CHAPTER 925*
STATUTORY RIGHTS OF ACTION AND DEFENSES

      Sec. 52-555. Actions for injuries resulting in death. (a) In any action surviving to or brought by an executor or administrator for injuries resulting in death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, such executor or administrator may recover from the party legally at fault for such injuries just damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital and nursing services, and including funeral expenses, provided no action shall be brought to recover such damages and disbursements but within two years from the date of death, and except that no such action may be brought more than five years from the date of the act or omission complained of.

      (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, an action may be brought under this section at any time after the date of the act or omission complained of if the party legally at fault for such injuries resulting in death has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a violation of section 53a-54a, 53a-54b, 53a-54c, 53a-54d, 53a-55 or 53a-55a with respect to such death.

      (1949 Rev., 8296; 1949, 1951, S. 3230d; 1957, P.A. 532; 1969, P.A. 401, S. 1; P.A. 91-238, S. 1, 2; P.A. 99-42; P.A. 00-200, S. 8.)

      History: 1969 act changed deadline for bringing action from one year from date injury is sustained or discovered or should have been discovered to two years from that date, effective October 1, 1969, and applicable only to injuries first sustained on or after that date; P.A. 91-238 required that action be brought within two years of death or within five years of act or omission complained of rather than within two years of date of injury or discovery of injury or within three years of act or omission complained of, effective October 1, 1991, and applicable only to injuries first sustained on or after that date; P.A. 99-42 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) eliminating time limitation in certain homicide cases; P.A. 00-200 amended Subsec. (b) by adding references to Secs. 53a-55 and 53a-55a.

      See Sec. 45a-448 re distribution of damages recovered for injuries resulting in death.

      See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property.

      See Sec. 52-594 re time limit for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to deceased person's representatives.

      No action lay at common law for causing death. 25 C. 272. Right of recovery in general; 24 C. 577; 69 C. 284; 72 C. 617; 73 C. 616; 77 C. 111; 87 C. 337; action begun by injured person in lifetime survives, not restricted to death from negligence; 87 C. 301; action lies for death in another state; 83 C. 278; statute is not penal; 33 C. 246; it prevents any suit for the benefit of deceased's estate generally. 34 C. 58. Action lies for instantaneous death; 30 C. 187; 69 C. 620; 72 C. 616; and substantial damages may be given. 73 C. 616; 99 C. 6. Administration proper to enforce right, though there is no estate. 36 C. 214. The law presumes that there are heirs; effect. 64 C. 482; 69 C. 272; 71 C. 286. Under former statute, sum named was limitation, not measure, of damages. 85 C. 117. Purpose of statute is not to penalize, but to give just damages. 87 C. 472. Elements and rule of damage. 29 C. 496; 33 C. 56; 61 C. 159; 72 C. 617; 73 C. 620; 75 C. 548; Id., 571; 79 C. 367; 83 C. 278; 90 C. 35; 92 C. 678; 95 C. 117; 103 C. 530; 106 C. 330; 123 C. 302; 132 C. 466. Omission to charge as to limitation not error. 87 C. 149. Necessary averments in action. 33 C. 247. Effect of default by defendant. 33 C. 252; 36 C. 155. Delay in taking out administration does not extend time limit; 90 C. 527; but the provisions of section 52-592 apply. 91 C. 395; 102 C. 69. Negligence of statutory distributees is no defense. 78 C. 284. Not necessary to count on statute in complaint; applies whether death is instantaneous or not. 99 C. 6. Limit of damage covers all expenses prior to death as well as loss to estate. 103 C. 529; 106 C. 338. New York statute enforceable in our courts. 108 C. 445. No bar to action that heirs at law are the defendants. Id., 649. Does not permit recovery of damages for death resulting from breach of implied warranty. 115 C. 253. History of this statute. Id., 255; 122 C. 95. Whether action for death due to highway defect falls within this section, quaere. Id. Employer obligated to pay compensation to deceased employee's dependents is entitled to apportionment under section 31-293 of damages recovered by administratrix from third person. 116 C. 92. Statute applies in action to recover damages for death against physician for malpractice. 127 C. 380. Does not create new cause of action; administratrix of father may not sue unemancipated minor son. 129 C. 518. Cited. 111 C. 336; 127 C. 692; 131 C. 130; 142 C. 84. This section is not limited or modified by section 45-210 so as to postpone the beginning of the one-year period. 134 C. 382. Cited. 143 C. 653. Basic principles underlying act; assessment of damages. 144 C. 659. Distinguished from section 52-599. Id. Computation of actuarial expectancy of child. 145 C. 622. Extensive discussion of rule for measuring damages. 146 C. 114. In such an action the administrator does not act in his true capacity as administrator for the benefit of the estate but as agent or trustee for those beneficially interested. 147 C. 233. Proceeds do not become general assets of the estate. Id. Right of action for wrongful death and that for nonfatal personal injuries rest on substantially the same basis. Id., 649. Administrator of unemancipated minor may sue her unemancipated minor sister for wrongful death. Id. Damages for death and its direct consequences are recoverable only if, and to the extent that, they are made so by statute. 153 C. 360. Cited. Id., 633. Plaintiff stands in shoes of decedent and can recover only if he, had his injuries not proved fatal, could himself have recovered. 154 C. 432. As executor, plaintiff is empowered to sue for injuries resulting in decedent's death whether his appointment issued from a court in this state or in a foreign jurisdiction. 156 C. 115. Admission in evidence of hearsay statements by defendant's driver, although made in presence of plaintiff's decedent on date of accident, was reversible error. 159 C. 307. Injuries resulting in death held not to constitute medical malpractice. 170 C. 443. Cited. Id., 637. Cited. 183 C. 448. Cited. 187 C. 53. Cited. 192 C. 280; Id., 327. Cited. 196 C. 134; Id., 509. Suit under this section not barred by workers' compensation act where minor killed while illegally employed. 203 C. 34. Permits a recovery of death damages only by decedent's estate. Claim for loss of ante mortem consortium distinguished from claim for loss of post mortem consortium. Id., 187. Three-year limitation is a jurisdictional prerequisite which must be met to maintain action under the statute and cannot be waived. Statute does not violate Conn. Const. Art. I Sec. 10. 205 C. 219. "Intent is not an essential element of the cause of action." 206 C. 229. Cited. 208 C. 392. Cited. 209 C. 59. Cited. 210 C. 175; Id., 721. Cited. 212 C. 415. Cited. 213 C. 282. Cited. 221 C. 346. Cited. 226 C. 282. Elements of wrongful death cause of action under section discussed. 267 C. 539.

      Cited. 3 CA 598. Cited. 43 CA 294. Cited. 44 CA 172.

      Limitation held applicable to recovery under section allowing action for death or injury against highway commissioner. 1 CS 136. History of section reviewed. Id; 11 CS 117. Action to be brought one year after "the neglect complained of" and not from date of death. 4 CS 32. Applicable to action where death results from malpractice of a physician. 6 CS 450. Cited. 7 CS 328. Cited. 9 CS 184. Statute does not limit the number of parties that can be sued. 10 CS 396. Proviso is not a true statute of limitations but a condition precedent to the actual ripening of a complete right of action. 11 CS 239. Parent has no cause of action to recover for loss of services of child wrongfully killed. Id., 447. Fact that person injured died more than a year after injury immaterial where original complaint was brought within statutory period. Id., 413; Id., 468. Cited. 16 CS 430. Cited. 17 CS 3. Covers both antemortem elements of damage such as pain and suffering and also for injuries resulting in death. 19 CS 487. Connecticut's wrongful death statute compared with that of North Carolina, which is based on Lord Campbell's Act. 21 CS 233. Where prenatal injuries result in death, the personal representative of the child may prosecute an action. It makes no difference whether death took place just after birth or just prior to birth. 23 CS 256. Stillborn infant, dead from injuries sustained as a viable fetus, has a cause of action. 26 CS 358. Connecticut follows the "survival" rather than the "new cause of action" theory. Id., 358. Damages for antemortem injuries, though required to be claimed in same action as damages for death, do not depend on this section but on section 52-599, which provides that decedent's cause of action survives to his personal representative. Where one year period of limitation with respect to those injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative, under section 52-594, had year from date of death to initiate action. 28 CS 461. Wrongful death action must be brought by executor or administrator to have standing. Standing acquired subsequent to statute of limitations does not cure original action. 29 CS 139. Amendment to complaint not deemed instituting new cause of action so as to be barred by section but was amplification and expansion not change of facts originally claimed. 35 CS 38. Wrongful death action is not a new and independent action created by the demise of the injured party, but rather a claim of the deceased party which survives his death. Therefore the decedent's spouse can attach to the wrongful death claim an independent claim for loss of consortium. Loss of consortium is now legally recoverable under "just damages". Consortium is an element of a marital relationship and cannot be extended to the children of the marriage. Id., 292. Cited. 37 CS 1. Cited. 38 CS 318. Damages for loss of consortium are not recoverable under this statute, which compensates losses suffered only by decedent or his estate. 39 CS 8. Cited. 40 CS 95. Read together with Secs. 45-249c and 45-249d(a) "executor or administrator" is interpreted to include a temporary administrator to be allowed to commence wrongful death action when necessary to preserve estate. Id., 451. Cited. Id., 457. Cited. 44 CS 477. Administratrix may maintain action for wrongful death on behalf of a viable unborn fetus for injuries and death. 48 CS 440.

      Sec. 52-555a. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse independent for determination of damages. Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse with respect to the death of the other spouse shall be separate from and independent of all claims or causes of action for the determination of damages with respect to such death.

      (P.A. 89-148, S. 1, 5.)

      History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.

      Cited. 226 C. 282.

      Cited. 44 CA 172.

      Sec. 52-555b. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse to be joined with all actions re death of spouse. Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse with respect to the death of the other spouse, which claim or cause of action may include, without limitation, claims for damages with respect to loss of the society of, affection of, moral support provided by, services provided by, sexual relations with or companionship of the other spouse, suffered because of the death of the other spouse, shall be brought with or joined with the claims and causes of action with respect to the death of the other spouse.

      (P.A. 89-148, S. 2, 5.)

      History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.

      Cited. 44 CA 172. Assets the trustee in bankruptcy transferred to bank, which were encumbered by a valid lien, were not "assets" within meaning of the Fraudulent Transfer Act and, therefore, transfer not subject to said act. 54 CA 481.

      Sec. 52-555c. Statute of limitations. Actions for loss of consortium re death of spouse contingent upon proof of facts for wrongful death. (a) No action with respect to any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium shall be commenced except within the time within which an action may be commenced with respect to the death of the other spouse in relation to which the action for loss of consortium arises.

      (b) Any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium by one spouse arising out of the claim or cause of action for the wrongful death of the other spouse shall be contingent upon proof of facts sufficient to establish recovery for the claim or cause of action for wrongful death. Nothing in sections 52-555a to 52-555d, inclusive, shall limit the assertion of any defenses against the claim or cause of action for loss of consortium that would be available against the claim or cause of action for wrongful death.

      (P.A. 89-148, S. 3, 5.)

      History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.

      Cited. 44 CA 172.

      Sec. 52-555d. Eligibility for workers' compensation benefits bar to action for loss of consortium against employer. No action with respect to any claim or cause of action for loss of consortium shall be brought by one spouse against an employer of the other spouse if such other spouse is entitled to receive, is receiving or has received benefits pursuant to chapter 568.

      (P.A. 89-148, S. 4, 5.)

      History: P.A. 89-148 effective October 1, 1989, and applicable to all causes of action arising on or after that date.

      Cited. 226 C. 282.

      Cited. 44 CA 172.

      Sec. 52-556. Actions for injuries caused by motor vehicles owned by the state. Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8297.)

      Cited. 143 C. 653. Cited. 144 C. 282. Cited. 185 C. 616. The legislature did not intend the statute to authorize an additional cause of action for state employees or their representatives who are eligible for workers' compensation. 189 C. 550. Cited. 239 C. 265. State's waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to this section does not exempt the state from a reallocation of damages under Sec. 52-572h(g). 247 C. 256.

      Cited. 7 CA 196. Cited. 10 CA 22. Cited. 20 CA 619. To constitute cause of action under statute, injury must result from negligent operation of motor vehicle by state employee or official. 82 CA 459. As a matter of law, state employee was "operating a motor vehicle" within the meaning of this section based on facts where he left a state-owned truck running along side of the road so he could perform required maintenance. 84 CA 535. Allegation defendant was operating a state vehicle in course of employment is insufficient ground to invoke statute as defense to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction when state was not a named party and never formally notified by plaintiff of pending action. 92 CA 158.

      Cited. 15 CS 251. Statute abolishes defense of governmental immunity. 18 CS 36. Defendant's motion to expunge portion of complaint alleging truck owned by state was insured denied as statute gives right of recovery only where there is such insurance. 22 CS 212.

      Negligence of a state official or employee must be established by a fair preponderance of all the evidence to recover damages. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 116.

      Sec. 52-557. Injury to children being transported to school. In any action brought by any person for personal injuries received while being transported to or from school in a vehicle owned, leased or hired by, or operated under contract with, any town, school district or other municipality, it shall be no defense that such transportation is in the line of governmental duty or is mandated by the state. In any such action brought against any town, school district or other municipality, the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be available and it shall be no defense that the transportation was being provided by an independent contractor.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8298; P.A. 00-133.)

      History: P.A. 00-133 barred the defense that the transportation is mandated by the state and the defense of sovereign immunity.

      See Sec. 52-557c re standard of care applicable to school bus owners and operators.

      Cited. 203 C. 317.

      Cited. 42 CA 624.

      Cited. 41 CS 402. Cited. 44 CS 527.

      Sec. 52-557a. Standard of care owed social invitee. The standard of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the standard of care owed to a business invitee.

      (1963, P.A. 575.)

      Postman a licensee comparable to a social invitee. 154 C. 185. Standard of care owed to social invitee is same as standard of care as owed to business invitee. 160 C. 61. Cited. 194 C. 129. Does not abrogate common law regarding status of firefighters and police officers. Status of such licensees is unaffected by manner in which they came upon the premises. 218 C. 610.

      Cited. 54 CA 335.

      Sec. 52-557b. "Good samaritan law". Immunity from liability for emergency medical assistance, first aid or medication by injection. School personnel not required to administer or render. (a) A person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under the provisions of chapter 370 or dentistry under the provisions of section 20-106 or members of the same professions licensed to practice in any other state of the United States, a person licensed as a registered nurse under section 20-93 or 20-94 or certified as a licensed practical nurse under section 20-96 or 20-97, a medical technician or any person operating a cardiopulmonary resuscitator or an automatic external defibrillator, or a person trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator in accordance with the standards set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association, who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person's employment or practice, renders emergency medical or professional assistance to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to exempt paid or volunteer firefighters, police officers or emergency medical services personnel from completing training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator in accordance with the standard set forth by the American Red Cross or American Heart Association. For the purposes of this subsection, "automatic external defibrillator" means a device that: (1) Is used to administer an electric shock through the chest wall to the heart; (2) contains internal decision-making electronics, microcomputers or special software that allows it to interpret physiologic signals, make medical diagnosis and, if necessary, apply therapy; (3) guides the user through the process of using the device by audible or visual prompts; and (4) does not require the user to employ any discretion or judgment in its use.

      (b) A paid or volunteer firefighter or police officer, a teacher or other school personnel on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, a member of a ski patrol, a lifeguard, a conservation officer, patrol officer or special police officer of the Department of Environmental Protection, or emergency medical service personnel, who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency first aid, which may constitute ordinary negligence. No paid or volunteer firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel who forcibly enters the residence of any person in order to render emergency first aid to a person whom such firefighter, police officer or emergency medical service personnel reasonably believes to be in need thereof shall be liable to such person for civil damages incurred as a result of such entry. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

      (c) An employee of a railroad company, including any company operating a commuter rail line, who has successfully completed a course in first aid, offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering the emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

      (d) A railroad company, including any commuter rail line, which provides emergency medical training or equipment to any employee granted immunity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by a person or for the death of a person which results from the company's acts or omissions in providing such training or equipment or which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

      (e) (1) For purposes of this subsection, "cartridge injector" means an automatic prefilled cartridge injector or similar automatic injectable equipment used to deliver epinephrine in a standard dose for emergency first aid response to allergic reactions.

      (2) Any volunteer worker associated with, or any person employed to work for, a program offered to children sixteen years of age or younger by a corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, who (A) has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, (B) has obtained the consent of a parent or legal guardian to use a cartridge injector on his or her child, and (C) uses a cartridge injector on such child in apparent need thereof participating in such program, shall not be liable to such child assisted or to such child's parent or guardian for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

      (3) A corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, which provides training in the use of cartridge injectors to any volunteer worker granted immunity pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by, or for the death of, a child sixteen years of age or younger who is participating in a program offered by such corporation, which injury or death results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

      (f) A teacher or other school personnel, on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, who has completed both a course in first aid in accordance with subsection (b) of this section and a course given by the medical advisor of the school or by a licensed physician in the administration of medication by injection, who renders emergency care by administration of medication by injection to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to the person assisted for civil damages for any injuries which result from acts or omissions by the person in rendering the emergency care of administration of medication by injection, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence.

      (g) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to require any teacher or other school personnel to render emergency first aid or administer medication by injection.

      (h) Any person who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, or has been trained in the use of a cartridge injector by a licensed physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or registered nurse, and who, voluntarily and gratuitously and other than in the ordinary course of such person's employment or practice, renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, or any person who is an identified staff member of a before or after school program, day camp or day care facility, as provided in section 19a-900, and who renders emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector on another person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence. For the purposes of this subsection, "cartridge injector" has the same meaning as provided in subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of this section.

      (1963, P.A. 205; 1967, P.A. 282; 878; 1969, P.A. 785; 1971, P.A. 729; P.A. 75-132; 75-456, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-225; 77-349, S. 3; 77-614, S. 323, 610; P.A. 78-122, S. 1, 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 224; 82-286; P.A. 83-375, S. 2; P.A. 84-546, S. 119, 173; P.A. 86-237, S. 1, 2; P.A. 87-589, S. 34, 87; P.A. 89-149; P.A. 93-381, S. 9, 39; P.A. 95-257, S. 12, 21, 58; P.A. 98-62, S. 1; P.A. 99-181, S. 13; P.A. 00-196, S. 36; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-4, S. 37, 58; P.A. 03-211, S. 10; P.A. 04-221, S. 27; P.A. 05-144, S. 1; 05-259, S. 6; P.A. 06-196, S. 181, 182.)

      History: 1967 acts added registered nurses, firemen, policemen and ambulance personnel; 1969 act applied provisions to persons certified as licensed practical nurses under Sec. 20-96 or 20-97; 1971 act added reference to completion of first aid course offered by American Heart Association; P.A. 75-132 applied provisions to members of ski patrols; P.A. 75-456 applied provisions to lifeguards, conservation officers and patrolmen or special policemen of environmental protection department; P.A. 77-225 clarified licensees under chapter 370 as persons licensed "to practice medicine and surgery", and applied provisions to dentists and to teachers and other school personnel while on school grounds, in school building or at school function; P.A. 77-349 applied provisions to medical technicians, persons operating cardiopulmonary resuscitator and persons trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation pursuant to standards of American Red Cross or American Heart Association; P.A. 77-614 substituted department of health services for department of health where appearing, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-122 referred to first aid courses offered by directors of health rather than those offered by municipal health departments and added Subsec. (b) re teachers and school personnel who have completed recognized first aid course; P.A. 82-160 redesignated part of former Subsec. (a) as a new Subsec. (b) and relettered the remaining Subsecs. accordingly and rephrased the section; P.A. 82-286 amended Subsec. (a) to provide immunity from civil damages for any fireman or policeman who forcibly enters residence to render emergency first aid; P.A. 83-375 amended Subsec. (a), providing that ambulance personnel who enter residences to render emergency aid shall be immune from liability for civil damages resulting from entry; P.A. 84-546 made technical change, moving provisions re firemen's and policemen's immunity from Subsec. (a) to Subsec. (b); P.A. 86-237 granted immunity to railroad companies and employees for ordinary negligence committed while rendering aid and granted immunity to railroad companies for ordinary negligence committed while training employees to render aid; P.A. 87-589 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 89-149 amended Subsec. (b) to include a course in first aid offered by the National Ski Patrol; P.A. 93-381 replaced department of health services with department of public health and addiction services, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-257 replaced Commissioner and Department of Public Health and Addiction Services with Commissioner and Department of Public Health, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 98-62 amended Subsec. (a) to include persons trained in the use of an automatic external defibrillator and added a definition thereof; P.A. 99-181 amended Subsec. (c) by allowing an employee to take a course in first aid offered by the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any certified director of public health, in addition to a course offered by the American Red Cross, and by making technical changes; P.A. 00-196 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (e); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-4 amended Subsec. (b) by changing "fireman" to "firefighter", "policeman" to "police officer", "patrolman" to "patrol officer" and "ambulance personnel" to "emergency medical service personnel"; P.A. 03-211 added new Subdiv. (e) re immunity for use of a cartridge injector by volunteer workers and for corporations that provide training in the use of cartridge injectors and redesignated existing Subsecs. (e) and (f) as new Subsecs. (f) and (g), effective July 1, 2003; P.A. 04-221 amended Subsec. (e)(2) by adding "or any person employed to work for"; P.A. 05-144 added Subsec. (h) re immunity from civil liability for rendering emergency assistance by using a cartridge injector; P.A. 05-259 amended Subsec. (a) to extend immunity to any person who operates an automatic external defibrillator during an emergency and to specify that such immunity does not exempt paid or volunteer firefighters, police officers or emergency medical services personnel from completing training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation or in the use of an automatic external defibrillator, effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 06-196 made technical changes in Subsecs. (e)(2) and (h), effective June 7, 2006.

      Cited. 10 CA 86.

      Liability for gross negligence was not abolished by Good Samaritan Law. 48 CS 10.

      Sec. 52-557c. Standard of care applicable to owners and operators of school buses. The standard of care applicable to the owners and operators of any school bus, as defined in section 14-275, or of any motor vehicle registered as a service bus transporting children to and from school or school activities, private or public camps or any other activities concerning the transportation of groups of children shall be the same as the standard of care applicable to common carriers of passengers for hire.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 303, S. 1.)

      Duty of carrier is to provide its passengers with a reasonably safe place to alight. 180 C. 302.

      Sec. 52-557d. Defense of charitable immunity abolished. The common law defense of charitable immunity is abolished and shall not constitute a valid defense to any cause of action.

      (1967, P.A. 52; P.A. 82-160, S. 225.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 deleted "arising subsequent to October 1, 1967" after "cause of action".

      Sec. 52-557e. Immunity of physicians from liability for uncompensated service on hospital utilization review committee. No action may be brought to recover damages against any licensed physician for any decision or action taken by him as a member of a hospital utilization review committee on which he serves without compensation and to which he shall have been appointed by the staff of the hospital, the function of which committee, as directed by the federal Medicare Act, as amended, shall have been to review the utilization of the facilities of the hospital in the interests of efficiency and the quality of service to the public.

      (1971, P.A. 157; P.A. 82-160, S. 226.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.

      Sec. 52-557f. Landowner liability for recreational use of land. Definitions. As used in sections 52-557f to 52-557i, inclusive:

      (1) "Charge" means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land;

      (2) "Land" means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty;

      (3) "Owner" means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises;

      (4) "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, snow skiing, ice skating, sledding, hang gliding, sport parachuting, hot air ballooning and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.

      (1971, P.A. 249, S. 1; 440, S. 2; P.A. 77-393; Oct. Sp. Sess. P.A. 79-12, S. 2, 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 227; P.A. 88-204; P.A. 90-310, S. 3.)

      History: Later 1971 act (P.A. 440) removed snowmobiling from definition of "recreational purpose"; P.A. 77-393 included cutting and removing wood in definition of "recreational purpose"; October, 1979, P.A. 79-12 removed cutting and removing wood from definition of "recreational purpose"; P.A. 82-160 alphabetized the defined terms; P.A. 88-204 included hang gliding and hot air ballooning in definition of "recreational purpose"; P.A. 90-310 in Subdiv. (4) added sport parachuting to the definition of "recreational purpose".

      See Sec. 52-557k re liability of landowner who allows general public to harvest firewood.

      Cited. 194 C. 129. Cited. 219 C. 914. Cited. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653. Connecticut recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Connecticut recreational land use act, Secs. 52-557f-52-557i cited. 226 C. 446. Cited. 238 C. 633. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 687. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id.

      Cited. 7 CA 164. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities. 24 CA 592. Cited. 39 CA 280. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA 17. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id.

      Subdiv. (3):

      Held municipalities are not owners within meaning of section, reconsidering and overruling decision in Manning v. Barenz, 221 C. 256.

      Sec. 52-557g. Liability of owner of land available to public for recreation; exceptions. (a) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who makes all or any part of the land available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service for recreational purposes owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recreational purposes.

      (b) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who, either directly or indirectly, invites or permits without charge, rent, fee or other commercial service any person to use the land, or part thereof, for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Make any representation that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) confer upon the person who enters or uses the land for recreational purposes the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or omission of the owner.

      (c) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.

      (1971, P.A. 249, S. 2-4; P.A. 73-70, S. 1, 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 228.)

      History: P.A. 73-70 deleted language limiting applicability to owners of "five or more acres" of land and specified that landowner may make "all or any part" of land available for public use without liability; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Cited. 204 C. 435. Applies to all municipal and private landowners. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653. Connecticut recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Connecticut recreational land use act, Secs. 52-557f-52-557i cited. 226 C. 446. Cited. 238 C. 653. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 687. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id.

      Cited. 7 CA 164. Void for vagueness doctrine does not require prior warning of civil immunity to potential claimants. 10 CA 86. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities; municipality's immunity under section extends to its employees. 24 CA 592. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 832. Cited. 39 CA 280. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA 17. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 226 C. 446.

      Sec. 52-557h. Owner liable, when. Nothing in sections 52-557f to 52-557i, inclusive, limits in any way the liability of any owner of land which otherwise exists: (1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity; (2) for injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.

      (1971, P.A. 249, S. 5; P.A. 82-160, S. 229.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 made minor technical change and replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators.

      Cited. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653. Connecticut recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Connecticut recreational land use act, Secs. 52-557h-52-557i cited. 226 C. 446. Cited. 238 C. 653. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 687. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id.

      Cited. 7 CA 164. Subdiv. (1): Does not authorize recovery for nuisance. Id. Cited. 10 CA 86. Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities. 24 CA 592. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 39 CA 280. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA 17. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id.

      Sec. 52-557i. Obligation of user of land. Nothing in sections 52-557f to 52-557i, inclusive, shall be construed to relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from any obligation which he may have in the absence of said sections to exercise care in his use of such land and in his activities thereon, or from the legal consequences of failure to employ such care.

      (1971, P.A. 249, S. 6.)

      Cited. 221 C. 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653. Connecticut recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Connecticut recreational land use act, Secs. 52-557f-52-557i cited. 226 C. 446. Cited. 238 C. 653. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 687. Recreational land use act Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id.

      Sec. 52-557f et seq. apply to all landowners including governmental entities. 24 CA 592. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. 39 CA 280. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA 17. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id.

      Sec. 52-557j. Liability of landowner upon whose land snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles, motorcycles, minibikes or minicycles are operated. No landowner may be held liable for any injury sustained by any person operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, as defined in section 14-379, motorcycle or minibike or minicycle, as defined in section 14-1, upon the landowner's property or by any passenger in the snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle or motorcycle, minibike or minicycle, whether or not the landowner had given permission, written or oral, for the operation upon his land unless the landowner charged a fee for the operation, or unless the injury is caused by the wilful or malicious conduct of the landowner.

      (1971, P.A. 440, S. 1; P.A. 73-67, S. 1, 2; 73-676, S. 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 230.)

      History: P.A. 73-67 exempted landowners from liability for injuries sustained in operation of all-terrain vehicles or motorcycles; P.A. 73-676 extended exemption to cover injuries sustained in operating minibikes and minicycles; P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.

      Statute held constitutional. 194 C. 129. Cited. 238 C. 653. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 687. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id.

      Court held city to be a "landowner" within the ambit of statute. Cited. 7 CA 164. Cited. 10 CA 86. Cited. 24 CA 592. Cited. 39 CA 280. Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Recreational Land Use Act cited. Id.

      Sec. 52-557k. Liability of landowner who allows persons to harvest firewood or fruits or vegetables. (a) As used in this section: (1) "Owner" means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, occupant or person in control of the premises; (2) "harvesting" means the cutting and removal of designated standing trees, down trees, tree tops and other logging slash or debris suitable for use as firewood or the picking and removal of designated fruits or vegetables; (3) "charge" means the fee asked in return for a specified volume of firewood or a specified volume of fruits or vegetables and the right to harvest such firewood or such fruits or vegetables.

      (b) Any owner of land who invites or permits any person (1) to enter the land or a part thereof to harvest firewood, with or without charge, or (2) to enter the land or a part thereof to harvest fruits or vegetables, without charge, on behalf of a nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation for use by such nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation or for distribution to other nonprofit organizations or nonprofit corporations, shall not be liable for damages as a result of injury to such person when such injury arises out of the use of the land or out of the act of harvesting firewood or harvesting fruits or vegetables, unless such injury is caused by such owner's failure to warn of a dangerous hidden hazard actually known to such owner.

      (c) This section shall not apply to (1) an owner who sells more than one hundred cords of firewood each calendar year, (2) an owner who operates a "pick or cut your own agricultural operation" as defined in section 52-568a, or (3) an owner who operates an agricultural operation to which the public is invited and charged for produce harvested and removed from the land.

      (Oct. Sp. Sess. P.A. 79-12, S. 1, 3; P.A. 01-82.)

      History: P.A. 01-82 made section applicable to owners who permit persons to harvest fruits or vegetables under certain circumstances, amending Subsec. (a) to redefine "harvesting" to include the picking and removal of designated fruits or vegetables and redefine "charge" to include the fee asked in return for a specified volume of fruits or vegetables and the right to harvest such fruits or vegetables, amending Subsec. (b) to designate existing provisions re person entering the land to harvest firewood as Subdiv. (1) and add new Subdiv. (2) re person entering the land to harvest fruits or vegetables on behalf of a nonprofit corporation or nonprofit organization for use or distribution by such nonprofit corporation or nonprofit organization and amending Subsec. (c) to designate existing provision re inapplicability of section to owner who sells more than one hundred cords of firewood as Subdiv. (1), add Subdiv. (2) re owner who operates a "pick or cut your own agricultural operation" and add Subdiv. (3) re owner who operates an agricultural operation to which the public is invited and charged for produce harvested and removed from the land.

      Cited. 194 C. 129. Cited. 238 C. 653. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id. Cited. Id., 687. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. Id.

      Cited. 10 CA 86.

      Sec. 52-557l. Immunity from liability of persons who donate food and of nonprofit organizations or corporations that distribute donated food. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, any person, including but not limited to a seller, farmer, processor, distributor, wholesaler or retailer of food, who donates an item of food for use or distribution by a nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation and any nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation that collects donated food and distributes such food to other nonprofit organizations or nonprofit corporations free of charge or for a nominal fee shall not be liable for civil damages or criminal penalties resulting from the nature, age, condition or packaging of the food, unless it is established that the donor, at the time of making the donation, or the nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation, at the time of distributing the food, knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the food was (1) adulterated as defined in section 21a-101 or (2) not fit for human consumption.

      (P.A. 83-223, S. 1, 2; P.A. 94-17.)

      History: P.A. 94-17 applied provisions to any nonprofit organization or nonprofit corporation that collects donated food and distributes such food to other nonprofit organizations or nonprofit corporations free of charge or for a nominal fee and deleted Subsec. (b) that had provided "Nothing in this section limits the liability of the donee organization or corporation accepting the food."

      Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687.

      Sec. 52-557m. Immunity from liability of directors, officers and trustees of nonprofit tax-exempt organizations. Any person who serves as a director, officer or trustee of a nonprofit organization qualified as a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, and who is not compensated for such services on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall be immune from civil liability for damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1987, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities if such person was acting in good faith and within the scope of such person's official functions and duties, unless such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 10; P.A. 87-227, S. 7; P.A. 88-364, S. 68, 123; P.A. 89-211, S. 50.)

      History: P.A. 87-227 replaced provision granting immunity for "any act or omission resulting in damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1986" with immunity for "damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1987, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities" and excluded damage or injury caused by "reckless" misconduct; P.A. 88-364 made technical change; P.A. 89-211 clarified reference to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

      P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Cited. 228 C. 375. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687.

      Sec. 52-557n. Liability of political subdivision and its employees, officers and agents. Liability of members of local boards and commissions. (a) (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit; and (C) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149. (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.

      (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from: (1) The condition of natural land or unimproved property; (2) the condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain or similar structure when used by a person in a manner which is not reasonably foreseeable; (3) the temporary condition of a road or bridge which results from weather, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (4) the condition of an unpaved road, trail or footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreational or scenic area, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (5) the initiation of a judicial or administrative proceeding, provided that such action is not determined to have been commenced or prosecuted without probable cause or with a malicious intent to vex or trouble, as provided in section 52-568; (6) the act or omission of someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision; (7) the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization, when such authority is a discretionary function by law, unless such issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or such failure or refusal constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety; (8) failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such political subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances; (9) failure to detect or prevent pollution of the environment, including groundwater, watercourses and wells, by individuals or entities other than the political subdivision; or (10) conditions on land sold or transferred to the political subdivision by the state when such conditions existed at the time the land was sold or transferred to the political subdivision.

      (c) Any person who serves as a member of any board, commission, committee or agency of a municipality and who is not compensated for such membership on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall not be personally liable for damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1992, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities on such board, commission, committee or agency if such person was acting in good faith, and within the scope of such person's official functions and duties, and was not acting in violation of any state, municipal or professional code of ethics regulating the conduct of such person, or in violation of subsection (a) of section 9-369b or subsection (b) or (c) of section 1-206. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 13; P.A. 92-198; P.A. 93-290.)

      History: P.A. 92-198 added Subsec. (c) concerning immunity of members of local boards and commissions who are not compensated for their membership; P.A. 93-290 amended Subsec. (b) by adding new Subdiv. (10) regarding preexisting conditions on land sold or transferred by the state.

      Cited. 208 C. 161. Cited. 214 C. 1. Court construed statute to provide action under Sec. 13a-149 is plaintiff's exclusive remedy against political subdivision for damages resulting from a defective road or bridge. 219 C. 179. Common law action for nuisance is barred by this section. Id., 641. Cited. 229 C. 829. Cited. 231 C. 370. Cited. 233 C. 524. Cited. 235 C. 408. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687. Section allows plaintiffs to bring direct cause of action for negligence against municipality. 263 C. 22. In absence of reference to Sec. 7-308 or 7-465, statutes can coexist and a party may choose to rely on either statute. Id.

      Cited. 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829. Cited. 36 CA 601. Cited. 42 CA 624. Absent specific language in this section modifying common law rule of governmental immunity for claims of strict liability pursuant to Sec. 22-357, that section should not be so construed. 58 CA 702. Section does not bar recovery from a political subdivision where circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm. 60 CA 178. Court provided jury with clear guidance on the issue of agency with respect to town's potential liability. 68 CA 284. Complaint alleging that city negligently failed to maintain a stairway in a reasonably safe condition constituted an allegation of negligent performance of a discretionary, rather than ministerial, act and therefore city was immune from liability pursuant to the statute that exempts political subdivisions from liability for negligent acts of its employees that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. 71 CA 844. Plaintiff's statutory negligence claims were barred by governmental immunity. 87 CA 353.

      Cited. 41 CS 420. Cited. 42 CS 22. Cited. 44 CS 45; Id., 527. Summary judgment granted for municipal defendants in matter where plaintiff alleged that defendant's failure to timely respond to 911 call and provide effective medical care resulted in her son's death. Plaintiff unable to invoke imminent harm/identifiable person exception to defendant's claimed governmental immunity because decedent was not identifiable nor was the harm imminent. 49 CS 200.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1)(C): Liability in nuisance can be imposed on a municipality only if condition constituting the nuisance was created by positive act of the municipality. 245 C. 385. Subdiv. (2)(A): Plaintiff's claim against city for intentional infliction of emotional distress by city employee is barred by governmental immunity. 267 C. 669. Subdiv. (1)(B) codifies common law rule that municipalities are liable for their negligent acts committed in their proprietary capacity. 279 C. 830.

      Cited. 39 CA 289. Language of section is clear and unambiguous in abrogating governmental immunity that common law gives to municipalities with respect to vicarious liability. 66 CA 669. Parties need not comply with filing requirements of Sec. 7-465 in order to utilize this section, rather parties can bring a direct cause of action for negligence against a municipality under its provisions. Id. Although trial court improperly analyzed plaintiff's claims under subsection, which concerns claims brought directly against a municipality, rather than under applicable municipal indemnification statute (Sec. 7-465), which provides that qualified municipal immunity does not apply to claims for indemnification for acts by municipal employees unless the acts are willful or wanton, she could not prevail on claim that trial court improperly granted motion for a directed verdict because there is no recognized right to a claim for emotional distress resulting to a person from loss of a pet. 84 CA 395. Trial court properly struck plaintiffs' negligence claim where plaintiffs claimed that city's negligence in failing to ensure security of the building after city had taken the property by eminent domain resulted in plaintiffs property being stolen and destroyed. Pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(B) city cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees pertaining to security of the property. 88 CA 1. Because municipal status of city of New Haven was undisputed, the protection afforded under Subdiv. (2)(A) granted municipal immunity from liability for intentional tort committed by plaintiff's coemployee who was a city employee. 92 CA 558.

      Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 41 CS 402. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id. Governmental immunity inapplicable in case in which plaintiff was involved in assisting police when she was bitten by police dog. 46 CS 197.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (7) cited. 226 C. 314. Subdiv. (6): Provision does not establish a sole proximate causation standard or some other heightened causation standard; codifies common law that municipal defendants are not liable for acts of nonemployees or nonagents of the municipality. 245 C. 385.

      Sec. 52-557o. Liability of land surveyors. No action for trespass shall lie against any surveyor licensed under chapter 391 or person acting at the direction of any such licensed surveyor who enters upon land other than the land being surveyed without causing any damage to such other land in order to perform a survey, provided no such surveyor or person acting at the direction of such surveyor shall enter upon any land owned by a railroad company, as defined in section 16-1, which is within fifty feet of a railroad track without first obtaining written permission from the railroad company, which written permission shall not be unreasonably withheld. Nothing herein shall relieve such licensed surveyor or person from liability for actual damages caused by such entry upon such other property.

      (P.A. 89-310, S. 1; P.A. 92-74, S. 2, 7.)

      History: P.A. 92-74 amended section to require surveyor or person acting at the direction of surveyor to obtain railroad company's written permission before entering upon any land owned by it which is within fifty feet of a railroad track.

      Recreational land use act, Sec. 52 557f et seq. cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687.

      Sec. 52-557p. (Formerly Sec. 52-577p). Assumption of risk by person engaged in recreational equestrian activities, when. Each person engaged in recreational equestrian activities shall assume the risk and legal responsibility for any injury to his person or property arising out of the hazards inherent in equestrian sports, unless the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of the person providing the horse or horses to the individual engaged in recreational equestrian activities or the failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity by the person providing the horse or horses or his agents or employees.

      (P.A. 93-286, S. 1.)

      History: Sec. 52-577p transferred to Sec. 52-557p in 1997.

      Sec. 52-557q. Immunity from liability of broadcaster that broadcasts emergency alert and information concerning child abduction. Immunity from liability of outdoor advertising establishment. No claim for damages shall be made against a broadcaster, as defined in subsection (l) of section 12-218, or an outdoor advertising establishment, as described in the United States Department of Labor Standard Industrial Classification System Code 7312, that, pursuant to a voluntary program between broadcasters and law enforcement agencies, or between law enforcement agencies and outdoor advertising establishments, broadcasts or disseminates an emergency alert and information provided by a law enforcement agency concerning the abduction of a child, including, but not limited to, a description of the abducted child, a description of the suspected abductor and the circumstances of the abduction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to (1) limit or restrict in any way any legal protection a broadcaster or outdoor advertising establishment may have under any other law for broadcasting, outdoor advertising or otherwise disseminating any information, or (2) relieve a law enforcement agency from acting reasonably in providing information to the broadcaster or outdoor advertising establishment.

      (P.A. 03-111, S. 1; P.A. 05-210, S. 33; P.A. 06-196, S. 183.)

      History: P.A. 05-210 provided immunity for outdoor advertising establishment; P.A. 06-196 made technical changes, effective June 7, 2006.

      Sec. 52-558. Liability for placing obstructions in highway. When any person places or keeps building materials, or any obstacle, in any highway, either with or without a license therefor from the town, city or borough in which such highway is situated, he shall pay to such town, city or borough all costs and damages which it sustains or is compelled to pay by reason thereof.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8299.)

      Open sewer box on sidewalk not an obstacle. 91 C. 255. Allowing water to flow from building and freeze on sidewalk. 104 C. 508. Gasoline from abutter's filling station making sidewalk unsafe. 108 C. 198. Imposes liability upon an abutting owner who, while not placing an obstruction in a highway, allows it to remain there. 134 C. 322.

      Sec. 52-559. Damage for spreading fire. Any person who sets fire on any land, that runs upon the land of any other person, shall pay to the owner all damages done by such fire.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8300.)

      See Sec. 23-48 re penalty for kindling fire in the open without proper authorization.

      See Sec. 23-49a re burning ban, special burning permits and penalties for violation of ban.

      If the fire was originally set on the plaintiff's land, by one occupying it under a license, he is not within the statute. 25 C. 170. The fire need not be proved to have run continuously on the ground from one lot to the other. 30 C. 306. Proof of negligence is not required; 54 C. 461; but if defendant did not cause to be set or himself set fire he is not liable under statute; nor at common law for negligence unless negligence is shown. 100 C. 701. Fire marshal, not having authority to start fire, may not claim governmental immunity. 119 C. 599. Not enough to warrant recovery that fire causing plaintiff's loss originated on defendant's land but must have been set by, or caused to be set by, defendant. 149 C. 170. The fire must have not only originated on the defendant's land, but it must have been set by the defendant or caused by him to be set. The affirmative act of causing the fire is required. 150 C. 432.

      Sec. 52-560. Damages for cutting trees, timber or shrubbery. Exclusion. Any person who cuts, destroys or carries away any trees, timber or shrubbery, standing or lying on the land of another or on public land, except on land subject to the provisions of section 52-560a, without license of the owner, and any person who aids therein, shall pay to the party injured five times the reasonable value of any tree intended for sale or use as a Christmas tree and three times the reasonable value of any other tree, timber or shrubbery; but, when the court is satisfied that the defendant was guilty through mistake and believed that the tree, timber or shrubbery was growing on his land, or on the land of the person for whom he cut the tree, timber or shrubbery, it shall render judgment for no more than its reasonable value.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8301; 1961, P.A. 548; 1963, P.A. 123; P.A. 06-89, S. 2.)

      History: 1961 act substituted terms "shrubbery" for "underwood" and "public land" for "town commons," eliminated separate provision for trees less than one foot in diameter, specified all provisions apply to trees, timber or shrubbery damaged, stipulated value, for determining damages, be reasonable value, deleting term "true" value in last clause and added provision for one cutting timber, etc., for another; 1963 act added provision re Christmas tree; P.A. 06-89 added exclusion re land subject to provisions of Sec. 52-560a.

      See Secs. 53a-115 to 53a-117a, inclusive, re criminal mischief.

      The increased damages are allowed not as a penalty but as compensation for the injury to the landowner. 74 C. 134; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Nature of right given; possession of land by plaintiff necessary element. 90 C. 576. Burden of proving honest mistake under statute rests on defendant. 105 C. 368. Cited. 125 C. 331. Not a penal statute. Damages may be, and generally are, compensatory in nature. It is jury's duty, if defendant is found liable, to treble the value of trees. 134 C. 592. Proof of title and absence of actual, exclusive possession by another are sufficient to show constructive possession. 136 C. 597. Cited. 185 C. 195. Trial court properly determined that replacement cost of trees was not a proper measure of damages. 275 C. 105.

      In order to recover treble damages under the statute, the complaint must clearly state that the claim for relief is based upon the statutory remedy. 1 CA 303. Cited. 43 CA 1. Cited. 45 CA 56. Replacement cost of destroyed trees is not a proper measure of damages under sec. 75 CA 781.

      For mitigation of treble damages provision, requirement is that defendant be "guilty through mistake" and believe that "timber was growing on his own land." Requirements are not in the alternative. 22 CS 195. Legislative history of section. Id. The true measure of damages is the reasonable market value of a severed tree or the diminution of the value of the land because of its loss. Evidence of replacement cost of a tree and a charge to the jury this could be "reasonable value" was error. 31 CS 536.

      Sec. 52-560a. Damages for encroachment on state, municipal or nonprofit land conservation organization open space land. Attorney General enforcement. Civil action. (a) As used in this section, "open space land" includes, but is not limited to, any park, forest, wildlife management area, refuge, preserve, sanctuary, green or wildlife area owned by the state, a political subdivision of the state or a nonprofit land conservation organization and "encroach" means to conduct an activity that causes damage or alteration to the land or vegetation or other features thereon, including, but not limited to, erecting buildings or other structures, constructing roads, driveways or trails, destroying or moving stone walls, cutting trees or other vegetation, removing boundary markers, installing lawns or utilities, or using, storing, or depositing vehicles, materials or debris.

      (b) No person may encroach or cause another person to encroach on open space land or on any land for which the state, a political subdivision of the state or a nonprofit land conservation organization holds a conservation easement interest, without the permission of the owner of such open space land or holder of such conservation easement or without other legal authorization.

      (c) Any owner of open space land or holder of a conservation easement subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section or the Attorney General may bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district where the land is located against any person who violates the provisions of said subsection with respect to such owner's land or land subject to such conservation easement. The court shall order any person who violates the provisions of subsection (b) of this section to restore the land to its condition as it existed prior to such violation or shall award the landowner the costs of such restoration, including reasonable management costs necessary to achieve such restoration. In addition, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and costs and such injunctive or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

      (d) In addition to any damages and relief ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the court may award damages of up to five times the cost of restoration or statutory damages of up to five thousand dollars. In determining the amount of the award, the court shall consider the willfulness of the violation, the extent of damage done to natural resources, if any, the appraised value of any trees or shrubs cut, damaged, or carried away as determined in accordance with the latest revision of The Guide for Plant Appraisal, as published by the International Society of Arboriculture, Urbana, Illinois, or a succeeding publisher, any economic gain realized by the violator and any other relevant factors.

      (P.A. 06-89, S. 1.)

      Sec. 52-561. Trespass to lands without color of right. Section 52-561 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8302; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 57; P.A. 81-410, S. 14.)

      Sec. 52-561a. Damage by domestic fowls. Any owner or keeper of domestic fowls who allows them to trespass upon the premises of another person shall be liable to the owner or occupant of such premises for all damage done by such fowls.

      (1971, P.A. 871, S. 49.)

      Sec. 52-562. Liability for fraud in contracting debt; concealing property. When any person is guilty of fraud in contracting a debt, or conceals, removes or conveys away any part of his property, with intent to prevent it from being taken by legal process, or refuses to pay any debt admitted by him or established by a valid judgment, while having property, not exempt from execution, sufficient to discharge the debt, concealed or withheld by him so that the property cannot be taken by legal process, or refuses to disclose his rights of action, with intent to prevent the rights of action from being taken by foreign attachment or garnishment, any creditor aggrieved thereby may institute an action against him, setting forth his debt and the fraudulent act or acts particularly in the complaint.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8303; P.A. 81-410, S. 11; P.A. 82-160, S. 231.)

      History: P.A. 81-410 eliminated provision re body attachment and execution; P.A. 82-160 replaced "estate" with "property", added "or garnishment" after "foreign attachment" and rephrased the section.

      See Sec. 52-279 re conditions under which attachment may be granted.

      See note to Sec. 52-552 re voiding of fraudulent conveyances, judgments and contract.

      This statute creates a new remedy. 19 C. 545. What constitutes a fraudulent concealment or withdrawal of property. 25 C. 368. The amount of the debt is ordinarily the rule of damages. 30 C. 413. Subsequent proceedings in insolvency, or insolvency in fact, no defense. Id., 412; 38 C. 76. Declaration. Id. Defense of offer of payment by note. Id., 77. Complaint held insufficient to show statutory fraud. 41 C. 241. Cited. Id., 301. Defendant held liable for refusing to disclose to officer the names of his debtors. 46 C. 270. A preconceived design not to pay for goods bought on credit is not essential to constitute fraud. 55 C. 277. Complaint charging a violation of the statute, and on which defendant's body has been attached, cannot be amended by adding count in contract; 63 C. 370; 105 C. 679; nor is another action pending seeking recovery for same debt under common counts a ground for abatement. Id., 683. Refusal to find fraud held warranted on writ of error. 108 C. 94. History of statutes concerning body attachments and executions. 111 C. 229. Cited. 114 C. 53; 134 C. 207. Requires that fraudulent acts be specifically set up in complaint. Evidence held to sustain ruling of not guilty of fraud. 136 C. 222.

      Cited. 12 CS 106. Not enough to prove a debt under this section; fraud must also be proved. 16 CS 158. Cited. 35 CS 130.

      Sec. 52-563. Liability for waste by tenant for life or years. Any person who, having no greater interest in real property than an estate for years, or for life, created by the act of the parties and not by the act of the law, commits waste upon the premises, beyond what tenants for years or life created by operation of law may do, shall be liable to the party injured in an action on this section, unless he was expressly authorized, by the contract under which the interest is created, to do the acts complained of.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8304; P.A. 82-160, S. 232.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 replaced "estate" with "property" and made a minor technical change.

      If tenant for life cuts fruit trees, it is waste. 24 C. 357. An estate created by devise is within this statute. Id., 356. Whether tenant of life estate created by will is liable for waste depends upon terms of will. 45 C. 527. Mortgagee not liable for waste. 46 C. 213. Waste by one having dower interest. 84 C. 202. Life tenant may be liable under the section to pay damages to owner for either voluntary or permissive waste before the termination of the tenancy. 220 C. 170.

      Term "waste" relates to real estate and does not relate to personalty. 5 CS 502.

      Sec. 52-563a. Transferred to Chapter 827, Sec. 47-121.

      Sec. 52-564. Treble damages for theft. Any person who steals any property of another, or knowingly receives and conceals stolen property, shall pay the owner treble his damages.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8305; 1963, P.A. 99.)

      History: 1963 act provided recovery be treble damages rather than treble the value of the property stolen.

      See Sec. 53-202 re machine guns.

      See chapter 952, part X, re larceny, robbery and related offenses, generally.

      In a public prosecution for theft, the court will not on conviction award treble damages to the owner. 6 C. 105. Plaintiff not bound to prove his case "beyond a reasonable doubt". 30 C. 103. Rules of evidence are the same as in any civil suit. Id., 556. This is not a penal statute. 74 C. 135; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Statutory treble damages discussed. 188 C. 36. Cited. 206 C. 125. Cited. 216 C. 200. Cited. 236 C. 582. Cited. 241 C. 678. Statutory theft under section is synonymous with larceny as provided in Sec. 53a-119. 255 C. 20. Statutory theft requires that defendant wrongfully take, obtain or hold property of another. Id.

      Cited. 1 CA 303. Cited. 8 CA 96. Cited. 11 CA 161. Cited. 18 CA 20. Cited. 33 CA 303. Cited. 37 CA 7. Cited. 42 CA 599. Cited. 43 CA 1. Cited. 45 CA 46; Id., 324. Statute synonymous with larceny under Sec. 53a-119. 47 CA 517. Liability for conversion is a precondition to finding of liability for treble damages under section. 86 CA 527.

      Sec. 52-564a. Liability for shoplifting. (a) Any person eighteen years of age or older or an emancipated minor who takes possession of goods or merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any mercantile establishment, or who takes from any real property any agricultural produce kept, grown or raised on the property for purposes of sale, without the consent of the owner and with the intention of converting such goods, merchandise or produce to his own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, or who alters the price indicia of such goods or merchandise, shall be liable in a civil action to the owner of the goods, merchandise or produce for (1) the actual and reasonable costs of maintaining the action, including court costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, (2) the retail value of the goods, merchandise or produce taken, if not recovered by the time of the commencement of the action or if recovered in an unmerchantable condition, and (3) punitive damages in an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars.

      (b) A conviction of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-119, shall not be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a civil action under this section.

      (c) In any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, if the plaintiff does not prevail, the court may award to the defendant his costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and damages not to exceed three hundred dollars.

      (d) No action shall be brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section but within two years from the date of the act complained of.

      (P.A. 90-197; 90-282, S. 5.)

      History: P.A. 90-282 added Subsec. (d) to impose two-year deadline for bringing action.

      Sec. 52-565. Double damages for forgery. Any person who falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits any document, or knowingly utters, as true, any document falsely made, altered, forged or counterfeited, shall pay double damages to any party injured thereby.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8306.)

      See Secs. 53a-137 to 53a-140, inclusive, re forgery.

      Not a penal statute. 1 D. 100; 74 C. 136; 87 C. 468. Is constitutional. 82 C. 5. Cited. 205 C. 93. Cited. 236 C. 582.

      Cited. 11 CA 161. Cited. 41 CA 659. Cited. 43 CA 1.

      An agent may commit forgery by making or signing an instrument in disobedience of his instructions or by exceeding his authority. 24 CS 498.

      Sec. 52-565a. Liability of drawer for dishonored check. Service charge on drawer for dishonored check. (a) A drawer negotiating a check who knows or should know that payment of such check will be refused by the drawee bank either because the drawer has no account with such bank or because the drawer has insufficient funds on deposit with such bank shall be liable to the payee for damages, in addition to the face amount of the check, provided the payee has presented such check for payment, the check is dishonored and the drawer fails to pay the face amount of such check within thirty days following the date of mailing by the payee of the written demand for payment as provided in subsection (f) of this section.

      (b) In the case of a drawer negotiating a check who knows or should know that payment of such check will be refused by the drawee bank because the drawer has no account with such bank, such damages shall be in an amount to be determined by the court in light of the circumstances, but in no event shall such amount be greater than the face amount of the check or seven hundred fifty dollars, whichever is less.

      (c) In the case of a drawer negotiating a check who knows or should know that payment of such check will be refused by the drawee bank because the drawer has insufficient funds on deposit with such bank, such damages shall be in an amount to be determined by the court in light of the circumstances, but in no event shall such amount be greater than the face amount of the check or four hundred dollars, whichever is less.

      (d) The drawer shall not be liable to the payee for the damages provided for by this section if: (1) The drawer gave such check as payment for residential service supplied by a gas, electric, steam, telephone or water utility; (2) the drawer gave such check as payment for the rental of residential premises; or (3) the drawer gave such check as repayment of all, or a portion of, a debt secured by collateral which the payee has repossessed.

      (e) The damages provided for in this section shall be available only to those persons or entities which post or otherwise give conspicuous notice to the public of the damages which may be imposed pursuant to this section. Such notice shall set forth: (1) The damages that may be imposed if a check is dishonored; (2) the section of the general statutes authorizing imposition of such damages; and (3) that criminal penalties also may apply.

      (f) The written demand for payment on the dishonored check shall be in the form prescribed by subsection (g) of this section and shall be sent to the drawer's last-known residence address or last-known place of business (1) by first class mail and certified mail return receipt requested with delivery restricted to the drawer, or (2) by first class mail or regular mail supported by an affidavit of service by mail. Such written demand for payment shall be sent on or after the date the payee received notice that such check had been dishonored. Such affidavit of service by mail shall provide substantially as follows:

...., being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states that he/she is of legal age and that on (date) ...., 20.., he/she served the attached Written Demand for Payment, by placing a true and correct copy thereof securely enclosed in an envelope addressed as follows:
....
....
....
....
and deposited the same, with postage prepaid, in the United States mails at ....,.... .

....

(Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this .... day of ...., 20.. .

....
Notary Public
.... County, ....

(SEAL)

      Sec. 52-566. Treble damages for wilful removal or destruc