Topic:
ARREST; DRUNK DRIVING; MOTOR VEHICLES; TRAFFIC REGULATIONS;
Location:
DRUNK DRIVING;

OLR Research Report


May 4, 2004

 

2004-R-0407

SUMMARY OF STATE V. HAIGHT

 

By: Sarah Black, Legislative Fellow

You asked for (1) a summary of the decision in State v. Haight, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 109 (Conn. Super. Dec. 2, 2003) (copy attached) and (2) the status of the case.

SUMMARY

State v. Haight presents an issue apparently of first impression in Connecticut: whether an intoxicated person can be prosecuted under the driving under the influence (DUI) statute when found asleep in his parked car with the headlights on and the keys in the ignition, but the car's engine not engaged. The trial judge denied the defense's motion to dismiss, holding that there was sufficient evidence to allow the finder of fact to determine whether such conduct constitutes operating a vehicle. This case is currently on appeal.

FACTS

Between midnight and 12:30 a.m. on October 20, 2001, a police officer found defendant Haight asleep in his Lexus. The car was parked on a street in Norwalk with its headlights on. The engine was not running. The keys were in the ignition and the door chime sounded when the police officer opened the door, indicating that the ignition may have been partially engaged. The police officer arrested Haight for DUI and the defendant subsequently failed a breath test. The officer then issued Haight a summons pursuant to CGS § 14-227a.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATUS

In April 2002, the defense filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the state had insufficient evidence to proceed with the case. In November, the court (Downey, J.) denied the motion from the bench without a written decision. In May 2003, Haight entered a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to appeal. In June, the defense appealed the court's denial of the motion to dismiss.

In August 2003, Haight filed a motion for articulation requesting the court to specify its reasons for denying the motion. The court denied this motion. The court also denied Haight's subsequent motion for review. Finally, the Appellate Court ordered Judge Downey to issue a written decision. The attached decision is the result of this order. The Appellate Court has not yet resolved this case.

LEGAL BASIS FOR DECISION

In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held there was sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to conclude that Haight's conduct constituted operating a vehicle.

The court cited Practice Book § 41-8, CGS § 54-56, and case law as establishing the legal criteria for evaluating a motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court must determine if there is sufficient evidence to justify continuing with the action (CGS § 54-56). To make this decision, the court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state (State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690, 702 (1998)).

The court found the trier of fact is responsible for determining if Haight was operating a vehicle at the time of his arrest. CGS § 14-1(54) defines an “operator” as a person who operates a motor vehicle, steers or directs a motor vehicle being towed, or is in physical control of a commercial motor vehicle. Case law has interpreted “operation” for the purposes of the DUI statute to include an act that alone or in sequence would set the vehicle in motion (State v. Teti, 50 Conn. App. 34, 38 (1998)).

The court noted two Supreme Court precedents that involved issues similar to Haight. In State v. Swift, the defendant was found to be operating a vehicle when the police found him in the driver's seat while his friend pushed the car in an attempt to get the engine started. The car had been driven into an embankment (125 Conn. 399 (1939)). In State v. De Coster, the court overturned the defendant's conviction for DUI. In this case, the police found the defendant in his car with the key in the ignition but the car not running. The car was stopped in the street and was damaged (147 Conn. 502 (1960)).

The Haight court noted that while these cases could provide guidance on legal issues, it was up to the trier of fact to make a factual determination if Haight was operating the Lexus. Thus, because the court found sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to make this determination, the court allowed the prosecution to go forward.

SB:nf