CHAPTER 900*
COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

      Sec. 52-185. Bond or recognizance for prosecution. (a) If the plaintiff in any civil action is not an inhabitant of this state, or if it does not appear to the authority signing the process that the plaintiff is able to pay the costs of the action should judgment be rendered against him, the plaintiff shall enter into a recognizance to the adverse party with a financially responsible inhabitant of this state as surety, or a financially responsible inhabitant of this state shall enter into a recognizance to the adverse party, that the plaintiff shall prosecute his action to effect and answer all costs for which judgment is rendered against him. The recognizance shall not be discharged by any amendment or alteration of the process between the time of signing and of serving it.

      (b) The recognizance may be taken in the following form:

      You, C.S., as principal, and E.C., as surety, acknowledge yourselves jointly and severally bound to J.L., in a recognizance (or, as the case may be, You, E.C., acknowledge yourself bound to J.L., in a recognizance) of .... dollars, that C.S. shall prosecute the action which he has now commenced against J.L. at the Superior court to be held at H. in and for the judicial district of H., on the .... Tuesday of ...., 20.. to full effect, and that he shall pay any costs for which judgment may be rendered against him thereon.

      Taken and acknowledged at H. on the .... day of ...., 20.., before me, J.W., Commissioner of the Superior Court.

      (c) If a bond or recognizance is required on any writ of summons or attachment, it may be noted in the writ in the following manner:

      E.C. of .... is recognized in $.... to prosecute, etc. (or words to that effect).

      (d) If there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of this section, or if the authority signing a writ has failed to certify in accordance with any statute or rule that he has personal knowledge as to the financial responsibility of the plaintiff and deems it sufficient, the validity of the writ and service shall not be affected unless the failure is made a ground of a plea in abatement. If such plea in abatement is filed and sustained or if the plaintiff voluntarily elects to cure the defect by filing a bond, the court shall direct the plaintiff to file a bond to prosecute in the usual amount. Upon the filing of the bond, the case shall proceed in the same manner and to the same effect as to rights of attachment and in all other respects as though the failure had not occurred. The court may, in its discretion, order, as a condition to the acceptance of the bond, that the plaintiff pay to the defendant costs not to exceed the costs in full to the date of the order.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7931; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 43; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 82-160, S. 86; P.A. 05-152, S. 6.)

      History: 1961 act deleted obsolete provision for actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 78-280 substituted "judicial district" for "county" where appearing; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; (Revisor's note: In 2001 the references in Subsec. (b) of this section to the date "19.." were changed editorially by the Revisors to "20.." to reflect the new millennium); P.A. 05-152 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision requiring plaintiff to enter into recognizance before the process is signed.

      The person serving the writ may give bond. 1 R. 356. Liability of bondsman continues until final termination of the litigation. 7 C. 435. Death of plaintiff discharges bond. 9 C. 238. Liability of surety on bond. 14 C. 329; 30 C. 143, 144. The want of a bond is only matter of abatement. 16 C. 574. Bond may be written out in full after suit is brought upon it. 48 C. 381. Is in itself a complete record, imports verity and is conclusive evidence of its own truth. Id., 380; 28 C. 534. If nonresident plaintiff fails to give bond, the defect cannot be made good by bond afterward given in court. 51 C. 327. Ordinary bond for costs not required where replevin bond is given. 54 C. 48. Bond for costs not essential on application for an alternative writ of mandamus. 67 C. 365, 366. Failure to give bond waived by appearance. Id. Bond of surety company may be accepted. 70 C. 558. The bondsman's undertaking is that of surety, although the plaintiff is not formally joined as principal. Id., 559, 560. Bond of $140 to answer all damages, etc., held sufficient. 73 C. 541. Memorandum de bond at foot of injunction writ, held a compliance with the statute. Id. Mistake in memo. 74 C. 170. Of practice in general; applies to writ of error. 75 C. 652. Effect of noting bond under this section. Id. Taking is ministerial act. 77 C. 184. Discretion of court as to amount. 82 C. 1. Statute applies to mandamus, when. 90 C. 639; 91 C. 114. Temporary residence in another state does not make one a nonresident. 92 C. 345. Statute applies only to process in actions in which costs are taxable; not to habeas corpus. 113 C. 739. Cited. Id., 772. Cited. 166 C. 174. Cited. 173 C. 408. Cited. 191 C. 201.

      History and review of section. 3 CS 434. Recognizance or certificate of financial responsibility is a condition precedent to the validity of the writ. 4 CS 279. Cited. 6 CS 156. Applicability in divorce actions. 7 CS 88. Cited. 8 CS 398. Meaning of "substantial" discussed. 13 CS 13. Cited. Id., 441. Court cannot waive bond even in the case of an indigent plaintiff. 36 CS 37.

      Where addresses of two of three plaintiffs were lacking, but subscribing authority certified as to plaintiff's financial responsibility, plea in abatement by defendant upon grounds the two plaintiffs might be nonresidents was overruled. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 235.

      Sec. 52-186. Court may order bond. (a) If a court finds that any bond taken for prosecution in a pending action, or on appeal, is insufficient, or that the plaintiff has not given a bond for prosecution and is not able to pay the costs, it shall order a sufficient bond to be given before trial, unless the trial will thereby necessarily be delayed. In determining the sufficiency of the bond to be given, the court shall consider only the taxable costs which the plaintiff may be responsible for under section 52-257, except that in no event shall the court consider the fees or charges of expert witnesses notwithstanding that such fees or charges may be allowable under said section.

      (b) Any party failing to comply with an order of the court to give a sufficient bond may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.

      (c) Bonds for the prosecution of any civil action or appeal, pending in any court, may be taken when the court is not in session by its clerk.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7932; P.A. 82-160, S. 87; P.A. 91-158.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 91-158 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision limiting the costs which the court may consider in determining the sufficiency of the bond.

      Amount of bond is in court's discretion. 82 C. 1. Clerk may take bond for appeal, where that has been general practice of court. 84 C. 461. Cited. 113 C. 772. Cited. 131 C. 658. Bond furnished no security to one of the adverse parties, held case is not one of a bond which is merely "insufficient". 147 C. 722.

      Burden of proof is on party moving for such bond. 13 CS 13. Court cannot waive bond even in the case of an indigent person. 36 CS 37. Cited. Id., 37.

      Sec. 52-187. Member of community defending to give bond. If, in any action against a community, any individual member of the community appears to defend, he shall procure bond with surety to the acceptance of the court in which the action is pending to save the community harmless from all costs which may arise by reason of the appearance. The bond shall be payable to the community and be filed in the court. If the individual member successfully defends against the action, he shall be entitled to the costs recoverable from the plaintiff unless the community also appeared and incurred the costs of the defense.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7934; P.A. 82-160, S. 88.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Any inhabitant of a town can appear to defend in an action against it. 19 C. 331; 81 C. 235. Bond not required when a party aggrieved remonstrates against acceptance of report of committee on highway petition. 27 C. 424. Property of an inhabitant of a town may be taken on execution against it. 121 U.S. 121.

      Sec. 52-188. Court may order bond by nonresident defendant in realty action. Any nonresident defendant in any civil action relating to real property or any interest therein, if any relief other than money damages is claimed, may be ordered by the court, during the pendency of the action, to give such bond to such other party or parties to the action as the court may direct, conditioned for the payment of costs. Judgment as on default may be rendered against any defendant who fails to comply with such order.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7995; P.A. 82-160, S. 89.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Sec. 52-189. Surety company bond acceptable. Any surety company chartered by this state or authorized to do business herein may be accepted as surety or recognizor upon any bond or recognizance required by law in any civil action or in any proceeding instituted under the statutes of this state. In any action where a bond or recognizance is by law required, the bond of the company, duly executed and conditioned for the performance of the obligations expressed in the bond or recognizance, may be accepted by the person having authority thereto, and shall be filed by him in the court to which the action or proceeding is returnable or pending.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7935; P.A. 82-160, S. 90.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      It seems that bonds of surety companies for costs were lawful before this statute. 70 C. 558. Rule of construction favoring surety does not extend to surety company. 78 C. 702; 109 C. 266.

      Sec. 52-190. Action on probate bond. Endorsement of writ. (a) The writ in any action brought upon a probate bond, or bond taken to a judge of probate and his successors in office, shall be abatable unless, before its issue, a financially responsible inhabitant of the state signs a written endorsement upon it, substantially as follows: "I agree to be responsible for the costs of this action." The endorser shall be liable for the costs of the action in case of judgment for the defendant, and the judgment shall be rendered against the endorser and not against the plaintiff.

      (b) If the endorser dies or removes from this state, a new endorser on the writ shall be substituted. The court before which the action is pending may at any time order the substitution of a new endorser, to be approved by it, who shall endorse the writ and be liable for the costs from the commencement of the action in the same manner as the original endorser. For any failure to comply with such an order the plaintiff may be nonsuited.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7933; P.A. 82-160, S. 91.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      See Sec. 45a-144 re action on probate bond by aggrieved person.

      See Sec. 52-74 re action on foreign probate bond.

      See Sec. 52-117 re pleading in action on probate bond.

      Cited. 63 C. 569.

      Sec. 52-190a. Prior reasonable inquiry and certificate of good faith required in negligence action against health care provider. (a) No civil action or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint, initial pleading or apportionment complaint shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action or apportionment complaint that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant or for an apportionment complaint against each named apportionment defendant. To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's attorney, and any apportionment complainant or the apportionment complainant's attorney, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c, which similar health care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. Such written opinion shall not be subject to discovery by any party except for questioning the validity of the certificate. The claimant or the claimant's attorney, and any apportionment complainant or apportionment complainant's attorney, shall retain the original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate. The similar health care provider who provides such written opinion shall not, without a showing of malice, be personally liable for any damages to the defendant health care provider by reason of having provided such written opinion. In addition to such written opinion, the court may consider other factors with regard to the existence of good faith. If the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that such certificate was not made in good faith and that no justiciable issue was presented against a health care provider that fully cooperated in providing informal discovery, the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may also submit the matter to the appropriate authority for disciplinary review of the attorney if the claimant's attorney or the apportionment complainant's attorney submitted the certificate.

      (b) Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the action will be filed, an automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable inquiry required by subsection (a) of this section. This period shall be in addition to other tolling periods.

      (c) The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 12; P.A. 87-227, S. 9; P.A. 03-202, S. 14; P.A. 05-275, S. 2.)

      History: P.A. 87-227 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision that "No action, accruing on or after October 1, 1986, shall be filed to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death" with "No civil action shall be filed to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987"; P.A. 03-202 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision re form prescribed by rules of the superior court and making technical changes; P.A. 05-275 amended Subsec. (a) to make provisions applicable to an apportionment complaint and the filing thereof, require the opinion of the similar health care provider to be signed and include a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion, require the claimant or the claimant's attorney and any apportionment complainant or apportionment complainant's attorney to retain the original written opinion and attach a copy of such written opinion, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged, to such certificate and provide that such similar health care provider shall not, without a showing of malice, be personally liable by reason of having provided such written opinion and added new Subsec. (c) to provide that the failure to obtain and file the written opinion shall be grounds for dismissal of the action, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions filed on or after that date.

      P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1. Good faith certificate is not jurisdictional. 215 C. 701. Cited. 236 C. 681. Cited. 242 C. 1. In workers compensation case where city sought to intervene in employee's negligence action against physician, the city as a would-be intervenor was not required to file a good faith certificate where employee had filed such a certificate and the city asserted no additional claims. 253 C. 429. Applies only to civil actions to recover damages and does not apply to apportionment complaints under Sec. 52-102b which seek only apportionment of liability. 269 C. 10.

      Cited. 26 CA 497. Cited. 33 CA 378. Cited. 37 CA 105. Fall by person dependent on a wheelchair while transferring from wheelchair to an exercise mat at physical therapy facility during scheduled session, where transfers were a stated goal of therapy, is medical malpractice. 61 CA 353.

      Cited. 41 CS 169.

      Subsec. (b):

      Ninety-day extension provided in subsec. applies equally to both the two-year statute of limitation and three-year statute of repose in Sec. 52-584. 269 C. 787.

      Cited. 43 CA 397.

      Sec. 52-190b. Designation of negligence action against health care provider as complex litigation case. Not later than six months after the filing of an action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, the court shall schedule a conference of the parties at which the court shall determine whether to recommend to the Chief Court Administrator, or the Chief Court Administrator's designee, that the action be designated as a complex litigation case and be transferred to the complex litigation docket. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any party or a judge from, at any time, requesting the Chief Court Administrator, or the Chief Court Administrator's designee, to designate such action as a complex litigation case and transfer such action to the complex litigation docket.

      (P.A. 05-275, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 05-275 effective July 13, 2005.

      Sec. 52-191. Precedence of actions in favor of the state. All civil actions brought by or on behalf of the state, including informations on the relation of a private individual, shall have precedence over all other civil actions in respect to the order of trial, except actions upon probate bonds.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7945; P.A. 82-160, S. 92.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      Sec. 52-191a. Precedence of certain actions involving zoning ordinances and regulations. Any civil action wherein one of the issues is the interpretation of a zoning ordinance or regulation that is the basis of a pending criminal prosecution under section 8-12 shall be privileged in assignment for trial.

      (February, 1965, P.A. 109, S. 2.)

      Sec. 52-191b. Precedence of proceedings involving planning commissions. Any legal proceeding to which any municipal planning commission is a party shall be considered a privileged matter with respect to the order of trial.

      (1971, P.A. 274.)

      Sec. 52-191c. Precedence of actions involving terminally ill persons. (a) Any civil action to which a terminally ill person is a party shall be privileged in assignment for trial. For the purpose of this section, "terminally ill" means in the final stage of an incurable or irreversible medical condition which will result in death within a relatively short time, in the opinion of the attending physician.

      (b) The judges of the Superior Court may, in accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, adopt rules for the precedence of actions pursuant to this section.

      (P.A. 98-54.)

      Sec. 52-192. Precedence of other cases in order of trial. Any objections made to the acceptance of the report of a committee or auditor, or award of an arbitrator, shall be heard and determined promptly and without delay after return of the report or award, unless a continuance is granted for cause. Appeals from probate and from the actions of commissioners appointed by courts of probate, actions brought by or against executors or administrators of estates, actions brought by or against conservators of the estates of incapable persons, actions brought by or against guardians of the estates of minors, actions brought by receivers of insolvent corporations by order of the court by which such receivers were appointed, actions brought by or against any person sixty-five years of age or older or who reaches the age of sixty-five during the pendency of the action, actions in which a party has been ordered to post security with the Department of Motor Vehicles or has posted security with the Department of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to the requirements of section 14-117, appeals from any action of the Commissioner of Environmental Protection in accordance with section 25-17, appeals under the provisions of section 14-57, partitions and foreclosure cases, including cases in which a bond has been substituted for a mechanic's lien, shall have precedence over all other civil actions in respect to the order of trial, except as provided in section 52-191.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7946; 1957, P.A. 78, S. 1; March, 1958, P.A. 14, S. 2; 1959, P.A. 102; 1961, P.A. 329; 509, S. 1; 1963, P.A. 162; 1967, P.A. 819; 1971, P.A. 872, S. 156; P.A. 82-160, S. 93; P.A. 92-118, S. 8.)

      History: 1959 act added partitions and foreclosures; 1961 acts added appeals under section 14-57; 1963 act added cases where bond has been substituted for mechanic's lien; 1967 act added actions where party has been ordered to or has posted security with motor vehicle department; 1971 act replaced water resources commission with commissioner of environmental protection; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 92-118 added provision re precedence in order of trial for actions brought by or against executors or administrators of estates, conservators of estates of incapable persons and guardians of the estates of minors; (Revisor's note: In 1997 references to "Motor Vehicle Department" were changed editorially by the Revisors to "Department of Motor Vehicles" for consistency with customary statutory usage).

      See Sec. 49-39 re privileged status of action to foreclose a mechanics' lien with respect to order of trial.

      Cited. 63 C. 307. Cited. 179 C. 415. Cited. 229 C. 634. Cited. 230 C. 828.

      Privilege given to "persons" over sixty-five years of age does not extend to corporate entities in existence over sixty-five years. Legislative intent construed. 22 CS 156.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 26 CA 322. Cited. 44 CA 154.

      Sec. 52-192a. Offer of compromise by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Amount and computation of interest. (a) After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of compromise to the defendant's attorney or, if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, to the defendant himself or herself. Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of the offer of compromise and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the defendant or the defendant's attorney may file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of the offer of compromise agreeing to settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise. Upon such filing and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly. If the offer of compromise is not accepted within thirty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court, the offer of compromise shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled. Any such offer of compromise and any acceptance of the offer of compromise shall be included by the clerk in the record of the case.

      (b) In the case of any action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, an offer of compromise pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall state with specificity all damages then known to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney upon which the action is based. At least sixty days prior to filing such an offer, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney shall provide the defendant or the defendant's attorney with an authorization to disclose medical records that meets the privacy provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191) (HIPAA), as amended from time to time, or regulations adopted thereunder, and disclose any and all expert witnesses who will testify as to the prevailing professional standard of care. The plaintiff shall file with the court a certification that the plaintiff has provided each defendant or such defendant's attorney with all documentation supporting such damages.

      (c) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an offer of compromise which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain specified in the plaintiff's offer of compromise, the court shall add to the amount so recovered eight per cent annual interest on said amount. The interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action was filed with the court if the offer of compromise was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint, the interest shall be computed from the date the offer of compromise was filed. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render judgment accordingly. This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.

      (P.A. 76-316, S. 2; P.A. 77-269, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-60; 79-250, S. 1; P.A. 81-315, S. 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 94; 82-228; P.A. 83-295, S. 9; P.A. 92-110, S. 1; P.A. 94-20; P.A. 01-71, S. 1; P.A. 05-275, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 77-269 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that provisions apply to "all claims, except claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976" rather than to claims "accruing after October 1, 1976"; P.A. 79-60 raised annual interest on offer of judgment from six to twelve per cent in Subsec. (b); P.A. 79-250 authorized court to award attorney's fees not exceeding three hundred and fifty dollars and specified that provisions do not abrogate contractual rights concerning recovery of attorney's fees in Subsec. (b); P.A. 81-315 amended provisions in Subsec. (b) concerning computation of interest on judgments in actions commenced on or after October 1, 1981; P.A. 82-160 made minor technical changes to Subsecs. (a) and (b) and deleted Subsec. (c) which had provided "This section shall apply to all claims, except claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976"; P.A. 82-228 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the provision allowing a plaintiff to file a new offer of judgment after rejection and to continue to file offers up until trial, and amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on the amount of the verdict rather than on the amount "contained in such offer" and by deleting a provision concerning what constituted the largest offer of judgment for purposes of computing interest; P.A. 83-295 amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on and added to the "amount so recovered" rather than the "verdict"; P.A. 92-110 amended Subsec. (a) to authorize a plaintiff to file an offer of judgment in any civil action "seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought" rather than in any civil action "for the recovery of money only"; P.A. 94-20 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to be accepted prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court; P.A. 01-71 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to be filed not later than thirty days before trial and increase from thirty to sixty days the time period for filing an acceptance of the offer of judgment and made technical changes throughout section for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 05-275 replaced "offer of judgment" and "offer of settlement" with "offer of compromise" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the offer of compromise may be filed "not earlier than one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action", delete provision that the plaintiff is offering "to stipulate to a judgment", decrease from sixty days to thirty days the time period for the defendant to accept the offer, provide that when a defendant accepts an offer the defendant is agreeing "to settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain stated in the plaintiff's offer of compromise" rather than "agreeing to a stipulation for judgment as contained in plaintiff's offer of judgment" and replace "Upon such filing, the clerk shall enter judgment immediately on the stipulation" with "Upon such filing and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly", added new Subsec. (b) re requirements for the filing of an offer of compromise in an action to recover damages for an injury or death resulting from the negligence of a health care provider, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c) and amended said Subsec. to decrease the rate of annual interest from twelve per cent to eight per cent and delete obsolete provision re computation of interest in actions commenced before October 1, 1981, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      In the context of the statute, reference to "verdict" incorporates a recovery awarded by the court. Prejudgment and postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity not expressly waived. 205 C. 542. Cited. 206 C. 100. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 648. Cited. 225 C. 146. Cited. 227 C. 914. Cited. 228 C. 206. Cited. 229 C. 525. Cited. 231 C. 745. Cited. 234 C. 169. Cited. 239 C. 144; Id., 708; Id., 769; Id., 802. Cited. 240 C. 49; Id., 287; Id., 799. Cited. 241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect on this section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314.

      Cited. 3 CA 111; Id., 570. Cited. 8 CA 254. Cited. 13 CA 712. Cited. 21 CA 366; Id., 549. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court "will not permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff's offer of judgment merely because his contract obligations were made in another state." 22 CA 640. Cited. 25 CA 67. Cited. 26 CA 231; Id., 322. Cited. 30 CA 664. Cited. 31 CA 806. Cited. 32 CA 118. Cited. 33 CA 662; Id., 842. Cited. 35 CA 504. Cited. 36 CA 653. Cited. 38 CA 685. Cited. 42 CA 239; Id., 712. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 154. Cited. 45 CA 165; Id., 543. Cited. 46 CA 37. Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA 100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419. Claim that court improperly awarded plaintiff interest pursuant to offer of judgment statute could not be properly reviewed because defendant failed to file motion for articulation seeking an explanation from the court as to basis for finding that renewed offer of judgment was still valid. 96 CA 294.

      Subsec. (a):

      Although the required attorney's signature on an offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney's law partner with attorney's permission, the document is in substantial compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 188 C. 213. Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1.

      Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney's fees. 47 CA 517. Calculation of interest under subsec. discussed. 88 CA 459.

      Sec. 52-192b. Offers of judgment. Applicability. Sections 52-192a to 52-195, inclusive, of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2005, shall be applicable to any cause of action accruing prior to October 1, 2005.

      (P.A. 06-40, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 06-40 effective May 8, 2006.

      Sec. 52-193. Offer of compromise by defendant. In any action on contract, or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the defendant may, not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise signed by the defendant or the defendant's attorney, directed to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7942; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 175; P.A. 92-110, S. 2; P.A. 01-71, S. 2; P.A. 05-275, S. 5.)

      History: 1959 act deleted reference to actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 92-110 authorized the defendant to file an offer of judgment in any action "seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought" rather than in any action "for the recovery of money only"; P.A. 01-71 required an offer of judgment to be filed not later than thirty days before trial and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 05-275 authorized the filing of "a written offer of compromise" that would offer "to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain" rather than "a written notice" that would offer "to allow the plaintiff to take judgment for the sum named in such notice", effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      Not applicable to foreclosure suits. 27 C. 146. Statute construed. 33 C. 217. Cited. 163 C. 445. Cited. 192 C. 301. Cited. 239 C. 708.

      Cited. 17 CA 219.

      Cited. 10 CS 166.

      Sec. 52-194. Acceptance of defendant's offer of compromise. In any action, the plaintiff may, within sixty days after being notified by the defendant of the filing of an offer of compromise, file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of the offer signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney agreeing to settle the underlying action for the sum certain specified in the defendant's offer of compromise. Upon the filing of the written acceptance and receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk of the court and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly. No trial may be postponed because the period within which the plaintiff may accept the offer has not expired, except at the discretion of the court.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7943; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 95; P.A. 05-275, S. 6.)

      History: 1959 act deleted provisions for actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 05-275 increased from ten days to sixty days the time period for acceptance of the offer, replaced "offer of judgment" with "offer of compromise", provided that by filing the acceptance the plaintiff was "agreeing to settle the underlying action for the sum certain specified in the defendant's offer of compromise" and replaced "Upon the filing of the written acceptance, the court shall render judgment against the defendant as upon default for the sum so named and for the costs accrued at the time of the defendant's giving the plaintiff notice of the offer" with "Upon the filing of the written acceptance and receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk of the court and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly", effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      See note to Sec. 52-193.

      Cited. 163 C. 445. Cited. 239 C. 708. Language of section unambiguously provides that written acceptance of a party's offer of judgment against defendant must result in court's rendering judgment against defendant. 258 C. 299.

      Cited. 10 CS 166.

      Sec. 52-195. Effect of failure to accept defendant's offer of compromise. (a) If the plaintiff does not, within the time allowed for acceptance of the offer of compromise and before the commencement of the trial, file the plaintiff's notice of acceptance, the offer shall be deemed to be withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence.

      (b) Unless the plaintiff recovers more than the sum specified in the offer of compromise, with interest from its date, the plaintiff shall recover no costs accruing after the plaintiff received notice of the filing of such offer, but shall pay the defendant's costs accruing after the plaintiff received notice. Such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars.

      (c) This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action. The provisions of this section shall not apply to cases in which nominal damages have been assessed upon a hearing after a default or after a demurrer has been overruled.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7944; P.A. 79-250, S. 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 96; P.A. 05-275, S. 7.)

      History: P.A. 79-250 specified that costs may include attorney's fees not exceeding three hundred fifty dollars and that provisions do not abrogate contractual rights re recovery of attorney's fees; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 05-275 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to replace "offer of judgment" with "offer of compromise" where appearing and make technical changes, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date.

      See note to Sec. 52-193.

      Cited. 163 C. 445. The phrase which states "such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees" modifies only the term "defendants costs" in the immediately preceding clause of the statute. 188 C. 213. Cited. 239 C. 708. Plaintiff must establish all of the elements of a negligence claim, including causation and actual injury, in order to recover and, therefore, the technical legal injury concept does not apply to a negligence action. 277 C. 364.

      Cited. 8 CA 254.

      Cited. 10 CS 166. Reasonableness of offer of judgment discussed. 39 CS 467.

      Sec. 52-195a. (Formerly Sec. 52-256). Unliquidated damages; tender. Any party upon whom a claim for unliquidated damages is made may tender to the claimant a sum of money in payment thereof, which tender may be pleaded and in all respects be as effectual as a tender in case of a claim for debt.

      (1949 Rev., S. 8002.)

      History: Sec. 52-256 transferred to Sec. 52-195a in 1983.

      Annotations to former section 52-256:

      General issue and tender repugnant; costs. 67 C. 74. Waiver of defects in tender; Id., 585; 76 C. 705. Tender bars costs. 80 C. 233; 87 C. 158. Not now necessary to pay money into court. Id., 157. Tender of money due on contract excused where other party cannot perform. 88 C. 64.

      Sec. 52-195b. Referral of civil action involving motor vehicle to alternative dispute resolution program. Expedited process case. Privileged case. (a) In any civil action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a private passenger motor vehicle the parties may agree to refer the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution program. Such referral shall be made within sixty days of the return date. The duration of the referral shall not exceed ninety days unless the court, for good cause shown, extends the time period. The court shall stay the time periods within which all further pleadings, motions, requests, discovery and other procedures must be filed or undertaken until (1) such time as the alternative dispute resolution process is completed or (2) the time period set by the court for the referral has elapsed, whichever occurs first.

      (b) (1) If the alternative dispute resolution process does not result in a resolution of the dispute, the parties shall report the lack of resolution to the court promptly but in no event later than five days after the expiration of the stay provided in subsection (a) of this section.

      (2) Any such action wherein each plaintiff has limited his own claim, exclusive of interest and costs, to a maximum of seventy-five thousand dollars may, with the consent of all parties, be brought as an expedited process case in accordance with section 51-15 and shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.

      (3) Any such action wherein at least one plaintiff has not limited his own claim, exclusive of interest and costs, to a maximum of seventy-five thousand dollars, shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.

      (c) If an agreement is reached between the parties on any issues, the neutral party shall report such agreement to the court and the parties shall seek the entry of an appropriate order from the court.

      (d) If the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution program consisting of binding arbitration, the parties shall report to the court upon completion of such arbitration. The arbitration award may be confirmed in the same manner as any other arbitration award as provided in chapter 909.

      (e) The alternative dispute resolution process under this section shall be deemed to be settlement negotiations for evidentiary and confidentiality purposes.

      (P.A. 93-297, S. 3, 29.)

      History: P.A. 93-297 effective January 1, 1994.

      Sec. 52-195c. Time period for payment of settlement amount. (a) When an action to recover damages has been settled, any settling defendant shall tender all sums due from such settling defendant to any settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent not later than thirty days after receipt by the person or office designated in writing to the settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent by the settling defendant at the time of settlement of a duly executed release and a withdrawal discontinuing any court action, if any such action is pending, that are tendered by such settling plaintiff or plaintiff's agent and are executed by or on behalf of the settling plaintiff. If no such person or office is so designated, a settling plaintiff may tender such settlement documents to the settling defendant's attorney or the representative of the settling defendant's insurer with whom the settlement agreement was reached and such settling defendant shall tender all sums due from such settling defendant to any settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent not later than thirty days after receipt of such settlement documents by the settling defendant's attorney or the representative of the settling defendant's insurer.

      (b) In an action that requires judicial approval of the settlement, the plaintiff shall also tender a copy of the order of the Probate Court or other order approving such settlement with the duly executed release and withdrawal discontinuing any pending court action executed on behalf of the plaintiff.

      (c) In the event that a settling defendant or insurer fails to promptly tender all sums as required by subsection (a) of this section, a default judgment shall be entered by the court on behalf of any unpaid plaintiff against such defendant twenty days after such plaintiff files a motion for a default judgment with the court and serves such motion upon the representative of the insurer with whom the settlement was reached or the defendant with whom the settlement was reached. Such motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney setting forth the terms of such settlement with supporting documentation attached.

      (d) Any insurer or defendant with whom the settlement was reached that fails to tender settlement proceeds within the time limit set forth in this section shall be liable for interest at a rate of twelve per cent a year on the amount of such settlement proceeds computed from the date such time limit expired.

      (e) As used in this section, "tender" means either to personally deliver or cause to be delivered or to mail by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. An insurer or a defendant may otherwise prove tender by presenting evidence that the settlement sums due from such insurer or such defendant were received by the settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent.

      (P.A. 97-58, S. 3.)

      Sec. 52-196. Motion to continue or postpone. Whenever in any action pending in the Superior Court a motion for a postponement or continuance is made by either party and such motion is granted, the court may require the party making the same to pay to the adverse party such sum by way of indemnity as it deems reasonable.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7930; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 112; P.A. 74-183, S. 85, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 129, 681.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for city court; P.A. 74-183 removed actions pending in circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed actions pending in court of common pleas from purview of section reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978.

      Discretion of court to grant continuances. 69 C. 186; 75 C. 308; Id., 314; 78 C. 654; 79 C. 383; 81 C. 474; 92 C. 658; 100 C. 4. Informalities in adjournment of justice court from time to time waived if parties eventually appear and are heard. 104 C. 294. Where defendant's motion for mistrial was, in essence, one for continuance or postponement because of illness of necessary witness, trial court did not err in denying motion when not informed of the facts at the time. 157 C. 561.

      Sec. 52-197. Motion for disclosure. Rules. (a) In any civil action, the court, upon motion of either party, may order disclosure of facts or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents by any party thereto, material to the moving party's cause of action or defense, and within the knowledge, possession or power of the adverse party.

      (b) The judges of the Supreme Court shall make rules to carry out the provisions of this section.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7949; 1957, P.A. 651, S. 30; P.A. 82-160, S. 97.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      Discovery to be responsive to the motion. 20 C. 486. Cited. 59 C. 243; Id., 508. Applies only where the matter lies within the exclusive knowledge or possession of the adverse party. 61 C. 594; 90 C. 261. Statute simply designed to enable a court of law to exercise clearly defined powers of a court of equity. 61 C. 596. Cited. 63 C. 569. Form of motion. 77 C. 387. Right of court to compel production of documents on trial. 79 C. 121. Errors in action on demurrer to motion waived by replacing it with another. 90 C. 270. Denial of motion addressed to defense that would be unavailing is harmless. 91 C. 554. Where demurrer to complaint is sustained and plaintiff does not plead over, motion does not lie. 95 C. 301. Cited. 125 C. 9. Does not abrogate independent action for discovery in equity. 126 C. 386. A trial tests the court's ruling on a motion for disclosure for it then appears whether the mover was hampered in the preparation and presentation of his case by the denial of his motion. 147 C. 321. Party cannot assert lack of notice to produce or want of a subpoena duces tecum if, by his own testimony, either would have been futile. Id., 496. An answer to an interrogatory is not, without more, a judicial admission in the same sense as admissions in the pleadings or in open court. 148 C. 202. Relation to constitutional separation of powers. History (dissent). 166 C. 501. Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716. Cited. 230 C. 1.

      Cited. 4 CA 339. Cited. 14 CA 267.

      Motion to inspect a trolley car is not within the statute. 5 CS 161. Cited. Id., 291. An independent equitable action for discovery may be maintained notwithstanding this section. 7 CS 76. Cited. 8 CS 137; Id., 246. Cited. 9 CS 44. The facts desired by the defendant to be disclosed by the plaintiff must be material to the defendant's cause. 16 CS 54. Disclosure may be ordered as to any matter concerned solely with damages as well as to issues of liability. 17 CS 40. Cited. 19 CS 147. Disclosure of written statements of witnesses and defendants refused. 21 CS 165. Disclosure of whether there is liability insurance, and the amount and terms thereof, held not within the rules of disclosure. Id., 168, but see section 52-200a. Connecticut's disclosure rules are not as broad as the federal rules. Id., 170. Court refused request for pretrial disclosure of confidential corporate information required to establish damages before the right to obtain damages of any kind had been proved. Id. In a criminal case the accused cannot compel the prosecution to produce documents which he himself has made. Furthermore, facts sought to be disclosed must be shown to be exclusively within the knowledge of the state. 23 CS 41. Plaintiff alleging loss of earnings not required to produce copies of income tax returns. 25 CS 147. Cited. 26 CS 338. Cited. 28 CS 53. Discovery not available in appeal from administrative agency, when. 30 CS 299. Cited. 31 CS 129. Motion not allowed where an overwhelming volume of inquiry was proposed and the information was obtainable from other defendants. Id., 335. Discovery is available in summary process proceeding. 36 CS 47.

      Sec. 52-197a. Transferred to Chapter 368a, Sec. 19a-17b.

      Sec. 52-197b. Discovery outside country to be in accordance with treaty or convention or court order. (a) If an applicable treaty or convention including, but not limited to, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, provides for discovery outside the United States of America, the discovery methods agreed to in such treaty or convention shall be employed.

      (b) If an applicable treaty or convention renders discovery inadequate or inequitable but does not prohibit additional discovery, the Superior Court may, upon application, order additional discovery under such terms and conditions as the court deems just and equitable.

      (P.A. 91-324, S. 2.)

      Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Sec. 52-198. Disclosure; examination of officer of corporation. If a corporation is party to an action, the opposite party may examine the president, treasurer, secretary, clerk or any director or other officer thereof in the same manner as if he were a party to the suit.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7950.)

      Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Sec. 52-199. Questions which need not be answered. Self-incrimination. (a) In any hearing or trial, a party interrogated shall not be obliged to answer a question or produce a document the answering or producing of which would tend to incriminate him, or to disclose his title to any property if the title is not material to the hearing or trial.

      (b) The right to refuse to answer a question, produce a document or disclose a title may be claimed by the party interrogated or by counsel in his behalf.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7951; P.A. 82-160, S. 62.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      See Sec. 51-35 re witnesses' imprisonment for refusal to testify and protection against self-incrimination.

      See Sec. 54-84 re option of accused to testify or remain silent during trial.

      Answers to interrogatories did not expose defendant to self-degradation and self-incrimination. 137 C. 404. Privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      The term "any hearing or trial" includes the taking of a deposition. 31 CS 66. Cited. 32 CS 306.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 32 CA 811. Cited. 37 CA 456; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176.

      Sec. 52-200. Disclosure not conclusive. When either party in any action has obtained from the other party a disclosure on oath, respecting the matters alleged in any pleading, the disclosure shall not be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like any other testimony.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7952.)

      Cited. 186 C. 275. Cited. 194 C. 35. Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 228 C. 42. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Cited. 2 CA 523. Cited. 4 CA 641. Cited. 11 CA 518. Cited. 13 CA 725. Cited. 40 CA 449.

      Sec. 52-200a. Defendant's insurance liability policy limits and insurer's duty to indemnify subject to discovery. In any civil action founded upon negligence, both the defendant's insurance liability policy limits and whether or not the insurer has disclaimed its duty to indemnify shall be subject to discovery upon written motion of the plaintiff. Any such motion and disclosure shall be excluded from the file submitted to the jury.

      (1967, P.A. 485; P.A. 78-142.)

      History: P.A. 78-142 reworded provisions and made "whether or not the insurer has disclaimed its duty to indemnify" subject to discovery upon written motion of plaintiff.

      Cited. 212 C. 661. Cited. 229 C. 716.

      Statute is not unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial department. Public policy often requires legislation to facilitate administration of justice. 28 CS 32. Applies to pending cases at its enactment and is not unconstitutional infringement on judiciary rule making power. 29 CS 195.

      Sec. 52-201. Action on nonnegotiable instruments; defense. Assignment. Section 52-201 is repealed.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7953; 1959, P.A. 133, S. 10-102.)

      Sec. 52-202. Transferred to Chapter 925, Sec. 52-570a.

      Sec. 52-203. Demand for receipt not to vitiate a legal tender. The requirement or demand for a receipt for such amount of lawful money as may be offered or tendered on account, or in payment or in part payment of any indebtedness, shall not prevent such offer or tender from being regarded or held to be a legal tender.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7955.)

      Sec. 52-204. Recovery of expenditures by husband or parent. In any civil action arising out of personal injury or property damage, as a result of which personal injury or property damage the husband or parent of the plaintiff has made or will be compelled to make expenditures or has contracted indebtedness, the amount of such expenditures or indebtedness may be recovered by the plaintiff, provided a recovery by the plaintiff shall be a bar to any claim by such husband or parent, except in an action in which the husband or parent is a defendant.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7947; 1951, S. 3181d.)

      Cited. 117 C. 686. Damages due to incapacity of wife by reason of personal injury are recoverable by her and not her husband; but right to recover sums actually paid by husband because of her incapacity is in him. 125 C. 390. In absence of endorsement on writ by husband, wife may recover expenditures if it is not reasonably probable that husband would have to pay them but probable that she will be called upon to do so. 129 C. 361. When a minor child is injured by the negligent act of a third party, two independent causes of action spring into existence; first, the right of action by the child for personal injuries; second, a right of action by the parent for consequential damages. 147 C. 333. Cited. 153 C. 363. Cited. 165 C. 490. Cited. 200 C. 290.

      Husband must endorse his consent upon the complaint prior to service on defendant. 4 CS 147. Transfer by parent of his right of action for consequential damages has all the attributes of an assignment. 7 CS 480. Cited. 19 CS 480. Vicarious contributory negligence or concurring negligence of parent does not bar plaintiff's recovery of consequential damages. 28 CS 493. Wife may sue for husband's medical expenses for which she is legally liable. 32 CS 156.

      Sec. 52-205. Court may determine order in which issues shall be tried. In all cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may order that one or more of the issues joined be tried before the others.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7939.)

      Cited. 63 C. 560. When legal issues of fact should be determined by jury before court tries equitable issues. 98 C. 221. General claim for jury list does not secure jury trial of equitable issues of fact; special order necessary under section 52-218. 100 C. 248. The court may determine the issues on the cross complaint first. 135 C. 558. Cited. 149 C. 430.

      Illness of plaintiff's attorney reason to bifurcate trial. 50 CA 577.

      Sec. 52-206. Writings; admission of their execution. (a) Either party to a civil action may, by a written notice, call upon the other to admit the existence and due execution of any document, material to the issue, saving all just exceptions.

      (b) If the opposing party neglects or refuses to make such a requested admission within a reasonable time after the receipt of such notice, the costs of proving the document shall be paid by the party neglecting or refusing to make the admission regardless of the result of the action unless the court finds that the neglect or refusal was reasonable.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7959; P.A. 82-160, S. 98.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      Sec. 52-207. Defense based on Sunday contract. No person who has received a valuable consideration for a contract, express or implied, made on a Sunday prior to June 9, 1976, may defend any action upon the contract on the ground that it was made on a Sunday, until he has restored the consideration.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7980; P.A. 76-415, S. 6; 76-435, S. 81, 82; P.A. 82-160, S. 99.)

      History: P.A. 76-415 specified applicability to contracts made on Sunday "prior to October 1, 1976"; P.A. 76-435 changed effective date from October 1, 1976, to June 9, 1976, amending section text accordingly; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      See Sec. 53-300a re validity of Sunday real estate contracts.

      Cited. 66 C. 275. Defendant must pay the reasonable value or agreed price, where a return of the identical consideration is practically impossible. 73 C. 624. Court should instruct jury as to whether certain date is Sunday. 81 C. 490. That contract was made on Sunday should be pleaded. 85 C. 635. See notes to sections 53-300, 53-301. In action by assignee to enforce bond for deed, defendant who received nothing as result of assignment may defend on ground it was made on Sunday. 133 C. 649. Cited. 155 C. 55. Cited. 177 C. 304.

      Cited. 14 CS 407. Sunday contract not demurrable if there is nothing to indicate that deposit allegedly accepted by defendant has been returned. 20 CS 443.

      Sec. 52-208. Reception of evidence objected to as inadmissible. Whenever evidence offered upon the trial of any civil action is objected to as inadmissible, the court or committee trying such action shall not admit such evidence subject to the objection, unless both parties agree that it be so admitted; but, if either party requests a decision, such court or committee shall pass upon such objection and admit or reject the testimony.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7960.)

      Does not apply to evidence received in advance of its logical place. 53 C. 558. New trial ordinarily granted for an infraction of statute, unless the error appears to have been harmless. 68 C. 63. Admitting evidence with an offer to consider later a motion to strike it out is equivalent of admitting it subject to objection. 130 C. 232. Cited. 132 C. 646. To avail himself of the rule that grounds upon which evidence is claimed to be inadmissible must be stated, a party must state the grounds for his claim of admissibility. 148 C. 208.

      Cited. 5 CA 118.

      Sec. 52-209. Argument of counsel; time limit. In a trial before the Superior Court, counsel shall not occupy more than one hour in argument, unless the court, on motion for special cause, before the commencement of the argument, allows a longer time. Interlocutory questions arising during the trial of an action shall not be argued by counsel unless the court requests it.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7962; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 113; P.A. 76-436, S. 404, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 100.)

      History: 1959 act deleted provision for appeal from trial before justice of the peace; P.A. 76-436 removed trials before court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.

      The constitutional right of the accused to be heard by counsel is subject to a reasonable time limit. 47 C. 535. Party represented by two counsel in superior court may occupy two hours in argument, dividing the time as they may agree. 55 C. 18. Discretion of court to extend time for argument. 95 C. 79. Cited. 122 C. 611. Cited. 217 C. 671.

      Where presentation of evidence lasted three and one-half days and plaintiff's counsel did not move for additional time until after the argument had begun, rule of court limiting him to one hour was not an abuse of discretion. 15 CS 305.

      Sec. 52-210. Motion for nonsuit. If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil action, the plaintiff has produced his evidence and rested his cause, the defendant may move for judgment as in case of nonsuit, and the court may grant such motion, if in its opinion the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7977.)

      This does not impair right of trial by jury. 24 C. 468. Cannot be granted because suit was brought without authority. 26 C. 529. Cases of nonsuit. 23 C. 485; 24 C. 40; Id., 207; 30 C. 492. When to be granted. 93 C. 96; 97 C. 312. Refusal to nonsuit not reviewable on application of defendant. 51 C. 512. A nonsuit should not be granted where there is substantial evidence to support plaintiff's claim. 58 C. 279; 70 C. 74; 71 C. 29. Nor on a jury trial upon the ground that the allegations of the complaint, if proved, would not support a judgment. 66 C. 196. Nor because the court is satisfied that the witnesses are not credible. Id., 206. Statute salutary. 76 C. 41. If law applied to facts proved does not make out case, nonsuit is proper; 77 C. 321; so, where plaintiff's evidence brings case within statute of limitations; 64 C. 430; 71 C. 24; or statute of frauds; 82 C. 293; or plaintiff fails to make out prima facie case; 66 C. 313; 104 C. 78, 746; or bases case on surmise or conjecture; 82 C. 403; 83 C. 231; 84 C. 401; 86 C. 509; id., 546; or offers no substantial evidence. 70 C. 74; 84 C. 403. But not proper if plaintiff makes out prima facie case; 71 C. 24; 104 C. 78; or offers substantial evidence; 82 C. 236; 83 C. 261; though it is weak; 83 C. 20; or evidence is conflicting; 70 C. 505; or issue involves determination of credibility of witness; 94 C. 350; 96 C. 230; 116 C. 69; or reasonable men might differ. 87 C. 119. Sufficiency of allegations of complaint not in question. 82 C. 236. Court must construe evidence most favorably to plaintiff. 83 C. 20; 116 C. 69. Motion need not specify grounds. 77 C. 559. Proper as to one of several defendants. 79 C. 379; 82 C. 685. Court may permit reopening of case to supply proof. 68 C. 33. Discretion of court in refusing to grant. 77 C. 136; Id., 334; id., 462; 79 C. 266; Id., 379; 80 C. 298; 106 C. 13. Form motion takes immaterial if no evidence offered which could sustain recovery. 90 C. 617. Grant carries costs but does not determine issues; form of judgment file. 94 C. 80. Has no place on hearing in damages after default. Id., 244. Rules same in court and jury cases. 96 C. 230. All inferences to be drawn in favor of plaintiff. Id., 222. Only evidence considered is that offered by plaintiff to support complaint, not that pertinent to affirmative defense. 97 C. 312; 100 C. 42. Nature of nonsuit; is entirely different from erasure or dismissal for want of jurisdiction. 98 C. 231. Does not apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Denial of motion for nonsuit serves no other purpose than to establish fact that prima facie case is made. 132 C. 402. Upon a motion for nonsuit, unless it appears that no relief could be granted under the pleadings, their legal sufficiency is not open to question. 134 C. 502. Cited. 140 C. 643. Nonsuit may be granted only when plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. 143 C. 230. Cited. 145 C. 99. Cited. 147 C. 260. Cited. 152 C. 699. See note to section 52-80. Cited. 185 C. 1. Where granting of a nonsuit must depend in any appreciable degree upon court's passing on credibility of a witness nonsuit should not be granted. Id., 195.

      Cited. 30 CA 664. Cited. 43 CA 83.

      Motion for dismissal is unknown to Connecticut law. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 8 (Diss. Op.).

      Sec. 52-211. Refusal to set aside nonsuit; appeal. If a nonsuit has been so granted in the Superior Court, the plaintiff may either (a) during the same term or session of the court and before its next return day, file a written motion to set aside such judgment; and, if such motion is denied, may appeal from such denial; and to enable him to do so the court shall state the whole evidence so produced as aforesaid that it may become a part of the record or (b) appeal pursuant to section 51-197a directly from the judgment of nonsuit. If such judgment is set aside, either on motion or appeal, the cause shall be proceeded with as though no nonsuit had been granted.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7978; 1953, S. 3183d; 1969, P.A. 310; P.A. 74-183, S. 86, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 130, 681.)

      History: 1969 act allowed plaintiff option of filing appeal pursuant to Sec. 52-263 directly from judgment of nonsuit; P.A. 74-183 added reference to appeals filed pursuant to Sec. 51-265; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court and substituted reference to Sec. 51-197a for reference to Secs. 52-263 and 51-265, effective July 1, 1978.

      A motion for a nonsuit cannot be reserved for advice of supreme court. 33 C. 445. Formerly the refusal to set aside a nonsuit could be reviewed only on a motion in error. 43 C. 167; 44 C. 465. Cited. 51 C. 512. No appeal lies until the court has denied the written motion to set aside the judgment. 72 C. 707. Motion to set aside need not state grounds; 77 C. 559; must be reasonably made; discretion of court. 75 C. 314. If granted for variance between pleading and evidence, remedy is new action. 82 C. 236. Motion to set aside must be made. 72 C. 707; 75 C. 317; 106 C. 14. Refusal to grant not ground of exception. 64 C. 481. Appellant must furnish court with transcript of evidence. 82 C. 132; Id., 142; 83 C. 316. Questions presented; finding necessary if rulings on evidence are to be reviewed. 71 C. 339; 89 C. 382. Time allowed for appeal; certification of evidence not an extension. 83 C. 316. The granting of a nonsuit will not prevent an appeal from rulings leading up to it. 73 C. 1. Granting or refusing nonsuit regarded on appeal as an exercise of the court's discretion. 75 C. 314; 79 C. 266; 80 C. 299. Only question ordinarily open is, has plaintiff failed for any reason to make out prima facie case. 94 C. 80; 104 C. 746. Evidence to be taken in light most favorable to plaintiff. 95 C. 206; Id., 442; 101 C. 52, 79. Does not apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Cited. 140 C. 643. Exclusive method of attacking the court's action in rendering a judgment of nonsuit is to appeal from the denial of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the judgment. 143 C. 226; 145 C. 99. Applies only to nonsuit for failure to make out a prima facie case. 147 C. 260. Cited. 152 C. 699. See note to section 52-210.

      Failure to move to have nonsuit set aside not a bar to plaintiff's right to bring new action for the same cause within one year. Motion to erase improper way to attack court's jurisdiction. 20 CS 377.

      Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 8 (diss. op.).

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 34 CS 606.

      Sec. 52-212. Opening judgment upon default or nonsuit. (a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reinstated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.

      (b) The complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.

      (c) The court shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of the complaint or written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin him against enforcing the judgment or decree until the decision upon the complaint or written motion.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7963, 7964; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 114; 1967, P.A. 849; P.A. 74-183, S. 87, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 131, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 102.)

      History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for municipal court which was abolished; 1967 act clarified rights of plaintiff; P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of its functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.

      Refusal to open a judgment of default, upon motion, may be reviewed where the question is purely one of law; 51 C. 391; but otherwise the motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 69 C. 362. Action by court where substitute complaint improperly allowed after default. 86 C. 313. Formerly did not include nonsuit. Averments in complaint. 75 C. 317. Petition for new trial may be brought after the four-month period has elapsed. 93 C. 161. Effect of judgment of default; this only further procedure permitted. 97 C. 123. Cited. 123 C. 491. Default resulting from party's own neglect will not be opened. 138 C. 27. No abuse of discretion in denying motion when it appears the defendant has no defense or has not been prevented from appearing by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. 139 C. 532. Cited. 144 C. 389. Judgment of nonsuit for failure to appear should be opened if plaintiff can show reasonable cause. 147 C. 260. A motion to open judgment which stated merely that an appearance was entered as soon as defendant's attorney received notice of the action, held not a reasonable cause for opening judgment. 148 C. 435. Cited. 150 C. 191, 195; 152 C. 699. Statement that defendant failed to secure substitute counsel because of confusion attendant upon bankruptcy proceedings did not particularly set forth the reason why defendant failed to appear. Statute construed. Relief under statute discretionary. 154 C. 294. Prior to 1967 amendments, last two sentences applied to written motions as well as complaints. Id., 297. Where no attempt was made to show any mistake, accident or other reasonable cause for default, there was no abuse of discretion in court's denial of motion to reopen judgment. 156 C. 6. Since, on appeal, defendant requested no finding and none was made, he failed to show cause why his motion to open default judgment against him should have been granted or to establish error in trial court's denial of motion. 159 C. 352, 358. Relief under statute ordinarily should not be granted if failure to comply with order of court resulted from moving party's own negligence. Id., 427, 432. Defendant precluded from attacking a finding as unsupported by the evidence as he failed to request a transcript of the record pursuant to section 51-70a. 168 C. 184. Whether proceeding under common law or statute, action of trial court in granting or refusing application to open judgment is generally within discretion of such court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless trial court has clearly abused its discretion. 172 C. 520. Cited. 176 C. 579. Cited. 179 C. 290; Id., 671. Cited. 187 C. 509, 510. Cited. 188 C. 145, 151. Continuing jurisdiction under this statute not affected by provisions of Sec. 49-35c(b). Id., 253. Cited. 190 C. 679; Id., 707. Cited. 193 C. 128; Id., 160. Cited. 196 C. 233; Id., 355. Cited. 200 C. 697. Cited. 208 C. 230. Cited. 214 C. 464. Cited. 216 C. 341. Cited. 224 C. 263. Cited. 225 C. 705. Cited. 231 C. 462. Cited. 236 C. 78.

      Cited. 1 CA 282; Id., 298. Cited. 5 CA 230. Cited. 6 CA 504. Cited. 9 CA 320; Id., 355. Cited. 10 CA 160. Cited. 14 CA 172; Id., 236. Cited. 15 CA 308. Cited. 18 CA 589. Cited 19 CA 8. Cited. 22 CA 424. Cited. 28 CA 7. Section requires date of judgment not be included in time calculation. 29 CA 465. Cited. 30 CA 541. Cited. 31 CA 634. Cited. 35 CA 236. Cited. 40 CA 404. Cited. 42 CA 119. Cited. 45 CA 137. Cited. 46 CA 54. Trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to open judgment filed outside the four-month period and may refuse to consider procedurally defective motions. 51 CA 1. Negligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of statute to set aside a default judgment. 63 CA 544. It is axiomatic that the right to move to open and vacate a judgment assumes that the party who is to exercise the right be given opportunity to know that there is a judgment to open. Plaintiff that demonstrated it did not receive notice of entry of nonsuit in timely manner allowed to file motion to open within four months of receiving notice. 68 CA 68. Court has intrinsic power, independent of statutory provision, to vacate any judgment obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake. 78 CA 684.

      Cited. 7 CS 250. Judgment of nonsuit not reopened to allow filing of substituted complaint where the action had been in court over a year previously and counsel did not see fit to plead over within the time provided by rules of court. 8 CS 372. Judgment in uncontested divorce action set aside where appearance of defendant's counsel by accident or inadvertence was not entered. 16 CS 111. Statute refers to a final judgment and not to judgment by default. 17 CS 118. Cited. 19 CS 288. A default is not a judgment but an interlocutory order of court, the effect of which is to preclude defendant from making any further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned. A judgment upon default, on the other hand, is the final judgment in the case which is entered after the default and after a hearing in damages. A motion to set aside a default may be filed at any time before entry of judgment, may be informal in nature and may be granted for such reason as the court sees fit. 24 CS 81. Trial court's refusal to open a default judgment because of defendant's negligence in failing to appear was not an abuse of discretion on the record. 31 CS 540. Failure of defendants to appear on date set by court order of final assignment for trial because they relied on assistant court clerk's advice the action had been reassigned to a later date, not "reasonable cause" for opening default judgment. Id., 549. Cited. 33 CS 554; Id., 775. Cited. 34 CS 501; Id., 559. In order not to frustrate the remedial purpose of the statute the time limit provisions must be construed as a limitation on the prejudiced party rather than as a jurisdictional barrier to the exercise of judicial power. 35 CS 581. Cited. Id., 598. Cited. 36 CS 626. Cited. 37 CS 676. Cited. 38 CS 731. Default judgment should not be opened where defendant received actual notice of the action but chose to ignore authority of the court. 45 CS 563.

      Failure to move to open judgment resulted in waiver of claim of discharge in bankruptcy. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 386. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Mere negligence or inattention of a party is no ground for vacating a judgment on default against him. Id., 397. Where plaintiff's motion to open judgment on default was denied, he was not precluded from petitioning for a new trial. Determination of motion was not res judicata. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 201. Granting motion to open judgment on default abuse of discretion where facts show failure to appear and defend due to defendant's negligence. Id., 396. Granting of motion to open judgment is interlocutory ruling, reviewable upon appeal from final judgment, and appeal was not allowed as this was not final action of circuit court. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 289. Opening judgment after default, unless based on pure error of law, lies in sound discretion of court. Id., 291.

      Subsec. (a):

      Defendant's motion to open judgment was properly denied since a party must meet both parts of two prong test and defendant failed to allege any purported defense to the action. 193 C. 160. Cited. 212 C. 741. Cited. 234 C. 783. Trial court did not err in refusing to open default judgment in foreclosure action because evidence gave rise to a reasonable presumption of receipt of actual notice of the action by nonresident defendant. 278 C. 92.

      Cited. 13 CA 223. Cited. 27 CA 755; judgment reversed, see 225 C.757. Cited. 38 CA 506. Cited. 39 CA 253. Cited. 40 CA 590. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 381; Id., 724. Cited. 46 CA 5. Negligence is not sufficient reason to open a judgment of default. 78 CA 466.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 10 CA 1.

      Sec. 52-212a. Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months only. Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed. The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights. The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights.

      (P.A. 77-576, S. 28, 65; P.A. 82-160, S. 103; P.A. 93-51; P.A. 98-241, S. 14, 18; P.A. 00-137, S. 16.)

      History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 93-51 added provisions re reopening of judgments terminating parental rights; P.A. 98-241 changed reference from Subsec. (i) to Subsec. (h) of Sec. 17a-112, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-137 changed reference from Subsec. (h) to Subsec. (o) of Sec. 17a-112.

      Judgments obtained by fraud may be attacked at any time. 180 C. 129. Cited. 181 C. 463. A motion to open and vacate a judgment is addressed to the court's discretion. 184 C. 461. Cited. 185 C. 495. Cited. 187 C. 509. Cited. 191 C. 555. Cited. 196 C. 517; Id., 579. Cited. 211 C. 648. Cited. 214 C. 23. Cited. 215 C. 143. Cited. 217 C. 394. Cited. 223 C. 68; Id., 155. Court held legislature intended provisions of Sec. 17a-112 and this section to coexist so superior court has limited jurisdiction to open judgment for termination of parental rights for four months after its rendering but not thereafter in absence of waiver or consent. 224 C. 263. Cited. 225 C. 757. Cited. Id., 804. Prohibits trial court from entertaining motion to open and modify divorce decree with respect to nondisability military retired or retainer pay; time limitations on opening not preempted by federal law division of military retirement benefits. 226 C. 219. Cited. Id., 831. Cited. 228 C. 85. Cited. 232 C. 405. Judgment of appellate court in Jenks v. Jenks, 34 CA 462,. reversed. Id., 750. Cited. 236 C. 78. Cited. 239 C. 375.