

**GAE Public Hearing
February 29, 2008
Testimony of Luther G. Weeks**

Testimony

334 Hollister Way West
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Luther@CTVotersCount.org

Introduction

Chairs and members of the committee. My name is Luther Weeks. I am a retired Software Engineer and Computer Scientist. I am the co-founder of CTVotersCount.org

I have an undergraduate degree in Mathematics, and Masters Degrees in Computer Science and Business. I have programmed computers since 1966. My career has been spent in building and buying software for a large insurance company, and building and marketing software for small software companies.

For the last four years I have studied voting systems and software. I have testified here and lobbied in Washington for laws proposed by Congressman Rush Holt.

Last year I attended three conferences on voting integrity, including the Post-Election Audit Summit which brought together Advocates, Scientists, Elected Officials and Election Officials to improve Post-Election Audits. Among the other attendees were our Deputy Secretary of the State Lesley Mara, and Deputy SEEC Director Albert Lenge.

Out of that Conference I copied an idea from Minnesota to create the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition. We organized 51 citizens to observe 31 of the 41 post election audits after the November 2007 election.

At the recent public hearing in Norwalk, I explained why Connecticut's post-election audits are Insufficient, Unreliable, and Ineffective.

I have personally observed ten post-election audits in Connecticut.

I have also attached a copy of a petition signed by 138 Connecticut voters, outlining requested changes to current audit law, PA 07-194. I recently delivered copies of the names, addresses, and signatures of those citizens to Senator Slossberg.

Today, I will talk about three solutions:

Solution # 1 Emergency Fixes To Our Audit Law

SB 444 simply repeats most of the inadequacies, loopholes, and mistakes in PA 07-194.

I have attached suggested text to modify our current audit law which I request be used to augment or replace appropriate sections SB 444.

Now, let us turn to the future: What we can start in 2008 for the 2009 election cycle and beyond.

Solution # 2 Memory Card Programming That Is Simpler and More Secure

Audits deal with detecting and correcting errors and fraud. This solution deals with prevention.

Dr. Shvartsman performed a random test of memory cards. Those partial tests showed that Registrars were unable to follow procedures, and that LHS was unable to reliably program, test, and deliver memory cards.

LHS's programming and quality control is inadequate. Random testing to find errors after the fact is inadequate. The chain-of-custody is inadequate. Procedures are difficult for Registrars to follow.

There is a solution that will solve all of these problems. Programming the cards in Connecticut -- 100% independent testing in Connecticut, located near the programming -- Swift delivery under a strong chain of custody to Registrars.

There are costs and there are savings in this program. The bottom line is that we can deliver good cards to Registrars the 1st time, make corrections quickly, and provide a system that is more reliable and easier for Registrars to follow.

Solution # 3 Audits That Are More Reliable, More Secure, More Effective, and Less Costly

Advocates and computer scientists want more secure and reliable audits. This means more transparent audits and more comprehensive audits, started and completed very soon after the election.

Registrars do not like the added burden of occasional random audits, the occurrence of which are unpredictable – in small towns, audits may happen once every ten years – many election officials will not experience two audits in their entire period of service.

Municipalities do not like the costs, which are also unpredictable – those picked randomly, audit to protect the election for all of us.

Statisticians' formulas indicate that audits like we have in Connecticut, 10% of 20% of races, is in some cases excessive, and in others woefully inadequate.

Read the recommendations of statisticians like Ron Rivest of MIT, the Verified Voting Foundation, and the American Statistical Association.

All of these conflicting requirements seem impossible when viewed in the context of Connecticut's audits conducted by individual towns.

All of these requirements become feasible when viewed in the context of other states that conduct elections and audits on a county basis, providing a paradigm where the random audit workload is predictable and where statistical audit savings and security can be realized.

For Examples: Read New Jersey's audit bill, the new Holt Bill, HR 5036, in the U.S. Congress, California's Procedures, and the recommendations of the Brennan Center for Justice.

The solution for Connecticut, is audits conducted under the guidance and supervision of an Independent Audit Board.

Let me end with the words of David Dill, Stanford Professor, and founder of the Verified Voting Foundation:

“People will make incorrect claims about state, and especially national, laws about electronic voting... In one local state or community, people could make some problem sound totally insolvable, when in fact it's routinely solved in other places. Once you know that and have that perspective, it's easier to get something done.”

Thank you,

References:

NJ Audit Law Passed January 2008: http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3000/2730_R1.PDF

Holt Emergency Bill, HR 5036 (Section 3 pages 8-19): http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h5036ih.txt.pdf

CA Audit Procedures: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/post_election_req.pdf

Ron Rivest, MIT: [http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-](http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-ASimpleRuleOfThumbForElectionAuditSizeDetermination.pdf)

[ASimpleRuleOfThumbForElectionAuditSizeDetermination.pdf](http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-ASimpleRuleOfThumbForElectionAuditSizeDetermination.pdf)

Verified Voting Foundation:

<http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/VerifiedVoting/SAFE-Auditing-July-26-Final.pdf>

Joseph Lorenzo Hall audit calculator:

http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/peas/hall_joe_auditing_mathematics_primer.pdf

Statement of the American Statistical Association:

<http://www.amstat.org/news/2007ASAElectionLettertoDFeinstein.pdf>

Brennan Center: http://brennan.3cdn.net/f1867ccc368442335b_8em6bso3r.pdf

UConn Memory Card And Audit Reports: <http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/Reports.html>

Coalition Audit Observation Reports: <http://www.CTElectionAudit.org>

Why we should be concerned with optical scan voting machines and PA 07-194?

Our concerns with Connecticut's new voting machines and audit law are similar to the ones articulated in reports from the University of Connecticut, reports commissioned by the Secretary of the State of California, and elsewhere:

- The Diebold AccuVote-OS machines can be easily hacked via the memory cards at any point in the process – altered invisibly to do almost anything conceivable
- The weakest point in the process is in the programming of each election, where those that have full access to the cards can do almost anything.
- Programming of each of our elections is outsourced to Diebold and its distributor LHS. (Note: Diebold's name is changing to Premier)

Computer scientists everywhere agree:

- No matter what we do, a computer system cannot be proven to be accurate or tested to be accurate.
- The only way to assure an electronic election is correct is post-election audits that are effective.

Connecticut's new law, PA 07-194, audits a minimum of three or 20% of races.

- It is not what statisticians would call a 10% audit – sometimes it is 10%, and more often it is a 0% or 2-3% audit.
- No referendums or ballot questions will be audited.
- No originally hand counted ballots are audited – which Registrars attest are subject to human counting errors.
- No centrally optically scanned absentee ballots are audited.
- The maximum probability of detecting an error or fraud in a state wide race is 20%- 30%.
- In races, such as state representative, state senator, and small to mid size municipal races, the probability of detecting an error fraud is just 2%-4%.
- In the case of a close or contested statewide race, there will be no random audit in the entire election. This is a loophole.
- Criteria for counting discrepancies and triggering recounts creates barriers that are too high.\
- Random selection of races is not required to be public.
- There is no advance notification requirement for the public random audits.
- It is not an Independent Audit. It does not merit the name Audit. It is conducted and assessed by the same individuals responsible for selecting equipment, creating procedures, and conducting the elections – the Registrars and the Secretary of the State.

History shows that no matter how secure procedures are on paper, they are often violated, even in Connecticut.

- In fact, they were overlooked by voting officials and violated by LHS, with no penalty in the Nov 2007, 2nd District recount. An LHS employee substituted an insecure voting machine from his vehicle for one sealed by the state and tested by the town.
- UConn memory card tests show that less than 45% of Registrars fully followed pre-election testing requirements.
- Registrars testified at the February 2008 public hearings that problems with lever machines occurred frequently and were routinely covered up.

Emergency Act of 2008 for Election Security and Confidence

Bill Text	Comment
<p>The Secretary of the State is authorized to accept proposals and award of grants up to a total of \$300,000 for the purpose of researching and reporting on best practices for counting paper ballots in ways that are efficient, accurate, publicly transparent, and publicly observable. Such proposals and grants being limited to accredited universities and colleges within the State of Connecticut.</p>	<p>One of the problems with post-election audits is guidance on methods – no best practice studies have been as yet published. - Supports: CTElectionAudit.org Recommendation #1</p>
<p>Each year a three member Independent Election Audit Board to oversee the operation, integrity, and reporting of the post-election audits shall be appointed by July 1st to serve for one year. Two members of the board must be qualified as independent auditors as generally defined and be of different political parties, one appointed by the Governor and the other by the members of the Government Administrations and Elections Committee of the General Assembly not of the same party as the Governor. At least one member of the Board must have verifiable expertise in statistics, who shall be appointed by the Attorney General. No members of the Board shall serve on a campaign committee, publicly endorse candidates for any elections during their service, or be associated with any company providing election equipment or election services.</p>	<p>The Independent Audit Board is consistent with the meaning of Independent. Requested by many advocates. Similar to other states' post-election audit laws and meets currently proposed federal emergency legislation for 2008 introduced in the U.S. Congress by Rep Rush Holt, The Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008 HR 5036", which will be referenced as "Holt 2008".</p>
<p>(a) No later than August 1st the Secretary of the State shall submit to the Independent Election Audit Board, proposed post-election audit procedures for ballot chain of custody, optical scanner and memory card chain of custody, pre-election testing of memory cards, and post-election audit procedures. These procedures shall meet standards set in this act and other applicable Connecticut laws and regulations. No later than September 15, the Election Audit Board in consultation with the Secretary of the State, will finalize and issue the procedures.</p> <p>(b) The Secretary of the State will copy and expeditiously transmit all reports of pre-election testing, incident reports, and post-election auditing reports required by law, regulation, or procedures to the Election Audit Board.</p> <p>(c) All ballots, optical scanners, and memory cards shall remain under seal and chain of custody until released in writing to municipalities by the Election Audit Board.</p> <p>(d) The Election Audit Board will review results of the audit and shall request the University of Connecticut Voter center to perform forensic investigation of significant counting discrepancies. The Board shall order expended audits where discrepancies, if projected in a race indicate a reduction in the margin of victory by one-fourth (25%) of the margin of victory or in their judgment are warranted. The Election Audit Board may order an audit, re-audit, for forensic research in any district for any reason they deem appropriate. The Election Audit Board will submit complaints to the Election Enforcement Commission for substantial violations of election procedures uncovered in chain-of-custody,</p>	<p>Represents what can be done in 2008 to provide increased integrity and confidence in the Presidential Election and General Assembly, along with a basis for a more permanent long term solution. Implements in part or otherwise satisfies CTElectionAudit.org recommendations #2, #7, #8, #13, #16, #17, and #18. (Placing responsibility for judgment on an Independent Audit Board to make independent decisions, rather than the Secretary of the State who is charged with responsibility for selecting the equipment and administering the conduct of the elections). There are several ways of triggering additional audits, for instance, the NJ law specifies one tenth of one percent of the votes counted; CA standards require additional audits at errors of one tenth of the margin of victory, two and a half times more strict than proposed here.</p>

<p>incidents, pre-election testing, and post-election audits. (e) No later than January 15 the Election Audit Board shall provide the General Assembly with a report assessing the results of the post-election audits and the quality of the conduct of the elections and post-election audits. (f) No later than January 15, 2009 the Election Audit Board shall provide the General Assembly with recommendations for legislation and the conduct of future elections and Independent Audits.</p>	
<p>(a) The State of Connecticut shall reimburse municipalities for the actual reasonable costs incurred in conducting post-election audits as approved by the Independent Audit Board. (b) The Secretary of the State shall seek Federal reimbursement for the cost of post-election audits. (c) To the extent practical, the Secretary of the State and the Independent Audit Board shall implement procedures consistent with and where necessary more stringent than Connecticut laws and regulations in order to qualify for Federal reimbursement of post-election audits.</p>	<p>Since districts are selected randomly, the towns are concerned about unfunded mandates, while the cost to the entire state are much more predictable. The Secretary of the State has previously been able to obtain Federal reimbursement for post-election audits. "Holt 2008" would reimburse audits that meet certain criteria.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (b) be replaced as follows: (b) The voting districts subject to the audit described in subsection (a) of this section shall be selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State and such selection process shall be open to the public. The races and questions subject to the audit pursuant to this section shall be in each selected district, [(1) in the case of an election where the office of presidential elector is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (2) in the case of an election where the office of Governor is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (3) in the case of a municipal election, three offices or twenty per cent of the number of offices on the ballot, whichever is greater, selected at random by the municipal clerk, and (4) in the case of a primary election, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office, if any, but in no event less than twenty per cent of the offices on the ballot, selected in a random drawing by the municipal clerk]. <u>(1) in all elections a minimum of three offices or twenty per cent of the number of offices and questions on the ballot whichever is greater and, (2) in the case of an election where the office of presidential elector or U.S. House Representative is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited or are reimbursable by federal law or if none are required by Federal Law a minimum of one office randomly selected from Federal races, (3) in the case where state offices are on the ballot a minimum of one randomly selected from state offices and questions, and (4) remaining offices and questions of the three or twenty percent, including a minimum of at least one, will be randomly selected from all offices and questions in each district selected at random. and (5) in the case of a primary election,</u></p>	<p>Resolves ambiguities and increases diversity of offices audited by requiring they always be selected locally and separately by district. Removes the exemption of questions, referendums, and special elections from the audit, since they not exempt from errors. Assures maximum audit covered by Federal reimbursement. Assures that at least one Federal and State office is audited in every selected district. Exempts uncontested offices from the audit. Includes in part CTElectionAudit.org recommendations #9, #12</p>

<p><u>referendum, or special election, all offices required to be audited or reimbursable by federal law, plus one additional office, if any, but in no event less than twenty per cent of the offices on the ballot, selected in a random drawing. All random selections of offices and questions will be selected separately for each district to be audited by the municipal clerk publicly in a random drawing. Offices without multiple candidates on the ballot or in offices allowing multiple votes with no more candidates on the ballot than votes allowed per voter, unless required by Federal law, will be exempt from the audit and will not be considered when randomly selecting offices and questions for audit.</u></p>	
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (c) be replaced as follows: (c) If a selected voting district has an race or question that is subject to recanvass [or an election or primary contest pursuant to the general statutes, the Secretary Municipal Clerk shall select an alternative race or question, pursuant to the process described in subsection (b) of this section. Audits of selected districts where ballots and machines are locked by court order, must be audited as soon as practical after the ballots are no longer covered by the court order, such delays will not be used to delay other provisions of this law covering districts not subject to such delays. The Independent Audit Board's authority to investigate discrepancies based on post-election audits includes the authority to investigate discrepancies uncovered in recanvasses.</p>	<p>Removes exemption for races and questions which are in districts with one race or question being contested. Removes the ability of a race being contested as a strategy to avoid an audit in a district or in a particular race. Compensates for the current lack of authority for the Secretary of the State's Office to investigate discrepancies found in recanvasses.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (d) be replaced as follows: (d) The audit shall include a hand count of all ballots, including absentee ballots, early ballots, and provisional ballots cast by all individuals who voted in or are under the jurisdiction of the district with respect to which the audit takes place, without regard to the time, place, or manner in which the votes were cast Each hand count conducted under this section shall produce the following information with respect to the race which will be reported to the Secretary of the State's Office: (A) The vote tally for each candidate. (B) The number of overvotes, undervotes, spoiled ballots, and blank ballots cast (or their equivalents, as defined by the State, county or equivalent location). (C) The number of write-in ballots and the names written in on such ballots pursuant to State law. (D) The total number of ballots cast. (E) A record of judgment calls made regarding voter intent.</p>	<p>Similar to "Holt 2008" requirements to implement a complete audit. Removes the exemption of absentee ballots, since they not exempt from errors. Simplifies the process by counting all ballots, reducing errors associated with both election night and audit associated with misclassifying ballots that were read or not read by the scanner.</p>
<p>All hand counting of ballots for post-election audits shall be conducted by a team of not fewer than 2 individuals who shall be witnessed by at least one observer sitting at the same table with such individuals. All such individuals shall be election officials.</p>	<p>Similar to "Holt 2008". Emergency provision to address CTElectonAudit.org recommendations #1 and #10 while best practices are being developed</p>

<p>Each post-election audit, district selection, race selection, or pre-election testing session shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire process, including reasonable advance notice, sufficient to confirm but not interfere with the proceedings. Sufficient advance notice includes notifying the Secretary of the State's Office at least three business days prior to commencing of an audit, race selection, or pre-election testing session. The Secretary of the State's Office shall provide the public with a means to obtain the date, times and locations no later than two business days prior to commencement of such audits, race selections, or pre-election sessions. For post-election audits, public observers must be provided the opportunity to see ballot bag seals before they are broken, seal numbers on the ballot bags, seal numbers recorded by the moderator while closing the polls, markings on ballots and hash marks being made such that they can verify that ballots are being accurately counted; For each manual count or manual recount, hash mark sheets, totals of hash marks for each candidate on each sheet, and final totals, along with and forms required to be submitted to the Secretary of the State's Office must be made available to observers to view during and at the conclusion of the audits, preserved and submitted to the Secretary of the State's Office. As long as they do not interfere with the hand counting process, public observers must be able to stand anywhere behind or in front of counters so that that the public observers can see ballots as they are counted and see hash marks as they are recorded.</p> <p>The results of the manual tabulation shall be reported on a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State within twenty-four hours of the completion of the audit. Such report shall be filed with the Secretary of the State who shall immediately forward such report to the Election Audit Board and The University of Connecticut for analysis. The University of Connecticut shall file a written report with the Secretary of the State and the Election Audit Board regarding such analysis that describes any discrepancies identified. After receipt of such report, the Secretary of the State shall file such report with the State Elections Enforcement Commission.</p>	<p>First sentence similar to "Holt 2008". Addresses and articulates CTElectonAudit.org recommendations #14 and #15 .</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (e) and (f) be deleted:</p>	<p>They are overridden by above provisions.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (g) be replaced as follows: (g) If The University of Connecticut report described in subsection (d) of this section indicates that a voting machine failed to record votes accurately [Secretary of the State] Election Audit Board may in its judgment require that the voting machine be examined and recertified by the Secretary of the State, or the secretary's designee. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the Secretary of the State from requiring that a voting machine be examined and recertified.</p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions.</p>

<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (i) be replaced as follows: (i) If the audit officials are unable to reconcile the manual count with the electronic vote tabulation and discrepancies, the [Secretary of the State shall conduct] Election Audit Board shall order such further investigation of the voting machine or tabulator malfunction as may be necessary for the purpose of reviewing whether or not to decertify the voting machine or machines in question or to order the voting machine to be examined and recertified pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. Any report produced by the Secretary of the State as a result of such investigation shall be filed with the State Elections Enforcement Commission and the commission may initiate such further investigation in accordance with subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 9 7b of the general statutes, as may be required to determine if any violations of the general statutes concerning election law have been committed <u>based on any of the reports filed with them or transmitted to them from the Election Audit Board.</u></p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (j) be replaced as follows: (j) The individual paper ballots used at an election, <u>special election, referendum,</u> or primary shall be carefully preserved and returned in their designated receptacle in accordance with the requirements of section 9-266, 9-302 or 9-310 of the general statutes, whichever is applicable. <u>Ballots must remain under seal except when required to be unsealed for the purposes of a post-election audit, audit investigation, or court order until released in writing by the Election Audit Board. Each time the ballots are unsealed for these purposes they must be resealed and a new record made of the new seal number, which must be checked when the ballots are next unsealed.</u></p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions. Addresses CTElectionAudit.org recommendations #17.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (l) be replaced as follows: (l) After an election, <u>special election, referendum,</u> or primary, any voting machine may be kept locked for a period longer than that prescribed by sections 9 266, 9 310 and 9 447 of the general statutes, if such an extended period is ordered by either a court of competent jurisdiction, the <u>Election Audit Board,</u> the Secretary of the State or the State Elections Enforcement Commission. Either the court or the [Secretary of the State] <u>Election Audit Board</u> may order an audit of such voting machine to be conducted by such persons as the court or the [Secretary of the State] <u>Election Audit Board</u> may designate, provided the State Elections Enforcement Commission may order such an audit under the circumstances prescribed in subsection [(f)] <u>(i)</u> of this section. If the machine utilized in such election <u>special election, referendum</u> or primary is an optical scan voting system, such order to lock such machine shall include the tabulator, memory card and all other components and processes utilized in the programming of such machine.</p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions. Addresses CTElectionAudit.org recommendations #17.</p>

<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (m) be replaced as follows: (m) The Secretary of the State and the Election Audit Board may adopt regulations and procedures, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 of the general statutes, as may be necessary for the conduct of the manual tabulation of the paper ballots described in subsection (a) of this section and to establish guidelines for expanded audits when there are differences between the manual and counts.</p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (n) be replaced as follows: (n) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, the Secretary of the State and the Election Audit Board and their designated investigators shall have access to the code in any voting machine whenever any problem is discovered as a result of the audit described in subsection (a) of this section.</p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions. To indicate that computer experts can be designated to participate in such investigations.</p>
<p>PA 07-194 Section 1 (o) be replaced as follows: (o) As used in this section, "discrepancy" means any difference in vote totals between machine and manual counts in a voting district [that exceeds one half of one per cent of the lesser amount of the vote totals] between machine originally reported counts from any source for votes in the district and manual counts [where such differences cannot be resolved through an accounting of ballots that were not marked properly in accordance with subsection (e) of this section,] "state election" means "state election", as defined in section 9 1 of the general statutes, and "municipal election" means a municipal election held pursuant to section 9 164 of the general statutes.</p>	<p>To be consistent with other modified and new provisions.</p>

Petition To Enhance Confidence In Connecticut Elections By November 2008

To: The Honorable Susan M. Bysiewicz, Secretary of the State, Connecticut
Government Administration and Elections Committee, Connecticut General Assembly

Whereas election integrity is a basic requirement of democracy; it is impossible to evaluate or test electronic voting sufficiently to guarantee accurate election results; recent scientific studies, including those from the University of Connecticut commissioned by the State of Connecticut, show that the AccuVote-OS is highly subject to errors and fraud, by insiders, neglected procedures, or compromised procedures; history has shown that election procedures are frequently violated or ignored, including in Connecticut; history has shown that paper balloting alone is also subject to error and fraud; time is running out to make changes to protect our elections in November 2008.

The prudent course for Connecticut in the near term is to assure that votes are counted publicly via our optical scan equipment, expeditiously followed by transparent, hand-counted, random audits sufficient to detect errors, deter fraud, and provide reasonable confidence that the voters' intentions are reflected in the results of each election, race, and question.

We the undersigned request that you enact legislation and appropriate rules and procedures in time for the 2008 November election which meet the following minimum standards:

- Expeditious, transparent, public, hand-counted, random audits after every type of election, primary, and referendum, Federal, State and local, by either:
 - 1) auditing all statewide races and questions in 10% of randomly selected districts statewide;
 - and 2) auditing of all other races and questions by statewide random selection of one district in each town; plus audits of 10% of districts statewide, randomly selected from the remaining districts in towns with more than four districts; plus, if a race or question remains, that is not in any district already selected, one of its districts will be randomly selected for audit of that one race or question.
 - or 3) an alternative random audit process for all races and questions, providing a confidence of 80% that the results reflect the intention of the voters, for each statewide and Federal race or question, and a confidence of least 33% for all other races and questions, using statistical methods such as those referenced in recent reports by Verified Voting and the Brennan Center.
- The only exceptions to these audits being races with candidates running unopposed or where a particular race or question will have a full manual recount.
- An automatic full recount when the manual audit totals of all votes cast in one district, (at the polls, absentee, provisional, and overseas etc.) varies from the originally reported totals by more than 1% or by more than 0.4% if the winning margin for the entire race or question was less than 2%
- Public, downloadable, posting on the State of Connecticut web of all initially reported results by district by broken down by electronic counts, over-votes, under-votes, absentee ballots, and provisional ballots, within 24 hours of the close of the poll and within 24 hours of the provisional deadline.
- The appointment of an Independent Audit Review Board to review audit results and the posted statistics with the power to order full or partial hand-count recounts whenever they determine that the results may not reflect the intention of the voters or would be in the interest of enhancing public confidence.
- The Audit Review Board also to recommend future audit refinements with more transparent and credible ballot programming procedures than the current outsourcing to voting equipment suppliers.

Whereas the added costs of manual audits represent an unfunded mandate by the State, necessitated in part by Federal laws, which falls disproportionately on smaller municipalities; these costs represent a small fraction of the cost of optical scan voting, a small fraction of the costs of an election, less than the cost a candidate or legislator spends on a single mailing; a small fraction of the costs of many recent instances of lax oversight and corruption; these costs represent a small price to insure a government of and by the people.

We the undersigned also:

- Are willing to pay our fair share in state taxes to reimburse towns for reasonable best practice costs of such manual audits, which are estimated to be in the range of \$0.20 to \$0.50 per ballot cast in Federal, State, and Municipal elections.
- Request that you to seek ways to use Federal funds to offset the maximum proportion of these costs.
- Request that you fund research into mechanisms for counting votes, looking carefully at practices employed elsewhere that indicate an average cost of \$0.04 per ballot per race counted are attainable.

I am a Connecticut voter and I endorse the CTVotersCount.org Petition To Enhance Confidence In Connecticut Elections by November 2008				
Signature:	Name:	Town:	Zip:	Phone:
Date:	Email:	Address:		

Mail signed petitions to: CTVotersCount.org, c/o L. Weeks, 334 Hollister Way West, Glastonbury, CT 06033