CHAPTER 961*
TRIAL AND PROCEEDINGS AFTER CONVICTION

PART I
DISCOVERY, TRIAL AND WITNESSES

      Sec. 54-77. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-352.

      Sec. 54-77a. Establishing venue and selecting jurors for the town of Plymouth. Section 54-77a is repealed.

      (P.A. 75-26, S. 1, 8; P.A. 76-436, S. 664, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 11, 65.)

      Sec. 54-77b. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-352a.

      Sec. 54-78. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-353.

      Sec. 54-79. Transferred to Chapter 890, Sec. 51-353b.

      Secs. 54-80 to 54-81b. Public defenders. Assistant public defenders; office; assistance. Expenses. Appointment of special defender. Public defenders for Common Pleas Court. Representation of accused on bindover. Sections 54-80 to 54-81b, inclusive, are repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 3615, 8796; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 13; 1961, P.A. 564, S. 1-3; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 69, 70; February, 1965, P.A. 178, S. 1, 2; 218; 1967, P.A. 34, S. 1; 189; 622, S. 8; 1969, P.A. 655, S. 2; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 121; 1972, P.A. 281, S. 22, 23; P.A. 73-116, S. 25, 26; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 150, 151, 291; 74-317, S. 12, 14.)

      Sec. 54-82. Accused's election of trial by court or by jury. Number of jurors. (a) In any criminal case, prosecution or proceeding, the party accused may, if he so elects when called upon to plead, be tried by the court instead of by the jury; and, in such case, the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try such case and render judgment and sentence thereon.

      (b) If the accused is charged with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for life and elects to be tried by the court, the court shall be composed of three judges to be designated by the Chief Court Administrator, or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.

      (c) If the party accused does not elect to be tried by the court, he shall be tried by a jury of six except that no person, charged with an offense which is punishable by death or life imprisonment, shall be tried by a jury of less than twelve without his consent.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8797; 1953, S. 3326d; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 62; P.A. 73-576, S. 3, 4; 73-616, S. 41, 67; P.A. 76-336, S. 4; P.A. 77-474, S. 1, 2; P.A. 80-313, S. 36; P.A. 81-47.)

      History: 1967 act provided for designation of judges by chief court administrator instead of chief justice; P.A. 73-576 substituted "Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers" for "State Prison" and replaced provision calling for trial by jury of six unless defendant claims twelve-person jury or case is punishable by death or life imprisonment with provision calling for jury of six except in cases involving capital offense which require trial by twelve-person jury unless defendant consents to jury of six; P.A. 73-616 transferred duty to select panel judges from chief court administrator to chief justice; P.A. 76-336 deleted specific references to imprisonment at Somers Correctional Institution; P.A. 77-474 required jury of twelve in cases involving offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment rather than in cases involving capital offenses; P.A. 80-313 divided section into Subsecs.; P.A. 81-47 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing provision re appointment of judges by chief justice with provision that three judges shall be designated by chief court administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial.

      Application by accused for leave to withdraw election made under this statute is addressed to court's discretion; refusal to permit withdrawal held no error. 102 C. 51. The court's determination of guilt or innocence upon the evidence should be raised on appeal by an assignment of error; not necessary to make a motion to set aside verdict. 105 C. 332; 109 C. 126; 110 C. 552. Court fulfills function of jury; its additional power under this statute does not authorize convicting of robbery a defendant charged with murder. 132 C. 43. Cited. 142 C. 114. It is not violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial for the legislature to enact a statute which changes the form of jury procedure if it still maintains the substance of the institution. 144 C. 228. Insofar as it provides that an accused shall be tried to a jury of six unless at the time he is put to plea he demands a jury of twelve, it does not deprive any defendant of his right of trial by jury. Id., 230. Cited. 146 C. 78; 147 C. 95; 153 C. 328. Cited. 161 C. 413. Since determination of jury size is not a matter presently or historically lying exclusively within control of the judiciary, this section, which regulates size of criminal juries, does not violate separation of powers clause of Conn. Const. 171 C. 395. Cited. 173 C. 450. Cited. 174 C. 22. Cited. 176 C. 224. Cited. 182 C. 353. Cited. 190 C. 639. Cited. 227 C. 448. Cited. 231 C. 235.

      Cited. 41 CA 361. Three-judge court not required to deliberate with respect to all charges when only one charge carried maximum penalty of death or life in prison. 69 CA 267.

      Cited. 33 CS 739. Cited. 34 CS 674.

      Accused cannot postpone trial of his case indefinitely by repeatedly changing his election concerning trial by jury. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 218, 222, 223.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 191 C. 506. Cited. 198 C. 77.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 184 C. 455. Cited. 201 C. 534. Cited. 203 C. 4.

      Cited. 13 CA 667. Cited. 22 CA 265.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 197 C. 247. Cited. 223 C. 384.

      Cited. 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537. Cited. 41 CA 831.

      Cited. 39 CS 347.

      Sec. 54-82a. Test of insanity as defense. Section 54-82a is repealed.

      (1967, P.A. 336, S. 1, 2; 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.)

      See Sec. 53a-13 re lack of capacity resulting from mental disease or defect as affirmative defense.

      Sec. 54-82b*. Right to trial by jury. (a) The party accused in a criminal action in the Superior Court may demand a trial by jury of issues which are triable of right by a jury. There is no right to trial by jury in criminal actions where the maximum penalty is a fine of one hundred ninety-nine dollars or in any matter involving violations payable through the Centralized Infractions Bureau where the maximum penalty is a fine of five hundred dollars or less.

      (b) In criminal proceedings the judge shall advise the accused of his right to trial by jury at the time he is put to plea and, if the accused does not then claim a jury, his right thereto shall be deemed waived, but if a judge acting on motion made by the accused within ten days after judgment finds that such waiver was made when the accused was not fully cognizant of his rights or when, in the opinion of the judge, the proper administration of justice requires it, the judge shall vacate the judgment and cause the proceeding to be set for jury trial.

      (c) In any criminal trial by a jury, except as otherwise provided by law, such trial shall be by a jury of six.

      (P.A. 80-313, S. 35; P.A. 86-227; P.A. 87-241; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-6, S. 82, 117.)

      *Note: This section was formerly part of Sec. 51-239b. See Sec. 51-239b History re P.A. 80-313.

      History: P.A. 86-227 provided that "The party accused", rather than "Any party", may demand a jury trial and increased from ninety-nine dollars to one hundred ninety-nine dollars the maximum fine threshold for a jury trial; P.A. 87-241 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting reference to maximum penalty of sentence of thirty days or penalty consisting of both fine and imprisonment; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-6 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that there is no right to trial by jury in any matter involving violations payable through the centralized infractions bureau where the maximum penalty is a fine of five hundred dollars or less.

      See Sec. 51-180 re criminal terms and sessions of court.

      See Sec. 51-180a re special session held when an accused is confined for want of bail.

      Right to jury trial discussed. 188 C. 697. Cited. 190 C. 639. Cited. 191 C. 506. Cited 201 C. 489. Cited. 205 C. 456. Cited. 222 C. 591. Cited. 225 C. 355. Cited. 226 C. 618.

      Cited. 9 CA 255. Cited. 10 CA 692. Cited. 41 CA 454.

      Subsec. (a):

      Statute does not violate right to trial by jury under federal or state constitutions. 5 CA 434. Cited. 12 CA 481. Cited. 14 CA 816.

      Subsec. (b):

      Right to jury trial discussed. 188 C. 697. Cited. 198 C. 77.

      Cited. 39 CA 702. Cited. 46 CA 486.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 197 C. 247. Cited. 223 C. 384.

      Sec. 54-82c. (Formerly Sec. 54-139). Prisoner's right to speedy trial on pending charges. (a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state and, during the continuance of the term of imprisonment, there is pending in this state any untried indictment or information against such prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred twenty days after he has caused to be delivered, to the state's attorney or assistant state's attorney of the judicial district or geographical area, in which the indictment or information is pending, and to the appropriate court, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition to be made of the indictment or information. For good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the warden, Community Correctional Center Administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles relating to the prisoner.

      (b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, Community Correctional Center Administrator or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.

      (c) The warden, Community Correctional Center Administrator or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment or information against him concerning which the warden, administrator or other official has knowledge and of his right to make a request for final disposition thereof.

      (d) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall void the request.

      (1957, P.A. 551, S. 1; 1961, P.A. 465; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 79; P.A. 73-116, S. 14; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 156, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 558, 681; P.A. 80-313, S. 37; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 74, 121; P.A. 04-234, S. 2.)

      History: 1961 act specified, in Subsec. (a), request and notice be to state's attorney or prosecuting attorney and added circuit court; 1963 act stipulated state's attorney be of the county, deleted reference to prosecuting attorney of county and substituted jail administrator for sheriff; P.A. 73-116 added reference to judicial districts and replaced jail administrator with community correctional center administrator; P.A. 73-667 changed effective date of P.A. 73-116 from October 1, 1973, to April 25, 1973; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced prosecuting attorneys of common pleas court with assistant state's attorneys and deleted reference to various courts' jurisdiction, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 80-313 deleted reference to counties and made slight change in wording; Sec. 54-139 transferred to Sec. 54-82c in 1981; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004.

      Annotations to former section 54-139:

      Phrase "has caused to be delivered" is equivalent of "has delivered" and one-hundred-twenty-day period runs from completion of delivery of both request and supplemental information. 149 C. 250. Cited. 153 C. 28. Statute permits court to grant continuance for good cause shown even where facts which lead court to grant continuance are beyond defendant's control. 171 C. 487. Cited. 185 C. 118. Cited. 194 C. 297. Cited. 198 C. 573.

      Cited. 40 CA 757.

      Does not apply to prisoner in federal institution in Connecticut. 24 CS 308. Does not purport to place a limit on time within which information should be made. Id. Cited. 36 CS 327, 330.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 193 C. 270. Cited. 194 C. 297. Cited. 197 C. 166. Cited. 198 C. 573. Cited. 202 C. 93. Cited. 221 C. 921. Cited. 224 C. 163. Cited. 242 C. 409.

      Cited. 12 CA 1. Cited. 14 CA 244; Id., 493. Cited. 20 CA 205. Cited. 26 CA 698. Cited. 28 CA 195. Cited. 32 CA 38. Cited. 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707. Cited. 40 CA 757.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 29 CA 694.

      Sec. 54-82d. (Formerly Sec. 54-140). Dismissal of charges on failure to grant prisoner speedy trial. If an action is not assigned for trial within the period of time as provided in section 54-82c, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried indictment or information be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same.

      (1957, P.A. 551, S. 2; P.A. 80-313, S. 38.)

      History: P.A. 80-313 added specific reference to Sec. 54-139 and made slight change in wording; Sec. 54-140 transferred to Sec. 54-82d in 1981 and reference to Sec. 54-139 revised to reflect its transfer as well.

      Annotations to former section 54-140:

      Period of time construed to run from completion of delivery of both request and supplemental information. 149 C. 250. Cited. 171 C. 487. Cited. 185 C. 118.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 194 C. 297; Id., 510. Cited. 197 C. 166. Cited. 198 C. 573. Failure to bring to trial within time limit prescribed by Sec. 54-82c may be waived. Statute affects personal jurisdiction not subject matter jurisdiction. 202 C. 93. Cited. 221 C. 921. Cited. 224 C. 163.

      Cited. 12 CA 1. Cited. 14 CA 244. Cited. 20 CA 205. Cited. 26 CA 698. Cited. 28 CA 195. Cited. 29 CA 694. Cited. 40 CA 757.

      Sec. 54-82e. (Formerly Sec. 54-141). Mentally ill person not covered. The provisions of sections 54-82c and 54-82d shall not apply to any person adjudged to be mentally ill.

      (1957, P.A. 551, S. 3.)

      History: Sec. 54-141 transferred to Sec. 54-82e in 1981 and revised references to other sections within provisions as necessary to reflect their transfer.

      Cited. 194 C. 297.

      Sec. 54-82f*. Voir dire examination. In any criminal action tried before a jury, either party shall have the right to examine, personally or by his counsel, each juror outside the presence of other prospective jurors as to his qualifications to sit as a juror in the action, or as to his interest, if any, in the subject matter of the action, or as to his relations with the parties thereto. If the judge before whom the examination is held is of the opinion from the examination that any juror would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict, the juror shall be excused by the judge from any further service upon the panel, or in the action, as the judge determines. The right of such examination shall not be abridged by requiring questions to be put to any juror in writing and submitted in advance of the commencement of said action.

      (P.A. 80-313, S. 39.)

      *Note: This section was formerly part of Sec. 51-240. See Sec. 51-240 History re P.A. 80-313.

      Cited. 196 C. 667. Cited. 197 C. 314. Cited. 200 C. 586. Cited. 201 C. 125. Cited. 203 C. 506. Cited. 204 C. 156; Id., 377. Cited. 205 C. 61. Cited. 218 C. 309. Cited. 222 C. 1. Cited. 223 C. 299. Cited. 226 C. 237; Id., 618. Cited. 230 C. 385; see also 37 CA 801. Cited. 233 C. 215; Id., 813. Cited. 237 C. 238; Id., 454. Nothing in section requires trial court to permit a party to ascertain prospective jurors' views on specific evidence during voir dire. 269 C. 213.

      Cited. 10 CA 624. Cited. 16 CA 165; Id., 333. Cited. 26 CA 165. Cited. 30 CA 359; Id., 470. Cited. 31 CA 278; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385; see also 37 CA 801. Cited. 38 CA 247; Id., 598. Cited. 40 CA 328. Cited. 46 CA 600. Purpose of voir dire. 49 CA 41.

      Sec. 54-82g. (Formerly Sec. 51-242). Peremptory challenges in criminal prosecution. The accused may challenge peremptorily, in any criminal trial before the Superior Court for any offense punishable by death, twenty-five jurors; for any offense punishable by imprisonment for life, fifteen jurors; for any offense the punishment for which may be imprisonment for more than one year and for less than life, six jurors; and for any other offense, three jurors. In any criminal trial in which the accused is charged with more than one count on the information or where there is more than one information, the number of challenges is determined by the count carrying the highest maximum punishment. The state, on the trial of any criminal prosecution, may challenge peremptorily the same number of jurors as the accused.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8798; 1953, S. 3327d; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 210; February, 1965, P.A. 574, S. 39; P.A. 73-576, S. 1, 4; P.A. 74-183, S. 55, 291; P.A. 76-336, S. 16; P.A. 76-436, S. 105, 681; P.A. 77-452, S. 19, 72; P.A. 80-152; 80-313, S. 40, 62.)

      History: 1959 act added circuit court; 1965 act deleted obsolete reference to common pleas court, its criminal jurisdiction having been abolished in 1959; P.A. 73-576 replaced "State Prison" with "Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers" and deleted provisions which pertained to twelve-person juries and allowed for eight challenges in trials where offense is punishable by sentence of less than life and four challenges for other offenses, retaining six challenges and four challenges, respectively, previously applicable to six-person juries and now made generally applicable, effective June 12, 1973, and applicable to all prosecutions claimed for jury trial on and after that date; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-336 specified that six challenges are allowed where imprisonment may be for "more than one year" and deleted specific mention of Somers institution as place of imprisonment; P.A. 76-436 reiterated changes of P.A. 76-336 and deleted reference to arraignment before court of common pleas, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-452 made technical grammatical change; P.A. 80-152 deleted specific reference to superior court arraignments, referring instead to arraignment "in any criminal trial" and added provision re determination of challenges allowed in cases involving more than one court or more than one information; P.A. 80-313 reiterated deletion of reference to arraignment in superior court; Sec. 51-242 transferred to Sec. 54-82g in 1981.

      Annotations to former section 51-242:

      Peremptory challenge must be made at time of examination, unless new cause arises. 18 C. 177. Juror need not be sworn on voir dire; 47 C. 528; not a strict right, but may be granted; in any event waived by neglect to request. Id., 528. If challenge for favor overruled, no cause of complaint unless peremptory challenges exhausted. Id., 528; 49 C. 379. When court has discretion to sentence for life, accused may challenge fifteen jurors peremptorily. Id., 232. Accused has no absolute right to examine jurors. 69 C. 186; 80 C. 614. Control of judge over examination. 72 C. 722. See note to section 51-241. Where more than one count, number that may be challenged is determined by highest maximum punishment under any count. 80 C. 618. Disqualifications of jurors discussed; distinction between principal challenge and challenge to the favor. 103 C. 542. Challenge to the array, which can lie only for a cause affecting entire panel discussed. 100 C. 209; 103 C. 471; 109 C. 572. Qualifications of jurors who hold opinions formed through news reports. 147 C. 194.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 193 C. 646. Cited. 195 C. 421. Cited. 223 C. 299. Cited. 226 C. 618. Cited. 233 C. 813. Cited. 237 C. 238. Nothing in section requires trial court to permit a party to ascertain prospective jurors' views on specific evidence during voir dire. 269 C. 213.

      Cited. 7 CA 503. Cited. 16 CA 333. Cited. 36 CA 631. Cited. 38 CA 231.

      Sec. 54-82h*. Alternate jurors in criminal cases. Peremptory challenges. (a) In any criminal prosecution to be tried to the jury in the Superior Court if it appears to the court that the trial is likely to be protracted, the court may, in its discretion, direct that, after a jury has been selected, two or more additional jurors shall be added to the jury panel, to be known as "alternate jurors". Such alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications and be selected and subject to examination and challenge in the same manner and to the same extent as the jurors constituting the regular panel, provided, in any case when the court directs the selection of alternate jurors, the number of peremptory challenges allowed shall be as follows: In any criminal prosecution the state and the accused may each peremptorily challenge thirty jurors if the offense for which the accused is arraigned is punishable by death, eighteen jurors if the offense is punishable by life imprisonment, eight jurors if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and for less than life, and four jurors in any other case.

      (b) Alternate jurors shall be sworn separately from those constituting the regular panel, and the oaths to be administered shall be as provided in section 1-25.

      (c) Alternate jurors shall attend at all times upon trial of the cause. They shall be seated when the case is on trial with or near the jurors constituting the regular panel, with equal opportunity to see and hear all matters adduced in the trial of the case. If, at any time, any juror shall, for any reason, become unable to further perform the duty of a juror, the court may excuse such juror and, if any juror is so excused or dies, the court may order that an alternate juror who is designated by lot to be drawn by the clerk shall become a part of the regular panel and the trial or deliberation shall then proceed with appropriate instructions from the court as though such juror had been a member of the regular panel from the time when the trial or deliberation began. If the alternate juror becomes a member of the regular panel after deliberations began, the jury shall be instructed by the court that deliberations by the jury shall begin anew. A juror who has been selected to serve as an alternate shall not be segregated from the regular panel except when the case is given to the regular panel for deliberation at which time such alternate juror may be dismissed from further service on said case or may remain in service under the direction of the court.

      (P.A. 80-313, S. 41; P.A. 82-307, S. 5, 8; P.A. 00-116, S. 6.)

      *Note: This section was formerly part of Sec. 51-243. See Sec. 51-243 History re P.A. 80-313.

      History: P.A. 82-307 amended Subsec. (a) by changing the number of alternate jurors from "one or two" to two "or more" and amended Subsec. (c) to reflect this change; P.A. 00-116 amended Subsec. (c) by making technical changes, by permitting alternate juror to become part of the deliberation and proceed with appropriate instructions from the court as though alternate juror was part of the regular panel when the trial or deliberation began, by providing if alternate juror becomes member of panel after deliberations began, the jury shall be instructed by the court that deliberations by the jury shall begin anew, and by adding provision allowing alternate juror to remain in service under the direction of the court during deliberation of regular panel.

      Cited. 200 C. 615. Cited. 209 C. 564. Cited. 223 C. 299. Cited. 226 C. 618. Cited. 233 C. 813.

      Cited. 7 CA 503. Cited. 36 CA 631. Cited. 38 CA 231. Cited. 41 CA 831.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 190 C. 219. Cited. 195 C. 421.

      Cited. 8 CA 158. Cited. 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537. Cited. 35 CA 541.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 199 C. 163. Cited. 216 C. 367. Cited. 231 C. 235. Statute requires alternate jurors to be dismissed after commencement of jury deliberations and substitution of alternate juror after commencement of deliberations is prohibited. 254 C. 472. Substitution of alternate juror after commencement of deliberations in violation of statute is not harmless error. Id. Statute now explicitly permits substitution of a juror after deliberations have begun. 257 C. 192. Process for selecting and dismissing alternate jurors, including under this subsec., does not implicate constitutional rights. 272 C. 432.

      Cited. 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537. Cited. 35 CA 541. Judgments of conviction reversed due to substitution of two nonjurors, formerly alternate jurors who were dismissed by trial court after deliberations had begun, for regular jurors in the jury by the trial court. 67 CA 734.

      Sec. 54-82i. (Formerly Sec. 54-22). Attendance of witnesses in criminal proceedings. (a) Definitions. The following words, when used in this section, have the meaning specified, unless the context otherwise indicates: "Witness" means a person whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a grand jury or in a criminal action, prosecution or proceeding; "state" includes any territory of the United States and the District of Columbia, and "summons" means a subpoena, order or other notice requiring the appearance of a witness.

      (b) Summoning witness in this state to testify in another state. If a judge of a court of record in any state which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that state to attend and testify in this state certifies, under the seal of such court, that there is a criminal prosecution pending in such court, or that a grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence, that a person being within this state is a material witness in such prosecution or grand jury investigation and that the presence of such witness will be required for a specified number of days, upon presentation of such certificate to any judge of a court of record in the judicial district in which such person is, such judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing and shall make an order directing the witness to appear at such time and place for such hearing. If, at such hearing, the judge determines that the witness is material and necessary, that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to attend and testify in the prosecution or a grand jury investigation in the other state and that the laws of such other state and the laws of any other state through which the witness may be required to pass by ordinary course of travel will give to such witness protection from arrest and from the service of civil or criminal process, the judge shall issue a summons, with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the court where the prosecution is pending, or where a grand jury investigation has commenced or is about to commence at a time and place specified in the summons. At any such hearing, the certificate shall be prima facie evidence of all the facts stated therein. If such certificate recommends that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state to assure the attendance of the witness in such state, such judge may, in lieu of notification of the hearing, direct that such witness be forthwith brought before such judge for such hearing, and, being satisfied, at such hearing, of the desirability of such custody and delivery, of which desirability such certificate shall be prima facie proof, may, in lieu of issuing a subpoena or summons, order that such witness be forthwith taken into custody and delivered to an officer of the requesting state. If such witness, after being paid or tendered by an authorized person the same amount per mile as provided for state employees pursuant to section 5-141c for each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court where the prosecution is pending and five dollars each day that such witness is required to travel and attend as a witness, fails, without good cause, to attend and testify as directed in the summons, the witness shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record in this state.

      (c) Witness from another state summoned to testify in this state. If a person in any state, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions or in grand jury investigations commenced or about to commence in this state, is a material witness in a prosecution pending in a court of record in this state, or in a grand jury investigation which has commenced or is about to commence, a judge of such court may issue a certificate under the seal of the court, stating such facts and specifying the number of days the witness will be required. Such certificate may include a recommendation that the witness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of this state to assure the attendance of the witness in this state. Such certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the judicial district in which the witness is found. If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in this state, the witness shall be tendered the same amount per mile as provided for state employees pursuant to section 5-141c for each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court where the prosecution is pending, and five dollars for each day that such witness is required to travel and attend as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the summons shall not be required to remain within this state a longer period of time than the period mentioned in the certificate, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If such witness, after coming into this state, fails, without good cause, to attend and testify as directed in the summons, the witness shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a court of record in this state.

      (d) Exemption from arrest and service of process. If a person comes into this state in obedience to a summons directing him to attend and testify in this state, he shall not, while in this state pursuant to such summons, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under such summons. If a person passes through this state while going to another state in obedience to a summons to attend and testify in that state or while returning therefrom, he shall not, while so passing through this state, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under such summons.

      (e) Interpretation. This section shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of the states which enact it.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8732; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 01-186, S. 10, 11.)

      History: P.A. 78-280 substituted "judicial district" for "county"; Sec. 54-22 transferred to Sec. 54-82i in 1981; P.A. 01-186 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing "sum of ten cents a mile" with provision re payment of same amount per mile as provided for state employees pursuant to Sec. 5-141c and making technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec. (c) by replacing "sum of ten cents for each mile" with provision allowing witness the same amount per mile as provided for state employees pursuant to Sec. 5-141c and making technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.

      Annotations to former section 54-22:

      Cited. 179 C. 102.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 171 C. 47.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 198 C. 517. Cited. 237 C. 58.

      Cited. 7 CA 503. Cited. 36 CA 250.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 193 C. 350. Cited. 194 C. 89. Cited. 198 C. 542.

      Cited. 3 CA 137. Habeas corpus petitioner, incarcerated in Arizona, could not prevail on his claim that trial court should have invoked provisions of subsec. to secure petitioner's presence at hearing on Commissioner of Correction's motion to dismiss petition. Subsec. applies to criminal and grand jury proceedings not habeas corpus proceedings which are civil in nature. 82 CA 25.

      Cited. 38 CS 301; Id., 521.

      Sec. 54-82j. (Formerly Sec. 54-23). Detention of witnesses. Warrant. Upon the written complaint of any state's attorney addressed to the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district wherein such state's attorney resides, alleging (1) that a person named therein is or will be a material witness in a criminal proceeding then pending before or returnable to the superior court for such judicial district, and in which proceeding any person is or may be charged with an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, and (2) that the state's attorney believes that such witness is likely to disappear from the state, secrete himself or otherwise avoid the service of subpoena upon him, or refuse or fail to appear and attend in and before such superior court as a witness, when desired, the clerk or any assistant clerk of the court shall issue a warrant addressed to any proper officer or indifferent person, for the arrest of the person named as a witness, and directing that such person be forthwith brought before any judge of the superior court for such judicial district, for examination. The person serving the warrant shall bring the person so arrested before the judge for examination as soon as is reasonably possible and hold him subject to the further orders of the judge. The person serving the warrant shall also notify the state's attorney of such arrest and of the time and place of such examination.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8760; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 144; February, 1965, P.A. 574, S. 44; P.A. 73-116, S. 20; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 135, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 527, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 80-313, S. 42.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for trial justice or municipal court; 1965 act deleted obsolete provision for bringing arrested witness before common pleas court judge; P.A. 73-116 added references to judicial districts and substituted "Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers" for "State Prison"; P.A. 73-667 changed effective date of P.A. 73-116 from October 1, 1973, to April 25, 1973; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 deleted reference to proceedings pending before common pleas court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, and applied provisions to cases involving imprisonment for more than one year, deleting specific reference to imprisonment in Somers facility, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties; P.A. 80-313 made minor changes in wording but made no substantive changes; Sec. 54-23 transferred to Sec. 54-82j in 1981.

      Cited. 5 CA 347.

      Sec. 54-82k. (Formerly Sec. 54-24). Recognizance; commitment; release; fees. (a) If, upon the examination provided for in section 54-82j, the judge is of the opinion that the interests of justice so require, he may order that a recognizance to the state be entered into by one or more persons of sufficient responsibility, conditioned that the person named as a witness shall appear before the superior court before which the proceeding is pending or to which it is returnable and abide the order of said superior court in the case.

      (b) If such recognizance is not entered into, the judge shall order the person to be committed to a community correctional center until the next criminal term of the Superior Court to be held in the judicial district, or until he is legally discharged, and the judge shall issue a proper mittimus for his commitment in the case. Any person so committed to a community correctional center shall not, upon such commitment, be confined or associated in the center with persons confined therein upon conviction of or charged with any criminal offense, and the state's attorney for the judicial district wherein the person is so detained may release the bond and order the discharge of the person if, in his judgment, the requirements of justice so demand. When any person is confined in a community correctional center under the provisions of this section and section 54-82j, he shall receive, in addition to his legal fees as a witness, two dollars for each day that he is so confined, and the fees and expenses incurred under the provisions of this section and section 54-82j, shall be taxed by the court and paid as other expenses in criminal proceedings.

      (c) Any person committed under the provisions of this section shall be released from confinement upon the giving of the required recognizance, which shall be taken as provided in case of imprisonment in a community correctional center upon criminal process.

      (d) "State's attorney", as used in section 54-82j, and in this section, includes assistant state's attorneys.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8761; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 145; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 64; P.A. 73-116, S. 21; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 136, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 528, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 80-313, S. 43.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for municipal court or trial justice, which were abolished; 1963 act deleted stipulation commitment be to jail in county where court has jurisdiction; P.A. 73-116 added references to judicial districts and substituted "community correctional center" for "jail" where appearing; P.A. 73-667 changed effective date of P.A. 73-116 from October 1, 1973, to April 25, 1973; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas, reflecting reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 amended section to delete references to proceedings before court of common pleas, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties; P.A. 80-313 divided existing provisions into Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d), rephrasing provisions, and inserted new Subsec. (c) re release upon giving required recognizance; Sec. 54-24 transferred to Sec. 54-82k in 1981 and references to other sections within provisions revised as necessary to reflect their transfer.

      Sec. 54-82l. Rules re speedy trial to be adopted by judges of Superior Court effective July 1, 1983. In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the Superior Court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1983. Such rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within eighteen months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is incarcerated in a correctional institution of this state pending such trial and is not subject to the provisions of section 54-82c, the trial of such defendant shall commence within twelve months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant's inability to stand trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1).

      (P.A. 82-349, S. 1, 4; P.A. 83-1, S. 1, 3.)

      History: P.A. 82-349, S. 1, effective July 1, 1983; P.A. 83-1 added words "on or after July 1, 1983" after "offense".

      Cited. 198 C. 542.

      Cited. 3 CA 349, 351. Cited. 5 CA 347, 351. Cited. 12 CA 364.

      Sec. 54-82m. Rules re speedy trial to be adopted by judges of Superior Court effective July 1, 1985. In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the Superior Court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985. Such rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is incarcerated in a correctional institution of this state pending such trial and is not subject to the provisions of section 54-82c, the trial of such defendant shall commence within eight months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant's inability to stand trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1).

      (P.A. 82-349, S. 2, 4; P.A. 83-1, S. 2, 3.)

      History: P.A. 82-349, S. 2, effective July 1, 1985; P.A. 83-1 added words "on or after July 1, 1983" after "offense".

      Cited. 202 C. 443. Cited. 218 C. 85. Cited. 233 C. 813. Exception to sixty-day limitation period for acts of God and misconduct on part of a defendant is a necessary implication. 242 C. 389. Cited. 243 C. 115. Trial court properly determined that the time that co-defendant's attorney was unavailable was excludable time for computing the commencement of defendant's trial. 252 C. 714. Administrative incompetence, whether founded in negligence, recklessness or a serious dereliction of duty, does not constitute "exceptional circumstances", and therefore "good cause", for the failure to bring defendant to trial before the thirty-day period has expired. 265 C. 437.

      Cited. 14 CA 244. Cited. 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707. Cited. 37 CA 384. Cited. 38 CA 868. Cited. 40 CA 483. Statutory right to speedy trial cited. Id. Cited. Id., 643; Id., 757. Cited. 42 CA 144. Cited. 43 CA 488. Right to protection of statute waived by withdrawing motion and not filing for dismissal. 47 CA 91. Cited. 54 CA 361. Section codifies defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial and confers on Superior Court judges authority to make such rules as they deem necessary to establish procedure for implementing that right. 66 CA 357. Defendant not deprived of right to speedy trial when trial delay was occasioned by continuances requested by defendant's counsel, rather than by defendant, and defendant did not object. 78 CA 659.

      Secs. 54-82n to 54-82p. Reserved for future use.

      Sec. 54-82q. Temporary restraining order prohibiting harassment of witness. (a) Upon application of a prosecutorial official, a court may issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting the harassment of a witness in a criminal case if the court finds, from specific facts shown by affidavit or verified complaint, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that harassment of an identified witness in a criminal case exists or that such order is necessary to prevent and restrain the commission of an offense under section 53a-151 or 53a-151a.

      (b) A temporary restraining order may be issued under this section without written or oral notice to the adverse party or such party's attorney if the court finds, upon written certification of facts by the prosecutorial official, that such notice should not be required and that there is a reasonable probability that the state will prevail on the merits. A temporary restraining order shall set forth the reasons for the issuance of such order, be specific in its terms and describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts being restrained.

      (c) A temporary restraining order issued without notice under this section shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance and be filed forthwith in the office of the clerk of the court that issued the order.

      (d) A temporary restraining order issued under this section shall expire at such time as the court directs, not to exceed ten days from issuance. The court, for good cause shown before expiration of the order, may extend the expiration date of the order for not more than ten days or for a longer period if agreed to by the adverse party. If the prosecutorial official files an application for a protective order pursuant to section 54-82r prior to the expiration date of the temporary restraining order, the temporary restraining order shall remain in effect until the court makes a decision on the issuance of such protective order.

      (e) If, on two days' notice to the prosecutorial official or on such shorter notice as the court may prescribe, the adverse party appears and moves to dissolve or modify the temporary restraining order, the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion expeditiously.

      (f) When a temporary restraining order is issued without notice, an application for a protective order filed pursuant to section 54-82r shall be privileged in assignment for hearing and shall take precedence over all other matters except matters of the same character, and, if the prosecutorial official does not proceed with such application at such hearing, the temporary restraining order shall be dissolved.

      (P.A. 99-240, S. 2.)

      See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.

      Sec. 54-82r. Protective order prohibiting harassment of witness. (a) Upon application of a prosecutorial official, a court may issue a protective order prohibiting the harassment of a witness in a criminal case if the court, after a hearing at which hearsay evidence shall be admissible, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that harassment of an identified witness in a criminal case exists or that such order is necessary to prevent and restrain the commission of a violation of section 53a-151 or 53a-151a. Any adverse party named in the complaint has the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at such hearing. Such order shall be an order of the court, and the clerk of the court shall cause a certified copy of such order to be sent to the witness, and a copy of such order, or the information contained in such order, to be sent by facsimile or other means within forty-eight hours of its issuance to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

      (b) A protective order shall set forth the reasons for the issuance of such order, be specific in terms and describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts being restrained. A protective order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect the witness from threats, harassment, injury or intimidation by the adverse party including, but not limited to, enjoining the adverse party from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the witness, (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting or sexually assaulting the witness, or (3) entering the dwelling of the witness. Such order shall contain the following language: "In accordance with section 53a-223 of the Connecticut general statutes, any violation of this order constitutes criminal violation of a protective order which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both. Additionally, in accordance with section 53a-107 of the Connecticut general statutes, entering or remaining in a building or any other premises in violation of this order constitutes criminal trespass in the first degree which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than one year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars, or both." If the adverse party is the defendant in the criminal case, such order shall be made a condition of the bail or release of the defendant and shall also contain the following language: "Violation of this order also violates a condition of your bail or release and may result in raising the amount of bail or revoking release."

      (c) The protective order shall remain in effect for the duration of the criminal case except as otherwise ordered by the court.

      (P.A. 99-240, S. 3; P.A. 02-132, S. 58; P.A. 05-288, S. 186.)

      History: P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing provisions re sending certified copy of order to law enforcement agency with provisions re sending copy of or information contained in order to law enforcement agency by facsimile or other means, effective January 1, 2003; P.A. 05-288 amended Subsec. (b) by making technical changes and revising required language in order re penalty for criminal violation of a protective order, effective July 13, 2005.

      See Sec. 51-5c re automated registry of protective orders.

      Sec. 54-82s. The Leroy Brown, Jr. and Karen Clarke Witness Protection Program. The program of providing protective services to witnesses under sections 54-82t and 54-82u shall be known as the "The Leroy Brown, Jr. and Karen Clarke Witness Protection Program".

      (P.A. 99-247, S. 6.)

      Sec. 54-82t. Protective services for witness at risk of harm. (a) For the purposes of this section and section 54-82u:

      (1) "Witness" means any person who is summoned, or who may be summoned, to give testimony in a criminal proceeding, and includes a member of the immediate family of such person.

      (2) "Witness at risk of harm" means a witness who, as a result of cooperating in an investigation or prosecution of a serious felony offense, has been, or is reasonably likely to be, intimidated, harassed, threatened, retaliated against or subjected to physical violence.

      (3) "Serious felony offense" means any felony that involves the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person or results in the serious physical injury or death of another person.

      (b) In any investigation or prosecution of a serious felony offense, the prosecutorial official shall review all witnesses to the offense and may identify any witness as a witness at risk of harm. Upon such identification, the prosecutorial official shall then determine whether a witness at risk of harm is critical to a criminal investigation or prosecution. If the witness at risk of harm is determined to be critical to such investigation or prosecution, the prosecutorial official may (1) certify that the witness receive protective services, or (2) if the prosecutorial official finds a compelling need to temporarily relocate the witness, certify that the witness receive protective services including temporary relocation services. In determining whether a witness should receive protective services, the prosecutorial official shall give special consideration to a witness who is a child, elderly or handicapped or otherwise more at risk of being intimidated, harassed, threatened, retaliated against or subjected to physical violence or who is a witness in a case involving organized crime, gang activities or drug trafficking or involving a high degree of risk to the witness.

      (c) When a witness is certified as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the Chief State's Attorney shall provide appropriate protective services to such witness. The Chief State's Attorney shall coordinate the efforts of state and local agencies to provide protective services to a witness.

      (d) Protective services provided to such witness may include, but are not limited to:

      (1) Armed protection, escort, marked or unmarked surveillance or periodic visits or contact by law enforcement officials prior, during or subsequent to the official proceeding;

      (2) Temporary physical relocation to an alternate residence;

      (3) Housing expenses;

      (4) Transportation or storage of personal possessions;

      (5) Basic living expenses including, but not limited to, food, transportation, utility costs and health care; or

      (6) Other services as needed and approved by the Chief State's Attorney.

      (e) Protective services may be provided for the duration of the criminal case or until the risk giving rise to certification has diminished, whichever occurs first.

      (f) In addition to the protective services provided pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the Chief State's Attorney shall provide such witness with (1) information on the responsibilities and risks of being a witness, and (2) the names and telephone numbers of persons to contact if such witness has questions or concerns for such witness's safety, including at least one telephone number that may be called twenty-four hours a day.

      (g) If a witness declines to receive protective services under this section, the Chief State's Attorney shall request the witness to make such declination in writing. Such declination shall set forth (1) the type of protective services offered, (2) that the offer of protective services has been explained in detail to the witness, and (3) a telephone number that the witness may call twenty-four hours a day if the witness has concerns for the witness's safety or reconsiders the witness's decision to decline protective services.

      (h) If the parent or parents or guardian of a child who is certified as a witness at risk of harm critical to a criminal investigation or prosecution as provided in subsection (b) of this section, declines the provision of protective services under this section, the Office of the Chief State's Attorney shall be notified within twenty-four hours after such declination. Upon receipt of such notice, the Chief State's Attorney shall make reasonable efforts to confer with a victim advocate providing services for the Office of Victim Services and shall, not later than three days after such declination, determine if the matter should be referred to the Department of Children and Families for investigation as to whether such child is neglected, as defined in section 46b-120, and whether the department should provide protective services or take other action pursuant to chapter 319a or 815t with respect to such child.

      (i) The costs of providing protective services to witnesses under this section shall be shared by the state and local agencies providing such services pursuant to the witness protection policy established by the Office of the Chief State's Attorney.

      (j) Any record of the Division of Criminal Justice or other governmental agency that, in the reasonable judgment of the Chief State's Attorney or a state's attorney, would disclose or would reasonably result in the disclosure of the identity or location of any person receiving or considered for the receipt of protective services under this section or of law enforcement techniques not otherwise known to the general public that are used in protecting witnesses, shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, as defined in section 1-200.

      (k) The Division of Criminal Justice may utilize the resources of other state agencies in order to provide protective services to witnesses under this section. All offices of the state's attorneys and other agencies requesting assistance under this section shall comply with the provisions of the witness protection policy established by the Office of the Chief State's Attorney.

      (l) The Chief State's Attorney, pursuant to his authority under section 51-279, shall implement the provisions of this section and section 54-82u. The Chief State's Attorney may adopt regulations in accordance with chapter 54 to implement the provisions of this section and section 54-82u.

      (m) Not later than November 15, 2001, and annually thereafter, the Chief State's Attorney shall submit a report to the General Assembly on the fiscal and operational status of the program to provide protective services to witnesses under this section.

      (P.A. 99-240, S. 6.)

      Sec. 54-82u. Witness protection agreement. (a) In order to receive protective services under section 54-82t, the witness shall enter into a written agreement with the Chief State's Attorney. The witness protection agreement shall be in writing and shall specify the responsibilities of the witness that establish the conditions for the Chief State's Attorney to provide protective services. The witness shall agree to all of the following:

      (1) To testify in and provide information to all appropriate law enforcement officials concerning all appropriate proceedings;

      (2) To refrain from committing any crime;

      (3) To take all necessary steps to avoid detection by other persons of the facts concerning the protective services provided to the witness under section 54-82t;

      (4) To comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against the witness;

      (5) To cooperate with all reasonable requests of officers and employees of the state or any municipality who are providing protective services under section 54-82t;

      (6) To designate another person to act as agent for service of process;

      (7) To make a sworn statement of all outstanding legal obligations, including obligations concerning child custody and visitation;

      (8) To disclose if the witness is on probation or parole and, if so, any conditions of probation or parole;

      (9) To inform regularly the appropriate official of the witness's activities and current address; and

      (10) To comply with any other lawful and appropriate conditions as determined by the Office of the Chief State's Attorney.

      (b) The Chief State's Attorney shall not be liable for any condition in the witness protection agreement that cannot reasonably be met due to a witness committing a crime during participation in the program.

      (P.A. 99-240, S. 7.)

      Sec. 54-83. Testimony required in capital cases. No person may be convicted of any crime punishable by death without the testimony of at least two witnesses, or that which is equivalent thereto.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8799; P.A. 80-313, S. 47.)

      History: P.A. 80-313 substituted "may" for "shall".

      Not necessary that there should be two witnesses to every material fact; true rule stated. 49 C. 385; 77 C. 274; 78 C. 18; 93 C. 246; 97 C. 465; 103 C. 467; 106 C. 705; 122 C. 533; 126 C. 57. Whether requirement is met is for the jury to say. 81 C. 27; 90 C. 126; 93 C. 246; 97 C. 465; 103 C. 467. Charge embodying rule approved. 97 C. 465. Cited. 123 C. 673. If testimony of one or more witnesses tends to prove that a murder has been committed, testimony of only one other witness implicating the defendant is sufficient to satisfy the statute. 139 C. 475. The proof of all the essential elements of a capital crime charged shall not depend upon the testimony of one witness. 142 C. 113. Cited. 147 C. 95. One witness may testify to some of the essential facts and another to the rest of the essential facts and the statute may be satisfied. Id., 194. Adoption of Wigmore definition of "corpus delicti". Previous cases defining "corpus delicti" overruled. 152 C. 15. Cited. 182 C. 511. Cited. 229 C. 125. Cited. 230 C. 183. Cited. 233 C. 813. Cited. 235 C. 206. Confession and independent circumstantial evidence satisfied the two witness rule. 251 C. 285.

      Sec. 54-84. Testimony or silence of accused. (a) Any person on trial for crime shall be a competent witness, and at his or her option may testify or refuse to testify upon such trial. The neglect or refusal of an accused party to testify shall not be commented upon by the court or prosecuting official, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

      (b) Unless the accused requests otherwise, the court shall instruct the jury that they may draw no unfavorable inferences from the accused's failure to testify. In cases tried to the court, no unfavorable inferences shall be drawn by the court from the accused's silence.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8800; 1971, P.A. 237; 871, S. 122; P.A. 77-360; P.A. 80-313, S. 44.)

      History: 1971 acts applied provisions equally with respect to either spouse where previously applicable only to wives receiving personal violence from husbands or to women charged with violation of specified sections; P.A. 77-360 prohibited comment upon neglect or refusal to testify "by the court or prosecuting official, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section" rather than comments "to the court or jury" and added Subsec. (b); P.A. 80-313 deleted provisions re spouse's competency as witness and option to testify or not except in cases involving violence against spouse or specified violations where testimony may be compelled, but see Sec. 54-84a.

      See Sec. 54-84a re spouse's privilege to refuse to testify against his or her husband or wife.

      Communication between husband and wife not privileged to extent of preventing one who overhears them from testifying thereto. 47 C. 540. Voluntary statements of accused before coroner or grand jury in no sense compulsory and are admissible in evidence. 56 C. 399. Attacking credit of accused where he does testify. 67 C. 290; 76 C. 94; 87 C. 22; 88 C. 150; 89 C. 417. Certain comments by state's attorney not objectionable. 73 C. 100; 96 C. 291. Commenting on refusal not always ground for new trial; accused must at once object. 79 C. 477. Effect of testimony by one of two jointly indicted. 82 C. 59. Remark by state's attorney in arguing question of evidence while putting in his own case, held not within rule. 83 C. 455. In absence of request, court need not charge as to rule. 90 C. 132. Proper course for accused to take to insure his rights under this rule. 96 C. 291. For charge under this rule, see 108 C. 463; but see 127 C. 592; does not prevent inference being drawn from failure to testify; but such failure must not be commented upon. 108 C. 463. Cited. 109 C. 134; Id., 497. For violence received from husband before marriage wife may refuse to testify against him. 113 C. 291. Court may comment to jury on failure of accused to testify. 119 C. 35; 127 C. 591. But see 154 C. infra. Reference by state's attorney to fact defendant's attorney offered no testimony to refute state's witnesses, not a violation of this section. 130 C. 549. Court may take into consideration failure of an accused to testify only if state has made out a prima facie case against him. 139 C. 124. Does not preclude cross-examination of the accused as to inconsistent statements made to spouse. 145 C. 60. It is violation of fifth and fourteenth amendments for court to comment on failure of defendant in a criminal trial to testify. 154 C. 41. Interpretation before Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. Id. Cited. 171 C. 12; Id., 586. Section gives witness' spouse option of testifying against accused spouse. 172 C. 37. Cited. Id., 74. Cited. 179 C. 327. Cited. 197 C. 369. Cited. 201 C. 462. Cited. 206 C. 621. Cited. 223 C. 52. Cited. 229 C. 516. Cited. 233 C. 813. Prosecutorial comments on defendant's exercise of right not to testify discussed. 243 C. 324. State's attorney's comment in closing argument that "I gave you everything I had" not seen as comment on defendant's failure to testify. 244 C. 547.

      Cited. 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370. Cited. 13 CA 386. Cited. 16 CA 264. Cited. 22 CA 321. Cited. 24 CA 642. Cited. 27 CA 601. Cited. 28 CA 369. Cited. 33 CA 126. Cited. 34 CA 250. Use of term "unfair" in lieu of term "unfavorable" inference discussed. 36 CA 41. Cited. 39 CA 96. Legislature could not have intended that instructions to venire panel would comply with dictates of this section to give instructions to jury. 60 CA 301. Although the recorded out-of-court statement of defendant was not equivalent of in-court testimony where defendant puts his credibility in issue, prosecutor's admonition to jury to consider defendant's interest in the outcome of the case when evaluating defendant's statement was not a forbidden indirect comment on defendant's decision not to testify. 78 CA 535. Defendant's right to a no adverse inference instruction was violated by court's postcharge, supplemental instruction that materially and substantially misstated the nature of defendant's privilege not to testify. 83 CA 811. Prosecutor's statement that sexual assault cases are often decided on credibility of victim or defendant was not an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify. 86 CA 641.

      Where state's case rested entirely on defendant's testimony, held it was error not to inform defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination. 24 CS 353. Defendant does not have option to refuse to testify in civil proceeding for homicide by automobile on ground that he may be subject to criminal prosecution for some facts. 28 CS 59. Cited. 33 CS 505; Id., 700.

      Defendant's failure to bring timely objection re comments on his refusal to testify results in waiver of right. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68. Charge to jury that, if they concluded there was such a strong probability of defendant's guilt that denial or explanation by him was reasonably called for, then they would be entitled to consider his failure to testify, held in violation of due process and constituted reversible error. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 463, 464. Any comment by presiding judge or counsel forbidden. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 520, 522, 523. Court's refusal to charge jury that no inference of guilt could be drawn or sinister meaning attached to defendant's failure to testify, proper. Id. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 181. Defendants who took stand for limited purpose of testifying new counsel represented them entitled to assistance of counsel when questioning of them broadened out to other matters. Id., 242.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 206 C. 300. Cited. 213 C. 422. Cited. 222 C. 469.

      Cited. 7 CA 292. Cited. 26 CA 674. Cited. 27 CA 643.

      Subsec. (b):

      Even though defense counsel did not object to the court's failure to give the "no unfavorable inference" instruction, the judgment was set. 182 C. 330. Cited. Id., 403. Failure to follow mandate of statute is reversible error despite failure to make a timely request or objection. Id., 580. Cited. 183 C. 444. Cited. 188 C. 681. Cited. 190 C. 1. Use of "unreasonable" instead of "unfavorable" in jury instruction constituted harmful error. 194 C. 594. Cited. 195 C. 421; Id., 444. Cited. 197 C. 574; Id., 588. Cited. 198 C. 77. Cited. 199 C. 322. Cited. 201 C. 659. Cited. 209 C. 636. Cited. 210 C. 751. Cited. 227 C. 910. Harmless error analysis applied to erroneous instruction under the statute; judgment of appellate court, State v. Yurch, 31 CA 688, 690, reversed. 229 C. 516. In context of entire jury charge re defendant's decision not to testify, reference to defendant's "failure to testify" was neither negative in substance nor improper; phrase "unless the defendant requests otherwise" does not obligate court to use defendant's requested language. 255 C. 581.

      Cited. 5 CA 79. Cited. 6 CA 124. Cited. 7 CA 477. Cited. 10 CA 302. Cited. 11 CA 425. Cited. 15 CA 342; Id., 749. Cited. 17 CA 490. Cited. 19 CA 48; Id., 618. Cited. 20 CA 721. Cited. 21 CA 162. Cited. 23 CA 28; Id., 151. Cited. 28 CA 290. Cited. 31 CA 688; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 516. Total omission of "no adverse interference" instruction is plain error that is not subject to harmless error analysis. 33 CA 126. Cited. 34 CA 153. Trial court's charge did not comply with requirements of statute because of improper reference to loss of defendant's presumption of innocence. Id., 250. Cited. 37 CA 672. Court will not infer a waiver of the mandatory instruction from defendant's silence. 59 CA 426. Where counsel had requested omission of instruction under this section in the jury charge, it was not error for court to fail to inquire expressly of defendant if he also wanted the court to omit the instruction. 64 CA 340. Since trial court's instruction to jury not to draw any unfavorable inference from the fact that defendant did not testify given in the context of instructions concerning how jury was to find facts in general did not clearly inform jury that it could not use defendant's silence as a factor in its verdict and did not satisfy the statutory requirement that court convey a specific instruction to jury that no unfavorable inference could be drawn from the fact that defendant did not testify and state failed to establish that the deficient instruction was clarified or remedied by the court and failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt, judgment was reversed and the case remanded for new trial. 97 CA 266.

      Cited. 36 CS 583.

      Sec. 54-84a*. Privilege of spouse. If any person on trial for crime has a husband or wife, he or she shall be a competent witness but may elect or refuse to testify for or against the accused, except that either spouse who has received personal violence from the other or is the spouse of one who is charged with violation of any of sections 53-20, 53-21, 53-23, 53-304, 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71 and 53a-83 to 53a-88, inclusive, may, upon his or her trial for offenses arising out of such personal violence or from violation of the provisions of any of said sections, be compelled to testify in the same manner as any other witness.

      (P.A. 80-313, S. 45.)

      *Note: This section was formerly part of Sec. 54-84. See Sec. 54-84 History re P.A. 80-313.

      History: (Revisor's note: In 1993 obsolete reference to repealed Sec. 53-25 was deleted editorially by the Revisors).

      Cited. 199 C. 631. Cited. 211 C. 555. Section codifies adverse spousal testimony privilege, as distinguished from marital communications privilege, and the privilege belongs to the witness spouse and is meant to protect against impact of the testimony on the marriage. 267 C. 710.

      Sec. 54-85. Witness to testify with regard to bribery at elections. A person summoned as a witness to testify regarding bribery at any election shall not be excused from testifying because his evidence may tend to disgrace or criminate him, nor shall he thereafter be prosecuted for anything connected with the transaction about which he so testifies, nor shall the evidence he may so give be used against him in any proceeding.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8801; P.A. 80-313, S. 46.)

      History: P.A. 80-313 restated provisions but made no substantive changes.

      Sec. 54-85a. Sequestering of witnesses in criminal prosecution. In any criminal prosecution, the court, upon motion of the state or the defendant, shall cause any witness to be sequestered during the hearing on any issue or motion or any part of the trial of such prosecution in which he is not testifying.

      (1967, P.A. 498.)

      Sequestration order merely prohibits sequestered witness from being present in courtroom when he is not testifying. 169 C. 322. Cited. Id., 428. Cited. 185 C. 211. Cited. 187 C. 6. Cited. 199 C. 62. Cited. 211 C. 672. Cited. 230 C. 591. Cited. 235 C. 711. Cited. 236 C. 112. Cited. 237 C. 284.

      Cited. 11 CA 80. Cited. 13 CA 687. Cited. 16 CA 172. Cited. 20 CA 342. Cited. 21 CA 474. Cited. 32 CA 448. Cited. 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502. Cited. 34 CA 276. Cited. 38 CA 371. Scope of suppression order was not limited only to the suppression hearing and defendant did not establish that he had been prejudiced by police officers' discussion of their testimony with each other in the time between the hearing and the trial. 74 CA 802.

      Sec. 54-85b. Employment protection for witnesses and victims of crime. Penalty. Action for damages and reinstatement. (a) An employer shall not deprive an employee of employment, penalize or threaten or otherwise coerce an employee with respect thereto, because (1) the employee obeys a legal subpoena to appear before any court of this state as a witness in any criminal proceeding, (2) the employee attends a court proceeding or participates in a police investigation related to a criminal case in which the employee is a crime victim, (3) a restraining order has been issued on the employee's behalf pursuant to section 46b-15, or (4) a protective order has been issued on the employee's behalf by a court of this state or by a court of another state, provided if issued by a court of another state, the protective order shall be registered in this state pursuant to section 46b-15a. For purposes of this section, "crime victim" means an employee who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as a result of a crime or an employee who is an immediate family member or guardian of (A) a person who suffers such harm and is a minor, physically disabled, as defined in section 46a-51, or incompetent, or (B) a homicide victim.

      (b) Any employer who violates subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section shall be guilty of criminal contempt and shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.

      (c) If an employer discharges, penalizes or threatens or otherwise coerces an employee in violation of subsection (a) of this section, the employee, not later than ninety days from the occurrence of such action, may bring a civil action for damages and for an order requiring the employee's reinstatement or otherwise rescinding such action. If the employee prevails, the employee shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court.

      (P.A. 81-186; P.A. 02-136, S. 1.)