Topic:
EDUCATION (GENERAL); DISCRIMINATION; EMPLOYMENT (GENERAL); SCHOOLS (GENERAL);
Location:
DISCRIMINATION;
Scope:
Court Cases; Connecticut laws/regulations;

OLR Research Report


February 1, 2001

 

2001-R-0145

DISCRIMINATION

 

By: Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Attorney

You wanted to know (1) the practices a section of the public accommodations law was intended to prevent, (2) the practices the law prohibiting discrimination in educational and vocational programs was intended to prohibit, and (3) whether either law applies to public schools.

SUMMARY

Connecticut has had a statute prohibiting discrimination by places of public accommodation since 1905. The statute, which contains two subsections and several subdivisions, generally prohibits places that are open to the public from discriminating among different segments of the population.

Section (a)(2) of the statute prohibits a place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement from segregating or separating people based on their race; creed; color; national origin; ancestry; sex; marital status; age; lawful source of income; mental retardation; or mental, learning, or physical disability. The law defines a “place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement” as any establishment that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the general public (CGS § 46a-63).

CGS § 46a-75, which dates back to 1969, prohibits state agencies that offer educational, counseling and vocational guidance programs and all apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs from engaging in discriminatory practices.

No Connecticut court has ruled on whether a public school is a “public accommodation” within the meaning of the accommodation statute or whether CGS § 46a-75 applies to public schools. But a human rights referee selected to hear discrimination complaints has ruled that public schools are not public accommodations. A referee has also ruled that CGS § 46a-75 does not apply to schools. Neither courts nor other hearing officers are bound by a referee's ruling. Thus, courts and future referees presented with the issue of whether schools are public accommodations would likely consider whether the schools serve the “general public.” Both of the cases are on appeal to the superior court. We will give you a copy of the decisions once the trials are completed.

Unlike the human rights referee, the commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) appears to believe the public accommodation law applies to public schools. It includes schools on its Web page as an example of a public accommodation and it takes complaints alleging that a public school violated the public accommodation law. CHRO also appears to believe that CGS § 46a-75 applies to public schools. It is possible for the commission and human rights referees to hold different positions on whether or not the law is violated because the referees are not commission employees. They are independent officers who are nominated by the governor and approved by the General Assembly.

DISCRIMINATORY PUBLIC ACCOMODATION PRACTICES

In addition to preventing segregating or separating people based or race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income, mental retardation, or mental or physical disability, the law prohibits a place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement from:

1. denying full and equal accommodations to people based or race creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income, mental retardation, or mental or physical disability;

2. restricting or limiting a mother's right to breast-feed her child;

3. failing or refusing to post a notice that guide dogs wearing a harness or orange-colored leash and collar can accompany a blind, deaf, or mobility impaired person on the premises; or

4. denying equal access to accommodations to any person using or training a guide dog (CGS § 46a-64).

IS A PUBLIC SCHOOL A PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION?

The first step in any analysis to determine what is a public accommodation begins with the statutes and the definition of the phrase. As stated above, a place of public accommodation is an establishment that offers services or goods to the general public. Although the state Supreme Court found the term “establishment” ambiguous when the issue was whether the Boy Scouts of America, Inc., a nonphysical structure could be an accommodation, it appears clear from the Court's analysis that a public school, a physical structure, is an “establishment” (Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. v. CHRO, 204 Conn. 287 (1987)). Since the statutory definition of “public accommodation” appears to clearly include public schools, a court, would not likely pursue the question further.

To determine whether a school (the establishment) “serves the general public,” a court would likely look to the legislative purpose of eliminating discriminatory conduct by those who serve the general public. The Supreme Court in Boy Scouts stated “the organizational status of the enterprise that is the service provider cannot be the determinant of statutory coverage” (p. 299). Thus, an organization, even a private one, that opens its doors to the general public is subject to the law prohibiting discrimination.

That said, a public school representative would probably argue that the school does not “serve the general public” but rather those who meet the statutory age and residency requirements (CGS § 10-184) and other conditions set by the local school board. The representative might also argue that the legislature would not have enacted CGS § 10-15c if it intended schools to be public accommodation. CGS § 10-15c prohibits public schools from discriminating against its pupils based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. As stated earlier a court has not decided this issue; thus, it is unclear how a court would rule.

A human rights referee has concluded that no interpretation of the public accommodation statute is necessary because it clearly does not apply to public schools. Although the referee conceded that a public school is an establishment that offers services, she concluded that school services are not offered to the general public.

Educational services, however, are offered only to specific

individuals, namely students deemed eligible by the town's

board of education, typically those residing in the town

itself and within a specific age range. Such a limited group

of individuals cannot be considered the “general public.”

Furthermore, public schools are not listed in the definition

in the General Statutes themselves (Alston v. East Haven

of Education, 9830205, (May 3, 2000)).

DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL AND VOCATIONAL PROGRAMS

The law requires state agencies to make any educational, counseling, vocational guidance, apprenticeship or on-the-job training program they offer open to all people who qualify without regard to race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of income, mental retardation, or learning or physical disability. The law also applies to such programs offered by others if state agencies participate in any way.

The programs must be conducted to develop students' and trainees' interests, aptitudes, skills, and capacities. Special attention must be paid to the needs of students and trainees who are culturally deprived, educationally handicapped, learning disabled, economically disadvantaged, or physically disabled. Agencies must encourage employees who would derive the greatest benefit from upgraded skills to participate in the training programs (CGS § 46a-75).

DOES CGS § 46A-75 APPLY TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS?

Connecticut courts have not been asked to decide whether CGS § 46a-75 applies to public schools. But a human rights referee has concluded that it does not (see Ballard v. Cheshire Board of Education, CHRO No. 9830294, (May 31, 2000)). In reaching this conclusion, the referee relied on the fact that:

1. the statute does not specifically include public schools or local boards of education, but instead refers to labor programs offered by state agencies and those in which state agencies participate;

2. the statute's reference to “training opportunities” and directive for program sponsors to encourage “larger numbers of participants from those segments of the labor force where the need for upgraded skills are greatest” are inconsistent with programs offered by public schools;

3. based on a statement made during the 1969 debate on the bill, the legislature intended the act to guarantee equal employment opportunities in state government;

4. prior to the 1980 recodification, CGS § 46a-75 was located in a chapter entitled “Organization of State Agencies;”

5. CGS § 46a-75 was recodified with eight other statutes, all applicable to state agencies;

6. to apply the statute to local boards of education would allow parties to circumvent the elaborate procedure for handling allegations of discrimination set out in CGS § 10-4b;

7. the superior court, in Fritz v. Guida-Fenton Ophthalmology Association, CV 970398021S (9/18/97), stated that CGS § 46a-99 and §§ 46a-70 to 46a-78 are applicable “when the alleged discriminatory employer is a state agency;”

8. CHRO's regulations considers § 46a-75 and the other statutes in its group to apply to employment-related, state-sponsored education programs rather than programs sponsored by public schools; and

9. another referee reached the same conclusion when deciding this issue in another case.

The referee rejected the argument that language in the statutes making it applicable to programs “ in which state agencies participate” contemplated the inclusion of public schools.

SN-E:eh