settled principle, the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated its statute because it authorized a contested visitation order at the intrusive behest of any person at any time subject only to a best-interests-of-the-child standard. In construing the statute, the state court explained that the "any person" at "any time" language was to be read literally, 137 Wash. 2d, at 10-11, 969 P. 2d, at 25-27, and that "[m]ost notably the statut[e] do[es] not require the petitioner to establish that he or she has a substantial relationship with the child," *id.*, at 20-21, 969 P. 2d, at 31. Although the statute speaks of granting visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest of the child," Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160 (3) (1994), the state court authoritatively read this provision as placing hardly any limit on a court's discretion to award visitation rights. As the court understood it, the specific best-interests provision in the '78 statute would allow a court to award visitation whenever it thought it could make a better decision than a child's parent had done. See 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 31 ("It is not within the province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a 'better' decision").^[2] On that basis in part, the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated the State's own statute: "Parents have a right to limit visitation of their children with third persons." *Id.*, at 21, 969 P. 2d, at 31.

79 Our cases, it is true, have not set out exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child, but Meyer's repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visitation by "any party" at "any time" a judge believed he "could make a 'better' decision"^[3] than the objecting parent had done. The strength of a parent's interest in controlling a child's associates is as obvious as the influence of personal associations on the development of the child's social and moral character. Whether for good or for ill, adults not only influence but may indoctrinate children, and a choice about a child's social companions is not essentially different from the designation of the adults who will influence the child in school. Even a State's considered judgment about the preferable political and religious character of schoolteachers is not entitled '79 to prevail over a parent's choice of private school. Pierce, *supra*, at 535 ("The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations"). It would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to any individual judge's choice of a child's associates from out of the general

population merely because the judge might think himself more enlightened than the child's parent.^[41] To say the least (and as the Court implied in *Pierce*), parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the government's designation of an official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.

Since I do not question the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality,^[5] see *Chicago v. Morales*, 527 U.S. 41, 55, n. 22 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.), this for me is the end of the case. I would simply affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington that its statute, authorizing courts to grant visitation rights to any person at any time, is unconstitutional. I therefore respectfully concur in the judgment.

80 *80 Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.

I write separately to note that neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision. As a result, I express no view on the merits of this matter, and I understand the plurality as well to leave the resolution of that issue for another day.^[1]

Consequently, I agree with the plurality that this Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children resolves this case. Our decision in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), holds that parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their children, including the right to determine who shall educate and socialize them. The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State of Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing of a compelling one—in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties. On this basis, I would affirm the judgment below.

Justice Stevens, dissenting.

81 The Court today wisely declines to endorse either the holding or the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington. In my opinion, the Court would have been even wiser to deny certiorari. Given the problematic character of the trial court's decision and the uniqueness of the Washington statute, there was no pressing need to review a State Supreme *81 Court decision that merely requires the state legislature to draft a better statute.

Having decided to address the merits, however, the Court should begin by recognizing that the State Supreme Court rendered a federal constitutional judgment holding a state law invalid on its face. In light of that judgment, I believe that we should confront the federal questions presented directly. For the Washington statute is not made facially invalid either because it may be invoked by too many hypothetical plaintiffs, or because it leaves open the possibility that someone may be permitted to sustain a relationship with a child without having to prove that serious harm to the child would otherwise result.

In response to Tommie Granville's federal constitutional challenge, the State Supreme Court broadly held that Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996) was invalid on its face under the Federal Constitution.^[11] Despite the nature of this judgment, Justice O'Connor would hold that the Washington visitation statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only as applied. *Ante*, at 65, 67, 73 (plurality opinion). I agree with Justice Souter, *ante*, at 75-76, and n. 1 (opinion concurring in judgment), that this approach is untenable.

82 The task of reviewing a trial court's application of a state statute to the particular facts of a case is one that should be performed in the first instance by the state appellate courts. In this case, because of their views of the Federal Constitution, the Washington state appeals courts have yet to decide whether the trial court's findings were adequate under the *82 statute.^[2] Any as-applied critique of the trial court's judgment that this Court might offer could only be based upon a guess about the state courts' application of that State's statute, and an independent assessment of the facts in this case—both judgments that we are ill-suited and ill-advised to make.^[3]

83 *83 While I thus agree with Justice Souter in this respect, I do not agree with his conclusion that the State Supreme Court made a definitive construction of the visitation statute that necessitates the constitutional conclusion he would draw.^[4] As I read the State Supreme Court's opinion, *In re Smith*, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 19-20, 969 P. 2d 21, 30-31 (1998), its interpretation of the Federal Constitution made it unnecessary to adopt a definitive construction of the statutory text, or, critically, to decide whether the statute had been correctly applied in this case. In particular, the state court gave no content to the phrase, "best interest of the child," Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996)—content that might well be gleaned from that State's own statutes or decisional law employing the same phrase in different contexts, *84 and from the myriad other state statutes and court decisions at least nominally applying the same standard.^[5] Thus, I believe that Justice Souter's conclusion that

the statute unconstitutionally imbues state trial court judges with "too much discretion in every case," *ante*, at 78, n. 3 (opinion concurring in judgment) (quoting *Chicago v. Morales*, 527 U. S. 41, 71 (1999) (Brever, J., concurring)), is premature.

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We are thus presented with the unconstrued terms of a state statute and a State Supreme Court opinion that, in my view, significantly misstates the effect of the Federal Constitution upon any construction of that statute. Given that posture, I believe the Court should identify and correct the two flaws in the reasoning of the state court's majority opinion, "85 and remand for further review of the trial court's disposition of this specific case.

II

In my view, the State Supreme Court erred in its federal constitutional analysis because neither the provision granting "any person" the right to petition the court for visitation, 137 *Wash. 2d* at 20, 969 P. 2d at 30, nor the absence of a provision requiring a "threshold . . . finding of harm to the child," *ibid.*, provides a sufficient basis for holding that the statute is invalid in all its applications. I believe that a facial challenge should fail whenever a statute has "a plainly legitimate sweep," *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U. S. 702, 739-740, and n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).⁶¹ Under the Washington statute, there are plainly any number of cases—indeed, one suspects, the most common to arise—in which the "person" among "any" seeking visitation is a once-custodial caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a genetic parent. Even the Court would seem to agree that in many circumstances, it would be constitutionally permissible for a court to award some visitation of a child to a parent or previous caregiver in cases of parental separation or divorce, cases of disputed custody, cases involving temporary foster care or guardianship, and so forth. As the statute plainly sweeps in a great deal of the permissible, the State Supreme Court majority incorrectly concluded that a statute authorizing "any person" to file a petition seeking visitation privileges would invariably run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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The second key aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's holding—that the Federal Constitution requires a showing of actual or potential "harm" to the child before a court may "86 order visitation continued over a parent's objections—finds no support in this Court's case law. While, as the Court recognizes, the Federal Constitution certainly protects the parent-child relationship from arbitrary impairment by the State, see *infra* this page and 87-88, we have never held that the parent's liberty interest in this relationship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid constitutional shield, protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm.⁷² The presumption that parental decisions generally serve the best interests of their children is sound, and clearly in the normal case the parent's interest is paramount. But even a fit parent is capable of treating a child like a mere possession.

Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between the parents and the State over who has final authority to determine what is in a child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated in every case to which the statute applies—the child.

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It has become standard practice in our substantive due process jurisprudence to begin our analysis with an identification of the "fundamental" liberty interests implicated by the challenged state action. See, e. g., *ante*, at 65-66 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U. S. 702 (1997); *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). My colleagues are of course correct to recognize that the right of a parent to maintain a relationship with his or her child is among the interests included "87 most often in the constellation of liberties protected through the Fourteenth Amendment. *Ante*, at 65-66 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and guiding their children, and a corresponding privacy interest—absent exceptional circumstances—in doing so without the undue interference of strangers to them and to their child. Moreover, and critical in this case, our cases applying this principle have explained that with this constitutional liberty comes a presumption (albeit a rebuttable one) that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." *Perham v. J. R.*, 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); see also *Casey*, 505 U. S., at 895; *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U. S. 745, 759 (1982) (State may not presume, at factfinding stage of parental rights termination proceeding, that interests of parent and child diverge); see also *ante*, at 68-69 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).

Despite this Court's repeated recognition of these significant parental liberty interests, these interests have never been seen to be without limits. In *Lehr v. Robertson*, 463 U. S. 248 (1983), for example, this Court held that a putative biological father who had never established an actual relationship with his child did not have a constitutional right to notice of his child's adoption by the man who had married the child's mother. As this Court had recognized in an earlier case, a parent's liberty interests "do not spring fullblown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring." *Id.*, at 260 (quoting *Caban v. Mohammed*, 441 U. S. 380, 397 (1979)).

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Conversely, in *Michael H. v. Gerald D.*, 491 U. S. 110 (1989), this Court concluded that despite both biological parenthood and an established relationship with a young child, a father's due process liberty interest in maintaining some connection with that child was not sufficiently powerful to overcome a state statutory presumption that the husband of the child's mother was the child's parent. As a result of the "88 presumption, the biological father could be denied even visitation with the child because, as a matter of state law, he was not a "parent." A plurality of this Court there recognized that the parental liberty interest was a

function, not simply of "isolated factors" such as biology and intimate connection, but of the broader and apparently independent interest in family. See, e. g., *id.*, at 123; see also *Lehr*, 463 U. S., at 261; *Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform*, 431 U. S. 816, 842-847 (1977); *Moore v. East Cleveland*, 431 U. S. 494, 498-504 (1977).

A parent's rights with respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute, but rather are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child, and are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family. These limitations have arisen, not simply out of the definition of parenthood itself, but because of this Court's assumption that a parent's interests in a child must be balanced against the State's long-recognized interests as *parens patriae*, see, e. g., *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U. S. 292, 303-304 (1993); *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U. S., at 766; *Parham*, 442 U. S., at 605; *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944), and, critically, the child's own complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and protection, *Santosky*, 455 U. S., at 760.

While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like bonds, 491 U. S., at 130 (reserving the question), it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.⁸⁸ At a minimum, our prior cases recognizing⁸⁹ that children are, generally speaking, constitutionally protected actors require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it comes to parental rights, children are so much chattel. See *ante*, at 64-65 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (describing States' recognition of "an independent third-party interest in a child"). The constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child.⁹⁰

This is not, of course, to suggest that a child's liberty interest in maintaining contact with a particular individual is to be treated invariably as on a par with that child's parents' contrary interests. Because our substantive due process case law includes a strong presumption that a parent will act⁹⁰ in the best interest of her child, it would be necessary, were the state appellate courts actually to confront a challenge to the statute as applied, to consider whether the trial court's assessment of the "best interest of the child" incorporated that presumption. Neither would I decide whether the trial court applied Washington's statute in a constitutional way in this case, although, as I have explained, n. 3, *supra*, I think the outcome of this determination is far from clear. For the purpose of a facial challenge like this, I think it safe to assume that trial judges usually give great deference to parents' wishes, and I am not persuaded otherwise here.

But presumptions notwithstanding, we should recognize that there may be circumstances in which a child has a stronger interest at stake than mere protection from serious harm caused by the termination of visitation by a "person" other than a parent. The almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our ever-changing society strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that treats a biological parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision of her child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily. It is indisputably the business of the States, rather than a federal court employing a national standard, to assess in the first instance the relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this.⁹¹ Far from guaranteeing that⁹¹ parents' interests will be trammled in the sweep of cases arising under the statute, the Washington law merely gives an individual—with whom a child may have an established relationship—the procedural right to ask the State to act as arbiter, through the entirely well-known best-interests standard, between the parent's protected interests and the child's. It seems clear to me that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment leaves room for States to consider the impact on a child of possibly arbitrary parental decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by the best interests of the child.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Scalia, dissenting.

In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the "unalienable Rights" with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator." And in my view that right is also among the "othe[r] [rights] retained by the people" which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to deny or disparage." The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution's refusal to "deny or disparage" other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted by the people. Consequently, while I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative⁹² democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the State has *no power* to interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a *judge* entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.

Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children⁹²—two of them from an era rich in

substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232-233 (1972). Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923)). The sheer diversity of today's opinions persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to *stare decisis* protection. A legal principle that can be thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance. While I would not now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been urged), neither would I extend the theory upon which they rested to this new context.

93 Judicial vindication of "parental rights" under a Constitution that does not even mention them requires (as Justice Kennedy's opinion rightly points out) not only a judicially crafted definition of parents, but also—unless, as no one believes, "93 the parental rights are to be absolute—judicially approved assessments of "harm to the child" and judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the parents. If we embrace this unenumerated right, I think it obvious—whether we affirm or reverse the judgment here, or remand as Justice Stevens or Justice Kennedy would do—that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law. I have no reason to believe that federal judges will be better at this than state legislatures; and state legislatures have the great advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.^[2]

For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment below.

Justice Kennedy, dissenting.

The Supreme Court of Washington has determined that petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel have standing under state law to seek court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren, notwithstanding the objections of the children's parent, respondent Tommie Granville. The statute relied upon provides:

"Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances." Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994).

94 "94 After acknowledging this statutory right to sue for visitation, the State Supreme Court invalidated the statute as violative of the United States Constitution, because it interfered with a parent's right to raise his or her child free from unwarranted interference. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P. 2d 21 (1998). Although parts of the court's decision may be open to differing interpretations, it seems to be agreed that the court invalidated the statute on its face, ruling it a nullity.

The first flaw the State Supreme Court found in the statute is that it allows an award of visitation to a nonparent without a finding that harm to the child would result if visitation were withheld; and the second is that the statute allows any person to seek visitation at any time. In my view the first theory is too broad to be correct, as it appears to contemplate that the best interests of the child standard may not be applied in any visitation case. I acknowledge the distinct possibility that visitation cases may arise where, considering the absence of other protection for the parent under state laws and procedures, the best interests of the child standard would give insufficient protection to the parent's constitutional right to raise the child without undue intervention by the State; but it is quite a different matter to say, as I understand the Supreme Court of Washington to have said, that a harm to the child standard is required in every instance.

95 Given the error I see in the State Supreme Court's central conclusion that the best interests of the child standard is never appropriate in third-party visitation cases, that court should have the first opportunity to reconsider this case. I would remand the case to the state court for further proceedings. If it then found the statute has been applied in an unconstitutional manner because the best interests of the child standard gives insufficient protection to a parent under the circumstances of this case, or if it again declared the statute a nullity because the statute seems to allow any person "95 at all to seek visitation at any time, the decision would present other issues which may or may not warrant further review in this Court. These include not only the protection the Constitution gives parents against state-ordered visitation but also the extent to which federal rules for facial challenges to statutes control in state courts. These matters, however, should await some further case. The judgment now under review should be vacated and remanded on the sole ground that the harm ruling that was so central to the Supreme Court of Washington's decision was error, given its broad formulation.

Turning to the question whether harm to the child must be the controlling standard in every visitation proceeding, there is a beginning point that commands general, perhaps unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions: As our case law has developed, the custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the State, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child. The parental right stems from the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925);

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232-233 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753-754 (1982). Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in recent times, may well have been grounded upon First Amendment principles protecting freedom of speech, belief, and religion. Their formulation and subsequent interpretation have been quite different, of course; and they long have been interpreted to have found in Fourteenth Amendment concepts of liberty an independent right of the parent in the "custody, care and nurture of the child," free from state intervention. Prince, supra, at 166. The principle exists, then, in broad formulation; yet courts must use considerable restraint, including careful adherence to the incremental instruction⁹⁶ given by the precise facts of particular cases, as they seek to give further and more precise definition to the right.

The State Supreme Court sought to give content to the parent's right by announcing a categorical rule that third parties who seek visitation must always prove the denial of visitation would harm the child. After reviewing some of the relevant precedents, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded "[t]he requirement of harm is the sole protection that parents have against pervasive state interference in the parenting process." 137 Wash. 2d, at 19-20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S. W. 2d 573, 580 (Tenn. 1993)). For that reason, "[s]hort of preventing harm to the child," the court considered the best interests of the child to be "insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights." 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30.

While it might be argued as an abstract matter that in some sense the child is always harmed if his or her best interests are not considered, the law of domestic relations, as it has evolved to this point, treats as distinct the two standards, one harm to the child and the other the best interests of the child. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington rests on that assumption, and I, too, shall assume that there are real and consequential differences between the two standards.

On the question whether one standard must always take precedence over the other in order to protect the right of the parent or parents, "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" do not give us clear or definitive answers. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997). The consensus among courts and commentators is that at least through the 19th century there was no legal right of visitation; court-ordered visitation appears to be a 20th-century phenomenon. See, e. g., 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children 124, 136 (2d ed. 1994); 2 J. Atkinson, Modern '97 Child Custody Practice § 8.10 (1986). A case often cited as one of the earliest visitation decisions, Succession of Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, 353, 15 So. 151, 152 (1894), explained that "the obligation ordinarily to visit grandparents is moral and not legal"—a conclusion which appears consistent with that of American common-law jurisdictions of the time. Early 20th-century exceptions did occur, often in cases where a relative had acted in a parental capacity, or where one of a child's parents had died. See Douglass v. Merriman, 163 S. C. 210, 161 S. E. 452 (1931) (maternal grandparent awarded visitation with child when custody was awarded to father; mother had died); Solomon v. Solomon, 319 Ill. App. 618, 49 N. E. 2d 807 (1943) (paternal grandparents could be given visitation with child in custody of his mother when their son was stationed abroad; case remanded for fitness hearing); Consaul v. Consaul, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson Cty. 1946) (paternal grandparents awarded visitation with child in custody of his mother; father had become incompetent). As a general matter, however, contemporary state-court decisions acknowledge that "[h]istorically, grandparents had no legal right of visitation." Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P. 2d 635, 642, n. 15 (Utah App. 1995), and it is safe to assume other third parties would have fared no better in court.

To say that third parties have had no historical right to petition for visitation does not necessarily imply, as the Supreme Court of Washington concluded, that a parent has a constitutional right to prevent visitation in all cases not involving harm. True, this Court has acknowledged that States have the authority to intervene to prevent harm to children, see, e. g., Prince, supra, at 168-169; Yoder, supra, at 233-234, but that is not the same as saying that a heightened harm to the child standard must be satisfied in every case in which a third party seeks a visitation order. It is also true that the law's traditional presumption has been "that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the⁹⁸ best interests of their children," Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); and "[s]imply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state," *id.*, at 603. The State Supreme Court's conclusion that the Constitution forbids the application of the best interests of the child standard in any visitation proceeding, however, appears to rest upon assumptions the Constitution does not require.

My principal concern is that the holding seems to proceed from the assumption that the parent or parents who resist visitation have always been the child's primary caregivers and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the child. That idea, in turn, appears influenced by the concept that the conventional nuclear family ought to establish the visitation standard for every domestic relations case. As we all know, this is simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many households. See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). For many boys and girls a traditional family with two or even one permanent and caring parent is simply not the reality of their childhood. This may be so whether their childhood has been marked by tragedy or filled with considerable happiness and fulfillment.

Cases are sure to arise—perhaps a substantial number of cases—in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto. See Michael H. v. Gerald

99 D. 491 U. S. 110 (1989) (putative natural father not entitled to rebut state-law presumption that child born in a marriage is a child of the marriage); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978) (best interests standard sufficient in adoption proceeding to protect interests of natural father who had not legitimated the child); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 261 (1983) ("[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved '99 and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood relationship" (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977), in turn quoting Yoder, 406 U. S. at 231-233)). Some pre-existing relationships, then, serve to identify persons who have a strong attachment to the child with the concomitant motivation to act in a responsible way to ensure the child's welfare. As the State Supreme Court was correct to acknowledge, those relationships can be so enduring that "in certain circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the child of the relationship could cause severe psychological harm to the child," 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30; and harm to the adult may also ensue. In the design and elaboration of their visitation laws, States may be entitled to consider that certain relationships are such that to avoid the risk of harm, a best interests standard can be employed by their domestic relations courts in some circumstances.

100 Indeed, contemporary practice should give us some pause before rejecting the best interests of the child standard in all third-party visitation cases, as the Washington court has done. The standard has been recognized for many years as a basic tool of domestic relations law in visitation proceedings. Since 1965 all 50 States have enacted a third-party visitation statute of some sort. See *ante*, at 73-74, n. (plurality opinion). Each of these statutes, save one, permits a court order to issue in certain cases if visitation is found to be in the best interests of the child. While it is unnecessary for us to consider the constitutionality of any particular provision in the case now before us, it can be noted that the statutes also include a variety of methods for limiting parents' exposure to third-party visitation petitions and for ensuring parental decisions are given respect. Many States *100 limit the identity of permissible petitioners by restricting visitation petitions to grandparents, or by requiring petitioners to show a substantial relationship with a child, or both. See, e. g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-129 (1993 and Supp. 1998) (grandparent visitation authorized under certain circumstances if a substantial relationship exists); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.2, 50-13.2A, 50-13.5 (1999) (same); Iowa Code § 598.35 (Supp. 1999) (same; visitation also authorized for great-grandparents); Wis. Stat. § 767.245 (Supp. 1999) (visitation authorized under certain circumstances for "a grandparent, great grandparent, stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child"). The statutes vary in other respects—for instance, some permit visitation petitions when there has been a change in circumstances such as divorce or death of a parent, see, e. g., N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17—d (1992), and some apply a presumption that parental decisions should control, see, e. g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 3104 (e)—(f) (West 1994); R. I. Gen. Laws § 15-5—24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999). Georgia's is the sole state legislature to have adopted a general harm to the child standard, see Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7—3(c) (1999), and it did so only after the Georgia Supreme Court held the State's prior visitation statute invalid under the Federal and Georgia Constitutions, see Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S. E. 2d 769, cert. denied, 516 U. S. 942 (1995).

101 In light of the inconclusive historical record and case law, as well as the almost universal adoption of the best interests standard for visitation disputes, I would be hard pressed to conclude the right to be free of such review in all cases is itself "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937)). In my view, it would be more appropriate to conclude that the constitutionality of the application of the best interests standard depends on more specific factors. In short, a fit parent's right vis-à-vis a complete *101 stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis another parent or a *de facto* parent may be another. The protection the Constitution requires, then, must be elaborated with care, using the discipline and instruction of the case law system. We must keep in mind that family courts in the 50 States confront these factual variations each day, and are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that arise. Cf. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, 703-704 (1992).

It must be recognized, of course, that a domestic relations proceeding in and of itself can constitute state intervention that is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated. The best interests of the child standard has at times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable results. See, e. g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 2, and n. 2 (Tent. Draft No. 3, Mar. 20, 1998). If a single parent who is struggling to raise a child is faced with visitation demands from a third party, the attorney's fees alone might destroy her hopes and plans for the child's future. Our system must confront more often the reality that litigation can itself be so disruptive that constitutional protection may be required; and I do not discount the possibility that in some instances the best interests of the child standard may provide insufficient protection to the parent-child relationship. We owe it to the Nation's domestic relations legal structure, however, to proceed with caution.

102 It should suffice in this case to reverse the holding of the State Supreme Court that the application of the best interests of the child standard is always unconstitutional in third-party visitation cases. Whether, under the circumstances of this case, the order requiring visitation over the objection of this fit parent violated the Constitution ought to be reserved for further proceedings. Because of its sweeping ruling requiring *102 the harm to the child standard, the Supreme Court of Washington did not have the occasion to address the specific visitation order the Troxels obtained. More specific guidance should await a case in which a State's highest court has considered all of the facts in the course of elaborating the protection

afforded to parents by the laws of the State and by the Constitution itself. Furthermore, in my view, we need not address whether, under the correct constitutional standards, the Washington statute can be invalidated on its face. This question, too, ought to be addressed by the state court in the first instance.

In my view the judgment under review should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

[*] Briefs of *amici curiae* urging reversal were filed for the State of Washington et al. by *Christine O. Gregoire*, Attorney General of Washington, and *Maureen A. Hart*, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: *Mark Pryor* of Arkansas, *Bill Lockyer* of California, *Ken Salazar* of Colorado, *Earl I. Anzai* of Hawaii, *Carla J. Stovall* of Kansas, *Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon* of Missouri, *Joseph P. Mazurek* of Montana, *John J. Farmer, Jr.*, of New Jersey, *Heidi Heitkamp* of North Dakota, *Betty D. Montgomery* of Ohio, and *Paul G. Summers* of Tennessee; for AARP et al. by *Rochelle Bobroff*, *Bruce Vignery*, and *Michael Schuster*; for Grandparents United for Children's Rights, Inc., by *Judith Sperling Newton* and *Carol M. Gopen*; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by *Richard Ruda* and *James I. Crowley*; and for the Grandparent Caregiver Law Center of the Brookdale Center on Aging.

Briefs of *amici curiae* urging affirmation were filed for the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers by *Barbara Ellen Handschu* and *Sanford K. Ain*; for the American Center for Law and Justice by *Jay Alan Sekulow*, *Colby May*, *Vincent McCarthy*, and *John P. Tuskey*; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by *Matthew A. Coles*, *Michael P. Adams*, *Catherine Weiss*, and *Steven R. Shapiro*; for the Coalition for the Restoration of Parental Rights by *Karen A. Wyle*; for the Institute for Justice et al. by *William H. Mellor*, *Clint Bolick*, and *Scott G. Bullock*; for the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution by *Michael P. Farris*; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by *Kimberlee Wood Colby*, *Gregory S. Baylor*, and *Carl H. Esbeck*; for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by *Patricia M. Logue*, *Ruth E. Harlow*, and *Beatrice Dohrn*; for the Society of Catholic Social Scientists by *Stephen M. Krason* and *Richard W. Garnett*; and for *Debra Hein* by *Stuart M. Wilder*.

Briefs of *amici curiae* were filed for the Center for Children's Policy Practice & Research at the University of Pennsylvania by *Barbara Bennett Woodhouse*; for the Domestic Violence Project, Inc./Safe House (Michigan) et al. by *Anna L. Argiroff* and *Ann L. Routh*; for the National Association of Counsel for Children by *Robert C. Fellmeth* and *Joan Hollinger*; and for the Northwest Women's Law Center et al. by *Cathy J. Zavis*.

[*] All 50 States have statutes that provide for grandparent visitation in some form. See Ala. Code § 30-3-4.1 (1989); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 25.20.065 (1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-409 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103 (1998); Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 3104 (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-117 (1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 (1995); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 1031(7) (1999); Fla. Stat. § 752.01 (1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-7-3 (1991); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46.3 (1999); Idaho Code § 32-719 (1999); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 750, § 5/607 (1998); Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1 (1999); Iowa Code § 598.35 (1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-129 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:344 (West Supp. 2000); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 136 (West Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, § 1803 (1998); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 9-102 (1999); Mass. Gen. Laws § 119:39D (1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.27b (West Supp. 1999); Minn. Stat. § 257.022 (1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-3 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.402 (Supp. 1999); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-9-102 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802 (1998); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.050 (Supp. 1999); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17-d (1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1999-2000); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 40-9-2 (1999); N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 72 (McKinney 1999); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-13.2, 50-13.2A (1999); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-09-05.1 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3109.051, 3109.11 (Supp. 1999); Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1999); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.121 (1997); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5311-5313 (1991); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-5-24 to 15-5-24.3 (Supp. 1999); S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7-420(33) (Supp. 1999); S. D. Codified Laws § 25-4-52 (1999); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-306, 36-6-307 (Supp. 1999); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.433 (Supp. 2000); Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1998); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 1011-1013 (1989); Va. Code Ann. § 20-124.2 (1995); W. Va. Code §§ 48-2B-1 to 48-2B-7 (1999); Wis. Stat. §§ 767.245, 880.155 (1993-1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101 (1999).

[1] The Supreme Court of Washington made its ruling in an action where three separate cases, including the Troxels', had been consolidated. *In re Smith*, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 6-7, 969 P. 2d 21, 23-24 (1998). The court also addressed two statutes, Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996) and former Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.240 (1994), 137 Wash. 2d at 7, 969 P. 2d at 24, the latter of which is not even at issue in this case. See Brief for Petitioners 6, n. 9; see also *ante*, at 61. Its constitutional analysis discussed only the statutory language and neither mentioned the facts of any of the three cases nor reviewed the records of their trial court proceedings below. 137 Wash. 2d at 13-21, 969 P. 2d at 27-31. The decision invalidated both statutes without addressing their application to particular facts: "We conclude petitioners have standing but, as written, the statutes violate the parents' constitutionally protected interests. These statutes allow any person, at any time, to petition for visitation without regard to relationship to the child, without regard to changed circumstances, and without regard to harm." *Id.*, at 5, 969 P. 2d at 23 (emphasis added); see also *id.*, at 21, 969 P. 2d at 31 ("RCW 26.10.160(3) and former RCW 26.09.240 impermissibly interfere with a parent's fundamental interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

[2] As Justice O'Connor points out, the best-interests provision "contains no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the Washington statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge." *Ante*, at 67.

[3] Cf. *Chicago v. Morales*, 527 U. S. 41, 71 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case. And if every application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited discretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its applications").

[4] The Supreme Court of Washington invalidated the broadly sweeping statute at issue on similarly limited reasoning: "Some parents and judges will not care if their child is physically disciplined by a third person; some parents and judges will not care if a third person teaches the child a religion inconsistent with the parents' religion; and some judges and parents will not care if the child is exposed to or taught racist or sexist beliefs. But many parents and judges will care, and, between the two, the parents should be the ones to choose whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas." 137 Wash. 2d at 21, 969 P. 2d at 31 (citation omitted).

[5] This is the pivot between Justice Kennedy's approach and mine.

[*] This case also does not involve a challenge based upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause and thus does not present an opportunity to reevaluate the meaning of that Clause. See *Saenz v. Roe*, 526 U. S. 489, 527-528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

[1] The State Supreme Court held that, "as written, the statutes violate the parents' constitutionally protected interests." *In re Smith*, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 969 P. 2d 21, 23 (1998).

[2] As the dissenting judge on the state appeals court noted, "[t]he trial court here was not presented with any guidance as to the proper test to be applied in a case such as this." *In re Troxel*, 87 Wash. App. 131, 143, 940 P. 2d 698, 703 (1997) (opinion of Ellington, J.). While disagreeing with the appeals court majority's conclusion that the state statute was constitutionally infirm, Judge Ellington recognized that despite this disagreement, the appropriate result would not be simply to affirm. Rather, because there had been no definitive guidance as to the proper construction of the statute, "[t]he findings necessary to order visitation over the objections of a parent are thus not in the record, and I would remand for further proceedings." *Ibid.*

[3] Unlike Justice O'Connor, *ante*, at 69-70, I find no suggestion in the trial court's decision in this case that the court was applying any presumptions at all in its analysis, much less one in favor of the grandparents. The first excerpt Justice

O'Connor quotes from the trial court's ruling, *ante*, at 69, says nothing one way or another about *who* bears the burden under the statute of demonstrating "best interests." There is certainly no indication of a presumption *against* the parents' judgment, only a "commonsensical" estimation that, usually but not always, visiting with grandparents can be good for children. *Ibid*. The second quotation, "I think [visitation] would be in the best interest of the children and I haven't been shown it is not in [the] best interest of the children," *ibid*., sounds as though the judge has simply concluded, based on the evidence before him, that visitation in this case would be in the best interests of both girls. Verbatim Report of Proceedings in *In re Troxel*, No. 93-3—00650-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 1994), p. 214. These statements do not provide us with a definitive assessment of the law the court applied regarding a "presumption" either way. Indeed, a different impression is conveyed by the judge's very next comment: "That has to be balanced, of course, with Mr. and Mrs. Wynn [a.k.a. Tommie Granville], who are trying to put together a family that includes eight children, . . . trying to get all those children together at the same time and put together some sort of functional unit wherein the children can be raised as brothers and sisters and spend lots of quality time together." *Ibid*. The judge then went on to reject the Troxels' efforts to attain the same level of visitation that their son, the girls' biological father, would have had, had he been alive. "[T]he fact that Mr. Troxel is deceased and he was the natural parent and as much as the grandparents would maybe like to step into the shoes of Brad, under our law that is not what we can do. The grandparents cannot step into the shoes of deceased parent, per say [*sic*], as far as whole gamut of visitation rights are concerned." *Id.*, at 215. Rather, as the judge put it, "I understand your desire to do that as loving grandparents. Unfortunately that would impact too dramatically on the children and their ability to be integrated into the nuclear unit with the mother." *Id.*, at 222-223.

However one understands the trial court's decision—and my point is merely to demonstrate that it is surely open to interpretation—its validity under the state statute as written is a judgment for the state appellate courts to make in the first instance.

[4] Justice Souter would conclude from the state court's statement that the statute "do[es] not require the petitioner to establish that he or she has a substantial relationship with the child," 137 Wash. 2d at 21, 969 P. 2d at 31, that the state court has "authoritatively read [the 'best interests'] provision as placing hardly any limit on a court's discretion to award visitation rights," *ante*, at 77 (opinion concurring in judgment). Apart from the question whether one can deem this description of the statute an "authoritative" construction, it seems to me exceedingly unlikely that the state court held the statute unconstitutional because it believed that the "best interests" standard imposes "hardly any limit" on courts' discretion. See n. 5, *infra*.

[5] The phrase "best interests of the child" appears in no less than 10 current Washington state statutory provisions governing determinations from guardianship to termination to custody to adoption. See, e. g., Wash. Rev. Code § 26.09.240(6) (Supp. 1996) (amended version of visitation statute enumerating eight factors courts may consider in evaluating a child's best interests); § 26.09.002 (in cases of parental separation or divorce "best interests of the child are served by a parenting arrangement that best maintains a child's emotional growth, health and stability, and physical care"; "best interest of the child is ordinarily served when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child is altered only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm"); § 26.10.100 ("The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child"). Indeed, the Washington state courts have invoked the standard on numerous occasions in applying these statutory provisions—just as if the phrase had quite specific and apparent meaning. See, e. g., *In re McDovle*, 122 Wash. 2d 604, 859 P. 2d 1239 (1993) (upholding trial court "best interest" assessment in custody dispute); *McDaniels v. Carlson*, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310, 738 P. 2d 254, 261 (1987) (elucidating "best interests" standard in paternity suit context). More broadly, a search of current state custody and visitation laws reveals fully 698 separate references to the "best interest of the child" standard, a number that, at a minimum, should give the Court some pause before it upholds a decision implying that those words, on their face, may be too boundless to pass muster under the Federal Constitution.

[6] It necessarily follows that under the far more stringent demands suggested by the majority in *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (plaintiff seeking facial invalidation "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid"), respondent's facial challenge must fail.

[7] The suggestion by Justice Thomas that this case may be resolved solely with reference to our decision in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925), is unpersuasive. *Pierce* involved a parent's choice whether to send a child to public or private school. While that case is a source of broad language about the scope of parents' due process rights with respect to their children, the constitutional principles and interests involved in the schooling context do not necessarily have parallel implications in this family law visitation context, in which multiple overlapping and competing prerogatives of various plausibly interested parties are at stake.

[8] This Court has on numerous occasions acknowledged that children are in many circumstances possessed of constitutionally protected rights and liberties. See *Parham v. J. R.*, 442 U. S. 584, 600 (1979) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary confinement); *Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth*, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights"); *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.*, 393 U. S. 503, 506-507 (1969) (First Amendment right to political speech); *In re Gault*, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967) (due process rights in criminal proceedings).

[9] Cf., e. g., *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U. S. 205, 244-246 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views. He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he will have to break from the Amish tradition. It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today. . . . It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of their own destiny"). The majority's disagreement with Justice Douglas in that case turned not on any contrary view of children's interest in their own education, but on the impact of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment on its analysis of school-related decisions by the Amish community.

[10] See *Palmora v. Sidoti*, 466 U. S. 429, 431 (1984) ("The judgment of a state court determining or reviewing a child custody decision is not ordinarily a likely candidate for review by this Court"); cf. *Collins v. Harker Heights*, 503 U. S. 115, 128 (1992) (matters involving competing and multifaceted social and policy decisions best left to local decisionmaking); *Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing*, 474 U. S. 214, 226 (1985) (emphasizing our "reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions" as federal courts are ill-suited to "evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by" experts in the field evaluating cumulative information). That caution is never more essential than in the realm of family and intimate relations. In part, this principle is based on long-established, if somewhat arbitrary, tradition in allocating responsibility for resolving disputes of various kinds in our federal system. *Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, 504 U. S. 689 (1992). But the instinct against over regularizing decisions about personal relations is sustained on firmer ground than mere tradition. It flows in equal part from the premise that people and their intimate associations are complex and particular, and imposing a rigid template upon them all risks severing bonds our society would do well to preserve.

[11] Whether parental rights constitute a "liberty" interest for purposes of procedural due process is a somewhat different question not implicated here. *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), purports to rest in part upon that proposition, see *id.*, at 651-652; but see *Michael H. v. Gerald D.*, 491 U. S. 110, 120-121 (1989) (plurality opinion), though the holding is independently supported on equal protection grounds, see *Stanley, supra*, at 658.

[12] I note that respondent is asserting only, *on her own behalf*, a substantive due process right to direct the upbringing of her own children, and is not asserting, *on behalf of her children*, their First Amendment rights of association or free exercise. Therefore do not have occasion to consider whether, and under what circumstances, the parent could assert the latter enumerated rights.

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