CHAPTER 832*
SUMMARY PROCESS

      Sec. 47a-23. (Formerly Sec. 52-532). Notice to quit possession or occupancy of premises. Form. Delivery. Federal termination notice. (a) When the owner or lessor, or the owner's or lessor's legal representative, or the owner's or lessor's attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or building, any apartment in any building, any dwelling unit, any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, and (1) when a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of time; (B) by reason of any expressed stipulation therein; (C) violation of the rental agreement or lease or of any rules or regulations adopted in accordance with section 47a-9 or 21-70; (D) nonpayment of rent within the grace period provided for residential property in section 47a-15a or 21-83; (E) nonpayment of rent when due for commercial property; (F) violation of section 47a-11 or subsection (b) of section 21-82; (G) nuisance, as defined in section 47a-32, or serious nuisance, as defined in section 47a-15 or 21-80; or (2) when such premises, or any part thereof, is occupied by one who never had a right or privilege to occupy such premises; or (3) when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated; or (4) when an action of summary process or other action to dispossess a tenant is authorized under subsection (b) of section 47a-23c for any of the following reasons: (A) Refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of section 47a-23c, (B) permanent removal by the landlord of the dwelling unit of such tenant from the housing market, or (C) bona fide intention by the landlord to use such dwelling unit as such landlord's principal residence; or (5) when a farm employee, as described in section 47a-30, or a domestic servant, caretaker, manager or other employee, as described in subsection (b) of section 47a-36, occupies such premises furnished by the employer and fails to vacate such premises after employment is terminated by such employee or the employer or after such employee fails to report for employment, such owner or lessor, or such owner's or lessor's legal representative, or such owner's or lessor's attorney-at-law, or in-fact, shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days before the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy.

      (b) The notice shall be in writing substantially in the following form: "I (or we) hereby give you notice that you are to quit possession or occupancy of the (land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, or of any trailer or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, as the case may be), now occupied by you at (here insert the address, including apartment number or other designation, as applicable), on or before the (here insert the date) for the following reason (here insert the reason or reasons for the notice to quit possession or occupancy using the statutory language or words of similar import, also the date and place of signing notice). A.B.". If the owner or lessor, or the owner's or lessor's legal representative, attorney-at-law or attorney-in-fact knows of the presence of an occupant but does not know the name of such occupant, the notice for such occupant may be addressed to such occupant as "John Doe", "Jane Doe" or some other alias which reasonably characterizes the person to be served.

      (c) A copy of such notice shall be delivered to each lessee or occupant or left at such lessee's or occupant's place of residence or, if the rental agreement or lease concerns commercial property, at the place of the commercial establishment by a proper officer or indifferent person. Delivery of such notice may be made on any day of the week.

      (d) With respect to a month-to-month or a week-to-week tenancy of a dwelling unit, a notice to quit possession based on nonpayment of rent shall, upon delivery, terminate the rental agreement for the month or week in which the notice is delivered, convert the month-to-month or week-to-week tenancy to a tenancy at sufferance and provide proper basis for a summary process action notwithstanding that such notice was delivered in the month or week after the month or week in which the rent is alleged to be unpaid.

      (e) A termination notice required pursuant to federal law and regulations may be included in or combined with the notice required pursuant to this section and such inclusion or combination does not thereby render the notice required pursuant to this section equivocal, provided the rental agreement or lease shall not terminate until after the date specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy or the date of completion of the pretermination process, whichever is later. A use and occupancy disclaimer may be included in or combined with such notice, provided that such disclaimer does not take effect until after the date specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy or the date of the completion of the pretermination process, whichever is later. Such inclusion or combination does not thereby render the notice required pursuant to this section equivocal. Such disclaimer shall be in substantially the following form: "Any payments tendered after the date specified to quit possession or occupancy, or the date of the completion of the pretermination process if that is later, will be accepted for use and occupancy only and not for rent, with full reservation of rights to continue with the eviction action."

      (1949 Rev., S. 8274; 1949, S. 3217d; 1957, P.A. 291, S. 1; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 130; 1969, P.A. 313, S. 1; P.A. 74-183, S. 115, 291; P.A. 76-95, S. 23, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; 76-436, S. 102, 681; P.A. 77-451, S. 5; P.A. 78-280, S. 61, 127; P.A. 79-571, S. 46; P.A. 80-399, S. 1; P.A. 81-237; P.A. 82-274, S. 1; P.A. 86-210; 86-286, S. 2; P.A. 87-507, S. 1; P.A. 89-254, S. 8; P.A. 90-230, S. 98, 101; P.A. 91-5; 91-383, S. 18; P.A. 92-171, S. 1; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 38, 70; P.A. 93-185; 93-209, S. 1; P.A. 95-247, S. 1; P.A. 97-231, S. 10; P.A. 99-221; P.A. 04-127, S. 3.)

      History: 1959 act made writ, summons and complaint returnable to circuit court rather than to trial justices, alternate trial justices or municipal courts, which have been abolished; 1969 act deleted reference to requirement for "Duplicate" copies in form; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas and added provisions re venue, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-95 deleted reference to leases terminated under provisions of Sec. 47-23 and specified that complaint "shall be returned to court at least three days before the return day"; P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95, see history for Sec. 47a-1; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court and reference to Sec. 51-156a with reference to Sec. 51-348, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 52-532 transferred to Sec. 47a-23 in 1977; P.A. 77-451 added references to dwelling units and to lease terminations where Sec. 47a-15 or 47a-11 has bearing; P.A. 78-280 made technical corrections; P.A. 79-571 added references to rental agreements, divided section into Subsecs. and deleted detailed provisions re eviction procedure, reincorporated in statutes as Sec. 47a-23a; P.A. 80-399 required that lessee or occupant receive notice at least eight, rather than ten, days before termination of lease and deleted exception which had required only five days notice where lease is terminated for nonpayment of rent; P.A. 81-237 amended Subsec. (b) to require that the notice to quit contain the reason therefor; P.A. 82-274 amended Subsec. (c) to provide that if the rental agreement or lease concerns commercial property the notice may be left at the commercial establishment; P.A. 86-210 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that notice be given to an occupant "if the owner or lessor knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know the name of such occupant"; P.A. 86-286 repealed provision added by P.A. 86-210 and amended Subsec. (b) to provide that if owner or lessor, or legal representative, attorney-at-law or attorney-in-fact does not know or cannot reasonably discover the name of occupant, notice may be addressed to "occupant" or "occupants"; P.A. 87-507 amended Subsecs. (a) and (c) to replace "the lessee" with "each lessee" and amended Subsec. (b) to require the notice to set forth "the address, including apartment number or other designation, as applicable" of the premises and to permit the notice to be addressed to an occupant as "John Doe", "Jane Doe" or some other alias which reasonably characterizes the person to be served, rather than "occupant" or "occupants", when the owner or lessor "knows of the presence of an occupant" but does not know and cannot discover his name; P.A. 89-254 amended Subsec. (a) to restructure provisions, to insert Subdiv. indicators, to revise in Subdiv. (1) the reasons for the termination of a rental agreement or lease by inserting Subpara. indicators, by replacing "under the provisions of section 47a-15a" with "(D) nonpayment of rent within the grace period provided for residential property in section 47a-15a" and by adding as reasons Subpara. (C) "violation of the rental agreement or lease or of any rules or regulations adopted in accordance with section 47a-9", Subpara. (E) "nonpayment of rent when due for commercial property", and Subpara. (G) "nuisance, as defined in section 47a-15", to replace in Subdiv. (2) "one who has no right or privilege" with "one who never had a right or privilege" and to add in Subdiv. (3) "other than under a rental agreement or lease"; P.A. 90-230 added "or his legal representative, or his attorney-at-law, or in-fact" to Subsec. (a)(3); P.A. 91-5 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the reason or reasons for the notice to quit be inserted "using the statutory language or words of similar import"; P.A. 91-383 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to Secs. 21-70, 21-83, 21-82(b) and 21-80 in Subparas. (C), (D), (F) and (G), respectively, of Subdiv. (1); P.A. 92-171 amended Subsec. (a) to require notice be given at least five, rather than eight, days before termination of rental agreement or lease or before time specified in the notice to quit possession or occupancy, amended Subsec. (b) to delete requirement that reasonable diligence be exercised to discover the name of an occupant whose presence is known as a condition of addressing the notice to "John Doe", "Jane Doe" or some other alias, and amended Subsec. (c) to authorize delivery of the notice on any day of the week; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-185 added Subsec. (d) re the effect of delivering a notice to quit possession based on nonpayment of rent in the month after the month in which the rent is alleged to be unpaid; P.A. 93-209 added Subsec. (e) to authorize a federal termination notice to be included in or combined with a notice required pursuant to this section and to specify the effect of such inclusion or combination; P.A. 95-247 amended Subsec. (a) to delete in Subdiv. (3) provision that characterized right or privilege to occupy premises as being "other than under a rental agreement or lease" and to add as reasons for notice to quit possession or occupancy Subdiv. (4) re when an action is authorized under certain provisions of Sec. 47a-23c(b) and Subdiv. (5) re when a farm employee or domestic servant, caretaker, manager or other employee fails to vacate premises furnished by his employer; P.A. 97-231 amended Subsec. (a) to require notice be given at least three, rather than five, days before termination of rental agreement or lease or before the time specified in the notice to quit possession or occupancy; P.A. 99-221 made technical changes and amended Subsec. (e) by adding provisions re the use and occupancy disclaimer; P.A. 04-127 amended Subsec. (d) by adding provisions re week-to-week tenancy.

      Annotations to former section 52-532:

      Statute is to be strictly construed. 12 C. 259; 14 C. 277. Termination of lease. 12 C. 559. The lessor need not directly authorize the particular person who leaves the notice to do so. 14 C. 276. Pleading. Id.; 32 C. 348. Landlord has no right to enter peaceably in tenant's absence and afterward hold possession by force. 23 C. 310; 52 C. 16. Statutory notice supersedes the six months' notice in estates from year to year, when. 23 C. 317. Statute supersedes no common-law remedies except the notice to quit and the form of procedure. 29 C. 337. Writ issued by one justice may be made returnable to another. 36 C. 205. Judgment for plaintiff is conclusive evidence that defendant was his tenant. 48 C. 22. Conservator may bring action of summary process in his own name. 55 C. 116, 117. Terms of notice held sufficient. 66 C. 438. Error in year stated for return day held immaterial. 70 C. 348. Character of possession held admissible under the issue. 73 C. 86. Purpose of act. 79 C. 308. Trustee may bring action to free trust from an encumbrance at a time after he is required to convey the property in fee. 91 C. 667. Waiver in lease of demand for rent and reentry; effect of justice judgment and record; waiver of forfeiture relied on as a defense. 92 C. 144. Equity will enjoin prosecution of summary process action, when. 93 C. 638; 96 C. 630; Id., 645. That action is brought in behalf of one who has agreed to purchase property, nil. sig. 94 C. 452. A statutory procedure of limited application; lies when. 95 C. 69; 102 C. 694. Duplicate, not attested copy, of notice to quit is necessary. 97 C. 66. History of statute. Id., 72. Tenancy at will terminated by reasonable notice to quit. 102 C. 640. Should be returned to justice in town where land lies, thereafter transferable to justice in town where either party resides. 104 C. 294. Informalities in adjournment waived if parties eventually appear and are heard. Id. Action could be transferred by stipulation of parties under former section 51-99. Id. Necessary and only basis of summary process is that lease has terminated, not that rent is unpaid in itself. 125 C. 550. Notice may be signed by lessor's attorney. Id., 552. Defendant may not interpose counterclaim for declaratory judgment and damages and thereby secure transfer to superior court. 131 C. 528. Delay in bringing action after effective day of notice, if not unreasonable, will not prevent its maintenance. 132 C. 622. Notice describing property by wrong street number is invalid. 133 C. 95. Relief demanded in complaint is the determinative factor concerning the right of appeal. 134 C. 649. It is essential that lease should have terminated in one of ways specified. 135 C. 364. Cited. Id., 392; 144 C. 80. Essential to action that there has been a lease between parties and that it has terminated. 138 C. 474; 139 C. 598. Duplicate copy provision satisfied when original and duplicate differ merely in circumstantial discrepancies. 141 C. 247. Cited. 159 C. 64. Despite purpose of summary process to avoid delay loss and expense, stay of proceedings is not a "final judgment" and therefore not appealable. 164 C. 287.

      Cited. 6 CS 156. Cited. 8 CS 389. Notice to quit possession equally valid whether served ten days before termination of the lease or at least ten days before the time specified in the notice for the lessee to quit possession. 12 CS 264. Cited. 13 CS 441. Nature of summary process discussed. 15 CS 141. Notices to quit which are served on two or more tenants need not be identical. Statute merely requires that they be duplicates of their originals. A notice addressed specifically to one tenant and another notice addressed specifically to another tenant met the statutory requirements. 23 CS 291. Summary process is available only where there is a lease and it has been terminated. Id., 388. Action is limited to cases where the issue of the expiration of the lease is simple issue of fact, not complicated by questions as to the proper legal construction of the lease. Id. Quasi-public landlord must conduct informal hearing before commencing summary process action. Section discussed and constitutionality questioned. 33 CS 15.

      Period of "at least ten days" excludes both terminal days. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 385. After making use of the benefits of summary process, defendant could not then disclaim its applicability to him when it appeared to be to his disadvantage. Id., 561, 564. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 265. Notice to quit to be served ten days before date of expiration of lease if one exists; if not, ten days before time specified by notice to quit. Id., 419. Action for possession for nonpayment of rent must be based on lease and will not be successful when plaintiff and defendant had not agreed on any terms. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 1.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 202 C. 128. Cited. 209 C. 724. Cited. 215 C. 701. Cited. 225 C. 600. Landlord, after withdrawing its complaint in a summary process action, is required to serve a new notice to quit prior to commencing a new summary process action against a tenant under Sec. 47a-23a. 292 C. 459.

      Cited. 4 CA 162; Id., 627. Cited. 5 CA 101. Cited. 6 CA 373. Cited. 7 CA 301; Id., 639. Cited. 11 CA 360. Cited. 13 CA 150. Cited. 16 CA 574. Cited. 18 CA 384. Cited. 19 CA 483; Id., 564. Cited. 28 CA 684. Cited. 31 CA 575. "The covenant of quiet enjoyment operates as a shield for the lessee in protecting his possessory interests in his leasehold; it does not serve as a sword of the landlord to terminate a lease agreement." 35 CA 185. Legislature did not intend to give an owner and lessor, but not a sublessor, an expeditious means of obtaining possession of the premises from a commercial tenant for nonpayment of rent; thus, plaintiff, as sublessor, could avail itself of section. 81 CA 486. Property owner may bring summary process action against one who has no right or privilege to occupy the premises without having to allege that the occupier is a tenant; furthermore, because statute requires party seeking summary process only to allege and prove ownership of the subject property and to assert a demand for possession, defendants could not prevail on their claim that plaintiff failed to prove that it was in possession of the premises or that it sought possession. 88 CA 661. Court order restoring tenant to possession in entry and detainer action did not create a new tenancy and plaintiff in summary process action was not required to serve a new notice to quit possession. 121 CA 790.

      Sovereign immunity to action under statute claimed; not waived by entering into lease under former section 4-128. Nonpayment of rent not a "taking" in constitutional sense which would nullify defense of sovereign immunity. 35 CS 180. Statute does not require the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship or consistency of ownership for an owner to evict. Id., 233. Defendant to tenant's unsolicited mailing of money order for next month's rent to landlord after issuance of notice to quit and prior to issuance of complaint and plaintiff's mere retention of money order was insufficient to constitute acceptance of rent. To constitute acceptance, retention requires demonstration of ownership such as endorsement or actual cashing of check. Issuance of complaint one day after receipt of rental offer was unequivocal manifestation of plaintiff's rejection of tenant's rental offer. Id., 258. Cited. Id., 274; Id., 297. Notice to quit may be signed by duly authorized attorney. Id., 549. Discovery is available in summary process proceedings. Summary process deemed and intended by legislature to be civil action. 36 CS 47. Cited. Id., 626. Cited. 37 CS 654. Cited. 38 CS 1; Id., 8; Id., 70; Id., 341. Cited. 40 CS 4.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1)(E) cited. 231 C. 213; Id., 923. Cited. 233 C. 213. Where notice to quit provided wrong year for date to quit, trial court properly found that defect was circumstantial under Sec. 52-123 and that defendant had received actual notice in accordance with Subsec. 292 C. 381.

      Cited. 9 CA 477. Cited. 20 CA 159. Cited. 27 CA 530. Cited. 36 CA 432. If lease is subsequent to mortgage, foreclosure extinguishes lease. 52 CA 37. Reasons for issuing a notice to quit set forth in Subsec. are the only reasons that an owner may rely on for issuing a valid notice to quit. 68 CA 638. Where owner relies on Subdiv (4) in notice to quit, but fails to show that tenant was member of the class described in Sec. 47a-23c, the notice is invalid. Id. Prefatory language in Subdiv. (4) indicates that legislature intended subdiv. to apply only to summary process actions authorized by Sec. 47a-23c(b) and only to the protected class of tenants described therein. Id. Where legal title to real property rested with estate of decedent, it was within executor's power, as fiduciary and legal representative of the estate, to maintain summary process action on behalf of estate. 118 CA 577.

      Cited. 40 CS 100.

      Sec. 47a-23a. Complaint. (a) If, at the expiration of the three days prescribed in section 47a-23, the lessee or occupant neglects or refuses to quit possession or occupancy of the premises, any commissioner of the Superior Court may issue a writ, summons and complaint which shall be in the form and nature of an ordinary writ, summons and complaint in a civil process, but which shall set forth facts justifying a judgment for immediate possession or occupancy of the premises and make a claim for possession or occupancy of the premises. If the claim is for the possession or occupancy of nonresidential property, the writ, summons and complaint may also make a claim for the forfeiture to the plaintiff of the possessions and personal effects of the defendant in accordance with section 47a-42a. If the plaintiff has properly issued a notice to quit possession to an occupant by alias, if permitted to do so by section 47a-23, and has no further identifying information at the time of service of the writ, summons and complaint, such writ, summons and complaint may also name and serve such occupant or occupants as defendants. In any case in which service is to be made upon an occupant or occupants identified by alias, the complaint shall contain an allegation that the plaintiff does not know the name of such occupant or occupants. Such complaint shall be returnable to the Superior Court. Such complaint may be made returnable six days, inclusive, after service upon the defendant and shall be returned to court at least three days before the return day. Such complaint may be served on any day of the week. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-185 no recognizance shall be required of a complainant appearing pro se.

      (b) Venue for actions brought pursuant to this chapter shall be the geographical area, established pursuant to section 51-348, where the defendant resides or where the leased premises or trailer are located at the plaintiff's election or, in the case of a defendant corporation or domestic corporation, where the defendant has an office or place of business. If the defendant is a nonresident, venue shall be the geographical area, established pursuant to section 51-348, where the plaintiff resides or where the land lies at the plaintiff's election.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 47; P.A. 80-399, S. 3; P.A. 87-507, S. 2; P.A. 92-171, S. 2; P.A. 93-435, S. 19, 95; P.A. 97-231, S. 9.)

      History: P.A. 80-399 amended section to reflect change in notice requirement, i.e. from 10 or 5 days to 8 days, see Sec. 47a-23 and specified that no recognizance is required of complainant appearing pro se; P.A. 87-507 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that when a plaintiff has issued a notice to quit to an occupant by alias and has no further identifying information, the writ, summons and complaint may also name and serve such occupant or occupants as defendants and that when service is to be made upon an occupant or occupants by alias, the complaint shall allege that the plaintiff does not know and cannot discover the name of such occupant or occupants; P.A. 92-171 amended Subsec. (a) by changing "eight days" to "five days" to reflect change in notice requirement of Sec. 47a-23, deleting the requirement that when an occupant is served by alias the complaint contain an allegation that the plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence cannot discover the name of the occupant, and authorizing the complaint to be served on any day of the week; P.A. 93-435 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective June 28, 1993; P.A. 97-231 amended Subsec. (a) to change "five days" to "three days prescribed in section 47a-23" and to add provision that if the claim is for the possession or occupancy of nonresidential property a claim may also be made for the forfeiture of the possessions and personal effects of the defendant.

      Cited. 235 C. 650.

      Cited. 1 CA 439. Cited. 4 CA 162. Cited. 7 CA 301. Cited. 16 CA 574. Cited. 18 CA 539.

      Cited. 38 CS 70. Cited. 39 CS 367.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 217 C. 313.

      Cited. 36 CA 432. Trial court properly determined that summary process action was issued in conformity with statute. "Issue" means more than mere clerical preparation, dating and attestation of a writ and, with reference to writs, is ordinarily construed as importing delivery to the proper person or officer for service. Date on which summary process was delivered to judicial marshal was date summary process was issued. 97 CA 662.

      This statute continues in effect as a special rule governing summary process actions until modified by a later rule of the judges of the superior court. 38 CS 389. Cited. 40 CS 4.

      Sec. 47a-23b. Service of notice to quit or summons if lessee a nonresident or if whereabouts unknown. (a) If the lessee or occupant of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit or of any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, is a nonresident of this state at the time when it is desired to give him notice to quit possession or occupancy of such premises, or at the time of the issuance of the summons, such notice to quit, or such summons, may be served upon the person in charge thereof; or, if no person is in charge of such premises, the notice to quit may be served upon such lessee or occupant in the manner provided by section 52-57 or 52-57a, at least ten days before the time specified in such notice, and such summons may be served in like manner, except that such copy shall be mailed at least six days before the return day thereof.

      (b) If such lessee or occupant has gone to parts unknown, the notice to quit may be served upon such lessee or occupant by advertising such notice to quit at least twice in a paper published in the county and having a circulation in the town in which such premises are located. Such notice shall be first advertised at least ten days before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession. Such summons may be served in like manner, except that notice of the pendency of such summons shall be first advertised at least six days before the return day thereof.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 48; P.A. 80-399, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 80-399 required that notice be served as provided in Sec. 52-57 or 52-57a rather than by registered or certified mail to last-known address.

      Cited. 38 CS 70. Cited. 40 CS 4.

      Sec. 47a-23c. Prohibition on eviction of certain tenants except for good cause. (a)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, this section applies to any tenant who resides in a building or complex consisting of five or more separate dwelling units or who resides in a mobile manufactured home park and who is either: (A) Sixty-two years of age or older, or whose spouse, sibling, parent or grandparent is sixty-two years of age or older and permanently resides with that tenant; (B) blind, as defined in section 1-1f; or (C) physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, but only if such disability can be expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.

      (2) With respect to tenants in common interest communities, this section applies only to (A) a conversion tenant, as defined in subsection (3) of section 47-283, who (i) is described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or (ii) is not described in subdivision (1) of this subsection but, during a transition period, as defined in subsection (4) of section 47-283, is residing in a conversion condominium created after May 6, 1980, or in any other conversion common interest community created after December 31, 1982, or (iii) is not described in subdivision (1) of this subsection but is otherwise protected as a conversion tenant by public act 80-370*, and (B) a tenant who is not a conversion tenant but who is described in subdivision (1) of this subsection if his landlord owns five or more dwelling units in the common interest community in which the dwelling unit is located.

      (3) As used in this section, "tenant" includes each resident of a mobile manufactured home park, as defined in section 21-64, including a resident who owns his own home, "landlord" includes a "licensee" and an "owner" of a mobile manufactured home park, as defined in section 21-64, "complex" means two or more buildings on the same or contiguous parcels of real property under the same ownership, and "mobile manufactured home park" means a parcel of real property, or contiguous parcels of real property under the same ownership, upon which five or more mobile manufactured homes occupied for residential purposes are located.

      (b) (1) No landlord may bring an action of summary process or other action to dispossess a tenant described in subsection (a) of this section except for one or more of the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent; (B) refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of this section; (C) material noncompliance with section 47a-11 or subsection (b) of section 21-82, which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or which materially affects the physical condition of the premises; (D) voiding of the rental agreement pursuant to section 47a-31, or material noncompliance with the rental agreement; (E) material noncompliance with the rules and regulations of the landlord adopted in accordance with section 47a-9 or 21-70; (F) permanent removal by the landlord of the dwelling unit of such tenant from the housing market; or (G) bona fide intention by the landlord to use such dwelling unit as his principal residence.

      (2) The ground stated in subparagraph (G) of subdivision (1) of this subsection is not available to the owner of a dwelling unit in a common interest community occupied by a conversion tenant.

      (3) A tenant may not be dispossessed for a reason described in subparagraph (B), (F) or (G) of subdivision (1) of this subsection during the term of any existing rental agreement.

      (c) (1) The rent of a tenant protected by this section may be increased only to the extent that such increase is fair and equitable, based on the criteria set forth in section 7-148c.

      (2) Any such tenant aggrieved by a rent increase or proposed rent increase may file a complaint with the fair rent commission, if any, for the town, city or borough where his dwelling unit or mobile manufactured home park lot is located; or, if no such fair rent commission exists, may bring an action in the Superior Court to contest the increase. In any such court proceeding, the court shall determine whether the rent increase is fair and equitable, based on the criteria set forth in section 7-148c.

      (d) A landlord, to determine whether a tenant is a protected tenant, may request proof of such protected status. On such request, any tenant claiming protection shall provide proof of the protected status within thirty days. The proof shall include a statement of a physician in the case of alleged blindness or other physical disability.

      (P.A. 80-370, S. 1, 9; P.A. 81-319, S. 3, 6; P.A. 82-356, S. 1, 14; 82-472, S. 130, 183; P.A. 83-94; 83-474, S. 95, 96; P.A. 84-546, S. 106, 173; P.A. 87-310; P.A. 89-254, S. 16; P.A. 91-383, S. 19.)

      *Note: Public act 80-370 is entitled "An Act Concerning Condominium Conversion and the Encouragement of New Rental Housing". (See Reference Table captioned "Public Acts of 1980" in Volume 16 which lists the sections amended, created or repealed by the act.)

      History: P.A. 81-319 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the prohibitions of the subsection do apply to a landlord who intends to use a dwelling unit as his principal residence if the unit is in a conversion condominium and at the time of conversion was occupied by a lessee described in Subdiv. (2), to clarify that a landlord may pass on only legitimate and reasonable rent increases, and to provide that if a fair rent commission does not exist the lessee may bring an action in superior court; P.A. 82-356 amended Subsec. (b) to extend from January 1, 1983, to January 1, 1988, the prohibition on landlords bringing a summary process action except in certain instances, revised the criteria for lessee eligibility, deleted the income limitations for lessee eligibility, added as a reason for eviction a "refusal to agree to a legitimate and reasonable rent increase", and clarified the permissible reasons for eviction, the applicability of the subsection and the remedies and procedure for an aggrieved lessee; P.A. 82-472 amended Subsec. (a)(4) by changing except as provided in this section and "sections 47-76, 47-88b to 47-88d, inclusive, 47-116 and 47a-39" to "section 47-88d"; P.A. 83-94 deleted the expiration date of January 1, 1988, for the prohibition on landlords bringing a summary process action except in certain instances; P.A. 83-474 deleted Subsec. (a) re the statement of policy, rephrased, revised and reordered former Subsec. (b), specified the applicability of the section to tenants in common interest communities and added Subsec. (d) to authorize a landlord to request proof from tenants claiming protected status; P.A. 84-546 made technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 87-310 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to make section applicable to qualified tenants in a building or complex with five or more separate dwelling units, rather than seven or more units, and amended Subsec. (a)(2) to clarify the conversion tenants to which the section is applicable and to make section applicable to an elderly, blind or disabled tenant who is not a conversion tenant if his landlord owns five or more dwelling units in the common interest community; P.A. 89-254 amended Subsec. (a) to make section applicable to qualified tenants who reside in a mobile manufactured home park and to define "mobile manufactured home park" and amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to "mobile manufactured home park lot"; P.A. 91-383 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to add definitions of "tenant" and "landlord" and amended Subsecs. (b)(1)(C) to add reference to Sec. 21-82(b) and (b)(1)(E) to add reference to Sec. 21-70.

      Cited. 215 C. 367. Section shields tenants who qualify for its protections from executions of judgments of ejectment pursuant to Sec. 49-22. 237 C. 679.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 207 C. 441.

      Cited. 1 CA 439. Statute attempts to balance rights given to protected tenants by giving owner option of removing a rental unit from housing market when it is no longer economically feasible to rent to such tenants or for other reasons. 68 CA 638.

      Sec. 47a-23d. Report to General Assembly. Obsolete.

      (P.A. 80-370, S. 7, 9.)

      Sec. 47a-24. (Formerly Sec. 52-532a). Action by cooperative housing corporation. As used in this chapter, (1) "lessee or occupant" includes a member or shareholder of a cooperative housing corporation who occupies a dwelling unit in such corporation's premises pursuant to an agreement of occupancy, whether or not it is designated as a lease or rental agreement, which agreement provides that, for breach by the member or shareholder of any provision of such agreement, the corporation shall have the legal remedies available to a landlord for breach by a tenant of a provision of a lease or rental agreement; and (2) "owner or lessor" includes any such cooperative housing corporation.

      (1971, P.A. 12, S. 1; P.A. 79-571, S. 43.)

      History: Sec. 52-532a transferred to Sec. 47a-24 in 1977; P.A. 79-571 added Subdiv. indicators, made minor wording changes and added reference to rental agreements in Subdiv. (1).

      Cited. 1 CA 439.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-24a. Action by receiver of rents. As used in this chapter, "owner or lessor" includes any receiver appointed under sections 47a-56 to 47a-56i, inclusive.

      (P.A. 95-247, S. 11.)

      See Sec. 47a-56d re authority of receiver to bring summary process action.

      Sec. 47a-25. (Formerly Sec. 52-533). Waiver of notice to quit. When, in any written lease of any land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, notice to quit possession has been expressly waived by the lessee in the event such lease terminates by lapse of time, the three days' notice prescribed in sections 47a-23 and 47a-23a shall not be necessary; and complaint and summons may issue in the same manner as if such notice to quit had been previously given.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8275; P.A. 77-451, S. 6; P.A. 79-571, S. 49; P.A. 80-399, S. 2; P.A. 92-171, S. 3; P.A. 97-231, S. 11.)

      History: Sec. 52-533 transferred to Sec. 47a-25 in 1977; P.A. 77-451 included leases of dwelling units; P.A. 79-571 added references to Secs. 47a-23a and 47a-23b; P.A. 80-399 changed ten days notice to eight days notice and specified that notice is not necessary "in the event such lease terminates by lapse of time", omitting reference to Sec. 47a-23b as well; P.A. 92-171 changed the eight days' notice to five days' notice; P.A. 97-231 changed provision re five days' notice to three days' notice.

      Cited. 4 CA 627. Cited. 7 CA 301.

      Cited. 38 CS 70. Cited. 40 CS 107.

      Sec. 47a-26. (Formerly Sec. 52-534). Failure to appear. Judgment. If the defendant does not appear within two days after the return day and a motion for judgment for failure to appear and an endorsed copy of the notice to quit is filed with the clerk, the court shall, not later than the first court day after the filing of such motion, enter judgment that the complainant recover possession or occupancy of the premises with the complainant's costs, and execution shall issue subject to the provisions of sections 47a-35 to 47a-41, inclusive.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8277; 1949, S. 3219d; 1957, P.A. 291, S. 2; 1961, P.A. 509, S. 3; 1963, P.A. 562; 1969, P.A. 295; 313, S. 2; P.A. 76-59, S. 3; 76-95, S. 24, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; P.A. 77-451, S. 7; 77-452, S. 29, 72; P.A. 78-280, S. 62, 127; 78-331, S. 19, 58; P.A. 79-571, S. 51; P.A. 99-157, S. 2.)

      History: 1961 act added references to sections 52-542 to 52-548, 51-264 and 51-265; 1963 act added provisions for time limit on defendant's nonappearance and filing of motion for failure to appear and specified procedure when defendant appears but fails to plead; 1969 acts required that all pleadings advance one step within each successive three-day period from previous pleading and deleted reference to "duplicate" copy of notice to quit; P.A. 76-59 added provision requiring that execution to enforce judgment be issued within one year from date judgment was entered, excluding any period during which execution was stayed; P.A. 76-95 required that defendant appear within two rather than three days after return day and added provisions re defendant's deposit of payments for use and occupancy of premises during pendency of action and re court's determination of amounts due each party; P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95, see history for Sec. 47a-1; P.A. 77-451 specified that clerk rather than court orders defendant who fails to make required payments to file answer within four days rather than two as was previously the case; P.A. 77-452 referred to superior court's rules for service of pleadings rather than to supreme court's rules; Sec. 52-534 transferred to Sec. 47a-26 in 1977; P.A. 78-280 substituted reference to Secs. 51-197c to 51-197f for reference to Secs. 51-264 and 51-265; P.A. 78-331 substituted "four-day" for "two-day" period in keeping with provisions of P.A. 77-451; P.A. 79-571 deleted provisions other than provision ordering judgment in favor of complainant when defendant fails to appear, reincorporating them in statutes as Secs. 47a-26a to 47a-26g; P.A. 99-157 required the court to enter judgment "not later than the first court day after the filing of such motion" rather than "forthwith" and made provisions of section gender neutral.

      Annotations to former section 52-534:

      Execution can only run against defendant. 12 C. 261. Assignment of lessor's title, not followed by attornment, no defense. 14 C. 278. Each party may peremptorily challenge two jurors. 20 C. 520. Tenant estopped to deny title of his lessor. 33 C. 156. Subsequent "title" defined. Id. Forfeiture for nonpayment of rent, how far barred by matter of recoupment. Id., 210. Breach of condition no termination of lease, unless so expressly provided. 34 C. 528. Formerly, after reversal on writ of error, cause could not be entered and retried in superior court. 39 C. 308. Certain pleadings in, considered. 73 C. 83. Mere option or equitable right in lessee to renew lease no defense. 75 C. 186; 86 C. 212. Formerly means to review erroneous action by city court was by writ of error to supreme court. 79 C. 308; see 86 C. 32. Effect of failure to plead notice to quit. 79 C. 100. Estoppel from withdrawal of action and acceptance of rent. 80 C. 504. Justification under new void lease held demurrable. 86 C. 32. Waiver of condition broken is a defense. 92 C. 144. Formerly writ of error was proper method of review; Id., 150; and was brought under section 52-274; 96 C. 626; appeal will be erased from docket on motion; 95 C. 69; errors must be specifically assigned. 91 C. 671; 102 C. 696. Relief in equity against process. 93 C. 638; 96 C. 630; Id., 645. Rulings on evidence may be reviewed only by bill of exceptions setting forth all circumstances surrounding each ruling. 102 C. 696; 104 C. 293. Remedy limited to cases where issue of termination of lease presents simple question of fact; does not include cases involving questions de construction of leases. 102 C. 695. Formerly, initial review was by writ of error; if such writ was taken to superior or common pleas court, appeal lay therefrom to supreme court. 125 C. 543. Cited. 131 C. 530. Cited. 134 C. 649.

      Formerly review in summary process was obtained by writ of error. 15 CS 141. Judge of municipal court had no power to order stay of execution of judgment in summary process action; mandamus would not issue to order him to do so. 19 CS 41.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 561(fn).

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 217 C. 313.

      Cited. 1 CA 439.

      Cited. 34 CS 699. It was proper to exclude issue of illegality of contract from consideration in summary process. 35 CS 549. Cited. 36 CS 47. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-26a. Failure to plead. Judgment. If the defendant appears but does not plead within two days after the return day, the complainant may file a motion for judgment for failure to plead, served upon the defendant in the manner provided in the rules adopted by the judges of the Superior Court for the service of pleadings. If the defendant fails to plead within three days after receipt of such motion by the clerk, the court shall forthwith enter judgment that the complainant recover possession or occupancy with his costs.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 52; P.A. 92-171, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 92-171 reduced the time period for an appearing defendant to plead from three days to two days after the return day.

      Cited. 217 C. 313.

      Cited. 1 CA 439. Cited. 5 CA 417.

      Appears judge has power to grant such motion when court is in session, not ex parte in chambers. 36 CS 565. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-26b. Motion and order for payments for use and occupancy. (a) If the defendant appears, the court shall, upon motion and without hearing, unless the defendant files an objection within five days of the filing of the motion, order the defendant to deposit with the court within ten days of the filing of the motion payments for use and occupancy in an amount equal to the last agreed-upon rent or, in the absence of a prior agreed-upon rent, in an amount equal to the fair rental value of the premises during the pendency of such action accruing from the date of such order. If the motion is served upon the defendant with the complaint, the motion shall be deemed for purposes of this section to have been filed on the date on which the defendant appears. If all or a portion of the defendant's rent is being paid to the plaintiff by a housing authority, municipality, state agency or similar entity, this requirement shall be satisfied if the defendant deposits with the court an amount equal to his portion of the last agreed-upon rent. The motion for use and occupancy payments shall include a statement of the amount of the last agreed-upon rent. The motion shall be filed on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator and shall contain, in clear and simple language, a notice advising the defendant that, if the defendant files an objection within five days of the date the motion was filed, the court will conduct a hearing on the motion prior to entering an order, but, if the defendant does not file an objection during such time period, the court will order use and occupancy payments without a hearing. The form shall also contain a place for the defendant to claim an objection to the motion and notice that the defendant may file an objection at any time. The filing by the plaintiff of a motion for use and occupancy payments shall not suspend the time limits for pleading under section 47a-26a.

      (b) Notice to the defendant of an order for use and occupancy payments shall be given on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator. Such form shall state in clear and simple language and in readable format (1) the amount to be paid, (2) the date by which such payment must be received by the clerk, and (3) the consequences of failure to make payment as ordered.

      (c) If the defendant files an objection to the motion, a hearing on the objection shall be held not more than seven days after such objection is filed, after which the court shall order the defendant to deposit with the court payments for use and occupancy in an amount equal to the fair rental value of the premises during the pendency of such action accruing from the date of such order. If all or a portion of the defendant's rent is being paid to the plaintiff by a housing authority, municipality, state agency or similar entity, this requirement shall be satisfied if the defendant deposits with the court an amount equal to his portion of the fair rental value of the premises. The last agreed-upon rent shall be prima facie evidence of the fair rental value of the premises. The party claiming a different amount shall have the burden of proving that the last agreed-upon rent is not the fair rental value. Such order shall permit the payment of such amounts in monthly installments, as such amounts become due. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude either party from subsequently moving to modify the amount of the payment order for cause shown.

      (d) If the defendant fails to make such payments as ordered, the clerk shall, immediately and without the filing of a motion, order the defendant to file his answer and, if the defendant fails to do so within four days of the mailing of such order, judgment shall forthwith be entered for the plaintiff. If the defendant files an answer within such four-day period, the clerk shall set such matter down for hearing not less than three nor more than seven days after such answer and reply, if any, are filed.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 53; P.A. 80-399, S. 5; 80-483, S. 129, 186; P.A. 84-266, S. 2, 4; P.A. 86-267, S. 3; P.A. 89-254, S. 9; P.A. 92-171, S. 5; P.A. 95-247, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 80-399 required that hearing be held within seven days rather than five days; P.A. 80-483 made technical grammatical correction; P.A. 84-266 added provision that the last agreed-upon rent shall be prima facie evidence of the fair rental value and that the party claiming a different amount has the burden of proving otherwise; P.A. 86-267 divided section into Subsecs. and added provisions authorizing the court without hearing to order the defendant to deposit within ten days use and occupancy payments equal to the last agreed-upon rent unless the defendant files an objection, prescribing the contents of the notice of such order, specifying that the filing of a motion for use and occupancy does not suspend the pleading time limits under Sec. 47a-26a, requiring the court to hold a hearing within seven days if the defendant files an objection and order the defendant to deposit use and occupancy payments equal to the fair rental value of the premises, and specifying that nothing in Subsec. (b) precludes a subsequent motion to modify the payment amount; P.A. 89-254 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that if all or a portion of the rent is being paid by certain third parties the defendant satisfies the requirement of making use and occupancy payments by depositing with the court an amount equal to his portion of the last agreed-upon rent and to add provisions re the form and content of the motion for use and occupancy payments, designated the provisions re the notice of an order for use and occupancy payments as Subsec. (b) and required the notice be given on a form prescribed by the "office of the chief court administrator" rather than by the "judicial department", redesignated Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c) and added provision that if all or a portion of the rent is being paid by certain third parties the defendant satisfies the requirement by depositing with the court an amount equal to his portion of the fair rental value of the premises, and redesignated Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 92-171 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the time period for depositing use and occupancy payments with the court runs from the filing of the motion rather than from the issuance of the order and to add provision that if the motion is served with the complaint it shall be deemed to have been filed on the date the defendant appears; P.A. 95-247 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that "in the absence of a prior agreed-upon rent", use and occupancy payments shall be "in an amount equal to the fair rental value of the premises".

      Cited. 4 CA 162. Cited. 17 CA 314. Cited. 19 CA 32. Cited. 20 CA 733.

      Cited. 37 CS 688; Id., 897. Cited. 38 CS 70. Contempt remedy was inappropriate since remedy for noncompliance with the statute is included within the section and is self-executing. Id., 370. Cited. 40 CS 53.

      Sec. 47a-26c. Advancement of pleadings. Failure to plead. All pleadings, including motions, shall advance at least one step within each successive period of three days from the preceding pleading or motion. If the defendant fails to plead within any such period, the complainant may file a motion for judgment for failure to plead, served upon the defendant in the manner provided in the rules adopted by the judges of the Superior Court for the service of pleadings. If the defendant fails to plead within three days after receipt of such motion by the clerk, the court shall forthwith enter judgment that the complainant recover possession or occupancy with costs.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 54; P.A. 04-127, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 04-127 added provisions re failure to plead and motion for judgment.

      Cited. 217 C. 313.

      Cited. 1 CA 439. Cited. 5 CA 417. Cited. 16 CA 574.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-26d. Trial. Finding. Judgment. If, on the trial of a summary process complaint it is found that the defendant is the lessee of the complainant and holds over after the termination of the lease or rental agreement or, if there was no lease or rental agreement, that the defendant is the occupant of such premises and has no right or privilege to occupy the same and that notice to quit has been given as provided in this chapter, yet that the defendant holds possession or occupancy after the expiration of the time specified in such notice to quit, and the defendant does not show a title in himself which accrued after the giving of the lease or rental agreement, if any, or if the defendant does not show a title in himself existing at the time the notice to quit possession or occupancy was served upon him, the court shall forthwith enter judgment that the complainant recover possession or occupancy of the premises with his costs, and execution shall issue accordingly subject to the provisions of sections 47a-35 to 47a-41, inclusive.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 55.)

      Cited. 6 CA 373. Plaintiff was entitled to possession of premises because defendant could not show evidence of title in itself at the time notice to quit was served. Defendant had no right to possession of premises after a five-year leasehold had expired. 74 CA 760.

      Cited. 38 CS 70; Id., 341; Id., 730.

      Sec. 47a-26e. Order of payments on appeal. If an order of payments is in effect on the date of judgment in the trial court and an appeal is taken by any party, the order shall remain in effect and compliance with the order shall constitute satisfactory compliance with the bond requirement of section 47a-35a.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 56; P.A. 93-209, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 93-209 provided that the order shall remain in effect if an appeal is taken by "any party", rather than "the defendant".

      Cited. 38 CS 70. Cited. 40 CS 53.

      Sec. 47a-26f. Hearing to distribute payments. After entry of final judgment, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount due each party from the accrued payments for such use and occupancy and order distribution in accordance with its determination. Such determination shall be based upon the respective claims of the parties arising during the pendency of the proceedings after the date of the order for payments and shall be conclusive of such claims only to the extent of the total amount distributed.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 57.)

      Cited. 19 CA 32.

      Cited. 37 CS 688; Id., 897. Cited. 38 CS 70; Id., 603. Cited. 40 CS 53.

      Sec. 47a-26g. Appeal. Appeal shall be allowed from any judgment rendered in any summary process action in the manner provided in sections 47a-35 to 47a-35b, inclusive, and sections 51-197c to 51-197f, inclusive.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 59.)

      See Sec. 47a-35 re time period to appeal.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-26h. Persons bound by judgment. Notice. Exemption. (a) A summary process judgment shall bind (1) the named defendants and any minors holding under them; (2) any occupant who first commenced occupancy of the premises after service of the notice to quit upon which the summary process action was based, unless such occupancy was commenced or continued with the consent of the plaintiff or under a right to occupy equal or superior to the rights of the plaintiff; (3) if the plaintiff has properly named and served each occupant whose presence is known with a notice to quit and a writ, summons and complaint in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 and 47a-23a, any occupant who first commenced occupancy of the premises prior to service of the notice to quit and (A) who the plaintiff and his agents did not know was in occupancy of the premises, or (B) of whose presence the plaintiff or his agent knew but whose name they did not know.

      (b) Upon entry of judgment, the clerk shall mail a notice of judgment to all defendants against whom judgment was rendered. Such notice shall be addressed to the named defendants and any other current occupants and shall contain the names of all defendants against whom judgment was entered, the date of judgment and notice of the right to apply for a stay of execution. The notice shall be on a form prescribed by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, shall be in clear and simple language and in readable format, and shall include a conspicuous notice to all occupants not named in the judgment, in large boldface type, that any such occupant who claims to have a right to continue to occupy the premises should promptly complete and file with the clerk of the court a claim of exemption from the judgment. If no such notice would otherwise be sent to the premises, an additional notice shall be sent to the premises, addressed to the named defendants "or any other current occupants".

      (c) Any occupant not named in the action who claims not to be subject to the summary process action because his occupancy commenced prior to service of the notice to quit or his occupancy commenced or continued with the consent of the plaintiff or under a right to occupy equal or superior to the rights of the plaintiff may, at any time before or after judgment but prior to issuance of an execution, file under oath a claim of exemption from such action. The Office of the Chief Court Administrator shall prescribe a form upon which such claim can be made, which form shall be in clear and simple language and in readable format. Upon the filing of such a claim, the clerk shall schedule a hearing, which shall be held not more than seven days after the date of filing. Execution shall not issue until the court renders its decision on the claim. The claimant shall have the burden of proof to show that his occupancy commenced prior to service of the notice to quit or that his occupancy was commenced or continued with the consent of the plaintiff or under a right to occupy equal or superior to the rights of the plaintiff. The burden of proof shall be upon the plaintiff to show that he did not know of the presence of the occupant or the name of the occupant, as the case may be. For purposes of this chapter, if rent or use and occupancy payments have been made to the plaintiff or his agent by the occupant, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have known of the presence and the name of the occupant. The court shall determine whether the claimant is bound by the action and, if the court finds that the claimant is not bound, it shall declare the claimant to be exempt from the action. In order to obtain a judgment for possession of the premises as part of such action the plaintiff shall serve the previously exempt occupant with a notice to quit possession pursuant to section 47a-23. If the occupant is still in possession after the date to quit possession has passed, the plaintiff shall serve the occupant with an amended writ, summons and complaint adding the occupant as a party defendant to such action of summary process. Any occupant not exempt from the action shall have the same rights and obligations as a named defendant and shall be bound by any judgment. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-42, no summary process execution shall be issued or enforced unless valid execution has been issued against all occupants of the premises, except that such execution may be issued and enforced, without issuing or enforcing execution against other occupants, upon a person against whom a judgment has been entered based upon that person's having conducted himself in a manner which constitutes a serious nuisance by using the premises or any area within fifteen hundred feet of any housing authority property in which such person resides for the illegal sale of drugs, as defined in subparagraph (D) of section 47a-15.

      (d) Nothing in this section shall in any way limit other remedies available in law or equity to any person, including remedies available after issuance of an execution.

      (P.A. 87-507, S. 3; P.A. 89-254, S. 10; P.A. 92-171, S. 6; P.A. 95-247, S. 3; P.A. 97-231, S. 6.)

      History: P.A. 89-254 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the form be prescribed by the office of the chief court administrator rather than by the judicial department and that the notice include a conspicuous notice to "all occupants not named in the judgment" rather than to "occupants", amended Subsec. (c) to replace "Any person who claims not to be subject to a summary process judgment" with "Any occupant not named in the action who claims not to be subject to the summary process action because his occupancy commenced prior to service of the notice to quit or his occupancy commenced or continued with the consent of the plaintiff or under a right to occupy equal or superior to the rights of the plaintiff", to replace references to "judgment" with "action", to provide that the exemption claim form shall be prescribed by the office of the chief court administrator rather than the judicial department, to replace "If the claimant is a person not named in the judgment, the burden of proof shall be on the occupant" with "The claimant shall have the burden of proof", to add provisions requiring the plaintiff in order to obtain a judgment for possession of the premises as part of such action to serve the previously exempt occupant with a notice to quit possession and, if the occupant is still in possession after the date to quit possession has passed, to serve the occupant with an amended writ, summons and complaint adding the occupant as a party defendant to such action, to provide that any "occupant" not exempt from the action shall have the same "obligations" as a named defendant and "shall be bound by any judgment", and to add exception for the issuance and enforcement of an execution against a person who used the premises for the illegal sale of drugs; P.A. 92-171 amended Subsec. (a) to delete the provision that required the plaintiff, in order for the judgment to bind an occupant who first commenced occupancy prior to service of the notice to quit, to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the presence of an occupant or, if the presence of the occupant is known, to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the name of the occupant; P.A. 95-247 amended Subsec. (c) to delete provision placing burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that he "in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have discovered" the presence or name of the occupant, reflecting deletion of same language in Subsec. (a) by P.A. 92-171; P.A. 97-231 amended Subsec. (c) to add exception for issuance and enforcement of execution upon a person who used any area within 1,500 feet of any housing authority property in which such person resides for the illegal sale of drugs.

      Cited. 21 CA 40.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 40 CA 30.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 225 C. 600.

      Sec. 47a-26i. Motion to open or set aside judgment or to extend final stay of execution. If a motion to open or set aside, or to extend a final stay of execution of, a summary process judgment is filed with the court, the court shall, not later than the first court day after the filing of such motion, conduct an ex parte review of the motion and grant the motion, deny the motion or schedule a hearing on the motion as the court deems warranted under the circumstances.

      (P.A. 96-74, S. 7; P.A. 99-157, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 99-157 made provisions applicable to a motion to extend a final stay of execution, required the court to conduct the ex parte review of a motion and take action "not later than the first court day after the filing of such motion" and deleted the provision that allowed the court to schedule a hearing without first reviewing the motion.

      Sec. 47a-27. (Formerly Sec. 52-535). Summary process by assignee and mortgagee. The remedy provided by this chapter in favor of lessors shall extend to all persons deriving title from the lessor or lessee of any land, building, apartment or dwelling unit and to the mortgagee of any land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, after his title has become absolute by foreclosure, and to all persons deriving title from him, or from the mortgagor. On a complaint by the mortgagee or his assigns, it shall be sufficient for him to prove the mortgage and his title thereunder, the foreclosure and the failure to redeem, that notice to quit at or after the expiration of the time limited for redemption has been served on the defendant and that he is the mortgagor, or one holding under him, and holds possession after the expiration of the term specified in such notice, unless the defendant can show a superior title in himself.

      (1949 Rev., 8278; P.A. 77-451, S. 8.)

      History: Sec. 52-535 transferred to Sec. 47a-27 in 1977; P.A. 77-451 added references to dwelling units.

      Annotation to former Sec. 52-535:

      Grantee of leased premises succeeds to lessor's remedy for a forfeiture of the lease. 70 C. 357.

      Annotations to present section:

      If lease is subsequent to mortgage, foreclosure extinguishes lease and summary process is an appropriate remedy. 52 CA 37.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-28. (Formerly Sec. 52-536). Action by selectmen. An action of summary process may be maintained by the selectmen of a town in its name to gain possession or occupancy of any land or buildings belonging to such town, which is held under a lease or by one in possession or occupancy thereof without right, title or privilege.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8279; 1949, S. 3220d; 1957, P.A. 291, S. 3; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 131; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 49; P.A. 74-183, S. 116, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 506, 681.)

      History: 1959 act provided action be before circuit court rather than before trial justice, alternate trial justice or municipal court, all of which were abolished; 1961 act deleted provision for actions brought by county commissioners for county, county government having been abolished; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 deleted provision which had required that action be brought to and tried before common pleas court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 52-536 transferred to Sec. 47a-28 in 1977.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-29. (Formerly Sec. 52-537). Action by reversion or remainderman. When any lessee occupies any land, building, apartment or dwelling unit under a lease or rental agreement from a tenant for life, any person entitled to the reversion or remainder may, upon the death of such tenant for life, proceed against such lessee by summary process, in the manner prescribed in this chapter. All proceedings commenced by such tenant for life for the recovery of such leased premises may, upon his death, be prosecuted in the name of the reversioner or remainderman, in the same manner as the lessor might have prosecuted the same if living.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8280; P.A. 77-451, S. 9; P.A. 79-571, S. 44.)

      History: Sec. 52-537 transferred to Sec. 47a-29 in 1977; P.A. 77-451 added reference to dwelling units; P.A. 79-571 added reference to rental agreements, specified tenants as "tenants for life" and made minor changes in wording.

      Annotation to former Sec. 52-537:

      Necessary averments in complaint. 35 C. 391.

      Annotation to present section:

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-30. (Formerly Sec. 52-538). Eviction of former farm employee, domestic servant, caretaker, manager or other employee. (a) When any farm employee or any domestic servant, caretaker, manager or other employee as described in section 47a-36 occupies a dwelling, dwelling unit or tenement furnished by his employer and when his employment is terminated by himself or his employer, or such employee fails to report for employment, and fails to vacate the premises in which he is residing, he shall be given not less than three days' notice to quit possession of such premises on the form prescribed by section 47a-23.

      (b) If he fails, after the expiration of the period specified in such notice, to vacate such premises, an action of summary process may be brought against such employee.

      (c) At the summary process hearing, the court may take into account the needs of the employee and enter a judgment granting such stay of execution as is reasonable and fair to the parties but, notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-36, in no case more than fifteen days. The provisions of sections 47a-37 to 47a-39, inclusive, shall not apply to an action of summary process under the provisions of this section.

      (1955, S. 3215d; 1957, P.A. 37; P.A. 77-451, S. 10; P.A. 79-571, S. 45; P.A. 95-247, S. 4; P.A. 04-127, S. 5; P.A. 05-288, S. 168.)

      History: Sec. 52-538 transferred to Sec. 47a-30 in 1977 and references to other sections within provisions revised as necessary to reflect their transfer; P.A. 77-451 added reference to "dwelling unit"; P.A. 79-571 divided section into Subsecs. and rephrased provisions; P.A. 95-247 amended Subsec. (a) to add "or any domestic servant, caretaker, manager or other employee as described in subsection (b) of section 47a-36"; P.A. 04-127 amended Subsec. (a) by changing notice period from not less than five days to not less than three days; P.A. 05-288 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective July 13, 2005.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-31. (Formerly Sec. 52-539). Illegal use of premises voids lease. When the lessee or tenant of any house, room, tenement or dwelling unit is convicted of keeping a house of ill-fame therein, resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or of a violation therein of any law against gaming, the lease, contract or rental agreement for letting such house, room, tenement or dwelling unit shall thereupon be void; and the lessor may recover possession of the premises in the manner prescribed in this chapter, but notice to quit possession shall not be required.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8281; P.A. 79-571, S. 50.)

      History: Sec. 52-539 transferred to Sec. 47a-31 in 1977; P.A. 79-571 added references to dwelling units and rental agreements and rephrased provisions.

      See Sec. 53a-89 re penalty for using premises for prostitution purposes.

      Annotations to former Sec. 52-539:

      Duty of landlord in order to avoid penalty imposed by municipal ordinance. 33 C. 93. Lease for use as place for illegal sale of intoxicating liquors. 102 C. 346. Section is not applicable without a conviction. 135 C. 364. Conviction of officers of corporation is not a conviction of the corporation so as to sustain a summary process action. 136 C. 156.

      Annotation to present section:

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-32. (Formerly Sec. 52-540). Nuisance defined. In any action of summary process based upon nuisance, that term shall be taken to include, but shall not be limited to, any conduct which interferes substantially with the comfort or safety of other tenants or occupants of the same or adjacent buildings or structures.

      (1949, S. 3214d.)

      History: Sec. 52-540 transferred to Sec. 47a-32 in 1977.

      Annotation to former section 52-540:

      Cited. 241 C. 502.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 57 CA 731.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-33. (Formerly Sec. 52-540a). Defense that action is retaliatory. In any action for summary process under this chapter or section 21-80 it shall be an affirmative defense that the plaintiff brought such action solely because the defendant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, including contacting officials of the state or of any town, city, borough or public agency or filing a complaint with a fair rent commission, any condition constituting a violation of any of the provisions of chapter 368o, or of chapter 412, or of any other state statute or regulation or of the housing or health ordinances of the municipality wherein the premises which are the subject of the complaint lie. The obligation on the part of the defendant to pay rent or the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises which are the subject of any such action shall not be abrogated or diminished by any provision of this section.

      (1969, P.A. 315; 1972, P.A. 160, S. 4; 186, S. 14; P.A. 74-333, S. 6, 12; P.A. 78-303, S. 118, 136; P.A. 79-560, S. 20, 39.)

      History: 1972 acts specified as affirmative defense that plaintiff brought action because defendant sought remedy by filing complaint with fair rent commission and added reference to statutes and regulations other than provisions of Ch. 352 and later added reference to Ch. 412; P.A. 74-333 added reference to Sec. 21-80; Sec. 52-540a transferred to Sec. 47a-33 in 1977; P.A. 78-303 deleted reference to Sec. 21-80; P.A. 79-560 restored reference to Sec. 21-80.

      See Sec. 47a-20 prohibiting retaliatory action by landlord.

      See Sec. 47a-21 re actions deemed not to be retaliatory.

      Annotations to former section 52-540a:

      Cited. 33 CS 15. Defense of retaliatory eviction not available in summary process action for nonpayment of rent. 34 CS 594. Cited. Id.

      Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207, 208.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 178 C. 586. Cited. 217 C. 313.

      Cited. 1 CA 439. Cited. 16 CA 444.

      Cited. 35 CS 233. Section establishes retaliatory action as affirmative defense. No presumptions permitted under section and tenant, by affirmative proof, must establish landlord's primary motive in seeking eviction was in retaliation for tenant's exercise of his statutory right to report housing code violations. Burden of persuasion for affirmative defense rests upon tenant who asserts it. Id., 261. Cited. 36 CS 47. Cited. 38 CS 70; Id., 370.

      Sec. 47a-33a. Presentation of affirmative defenses. In any action of summary process under this chapter, the tenant may present any affirmative legal, equitable or constitutional defense that the tenant may have.

      (P.A. 95-247, S. 8.)

      Sec. 47a-34. (Formerly Sec. 52-541). Other legal remedies not affected. All persons claiming title to premises concerning which any proceedings under this chapter have been had shall be entitled to any other legal remedy in the same manner as if such proceedings had not been had.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8282; P.A. 79-571, S. 58.)

      History: Sec. 52-541 transferred to Sec. 47a-34 in 1977; P.A. 79-571 deleted the word "notwithstanding" preceding "be entitled".

      Cited. 37 CS 889. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-35. (Formerly Sec. 52-542). Stay of execution. Appeal. (a) Execution shall be stayed for five days from the date judgment has been rendered, provided any Sunday or legal holiday intervening shall be excluded in computing such five days.

      (b) No appeal shall be taken except within such five-day period. If an appeal is taken within such period, execution shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried the case that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay or unless the defendant fails to give bond, as provided in section 47a-35a. If execution has not been stayed, as provided in this subsection, execution may then issue, except as otherwise provided in sections 47a-36 to 47a-41, inclusive.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8283; 1949, S. 3221d; 1957, P.A. 291, S. 4; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 132; 1961, P.A. 509, S. 4; 1969, P.A. 296; 1971, P.A. 316; P.A. 76-95, S. 25, 27; P.A. 76-435, S. 75, 82; P.A. 79-571, S. 60; P.A. 80-399, S. 7; P.A. 96-74, S. 3.)

      History: 1959 act deleted reference to trial justice and alternate trial justice which were abolished; 1961 act substituted the taking of an appeal for procuring a writ of error, deleted forty-eight-hour time limit for appeal and stay of execution during same, added execution be stayed for five days from judgment and added provision re effect of appeal on execution; 1969 act specified that bond be given "within the period allowed for taking such appeal or within three days from the fixing of the bond, whichever is later", that court is responsible for fixing bond and that bond answers for rents or reasonable value for use and occupancy accruing from commencement of action to date of judgment; 1971 act specified applicability to defendants "occupying an apartment in a tenement house as defined in chapter 352", deleted reference to bonds given within three days from fixing of bond and reworded provisions, specifying that in other appeal court "may fix a sufficient bond with surety to the adverse party"; P.A. 76-95 referred to dwelling units rather than to apartments in tenement houses, deleted reference to bonds quartering rents accruing from commencement of action to date of judgment and to rents due at time of appeal's disposal, added proviso re payments for fair rental value for use and occupancy during pendency of appeal, allowed payments in monthly installments and added provisions re determination of amounts due to parties upon final disposition of appeal; P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95, see history for Sec. 47a-1; Sec. 52-542 transferred to Sec. 47a-35 in 1977 and internal references to other sections revised as necessary to reflect their transfer; P.A. 79-571 deleted provisions re bonds and determination and distribution of amounts due to parties, reincorporating them as Secs. 47a-35a and 47a-35b; P.A. 80-399 added provisions re stays of execution in cases involving nonpayment of rent; P.A. 96-74 designated existing provisions re automatic stay of execution as Subsec. (a) and deleted provisions authorizing a defendant in an action for nonpayment of rent to apply for an additional stay of execution not exceeding three months upon the deposit of the full arrearage with the clerk of the court and requiring the clerk to distribute such arrearage, said provisions being reenacted in Sec. 47a-37 by same public act, and designated existing provisions re taking of an appeal as Subsec. (b) and rephrased provisions.

      Annotations to former statute:

      If, after lessee is put out on execution, judgment is reversed on error, during the term of the lease, he may claim a writ of restitution. 12 C. 539, 540. The cause cannot after a reversal be retained for trial in the superior court. 39 C. 307. Applies to writ of error from city court to supreme court. 79 C. 308. Plaintiff may have writ of error; quaere, as to right of defendant to bring after forty-eight hours. 86 C. 35. Bill of exceptions may be allowed and writ issued after forty-eight hours. Cited. 92 C. 150; 95 C. 281. This statute must be followed; injunction against landlord will not lie in absence of fraud, accident or mistake. 96 C. 630. Cited. 97 C. 123; 114 C. 584. Bond would continue to apply during period when appeal from decision on writ of error might be pending before supreme court. 125 C. 548. Cited. 131 C. 530; 134 C. 652. Not a statute of limitations. Sole purpose is to stay execution to give tenant an opportunity to institute writ of error. 137 C. 635.

      Section imposes strict limitations upon resort to writ of error. 15 CS 143. Cited. 19 CS 40; 22 CS 470. Bond executed by stranger to the action does not comply with requirements of statute. 23 CS 196. Appeal period not tolled by motion to open judgment or motion to stay execution. 30 CS 580. Appeal bond requirement cannot be waived. 33 CS 15. This section, not section 52-6a, controls time limit for appeals by either party. Id., 522. This section not a denial of equal protection or due process of law. Id., 531.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 561. Appeal must be taken within period of five days from date of judgment, day that judgment was rendered being excluded from count of days. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 265. Bond requirement does not violate equal protection clause of federal and state constitutions as to indigent defendants. Id., 282. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal for failure of defendant to file bond granted, and defendant's motion to determine bond not considered as appellate court has no authority to fix bond. Id., 350. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 2. After commencement of hearing on merits, plaintiff may withdraw action only by leave of trial court for cause shown. See section 52-80. Motion for leave to withdraw action should be addressed to trial court and not to appellate division. Id., 168. Limit of five days to appeal summary process judgment, acts as general limit to general fourteen day right under section 51-265. Id., 529, 530.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 225 C. 757. Legislature intended the five-day time limitation as jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal from housing court ruling in a summary process eviction proceeding. 235 C. 650.

      Cited. 5 CA 153. Cited. 40 CA 553. Cited. 45 CA 324.

      Filing time extended when fifth day falls on a day when clerk's office closed. 36 CS 541. Cited. Id., 623; Id., 626. Cited. 37 CS 645, 646. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-35a. Bond on appeal. Rent to be paid into court. (a) When any appeal is taken by the defendant occupying a dwelling unit as defined in section 47a-1 in an action of summary process, he shall, within the period allowed for taking such appeal, give a bond with surety to the adverse party to guarantee payment for all rents that may accrue during the pendency of such appeal, or, where no lease had existed, for the reasonable value for such use and occupancy that may so accrue; provided the court shall upon motion by the defendant and after hearing thereon order the defendant to deposit with the court payments for the reasonable fair rental value of the use and occupancy of the premises during the pendency of such appeal accruing from the date of such order. Such order shall permit the payment of such amount in monthly installments, as it becomes due, and compliance with such order shall be a substitute for any bond required by this section. If all or a portion of the defendant's rent is being paid to the plaintiff by a housing authority, municipality, state agency or similar entity, this requirement shall be satisfied if the defendant deposits with the court an amount equal to his portion of the rent.

      (b) In any other appeal the court on its own motion or on motion of the parties, may fix a sufficient bond with surety to the adverse party in such amount as it may determine.

      (c) When any appeal is taken by a plaintiff in an action of summary process, the court, upon motion of the plaintiff and after a hearing thereon, shall order the defendant to deposit with the court payments in monthly installments, as each payment becomes due, for the reasonable fair rental value of the use and occupancy of the premises during the pendency of the appeal accruing from the date of such order.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 61; P.A. 89-254, S. 11; P.A. 93-209, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 89-254 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision that if all or a portion of the rent is being paid by certain third parties the defendant satisfies the requirement by depositing with the court an amount equal to his portion of the rent; P.A. 93-209 added Subsec. (c) requiring the defendant to deposit with the court monthly use and occupancy payments during the pendency of an appeal taken by the plaintiff.

      Where no lease existed and defendant made a motion to make payments for reasonable fair rental value of the property, an appeal bond is not required. 249 C. 482.

      Cited. 5 CA 153. Cited. 29 CA 139.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 40 CA 513.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 40 CA 513.

      Sec. 47a-35b. Distribution of payments after appeal. Upon final disposition of the appeal, the trial court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount due each party from the accrued payments for use and occupancy and order distribution in accordance with such determination. Such determination shall be based upon the respective claims of the parties arising during the pendency of the proceedings after the date of the order for payments and shall be conclusive of those claims only to the extent of the total amount distributed.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 62.)

      A proceeding under section is properly limited to those claims related to the use and occupancy of the premises during pendency of the appeal and therefore court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to enlarge the proceedings to include a CUTPA claim and an entry and detainer action. 112 CA 1.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-36. (Formerly Sec. 52-543). Occupancies to which stay of execution provisions are inapplicable. Sections 47a-37 to 47a-41, inclusive, shall not apply to (1) housing accommodations situated on a farm and occupied by a tenant who is engaged for a substantial portion of his time in farming operations thereon, (2) dwelling space occupied by domestic servants, caretakers, managers or other employees, to whom the space is provided as part or all of their compensation and who are employed for the purpose of rendering services in connection with the premises of which the dwelling space is a part, (3) land, housing accommodations or a trailer, used or occupied for dwelling purposes, or any land upon which a trailer is used, stands or is occupied for dwelling purposes located in a resort community and customarily rented or occupied on a seasonal basis, or (4) transient occupancy of a dwelling unit in a hotel or motel or similar lodging.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8285; 1949, S. 3222d; P.A. 77-451, S. 11; P.A. 79-571, S. 63; P.A. 82-472, S. 131, 183; P.A. 89-254, S. 12; P.A. 92-171, S. 7; P.A. 95-247, S. 5; P.A. 96-74, S. 4.)

      History: Sec. 52-543 transferred to Sec. 47a-36 in 1977 and internal references to other sections revised as necessary to reflect their transfer; P.A. 77-451 added reference to dwelling units; P.A. 79-571 divided section into Subsecs., adding reference to Secs. 47a-26a, 47a-26b and 47a-26d in Subsec. (a) and replacing alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators in Subsec. (b); P.A. 82-472 made technical change; P.A. 89-254 amended Subsec. (b)(4) by replacing "any room or rooms in a hotel, lodging house or rooming house" with "transient occupancy of a dwelling unit in a hotel or motel or similar lodging"; P.A. 92-171 amended Subsec. (a) to reduce the period of the stay of execution from 20 to 15 days and to add as an exception to such period a judgment rendered based on the ground set forth in Sec. 47a-23(a)(2); P.A. 95-247 amended Subsec. (a) to delete provision that limited applicability of section to any land, building, dwelling unit or trailer "used or occupied for dwelling purposes"; P.A. 96-74 deleted Subsec. (a) that had provided an automatic stay of execution of 15 days if the judgment was rendered for any reason other than nonpayment of rent, nuisance committed or permitted by the defendant, the use of or permitting the use of the premises for an immoral or illegal purpose or the ground set forth in Sec. 47a-23(a)(2), and replaced reference to Sec. 47a-36 with Sec. 47a-37.

      Annotations to former section 52-543.

      Cited. 19 CS 40. Cited. 20 CS 392.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 561(fn).

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 35 CS 274. Cited. 36 CS 623. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-37. (Formerly Sec. 52-544). Application for stay of execution. (a) Within a period of five days after a judgment has been rendered for a plaintiff under the provisions of section 47a-26, 47a-26a, 47a-26b or 47a-26d for any reason other than (1) nonpayment of rent, (2) nuisance committed or permitted by the defendant, (3) the use of or permitting the use of the premises for an immoral or illegal purpose, or (4) the ground set forth in subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 47a-23, any defendant against whom such judgment has been rendered may file an application in triplicate with the clerk of the superior court in which the judgment was rendered, requesting a stay of execution and setting forth the reasons therefor, except that in the case of a judgment rendered against a defendant for nonpayment of rent, if within five days of the date of such judgment the defendant deposits with the clerk of the court the full arrearage, the defendant may then apply for a stay of execution in accordance with this section. The clerk shall distribute such arrearage to the plaintiff in accordance with an order of the court.

      (b) The court rendering the judgment shall inform each defendant in such case of his right to file an application for a stay of execution and, upon request, shall furnish him with the necessary form. Upon the filing of such an application, execution of the judgment rendered shall be further stayed until a decision is rendered on the application. The clerk of the court rendering the judgment shall forthwith hand or send one copy of the application to the adverse party or his attorney, shall note on the original and each copy the date of filing and the date and method of transmittal of the copy to the adverse party or his attorney, and shall file the original and one copy of the application with the complete court records, papers and exhibits in connection with such proceedings.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8286; 1949, 1955, S. 3223d; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 133; 1961, P.A. 509, S. 5; February, 1965, P.A. 142; P.A. 74-183, S. 117, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 507, 681; P.A. 79-571, S. 64; P.A. 96-74, S. 5.)

      History: 1959 act deleted references to trial justices and added "circuit" to the word "court"; 1961 act eliminated forwarding of application to common pleas court; 1965 act specified applicability re judgments "as described in section 52-543"; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 52-544 transferred to Sec. 47a-37 in 1977 and reference to Sec. 52-543 revised to reflect its transfer; P.A. 79-571 rephrased provisions but made no substantive changes; P.A. 96-74 divided section into Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (a) to replace requirement that an application for a stay of execution be filed within 20 days after a judgment as described in Sec. 47a-36 with requirement that such application be filed within 5 days after judgment has been rendered for a plaintiff under the provisions of Sec. 47a-26, 47a-26a, 47a-26b or 47a-26d for any reason other than nonpayment of rent, nuisance committed or permitted by the defendant, the use of or permitting the use of the premises for an immoral or illegal purpose or the ground set forth in Sec. 47a-23(a)(2), and to add provisions, formerly part of Sec. 47a-35, authorizing a defendant in a nonpayment of rent case to apply for a stay of execution if he deposits the full rent arrearage with the clerk of the court and requiring the clerk to distribute such arrearage.

      Annotations to former Sec. 52-544:

      After statutory periods for stay of judgment in summary process action have expired, judge may not entertain motion to stay execution nor may clerk refuse to issue execution. 20 CS 300.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 561.

      Annotations to present statute:

      Cited. 36 CS 623. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-38. (Formerly Sec. 52-545). Hearing on application for stay of execution. Upon the receipt of any application for stay of execution, the clerk of the Superior Court shall include the matter on the short calendar for a hearing on the application, and shall give each party or his attorney at least three days' notice of the time and place of the hearing.

      (1955, S. 3224d; 1961, P.A. 509, S. 6; P.A. 74-183, S. 118, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 508, 681; P.A. 79-571, S. 65.)

      History: 1961 act updated statute, deleting provision for receipt of court record in summary process action and substituting circuit for common pleas court, and added matter be included on short calendar; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 52-545 transferred to Sec. 47a-38 in 1977; P.A. 79-571 replaced "such" with "the" where appearing.

      Cited. 36 CS 623. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-39. (Formerly Sec. 52-546). Court may grant stay of execution. Upon the hearing on such application in the Superior Court the judgment of the trial court shall stand, but upon such hearing if it appears that the premises, judgment for possession or occupancy of which has been rendered, are used for dwelling purposes and are not excluded by the provisions of section 47a-36; that the applicant cannot secure suitable premises for himself and his family elsewhere within the city or town or in a city or town adjacent thereto in a neighborhood reasonably comparable to that in which the premises occupied by him are situated; that he has used due diligence and reasonable effort to secure other premises; that his application is made in good faith, and that he will abide by and comply with such terms and provisions as the court may prescribe, the court may grant a stay of execution for a period or for periods in the aggregate not exceeding six months from the date of the judgment in the summary process action upon such conditions and terms as appear fair and equitable, except that such stay of execution shall not exceed three months in the aggregate if the reason for the judgment against the defendant was nonpayment of rent; provided in the case of an applicant who is a resident in a mobile manufactured home park and owns his own unit and has received notice pursuant to subparagraph (E) of subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of section 21-80 or an applicant who is a conversion tenant, as defined in section 47-283, or who at the time of conversion was residing in a dwelling unit in a building or on property which has been declared a conversion condominium, at the end of such six-month period the court may extend such stay of execution under the same or different conditions and terms for an additional period not exceeding nine months taking into consideration the age of the applicant, the size of the applicant's family, the length of time of such applicant's tenancy and the availability of suitable alternative housing. Such extended stay may be reviewed every two months. The court shall consider all the circumstances of the case, the equities involved and whether any undue hardship would result to either party. Such conditions and terms may include the requirement that the applicant shall pay to the plaintiff in the summary process action such amount in such installments from time to time and in such manner as the court may direct, for the use and occupancy of the premises for such period of the stay, at the rate to which he was liable as rent for the month immediately prior to the expiration of his term or tenancy, if any, and any assessment for current common expenses not already included in the rent as provided in subsection (b) of section 47-76, if any, or such sum as may be determined by the court to be reasonable for such use and occupancy. Such payment shall also include all rent unpaid prior to the period of such stay.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8288; 1949, 1955, S. 3226d; 1957, P.A. 291, S. 5; 1961, P.A. 509, S. 7; P.A. 74-183, S. 119, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 509, 681; P.A. 80-370, S. 2, 9; P.A. 87-358, S. 4; P.A. 90-242, S. 2, 5 P.A. 91-383, S. 20; P.A. 96-74, S. 6.)

      History: 1961 act substituted circuit for common pleas court, specified hearing be on application, deleted stipulation judgment shall not stand where writ of error has been issued and provision for issuance of stay by judge and added stay may be for periods in the aggregate not exceeding six months; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 52-546 transferred to Sec. 47a-39 in 1977 and reference to Sec. 52-543 revised to reflect its transfer; P.A. 80-370 added proviso re applicants residing in dwelling units declared conversion condominiums, specified that extended stays may be reviewed every two months and authorized that payments for use and occupancy of premises may include assessment for current common expenses; P.A. 87-358 increased from six to nine months the extended stay of execution which the court may grant to an applicant in a conversion condominium; P.A. 90-242 authorized an extended stay of execution for a resident in a mobile manufactured home park who owns his own unit and has received notice pursuant to Sec. 21-80(b)(1)(E); P.A. 91-383 replaced "an applicant residing in a dwelling unit which has been declared a conversion condominium" with "an applicant who is a conversion tenant, as defined in section 47-283, or who at the time of conversion was residing in a dwelling unit in a building or on property which has been declared a conversion condominium"; P.A. 96-74 replaced condition that the premises "come within the classification of premises as set forth in section 47a-36" with condition that the premises "are not excluded by the provisions of section 47a-36" and added exception, formerly part of Sec. 47a-35, that the stay of execution shall not exceed three months if the reason for the judgment against the defendant was nonpayment of rent.

      Cited. 217 C. 57.

      Cited. 36 CS 623. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-40. (Formerly Sec. 52-547). No entry fee, judgment fee or costs on application or hearing. No entry fee and no judgment fee shall be required and no costs shall be taxed in favor of either party in connection with an application for a stay of execution and the hearing thereon.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8289; 1961, P.A. 509, S. 8; P.A. 79-571, S. 66.)

      History: 1961 act updated statute, deleting specification section apply to court of common pleas, and added stipulation re application and hearing; Sec. 52-547 transferred to Sec. 47a-40 in 1977; P.A. 79-571 substituted "an application for a stay of execution" for "such application".

      Cited. 36 CS 623. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-41. (Formerly Sec. 52-548). Waiver of tenant's rights to be void. Any provision of a lease or rental agreement whereby a lessee or tenant waives the benefits of sections 47a-36 to 47a-40, inclusive, or any provision of any lease or rental agreement which limits the rights of any lessee or tenant under the provisions of said sections, is against public policy and void.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8290; P.A. 79-571, S. 67.)

      History: Sec. 52-548 transferred to Sec. 47a-41 in 1977; P.A. 79-571 added references to rental agreements and substituted "is" for "shall be deemed to".

      Cited. 36 CS 623. Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-41a. Execution void after six months. An execution to enforce a summary process judgment shall not be issued after the expiration of six months from the date such judgment was entered, except that any period during which execution was stayed shall be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation.

      (P.A. 79-571, S. 68; P.A. 80-399, S. 6.)

      History: P.A. 80-399 changed deadline for execution from one year to six months and deleted language referring to stays of execution pursuant to Secs. 47a-35 to 47a-41.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-42. (Formerly Sec. 52-549). Eviction of tenant and occupants from residential property. Removal and sale of unclaimed possessions and personal effects. (a) Whenever a judgment is entered against a defendant pursuant to section 47a-26, 47a-26a, 47a-26b or 47a-26d for the recovery of possession or occupancy of residential property, such defendant and any other occupant bound by the judgment by subsection (a) of section 47a-26h shall forthwith remove himself or herself, such defendant's or occupant's possessions and all personal effects unless execution has been stayed pursuant to sections 47a-35 to 47a-41, inclusive. If execution has been stayed, such defendant or occupant shall forthwith remove himself or herself, such defendant's or occupant's possessions and all personal effects upon the expiration of any stay of execution. If the defendant or occupant has not so removed himself or herself upon entry of a judgment pursuant to section 47a-26, 47a-26a, 47a-26b or 47a-26d, and upon expiration of any stay of execution, the plaintiff may obtain an execution upon such summary process judgment, and the defendant or other occupant bound by the judgment by subsection (a) of section 47a-26h and the possessions and personal effects of such defendant or other occupant may be removed by a state marshal, pursuant to such execution, and delivered to the place of storage designated by the chief executive officer for such purposes.

      (b) Before any such removal, the state marshal charged with executing upon any such judgment of eviction shall give the chief executive officer of the town twenty-four hours notice of the eviction, stating the date, time and location of such eviction as well as a general description, if known, of the types and amount of property to be removed from the premises and delivered to the designated place of storage. Before giving such notice to the chief executive officer of the town, the state marshal shall use reasonable efforts to locate and notify the defendant of the date and time such eviction is to take place and of the possibility of a sale pursuant to subsection (c) of this section. Such notice shall include service upon each defendant and upon any other person in occupancy, either personally or at the premises, of a true copy of the summary process execution. Such execution shall be on a form prescribed by the Judicial Department, shall be in clear and simple language and in readable format, and shall contain, in addition to other notices given to the defendant in the execution, a conspicuous notice, in large boldface type, that a person who claims to have a right to continue to occupy the premises should immediately contact an attorney, and clear instructions as to how and where the defendant may reclaim any possessions and personal effects removed and stored pursuant to this section, including a telephone number that may be called to arrange release of such possessions and personal effects.

      (c) Whenever the possessions and personal effects of a defendant are removed by a state marshal under this section, such possessions and effects shall be delivered by such marshal to the designated place of storage. Such removal, delivery and storage shall be at the expense of the defendant. If such possessions and effects are not reclaimed by the defendant and the expense of such storage is not paid to the chief executive officer within fifteen days after such eviction, the chief executive officer shall sell the same at public auction, after using reasonable efforts to locate and notify the defendant of such sale and after posting notice of such sale for one week on the public signpost nearest to the place where the eviction was made, if any, or at some exterior place near the office of the town clerk. The chief executive officer shall deliver to the defendant the net proceeds of such sale, if any, after deducting a reasonable charge for storage of such possessions and effects. If the defendant does not demand the net proceeds within thirty days after such sale, the chief executive officer shall turn over the net proceeds of the sale to the town treasury.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8284; 1963, P.A. 479; P.A. 76-195; P.A. 79-571, S. 69; P.A. 84-146, S. 16; P.A. 87-507, S. 4; P.A. 97-231, S. 7; P.A. 00-99, S. 96, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 44, 181; P.A. 10-171, S. 1.)

      History: 1963 act deleted provisions applying section where personal effects are owned by one other than tenant, required immediate removal rather than within 24 hours and made technical changes; P.A. 76-195 inserted new Subsecs. (a) and (b) re defendant's removal from property and re duties of sheriff, deputy and town's chief executive officer, designated previous provisions as Subsec. (c), substituted "defendant" for "tenant" and "chief executive officer" for "selectmen" and specified that auction may not be held unless reasonable efforts have been made to notify defendant of sale; Sec. 52-549 transferred to Sec. 47a-42 in 1977 and internal references to sections revised as necessary to reflect their transfer; P.A. 79-571 added references to Secs. 47a-26a, 47a-26b and 47a-26d in Subsec. (a) and rephrased provisions; P.A. 84-146 included a reference to posting of notice on a place other than a signpost; P.A. 87-507 amended Subsec. (a) to include "any other occupant bound by the judgment by subsection (a) of section 47a-26h" and to add references to such "occupant" and amended Subsec. (b) to require the notice to include service of a true copy of the summary process execution upon each defendant and occupant, to add requirements re the form and format of the execution and to require the execution to contain a notice re contacting an attorney; P.A. 97-231 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability of section to judgments "for the recovery of possession or occupancy of residential property" and to authorize a sheriff or his deputy to remove the defendant or other occupant bound by the judgment; P.A. 00-99 replaced references to sheriff and deputy sheriff with state marshal in Subsecs. (a) and (b), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 11, 2001; P.A. 10-171 amended Subsec. (a) to authorize state marshal to deliver tenant possessions and personal effects to place of storage designated by chief executive officer and delete provision re setting such possessions and effects out on the adjacent sidewalk, amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re delivery to designated place of storage and require summary process execution to include instructions re how and where defendant may reclaim removed possessions and effects, and made conforming changes in Subsec. (c), effective July 1, 2010.

      Annotations to former Sec. 52-549:

      Cited. 114 C. 441. Tenant, as used in this section, is to be taken in its general meaning of holder or possessor of land and applied to plaintiff who continued to hold possession of condemned land after title and right to possession had passed to highway commissioner. History of the statute. 159 C. 64.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 225 C. 757. Cited. 237 C. 679.

      Cited. 38 CS 70.

      Sec. 47a-42a. Eviction of tenant and occupants from commercial property. Disposition of unclaimed possessions and personal effects. (a) Whenever a judgment is entered against a defendant pursuant to section 47a-26, 47a-26a, 47a-26b or 47a-26d for the possession or occupancy of nonresidential property, such defendant and any other occupant bound by the judgment by subsection (a) of section 47a-26h shall forthwith remove himself or herself, such defendant's or occupant's possessions and all personal effects unless execution has been stayed pursuant to sections 47a-35 to 47a-41, inclusive. If execution has been stayed, such defendant or occupant shall forthwith remove himself or herself, such defendant's or occupant's possessions and all personal effects upon the expiration of any stay of execution. If the defendant or occupant has not so removed himself or herself upon entry of a judgment pursuant to section 47a-26, 47a-26a, 47a-26b or 47a-26d, and upon expiration of any stay of execution, the plaintiff may obtain an execution upon such summary process judgment, and the defendant or other occupant bound by the judgment by subsection (a) of section 47a-26h and the possessions and personal effects of such defendant or other occupant may be removed as provided in this section.

      (b) The state marshal charged with executing upon any such summary process judgment shall, at least twenty-four hours prior to the date and time of the eviction, use reasonable efforts to locate and notify the defendant or occupant of the date and time such eviction is to take place. Such notice shall include service upon each defendant and upon any other person in occupancy, either personally or at the premises, of a true copy of the summary process execution. Such execution shall be on a form prescribed by the Judicial Department, shall be in clear and simple language and in readable format, and shall contain, in addition to other notices given to the defendant or occupant in the execution, a conspicuous notice, in large boldface type, that a person who claims to have a right to continue to occupy the premises should immediately contact an attorney. Such execution shall contain a notice advising the defendant or occupant that if he or she does not remove such defendant's or occupant's possessions and personal effects from the premises by the date and time set for the eviction and thereafter fails to claim such possessions and personal effects from the landlord and pay any removal and storage costs within fifteen days after the date of such eviction, such possessions and personal effects will be forfeited to the landlord.

      (c) The state marshal who served the execution upon the defendant or occupant as provided in subsection (b) of this section shall return to the premises at the date and time such eviction is to take place. If the defendant or occupant has not removed himself or herself from the premises, the state marshal shall remove such defendant or occupant. If the defendant or occupant has not removed such defendant's or occupant's possessions and personal effects from the premises, the plaintiff, in the presence of the state marshal, shall prepare an inventory of such possessions and personal effects and provide a copy of such inventory to the state marshal. The plaintiff shall remove and store such possessions or personal effects or shall store the same in the premises. Such removal and storage or storage in the premises shall be at the expense of the defendant. If such possessions and effects are not called for by the defendant or occupant and the expense of such removal and storage or storage in the premises is not paid to the plaintiff within fifteen days after such eviction, the defendant or occupant shall forfeit such possessions and personal effects to the plaintiff and the plaintiff may dispose of them as the plaintiff deems appropriate.

      (P.A. 97-231, S. 8; P.A. 00-99, S. 97, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 45, 181.)

      History: P.A. 00-99 replaced references to sheriff and deputy sheriff with state marshal in Subsecs. (b) and (c), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality throughout, effective July 11, 2001.