CHAPTER SEVEN
Recommendations for Community Corrections Procedure
To fully adopt and implement a community corrections strategy, legislative and administrative changes must be made to existing sentencing options and the current criminal justice process. Budget appropriations should proportionally support all components of the community corrections model. The following chapter provides specific recommendations to improve the criminal justice procedure and reinvest in Connecticut's implementation of a comprehensive community corrections strategy.
Community Corrections Procedure
Reinvestment in community corrections. Currently, a disproportionate share of the state's criminal justice budget is spent on the smallest percentage of offenders -- although arguably the most serious population. Table VII-1 shows the General Fund expenditures for the Department of Correction, Board of Parole, and judicial branch adult probation and bail services. The table tracks the funds spent on incarceration and community corrections since FY 92.
Generally, budgets for all of the agencies grew over the nine-year period. The greatest increases in expenditures occurred during the early 1990s in response to the persistent prison overcrowding crisis at that time. The budget for adult probation significantly increased (almost 54 percent from FY 92 to FY 94) due to the initiation of the Alternative to Incarceration Program. The DOC's budget jumped 21 percent from FY 93 to FY 94 to bring on-line 9,000 new prison beds. The parole board experienced a dramatic increase of 437 percent between FY 94 and FY 95 when it was transferred out of DOC and became a separate state agency with release and supervision responsibilities.
The parole board and the judicial branch, through its Office of Adult Probation and Alternative to Incarceration Program, supervise about 60,000 offenders in the community. The cost associated with this supervision was approximately $68 million in FY 00. The cost for those offenders in the custody of the Department of Correction, both within the state's prisons and in the community, was about $464 million. The department has a current prison population of about 18,000 with an additional 1,000 inmates supervised in the community under transitional supervision, community placement program, or re-entry furlough. Based on the data, approximately 87 percent of the resources are spent on less than 25 percent of the offender population -- inmates in prison.
As discussed in Chapter 2, prison is the most intensive sanction and as such is the most expensive. A benefit of community corrections is its lower cost per offender. Connecticut spends about $96 per day to house an inmate and thereby protect the public from possible criminal activity. In contrast, approximately $2 is spent to supervise offenders on probation, and $11 is spent per parolee each day. It is these offenders, living in the community, however, who pose the most immediate risk to public safety.
|
Table VII-1. Expenditures for Criminal Offender Incarceration and Community Supervision (General Fund)* |
||||
|
FY |
DOC |
Parole** |
Probation^ |
Bail |
|
92 |
$247,544,594 |
$260,514 |
$22,525,527 |
$3,155,320 |
|
93 |
$285,774,762 |
$343,342 |
$26,167,798 |
$3,322,935 |
|
94 |
$346,031,301 |
$448,816 |
$34,692,231 |
$2,799,239 |
|
95 |
$376,293,297 |
$2,408,315 |
$37,420,075 |
$3,336,063 |
|
96 |
$372,716,723 |
$5,491,904 |
$39,052,613 |
$4,139,075 |
|
97 |
$401,163,537 |
$6,435,906 |
$41,718,276 |
$3,971,548 |
|
98 |
$391,970,720 |
$6,011,195 |
$41,997,365 |
$4,457,323 |
|
99 |
$414,776,321 |
$6,848,582 |
$45,683,335 |
$4,875,639 |
|
00 |
$464,037,252 |
$8,070,564 |
$54,630,784 |
$5,119,421 |
|
*Division of Criminal Justice, Public Defender Services, and judicial branch court operations budgets not included. **In 1995, funds were removed from DOC to support Board of Parole as a separate state agency. ^Budget includes adult probation and alternative sanctions program. Source of data: Legislative Office of Fiscal Analysis |
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The average caseload per probation officer is currently 241. Because of different levels of supervision, the caseloads range from a low of 25 offenders in special management units such as the sex offender supervision and the relapse units to a high of 12,500 offenders who are monitored via the mail and telephone rather than supervised in person by a probation officer. On average, the caseload for high security probation supervision is between 100 and 200 offenders -- the caseload goal is 75 -- and medium security supervision caseload is about 400 -- the caseload goal is 250. The judicial branch is expected to hire an additional 60 probation officers during 2001, which will slightly reduce caseloads, and it plans to hire 120 more during the next two years.
Currently, the parole board maintains an average caseload of 60 parolees -- only slightly more than its caseload goal. The board has a much smaller client population than probation. The recommendations discussed throughout this section have the potential to greatly increase the board's caseload. Therefore, budget decision should reflect the possible growth in caseload.
In recent years, budgetary shortfalls and continued growth in the number of offenders under supervision have resulted in larger community corrections caseloads and fewer services and programs. An unintended result of a disproportionate share of the total budget being allocated to incarceration services is a high rate of failure among offenders under community supervision.
During 1999, 25 percent of the admissions to prison were for a violation of probation. The DOC estimates the percentage of probation violators is even higher given that many are admitted under a new sentence for the most recent criminal charge rather than a VOP -- the court often vacates the sentence of probation and imposes a new sentence for the current offense1. In addition, almost 40 percent of the inmates released to parole are returned to prison for a violation of their release conditions.
The community correction failure rate increases when violations that do not result in re-imprisonment are included. Violations of either probation or parole often times do not require an arrest or return to prison, but rather an increased sanction such as drug testing, residential program placement, or electronic monitoring. The ability to sanction an offender under community supervision without resorting to re-imprisonment is vital to community corrections effectiveness in protecting public safety and rehabilitating criminals and efficient use of prison beds.
Inequities in state expenditures for incarceration and community supervision staff and programs have stalled the development, operation, and effectiveness of the community corrections model over the past five years. It is also evidence of the current lack of commitment to implementing a workable system of graduated sanctions. Thus, the committee recommends the General Assembly reinvest in the community corrections strategy to protect public safety and appropriately and efficiently reserve prison resources for the most serious, violent, and repeat offenders.
The General Assembly shall provide funding to ensure: (1) adequate staffing levels for community supervision through adult probation and parole, adding at a maximum 50 parole officers and 160 probation officers to current personnel resources over the next three years; and (2) treatment, training, and rehabilitation programs, including but not limited to substance abuse, mental health, education or vocational training, life skills, anger management, sex offender treatment, halfway house, and community service, that are sufficient to meet the service needs of the population of incarcerated and community supervised offenders.
Presumptive sentencing authority. In addition to the statutory sentencing guidelines for felony offenses, the state penal code allows for enhanced penalties to be imposed for certain crimes or offenders through mandatory minimum sentences and the persistent offender provisions. Mandatory minimums are required for certain crimes, typically violent or drug offenses. The provisions generally require a longer period of incarceration than the statutory minimum for the offense class. Upon conviction, the mandatory term of a sentence must be imposed and may not be reduced or suspended by the court.2
Mandatory minimums and the persistent offender provisions limit the court's discretion to impose a sentence based on the offender's criminal and personal history and the specific facts of the case. These provisions assume all offenders and crimes carrying a mandatory sentence are the same.3 For certain offenses, however, state law4 currently authorizes the court to impose a sentence other than an established mandatory minimum -- this authority is typically referred to as "presumptive sentencing." The court may, upon a showing of "mitigating circumstances", suspend the mandatory portion of the sentence and impose a lesser term.
Also, a recent change in the law, authorizes the parole board to disregard any portion of a mandatory minimum sentence in the calculation of parole eligibility. The offender is still subject to supervision for the full term of the mandatory minimum prison term, but may be released early from prison before serving the required portion of the sentence. This law diminishes the impact of a mandatory minimum sentence.
Program review staff developed information that favored establishing statutory authority to give the court the discretion to impose a sentence other than that required by a mandatory minimum or persistent offender provision based on the facts of the case presented and to more clearly reflect the intent of sentencing legislation. However, the committee believes such action would be inconsistent with the intent of the "truth in sentencing" policies established over the past five years.
Sentence calculation. Criminal sentences can be complex. A sentence can consist of several sanctions (i.e., prison, parole, probation, and victim restitution). The custody status of the offender can change during a criminal sentence between incarceration and community supervision.
The major sentencing reforms over the past 20 years have established different standards and procedures for calculating sentence length and time served, determining parole and early release eligibility, and the criteria for the types of offenders eligible for alternative sentences, "good time," and parole. The effective dates of the new laws are used to delineate which offenders are affected by the changes. Sentences are also subject to administrative procedures implemented by criminal justice agencies (i.e., the parole board's policy to designate offenders as serious and violent in accordance with the "85 percent rule").
The court, to make fair and rationale sentence decisions, must be aware of the implications of the sentence based on the policies and procedures of the criminal justice agencies administering the sentence. The program review committee, therefore, recommends a sentence worksheet be prepared as part of the pre-sentence investigation required by state law (C.G.S. §54-91a) or upon request by the court. The sentence worksheet shall be presented to the court during the sentencing hearing5. It shall serve to provide the court and the defendant with an estimate of the required time to be served on the sentence, parole eligibility, and period of probation or special parole. The sentence worksheet shall be a guideline based on prevailing sentencing laws, regulations, and policies. The worksheet shall not constitute a guarantee of any eligibility for an early release from prison, reduction of sentence length, or participation in a program.
The information provided by the sentence worksheet will give the court a "snapshot" of its implementation. It will also offer a day-to-day reinforcement of sentencing rules and procedures. The calculation should provide the court with an approximate:
Sentencing teams. In the early 1990s, the judicial branch began administering the Alternative to Incarceration Program that created a range of alternative and intermediate sentencing options for the court. As part of the implementation process, the judicial branch developed intermediate sanction project (ISP) teams comprised of judges, state's attorneys, public defenders, bail commissioners, probation officers, and criminal sanctions monitors. A team was assigned to each court.
The ISP teams were responsible for determining the alternative or traditional sanction options that were best for certain targeted offender populations. Specifically, the ISP teams analyzed aggregate data on the offender population to identify needs, establish referral protocol for alternative sanctions, assure the appropriate use of alternative sanction programs, and review other criminal justice issues impacting alternative sentencing and sanctions.
Since the reorganization of the judicial branch's court support services, however, the ISP teams have remained operational in only a few court locations. The reliance on and importance of data analysis has been minimized. Important interagency links have not been fostered. It is now unclear how successful the Alternative to Incarceration Program has been in diverting "jail bound" offenders from prison and thereby assisting in an inmate population growth management strategy.
Therefore, it is recommended the judicial branch establish sentencing teams at all criminal court locations. Each sentencing team shall be comprised of a judge, state's attorney, public defender, bail commissioner, probation officer, criminal sanctions monitor, a representative from the Department of Correction, and a parole officer from the board's hearings division. The objectives of the sentencing teams are to:
To maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the community corrections strategy, the graduated system of alternative and traditional sentencing options must be appropriately imposed and administered. The participation and endorsement of the criminal justice administrators and judges whose decisions will determine its use are critical to the strategy's effectiveness. The sentencing teams will foster an interagency liaison to support the use of a range of graduated sanctions.
"Split" sentences and special parole. Probation and parole are similar in function, but are linked to different segments of the criminal justice system. Traditionally, probation is imposed in lieu of incarceration and is associated with keeping nonviolent and low level offenders in their communities through rehabilitative and treatment services. It is a front-end sanction that helps to divert offenders from prison. At the back end of the system is parole, which is a conditional release from prison. Parole supervises and assists the offender to learn to live in a community after a term in a prison. Probation is administered by the judicial branch and parole by the Board of Parole, an executive branch agency.
One of the sentences the court may impose is a prison term followed by a period of probation supervision. Typically, the court will suspend a portion or all of the prison term, but require the full period of probation be imposed. This sentence is referred to as a "split" sentence. Under a "split" sentence, probation is the post-incarceration supervision option.
The "split" sentence uses probation in place of parole supervision. This practice, which was codified in state law, began after parole was statutorily eliminated in 1980 as a result of the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing. The practice continued after parole was reinstated in 1990 because, at the time, the average sentence lengths and release practices of the board resulted in short periods of parole supervision -- generally one year or less. The period of parole was shortened by the awarding of "good time," which significantly reduced the maximum term of the sentence, and the conservative release practices of the board that required longer periods of incarceration prior to release. The board also used its discretion to deny parole (referred to as "maxing out"), thereby eliminating any post-prison supervision. The court imposed "split" sentences to: (1) ensure some period of community supervision after release from prison; and (2) extend the length of that supervision. "Split" sentences are now a common practice of the courts.
Special parole, established in 1998, is a sentencing option available to the court that allows for a period of mandatory parole supervision added to a prison sentence greater than two years. The court may impose a fixed period of special parole of between one and 10 years for most felony offenses, provided the total amount of the sentence and special parole do not exceed the maximum statutory sentence for the crime. Offenders convicted of certain sexual assault and persistent offender crimes are eligible for a prison term along with a period of special parole that can equal a life sentence under supervision. The parole board, not the court, sets the conditions of release. Parolees who violate special parole are subject to serving a prison term equal to the unexpired period of special parole. (Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of special parole.)
The General Assembly recognized the distinction between probation and parole supervision and intended to provide the court with an alternative to the traditional "split" sentence by enacting special parole. The court, however, has generally continued its practice of imposing "split" sentences, which overburdens adult probation and under-utilizes parole.
The program review committee recommends a "split" sentence of a period of incarceration followed by probation may only be imposed when the aggregate, non-suspended7 prison term is one year or less. A period of special parole may be imposed when the aggregate, non-suspended prison term is greater than one year.
When imposing a sentence of special parole, the courts shall set the conditions of release. The court may order the offender:
The Board of Parole shall monitor and enforce compliance with the court-ordered conditions of special parole. The board shall have the authority to modify, delete, or add, without a court hearing, any other stipulation necessary to comply with the court's order or the supervision of the offender.
The judicial branch's adult probation estimates approximately 8,000 (14 percent) of the 58,000 offenders on probation are serving a "split" sentence, which requires them to serve some time in prison. Realistically, this population should be under parole supervision.
Reducing the adult probation caseload will assist the judicial branch in the implementation of a new risk assessment and supervision policy that assigns offenders to different levels of supervision, which is currently being piloted in New London. The new policies and procedures are intended to increase supervision, accurately assess treatment and programming needs, and reduce the incidences of probation violations and recidivism.
This recommendation will incrementally shift offenders from probation to the parole board's caseload,8 which will require an increase in staffing and resources. However, there are benefits. Parole supervision is more responsive, intensive, and structured than probation and can better meet the needs of the serious offender who has served a prison term. The parole board also has the authority to return a parolee to prison without a court order; a parole revocation hearing is an administrative process.
Technical amendments to special parole statute. The existing law establishing special parole does not specifically provide for or clarify the necessary authority for the Board of Parole to fully implement the program. It is, therefore, recommended the special parole law be amended as follows. The parole board:
Parole reassessment hearing. The program review committee found one of the key causes of prison overcrowding is inmates are serving a greater portion of their sentence incarcerated prior to being released on parole. This is occurring for three reasons. First, "truth in sentencing" laws, enacted during the 1990s, established time-served standards for parole eligibility. As discussed previously, the majority of inmates are required to serve at least 50 percent of their sentence prior to being eligible for parole and serious, violent offenders must serve at least 85 percent. Second, "good time" was statutorily reduced and then eliminated. Third, over the past several years, the discretionary release decisions of the parole board have become more conservative. The board has required inmates to serve significantly more time than is mandated by state law.
As shown in Table VII-2, prior to the "truth in sentencing laws" (1992-1995), two-thirds (66 percent) of the eligible inmates were released on parole after serving the mandatory portion of their sentence -- 50 percent. Almost all of the remaining inmates (32 percent), were paroled after serving between 60 or 75 percent of their sentences. After the sentencing reforms, the amount of time served prior to parole release increased. The percentage of inmates paroled at first-eligibility dropped from 66 percent to 55 percent. As shown in the table, 10 percent serve at least 85 percent or "max out", meaning they are not paroled at all and serve the full 100 percent of their sentence, as compared to about 2 percent prior to the sentencing reforms.
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Table VII-2. Percentage of Time Served Prior to Parole by Inmates Eligible at 50 Percent |
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|
Pre-Sentence Reform (1993-1995) |
Post-Sentence Reform (1996-2000) |
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|
Time Served |
Number |
Percent |
Number |
Percent |
|
50% |
1,326 |
66% |
3,455 |
55% |
|
Up to 60% |
435 |
22% |
1,237 |
20% |
|
Up to 75% |
189 |
10% |
940 |
15% |
|
Up to 85% |
24 |
1% |
460 |
7% |
|
Up to 100% |
26 |
1% |
174 |
3% |
|
TOTALS |
2,000 |
100% |
6,266 |
100% |
|
Source of Data: Board of Parole |
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The law establishing the 85 percent time-served standard for serious, violent offenders was enacted in 1995. Many of the offenders required to meet this standard have not yet done so because they typically receive the longest prison terms. Therefore, an analysis was conducted on a sample of inmates who were: (1) required to serve 85 percent of their sentence prior to parole because of the crime for which they were convicted; and (2) released or discharged from their sentence during 1999. There were 105 inmates in the sample.
Only 41 inmates (39 percent) in the sample were actually paroled. The board required those inmates to serve significantly more than the mandated 85 percent of their sentence prior to release -- an average of 92 percent of the sentence.
Half of those inmates in the sample (52 inmates) served their full term in prison -- or "maxed out" -- and returned to their communities with no supervision9. Twelve of the inmates (8 percent) were released by the Department of Correction rather than the parole board under a re-entry furlough, which releases the inmate from prison early to prepare for his or her eventual discharge (i.e., secure a residence or apply for a job).
When the period of parole supervision is reduced by delaying release or eliminated by denying release, Connecticut loses the ability to supervise and provide services to inmates when they have the highest risk of recidivism and are most in need of services -- during their transition from prison back to their community. This is especially true of offenders with long prison terms and/or who committed serious or violent crimes. The parole board's practice of reducing the available period of parole supervision has significant consequences for its ability to minimize the potential risks to public safety posed by an inmate's return to the community and the offender's chances of re-offending.
An option might be establishing a mandatory period of parole supervision -- called "presumptive parole" -- for those inmates who had not been discretionarily paroled by the board, but had served a specific percentage of their court-imposed sentence (i.e., 75 percent). Inmates with serious prison disciplinary records would be ineligible for presumptive parole release. However, the committee believes a mandatory release law would be inconsistent with the intent of the "truth in sentencing" policies established over the past five years.
Therefore, the program review committee recommends the Board of Parole retain all discretionary release authority granted under state law. The board, however, shall be required to reassess the suitability for parole release of those inmates who have not otherwise been paroled by the board after serving 50 percent of their court-imposed sentence. A panel of the board shall reassess inmates upon serving 75 percent of their sentence for release to parole based on the following standards:
· there is reasonable probability the inmate will live and remain at liberty without violating the law; and
· the inmate's release to community supervision and transition substantially outweighs any period of continued confinement.
The board shall also apply the recommended standards when determining suitability for parole release of those inmates required to serve 85 percent of their court-imposed sentence.
After reassessment, if the board determines continued confinement is necessary, it shall articulate for the record the specific reasons why the inmate and the public would not benefit from a period of community supervision.
Figure VII-1 diagrams the objectives of a criminal sentence.10 The total sentence is punishment of the offender. The state's interest in punishment, however, shifts at some point from retribution to risk management because almost all criminals return to the community. As this study has pointed out, most return after serving less than three years in prison.
The period of retribution, which is currently defined in state law as at least the first 50 or 85 percent of the prison term, is a reactive sanction. Through incarceration, the state incapacitates an offender and achieves some deterrence against crime, rehabilitation of the offender, and a period of public and victim safety. Incarceration also plays an important symbolic role in the state's efforts to reduce crime.
At some point in the sentence, however, the state's interest must shift toward a more proactive sanction. This portion of a sentence acknowledges public safety and a reduction in crime is best achieved by managing the risks posed by an offender in the community. Risk management is typically achieved through parole or probation supervision. The outcomes of community supervision are public safety, victim restitution, offender accountability, rehabilitation, and reduced recidivism.
Given the current conservative nature of the parole board, the committee acknowledges by establishing a parole reassessment mandate the board may be even less apt to grant discretionary parole release at or near an inmate's eligibility -- upon serving either 50 or 85 percent of the sentence. Limiting the board's discretionary parole release authority or establishing a high standard for release, however, is not the intended purpose of the recommendation as it would continue to shorten the available period of parole supervision for inmates returning to their communities and absolve the board of its primary mandate. The board will retain and should continue to use its discretionary release authority for those inmates suitable for parole prior to serving 75 percent of their court-imposed sentence.
Administrative
reviews. Under existing state law, the parole board may conduct either a
panel hearing or administrative review without a hearing. The panel hearing is a
traditional hearing conducted by three members of the parole board. In 1993, the
board was given the authority to determine an inmate's suitability for parole
release through an administrative hearing process, which is completed by a
parole officer. A panel of at least two parole board members must approve any
release recommendations made through the administrative review process.
The administrative review process was initially limited by the board to inmates serving a sentence of four years or less, but was legislatively expanded to include any inmate within three years of discharge from their sentence. Given that many inmates are serving longer portions of their sentences prior to parole release, the potential pool of inmates eligible for an administrative review rather than a panel hearing has increased. The administrative review process is an efficient and effective mechanism for determining an inmate's suitability for release on parole.
The program review staff developed information that favored allowing the parole board to assess all inmates eligible for release after serving 50 percent of their sentence through the administrative hearing process, unless a panel hearing is deemed necessary by the chairman of the parole board. However, the committee believes such action was not warranted at this time.
Board of Parole. Parole was legislatively re-established after being eliminated as a result of the shift to determinate sentencing. The Board of Parole became a separate state agency in 1993, consolidating its discretionary release and supervision authorities. It has added statutory responsibilities for administrative hearings, structured decision-making, special parole, and extended supervision parole.
The board has assumed new roles in the criminal justice system, including policymaking, management of a growing organization, participation in criminal justice systemwide policy groups, and liaison to victims and the public. In addition, recommendations presented in this section have proposed further expansion of the parole board's authority, responsibilities, and caseload.
The mandate of the Board of Parole and its role as a key component of the state criminal justice system require a move toward a full-time, qualified board and away from the traditional part-time, lay board. There should be an organizational structure in place to perform the administrative functions of the board, including conducting administrative reviews and providing parole supervision.
It is, therefore, recommended the 15-member, part-time parole board as established in current state law be abolished and replaced with a three-member, full-time board consisting of a chairman and two board members. The terms of the three members shall be four-years, coterminous with the governor.
The chairman shall be qualified by education, experience, and training in the administration of community corrections, probation, or parole. One board member shall be qualified by education, experience, and training in the administration of substance abuse or mental health treatment services and one board member shall be qualified by education, experience, and training in the law.
The chairman of the Board of Parole shall be the chief executive of the agency and have the authority and responsibility for:
The chairman and two parole board members shall convene and conduct all panel, revocation, and rescission hearings and approve parole releases recommended by the administrative review process.
The board shall create three new administrative positions: executive director for parole, an assistant director for hearings division, and an assistant director for parole supervision. The executive director shall be appointed by the chairman. The executive director shall oversee the administration of the agency and, at the discretion of the chairman:
The chairman and executive director shall be further required to develop policies and procedures for:
There is a national trend toward smaller, full-time, professional parole boards. Currently, 30 states have full-time boards, and only 18 have part-time boards11. Many states (29) statutorily require certain qualifications for appointment to the parole board.
Revocation center. As previously discussed, there is a high rate of offenders returned to prison because they have "failed" probation or parole supervision. Currently, these offenders are housed in the general prison population, which creates administrative and management difficulties for all agencies involved. Criminal justice administrators agree there is a need for a facility to incarcerate offenders who have violated the conditions of their community release.
The program review committee recommends the Department of Correction conduct a feasibility study on establishing a revocation center for parole and probation violators that includes an assessment of converting an existing DOC dormitory prison into such a facility. The department shall consult with the parole board and judicial branch's adult probation to develop a proposal for the institutional program and admission and release procedures for revocation center. The study shall be submitted to the General Assembly by January 1, 2002.
Siting difficulties. Siting controversial facilities or programs, such as a prison or a community-based residential program, is difficult. Almost all criminal justice agencies, however, implement their policies and programs through community-based residential and non-residential programs established to serve and supervise the accused and sentenced offender population. In most cases, private non-profit agencies are responsible for siting and establishing community residences that are subject to local zoning control. The state's role in the siting process for community-based programs, unlike public facilities such as prisons, is primarily funding, licensing, and monitoring their development and operation.
Ideally, siting processes for controversial programs should balance two goals: efficiency and equity. In Connecticut, most siting decisions are left to the control of local authorities. There is no formal, comprehensive state policy regarding siting of controversial facilities or programs nor any single state agency responsible for overseeing locational decisions about state owned, regulated, or funded public facilities and programs.
The siting of programs and services necessary for achieving generally accepted public purposes often generates controversy and opposition from towns proposed as the "host" locations. Despite their social benefits, controversial facilities are unwanted because of real or perceived negative side effects on the host community, such as safety risks, diminished property values and other economic harm, or adverse social impact. In addition, a town may fear that by accepting one unwanted program, it will be targeted for more controversial services.
The Department of Correction has become more successful at gaining legal and public acceptance of a new or expanded facility. In part, this is because of its ability to offer incentives to a host community such as tax reimbursements, funds for municipal police or fire services, and payments for water and sewage treatment services. Community correction agencies and, in particular, the nonprofit service providers generally do not have the resources to offer such incentives.
"It is clear the state must intervene and, if necessary, override local control of land use to get publicly needed programs established. It is also evident local resistance frequently results from a lack of trust in government to act fairly or to adequately protect the public from possible health, safety, or economic harm. In the absence of a workable equity-based model, the legislature must concentrate on identifying ways to promote fairness in siting decision by state government"12
The program review committee recommends the following options:
Substance abuse policy. Traditionally, federal and state governments have relied heavily on the criminal justice system for the solution to the drug problem -- evidenced by the nation's 20-year "war on drugs." Although penalties and sanctions are important components of Connecticut's drug policies, the criminal justice system alone cannot solve the problem. State policy, to a lesser extent, has embraced substance abuse treatment and has marginally dealt with prevention and education.
During 1995, the legislative and executive branches conducted extensive research on the state's efforts to address substance abuse. The Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee, the Law Revision Commission, and the Governor's Blue Ribbon Task Force on Substance Abuse all concluded the state's current policy, which emphasized a criminal justice response, did not sufficiently focus on a comprehensive public health approach that included treatment, prevention, and education in addition to criminal sanctions.
To advance the recommended public health policy, the Connecticut Alcohol and Drug Policy Council was statutorily created. The council is responsible for conducting and interpreting research and data analysis and reviewing the policies and practices of state agencies and contracted service providers as they relate to the overall state substance abuse policy.
The council has failed to address substantive policy issues regarding the state's criminal justice response to substance abuse. There has been virtually no change in the rate of drug arrests or convictions or the sentences imposed for those crimes. The program review committee finds CADPC has not fulfilled its statutory mandate in this area.
It is therefore recommended the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, in cooperation with the Connecticut Alcohol and Drug Policy Council, evaluate the need for substance abuse and mental health services among the pre-trial and sentenced, incarcerated and community-supervised offender population and develop a plan to fund and provide such treatment and services both the correctional facilities and the community. The plan shall be submitted to the General Assembly January 1, 2002.
1 The DOC database tracks only the primary offense for which an offender is sentenced. If the crime resulting in a sentence of probation is vacated and the offender is admitted to prison under a new sentence, that crime becomes the primary offense.
2 Existing state law allows the court to reduce or suspend a mandatory minimum only if the offender is under 18 or has impaired mental capacity.
3 Routinely, the increased sanctions required by the mandatory minimum and persistent offender laws are used by prosecutors during the plea bargaining process. Amending the criminal charges to an offense with a lesser penalty is used as an incentive to induce an offender to plead guilty rather than go to trial.
4 For example, Connecticut General Statute §29-37.
5 Before imposing a sentence, the court holds a sentencing hearing to: allow the parties to present evidence relevant to the disposition of the case; explain or controvert information used by the court in sentencing; provide the victim a reasonable opportunity to make a statement regarding the sentence; allow the defendant to make a personal statement; and inform the court of any plea agreement.
6 Refer to Alternative Sanctions: A Three-Year Strategic Plan, (Fiscal Years 1994-1997), Connecticut Judicial Branch
7 An offender can be convicted of more than one crime and receive more than one sentence. The aggregate sentence is the total cumulative term to be served in prison; the suspended portions of the sentences are not calculated.
8 Offenders currently serving a "split" sentence will not be affected nor have their custody transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole.
9 Some of the inmates who were not paroled and served their full sentence in prison may have a "split" sentence with a period of probation following discharge from DOC, but the parole board data did not include that sentence information.
10 The figure diagrams a sentence involving parole and special parole, however, it can be applied to a traditional "split" sentence that includes a period of probation after a period of incarceration.
11 Four of the part-time boards, including Connecticut, have a full-time chairman.
12 Siting Controversial Land Uses, Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee (January 1992)