You asked for information on (1) Boston's Operation Night Light and (2) New York City's stop-and-frisk practices

SUMMARY

Boston's Operation Night Light is one of the programs the city implemented in the early to mid-1990s to focus on violent youth and the illegal gun market (other programs include Operation Ceasefire and the Boston Gun Project). Under Operation Night Light, probation officers convince judges to impose expanded probation conditions on offenders, including curfews and geographic restrictions. A probation officer is paired with two police officers to make surprise visits to homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk youth probationers between 7 p.m. and midnight, instead of the usual hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

The program targets high-risk youth probationers. The threat of unannounced visits also gives borderline juveniles an excuse to stay home by telling their gang leaders and associates that they would face sanctions for violating their curfew.

New York City's “stop-and-frisk” practices are described in a 1999 report by New York's attorney general. According to the report, the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) use of “stop-and-frisks” furthers the NYPD's goals of order maintenance, deterrence, crime prevention, and attacking gun violence. The NYPD's focus on apprehending violent criminals and preventing more serious crimes is assisted by aggressively enforcing laws aimed at low-level criminality. By stopping people on minor infractions, it becomes riskier for criminals to carry guns, and there will be fewer violent crimes if criminals stop carrying guns.

Guidelines for monitoring stop-and-frisks were set by a 2001 city law and a federal court lawsuit settled in 2004. Police report to the city council on the number of people stopped and questioned by officers, frisked, and the reason for stops. The data has been the subject of a number of studies. Organizations have also sued the NYPD for access to the data and allege racial profiling.

OPERATION NIGHT LIGHT

The description of Operation Night Light below is taken from:

1. “Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, February 1999, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun_violence/profile33.html and

2. Reichert, “Police-Probation Partnerships: Boston's Operation Night Light,” Promising Approaches to Addressing Crime, March 2002, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/jerrylee/programs/fjc/paper_mar02.pdf).

Operation Night Light is one of the programs Boston implemented starting in the early to mid-1990s to focus on violent youth and the illegal gun market (other programs include Operation Ceasefire and the Boston Gun Project). It is a partnership between police and probation officers that pairs a probation officer with two police officers to make surprise visits to homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk youth probationers between 7 p.m. and midnight, instead of the usual hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

Operation Night Light began in Dorchester in November 1992. At the time, Boston was experiencing heightened gang violence, a rise in homicide victims under age 17, increasingly bold behavior by gang members in courthouses, and criticism by minority community leaders and judges of police stop-and-search tactics.

Probation officers had high caseloads and the rising level of violence led to fewer visits in the community and more contacts in the office and by phone. Probation officers also worked independently from police officers. Probation officers worked during the day and police on the night shift did not know who was on probation. Police had limited authority to intervene even when they observed probation violations. Courts did not commonly impose curfews and they were difficult to enforce.

Under Operation Night Light, probation and police officers work together in the following ways.

● Probation officers convince judges to impose expanded probation conditions including curfews, geographic restrictions, and other constraints to keep youth from re-offending.

● Probation terms are strictly enforced.

● A probation officer is paired with two police officers to make surprise visits to homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk youth probationers between 7 p.m. and midnight, instead of the usual hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

● Resources are focused on high-risk offenders, the relatively small percentage who pose a threat to public safety.

● The probation officer decides which of 10 to 15 probationers to visit each evening based on which youth were defaulting on compliance.

● Teams wear plain clothes and use unmarked cars. At home visits, officers act in a courteous and professional manner and encourage parents to keep their children out of trouble. They discuss substance abuse prevention and treatment options.

Under Operation Night Light, pairing probation and police officers enhances the safety of probation officers and gives police the opportunity to meet people in the community in a non-confrontational manner in accordance with community policing. The unannounced home visits give borderline juveniles an excuse to stay home at night by telling their gang leaders and associates that they would face sanctions for violating their curfew (“Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, February 1999, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/gun_violence/profile33.html and Reichert, “Police-Probation Partnerships: Boston's Operation Night Light,” Promising Approaches to Addressing Crime, March 2002, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/jerrylee/programs/fjc/paper_mar02.pdf).

According to Kent Reichert, in “Police-Probation Partnerships: Boston's Operation Night Light,” Operation Night Light has been credited with reducing the rate of juvenile homicides, improving probation compliance, and increasing public safety. In this March 2002 article, he stated that:

1. homicides dropped from a high of 152 in 1990 to 31 in 1999,

2. juvenile homicides dropped from a high of 16 in 1990 to 0 in 1997, and

3. the rate of curfew compliance by juveniles more than doubled to 70% over the same period.

Reichert's report states that 50 police officers and 50 probation officers were riding the streets together seven nights a week and new probation officers were required to commit to spending at least 20% of their time in the community during non-traditional hours.

More information about Operation Night Light and Boston's other youth violence programs is available on-line at the Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence: http://sasnet.com/bostonstrategy/. Also see “Focus on Accountability: Best Practices for Juvenile Court and Probation,” Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants Program, August 1999, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/jaibgbulletin/exemp.html.

NEW YORK

A 1999 report by New York's attorney general described the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) use of “stop-and-frisk” as part of its crime fighting strategies.

● In 1994, the NYPD publicly issued two strategies reflecting order maintenance as the NYPD's approach to crime-fighting. One of the strategies stated: “By working systematically and assertively to reduce the level of disorder in the city, the NYPD will act to undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible.”

● By stopping people on minor infractions, it becomes riskier for criminals to carry guns, and there will be fewer violent crimes if criminals stop carrying guns.

● “Although rarely referenced in publicly-disseminated departmental strategy documents, the role of 'stop & frisk' in furthering the department's goals of order maintenance, deterrence, crime prevention, and a direct attack on gun violence is clear. Given the department's focus on apprehending violent criminals and preventing more serious crimes by aggressively enforcing laws aimed at low-level criminality, 'stop & frisk' serves as an important wedge into the criminal element.”

● A “stop” allows police to have contact with someone who may be involved in low-level criminal activity using a lower constitutional standard than for an arrest. This contact can lead to apprehending people who are already wanted for more serious crimes or who might be prepared to commit them in the near future.

● Thus, a model which values both proactive police interventions short of arrest and an aggressive approach to low-level disorder is well served by aggressive use of 'stop & frisk.' More to the point, 'stop & frisk' has served as an important tactical resource in promoting the department's specific strategic crime-fighting goals (Stop-and-Frisk Report, New York Attorney General, December 1, 1999, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html).

Guidelines for monitoring stop-and-frisks were set by a 2001 city law and a federal court lawsuit settled in 2004. Police give the city council a report four times a year on the number of people stopped and questioned by officers, frisked, and the reason for stops (“Police Data Shows Increase in Street Stops,” New York Times, May 6, 2008).

According to NYPD statistics reported by the New York Times, police officers made 145,098 stops during the first quarter of 2008, up from 134,029 during the same quarter last year. Stops increased from 97,296 in 2002 to 508,540 in 2006. The NYPD gave its data to the RAND Corporation, which released an analysis of racial disparities in the NYPD data in November 2007 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR534/). The NYPD also gave the data to the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data at the University of Michigan for a study (“Police Data Shows Increase in Street Stops,” New York Times, May 6, 2008).

Other studies of NYPD stop-and-frisk practices include the New York attorney general's report cited above and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' August 2000 report, “Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City” (http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/nypolice/main.htm).

The NYPD's practices have also been the subject of lawsuits. Organizations such as the New York Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed lawsuits seeking access to the NYPD's electronic database of data on the stops to conduct their own analysis to determine whether there is racial bias. The settlement of an earlier CCR case in 2003 required the NYPD to give CCR data on all stop-and-frisks conducted from 4^th quarter 2003 through 1^st quarter 2007 and to adopt a policy prohibiting unlawful racial profiling. CCR states that it is not allowed to publicly disclose the data or analysis under the settlement. CCR filed a class action lawsuit on April 16, 2008 charging the NYPD with engaging in racial profiling and suspicionless stop-and-frisks (“New Case Charges NYPD With Illegal Stop-and-Frisks,” CCR press release, May 7, 2008).

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