CHAPTER 900*
COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

      Sec. 52-185. Bond or recognizance for prosecution. (a) If the plaintiff in any civil action is not an inhabitant of this state, or if it does not appear to the authority signing the process that the plaintiff is able to pay the costs of the action should judgment be rendered against him, the plaintiff shall enter into a recognizance to the adverse party with a financially responsible inhabitant of this state as surety, or a financially responsible inhabitant of this state shall enter into a recognizance to the adverse party, that the plaintiff shall prosecute his action to effect and answer all costs for which judgment is rendered against him. The recognizance shall not be discharged by any amendment or alteration of the process between the time of signing and of serving it.

      (b) The recognizance may be taken in the following form:

      You, C.S., as principal, and E.C., as surety, acknowledge yourselves jointly and severally bound to J.L., in a recognizance (or, as the case may be, You, E.C., acknowledge yourself bound to J.L., in a recognizance) of .... dollars, that C.S. shall prosecute the action which he has now commenced against J.L. at the Superior court to be held at H. in and for the judicial district of H., on the .... Tuesday of ...., 20.. to full effect, and that he shall pay any costs for which judgment may be rendered against him thereon.

      Taken and acknowledged at H. on the .... day of ...., 20.., before me, J.W., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

      (c) If a bond or recognizance is required on any writ of summons or attachment, it may be noted in the writ in the following manner:

      E.C. of .... is recognized in $.... to prosecute, etc. (or words to that effect).

      (d) If there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of this section, or if the authority signing a writ has failed to certify in accordance with any statute or rule that he has personal knowledge as to the financial responsibility of the plaintiff and deems it sufficient, the validity of the writ and service shall not be affected unless the failure is made a ground of a plea in abatement. If such plea in abatement is filed and sustained or if the plaintiff voluntarily elects to cure the defect by filing a bond, the court shall direct the plaintiff to file a bond to prosecute in the usual amount. Upon the filing of the bond, the case shall proceed in the same manner and to the same effect as to rights of attachment and in all other respects as though the failure had not occurred. The court may, in its discretion, order, as a condition to the acceptance of the bond, that the plaintiff pay to the defendant costs not to exceed the costs in full to the date of the order.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7931; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 43; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 86; P.A. 05-152, S. 6.)

      History: 1961 act deleted obsolete provision for actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 78-280 substituted "judicial district" for "county" where appearing; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; (Revisor's note: In 2001 the references in Subsec. (b) of this section to the date "19.." were changed editorially by the Revisors to "20.." to reflect the new millennium); P.A. 05-152 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision requiring plaintiff to enter into recognizance before the process is signed.

      The person serving the writ may give bond. 1 R. 356. Liability of bondsman continues until final termination of the litigation. 7 C. 435. Death of plaintiff discharges bond. 9 C. 238. Liability of surety on bond. 14 C. 329; 30 C. 143, 144. The want of a bond is only matter of abatement. 16 C. 574. Bond may be written out in full after suit is brought upon it. 48 C. 381. Is in itself a complete record, imports verity and is conclusive evidence of its own truth. Id., 380; 28 C. 534. If nonresident plaintiff fails to give bond, the defect cannot be made good by bond afterward given in court. 51 C. 327. Ordinary bond for costs not required where replevin bond is given. 54 C. 48. Bond for costs not essential on application for an alternative writ of mandamus. 67 C. 365, 366. Failure to give bond waived by appearance. Id. Bond of surety company may be accepted. 70 C. 558. The bondsman's undertaking is that of surety, although the plaintiff is not formally joined as principal. Id., 559, 560. Bond of $140 to answer all damages, etc., held sufficient. 73 C. 541. Memorandum de bond at foot of injunction writ, held a compliance with the statute. Id. Mistake in memo. 74 C. 170. Of practice in general; applies to writ of error. 75 C. 652. Effect of noting bond under this section. Id. Taking is ministerial act. 77 C. 184. Discretion of court as to amount. 82 C. 1. Statute applies to mandamus, when. 90 C. 639; 91 C. 114. Temporary residence in another state does not make one a nonresident. 92 C. 345. Statute applies only to process in actions in which costs are taxable; not to habeas corpus. 113 C. 739. Cited. Id., 772. Cited. 166 C. 174. Cited. 173 C. 408. Cited. 191 C. 201.

      History and review of section. 3 CS 434. Recognizance or certificate of financial responsibility is a condition precedent to the validity of the writ. 4 CS 279. Cited. 6 CS 156. Applicability in divorce actions. 7 CS 88. Cited. 8 CS 398. Meaning of "substantial" discussed. 13 CS 13. Cited. Id., 441. Court cannot waive bond even in the case of an indigent plaintiff. 36 CS 37.

      Where addresses of two of three plaintiffs were lacking, but subscribing authority certified as to plaintiff's financial responsibility, plea in abatement by defendant upon grounds the two plaintiffs might be nonresidents was overruled. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 235.

      Sec. 52-186. Court may order bond. (a) The court, upon motion of the defendant or on its own motion, may order a sufficient bond to be given by the plaintiff before trial, unless the trial will thereby necessarily be delayed. In determining the sufficiency of the bond to be given, the court shall consider only the taxable costs which the plaintiff may be responsible for under section 52-257, except that in no event shall the court consider the fees or charges of expert witnesses notwithstanding that such fees or charges may be allowable under said section.

      (b) Any party failing to comply with an order of the court to give a sufficient bond may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.

      (c) Bonds for the prosecution of any civil action, pending in any court, may be taken when the court is not in session by its clerk.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7932; P.A. 82-160, S. 87; P.A. 91-158; P.A. 10-43, S. 16.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 91-158 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision limiting the costs which the court may consider in determining the sufficiency of the bond; P.A. 10-43 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision re court shall order sufficient bond be given if it finds that any bond taken for prosecution in pending action or on appeal is insufficient or that plaintiff has not given bond for prosecution and is not able to pay costs with provision re court may order sufficient bond be given by plaintiff upon motion of defendant or on its own motion and amended Subsec. (c) to delete reference to appeal bonds.

      Amount of bond is in court's discretion. 82 C. 1. Clerk may take bond for appeal, where that has been general practice of court. 84 C. 461. Cited. 113 C. 772. Cited. 131 C. 658. Bond furnished no security to one of the adverse parties, held case is not one of a bond which is merely "insufficient". 147 C. 722.

      Burden of proof is on party moving for such bond. 13 CS 13. Court cannot waive bond even in the case of an indigent person. 36 CS 37. Cited. Id., 37.

      Sec. 52-187. Member of community defending to give bond. If, in any action against a community, any individual member of the community appears to defend, he shall procure bond with surety to the acceptance of the court in which the action is pending to save the community harmless from all costs which may arise by reason of the appearance. The bond shall be payable to the community and be filed in the court. If the individual member successfully defends against the action, he shall be entitled to the costs recoverable from the plaintiff unless the community also appeared and incurred the costs of the defense.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7934; P.A. 82-160, S. 88.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Any inhabitant of a town can appear to defend in an action against it. 19 C. 331; 81 C. 235. Bond not required when a party aggrieved remonstrates against acceptance of report of committee on highway petition. 27 C. 424. Property of an inhabitant of a town may be taken on execution against it. 121 U.S. 121.

      Sec. 52-188. Court may order bond by nonresident defendant in realty action. Any nonresident defendant in any civil action relating to real property or any interest therein, if any relief other than money damages is claimed, may be ordered by the court, during the pendency of the action, to give such bond to such other party or parties to the action as the court may direct, conditioned for the payment of costs. Judgment as on default may be rendered against any defendant who fails to comply with such order.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7995; P.A. 82-160, S. 89.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Sec. 52-189. Surety company bond acceptable. Any surety company chartered by this state or authorized to do business herein may be accepted as surety or recognizor upon any bond or recognizance required by law in any civil action or in any proceeding instituted under the statutes of this state. In any action where a bond or recognizance is by law required, the bond of the company, duly executed and conditioned for the performance of the obligations expressed in the bond or recognizance, may be accepted by the person having authority thereto, and shall be filed by him in the court to which the action or proceeding is returnable or pending.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7935; P.A. 82-160, S. 90.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      It seems that bonds of surety companies for costs were lawful before this statute. 70 C. 558. Rule of construction favoring surety does not extend to surety company. 78 C. 702; 109 C. 266.

      Sec. 52-190. Action on probate bond. Endorsement of writ. (a) The writ in any action brought upon a probate bond, or bond taken to a judge of probate and his successors in office, shall be abatable unless, before its issue, a financially responsible inhabitant of the state signs a written endorsement upon it, substantially as follows: "I agree to be responsible for the costs of this action." The endorser shall be liable for the costs of the action in case of judgment for the defendant, and the judgment shall be rendered against the endorser and not against the plaintiff.

      (b) If the endorser dies or removes from this state, a new endorser on the writ shall be substituted. The court before which the action is pending may at any time order the substitution of a new endorser, to be approved by it, who shall endorse the writ and be liable for the costs from the commencement of the action in the same manner as the original endorser. For any failure to comply with such an order the plaintiff may be nonsuited.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7933; P.A. 82-160, S. 91.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      See Sec. 45a-144 re action on probate bond by aggrieved person.

      See Sec. 52-74 re action on foreign probate bond.

      See Sec. 52-117 re pleading in action on probate bond.

      Cited. 63 C. 569.

      Sec. 52-190a. Prior reasonable inquiry and certificate of good faith required in negligence action against a health care provider. Ninety-day extension of statute of limitations. (a) No civil action or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint, initial pleading or apportionment complaint shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action or apportionment complaint that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant or for an apportionment complaint against each named apportionment defendant. To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's attorney, and any apportionment complainant or the apportionment complainant's attorney, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c, which similar health care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. Such written opinion shall not be subject to discovery by any party except for questioning the validity of the certificate. The claimant or the claimant's attorney, and any apportionment complainant or apportionment complainant's attorney, shall retain the original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate. The similar health care provider who provides such written opinion shall not, without a showing of malice, be personally liable for any damages to the defendant health care provider by reason of having provided such written opinion. In addition to such written opinion, the court may consider other factors with regard to the existence of good faith. If the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that such certificate was not made in good faith and that no justiciable issue was presented against a health care provider that fully cooperated in providing informal discovery, the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may also submit the matter to the appropriate authority for disciplinary review of the attorney if the claimant's attorney or the apportionment complainant's attorney submitted the certificate.

      (b) Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the civil action will be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable inquiry required by subsection (a) of this section. This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods.

      (c) The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 12; P.A. 87-227, S. 9; P.A. 03-202, S. 14; P.A. 05-275, S. 2; P.A. 07-65, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 87-227 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision that "No action, accruing on or after October 1, 1986, shall be filed to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death" with "No civil action shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987"; P.A. 03-202 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision re form prescribed by rules of the superior court and making technical changes; P.A. 05-275 amended Subsec. (a) to make provisions applicable to an apportionment complaint and the filing thereof, require the opinion of the similar health care provider to be signed and include a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion, require the claimant or the claimant's attorney and any apportionment complainant or apportionment complainant's attorney to retain the original written opinion and attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate and provide that such similar health care provider shall not, without a showing of malice, be personally liable by reason of having provided such written opinion and added new Subsec. (c) to provide that the failure to obtain and file the written opinion shall be grounds for dismissal of the action, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions filed on or after that date; P.A. 07-65 amended Subsec. (b) to substitute "civil action" for "action" and add "to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death" re extension of statute of limitations.

      P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Good faith certificate is not jurisdictional. 215 C. 701. Cited. 236 C. 681. Cited. 242 C. 1. In workers compensation case where city sought to intervene in employee's negligence action against physician, the city as a would-be intervenor was not required to file a good faith certificate where employee had filed such a certificate and the city asserted no additional claims. 253 C. 429. Applies only to civil actions to recover damages and does not apply to apportionment complaints under Sec. 52-102b which seek only apportionment of liability. 269 C. 10. Section does not require plaintiffs to attach an opinion from a similar health care provider addressing causation. 292 C. 350.

      Cited. 26 CA 497. Cited. 33 CA 378. Cited. 37 CA 105. Fall by person dependent on a wheelchair while transferring from wheelchair to an exercise mat at physical therapy facility during scheduled session, where transfers were a stated goal of therapy, is medical malpractice. 61 CA 353. If a complaint is found to sound of medical malpractice, even if plaintiff claims the complaint sounds of ordinary tort and breach of contract, then failure by plaintiff to include a good faith certificate and an opinion of a similar health care provider shall constitute grounds for dismissal. 113 CA 569.

      Cited. 41 CS 169.

      Subsec. (a):

      Section establishes objective criteria, not subject to the exercise of discretion, making prelitigation requirements more definitive and uniform than requirements to testify at trial and arguably sets the bar higher to get into court than to prevail at trial; as to defendant health care provider who is a physician, the similar health care provider contemplated here is one defined in either Sec. 52-184c(b) or (c). 117 CA 535. Good faith opinion submitted sufficiently addressed allegations of negligence by indicating evidence of a breach of the standard of care, was not required to address causation, and, therefore, was sufficiently detailed for purposes of this Subsec. 119 CA 808. Because defendant is a board certified specialist, a similar health care provider must be one trained and experienced in same specialty as defendant and certified by appropriate American board in same specialty. 122 CA 597.

      Detailed basis for written opinion must enable defendant to ascertain basis of claim. 50 CS 385.

      Subsec. (b):

      Ninety-day extension provided in Subsec. applies equally to both the two-year statute of limitation and three-year statute of repose in Sec. 52-584. 269 C. 787.

      Cited. 43 CA 397. The term "filed", for purposes of effective date of a public act, refers to the bringing of a complaint or other pleading to the clerk of the court, not a state marshal for service. 106 CA 810.

      Subsec. (c):

      Failure to comply with this Subsec. renders complaint subject to motion to dismiss and not motion to strike. 106 CA 810. Action subject to dismissal not only for lack of opinion letter but also if opinion letter is not from similar health care provider or does not give detailed basis for the opinion. 117 CA 535.

      Failure to provide written opinion required by Subsec. (a) does not result in automatic dismissal under Subsec. (c), but rather dismissal is discretionary and based upon facts. 50 CS 385.

      Sec. 52-190b. Designation of negligence action against health care provider as complex litigation case. Not later than six months after the filing of an action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, the court shall schedule a conference of the parties at which the court shall determine whether to recommend to the Chief Court Administrator, or the Chief Court Administrator's designee, that the action be designated as a complex litigation case and be transferred to the complex litigation docket. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any party or a judge from, at any time, requesting the Chief Court Administrator, or the Chief Court Administrator's designee, to designate such action as a complex litigation case and transfer such action to the complex litigation docket.

      (P.A. 05-275, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 05-275 effective July 13, 2005.

      Sec. 52-190c. Mandatory mediation for negligence action against health care provider. Stipulation by mediator and parties. Rules. (a) There shall be mandatory mediation for all civil actions brought to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider. Each such civil action for which a valid certificate has been filed pursuant to section 52-190a shall be referred to mandatory mediation pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, unless the civil action is referred to another alternative dispute resolution program agreed to by the parties. Mandatory mediation under this section shall be conducted for the purpose of achieving a prompt settlement or resolution of the civil action. For the purposes of this section, "health care provider" means a provider, as defined in subsection (b) of section 20-7b, an institution, as defined in section 19a-490, or any other health care provider described in subsection (a) of section 52-184b.

      (b) Prior to the close of pleadings in such civil action, the presiding judge of the civil session of the court of the judicial district in which the action is pending shall refer the action to mandatory mediation or any other alternative dispute resolution program agreed to by the parties. The duration of the referral shall not exceed one hundred twenty days unless the court, for good cause shown, extends the duration of the referral. The court shall stay the time periods within which all further pleadings, motions, requests, discovery and other procedures must be filed or undertaken, including, but not limited to, filings under section 52-192a, except with respect to any apportionment complaint under section 52-102b.

      (c) Mediation under this section shall begin as soon as practicable, but not later than twenty business days after the date the action is referred under subsection (b) of this section. The first mediation session shall be conducted by the presiding judge or, at the discretion of the presiding judge, a different judge of the Superior Court or a senior judge or judge trial referee. At the first mediation session, the judge, senior judge or judge trial referee conducting the mediation session shall determine whether the action can be resolved at such mediation session, or, if the action cannot be resolved at that mediation session, whether the parties agree to participate in further mediation. If the action is not resolved at the first mediation session and the parties do not agree to further mediation, mandatory mediation under this section shall end. If the action is not resolved at the first mediation session and the parties agree to further mediation, the presiding judge of such civil session shall refer the action for mediation before an attorney who has experience as an attorney related to such civil actions and who has been a member of the bar of the state of Connecticut for at least five years. Upon such referral, mediation shall begin as soon as practicable, but not later than twenty business days after the referral. Fifty per cent of the cost of such mediation shall be paid by the plaintiffs, and fifty per cent of the cost of such mediation shall be apportioned among all defendants who are parties to the mediation.

      (d) Each party to such action, and a representative of each insurer that may be liable to pay a claim on behalf of a defendant pursuant to such action, shall appear in person at each mediation session, unless participation by telephone or electronic means is permitted by the judge, senior judge, judge trial referee or mediator.

      (e) If such mediation does not settle or conclude the civil action, and if all parties in attendance at such mediation agree, the mediator and all such parties may file a stipulation with the court setting forth any matter or conclusion that the parties and the mediator believe may be useful or relevant to narrow the issues, expedite discovery or assist the parties in preparing the civil action for trial.

      (f) The judges of the Superior Court may adopt such rules as they deem necessary for the conduct of mediation pursuant to this section. Such rules shall be adopted in accordance with section 51-14.

      (P.A. 10-122, S. 5.)

      History: P.A. 10-122 effective July 1, 2010.

      Sec. 52-191. Precedence of actions in favor of the state. All civil actions brought by or on behalf of the state, including informations on the relation of a private individual, shall have precedence over all other civil actions in respect to the order of trial, except actions upon probate bonds.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7945; P.A. 82-160, S. 92.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Sec. 52-191a. Precedence of certain actions involving zoning ordinances and regulations. Any civil action wherein one of the issues is the interpretation of a zoning ordinance or regulation that is the basis of a pending criminal prosecution under section 8-12 shall be privileged in assignment for trial.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 109, S. 2.)

      Sec. 52-191b. Precedence of proceedings involving planning commissions. Any legal proceeding to which any municipal planning commission is a party shall be considered a privileged matter with respect to the order of trial.

      (1971, P.A. 274.)

      Sec. 52-191c. Precedence of actions involving terminally ill persons. (a) Any civil action to which a terminally ill person is a party shall be privileged in assignment for trial. For the purpose of this section, "terminally ill" means in the final stage of an incurable or irreversible medical condition which will result in death within a relatively short time, in the opinion of the attending physician.

      (b) The judges of the Superior Court may, in accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, adopt rules for the precedence of actions pursuant to this section.

      (P.A. 98-54.)

      Sec. 52-192. Precedence of other cases in order of trial. Any objections made to the acceptance of the report of a committee or auditor, or award of an arbitrator, shall be heard and determined promptly and without delay after return of the report or award, unless a continuance is granted for cause. Appeals from probate and from the actions of commissioners appointed by courts of probate, actions brought by or against executors or administrators of estates, actions brought by or against conservators of the estates of incapable persons, actions brought by or against guardians of the estates of minors, actions brought by receivers of insolvent corporations by order of the court by which such receivers were appointed, actions brought by or against any person sixty-five years of age or older or who reaches the age of sixty-five during the pendency of the action, actions in which a party has been ordered to post security with the Department of Motor Vehicles or has posted security with the Department of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to the requirements of section 14-117, appeals from any action of the Commissioner of Environmental Protection in accordance with section 25-17, appeals under the provisions of section 14-57, partitions and foreclosure cases, including cases in which a bond has been substituted for a mechanic's lien, shall have precedence over all other civil actions in respect to the order of trial, except as provided in section 52-191.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7946; 1957, P.A. 78, S. 1; March, 1958, P.A. 14, S. 2; 1959, P.A. 102; 1961, P.A. 329; 509, S. 1; 1963, P.A. 162; 1967, P.A. 819; 1971, P.A. 872, S. 156; P.A. 82-160, S. 93; P.A. 92-118, S. 8.)

      History: 1959 act added partitions and foreclosures; 1961 acts added appeals under section 14-57; 1963 act added cases where bond has been substituted for mechanic's lien; 1967 act added actions where party has been ordered to or has posted security with motor vehicle department; 1971 act replaced water resources commission with commissioner of environmental protection; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 92-118 added provision re precedence in order of trial for actions brought by or against executors or administrators of estates, conservators of estates of incapable persons and guardians of the estates of minors; (Revisor's note: In 1997 references to "Motor Vehicle Department" were changed editorially by the Revisors to "Department of Motor Vehicles" for consistency with customary statutory usage).

      See Sec. 49-39 re privileged status of action to foreclose a mechanics' lien with respect to order of trial.

      Cited. 63 C. 307. Cited. 179 C. 415. Cited. 229 C. 634. Cited. 230 C. 828.

      Privilege given to "persons" over sixty-five years of age does not extend to corporate entities in existence over sixty-five years. Legislative intent construed. 22 CS 156.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 26 CA 322. Cited. 44 CA 154.

      Sec. 52-192a. Offer of compromise by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Amount and computation of interest. (a) After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain. For the purposes of this section, such plaintiff includes a counterclaim plaintiff under section 8-132. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of compromise to the defendant's attorney or, if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, to the defendant himself or herself. Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of the offer of compromise and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or the defendant's attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of the offer of compromise agreeing to settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise. Upon such filing and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly. If the offer of compromise is not accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled. Any such offer of compromise and any acceptance of the offer of compromise shall be included by the clerk in the record of the case.

      (b) In the case of any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, an offer of compromise pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall state with specificity all damages then known to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney upon which the action is based. At least sixty days prior to filing such an offer, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney shall provide the defendant or the defendant's attorney with an authorization to disclose medical records that meets the privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191) (HIPAA), as amended from time to time, or regulations adopted thereunder, and disclose any and all expert witnesses who will testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care. The plaintiff shall file with the court a certification that the plaintiff has provided each defendant or such defendant's attorney with all documentation supporting such damages.

      (c) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount, except in the case of a counterclaim plaintiff under section 8-132, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on the difference between the amount so recovered and the sum certain specified in the counterclaim plaintiff's offer of compromise. The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action or application under section 8-132 was filed with the court if the offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint or application. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint or application, the interest shall be computed from the date the offer of compromise was filed. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render judgment accordingly. This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.

      (P.A. 76-316, S. 2; P.A. 77-269, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-60; 79-250, S. 1; P.A. 81-315, S. 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 94; 82-228; P.A. 83-295, S. 9; P.A. 92-110, S. 1; P.A. 94-20; P.A. 01-71, S. 1; P.A. 05-275, S. 4; P.A. 07-141, S. 16.)

      History: P.A. 77-269 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that provisions apply to "all claims, except claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976" rather than to claims "accruing after October 1, 1976"; P.A. 79-60 raised annual interest on offer of judgment from 6% to 12% in Subsec. (b); P.A. 79-250 authorized court to award attorney's fees not exceeding $350 and specified that provisions do not abrogate contractual rights concerning recovery of attorney's fees in Subsec. (b); P.A. 81-315 amended provisions in Subsec. (b) concerning computation of interest on judgments in actions commenced on or after October 1, 1981; P.A. 82-160 made minor technical changes to Subsecs. (a) and (b) and deleted Subsec. (c) which had provided "This section shall apply to all claims, except claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976"; P.A. 82-228 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the provision allowing a plaintiff to file a new offer of judgment after rejection and to continue to file offers up until trial, and amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on the amount of the verdict rather than on the amount "contained in such offer" and by deleting a provision concerning what constituted the largest offer of judgment for purposes of computing interest; P.A. 83-295 amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on and added to the "amount so recovered" rather than the "verdict"; P.A. 92-110 amended Subsec. (a) to authorize a plaintiff to file an offer of judgment in any civil action "seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought" rather than in any civil action "for the recovery of money only"; P.A. 94-20 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to be accepted prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court; P.A. 01-71 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to be filed not later than 30 days before trial and increase from 30 to 60 days the time period for filing an acceptance of the offer of judgment and made technical changes throughout section for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 05-275 replaced "offer of judgment" and "offer of settlement" with "offer of compromise" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the offer of compromise may be filed no earlier than 180 days after service of process is made upon the defendant, delete provision that plaintiff is offering "to stipulate to a judgment", decrease from 60 days to 30 days the time period for the defendant to accept the offer, provide that when a defendant accepts an offer the defendant is agreeing "to settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain stated in the plaintiff's offer of compromise" rather than "agreeing to a stipulation for judgment as contained in plaintiff's offer of judgment" and replace "Upon such filing, the clerk shall enter judgment immediately on the stipulation" with "Upon such filing and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly", added new Subsec. (b) re requirements for the filing of an offer of compromise in an action to recover damages for an injury or death resulting from the negligence of a health care provider, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c) and amended said Subsec. to decrease the rate of annual interest from 12% to 8% and delete obsolete provision re computation of interest in actions commenced before October 1, 1981, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date; P.A. 07-141 amended Subsec. (a) to provide for purposes of section that a plaintiff includes a counterclaim plaintiff under Sec. 8-132, and amended Subsec. (c) re calculation of interest for a counterclaim plaintiff under Sec. 8-132 and added references to applications under Sec. 8-132, effective June 25, 2007, and applicable to applications filed on or after that date.

      In the context of the statute, reference to "verdict" incorporates a recovery awarded by the court. Prejudgment and postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity not expressly waived. 205 C. 542. Cited. 206 C. 100. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 648. Cited. 225 C. 146. Cited. 227 C. 914. Cited. 228 C. 206. Cited. 229 C. 525. Cited. 231 C. 745. Cited. 234 C. 169. Cited. 239 C. 144; Id., 708; Id., 769; Id., 802. Cited. 240 C. 49; Id., 287; Id., 799. Cited. 241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect on this section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314. Under 2005 revision, the legislative grant of authority to courts under this section to award offer of judgment interest after a trial reasonably cannot be construed to mean "after a settlement" even if the parties agree to treat settlement as a verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor for purposes of this section. 294 C. 719. The amendment to this section in 2007 evidences legislature's understanding that an amendment was necessary to bring condemnation appeals within the ambit of this section, and prior to 2007, legislature did not intend for this section to be applicable to condemnation appeals. Id., 803. Substitution of plaintiff under Sec. 52-109 did not render previously filed offers of judgment invalid and unenforceable, rather, the seemingly divergent principle of this section, which is punitive in nature, and Sec. 52-109, which is highly remedial, must be reconciled and leads to conclusion that substitution of plaintiff validated the offers of judgment such that interest began to accrue as of date of substitution. 297 C. 105.

      Cited. 3 CA 111; Id., 570. Cited. 8 CA 254. Cited. 13 CA 712. Cited. 21 CA 366; Id., 549. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court "will not permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff's offer of judgment merely because his contract obligations were made in another state." 22 CA 640. Cited. 25 CA 67. Cited. 26 CA 231; Id., 322. Cited. 30 CA 664. Cited. 31 CA 806. Cited. 32 CA 118. Cited. 33 CA 662; Id., 842. Cited. 35 CA 504. Cited. 36 CA 653. Cited. 38 CA 685. Cited. 42 CA 239; Id., 712. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 154. Cited. 45 CA 165; Id., 543. Cited. 46 CA 37. Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA 100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419. Claim that court improperly awarded plaintiff interest pursuant to offer of judgment statute could not be properly reviewed because defendant failed to file motion for articulation seeking an explanation from the court as to basis for finding that renewed offer of judgment was still valid. 96 CA 294. Court properly awarded offer of compromise interest on basis of defendants' having rejected plaintiff's offer. Defendants' offered no authority for proposition that inadequate performance of the party making an offer of compromise precludes the statutorily prescribed remedy. 102 CA 23. The court upheld award of judgment interest in accordance with the 1999 revision of section and rejected defendant's argument that defendant's conditional acceptance of plaintiff's offer of judgment is an exception permitted under the statute, since such conditional acceptance was a counteroffer and defendant's interpretation ignores the punitive aspect of section. 111 CA 287.

      Subsec. (a):

      Although the required attorney's signature on an offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney's law partner with attorney's permission, the document is in substantial compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596. Plaintiff is not required to state in an offer of judgment the period of time that defendant has to accept the offer. Including reference to the acceptance period in offer of judgment is a courtesy, done in order to save defendant from having to consult language of the statute. 103 CA 20.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 188 C. 213. Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1. Where trial court granted defendant's motion for remittitur due to limit of plaintiff's underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Sec. 38a-336, interest awarded pursuant to section is to be based on judgment amount, rather than verdict amount. 288 C. 38.

      Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney's fees. 47 CA 517. Calculation of interest under Subsec. discussed. 88 CA 459.

      Sec. 52-192b. Offers of judgment. Applicability. Sections 52-192a to 52-195, inclusive, of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2005, shall be applicable to any cause of action accruing prior to October 1, 2005.

      (P.A. 06-40, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 06-40 effective May 8, 2006.

      Sec. 52-193. Offer of compromise by defendant. In any action on contract, or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the defendant may, not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise signed by the defendant or the defendant's attorney, directed to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7942; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 175; P.A. 92-110, S. 2; P.A. 01-71, S. 2; P.A. 05-275, S. 5.)

      History: 1959 act deleted reference to actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 92-110 authorized the defendant to file an offer of judgment in any action "seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought" rather than in any action "for the recovery of money only"; P.A. 01-71 required an offer of judgment to be filed not later than 30 days before trial and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 05-275 authorized the filing of "a written offer of compromise" that would offer "to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain" rather than "a written notice" that would offer "to allow the plaintiff to take judgment for the sum named in such notice", effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      Not applicable to foreclosure suits. 27 C. 146. Statute construed. 33 C. 217. Cited. 163 C. 445. Cited. 192 C. 301. Cited. 239 C. 708.

      Cited. 17 CA 219.

      Cited. 10 CS 166.

      Sec. 52-194. Acceptance of defendant's offer of compromise. In any action, the plaintiff may, within sixty days after being notified by the defendant of the filing of an offer of compromise, file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of the offer signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney agreeing to settle the underlying action for the sum certain specified in the defendant's offer of compromise. Upon the filing of the written acceptance and receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk of the court and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly. No trial may be postponed because the period within which the plaintiff may accept the offer has not expired, except at the discretion of the court.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7943; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 95; P.A. 05-275, S. 6.)

      History: 1959 act deleted provisions for actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 05-275 increased from 10 days to 60 days the time period for acceptance of the offer, replaced "offer of judgment" with "offer of compromise", provided that by filing the acceptance the plaintiff was "agreeing to settle the underlying action for the sum certain specified in the defendant's offer of compromise" and replaced "Upon the filing of the written acceptance, the court shall render judgment against the defendant as upon default for the sum so named and for the costs accrued at the time of the defendant's giving the plaintiff notice of the offer" with "Upon the filing of the written acceptance and receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk of the court and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly", effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      Cited. 163 C. 445. Cited. 239 C. 708. Language of section unambiguously provides that written acceptance of a party's offer of judgment against defendant must result in court's rendering judgment against defendant. 258 C. 299.

      Cited. 10 CS 166.

      Sec. 52-195. Effect of failure to accept defendant's offer of compromise. (a) If the plaintiff does not, within the time allowed for acceptance of the offer of compromise and before the commencement of the trial, file the plaintiff's notice of acceptance, the offer shall be deemed to be withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence.

      (b) Unless the plaintiff recovers more than the sum specified in the offer of compromise, with interest from its date, the plaintiff shall recover no costs accruing after the plaintiff received notice of the filing of such offer, but shall pay the defendant's costs accruing after the plaintiff received notice. Such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars.

      (c) This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action. The provisions of this section shall not apply to cases in which nominal damages have been assessed upon a hearing after a default or after a demurrer has been overruled.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7944; P.A. 79-250, S. 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 96; P.A. 05-275, S. 7.)

      History: P.A. 79-250 specified that costs may include attorney's fees not exceeding $350 and that provisions do not abrogate contractual rights re recovery of attorney's fees; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 05-275 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to replace "offer of judgment" with "offer of compromise" where appearing and make technical changes, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      Cited. 163 C. 445. The phrase which states "such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees" modifies only the term "defendants costs" in the immediately preceding clause of the statute. 188 C. 213. Cited. 239 C. 708. Plaintiff must establish all of the elements of a negligence claim, including causation and actual injury, in order to recover and, therefore, the technical legal injury concept does not apply to a negligence action. 277 C. 364.

      Cited. 8 CA 254.

      Cited. 10 CS 166. Reasonableness of offer of judgment discussed. 39 CS 467.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subsec. requires payment of costs that are authorized elsewhere in statute if plaintiff fails to recover more than the offer of compromise, and because no statute authorizes costs for expenses of daily expedited trial transcripts, defendants' attorney's attendance at videoconference deposition or defendants' and defendants' employee trial testimony, trial court improperly authorized such costs. 289 C. 61.

      Sec. 52-195a. (Formerly Sec. 52-256). Unliquidated damages; tender. Any party upon whom a claim for unliquidated damages is made may tender to the claimant a sum of money in payment thereof, which tender may be pleaded and in all respects be as effectual as a tender in case of a claim for debt.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8002.)

      History: Sec. 52-256 transferred to Sec. 52-195a in 1983.

      Annotations to former section 52-256:

      General issue and tender repugnant; costs. 67 C. 74. Waiver of defects in tender; Id., 585; 76 C. 705. Tender bars costs. 80 C. 233; 87 C. 158. Not now necessary to pay money into court. Id., 157. Tender of money due on contract excused where other party cannot perform. 88 C. 64.

      Sec. 52-195b. Referral of civil action involving motor vehicle to alternative dispute resolution program. Expedited process case. Privileged case. (a) In any civil action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a private passenger motor vehicle the parties may agree to refer the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution program. Such referral shall be made within sixty days of the return date. The duration of the referral shall not exceed ninety days unless the court, for good cause shown, extends the time period. The court shall stay the time periods within which all further pleadings, motions, requests, discovery and other procedures must be filed or undertaken until (1) such time as the alternative dispute resolution process is completed or (2) the time period set by the court for the referral has elapsed, whichever occurs first.

      (b) (1) If the alternative dispute resolution process does not result in a resolution of the dispute, the parties shall report the lack of resolution to the court promptly but in no event later than five days after the expiration of the stay provided in subsection (a) of this section.

      (2) Any such action wherein each plaintiff has limited his own claim, exclusive of interest and costs, to a maximum of seventy-five thousand dollars may, with the consent of all parties, be brought as an expedited process case in accordance with section 51-15 and shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.

      (3) Any such action wherein at least one plaintiff has not limited his own claim, exclusive of interest and costs, to a maximum of seventy-five thousand dollars, shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.

      (c) If an agreement is reached between the parties on any issues, the neutral party shall report such agreement to the court and the parties shall seek the entry of an appropriate order from the court.

      (d) If the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution program consisting of binding arbitration, the parties shall report to the court upon completion of such arbitration. The arbitration award may be confirmed in the same manner as any other arbitration award as provided in chapter 909.

      (e) The alternative dispute resolution process under this section shall be deemed to be settlement negotiations for evidentiary and confidentiality purposes.

      (P.A. 93-297, S. 3, 29.)

      History: P.A. 93-297 effective January 1, 1994.

      Sec. 52-195c. Time period for payment of settlement amount. (a) When an action to recover damages has been settled, any settling defendant shall tender all sums due from such settling defendant to any settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent not later than thirty days after receipt by the person or office designated in writing to the settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent by the settling defendant at the time of settlement of a duly executed release and a withdrawal discontinuing any court action, if any such action is pending, that are tendered by such settling plaintiff or plaintiff's agent and are executed by or on behalf of the settling plaintiff. If no such person or office is so designated, a settling plaintiff may tender such settlement documents to the settling defendant's attorney or the representative of the settling defendant's insurer with whom the settlement agreement was reached and such settling defendant shall tender all sums due from such settling defendant to any settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent not later than thirty days after receipt of such settlement documents by the settling defendant's attorney or the representative of the settling defendant's insurer.

      (b) In an action that requires judicial approval of the settlement, the plaintiff shall also tender a copy of the order of the Probate Court or other order approving such settlement with the duly executed release and withdrawal discontinuing any pending court action executed on behalf of the plaintiff.

      (c) In the event that a settling defendant or insurer fails to promptly tender all sums as required by subsection (a) of this section, a default judgment shall be entered by the court on behalf of any unpaid plaintiff against such defendant twenty days after such plaintiff files a motion for a default judgment with the court and serves such motion upon the representative of the insurer with whom the settlement was reached or the defendant with whom the settlement was reached. Such motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney setting forth the terms of such settlement with supporting documentation attached.

      (d) Any insurer or defendant with whom the settlement was reached that fails to tender settlement proceeds within the time limit set forth in this section shall be liable for interest at a rate of twelve per cent a year on the amount of such settlement proceeds computed from the date such time limit expired.

      (e) As used in this section, "tender" means either to personally deliver or cause to be delivered or to mail by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. An insurer or a defendant may otherwise prove tender by presenting evidence that the settlement sums due from such insurer or such defendant were received by the settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent.

      (P.A. 97-58, S. 3.)

      Sec. 52-196. Motion to continue or postpone. Whenever in any action pending in the Superior Court a motion for a postponement or continuance is made by either party and such motion is granted, the court may require the party making the same to pay to the adverse party such sum by way of indemnity as it deems reasonable.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7930; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 112; P.A. 74-183, S. 85, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 129, 681.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for city court; P.A. 74-183 removed actions pending in circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed actions pending in court of common pleas from purview of section reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978.

      Discretion of court to grant continuances. 69 C. 186; 75 C. 308; Id., 314; 78 C. 654; 79 C. 383; 81 C. 474; 92 C. 658; 100 C. 4. Informalities in adjournment of justice court from time to time waived if parties eventually appear and are heard. 104 C. 294. Where defendant's motion for mistrial was, in essence, one for continuance or postponement because of illness of necessary witness, trial court did not err in denying motion when not informed of the facts at the time. 157 C. 561.

      Sec. 52-197. Motion for disclosure. Rules. (a) In any civil action, the court, upon motion of either party, may order disclosure of facts or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents by any party thereto, material to the moving party's cause of action or defense, and within the knowledge, possession or power of the adverse party.

      (b) The judges of the Supreme Court shall make rules to carry out the provisions of this section.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7949; 1957, P.A. 651, S. 30; P.A. 82-160, S. 97.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      Discovery to be responsive to the motion. 20 C. 486. Cited. 59 C. 243; Id., 508. Applies only where the matter lies within the exclusive knowledge or possession of the adverse party. 61 C. 594; 90 C. 261. Statute simply designed to enable a court of law to exercise clearly defined powers of a court of equity. 61 C. 596. Cited. 63 C. 569. Form of motion. 77 C. 387. Right of court to compel production of documents on trial. 79 C. 121. Errors in action on demurrer to motion waived by replacing it with another. 90 C. 270. Denial of motion addressed to defense that would be unavailing is harmless. 91 C. 554. Where demurrer to complaint is sustained and plaintiff does not plead over, motion does not lie. 95 C. 301. Cited. 125 C. 9. Does not abrogate independent action for discovery in equity. 126 C. 386. A trial tests the court's ruling on a motion for disclosure for it then appears whether the mover was hampered in the preparation and presentation of his case by the denial of his motion. 147 C. 321. Party cannot assert lack of notice to produce or want of a subpoena duces tecum if, by his own testimony, either would have been futile. Id., 496. An answer to an interrogatory is not, without more, a judicial admission in the same sense as admissions in the pleadings or in open court. 148 C. 202. Relation to constitutional separation of powers. History (dissent). 166 C. 501. Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716. Cited. 230 C. 1.

      Cited. 4 CA 339. Cited. 14 CA 267.

      Motion to inspect a trolley car is not within the statute. 5 CS 161. Cited. Id., 291. An independent equitable action for discovery may be maintained notwithstanding this section. 7 CS 76. Cited. 8 CS 137; Id., 246. Cited. 9 CS 44. The facts desired by the defendant to be disclosed by the plaintiff must be material to the defendant's cause. 16 CS 54. Disclosure may be ordered as to any matter concerned solely with damages as well as to issues of liability. 17 CS 40. Cited. 19 CS 147. Disclosure of written statements of witnesses and defendants refused. 21 CS 165. Disclosure of whether there is liability insurance, and the amount and terms thereof, held not within the rules of disclosure. Id., 168, but see section 52-200a. Connecticut's disclosure rules are not as broad as the federal rules. Id., 170. Court refused request for pretrial disclosure of confidential corporate information required to establish damages before the right to obtain damages of any kind had been proved. Id. In a criminal case the accused cannot compel the prosecution to produce documents which he himself has made. Furthermore, facts sought to be disclosed must be shown to be exclusively within the knowledge of the state. 23 CS 41. Plaintiff alleging loss of earnings not required to produce copies of income tax returns. 25 CS 147. Cited. 26 CS 338. Cited. 28 CS 53. Discovery not available in appeal from administrative agency, when. 30 CS 299. Cited. 31 CS 129. Motion not allowed where an overwhelming volume of inquiry was proposed and the information was obtainable from other defendants. Id., 335. Discovery is available in summary process proceeding. 36 CS 47.

      Sec. 52-197a. Transferred to Chapter 368a, Sec. 19a-17b.

      Sec. 52-197b. Discovery outside country to be in accordance with treaty or convention or court order. (a) If an applicable treaty or convention including, but not limited to, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, provides for discovery outside the United States of America, the discovery methods agreed to in such treaty or convention shall be employed.

      (b) If an applicable treaty or convention renders discovery inadequate or inequitable but does not prohibit additional discovery, the Superior Court may, upon application, order additional discovery under such terms and conditions as the court deems just and equitable.

      (P.A. 91-324, S. 2.)

      Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Sec. 52-198. Disclosure; examination of officer of corporation. If a corporation is party to an action, the opposite party may examine the president, treasurer, secretary, clerk or any director or other officer thereof in the same manner as if he were a party to the suit.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7950.)

      Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Sec. 52-199. Questions which need not be answered. Self-incrimination. (a) In any hearing or trial, a party interrogated shall not be obliged to answer a question or produce a document the answering or producing of which would tend to incriminate him, or to disclose his title to any property if the title is not material to the hearing or trial.

      (b) The right to refuse to answer a question, produce a document or disclose a title may be claimed by the party interrogated or by counsel in his behalf.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7951; P.A. 82-160, S. 62.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      See Sec. 51-35 re witnesses' imprisonment for refusal to testify and protection against self-incrimination.

      See Sec. 54-84 re option of accused to testify or remain silent during trial.

      Answers to interrogatories did not expose defendant to self-degradation and self-incrimination. 137 C. 404. Privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      The term "any hearing or trial" includes the taking of a deposition. 31 CS 66. Cited. 32 CS 306.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 32 CA 811. Cited. 37 CA 456; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176.

      Sec. 52-200. Disclosure not conclusive. When either party in any action has obtained from the other party a disclosure on oath, respecting the matters alleged in any pleading, the disclosure shall not be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like any other testimony.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7952.)

      Cited. 186 C. 275. Cited. 194 C. 35. Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 228 C. 42. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Cited. 2 CA 523. Cited. 4 CA 641. Cited. 11 CA 518. Cited. 13 CA 725. Cited. 40 CA 449.

      Sec. 52-200a. Defendant's insurance liability policy limits and insurer's duty to indemnify subject to discovery. In any civil action founded upon negligence, both the defendant's insurance liability policy limits and whether or not the insurer has disclaimed its duty to indemnify shall be subject to discovery upon written motion of the plaintiff. Any such motion and disclosure shall be excluded from the file submitted to the jury.

      (1967, P.A. 485; P.A. 78-142.)

      History: P.A. 78-142 reworded provisions and made "whether or not the insurer has disclaimed its duty to indemnify" subject to discovery upon written motion of plaintiff.

      Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Statute is not unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial department. Public policy often requires legislation to facilitate administration of justice. 28 CS 32. Applies to pending cases at its enactment and is not unconstitutional infringement on judiciary rule making power. 29 CS 195.

      Sec. 52-201. Action on nonnegotiable instruments; defense. Assignment. Section 52-201 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7953; 1959, P.A. 133, S. 10-102.)

      Sec. 52-202. Transferred to Chapter 925, Sec. 52-570a.

      Sec. 52-203. Demand for receipt not to vitiate a legal tender. The requirement or demand for a receipt for such amount of lawful money as may be offered or tendered on account, or in payment or in part payment of any indebtedness, shall not prevent such offer or tender from being regarded or held to be a legal tender.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7955.)

      Sec. 52-204. Recovery of expenditures by husband or parent. In any civil action arising out of personal injury or property damage, as a result of which personal injury or property damage the husband or parent of the plaintiff has made or will be compelled to make expenditures or has contracted indebtedness, the amount of such expenditures or indebtedness may be recovered by the plaintiff, provided a recovery by the plaintiff shall be a bar to any claim by such husband or parent, except in an action in which the husband or parent is a defendant.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7947; 1951, S. 3181d.)

      Cited. 117 C. 686. Damages due to incapacity of wife by reason of personal injury are recoverable by her and not her husband; but right to recover sums actually paid by husband because of her incapacity is in him. 125 C. 390. In absence of endorsement on writ by husband, wife may recover expenditures if it is not reasonably probable that husband would have to pay them but probable that she will be called upon to do so. 129 C. 361. When a minor child is injured by the negligent act of a third party, two independent causes of action spring into existence; first, the right of action by the child for personal injuries; second, a right of action by the parent for consequential damages. 147 C. 333. Cited. 153 C. 363. Cited. 165 C. 490. Cited. 200 C. 290.

      Husband must endorse his consent upon the complaint prior to service on defendant. 4 CS 147. Transfer by parent of his right of action for consequential damages has all the attributes of an assignment. 7 CS 480. Cited. 19 CS 480. Vicarious contributory negligence or concurring negligence of parent does not bar plaintiff's recovery of consequential damages. 28 CS 493. Wife may sue for husband's medical expenses for which she is legally liable. 32 CS 156.

      Sec. 52-205. Court may determine order in which issues shall be tried. In all cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may order that one or more of the issues joined be tried before the others.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7939.)

      Cited. 63 C. 560. When legal issues of fact should be determined by jury before court tries equitable issues. 98 C. 221. General claim for jury list does not secure jury trial of equitable issues of fact; special order necessary under section 52-218. 100 C. 248. The court may determine the issues on the cross complaint first. 135 C. 558. Cited. 149 C. 430.

      Illness of plaintiff's attorney reason to bifurcate trial. 50 CA 577.

      Sec. 52-206. Writings; admission of their execution. (a) Either party to a civil action may, by a written notice, call upon the other to admit the existence and due execution of any document, material to the issue, saving all just exceptions.

      (b) If the opposing party neglects or refuses to make such a requested admission within a reasonable time after the receipt of such notice, the costs of proving the document shall be paid by the party neglecting or refusing to make the admission regardless of the result of the action unless the court finds that the neglect or refusal was reasonable.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7959; P.A. 82-160, S. 98.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      Sec. 52-207. Defense based on Sunday contract. No person who has received a valuable consideration for a contract, express or implied, made on a Sunday prior to June 9, 1976, may defend any action upon the contract on the ground that it was made on a Sunday, until he has restored the consideration.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7980; P.A. 76-415, S. 6; 76-435, S. 81, 82; P.A. 82-160, S. 99.)

      History: P.A. 76-415 specified applicability to contracts made on Sunday "prior to October 1, 1976"; P.A. 76-435 changed effective date from October 1, 1976, to June 9, 1976, amending section text accordingly; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      See Sec. 53-300a re validity of Sunday real estate contracts.

      Cited. 66 C. 275. Defendant must pay the reasonable value or agreed price, where a return of the identical consideration is practically impossible. 73 C. 624. Court should instruct jury as to whether certain date is Sunday. 81 C. 490. That contract was made on Sunday should be pleaded. 85 C. 635. See notes to sections 53-300, 53-301. In action by assignee to enforce bond for deed, defendant who received nothing as result of assignment may defend on ground it was made on Sunday. 133 C. 649. Cited. 155 C. 55. Cited. 177 C. 304.

      Cited. 14 CS 407. Sunday contract not demurrable if there is nothing to indicate that deposit allegedly accepted by defendant has been returned. 20 CS 443.

      Sec. 52-208. Reception of evidence objected to as inadmissible. Whenever evidence offered upon the trial of any civil action is objected to as inadmissible, the court or committee trying such action shall not admit such evidence subject to the objection, unless both parties agree that it be so admitted; but, if either party requests a decision, such court or committee shall pass upon such objection and admit or reject the testimony.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7960.)

      Does not apply to evidence received in advance of its logical place. 53 C. 558. New trial ordinarily granted for an infraction of statute, unless the error appears to have been harmless. 68 C. 63. Admitting evidence with an offer to consider later a motion to strike it out is equivalent of admitting it subject to objection. 130 C. 232. Cited. 132 C. 646. To avail himself of the rule that grounds upon which evidence is claimed to be inadmissible must be stated, a party must state the grounds for his claim of admissibility. 148 C. 208.

      Cited. 5 CA 118.

      Sec. 52-209. Argument of counsel; time limit. In a trial before the Superior Court, counsel shall not occupy more than one hour in argument, unless the court, on motion for special cause, before the commencement of the argument, allows a longer time. Interlocutory questions arising during the trial of an action shall not be argued by counsel unless the court requests it.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7962; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 113; P.A. 76-436, S. 404, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 100.)

      History: 1959 act deleted provision for appeal from trial before justice of the peace; P.A. 76-436 removed trials before court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      The constitutional right of the accused to be heard by counsel is subject to a reasonable time limit. 47 C. 535. Party represented by two counsel in superior court may occupy two hours in argument, dividing the time as they may agree. 55 C. 18. Discretion of court to extend time for argument. 95 C. 79. Cited. 122 C. 611. Cited. 217 C. 671.

      Where presentation of evidence lasted three and one-half days and plaintiff's counsel did not move for additional time until after the argument had begun, rule of court limiting him to one hour was not an abuse of discretion. 15 CS 305.

      Sec. 52-210. Motion for nonsuit. If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil action, the plaintiff has produced his evidence and rested his cause, the defendant may move for judgment as in case of nonsuit, and the court may grant such motion, if in its opinion the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7977.)

      This does not impair right of trial by jury. 24 C. 468. Cannot be granted because suit was brought without authority. 26 C. 529. Cases of nonsuit. 23 C. 485; 24 C. 40; Id., 207; 30 C. 492. When to be granted. 93 C. 96; 97 C. 312. Refusal to nonsuit not reviewable on application of defendant. 51 C. 512. A nonsuit should not be granted where there is substantial evidence to support plaintiff's claim. 58 C. 279; 70 C. 74; 71 C. 29. Nor on a jury trial upon the ground that the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would not support a judgment. 66 C. 196. Nor because the court is satisfied that the witnesses are not credible. Id., 206. Statute salutary. 76 C. 41. If law applied to facts proved does not make out case, nonsuit is proper; 77 C. 321; so, where plaintiff's evidence brings case within statute of limitations; 64 C. 430; 71 C. 24; or statute of frauds; 82 C. 293; or plaintiff fails to make out prima facie case; 66 C. 313; 104 C. 78, 746; or bases case on surmise or conjecture; 82 C. 403; 83 C. 231; 84 C. 401; 86 C. 509; id., 546; or offers no substantial evidence. 70 C. 74; 84 C. 403. But not proper if plaintiff makes out prima facie case; 71 C. 24; 104 C. 78; or offers substantial evidence; 82 C. 236; 83 C. 261; though it is weak; 83 C. 20; or evidence is conflicting; 70 C. 505; or issue involves determination of credibility of witness; 94 C. 350; 96 C. 230; 116 C. 69; or reasonable men might differ. 87 C. 119. Sufficiency of allegations of complaint not in question. 82 C. 236. Court must construe evidence most favorably to plaintiff. 83 C. 20; 116 C. 69. Motion need not specify grounds. 77 C. 559. Proper as to one of several defendants. 79 C. 379; 82 C. 685. Court may permit reopening of case to supply proof. 68 C. 33. Discretion of court in refusing to grant. 77 C. 136; Id., 334; id., 462; 79 C. 266; Id., 379; 80 C. 298; 106 C. 13. Form motion takes immaterial if no evidence offered which could sustain recovery. 90 C. 617. Grant carries costs but does not determine issues; form of judgment file. 94 C. 80. Has no place on hearing in damages after default. Id., 244. Rules same in court and jury cases. 96 C. 230. All inferences to be drawn in favor of plaintiff. Id., 222. Only evidence considered is that offered by plaintiff to support complaint, not that pertinent to affirmative defense. 97 C. 312; 100 C. 42. Nature of nonsuit; is entirely different from erasure or dismissal for want of jurisdiction. 98 C. 231. Does not apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Denial of motion for nonsuit serves no other purpose than to establish fact that prima facie case is made. 132 C. 402. Upon a motion for nonsuit, unless it appears that no relief could be granted under the pleadings, their legal sufficiency is not open to question. 134 C. 502. Cited. 140 C. 643. Nonsuit may be granted only when plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. 143 C. 230. Cited. 145 C. 99. Cited. 147 C. 260. Cited. 152 C. 699. See note to section 52-80. Cited. 185 C. 1. Where granting of a nonsuit must depend in any appreciable degree upon court's passing on credibility of a witness nonsuit should not be granted. Id., 195.

      Cited. 30 CA 664. Cited. 43 CA 83.

      Motion for dismissal is unknown to Connecticut law. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 8 (Diss. Op.).

      Sec. 52-211. Refusal to set aside nonsuit; appeal. If a nonsuit has been so granted in the Superior Court, the plaintiff may either (a) during the same term or session of the court and before its next return day, file a written motion to set aside such judgment; and, if such motion is denied, may appeal from such denial; and to enable him to do so the court shall state the whole evidence so produced as aforesaid that it may become a part of the record or (b) appeal pursuant to section 51-197a directly from the judgment of nonsuit. If such judgment is set aside, either on motion or appeal, the cause shall be proceeded with as though no nonsuit had been granted.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7978; 1953, S. 3183d; 1969, P.A. 310; P.A. 74-183, S. 86, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 130, 681.)

      History: 1969 act allowed plaintiff option of filing appeal pursuant to Sec. 52-263 directly from judgment of nonsuit; P.A. 74-183 added reference to appeals filed pursuant to Sec. 51-265; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court and substituted reference to Sec. 51-197a for reference to Secs. 52-263 and 51-265, effective July 1, 1978.

      A motion for a nonsuit cannot be reserved for advice of supreme court. 33 C. 445. Formerly the refusal to set aside a nonsuit could be reviewed only on a motion in error. 43 C. 167; 44 C. 465. Cited. 51 C. 512. No appeal lies until the court has denied the written motion to set aside the judgment. 72 C. 707. Motion to set aside need not state grounds; 77 C. 559; must be reasonably made; discretion of court. 75 C. 314. If granted for variance between pleading and evidence, remedy is new action. 82 C. 236. Motion to set aside must be made. 72 C. 707; 75 C. 317; 106 C. 14. Refusal to grant not ground of exception. 64 C. 481. Appellant must furnish court with transcript of evidence. 82 C. 132; Id., 142; 83 C. 316. Questions presented; finding necessary if rulings on evidence are to be reviewed. 71 C. 339; 89 C. 382. Time allowed for appeal; certification of evidence not an extension. 83 C. 316. The granting of a nonsuit will not prevent an appeal from rulings leading up to it. 73 C. 1. Granting or refusing nonsuit regarded on appeal as an exercise of the court's discretion. 75 C. 314; 79 C. 266; 80 C. 299. Only question ordinarily open is, has plaintiff failed for any reason to make out prima facie case. 94 C. 80; 104 C. 746. Evidence to be taken in light most favorable to plaintiff. 95 C. 206; Id., 442; 101 C. 52, 79. Does not apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Cited. 140 C. 643. Exclusive method of attacking the court's action in rendering a judgment of nonsuit is to appeal from the denial of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the judgment. 143 C. 226; 145 C. 99. Applies only to nonsuit for failure to make out a prima facie case. 147 C. 260. Cited. 152 C. 699. See note to section 52-210.

      Failure to move to have nonsuit set aside not a bar to plaintiff's right to bring new action for the same cause within one year. Motion to erase improper way to attack court's jurisdiction. 20 CS 377.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 8 (diss. op.).

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 34 CS 606.

      Sec. 52-212. Opening judgment upon default or nonsuit. (a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.

      (b) The complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.

      (c) The court shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of the complaint or written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin him against enforcing the judgment or decree until the decision upon the complaint or written motion.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7963, 7964; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 114; 1967, P.A. 849; P.A. 74-183, S. 87, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 131, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 102.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for municipal court which was abolished; 1967 act clarified rights of plaintiff; P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of its functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      Refusal to open a judgment of default, upon motion, may be reviewed where the question is purely one of law; 51 C. 391; but otherwise the motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 69 C. 362. Action by court where substitute complaint improperly allowed after default. 86 C. 313. Formerly did not include nonsuit. Averments in complaint. 75 C. 317. Petition for new trial may be brought after the four-month period has elapsed. 93 C. 161. Effect of judgment of default; this only further procedure permitted. 97 C. 123. Cited. 123 C. 491. Default resulting from party's own neglect will not be opened. 138 C. 27. No abuse of discretion in denying motion when it appears the defendant has no defense or has not been prevented from appearing by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. 139 C. 532. Cited. 144 C. 389. Judgment of nonsuit for failure to appear should be opened if plaintiff can show reasonable cause. 147 C. 260. A motion to open judgment which stated merely that an appearance was entered as soon as defendant's attorney received notice of the action, held not a reasonable cause for opening judgment. 148 C. 435. Cited. 150 C. 191, 195; 152 C. 699. Statement that defendant failed to secure substitute counsel because of confusion attendant upon bankruptcy proceedings did not particularly set forth the reason why defendant failed to appear. Statute construed. Relief under statute discretionary. 154 C. 294. Prior to 1967 amendments, last two sentences applied to written motions as well as complaints. Id., 297. Where no attempt was made to show any mistake, accident or other reasonable cause for default, there was no abuse of discretion in court's denial of motion to reopen judgment. 156 C. 6. Since, on appeal, defendant requested no finding and none was made, he failed to show cause why his motion to open default judgment against him should have been granted or to establish error in trial court's denial of motion. 159 C. 352, 358. Relief under statute ordinarily should not be granted if failure to comply with order of court resulted from moving party's own negligence. Id., 427, 432. Defendant precluded from attacking a finding as unsupported by the evidence as he failed to request a transcript of the record pursuant to section 51-70a. 168 C. 184. Whether proceeding under common law or statute, action of trial court in granting or refusing application to open judgment is generally within discretion of such court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion. 172 C. 520. Cited. 176 C. 579. Cited. 179 C. 290; Id., 671. Cited. 187 C. 509, 510. Cited. 188 C. 145, 151. Continuing jurisdiction under this statute not affected by provisions of Sec. 49-35c(b). Id., 253. Cited. 190 C. 679; Id., 707. Cited. 193 C. 128; Id., 160. Cited. 196 C. 233; Id., 355. Cited. 200 C. 697. Cited. 208 C. 230. Cited. 214 C. 464. Cited. 216 C. 341. Cited. 224 C. 263. Cited. 225 C. 705. Cited. 231 C. 462. Cited. 236 C. 78.

      Cited. 1 CA 282; Id., 298. Cited. 5 CA 230. Cited. 6 CA 504. Cited. 9 CA 320; Id., 355. Cited. 10 CA 160. Cited. 14 CA 172; Id., 236. Cited. 15 CA 308. Cited. 18 CA 589. Cited 19 CA 8. Cited. 22 CA 424. Cited. 28 CA 7. Section requires date of judgment not be included in time calculation. 29 CA 465. Cited. 30 CA 541. Cited. 31 CA 634. Cited. 35 CA 236. Cited. 40 CA 404. Cited. 42 CA 119. Cited. 45 CA 137. Cited. 46 CA 54. Trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to open judgment filed outside the four-month period and may refuse to consider procedurally defective motions. 51 CA 1. Negligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of statute to set aside a default judgment. 63 CA 544. It is axiomatic that the right to move to open and vacate a judgment assumes that the party who is to exercise the right be given opportunity to know that there is a judgment to open. Plaintiff that demonstrated it did not receive notice of entry of nonsuit in timely manner allowed to file motion to open within four months of receiving notice. 68 CA 68. Court has intrinsic power, independent of statutory provision, to vacate any judgment obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake. 78 CA 684.

      Cited. 7 CS 250. Judgment of nonsuit not reopened to allow filing of substituted complaint where the action had been in court over a year previously and counsel did not see fit to plead over within the time provided by rules of court. 8 CS 372. Judgment in uncontested divorce action set aside where appearance of defendant's counsel by accident or inadvertence was not entered. 16 CS 111. Statute refers to a final judgment and not to judgment by default. 17 CS 118. Cited. 19 CS 288. A default is not a judgment but an interlocutory order of court, the effect of which is to preclude defendant from making any further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned. A judgment upon default, on the other hand, is the final judgment in the case which is entered after the default and after a hearing in damages. A motion to set aside a default may be filed at any time before entry of judgment, may be informal in nature and may be granted for such reason as the court sees fit. 24 CS 81. Trial court's refusal to open a default judgment because of defendant's negligence in failing to appear was not an abuse of discretion on the record. 31 CS 540. Failure of defendants to appear on date set by court order of final assignment for trial because they relied on assistant court clerk's advice the action had been reassigned to a later date, not "reasonable cause" for opening default judgment. Id., 549. Cited. 33 CS 554; Id., 775. Cited. 34 CS 501; Id., 559. In order not to frustrate the remedial purpose of the statute the time limit provisions must be construed as a limitation on the prejudiced party rather than as a jurisdictional barrier to the exercise of judicial power. 35 CS 581. Cited. Id., 598. Cited. 36 CS 626. Cited. 37 CS 676. Cited. 38 CS 731. Default judgment should not be opened where defendant received actual notice of the action but chose to ignore authority of the court. 45 CS 563.

      Failure to move to open judgment resulted in waiver of claim of discharge in bankruptcy. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 386. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Mere negligence or inattention of a party is no ground for vacating a judgment on default against him. Id., 397. Where plaintiff's motion to open judgment on default was denied, he was not precluded from petitioning for a new trial. Determination of motion was not res judicata. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 201. Granting motion to open judgment on default abuse of discretion where facts show failure to appear and defend due to defendant's negligence. Id., 396. Granting of motion to open judgment is interlocutory ruling, reviewable upon appeal from final judgment, and appeal was not allowed as this was not final action of circuit court. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 289. Opening judgment after default, unless based on pure error of law, lies in sound discretion of court. Id., 291.

      Subsec. (a):

      Defendant's motion to open judgment was properly denied since a party must meet both parts of two prong test and defendant failed to allege any purported defense to the action. 193 C. 160. Cited. 212 C. 741. Cited. 234 C. 783. Trial court did not err in refusing to open default judgment in foreclosure action because evidence gave rise to a reasonable presumption of receipt of actual notice of the action by nonresident defendant. 278 C. 92.

      Cited. 13 CA 223. Cited. 27 CA 755; judgment reversed, see 225 C.757. Cited. 38 CA 506. Cited. 39 CA 253. Cited. 40 CA 590. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 381; Id., 724. Cited. 46 CA 5. Negligence is not sufficient reason to open a judgment of default. 78 CA 466.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 10 CA 1.

      Sec. 52-212a. Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months only. Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed. The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights. The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights.

      (P.A. 77-576, S. 28, 65; P.A. 82-160, S. 103; P.A. 93-51; P.A. 98-241, S. 14, 18; P.A. 00-137, S. 16.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 93-51 added provisions re reopening of judgments terminating parental rights; P.A. 98-241 changed reference from Subsec. (i) to Subsec. (h) of Sec. 17a-112, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-137 changed reference from Subsec. (h) to Subsec. (o) of Sec. 17a-112.

      Judgments obtained by fraud may be attacked at any time. 180 C. 129. Cited. 181 C. 463. A motion to open and vacate a judgment is addressed to the court's discretion. 184 C. 461. Cited. 185 C. 495. Cited. 187 C. 509. Cited. 191 C. 555. Cited. 196 C. 517; Id., 579. Cited. 211 C. 648. Cited. 214 C. 23. Cited. 215 C. 143. Cited. 217 C. 394. Cited. 223 C. 68; Id., 155. Court held legislature intended provisions of Sec. 17a-112 and this section to coexist so superior court has limited jurisdiction to open judgment for termination of parental rights for four months after its rendering but not thereafter in absence of waiver or consent. 224 C. 263. Cited. 225 C. 757. Cited. Id., 804. Prohibits trial court from entertaining motion to open and modify divorce decree with respect to nondisability military retired or retainer pay; time limitations on opening not preempted by federal law division of military retirement benefits. 226 C. 219. Cited. Id., 831. Cited. 228 C. 85. Cited. 232 C. 405. Judgment of appellate court in Jenks v. Jenks, 34 CA 462, reversed. Id., 750. Cited. 236 C. 78. Cited. 239 C. 375. Section limits trial court's general authority to grant relief from a judgment, but does not limit its personal jurisdiction over the parties. 249 C. 94. Defendant did not prevail on its claim that, in the absence of a finding of contempt, court lacked jurisdiction to enter postjudgment orders after expiration of the four-month statutory period for opening a judgment. Court's continuing jurisdiction to enter orders in vindication of a prior judgment is grounded in its inherent powers and not its contempt powers and exercise of that jurisdiction in this case not barred by availability of appellate remedies. 260 C. 232. Trial court's clarification of injunctive order seven months after original order and modification was proper because court had continuing jurisdiction due to nature of injunctive order and internal inconsistencies in prior order. 275 C. 420. Order restoring case to docket is immediately appealable when challenged on the basis of court's authority to restore case to the docket in light of the limitation period of section. 276 C. 168. Court has continuing jurisdiction to vacate or modify a protective order after expiration of the four-month limitation period of section. Id.

      Cited. 2 CA 543. Cited. 5 CA 417. Cited. 8 CA 254. Cited. 9 CA 446. Cited. 10 CA 160; Id., 669. Cited. 11 CA 171. Cited. 15 CA 308. Cited. 18 CA 166; Id., 589. Cited. 19 CA 213. Cited. 22 CA 4; Id., 396; Id., 424. Cited. 27 CA 755; judgment reversed, see 225 C. 157. Cited. 29 CA 465; Id., 482. Cited. 32 CA 203. Cited. 33 CA 197. Cited. 34 CA 419; Id., 641. Cited. 36 CA 73. Defendant's filing of pleadings after judgment of dismissal could not have constituted a waiver of the four-month period for opening judgment of dismissal. 37 CA 56. Cited. Id., 397. Cited. 38 CA 340; Id., 745. Cited. 39 CA 258. Cited. 40 CA 115; Id., 590; Id., 733. Cited. 42 CA 119; Id., 409. Cited. 44 CA 588; Id., 771. Cited. 45 CA 137; Id., 352. Cited. 46 CA 54; Id., 614. In absence of fraud, mistake, duress or accident, trial court was without jurisdiction to order rescission of stipulated judgment where request for rescission was made more than four months after entry of judgment. 49 CA 203. Four-month limitation period does not apply because the entry of nonsuit was a clerical error. 55 CA 655. Judgment against defendant that was contrary to law shocks the judicial conscience and violates principles of equity, and court's denial of motion to open judgment, although filed more than four months after rendition of judgment, perpetuated the injustice. 59 CA 351. Discussion of "otherwise provided by law" provision. Failure to file renewed motion to open judgment within four-month limitation period. 69 CA 349. Because trial court did not make an express finding of mutual mistake, it lacked authority to open the judgment beyond the four-month period. 78 CA 734. Statutory provisions of the section do not operate to strip court of its jurisdiction over its judgments, but merely operate to limit period in which court may exercise its substantive authority to adjudicate merits of a case. 87 CA 735. Clerical error in recorded judgment with respect to amount of deficiency which is inconsistent with actual judgment, may be corrected by trial court at any time, even after expiration of four-month period set forth in section. 88 CA 592. A judgment rendered may be opened after 4-month limitation if it is shown that judgment was obtained because of mutual mistake. 109 CA 33. As a result of the trial court's original order to "remove" cement blocks being open to different interpretations, it was appropriate for plaintiff to invoke the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to interpret and to effectuate the order with respect to the cement blocks, and that court properly clarified rather than modified the original order. 111 CA 436. Court had authority to open judgment more than four months after its entry because plaintiff had by his actions waived right to raise claim under section. 120 CA 459.

      Secs. 52-213 and 52-214. Justice of the peace to keep docket, entry fee. Jury in suit before justice of the peace. Sections 52-213 and 52-214 are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7552, 7940; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 204.)

      Sec. 52-215. Dockets. Jury cases. Court cases. In the Superior Court a docket shall be kept of all cases. In such docket immediately following the names of the parties and their attorneys in all jury cases shall be entered the word "jury". The following-named classes of cases shall be entered in the docket as jury cases upon the written request of either party made to the clerk within thirty days after the return day: Appeals from probate involving the validity of a will or paper purporting to be such, appeals from the actions of commissioners on insolvent estates, and, except as hereinafter provided, civil actions involving such an issue of fact as, prior to January 1, 1880, would not present a question properly cognizable in equity, except that there shall be no right to trial by jury in civil actions in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand does not exceed two hundred fifty dollars or in a summary process case. When, in any of the above-named cases an issue of fact is joined, the case may, within ten days after such issue of fact is joined, be entered in the docket as a jury case upon the request of either party made to the clerk; and any such case may at any time be entered in the docket as a jury case by the clerk, upon written consent of all parties or by order of court. All issues of fact in any such case shall be tried by the jury, provided the issues agreed by the parties to be tried by the court may be so tried. All cases not entered in the docket as jury cases under the foregoing provisions, including actions in which an account is demanded and judgment rendered that the defendant shall account, writs of habeas corpus and ne exeat, complaints for dissolution of marriage and all other special statutory proceedings which, prior to January 1, 1880, were not triable by jury, shall be entered on the docket as court cases, and shall, with all issues of law and issues of fact, other than those hereinbefore specified, which may be joined in actions entered on the docket as jury cases, be disposed of as court cases.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7936; 1953, S. 3178d; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 115; 1967, P.A. 33, S. 1; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 5; P.A. 74-183, S. 88, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 132, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 104.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for city court, latter having been abolished; 1967 act added language "in any civil case triable by jury under the provisions of section 51-266", allowing entrance of such cases in docket as jury cases when an issue of fact is joined; 1971 act deleted references to presumption that requests for jury trial are requests for six-person jury unless jury of twelve is specifically requested; P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of its functions to court of common pleas and clarified applicability re civil actions by adding exception specifying that there is no right to jury trial where amount, legal interest or property in demand is $250 or less or in summary process cases and by deleting reference to civil cases triable by jury under Sec. 51-266, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, and substituted "dissolution of marriage" for "divorce" where appearing, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 deleted from the list of court cases "actions wherein the plaintiff sues for a debt due by book to balance books accounts" and "prohibition", and made minor technical changes.

      Appeal from doings of commissioners; time within which case must be placed on the jury docket. 54 C. 523. The ten days run from the joinder of an issue of fact. 72 C. 96. Time de placing case on jury docket applies to bastardy proceedings. 73 C. 248. Historical review of right. 75 C. 218. In statutory action to remove cloud from title; 78 C. 100; 90 C. 133; in eminent domain. 76 C. 435. No jury trial proper in proceedings to remove municipal officer; 81 C. 585; or appeal from probate; 90 C. 49; or book debt. 78 C. 649. Of claiming cases in general. 72 C. 96; 75 C. 608; 80 C. 493. Applies to bastardy action. 73 C. 247. Claiming after decision on demurrer causing delay; 74 C. 475; after thirty-day period but before issue joined; 80 C. 493; cannot be claimed after supreme court orders new trial. 91 C. 703. Where no claim properly made, opponent has absolute right to court trial. 81 C. 451. If issue joined within thirty days, time not extended by ten-day provision. 75 C. 609. If equitable issues tried to court are conclusive, jury trial of legal issues may be refused. 73 C. 486. As to former provision requiring notice as to issues to be tried to jury, see 83 C. 109; 85 C. 162; 89 C. 212; 90 C. 133; Id., 633; 91 C. 217. Discretion of court to order issues to the jury. 90 C. 624. Allowance of amendment after trial begun, merely changing date, does not give further right to claim case for jury; waiver of right. 95 C. 576. Case entered upon jury docket can be tried by court only by agreement of counsel or, in part, by discretion of court. 97 C. 718. When legal issues should be tried first; use of special interrogatories to enable jury to determine issues of fact. 98 C. 222. Cited. 113 C. 609. Cited. 114 C. 231. Contractor who had filed claim in receivership action not entitled to jury trial on cross complaint by receiver for balance of stock subscription. 117 C. 445, 454. Court has no greater latitude in testing justification for verdict in appeal from probate than in ordinary case where right to jury is constitutional. 126 C. 296. Jury may be claimed within ten days after issue joined on complaint amended after original pleadings had been closed. 127 C. 332. Where essential basis of action is such that the issues are properly cognizable at law, either party has right to have legal issues tried to jury, even though equitable relief is asked; as where controlling issue is based on claimed legal title to real estate. 128 C. 307. Action for declaratory judgment is special statutory proceeding within this section; where in reality complaint seeks advice of court of equity as to duties of trustees, no right to jury. 131 C. 312. Actions for declaratory judgments were created by statute in 1921 and should be entered upon the court docket. 135 C. 294. Test is not whether issue is statutory but if it is of same nature or such as prior to 1818 would have been triable by a jury. 143 C. 159. Whether a party has waived his right to a jury trial presents a question of fact for the trial court. 147 C. 153. Cited. Id., 423. Since claim for trial by jury made after time permitted but prior to joining issues in the third party action, there was continuing authority to the clerk to place the cause on the jury docket when the issues therein were joined. 165 C. 729. Cited. 169 C. 66. Court order denying motion to strike case from jury docket has same effect as having cause entered on jury docket by court order pursuant to this section. 171 C. 5, 7, 10 (Diss. Op.), 11 (Diss. Op.). Running of ten day period after issue of fact is joined discussed. 195 C. 333. Cited. 197 C. 34. Cited. 200 C. 482. Cited. 211 C. 370. Cited. 214 C. 464. Cited. 216 C. 40. Cited. 218 C. 386. Cited. 230 C. 148. Cited. 233 C. 905. Cited. 238 C. 282. Inverse condemnation action has no common law analogue that was triable to a jury prior to 1818, its nearest historical analogue, eminent domain, gives rise to a proceeding in equity, therefore there is no right to jury trial for cause of action based on inverse condemnation. 262 C. 45.

      Cited. 1 CA 511. Cited. 6 CA 576. Cited. 15 CA 297. Cited. 23 CA 287. Cited. 28 CA 693. Cited. 37 CA 162. Cited. 40 CA 261. Court did not improperly deny jury trial as to an interpleader. 87 CA 337.

      Action for accounting should be tried to court and not to jury notwithstanding issues of law are presented. 6 CS 193. Allowance of amendment does not enlarge period in which a case may be claimed for the jury docket. 8 CS 32; but see 12 CS 218. Jury trial is authorized in an appeal from the doings of commissioners on a solvent estate of a deceased person. 10 CS 1; but see 15 CS 415. Action by state for care and treatment of a patient is a special statutory proceeding which came into existence after January 1, 1880, and should be entered on the jury docket. Id., 369. Cited. 12 CS 218. Cited. 14 CS 410. If plaintiff claims an indebtedness which could be determined in an action at law, case cannot be stricken from jury docket. 18 CS 173. Claims of undue influence and incapacity in execution of a deed are triable by jury as of right in ejectment. 20 CS 13. Cited. 21 CS 160. Cited. 23 CS 145. A plea in abatement is not a "civil action" but a procedural part thereof and therefore may not be heard by a jury. 32 CS 245. Since any liability of a town for hospital services is statutory and did not exist prior to January 1, 1880, an action should be entered on the docket as a court case. Id., 272. Cited. 35 CS 549. If a new issue of fact is joined, either by amended complaint or amended answer or special defense, it should revive a right of election for jury trial. 36 CS 343. Cited. 37 CS 883. Cited. 44 CS 411.

      Sec. 52-215a. Jury of six in civil actions. On the trial of any civil action to a jury, the trial shall be to a jury of six.

      (1971, P.A. 40, S. 1.)

      Sec. 52-216. Deciding questions of law and of fact. The court shall decide all issues of law and all questions of law arising in the trial of any issue of fact; and, in committing the action to the jury, shall direct them to find accordingly. The court shall submit all questions of fact to the jury, with such observations on the evidence, for their information, as it thinks proper, without any direction as to how they shall find the facts. After the action has been committed to the jury, no pleas, arguments or evidence may be received before the verdict is returned into court and recorded.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7969; P.A. 82-160, S. 105.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 replaced "cause" with "action" and rephrased the section.

      See Sec. 52-224 re special verdicts to determine questions of law by court.

      Jury cannot pass on sufficiency of declaration. 32 C. 167. Construction of writings is for the court, unless it depends on proof of extrinsic circumstances, usages, etc. 12 C. 554; 38 C. 167. Court must decide on matters of fact bearing only on admissibility of evidence. 11 C. 463; And on challenge to jurors. 18 C. 171; 38 C. 137. Court may express opinion on weight of evidence. 21 C. 167; 37 C. 400. But court should not withdraw from jury any questions of fact, because it thinks the proof insufficient. 34 C. 538. It should instruct the jury, specifically, what law is applicable to the particular facts of the case; 32 C. 82; and may direct what verdict should be given, if the facts claimed and admitted would justify such verdict only. 5 C. 416; 8 C. 347; 65 C. 291. Verdict set aside, because document not in evidence was given to the jury by mistake; 18 C. 549; 109 C. 726; and because a juror gave evidence to his fellows out of court. 1 R. 523. Parties need not be formally called before taking the verdict. 41 C. 26. A claim devoid of evidence ought not to be submitted to the jury. 44 C. 88. Verdict not complete until read to jury and assented to by them. 46 C. 233. Court to determine all matters of law, even such as involve the decision of facts. Id., 383. Parties are entitled to a verdict on each of several separate counts. 53 C. 240. What comments of the court are to be commended. 59 C. 400, 401. Statute is identical in some of its features with section 54-89; 64 C. 338; 103 C. 478. Court should direct a verdict where that depends upon a question of law. 65 C. 291. Court may express its opinion on the weight of evidence, leaving the decision of questions of fact to the jury. 69 C. 92. Is in accord with the constitutional right of trial by jury. Id., 145. Weight of testimony and the good or bad faith of parties are matters for the jury. 70 C. 509. Judge is not required to review all the evidence; how far he shall comment upon it is within his judicial discretion. Id., 719. Of jury trial in general. 75 C. 234. Functions of jury; 74 C. 71; in libel action. 67 C. 512; 69 C. 132; 75 C. 232. Must take law from judge; 69 C. 128; 73 C. 18; 75 C. 218; 78 C. 28; 80 C. 531; 85 C. 438; to leave it to them to decide is error. 86 C. 641. Weight and credibility of evidence is for jury; 73 C. 623; 81 C. 22; Id., 623; 82 C. 600; 86 C. 98; Id., 289; 87 C. 363; Id., 585; 90 C. 701; 94 C. 350; 97 C. 187; where evidence conflicts and fairminded men might differ; 94 C. 257; Id., 613; though witness is undisputed; 84 C. 267; 88 C. 619; or defendant offers no evidence; 92 C. 427; or one witness stands against many; 87 C. 363; so, inferences to be drawn from evidence; 86 C. 82; Id., 289; Id., 677; so meaning of words; 66 C. 525; so contract partly oral, partly written; 83 C. 16; weight of each part of evidence and its bearing upon the rest. 97 C. 187. Procuring cause of sale; 94 C. 475; agency and authority; 96 C. 21; 97 C. 149; whether written instrument meant to include whole agreement of parties. 97 C. 381. Jury must consider evidence as a whole. 75 C. 326. Judge as part of jury system. 74 C. 68; 75 C. 678; 76 C. 495; 81 C. 347; Id., 624. He may direct verdict in proper case; 77 C. 137; 79 C. 406; Id., 569; 80 C. 300; 81 C. 347; id., 578; 86 C. 439; 89 C. 117; 91 C. 432; where only one conclusion is reasonably possible; 81 C. 343; 82 C. 394; 86 C. 131; 88 C. 16; 90 C. 30; Id., 139; 91 C. 433; 92 C. 560; 95 C. 441; 109 C. 159; where facts are undisputed and effect is question of law; 96 C. 319; where injury is clearly due to plaintiff's own negligence; 95 C. 48; constitutional limitation on powers; 91 C. 460; in libel action; 91 C. 442; and where a verdict is directed, the judgment will not readily be reversed. 78 C. 99; 82 C. 396. Refusal to direct verdict not ground of error. 93 C. 454. Court may comment on evidence; 73 C. 33; Id., 118; Id., 377; 79 C. 116; Id., 380; 87 C. 691; 88 C. 93; 90 C. 275; 92 C. 236; Id., 579; 93 C. 691; or its absence; 91 C. 316; in a criminal case; 64 C. 330; 67 C. 581; 72 C. 40; 78 C. 28; 81 C. 98; 83 C. 160; Id., 601; 87 C. 5; Id., 285; 98 C. 467; 109 C. 91. This is ordinarily a matter of discretion; 79 C. 663; 80 C. 88; Id., 538; 82 C. 518; 83 C. 597; 85 C. 459; 88 C. 93; 91 C. 388; but it may be its duty to do so; 71 C. 1; Id., 392; 72 C. 43; 75 C. 55; 79 C. 117; 82 C. 518; it may, but need not, call attention to particular evidence; 73 C. 462; 76 C. 135; 77 C. 295; 81 C. 556; 83 C. 261; 85 C. 180; 86 C. 15; Id., 252; 87 C. 363; as testimony of an accomplice; 72 C. 321; 76 C. 342; 84 C. 152; evidence as to character; 83 C. 598; circumstantial evidence; 77 C. 267; refusal of witness to answer question; 91 C. 316; credibility of witness; 95 C. 529; it may point out an undisputed fact; 86 C. 335; or one admitted; 89 C. 237; or one jury could not help but find; 81 C. 347; or one that is irrelevant; 78 C. 18; but it must leave decision to jury. 69 C. 91; 86 C. 335. It may express its own opinion. 92 C. 237. That comment affects credibility of party's claim nil sig. 93 C. 598. This section applies to comments made by the judge in ruling on evidence. 90 C. 95. Effect of series of writings as determining contract rights is for court to decide. 94 C. 445. Judge may ask questions of witness. 98 C. 468. This section does not apply to criminal cases. 103 C. 477, 479, but see section 54-89. A motion to reopen to offer evidence after case was committed to jury could not be granted. The statute is definite and contains no exceptions. 135 C. 599. Cited. 137 C. 123. Whether there is any evidence is a question for the judge. Whether sufficient evidence is for the jury. 143 C. 547. Comment to jury by court must be fair and reasonable. 144 C. 706. Verdict of jury must contain an intelligible finding so that its meaning can be clearly ascertained. 147 C. 72. Finding in a jury case is a statement of facts which, on the evidence, jury might have found proven and which parties claim were proven. Id., 90. Handling of expert testimony by jury discussed. Id., 171, 215. Purpose of rule that exceptions to a charge should be taken immediately after the charge is delivered. Id., 191. Construction of language of a will, even in a jury case, is for the court. Id., 248. In the absence of any request from defendant to withhold from jury exhibits concerned only with counts as to which a verdict in his favor had been directed, court itself not required to withhold such exhibits. Id., 589. It is error to submit to jury wholly inapplicable statutes. Id., 638. An inadvertent omission or inaccurate statement in a charge will not constitute reversible error unless it is reasonably probable that jury was misled by it. Id., 644. For case to go to jury, evidence fairly considered must be able to support a reasonable belief that it is more probable than otherwise that the fact in issue is true. Id., 699. Directed verdicts are not favored. Id., 704. When a court may direct a verdict. 148 C. 167; Id., 449. Finding in a jury trial is merely a narrative of facts claimed to have been proved by each side, made for the purpose of fairly presenting any claimed errors in charge or rulings of the court. Id., 208. What constitutes a request to charge which properly sets forth the "legal principle involved." Id., 266. A fact not contradicted does not necessarily become an undisputed fact which is required to be added to the finding. Id., 349. Purpose of a charge is to call attention of jury, unfamiliar with legal distinctions, to whatever is necessary and proper to guide them to a right decision in a particular case. Id., 391. Doctrine of estoppel was in issue but in charge jury was not given a definition of this term, held reversible error. Id. Although trial court is given much latitude in discussing the evidence in a charge, an incorrect statement of a material and important fact which is apt to mislead the jury constitutes error. Id., 459. Plaintiff filed no requests to charge. It does not appear that any exception was made to the charge as given. Had he any doubt about the jury's understanding, a proper request to charge would have alerted the court to the need for instruction and would have assured an adequate record for review. 149 C. 743. Charge to jury on Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Jury should have been instructed to indicate in their verdict whether the possession was for self-administration or possession for sale. Jury could have found defendant not guilty of possession for sale because of entrapment, but guilty of possession for self-administration. Dissent. 150 C. 1. Since there was no evidence that any of the vehicles involved in the collision had inadequate or defective brakes, the charge should not have submitted the issue to the jury. Since other omitted matter was essential to a proper and complete consideration and decision of the case, the failure to charge on it, after a request to do so, constituted error. Id., 158. Where more than one conclusion is reasonably possible, judge cannot direct a verdict. Id., 623. Judge's failure to repeat all of his charge on claims of negligence may have misled jury into overlooking plaintiff's claim of supervening negligence of defendant as proximate cause of his injuries; this omission in supplemental charge was error and judgment for defendant was reversed. 157 C. 194. Failure of court to charge jury by relating law to pleadings and evidence in case was reversible error. 158 C. 75. Cited. 196 C. 53.

      Cited. 7 CA 245.

      When verdict will be set aside for error in the charge. 21 CS 1. The ad damnum clause of a complaint has no probative value and should not be submitted to the jury. Id., 150.

      Sec. 52-216a. Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited. Adjustments for excessive and inadequate verdicts permitted. An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of the cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim among any plaintiffs or defendants in the action be read or in any other way introduced to a jury. If the court at the conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. If the court concludes that the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order an additur, and upon failure of the party so ordered to add the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. This section shall not prohibit the introduction of such agreement or release in a trial to the court.

      (P.A. 76-197; P.A. 77-604, S. 33, 84; P.A. 82-160, S. 106; 82-406, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 77-604 referred to agreements "with any tortfeasor" not to bring legal action rather than to agreements not to bring legal action "by any tortfeasor"; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 82-406 deleted provision re authority of court to deduct any amount of money received as settlement from verdict and added provision re authority of court to order remittitur or additur.

      See Sec. 52-572e re release of joint tortfeasor.

      Cited. 176 C. 245; Id., 383. Cited. 179 C. 269. Found unconstitutional as violating the right to trial by jury by permitting trial court to interfere with fact-finding function of jury. 186 C. 337. Cited. 187 C. 1. Statute as amended by public act 82-406, S. 3 held constitutional. 196 C. 53. Statute codifies proper procedure with regard to out-of-court settlements of joint tortfeasors. 196 C. 341. Cited. 203 C. 607. Cited. 206 C. 16. Cited. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 67. Cited. 212 C. 509. Cited. 219 C. 314. Cited. 223 C. 786. Cited. 229 C. 716. Cited. 230 C. 795. Cited. 231 C. 500. Cited. 234 C. 660. Cited. 239 C. 144. Section provides a directive to trial court that if defendant rejects the additur, trial court must set aside verdict and order a new trial, because initial verdict was necessarily inadequate as a matter of law. 246 C. 170. There is no irreconcilable conflict between Secs. 52-228b and 52-216a mandating that one be accepted and the other abandoned. Id. Trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether jury reasonably could have found that plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue. That decision should be made, not on the assumption that jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that jury did exactly what it intended to do. 252 C. 174. Statute inapplicable to an action brought pursuant to the defective highway statute in which municipality is the sole tortfeasor because express language of statute applies solely to actions in which there are, or could be, joint tortfeasors. 258 C. 574. Under this section a trial court may, in exercise of its discretion, reduce a jury award to account for pretrial settlement payments; however, before doing so, the court first must determine that the settlement payments, when added to the jury award, render that award excessive as a matter of law, a threshold that is met only when the total amount received so far exceeds what is fair and reasonable as to be unconscionable. 284 C. 645.

      Cited. 8 CA 407; Id., 642. Cited. 26 CA 509. Cited. 31 CA 584. Cited. 38 CA 685. Cited. 43 CA 475.

      Statute does not preclude an allegation of payments from a joint tortfeasor as a special defense. 40 CS 263.

      Sec. 52-216b. Articulation to trier of fact of amount of damages claimed to be recoverable permitted. (a) In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, counsel for any party to the action shall be entitled to specifically articulate to the trier of fact during closing arguments, in lump sums or by mathematical formulae, the amount of past and future economic and noneconomic damages claimed to be recoverable.

      (b) Whenever, in a jury trial, specific monetary sums or mathematical formulae are articulated during closing arguments as provided for in subsection (a) of this section, the trial court shall instruct the jury that the sums or mathematical formulae articulated are not evidence but only arguments and that the determination of the amount of damages to be awarded, if any, is solely the jury's function.

      (P.A. 89-319.)

      Cited. 216 C. 604. P.A. 89-319 cited. Id. Cited. 217 C. 671. Cited. 221 C. 331.

      Cited. 31 CA 518. Cited. 38 CA 447. Standard for admission of future economic damages is that it must be reasonably probable that plaintiff will require certain treatment in the future as a result of defendant's conduct and in this case admitted statement was impermissible when based on possibility that plaintiff may require surgery in the future. 85 CA 383.

      Sec. 52-216c. Failure to call a witness. Jury instruction prohibited; argument by counsel permitted. No court in the trial of a civil action may instruct the jury that an inference unfavorable to any party's cause may be drawn from the failure of any party to call a witness at such trial. However, counsel for any party to the action shall be entitled to argue to the trier of fact during closing arguments, except where prohibited by section 52-174, that the jury should draw an adverse inference from another party's failure to call a witness who has been proven to be available to testify.

      (P.A. 98-50.)

      Legislature intended not only that there be advance notice of counsel's intent to invite jury to draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to call a witness, but also that there be an advance ruling by trial judge that counsel has provided some evidentiary basis entitling him or her to do so. 72 CA 359. Defendant was properly permitted to present in closing argument that the jury could draw an adverse inference from plaintiff's decision not to call his wife as a witness. 123 CA 555.

      Sec. 52-217. Violation of statute by minor. In all actions for recovery of damages for injury to person or property, in which the plaintiff or defendant was a minor under sixteen years of age at the time such cause of action arose, it shall be a question of fact to be submitted to the judge or jury to determine whether or not such minor plaintiff or minor defendant was in the exercise of due care, when there is a violation of statutory duty by such plaintiff or defendant.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7948.)

      Cited. 146 C. 10. Minor child may be liable to her minor sister for damage caused by negligence. 147 C. 649. Cited. 148 C. 459. Boy fourteen years old entitled to have jury measure his conduct by that reasonably to be expected of children of similar age, judgment and experience. 151 C. 434. Cited. 154 C. 644. Cited. 165 C. 251.

      Cited. 38 CS 426.

      Sec. 52-218. Jury may try issues of fact in equitable action. Upon the application of either party, the court may order any issue or issues of fact in any action demanding equitable relief to be tried by a jury of six.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7937; 1953, S. 3179d; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 6.)

      History: 1971 act deleted provision specifying that application is deemed to be a request for six-person jury unless it expressly calls for full jury of twelve, making six-person jury the rule.

      Trial by jury in equitable action. 79 C. 260; 81 C. 451; 82 C. 293; 83 C. 109; 85 C. 159; 90 C. 624, 633; 98 C. 222; 100 C. 248. Methods and priority in trial of equitable and legal issues. Id. See note to section 52-215. No constitutional right to demand that incidental issues of fact in equitable action be tried to jury. 113 C. 608. Cited. 117 C. 454. In equitable proceeding general verdict usually will not serve purpose intended, which is to inform court as to facts upon which relief is to be granted; proper course in most instances is to submit interrogatories covering issues on which court in its discretion determines decision of jury will be appropriate and useful. 121 C. 649. Cited. 122 C. 512. But when general claim for jury trial of equitable action is granted, unless court later modifies order, better practice is to submit to jury all issues it may properly try. Id., 567. Court's discretion to submit legal issues to jury should be sparingly exercised. 124 C. 571. As where incidental damages asked in action in which fundamental purpose is injunctive relief. 127 C. 153. This section rather than section 52-219 applies in foreclosure action where defendant files cross complaint for money damages based on entirely separate transactions. 130 C. 206. Action of court is a discretionary matter. 134 C. 329. Action for declaratory judgment is not one in equity. 135 C. 294. Cited. 148 C. 391. Cited. 182 C. 193. Cited. 189 C. 490. Cited. 197 C. 34. Cited. 223 C. 419. Cited. 230 C. 148.

      Cited. 23 CA 287. Cited. 41 CA 19.

      Trial of questions of fact incidental to equitable issues is discretionary with the court. 4 CS 437. Cited. 15 CS 417. Cited. 17 CS 18. Strict foreclosure, being a purely equitable action, is not triable by a jury or of right but is within discretion of court and such discretion should be exercised sparingly. 18 CS 498. Cited. 44 CS 411.

      Sec. 52-219. Claim for damages and equitable relief; separate trials. Whenever an action brought to recover damages and also to obtain equitable relief has been placed upon the docket as a jury case, the determination of the equitable issues raised by the pleadings shall not prevent a jury trial of the claim for damages, unless both parties agree in writing to waive a jury, or unless the determination of the equitable issues has necessarily adjudicated all the facts upon which the claim for damages rests.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7938; P.A. 82-160, S. 107.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.

      Former practice. 73 C. 486. Cited. Id. Applied to creditor's bill; 78 C. 595; where relief is sought against person making and person receiving fraudulent assignment. 83 C. 112; 100 C. 718. Cited. 97 C. 719. Applied and explained. 100 C. 248. Defendant filing cross complaint in foreclosure action, raising some legal issues, not entitled to jury trial as of right. 130 C. 211. Cited. 134 C. 333. Where essential right asserted in cross complaint is equitable in its nature, and claim for damages is merely supplemental to equitable relief sought, plaintiff had no right to a jury trial. 135 C. 558. Cited. 223 C. 419. Cited. 227 C. 175.

      Sec. 52-220. Hearing in damages: When to jury. In any action at law in which the defendant suffers a default and there is a hearing in damages, the hearing in damages shall be to a jury of six if either party to the action, within thirty days after the default has been entered, files with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending a request in writing that the hearing in damages be to a jury.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7956; 1953, S. 3182d; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 7; P.A. 78-379, S. 20, 27; P.A. 82-160, S. 108.)

      History: 1971 act amended section to specify hearing heard by six-person juries in all cases where previously six-person jury was usual but request could be made for full twelve-person jury; P.A. 78-379 amended section to render provisions inapplicable in actions where judgment is rendered for plaintiff upon a demurrer to the complaint overruled; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Not retroactive nor applicable to action pending when statute was enacted. 59 C. 365. A default, and a neglect to answer after demurrer overruled, are not the same in legal effect. 63 C. 261. Notice of intention to suffer a default is not itself a default. 64 C. 487. Cited. 73 C. 684. Justification of entry of judgment; time of filing. 78 C. 289. Liability of defendant not in issue unless notice of intent to contest liability has been given. 138 C. 29. Cited. Id., 35. See note to section 52-84. A defendant who suffers a default is entitled to a hearing in damages in accordance with the statutes and rules of the court. 148 C. 435. Where one defendant defaulted, plaintiffs were not required to proceed to hearing in damages as to him but could properly wait until pleadings had been closed as to remaining defendants and court followed proper procedure in proceeding to trial of all issues raised by appearing defendants. 149 C. 458. Cited. 156 C. 6. When defendant has been defaulted for nonappearance at trial of case which was regularly assigned for trial, court may proceed forthwith to assessment of damages. Such case is to be distinguished from one when defendant defaults at point other than at trial of action. 159 C. 352.

      Cited. 9 CA 1.

      No jury granted for hearing in damages resulting under section 17-320. 14 CS 482.

      Sec. 52-221. Hearing in damages: Evidence. Notice. (a) In any hearing in damages upon default suffered or after demurrer overruled, the defendant shall not be permitted to offer evidence to contradict any allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, except such as relate to the amount of damage, unless he has given notice to the plaintiff of his intention to contradict such allegations and of the subject matter which he intends to contradict, nor shall the defendant be permitted to deny the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action, nor shall he be permitted to prove any matter of defense, unless he has given written notice to the plaintiff of his intention to deny such right or to prove such matter of defense.

      (b) The judges of the Supreme Court shall make such rules as to the manner of filing such notices and as to the form thereof as they deem advisable.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7957, 7958; 1957, P.A. 651, S. 31; P.A. 82-160, S. 109.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 inserted Subsec. indicators and substituted "the" for "such" in Subsec. (a).

      Prescribes a mere rule of procedure and affects pending suits. 70 C. 564; 71 C. 617. The defense of res judicata is available under the statute. 71 C. 489. Statute overrides conflicting rules, and the required notice is essential to the introduction of evidence. Id., 621. Cited. 72 C. 79; 73 C. 687; 138 C. 35. Nature of proceedings. 69 C. 556; 75 C. 76; 78 C. 289. Nature and sufficiency of notice. 73 C. 338; 75 C. 481; 77 C. 110. Hearing virtually a trial. 78 C. 289. Notice may be filed though demurrer is pending. 77 C. 110. Allowing amendment to complaint after hearing. 69 C. 556. Judgment for nominal damages as judgment for defendant 72 C. 388. Default as waiving defects in pleading; 73 C. 428; 75 C. 76; 77 C. 358; 77 C. 501; 78 C. 48; 78 C. 289; as admitting allegations of complaint. 68 C. 345; 69 C. 556; 72 C. 74; 77 C. 435; 78 C. 318; 86 C. 308; 100 C. 313. Burden of proof. 68 C. 345; 70 C. 54; 71 C. 632; 72 C. 74; Id., 397; 73 C. 203; Id., 453; Id., 680; 75 C. 289; Id., 481; 76 C. 317; 77 C. 145; Id., 358; 78 C. 318; Id., 617; Id., 709; 80 C. 470; 81 C. 432. Notice must set out fellow servant doctrine as defense. 77 C. 358. Proving invalidity of release set up in defense, without pleading. 81 C. 423. Liability of defendant not in issue unless notice of intent to contest liability has been given. 138 C. 29. A defendant who suffers a default is entitled to a hearing in damages in accordance with the statutes and rules of the court. 148 C. 435. A hearing in damages held ten days after the return day was premature. Id. While defaulted defendant called as witness could not disclaim his liability, he could nevertheless be so called by plaintiffs under section 52-178. 149 C. 459. Supreme court refused to consider issue raised for first time in appeal brief that judgment was rendered after hearing immediately following order of default; appeals court not required to consider errors which are not assigned or pass on questions not ruled on by trial court. 156 C. 6. Cited. 159 C. 355. Cited. 195 C. 191.

      Cited. 6 CA 390. Cited. 9 CA 1. Cited. 19 CA 515.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 18 CA 245.

      Sec. 52-221a. Hearing in damages: Proof of damages on defendant's failure to appear. In any hearing in damages at which the defendant fails to appear in person or by counsel the plaintiff shall be permitted to submit affidavits, duly sworn and acknowledged, of damages and special damages as proof of such damages.

      (1971, P.A. 411.)

      Cited. 9 CA 1.

      Sec. 52-222. Verdict by nine jurors. Section 52-222 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7971; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 11.)

      Sec. 52-223. Jury may be three times returned to consider verdict. The court may, if it judges the jury has mistaken the evidence in the action and has brought in a verdict contrary to the evidence, or has brought in a verdict contrary to the direction of the court in a matter of law, return them to a second consideration, and for the same reason may return them to a third consideration. The jury shall not be returned for further consideration after a third consideration.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7972; P.A. 82-160, S. 110.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      This embraces actions for a statutory penalty. 1 R. 493. New trial may be granted for wrong instructions given in returning jury. 9 C. 112. But not for expressing opinion in favor of a different verdict. 4 D. 406; 99 C. 416. Cited. 64 C. 65. When jury may be returned; discretion of court; instructions. 74 C. 584; 90 C. 262; 99 C. 416; 105 C. 530; 106 C. 728; 113 C. 254. See where jury is called in for further instructions or comes in to ask a question. 82 C. 618. If verdict returned a third time, it must be accepted. 89 C. 241. Discretion of court. 90 C. 276; 98 C. 462; 108 C. 553. Instructing jury as to duty to agree. 90 C. 385. Judge need not announce verdict returned because not in proper form. 72 C. 141. Verdict may be returned for addition of interest. 82 C. 615. Court may return jury where verdict is clearly inadequate; 90 C. 93; or where in homicide case, it doubts correctness of first degree verdict. 93 C. 244. Court should ordinarily permit clerk to read aloud verdict returned in proper form. 105 C. 530. Affidavits of jurors that they understood and weighed charge cannot be used to support motion in arrest of judgment where court returned jury thinking they had not understood the charge. Id. Proper for court to tell jury why they are returned; no error in remark that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover, amount was inadequate. 117 C. 436. Nor in comment that, if jury believed plaintiff's evidence concerning special damages, court felt inadequate amount had been allowed for general damages. 128 C. 56. Not a verdict until accepted by court, but court's silence when clerk proclaims verdict is acceptance. 120 C. 537. Court may return jury even though verdict not so unreasonable that if accepted it would have to be set aside. 133 C. 686. Not error for court to accept verdict on first count in murder case and return jury for further consideration of counts on which they could not agree. 134 C. 114. Cited. 143 C. 31. If jury's decision is unintelligible, court should direct jury, with appropriate instructions, to reconsider its verdict. 147 C. 72. Court may return jury for reconsideration of a verdict if it feels it is excessive. Id., 191. Before jury is returned for reconsideration, its verdict should be read by the clerk and assented to by the foreman. Id. Section did not apply where jury made three reports of disagreement to court; report of disagreement merely serves to inform court of inability of jury to reach a verdict and is not a verdict. 156 C. 159. Cited. 173 C. 183. Exercise of court's power in returning jury to reconsider verdict is not conditioned on verdict being so unreasonable that it would have to be set aside if accepted. 175 C. 230. Cited. 189 C. 1. Cited. 225 C. 238; Id., 420. Cited. 232 C. 480.

      Cited. 28 CA 449. Cited. 38 CA 447. Cited. 45 CA 571.

      The court may in returning the jury, submit any issue save that of damages. 10 CS 99. Cited. 22 CS 41. Cited. 38 CS 400, 404.

      Sec. 52-224. Special verdicts. Jury to assess damages. (a) The court shall determine questions of law referred to it by the jury in a special verdict, which they may give when they entertain doubts respecting points of law arising in the action, or when the parties request it. In a special verdict the jury shall find the facts, and state the questions of law thus:

If the law be so in such a point, then we find for the plaintiff;
but if the law be otherwise, then we find for the defendant.

      Sec. 52-225. Judgment on verdict; assessment of damages when judgment rendered other than on verdict. The court shall render judgment on all verdicts of the jury, according to their finding, with costs, unless the verdict is set aside; and in all cases where judgment is rendered otherwise than on a verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, the court shall assess the damages which he shall recover.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7974.)

      Assessment of damages in U.S. courts should follow the practice of the state courts. 43 C. 599. A default admits the right of the plaintiff to nominal damages only. 44 C. 501; 45 C. 58; 53 C. 193; Id., 474. Long before 1818 damages were assessed by the court upon a default or demurrer overruled. 53 C. 2. Applies to all cases where judgment is rendered otherwise than on a verdict. 57 C. 585. Cited. 63 C. 266. Assessment on alternative finding is erroneous. 71 C. 452; 72 C. 624. Motion for judgment non obstante veredicto lies when; not for variance. 91 C. 249. Judgments non obstante veredicto reviewed. 131 C. 622. Unless verdict is set aside, interest runs from date of verdict. 145 C. 74. Rule as to setting aside of verdict as against the evidence, reviewed. 146 C. 658, 705; 147 C. 18, 109. If a jury's final decision is unintelligible and inconsistent, a motion to set aside the verdict should be granted; motion to reassemble the jury and, or in the alternative, to correct the verdict should be denied. Id., 72. While a memorandum of decision is not required on denial of a motion to set aside the verdict, but only the granting of it, it is sound practice, where the motion is not frivolous, to set forth in a memorandum the basic reasons why the motion is denied. Id., 566. Trial court correct in setting aside verdict and in granting motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict as plaintiff did not establish a breach of duty by defendant. Id., 708. Time within which motions in arrest of judgment must be filed. 148 C. 57. Setting aside verdict by trial judge for error in instructions to jury (here, failure to explain meaning of "rebuttable presumption") should be exercised with great caution and only where judge is satisfied error is unmistakeable and unquestionably harmful. 155 C. 220. Plaintiff filed motion to set aside verdict of jury for defendant. Trial court, twenty-two months thereafter having neither decided motion nor entered judgment, ordered to forthwith grant or deny motion. 159 C. 605. Cited. 225 C. 420. Cited. 231 C. 77.

      Verdict of jury should not be set aside lightly. 21 CS 28. Court refused to set aside verdict where evidence on issue of contributory negligence was close. Id., 282. Cited. 29 CA 484. Cited. 38 CA 685.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 82. Where defendant did not move to set aside verdict, appeal court cannot decide whether jury erred in concluding defendant was guilty. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 334.

      Sec. 52-225a. Reduction in economic damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions for collateral source payments. (a) In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987, or (2) personal injury or wrongful death, arising out of the rendition of professional services by a health care provider, occurring on or after October 1, 1985, and prior to October 1, 1986, if the action was filed on or after October 1, 1987, and wherein liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compensate the claimant, the court shall reduce the amount of such award which represents economic damages, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-572h, by an amount equal to the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (b) of this section less the total of amounts determined to have been paid, contributed or forfeited under subsection (c) of this section, except that there shall be no reduction for (A) a collateral source for which a right of subrogation exists, and (B) the amount of collateral sources equal to the reduction in the claimant's economic damages attributable to the claimant's percentage of negligence pursuant to section 52-572h.

      (b) Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of fact and before the court enters judgment, the court shall receive evidence from the claimant and other appropriate persons concerning the total amount of collateral sources which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant as of the date the court enters judgment.

      (c) The court shall receive evidence from the claimant and any other appropriate person concerning any amount which has been paid, contributed or forfeited, as of the date the court enters judgment, by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he has received as a result of such injury or death.

      (P.A. 85-574, S. 1; P.A. 86-338, S. 4; P.A. 87-227, S. 4; P.A. 07-217, S. 191; P.A. 10-36, S. 9.)

      History: P.A. 86-338 deleted provision which limited operation of section to actions arising out of the rendition of professional services by a health care provider and expanded section to include any civil action accruing on or after October 1, 1986 seeking compensation for personal injury or wrongful death, and added provision prohibiting reduction in the award for the amount of collateral sources equal to the reduction in the claimant's recoverable damages attributable to his percentage of negligence; P.A. 87-227 divided section into Subsecs., amended Subsec. (a) to change applicability of section from "In any civil action, accruing on or after October 1, 1986, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks compensation for personal injury or wrongful death" to "In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987, or (2) personal injury or wrongful death arising out of the rendition of professional services by a health care provider, occurring on or after October 1, 1985, and prior to October 1, 1986, if the action was filed on or after October 1, 1987," provide the reduction shall be in "economic" damages, and replace the provision that reduction shall be by "the total of all amounts paid to the claimant from all collateral sources which are available to him" with reduction by "an amount equal to the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (b) less the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (c)", amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to receive evidence "before it enters judgment" concerning collateral sources paid "as of the date the court enters judgment", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace requirement that the court "also take testimony" with requirement that the court "receive evidence from the claimant and any other appropriate person," and to specify that the amount is that paid, contributed or forfeited "as of the date the court enters judgment" and that the collateral source benefit is that which he "has received" rather than "is receiving"; P.A. 07-217 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective July 12, 2007; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "paid under subsection (c)" with "paid, contributed or forfeited under subsection (c)" and amended Subsec. (c) to make a technical change, effective July 1, 2010.

      Cited. 203 C. 607. Cited. 206 C. 16. Cited. 212 C. 217. P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Cited. 218 C. 531. Collateral source rule cited. Id. Collateral source payments under this section are applicable to determine the amount of damages but not to determine amount of coverage. 225 C. 566. Cited. 229 C. 99. Application and interpretation of section discussed; deemed not unconstitutionally vague. 231 C. 77. Cited. 235 C. 107. Intent to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining double recoveries. 248 C. 409. Only payments specifically corresponding with items of damages included in jury's verdict are to be deducted as collateral sources from the economic damages award, not total amount paid by collateral sources for the medical bills, and burden is on defendant to submit interrogatories to jury concerning specific items of damages included within verdict. 269 C. 1.

      Cited. 29 CA 484. Cited. 31 CA 584; Id., 806. Cited. 33 CA 99. Cited. 34 CA 444. Cited. 37 CA 784. Cited. 38 CA 685. Cited. 46 CA 76. Collateral source rule cited. 47 CA 365. Statute requires reduction of economic damages by the total of all collateral source payments received, less the total of premiums paid to secure the collateral sources. 77 CA 238.

      Subsec. (a):

      When the amount of collateral sources received by plaintiff is less than or equal to the amount of reduction in claimant's economic damages attributable to claimant's own negligence, there shall be no collateral source reduction in the award. 55 CA 150.

      Subsec. (b):

      Trial court did not improperly allow evidence of collateral sources to be admitted to jury. 102 CA 93.

      Subsec. (c):

      Where the only collateral source benefit that plaintiff received as result of automobile accident was medical payments under plaintiff's automobile insurance policy, plaintiff was entitled to offset the collateral source reduction of her economic damage award by the cost of her medical payments coverage only. 263 C. 93.

      Sec. 52-225b. "Collateral sources" defined. For purposes of sections 52-225a to 52-225c, inclusive: "Collateral sources" means any payments made to the claimant, or on his behalf, by or pursuant to: (1) Any health or sickness insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by him or provided by others; or (2) any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental or other health care services. "Collateral sources" do not include amounts received by a claimant as a settlement.

      (P.A. 85-574, S. 2; P.A. 86-338, S. 5; P.A. 87-227, S. 5.)

      History: P.A. 86-338 included within definition of collateral sources any payments by any person as compensation for personal injury or wrongful death attributable to the incident giving rise to the cause of action and deleted the definition of health care provider to reflect the expansion of Sec. 52-225a to any civil action; P.A. 87-227 deleted provision added in 1986 including within definition of collateral sources any payments by any person as compensation for personal injury or wrongful death attributable to the incident giving rise to the cause of action and added provision that collateral sources do not include amounts received by a claimant as a settlement.

      Cited. 203 C. 607. P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Cited. 218 C. 531. Collateral source rule cited. Id. Cited. 225 C. 566. Cited. 231 C. 77. Cited. 235 C. 107. Trial court improperly applied provisions adopted in P.A. 87-227 instead of those adopted in P.A. 86-338. 247 C. 638. Social Security disability benefits are not a collateral source. 259 C. 325.

      Cited. 31 CA 806. Cited. 38 CA 685. Cited. 46 CA 76.

      Debts voluntarily forgiven by medical care provider and amounts paid by employer pursuant to wage continuation plan are not collateral sources. 49 CS 7.

      Sec. 52-225c. Recovery of collateral source benefits prohibited. Unless otherwise provided by law, no insurer or any other person providing collateral source benefits as defined in section 52-225b shall be entitled to recover the amount of any such benefits from the defendant or any other person or entity as a result of any claim or action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death regardless of whether such claim or action is resolved by settlement or judgment. The provisions of this section shall apply to insurance contracts issued, reissued or renewed on or after October 1, 1986.

      (P.A. 85-574, S. 3; P.A. 86-338, S. 6; P.A. 87-227, S. 6; P.A. 93-297, S. 24, 29.)

      History: P.A. 86-338 limited collateral source benefits to those defined in "subdivision (2)" of Sec. 52-225b, deleted limitation that action for damages arise out of the rendition of professional services by a health care provider, and made section applicable to insurance contracts issued, reissued or renewed on or after October 1, 1986; P.A. 87-227 replaced "any other party providing collateral source benefits as defined in subdivision (2) of section 52-225b" with "any other person providing collateral source benefits as defined in section 52-225b"; P.A. 93-297 included any "claim" for damages and added provision barring recovery "regardless of whether such claim or action is resolved by settlement or judgment", effective January 1, 1994, and applicable to acts or omissions occurring on or after said date.

      P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Cited. 218 C. 531. Collateral source rule cited. Id. Cited. 231 C. 77. Cited. 235 C. 107.

      Cited. 46 CA 76. Subrogation provision of health insurance policy deemed unenforceable due to conflict with statutory prohibition against recovery by insurers of collateral source payments. 47 CA 365.

      Sec. 52-225d. Payment of damages in lump sum and periodic installments in personal injury, wrongful death and property damage actions. (a) In any civil action wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, and wherein liability is admitted or determined by the trier of fact, the court shall proceed to enter judgment as follows: (1) The trier of fact shall make separate findings for each claimant specifying the amount of any economic damages and noneconomic damages, as defined in subsection (a) of section 52-572h. (2) The court shall take into account any applicable findings made by the court or jury and shall specify for each claimant the amount of recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages, as defined in subsection (a) of section 52-572h. (3) The court shall enter judgment in a lump sum for all such recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages up to an aggregate of two hundred thousand dollars. If the amount of such damages remaining is in excess of two hundred thousand dollars, the court shall provide the parties sixty days to negotiate and consent to an agreement to be incorporated into an amended judgment to provide for the payment of all such damages remaining in excess of two hundred thousand dollars in a lump sum or in periodic installment payments or in any combination thereof without regard to the provisions of this section.

      (b) (1) If the parties agree on the terms of payment pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, with respect to recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages in excess of two hundred thousand dollars, the court shall, subject to a determination by the court that the terms of subsection (e) of this section have been satisfied, enter an amended judgment incorporating such agreement of the parties into the amended judgment. (2) If the parties fail to agree on the terms of payment pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, with respect to the payment of damages in excess of two hundred thousand dollars, the court shall enter an amended judgment to provide for the payment of such damages in a lump sum.

      (c) If an amended judgment for periodic installment payments is entered pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that portion of the contingency fee or any other payment arranged between the claimant and the attorney for professional services relating to recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages subject to periodic installment payments as required under such amended judgment shall be payable in periodic installment payments in accordance with an order to be entered by the court simultaneously with but separate and apart from the amended judgment, unless prior to the entry of that order the claimant and such attorney have otherwise agreed and so informed the court.

      (d) The time within which any party aggrieved by a judgment of the court made under this section may appeal shall run from the issuance of notice of the rendition of the later-filed of the judgment or amended judgment prescribed by subsection (a) of this section or the amended judgment prescribed by subsection (b) of this section.

      (e) The court shall require any party liable for the payment of damages in periodic installment payments to demonstrate to the court its ability to make such periodic installment payments and, if appropriate, at the discretion of the court, require such party to post and maintain security adequate to assure full payment of such party's portion of the unpaid damages.

      (f) If the court enters judgment for periodic installment payments pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section and a claimant dies before the end of the period during which such periodic installment payments are to be made, the obligation of the defendant or defendants to make such periodic installment payments shall not cease until the remaining financial obligation of the defendant or defendants has, in accordance with an order of a court having jurisdiction in the matter, been paid into the estate of the claimant in periodic installment payments or distributed to the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the estate as such court may direct and such distribution shall be binding as to any party making periodic installment payments hereunder.

      (g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the right of a claimant, defendant or defendants and insurers to settle claims as they consider appropriate and in their complete discretion at any time.

      (h) Following the fulfillment of all obligations specified in the judgment for periodic installment payments, any obligation of the defendant or any other person to make further payments pursuant to this section shall cease.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 2; P.A. 87-227, S. 2; P.A. 05-288, S. 176.)

      History: P.A. 87-227 substantially revised and rewrote section including, inter alia, deleting definitions of future economic damages, past economic damages, future noneconomic damages and past noneconomic damages, changing applicability of section from "any civil action, accruing on or after October 1, 1986, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death" to "any civil action wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987," replacing provisions that required the trier of fact to specify past economic damages, future economic damages, past noneconomic damages and future economic damages and the court to apply applicable rules of law to such findings in calculating respective amounts of damages for each claimant to recover and each defendant to pay with provisions requiring the trier of fact to specify economic damages and noneconomic damages, as defined in Sec. 52-572h(a) and the court to take into account applicable findings and specify for each claimant the amount of recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages, as defined in Sec. 52-572h(a), replacing provisions that required the court to enter judgment in a lump sum for all past economic and past noneconomic damages and for all future economic and future noneconomic damages up to $200,000 with provisions requiring a lump sum payment for all recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages up to $200,000, replacing provisions that if the parties fail to agree on the payment of future economic and noneconomic damages in excess of $200,000 the court shall enter judgment for periodic installment payments with provisions that if the parties fail to agree on the payment of recoverable economic and recoverable noneconomic damages in excess of $200,000 the court shall enter an amended judgment to provide for a lump sum payment, deleting provisions concerning the amount and duration of periodic installment payments and prohibiting their modification, deleting provisions re payment of attorney's fees related to past economic and noneconomic damages and revising provisions re payment of attorney's fees related to damages subject to periodic installment payments, adding provisions re time period for appeal, making requirement of posting and maintaining security for unpaid damages discretionary with the court and revising provisions re the obligation of a defendant to make periodic installment payments upon the death of the claimant; P.A. 05-288 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b) and (c), effective July 13, 2005.

      P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Cited. 216 C. 605. Cited. 221 C. 473. Cited. 231 C. 77. Cited. 235 C. 107.

      Statute does not preclude listing of subcategories of classes of damages it specifies and does not take away court's common-law power to require jury to render a special verdict where plaintiff requests such a verdict. 64 CA 160.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1): Relationship between awards of economic and noneconomic damages discussed; judgment of appellate court in Childs v. Baines, 35 CA 301, reversed. 235 C. 107.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 217. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.; 217 C. 1.

      Subsec. (e):

      Cited. 212 C. 217.

      Sec. 52-225e. Notice of settlement in excess of ten thousand dollars by insurer to claimant. (a) Upon the payment in settlement of any third-party liability claim in excess of ten thousand dollars where the claimant is a natural person, the insurer shall mail to the claimant notice of such payment at the same time payment is made by the insurer.

      (b) The notice required pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be mailed to the last known address of such claimant as furnished by such claimant's attorney or representative at the time of settlement.

      (c) Nothing in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall (1) create any cause of action or proceeding for any person or entity against an insurer based upon a failure to provide notice as required by this section or defective notice, or (2) establish a defense for any party to any cause of action based upon a failure to provide notice as required by this section or defective notice.

      (P.A. 97-267, S. 1.)

      Sec. 52-225f. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights prior to October 1, 2003. (a) For purposes of this section:

      (1) "Annuity issuer" means an insurer that has issued any insurance contract used to fund periodic payments under a structured settlement;

      (2) "Expenses" means all broker's commissions, service charges, application or processing fees, closing costs, filing or administrative charges, legal fees, notary fees and other commissions, fees, costs and charges payable by the payee in connection with the proposed transfer or deductible from the gross consideration that would be paid to the payee in connection with the transfer;

      (3) "Interested parties" means, with respect to any structured settlement, the payee, any beneficiary designated to receive payments following the payee's death or, if the designated beneficiary is a minor, the designated beneficiary's parent or guardian, the annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor;

      (4) "Payee" means an individual who is receiving payments under a structured settlement and proposes to make a transfer of payment rights thereunder;

      (5) "Structured settlement" means an arrangement for periodic payment of damages established by settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim or for periodic payments in settlement of a workers' compensation claim;

      (6) "Structured settlement obligor" means, with respect to any structured settlement, the party that has the continuing periodic payment obligation to the payee under a structured settlement agreement or under an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning of Section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended;

      (7) "Structured settlement payment rights" means rights to receive periodic payments, including lump sum payments, under a structured settlement, whether from the settlement obligor or the annuity issuer;

      (8) "Transfer" means any sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation or other form of alienation or encumbrance made for consideration;

      (9) "Transfer agreement" means the agreement providing for transfer of structured settlement payment rights from a payee to a transferee; and

      (10) "Transferee" means any person receiving structured settlement payment rights resulting from a transfer.

      (b) No transfer of structured settlement payment rights, either directly or indirectly, shall be effective by any payee domiciled in this state or by any payee entitled to receive payments under a structured settlement funded by an insurance contract issued by an insurer domiciled in this state or owned by an insurer or corporation domiciled in this state and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of any such transfer unless (1) not less than ten days prior to the date on which the payee entered into the transfer agreement, the transferee provided to the payee a written disclosure statement setting forth (A) the amounts and due dates of the structured settlement payments to be transferred; (B) the aggregate amount of the payments; (C) the gross amount of all expenses; (D) the amount payable to the payee, net of all expenses, in exchange for the payments; (E) the discounted present value of all structured settlement payments to be transferred and the discount rate used in determining such discounted present value; and (F) a statement that the payee may be subject to adverse federal and state income tax consequences as a result of the proposed transfer; and (2) such transfer has been approved by a court pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.

      (c) (1) Prior to any transfer, the payee entitled to receive payments under such structured settlement shall commence a declaratory judgment action under section 52-29 for a determination as to whether the transfer of such structured settlement payment rights is in the best interests of the payee and is fair and reasonable to all interested parties under all of the circumstances then existing. The annuity issuer and the structured settlement obligor shall be made parties to such action. If the court determines, after hearing, that such transfer should be allowed, it shall approve such transfer upon such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate.

      (2) The court in which the original action was or could have been filed or the court which has jurisdiction where the applicant resides shall have jurisdiction over any such action.

      (3) The payee shall cause notice of the action to be served on all interested parties by a proper officer or other person lawfully empowered to make service. The notice of the action shall include (A) a copy of the payee's application to the court for approval of the transfer, (B) a copy of the disclosure statement required under subsection (b) of this section and (C) notice of the hearing.

      (4) The payee may seek an order setting the deadline for the filing of written objections. The payee shall give notice to all interested parties of the deadline for filing objections whether such deadline has been established by court order or by operation of the general statutes or court rule. Notice shall be mailed to all interested parties at least ten days before such deadline.

      (5) The court shall hold a hearing on the application. The payee shall give notice of the hearing to all interested parties.

      (d) Nothing contained in this section shall imply that any transfer under a transfer agreement dated prior to October 1, 1998, is binding upon any interested party or that any annuity issuer or structured settlement obligor is under any obligation to make transferred payments to the transferee of any such prior transfer.

      (e) The provisions of this section may not be waived.

      (f) The provisions of this section shall be applicable to transfer agreements executed on and after October 1, 1998, and prior to October 1, 2003.

      (P.A. 98-238, S. 1, 2; P.A. 03-110, S. 7.)

      History: P.A. 98-238 effective October 1, 1998, and applicable to transfer agreements executed on or after said date; P.A. 03-110 added Subsec. (f) making provisions applicable to transfer agreements executed on and after October 1, 1998, and prior to October 1, 2003.

      Section does not abrogate the common law right to include an antiassignment provision in a structured settlement agreement or annuity issued pursuant to such agreement. 254 C. 259.

      Sec. 52-225g. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: Definitions. For the purposes of sections 52-225g to 52-225l inclusive:

      (1) "Annuity issuer" means an insurer that has issued a contract to fund periodic payments under a structured settlement;

      (2) "Dependents" include a payee's spouse and minor children and all other persons for whom the payee is legally obligated to provide support, including alimony;

      (3) "Discounted present value" means the present value of future payments determined by discounting the payments to the present using the most recently published applicable federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, as issued by the United States Internal Revenue Service;

      (4) "Gross advance amount" means the sum payable to the payee or for the payee's account as consideration for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights before any reductions for transfer expenses or other deductions to be made from such consideration;

      (5) "Independent professional advice" means advice of an attorney, certified public accountant, actuary or other licensed professional adviser;

      (6) "Interested parties" means, with respect to any structured settlement, the payee, any beneficiary irrevocably designated under the annuity contract to receive payments following the payee's death, the annuity issuer, the structured settlement obligor and any other party that has continuing rights or obligations under such structured settlement;

      (7) "Net advance amount" means the gross advance amount less the aggregate amount of the actual and estimated transfer expenses required to be disclosed under subdivision (5) of section 52-225h;

      (8) "Payee" means an individual who is receiving tax-free payments under a structured settlement and proposes to transfer payment rights under the structured settlement;

      (9) "Periodic payments" includes both recurring payments and scheduled future lump-sum payments;

      (10) "Qualified assignment agreement" means an agreement providing for a qualified assignment within the meaning of Section 130 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended;

      (11) "Responsible administrative authority" means, with respect to a structured settlement, any government authority vested by law with exclusive jurisdiction over the settled claim resolved by such structured settlement;

      (12) "Settled claim" means the original tort claim or workers' compensation claim resolved by a structured settlement;

      (13) "Structured settlement" means an arrangement for periodic payment of damages for personal injuries or sickness established by settlement or judgment in resolution of a tort claim or for periodic payments in settlement of a workers' compensation claim;

      (14) "Structured settlement agreement" means the agreement, judgment, stipulation or release embodying the terms of a structured settlement;

      (15) "Structured settlement obligor" means, with respect to any structured settlement, the party that has the continuing obligation to make periodic payments to the payee under a structured settlement agreement or a qualified assignment agreement;

      (16) "Structured settlement payment rights" means rights to receive periodic payments under a structured settlement, whether from the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer, where:

      (A) The payee is domiciled in, or the domicile or principal place of business of the structured settlement obligor or the annuity issuer is located in, this state;

      (B) The structured settlement agreement was approved by a court or responsible administrative authority in this state; or

      (C) The structured settlement agreement is expressly governed by the laws of this state;

      (17) "Terms of the structured settlement" include, with respect to any structured settlement, the terms of the structured settlement agreement, the annuity contract, any qualified assignment agreement, and any order or other approval of any court or responsible administrative authority or other government authority that authorized or approved such structured settlement;

      (18) "Transfer" means any sale, assignment, pledge, hypothecation, or other alienation or encumbrance of structured settlement payment rights made by a payee for consideration, but does not include the creation or perfection of a security interest in structured settlement payment rights under a blanket security agreement entered into with an insured depository institution, in the absence of any action to redirect the structured settlement payments to such insured depository institution, or an agent or successor in interest thereof, or otherwise to enforce such blanket security interest against the structured settlement payment rights;

      (19) "Transfer agreement" means the agreement providing for a transfer of structured settlement payment rights;

      (20) "Transfer expenses" means all expenses of a transfer that are required under the transfer agreement to be paid by the payee or deducted from the gross advance amount, including, but not limited to, court filing fees, attorney's fees, escrow fees, lien recordation fees, judgment and lien search fees, finders' fees, commissions and other payments to a broker or other intermediary, but does not include preexisting obligations of the payee payable for the payee's account from the proceeds of a transfer; and

      (21) "Transferee" means a party acquiring or proposing to acquire structured settlement payment rights through a transfer.

      (P.A. 03-110, S. 1.)

      See Sec. 52-225l re transfer agreements to which applicable.

      Sec. 52-225h. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: Required disclosures to payee. Not less than three days prior to the date on which the payee signs a transfer agreement, the transferee shall provide to the payee a separate disclosure statement, in boldface type at least fourteen points in size, setting forth:

      (1) The amounts and due dates of the structured settlement payments to be transferred;

      (2) The aggregate amount of such payments;

      (3) The discounted present value of the payments to be transferred, which shall be identified as the "calculation of current value of the transferred structured settlement payments under federal standards for valuing annuities," and the amount of the applicable federal rate used in calculating such discounted present value;

      (4) The gross advance amount;

      (5) An itemized listing of all applicable transfer expenses, other than attorney's fees and related disbursements payable in connection with the transferee's application for approval of the transfer, and the transferee's best estimate of the amount of any such fees and disbursements;

      (6) The net advance amount;

      (7) The amount of any penalties or liquidated damages payable by the payee in the event of any breach of the transfer agreement by the payee; and

      (8) A statement that the payee has the right to cancel the transfer agreement, without penalty or further obligation, not later than the third business day after the date the agreement is signed by the payee.

      (P.A. 03-110, S. 2.)

      See Sec. 52-225l re transfer agreements to which applicable.

      Sec. 52-225i. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: Approval. No direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be effective and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless the transfer has been approved in advance in a final court order or order of a responsible administrative authority based on express findings by such court or responsible administrative authority that:

      (1) The transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents;

      (2) The payee has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived such advice in writing; and

      (3) The transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court or other government authority.

      (P.A. 03-110, S. 3.)

      See Sec. 52-225l re transfer agreements to which applicable.

      Sec. 52-225j. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: Effect. Following a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive:

      (1) The structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer shall, as to all parties except the transferee, be discharged and released from any and all liability for the transferred payments;

      (2) The transferee shall be liable to the structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer:

      (A) If the transfer contravenes the terms of the structured settlement, for any taxes incurred by such parties as a consequence of the transfer, and

      (B) For any other liabilities or costs, including reasonable costs and attorney's fees, arising from compliance by such parties with the order of the court or responsible administrative authority or arising as a consequence of the transferee's failure to comply with sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive;

      (3) Neither the structured settlement obligor nor the annuity issuer may be required to divide any periodic payment between the payee and any transferee or assignee or between two or more transferees or assignees; and

      (4) Any further transfer of structured settlement payment rights by the payee may be made only after compliance with all of the requirements of sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive.

      (P.A. 03-110, S. 4.)

      See Sec. 52-225l re transfer agreements to which applicable.

      Sec. 52-225k. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: Procedure for approval. (a) An application under sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive, for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be made by the transferee and may be brought in the superior court for the judicial district in which the payee resides or in which the structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer maintains its principal place of business or in the superior court or before the responsible administrative authority that approved the structured settlement agreement.

      (b) Not less than twenty days prior to the scheduled hearing on any application for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under section 52-225i, the transferee shall file with the court or responsible administrative authority and serve on all interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and the application for its approval, including with the notice:

      (1) A copy of the transferee's application;

      (2) A copy of the transfer agreement;

      (3) A copy of the disclosure statement required under section 52-225h;

      (4) A listing of each of the payee's dependents, together with each dependent's age;

      (5) Notification that any interested party is entitled to support, oppose or otherwise respond to the transferee's application, either in person or by counsel, by submitting written comments to the court or responsible administrative authority or by participating in the hearing; and

      (6) Notification of the time and place of the hearing and notification of the manner in which and the time by which written responses to the application must be filed, which shall be not less than fifteen days after service of the transferee's notice, in order to be considered by the court or responsible administrative authority.

      (P.A. 03-110, S. 5.)

      See Sec. 52-225l re transfer agreements to which applicable.

      Sec. 52-225l. Transfer of structured settlement payment rights: General provisions. (a) The provisions of sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive, may not be waived by any payee.

      (b) Any transfer agreement entered into on or after October 1, 2003, by a payee who resides in this state shall provide that disputes under such transfer agreement, including any claim that the payee has breached the agreement, shall be determined in and under the laws of this state. No such transfer agreement shall authorize the transferee or any other party to confess judgment or consent to entry of judgment against the payee.

      (c) No transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall extend to any payments that are life-contingent unless, prior to the date on which the payee signs the transfer agreement, the transferee has established and agreed to maintain procedures reasonably satisfactory to the structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer for:

      (1) Periodically confirming the payee's survival; and

      (2) Giving the structured settlement obligor and the annuity issuer prompt written notice in the event of the payee's death.

      (d) No payee who proposes to make a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall incur any penalty, forfeit any application fee or other payment or otherwise incur any liability to the proposed transferee or any assignee based on any failure of such transfer to satisfy the conditions of sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive.

      (e) Nothing contained in sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive, shall be construed to authorize any transfer of structured settlement payment rights in contravention of any law or to imply that any transfer under a transfer agreement entered into prior to October 1, 2003, is valid or invalid.

      (f) Compliance with the requirements set forth in section 52-225h and fulfillment of the conditions set forth in section 52-225i shall be solely the responsibility of the transferee in any transfer of structured settlement payment rights, and neither the structured settlement obligor nor the annuity issuer shall bear any responsibility for, or any liability arising from, noncompliance with such requirements or failure to fulfill such conditions.

      (g) The provisions of sections 52-225g to 52-225l, inclusive, shall be applicable to transfer agreements executed on and after October 1, 2003.

      (P.A. 03-110, S. 6.)

      Sec. 52-226. Trial to the court. Special finding. In any action for legal relief, when the parties join in an issue of fact and the action is tried to the court, the judge of the court may hear and try the issue without a jury, award damages and costs, and grant execution, in the same manner and on the same principles as in a trial by jury. In any trial to a court, except a trial at a small claims session, the court shall find, upon written motion of either party made within fourteen days after the entry of judgment, the facts upon which its judgment is founded, and make the finding a part of the record.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7975; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 176; 1963, P.A. 8; P.A. 82-160, S. 112.)

      History: 1959 act deleted reference to trial before justice of the peace; 1963 act required motion re finding of facts be written and made within 14 days after judgment and excepted trial at small claims session from same provision; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Judgment must answer the issue. 5 D. 47. Issue closed to the county court may be tried to jury, on appeal to superior court. 4 D. 448. A proceeding by mandamus falls within the provision de finding. 41 C. 137. Finding presumptively contains all the facts. 51 C. 399. Facts must be found at time of judgment, or at least during that term. 72 C. 611. Motion to find facts naturally follows judgment. 73 C. 685. Should be liberally construed in aid of the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Id., 686. Should include only facts necessary to judgment. 88 C. 123. Relation between special finding and finding for appeal. 72 C. 612; 73 C. 681; 87 C. 41; Id., 608. Memo of decision not a special finding. 80 C. 434; 88 C. 142. Procedure when court refuses to make special finding; effect of such refusal. 103 C. 45. Cited. 69 C. 409. Cited. 112 C. 441. Cited. 125 C. 622. If a party desires a special finding upon any particular issue, he should make a motion to trial court. 120 C. 247. By request for special finding, may cause trial court to place on record amount of damages it finds each plaintiff entitled to recover. 125 C. 737. Special finding cannot be claimed in connection with interlocutory ruling. 128 C. 295. See notes to section 52-231 and sections on appeals to supreme court. Although judgment did not comply with statutory directions of section 47-31, plaintiff's motion for special finding afforded a statement of material facts on which judgment was based and became a part of record; hence appeal was entertained. 156 C. 12. Petition for new trial on ground, inter alia, that late notification of judgment prevented motion for findings. Demurrer to petition sustained. 164 C. 212. Cited. 185 C. 495. Cited. 186 C. 237.

      Cited. 4 CA 46. Cited. 18 CA 559. Cited. 22 CA 265.

      Applies to actions for legal relief only. 13 CS 44.

      Sec. 52-226a. Special finding that action or defense without merit and not in good faith. In any civil action tried to a jury, after the return of a verdict and before judgment has been rendered thereon, or in any civil action tried to the court, not more than fourteen days after judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party may file a written motion requesting the court to make a special finding to be incorporated in the judgment or made a part of the record, as the case may be, that the action or a defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. Any such finding by the court shall be admissible in any subsequent action brought pursuant to section 52-568.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 8; P.A. 87-526, S. 2, 5; P.A. 00-196, S. 60.)

      History: P.A. 87-526 added "subsection (a) of"; P.A. 00-196 deleted reference to "subsection (a) of" Sec. 52-568.

      P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1.

      Cited. 44 CA 641.

      Cited. 41 CS 169.

      Sec. 52-227. Judgment for or against some of the parties only. In any civil action in which a cause of action is sustained in favor of or against only a part of the parties thereto, judgment may be rendered in favor of or against such parties only; but any defendant against whom no recovery is obtained shall be entitled to costs.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7976.)

      See Sec. 52-257 re fees of parties in civil actions.

      This section includes suits against partners. 25 C. 394. The ground of failure is immaterial. 28 C. 362. Withdrawal of action against one defendant. 31 C. 217. Cited. 43 C. 82. Cited. 44 C. 311. Only one bill of costs can be allowed to several defendants. 45 C. 102. Cited. 47 C. 210. Applies to defendants described as partners. 61 C. 48. Applies to joint tortfeasors. 67 C. 255; 73 C. 428; 79 C. 417; 83 C. 27. Statute is permissive. 68 C. 496. Cited. Id., 511. If two defendants join in same defense, they stand or fall together. 75 C. 356. Applied. 99 C. 644. Right to give judgment for or against some only of parties does not affect rules as to removal of causes to United States courts. 114 U.S. 59. Cited. 166 C. 325.

      Cited. 4 CS 167. Cited. 8 CS 30. Limits the taxation in section 52-257 to one bill of costs though there may be more than one prevailing party. Id., 324. Cited. 18 CS 106. Judgment allowable against one party in joint promise action. 30 CS 593.

      Sec. 52-228. Judgment too large; remittitur; correction. If any judgment is rendered, by mistake or clerical error, for a larger sum than is due, the party recovering the judgment may have the amount of the judgment decreased by remittitur to the amount which is due, provided reasonable notice has been given to the adverse party or his attorney. The court may thereupon order the record of the judgment to be corrected, and affirm the judgment for the amount to which it has been decreased.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7961; P.A. 78-280, S. 104, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 113.)

      History: P.A. 78-280 rephrased section and deleted reference to remittance of excess sum rendered in judgment by mistake or clerical error "at the same or any subsequent term or session of the court in which it was rendered", reflecting fact that court now sits continuously; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Otherwise before this statute. 4 C. 311. Applies where judgment exceeds damages claimed. 75 C. 255; Id., 263; 82 C. 619. Court may order; 69 C. 652; 71 C. 23; 78 C. 296; 81 C. 101; so supreme court may direct new trial unless part of damages remitted; 83 C. 278; 85 C. 24; Id., 611; 86 C. 319; 87 C. 686; so trial court may direct verdict to be set aside on same condition; 82 C. 171; and when court takes that course, party cannot take advantage of it after appeal. 89 C. 712. Where damages assessed as of wrong date, supreme court remanded case, with directions to set verdict aside unless remittitur filed. 93 C. 123. Court may in its discretion either order excessive verdict set aside unless remittitur filed or set it aside unconditionally. 126 C. 571. Action of trial court in ordering remittiturs will not be reversed unless the broad legal discretion vested in the trial court was abused. 147 C. 719. An obviously erroneous judgment can be corrected to conform to the finding of the trial court. 148 C. 504. Excessive judgment must be assigned as error on appeal. 154 C. 179. See notes to sections on appeal to supreme court. Cited. 230 C. 795.

      Cited. 26 CA 231. Cited. 32 CA 617; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 795.

      When court will set aside a verdict as excessive. 21 CS 233.

      Sec. 52-228a. Appeal from order of remittitur or additur. In any jury case where the court orders a decrease in the amount of the judgment or an increase in the amount of the judgment, the party aggrieved by the order of remittitur or additur may appeal as in any civil action. The appeal shall be on the issue of damages only, and judgment shall enter upon the verdict of liability and damages after the issue of damages is decided.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 605; 1972, P.A. 108, S. 10; P.A. 82-160, S. 114.)

      History: 1972 act applied provisions to cases where court orders an additur; P.A. 82-160 replaced "remittitur or additur" with "decrease in the amount of the judgment or an increase in the amount of the judgment".

      Cited. 208 C. 82. Legislature provided explicit right to appeal under this section not as replacement for the Sec. 52-228b right to reject the additur, but as alternative recourse for plaintiff. 246 C. 170. Secs. 52-228a and 52-228b are not inconsistent with one another. Id.

      Cited. 2 CA 174. Cited. 35 CA 850. A party, having accepted an additur, lacks standing to appeal from the order granting that additur. 72 CA 327. When court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff on same day she accepted additur, it essentially denied defendant opportunity to respond to additur by the deadline it previously had ordered. That denial contravenes provisions contained in Sec. 52-228b which allow parties a reasonable time in which to accept the additur. Because court rendered judgment before allowing defendant either to accept or reject the additur, court acted improperly. 93 CA 309.

      Sec. 52-228b. Setting aside of verdict in action claiming money damages. No verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money damages may be set aside except on written motion by a party to the action, stating the reasons relied upon in its support, filed and heard after notice to the adverse party according to the rules of the court. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are excessive unless the prevailing party has been given an opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the court deems excessive. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 532; P.A. 82-160, S. 115.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 replaced "remit" with "have the amount of the judgment decreased by" and rephrased the section.

      Action of trial court setting aside a verdict will not be disturbed unless discretion has been abused, but where there was no evidence on which verdict for defendant could be set aside, case was remanded and court directed to render judgment on verdict of jury for defendant. 155 C. 704. Cited. 156 C. 323. Cited. 160 C. 219. Purpose of statute to provide opportunity for trial court to pass on claims of error discussed. 185 C. 510; overruled, see 239 C. 207. Cited. 189 C. 484. Cited. 194 C. 35. Cited. 198 C. 322. Cited. 202 C. 234. Cited. 203 C. 607. Cited. 204 C. 303. Cited. 205 C. 751. Cited. 208 C. 82. Cited. 209 C. 450; Id., 510. Cited. 210 C. 503. Cited. 221 C. 14; Id., 356; Id., 549. Judgment of appellate court in Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., 32 CA 574, reversed. 230 C. 95. Cited. 234 C. 660. Cited. 235 C. 107. Court held that scope of appellate review is not limited to that provided by plain error doctrine where plaintiff fails to file motion to set aside verdict, overruling Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 C. 510, and its progeny. 239 C. 207. Secs. 52-228a and 52-228b are not inconsistent with one another. 246 C. 170. Because section permits "the parties" to reject an order of additur, it cannot be read to prohibit plaintiff from rejecting an order of additur. Id. There is no irreconcilable conflict between Secs. 52-228b and 52-216a mandating that one be accepted and the other abandoned. Id.

      Cited. 2 CA 174. Cited. 14 CA 289; judgment reversed, see 209 C. 450. Cited. 15 CA 6. Cited. 16 CA 379. Cited. 24 CA 739. Cited. 26 CA 231. Cited. 27 CA 135. Court should have given parties opportunity to accept a reasonable addition before ordering a new trial on all issues. Id., 471. Cited. 29 CA 151. Cited. 30 CA 125. Cited. 33 CA 575. Cited. 35 CA 239; Id., 301; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 107; Id., 850. Cited. 43 CA 453; Id., 475. Order of remittitur does not necessarily mean that verdict is tainted. 65 CA 441. Trial court was within its discretion to find that a jury's verdict, which compensated plaintiff for past medical bills and the cost of a future surgery that would produce pain, suffering and disability, but that failed to provide plaintiff with noneconomic damages, was improper as a matter of law. 112 CA 467. Section applies only to verdict for plaintiff that may be deemed inadequate, and a court may not order an additur to a defendant's verdict. 117 CA 658.

      Cited. 37 CS 1.

      Sec. 52-228c. Remittitur when noneconomic damages in negligence action against health care provider determined to be excessive. Whenever in a civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, the jury renders a verdict specifying noneconomic damages, as defined in section 52-572h, in an amount exceeding one million dollars, the court shall review the evidence presented to the jury to determine if the amount of noneconomic damages specified in the verdict is excessive as a matter of law in that it so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. If the court so concludes, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. For the purposes of this section, "health care provider" means a provider, as defined in subsection (b) of section 20-7b, or an institution, as defined in section 19a-490.

      (P.A. 05-275, S. 10.)

      History: P.A. 05-275 effective July 13, 2005.

      Secs. 52-229 and 52-230. Continuance of cases on docket of Superior Court or Court of Common Pleas. Discontinuance of cases in Circuit Court. Sections 52-229 and 52-230 are repealed.

      (1953, S. 3184d; 1955, S. 3185d; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 116; February, 1965, P.A. 81, S. 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 280, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 133, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 126, 127; 78-331, S. 54, 58; 78-379, S. 26, 27.)

      Sec. 52-231. Facts on which judgments found to appear on record. Each court shall keep a record of its proceedings and cause the facts on which it found its final judgments and decrees to appear on the record; and any such finding if requested by any party shall specially set forth such facts.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7979.)

      The facts found must justify the decree. 1 R. 207; 23 C. 83; Id., 536. Inferences of law from the facts found need not be expressly set forth. 29 C. 589. Judgment rendered without complying with statute is erroneous. 47 C. 581. Decree not erroneous by insertion of immaterial facts. Id. Cited. 60 C. 15; 69 C. 409; Id., 575. Does not preclude extrinsic evidence to explain judgment, when. 66 C. 248. Statute to be followed although no appeal is taken. 70 C. 504. The facts found form the basis of the judgment rendered. 72 C. 624. Finding must be made, when. Id., 613. Request for finding should ordinarily precede the judgment. 73 C. 685. Should be liberally construed in aid of the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Id. Purpose of statute; contents of judgment file in general. 83 C. 109. If all issues found for one party, judgment so stating good; otherwise facts must be found. 87 C. 617; 88 C. 118. Finding of "issue" construed to include all issues. 66 C. 249; 67 C. 74; 91 C. 378. If all issues not found for one party, judge should sign judgment file. 73 C. 360. Judgment file, not memorandum of decision or finding for appeal, shows issues decided. 72 C. 624; 73 C. 590; 76 C. 457; 78 C. 430; 80 C. 433; 87 C. 41. If facts not found, judgment file is defective. 74 C. 121; 109 C. 50. Should include only facts necessary to judgment; 75 C. 354; 88 C. 123; not those intended for appeal. 87 C. 31; Id., 617. Memorandum of decision as judgment. 76 C. 115; 82 C. 377; Id., 386; 89 C. 413. Finding as related to writ of error. 88 C. 143. If judgment for defendant is based on issues of answer, his counterclaim need not be mentioned. 73 C. 530. Issues not contained in recited allegations of judgment file are found not proven. 105 C. 510. This statute must be complied with in every case. 109 C. 51. Memorandum of decision is not judgment but merely a direction to enter judgment. Id., 50. Court has no power to make special finding after end of term in which judgment rendered. 112 C. 441. Improper to have special finding take place of finding made for purpose of appeal. 125 C. 622. Special finding cannot be claimed in connection with interlocutory ruling. 128 C. 295. Cited. 140 C. 457. Facts upon which a final judgment is predicated must appear in the judgment file. 141 C. 325. A judgment should not incorporate an exhibit since without a special order an exhibit does not remain part of the file. 147 C. 82. Court refused to make a particular finding since request not made until a week after judgment; not reviewed on appeal since party not harmed by the refusal. Id., 656. See note to section 52-226. Cited. 164 C. 554. Cited. 180 C. 345. Cited. 212 C. 678.

      Cited. 12 CS 192. Cited. 13 CS 44. Cited. 33 CS 549.

      Sec. 52-231a. Filing of affidavit re other custody proceedings; visitation rights. Before any court enters any decree in a matter pending before it involving the custody of a minor child or children, an affidavit shall be filed with said court averring that there is no proceeding pending in any other court affecting the custody of such children or any of them or, if there is such a proceeding, a statement in detail of the nature of the proceeding and averring that the decree of the court would not conflict with or interfere with such other proceeding. For the purposes of this affidavit, visitation rights granted by the Superior Court shall not be considered as affecting the custody of such child or children.

      (P.A. 73-156, S. 22; P.A. 74-164, S. 14, 20; P.A. 75-164, S. 2, 3; P.A. 76-436, S. 134, 681.)

      History: P.A. 74-164 substituted "any court" for "the superior court, court of common pleas, juvenile court or a court of probate" and deleted provision specifying that "complaining party" must file required affidavit; P.A. 75-164 specified that visitation rights granted by court do not affect custody of children; P.A. 76-436 amended provision added by P.A. 75-164 to specify applicability to visitation rights granted by superior court rather than to those rights granted by "any" court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to that court, effective July 1, 1978.

      Cited. 212 C. 63.

      Cited. 41 CS 258.

      Sec. 52-231b. Entry of order or judgment or approval of settlement that prohibits or restricts disclosure of sexual abuse of minor prohibited. In any action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault, no court shall enter an order or judgment in such action, or approve a settlement of such action, that prohibits or restricts any person from disclosing information concerning such abuse, exploitation or assault to the Commissioner of Children and Families or a law enforcement agency.

      (P.A. 02-138, S. 19.)

      History: P.A. 02-138 effective May 23, 2002.

      Sec. 52-232. Judge to file memorandum of decision on demurrer. Section 52-232 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7981; P.A. 78-379, S. 26, 27.)

      Sec. 52-233. Certification of statutory appeals taken to a judge. Whenever any statutory appeal from the doings of any administrative or quasi-judicial board or person is taken to a judge of the Superior Court, such judge shall certify his doings thereon to the clerk of his court and such clerk shall thereupon enter such appeal upon the docket of such court in the same manner as in other civil actions.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7965; P.A. 76-436, S. 471, 681.)

      History: P.A. 76-436 removed appeals taken to court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978.

      See Sec. 4-183 re appeals to Superior Court from administrative proceedings.

      See Sec. 51-197b re administrative appeals.

      Sec. 52-234. Time for entering of justice appeals. Section 52-234 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7966; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 204.)

      Sec. 52-235. Reservation of questions of law. (a) The Superior Court, or any judge of the court, with the consent of all parties of record, may reserve questions of law for the advice of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court in all cases in which an appeal could lawfully have been taken to said court had judgment been rendered therein.

      (b) The court or judge making the reservation shall, in the judgment, decree or decision made or rendered in such cases, conform to the advice of the Supreme Court or the Appellate Court.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7967; P.A. 82-160, S. 116; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 41, 82.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 included reference to appellate court.

      Questions depending on inferences of fact cannot be reserved. 20 C. 292; 27 C. 278; 35 C. 482; but see 38 C. 301. No question not particularly reserved will be considered. 23 C. 621; 35 C. 509. No advice will be given as to a point not final in its effect on the case; 27 C. 271; 36 C. 197; or one of procedure, not affecting substantive rights. 91 C. 241. Same questions cannot be reserved twice. 26 C. 117; 27 C. 462; 35 C. 222. Questions heard on reservation will not be heard again on motion in error. 43 C. 255; 44 C. 391; 71 C. 584. Reservation not affecting the merits of the case will not be entertained. 46 C. 240. Nature of advice where complaint is radically defective. 47 C. 376. Advice contingent upon an amendment and further finding. 52 C. 274. The lower court cannot give the supreme court jurisdiction merely by reserving the case for its advice. 58 C. 66. Nature and effect of reservation. 65 C. 119. The "consent" of the parties who chose to appear in the trial court is sufficient. 67 C. 320. Finding of facts necessary; transcript of evidence not enough; 68 C. 318; 77 C. 214; ultimate facts should be found. 74 C. 36. Only facts within issues of pleadings considered. 69 C. 392; 77 C. 214. Power of court to grant new trial because verdict against evidence may be considered. 64 C. 61. Issues open on reservation in quo warranto. 66 C. 300. Court can consider facts agreed upon but not on record. 75 C. 505. Necessity that decision should finally determine issues; 80 C. 71; filing of stipulation to that effect; 77 C. 327; 80 C. 318; 87 C. 362; but court sometimes disregards rule. 80 C. 646. Questions affecting parties not of record not ordinarily decided, but may be. 86 C. 565; 88 C. 207. Should involve only substantive rights, not motion to correct finding of compensation commissioner. 95 C. 160. Court will not pass on academic questions. Id., 161. Requirement as to stipulation; question whether on facts plaintiff entitled to recover not proper. 96 C. 568. Advice must be such that court from which reservation comes can properly apply it in deciding issues before it when reservation was made. 136 C. 49. An application for dissolution of attachment, though ancillary to main action, may be reserved for advice of supreme court. Id., 641. Cited. 318 U.S. 46. Cited. 142 C. 431. When court will hear a reservation even though the case is not ready for final judgment. 147 C. 22. The court cannot, in the first instance, draw conclusions of facts from primary facts and cannot be compelled by reservation to do so. 150 C. 387. In the case of actions praying for a declaratory judgment, since remedy sought is prospective, right to such relief is determined by the situation which has developed at the time of trial and not by that existing at the time the action was begun. 152 C. 323. See notes to sections on appeal to supreme court. Cited. 156 C. 253. Cited. 157 C. 4. Cited. 187 C. 451. Cited. 192 C. 327. Interpreted as not requiring that case be at final judgment stage when the reservation is brought-where issues raised are of critical importance to the proceedings and courts advice will further the interests of simplicity, directness and judicial economy. Id., 671. Cited. 201 C. 598. Cited. 202 C. 583. Cited. 236 C. 681. Cited. 237 C. 332.

      Cited. 1 CA 22. Cited. 28 CA 622. Cited. 35 CA 72.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 192 C. 671. Cited. 211 C. 51.

      Cited. 25 CA 673.

      Sec. 52-235a. Declaratory judgment to determine orders of priorities. In any action in which order of priorities could be determined under scire facias proceedings, such orders of priorities may be determined by declaratory judgment proceedings.

      (1959, P.A. 118, S. 1.)

      Cited. 186 C. 329. Cited. 205 C. 604.

      Sec. 52-235b. Proceedings stayed if attorney unable to appear. If, prior to judgment, an attorney for any reason ceases to be a member of the bar or becomes physically or mentally incapacitated or otherwise disabled so as to prevent him from appearing in court in an action in which he has appeared for a client, further proceedings shall not be taken in the action against the client, without leave of the court, until thirty days after notice to appear in person or by another attorney has been served upon the client either personally or in such manner as the court directs.

      (1969, P.A. 797; P.A. 82-160, S. 117.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Phrase "otherwise disabled" applies to an attorney who, in respects or circumstances other than physical or mental incapacity, is rendered incapable of appearing in court, therefore, defendant's counsel who was in the process of being disbarred and required to attend his own suspension hearing on same day as the hearing on plaintiff's motion was "otherwise disabled". 52 CA 69.

      Sec. 52-235c. Referral to alternative dispute resolution program. Stay of proceedings in court. The court may, upon stipulation of the parties, refer a civil action to an alternative dispute resolution program agreed to by the parties. The court shall not in any way impact or influence the alternative dispute resolution program selected by the parties. The court shall set a time limit on the duration of the referral, which shall not exceed ninety days. Such referral shall stay the time periods within which all further pleadings, motions, requests, discovery and other procedures must be filed or undertaken until such time as the alternative dispute resolution process is completed or the time period set by the court has elapsed, whichever occurs sooner.

      (P.A. 93-108, S. 5, 6.)

      History: P.A. 93-108 effective June 3, 1993.

      P.A. 93-108, Sec. 5 cited. 226 C. 475.

      Sec. 52-235d. Mediation. Disclosure. (a) As used in this section, "mediation" means a process, or any part of a process, which is not court-ordered, in which a person not affiliated with either party to a lawsuit facilitates communication between such parties and, without deciding the legal issues in dispute or imposing a resolution to the legal issues, which assists the parties in understanding and resolving the legal dispute of the parties.

      (b) Except as provided in this section, by agreement of the parties or in furtherance of settlement discussions, a person not affiliated with either party to a lawsuit, an attorney for one of the parties or any other participant in a mediation shall not voluntarily disclose or, through discovery or compulsory process, be required to disclose any oral or written communication received or obtained during the course of a mediation, unless (1) each of the parties agrees in writing to such disclosure, (2) the disclosure is necessary to enforce a written agreement that came out of the mediation, (3) the disclosure is required by statute or regulation, or by any court, after notice to all parties to the mediation, or (4) the disclosure is required as a result of circumstances in which a court finds that the interest of justice outweighs the need for confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law.

      (c) Any disclosure made in violation of any provision of this section shall not be admissible in any proceeding.

      (d) Nothing in this section shall prevent (1) the discovery or admissibility of any evidence that is otherwise discoverable merely because such evidence was presented during the course of the mediation, or (2) the disclosure of information for research or educational purposes done in cooperation with dispute resolution programs provided the parties and specific issues in controversy are not identifiable.

      (P.A. 98-59, S. 1.)

      Subsec. (b):

      Denial of motion for judgment and denial of motion for order pursuant to subsec. were not appealable final judgments. Plaintiffs did not have a colorable constitutional or statutory right, independent of the exercise of discretion of trial court, which would be irretrievably lost and irreparably harmed without immediate appellate review. 82 CA 148.

      Sec. 52-235e. Stay of proceedings in action against crime victim during pendency of criminal proceeding. Any civil action brought against a crime victim, as defined in section 1-1k, by a defendant in a criminal proceeding on account of the exercise or intended exercise by such crime victim of any right guaranteed under the first amendment to the United States Constitution, section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state or subsection b. of article twenty-ninth of the amendments to the Constitution of the state or any right provided to such crime victim by any provision of the general statutes, shall, upon motion of such crime victim, be stayed during the pendency of such criminal proceeding.

      (P.A. 01-211, S. 15.)