CHAPTER 815j*
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE, LEGAL SEPARATION
AND ANNULMENT

PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

      Sec. 46b-40. (Formerly Sec. 46-32). Grounds for dissolution of marriage; legal separation; annulment. (a) A marriage is dissolved only by (1) the death of one of the parties or (2) a decree of annulment or dissolution of the marriage by a court of competent jurisdiction.

      (b) An annulment shall be granted if the marriage is void or voidable under the laws of this state or of the state in which the marriage was performed.

      (c) A decree of dissolution of a marriage or a decree of legal separation shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred: (1) The marriage has broken down irretrievably; (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled; (3) adultery; (4) fraudulent contract; (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty; (6) seven years' absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from; (7) habitual intemperance; (8) intolerable cruelty; (9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year; (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.

      (d) In an action for dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation on the ground of habitual intemperance, it shall be sufficient if the cause of action is proved to have existed until the time of the separation of the parties.

      (e) In an action for dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation on the ground of wilful desertion for one year, with total neglect of duty, the furnishing of financial support shall not disprove total neglect of duty, in the absence of other evidence.

      (f) For purposes of this section, "adultery" means voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person other than such person's spouse.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 1; P.A. 74-169, S. 1, 18; P.A. 78-230, S. 18, 54; P.A. 91-19, S. 1.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 rephrased Subsec. (c) and applied provisions to decrees of legal separation; P.A. 78-230 restated provisions, adding Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (c) and creating Subsecs. (d) and (e) from provisions formerly in Subsec. (c); Sec. 46-32 transferred to Sec. 46b-40 in 1979; P.A. 91-19 added Subsec. (f) defining "adultery".

      See Sec. 46b-48 re dissolution of marriage or annulment upon conviction of crime against chastity.

      Annotations to former section 46-13:

      Petitioner's presence dispensed with in certain cases. K. 270. "Fraudulent contract" includes those cases only which render marriage void ab initio. 1 D. 114. Decree may be reversed on error. Id. The fact that a petition was to be made by procurement of respondent would be good ground for dismissing it. 4 D. 351. Sufficient if nonresident has actual notice and appears by attorney. 5 D. 358. Corporal imbecility in former statute means a permanent and incurable impotency to consummate the marriage, and such impotency must be shown by proper averment. 8 C. 167. Fraudulent representations must be set forth. Id. Divorce terminates husband's curtesy rights. Id., 541; 10 C. 230. Adultery condoned by cohabitation after knowledge. 9 C. 235. Knowledge that offending party had been convicted of adultery sufficient. Id., 235. An act of general assembly dissolving marriage procured by fraud renders it void only in futuro. Id., 328. Language calculated to wound the feelings insufficient; the cruelty required must be intolerable in fact. 17 C. 193, 194; 97 C. 694; 99 C. 430; 100 C. 3; 102 C. 755. Unreasonable exercise by husband of his marital right is not the cruelty contemplated unless he knew it was injurious and dangerous to wife. 17 C. 195; 61 C. 234. Husband not liable for wife's legal expenses in procuring divorce. 18 C. 421. Effect of, on responsibility for support of children. 22 C. 417. Proof of adultery inadmissible unless distinctly charged. 41 C. 40. Petition alleging adultery should be defined as to times, places and persons. Id., 40. A general finding of court that "respondent had not been guilty of intolerable cruelty" negatives specific allegation of cruelty. 43 C. 274. Desertion consists in a cessation of cohabitation, with a determination on part of offender not to renew it. Id., 318. Separation from necessity, such as inability by husband to support wife, does not constitute desertion. Id., 318, 319. Divorce granted for misconduct of wife as a matter of law does not revoke a legacy to her. 48 C. 504. Habitual intemperance a question of fact left to determination of trial court. 68 C. 192. When act of adultery was brought about by the connivance of petitioner, divorce will not be granted. Id., 195. Attitude of state as to divorce. 68 C. 186; 72 C. 151; Id., 569; 78 C. 242. Nature of legislative divorce. 69 C. 585. Who may attack decree for fraud. 69 C. 652; 73 C. 493. Humiliating wife by obscene profane language and appearing before her intoxicated, knowing her dangerous condition of health, and communicating to her infectious disease constitutes intolerable cruelty. 70 C. 427. Desertion. 72 C. 569; 84 C. 591; 90 C. 660; 91 C. 617; 97 C. 490; 126 C. 178; 131 C. 356; Id., 437. Furnishing support to a wife under order of court, though having deserted her, does not necessarily prevent court from finding husband guilty of desertion with total neglect of duty. 72 C. 571. No one has vested right to divorce; cause must exist at time of trial; evidence of actions since bringing of action admissible. 73 C. 54. Discretion of court. 78 C. 262. Fraudulent contract. 78 C. 242; 90 C. 399; 110 C. 443; 114 C. 7; 115 C. 303. Prior divorce a defense. 88 C. 689; not so, foreign divorce a mensa et thoro. 91 C. 617. Rabbinical divorce as abandonment. 90 C. 213. What constitutes intolerable cruelty. 95 C. 61; 107 C. 489; 110 C. 695; 126 C. 178. Proof of adultery should be clear. 96 C. 275. Four elements necessary to constitute desertion. 97 C. 490. Subsequent misconduct justifying divorce destroys effect of condonation and revives earlier, condoned offense. 100 C. 523. Unfounded accusations of adultery held to constitute intolerable cruelty under circumstances. 101 C. 84. Jurisdiction of court to order allowance to defend. 103 C. 197; 104 C. 415. Jurisdiction of superior court in general. 97 C. 443. State of domicile may grant divorce for any cause allowed by its laws, even though it was not a ground for divorce in place where committed. 108 C. 302. Law of forum governs throughout. Id. Condonation; removal of bar by subsequent conduct. Id., 303. Fraud by nondisclosure of facts. 110 C. 446. Misrepresentations as to age, name and nationality insufficient to dissolve consummated marriage. 114 C. 12. Misrepresentations as to continence in past condoned. Id., 11. Laches as ground for denial of divorce based on fraudulent contract. 115 C. 303. Concealment of epilepsy as fraudulent contract: Id. Divorce and annulment distinguished. 119 C. 197. Refusal of martial relations is not in itself desertion. 126 C. 178. Assault with intent to commit rape is an "infamous crime". 128 C. 128. In desertion an innocent plaintiff need not attempt reconciliation. 131 C. 356; Id., 437. Cited. 133 C. 457. Fact that parties lived in same house pending decision is not conclusive on issue of intolerable cruelty. 134 C. 658. Cited. 136 C. 192; 143 C. 727. Where court did not find as a fact that separation was without plaintiff's consent, a conclusion of wilful desertion could not be sustained. 137 C. 165. Interest which state has in outcome justified court in denying decree despite unequivocal testimony on vital element in desertion case. 138 C. 490. Rule of superior court which permits amendment to complaint stating a ground for divorce alleged to have arisen since commencement of action does not affect substantive rights and is purely procedural. 139 C. 163. Intolerable cruelty must be shown subjectively as well as objectively. 144 C. 568. If ground for divorce is clearly established, plaintiff is not precluded from judgment by reason that evidence lacked corroboration of other witnesses. 151 C. 180. Cited. 152 C. 156 (Fn 2). Adultery will be presumed upon proof that spouse has gone through a formally valid marriage ceremony with another and that spouse is living with that other. 153 C. 301. Cited. 154 C. 703. These grounds for divorce not necessary for granting divorce upon basis of continued legal separation under section 46-30. 157 C. 85.

      Institution of confinement must be in this state. 4 CS 243. Voluntary furnishing of support prevents proof of "total neglect of duty". Id., 499; 11 CS 14. Cited. 5 CS 34. Refusal of sexual intercourse as desertion discussed. 7 CS 197. Attempt to commit rape only attempt to violate conjugal duty and therefore not grounds for divorce. 9 CS 122. Silence as consent to separation. Id., 231. Ingredients of desertion. 10 CS 71. "Duty" in wilful desertion means the duty to cohabit and includes no others. 14 CS 129. Plaintiff cannot amend a complaint for intolerable cruelty to include desertion unless three years have elapsed prior to the commencement of the original suit. Id., 442. Confinement in an institution must be actual. The fact that one who escapes is still subject to confinement is not enough. 16 CS 130. Proving that habitual intemperance existed until the separation of the parties comes directly within the provisions of section 1-1 as to pending actions. Id., 446. Desertion provision of three years discussed. 17 CS 161. Cited. Id., 233. To justify divorce on ground of mental illness, court must find that illness is incurable. Id., 410. Three years of desertion must elapse before suit is brought not before trial. Id., 483. Adultery by plaintiff after desertion by defendant is a recriminatory bar to divorce. 18 CS 312. False accusations of adultery or unchastity held to constitute intolerable cruelty. 20 CS 435. Evidence of conviction of a crime of injury or risk of injury to children held not to support a divorce decree, for the crime is not of such a nature that the record of conviction necessarily conveys the essentials that it is infamous, that involves a violation of conjugal duty, and that it is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison. 21 CS 198. Condonation should be specially pleaded as a defense. Id., 228. An offense which has been condoned may be revived not only by a repetition of the same offense but also by the subsequent commission of other marital offenses constituting a ground of divorce. Id. Conditions necessary to sustain a decree of divorce for desertion. Id., 301. In action on ground of intolerable cruelty, mere wrangling over money matters held not intolerable cruelty and that plaintiff desired freedom from marriage is not enough. 22 CS 96. Nagging not intolerable cruelty. Id., 146. Claim of husband that conduct was not adulterous because the woman was not married held not relevant in divorce action although criminal statute (section 53-218) specifies married woman. Id., 147. If there is necessary domicile and requirements of our statutes as to notice to nonresident defendant are complied with, court has jurisdiction to grant divorce. 23 CS 161. Discussion of what constitutes wilful desertion; desertion may be actual or constructive. Husband may choose and fix domicile if, in doing so, he acts reasonably, and wife's unjustifiable refusal to accompany or follow him to new domicile constitutes desertion which is constructive. Id. Where parties gave no proof of Nevada divorce decree, nor of ground upon which it was granted, court refused to make Nevada judgment its own judgment by stipulation of parties. Also refused to award alimony to wife where Nevada divorce was obtained because of her misconduct. Id., 368. Cited. 25 CS 239. Special defense to complaint alleging intolerable cruelty that defendant is under conservatorship is insufficient and plaintiff's demurrer thereto is sustained. 27 CS 459. In action on ground of intolerable cruelty proof was lacking that conduct of defendant was intended by him to be cruel and that plaintiff had become tired of defendant as husband was no grounds for divorce. 28 CS 24. Continued relations of plaintiff with another man for whom she bought a trailer was sufficient provocation to constitute defense to her action for divorce on grounds of intolerable cruelty, her conduct having provoked husband to strong language complained of. Id., 336.

      Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 647.

      Annotations to former section 46-28:

      "Alimony" discussed. 77 C. 31. New York marriage void for lack of consent. 119 C. 197. Consent and intent essential to afford mutuality of a valid contract existed. 136 C. 196. Where both parties to an action for annulment of a void marriage are nonresidents and the defendant is not served with process within this state, the fact that the marriage was performed within this state does not empower the court to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant by constructive service and render a judgment annulling the marriage. 142 C. 175. Superior court has jurisdiction over subject matter of annulment where plaintiff is domiciled in Connecticut whether ground relied on would make marriage voidable. 152 C. 155.

      Power and jurisdiction of court over marriage is purely statutory and must be strictly construed. 1 CS 76. Court does not have power to order alimony pendente lite in annulment proceeding. 5 CS 224. In declaratory judgment with respect to marital status where one has gone through form of second marriage, second woman not entitled to alimony pendente lite, but is entitled to allowance to defend. 9 CS 1. Legislature intended laws of state where marriage was performed relating to voidability of marriage apply. Id., 100. Deception as to osteomyelitis not reason to annul marriage. 11 CS 361. An action for declaratory judgment declaring a Connecticut marriage void may be maintained in the superior court, notwithstanding that all the parties are nonresidents, where service was made in accordance with Connecticut statutes. 12 CS 276. Cited. 14 CS 317. Couple married in New York entitled to annulment where one was physically incapable of entering into marriage even though action in Connecticut brought more than five years after marriage and would be cut off by New York statute of limitations. 15 CS 77. Where agreement between parties that defendant would seek annulment six weeks after marriage annulment not warranted. Cases reviewed. 16 CS 101. Request of husband to join Roman Catholic church after marriage not basis for rendering marriage voidable. Id., 419. Does not empower courts of this state to apply the law of the state in which the marriage took place as to the legitimacy of the children of such marriage. 18 CS 474. Fraudulent premarital representation by wife that she is willing to bear children held not sufficient cause to declare marriage void. 23 CS 201. In action for annulment on grounds of invalidity of defendant's Mexican divorce from first wife, held plaintiff could not make collateral attack on validity of divorce because she had no legally protected interest which was adversely affected by the decree. Id., 275. Where defendant had no intention, at the time of the ceremony, to consummate marriage, decree of annulment was granted. 25 CS 239. Annulment is decree based on theory that marriage is void ab initio. Id. Action brought under this section seeks relief which is equitable in nature. 26 CS 260. Marriage entered into by plaintiff with defendant in New York while plaintiff was already married is bigamous and void under New York law. Hence action for annulment allowed although lawful husband of plaintiff had since died. 27 CS 342. Court has same power to award alimony in annulment cases as in divorce. 29 CS 44.

      Annotations to former section 46-32:

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 183 C. 433.

      Subsec. (c):

      Standard for marriage dissolution of "irretrievable breakdown" is not unconstitutional as a denial of due process since language is reasonably precise and not vague, uncertain or indefinite. 35 CS 123.

      Annotations to present section:

      Constitutional even without judicial guidelines to limit discretionary fact-finding of trial courts as to irretrievable breakdown (Subsec. (c)(1)). 178 C. 254. Cited. 184 C. 307. Cited. 190 C. 269; Id., 657. Cited. 194 C. 312. Cited. 224 C. 749.

      Cited. 13 CA 282. Cited. 25 CA 210.

      Cited. 44 CS 431.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 581.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 15 CA 96.

      Subsec. (c):

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 179 C. 568. Irretrievable breakdown not unconstitutionally vague within strictures of due process. 181 C. 225. Subdiv. (1) cited. 183 C. 512. Cited. 184 C. 558. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 156.

      Subdiv. (1) cited. 4 CA 611. Subdiv. (9) cited. 13 CA 632. Trial court rejected defendant's claim that statute infringed on his religious beliefs because statute permitted plaintiff to obtain a divorce against his wishes. Statute is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. 82 CA 41.

      Sec. 46b-41. (Formerly Sec. 46-36a). Complaint includes cross-complaints or cross actions. Whenever the word "complaint" is used in this chapter or section 46b-1 or 51-348a, it shall include cross-complaints or cross actions where appropriate.

      (P.A. 74-169, S. 15, 18.)

      History: Sec. 46-36a transferred to Sec. 46b-41 in 1979 and internal section references revised as necessary to reflect transfer of those sections.

      Sec. 46b-42. (Formerly Sec. 46-33). Jurisdiction. The Superior Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all complaints seeking a decree of annulment, dissolution of a marriage or legal separation.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 2.)

      History: Sec. 46-33 transferred to Sec. 46b-42 in 1979.

      Annotations to former section 46-33:

      Cited. 34 CS 251; Id., 628.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 11 CA 150. Cited. 13 CA 282.

      Sec. 46b-43. (Formerly Sec. 46-34). Capacity of minor to prosecute or defend. Any married minor may, in his own name, prosecute or defend to final judgment an action for annulment or dissolution of a marriage or for legal separation and may participate in all judicial proceedings with respect thereto.

      (1971, P.A. 8; P.A. 73-373, S. 41; P.A. 78-230, S. 19, 54.)

      History: P.A. 73-373 substituted "annulment or dissolution of marriage" for "divorce" and authorized married minor to participate in all judicial proceedings relating to annulment, dissolution or legal separation; P.A. 78-230 made technical change; Sec. 46-34 transferred to Sec. 46b-43 in 1979.

      Sec. 46b-44. (Formerly Sec. 46-35). Residency requirement. (a) A complaint for dissolution of a marriage or for legal separation may be filed at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

      (b) Temporary relief pursuant to the complaint may be granted in accordance with sections 46b-56 and 46b-83 at any time after either party has established residence in this state.

      (c) A decree dissolving a marriage or granting a legal separation may be entered if: (1) One of the parties to the marriage has been a resident of this state for at least the twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of the complaint or next preceding the date of the decree; or (2) one of the parties was domiciled in this state at the time of the marriage and returned to this state with the intention of permanently remaining before the filing of the complaint; or (3) the cause for the dissolution of the marriage arose after either party moved into this state.

      (d) For the purposes of this section, any person who has served or is serving with the armed forces, as defined by section 27-103, or the merchant marine, and who was a resident of this state at the time of his or her entry shall be deemed to have continuously resided in this state during the time he or she has served or is serving with the armed forces or merchant marine.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 3; P.A. 74-169, S. 2, 18; P.A. 78-230, S. 20, 54; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 36, 70.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 substituted "either party" for "plaintiff" and added feminine personal pronouns where occurring; P.A. 78-230 reordered and restated provisions and divided section into Subsecs.; Sec. 46-35 transferred to Sec. 46b-44 in 1979 and internal section references revised as necessary to reflect sections' transfer; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).

      Annotations to former sections 46-15 and 46-35:

      Construction of this section with regard to residence. 17 C. 286; 103 C. 193; 105 C. 504; 108 C. 300. Waiver of jurisdictional fact does not necessarily imply collusion. 35 C. 56. Spending winters out of the state not inconsistent with continuous residence in this state. 70 C. 426. As to residence necessary to give jurisdiction to foreign court so that its decree will be recognized here. 88 C. 689. Effect of divorce decreed against a nonresident. 201 U.S. 562. Residence requires more than technical domicile. 103 C. 193; 130 C. 656. Power of court to grant allowance to defend when it has no jurisdiction to grant divorce under this section. 103 C. 197; 104 C. 415. Facts held insufficient. 105 C. 504. When a wife may establish a separate domicile; frequent temporary visits out of state held not to affect acquisition of separate domicile. 108 C. 296. Question of continuous residence is one of fact. 132 C. 4. The expression "removal into this state" assumes plaintiff is here when action brought. Id., 5. Provision de persons in armed forces construed. Id., 185. Cited. 138 C. 8. Where act of abandonment took place while plaintiff was domiciled in Massachusetts, plaintiff's cause of divorce did not arise after she removed to this state. 139 C. 149. Pertains to divorce only and does not apply to annulment actions. 142 C. 173. Referee's finding upon reasonable evidence that plaintiff was domiciled in Connecticut at time of marriage, coupled with uncontested finding that plaintiff reacquired domicile here prior to bringing of action, satisfies jurisdictional requirements of statute. 154 C. 389. Jurisdiction for legal separation and divorce, under former Secs. 46-15 and 46-29, interrelationship of sections. 166 C. 476. Under this section a showing of residence by one party is, without showing of domicile, sufficient to establish jurisdiction for purposes of granting alimony or support pendente lite. 171 C. 433. Cited. Id., 433.

      Cited. 4 CA 581.

      What constitutes domicile. 7 CS 351. Cause of action held to arise after removal to this state where wife moved into state at husband's request thus condoning former acts and giving rise to new cause of action. 12 CS 216. Meaning of "at the time of the marriage". Id., 418. For the misconduct to occur within the state, it is probable that the defendant be present. 13 CS 44. What constitutes intent to permanently remain. 14 CS 85. What constitutes "removal into this state." 15 CS 1. Presence in this state while in the armed forces does not constitute residence. Id., 253. Cited. 16 CS 443. A course of conduct begun elsewhere and merely continued after removal into the state does not meet the requirements of the statute. 17 CS 335. Plaintiff's parents were domiciled in New York and after reaching his majority he spent his vacations in Connecticut while working in several other states, held this did not give plaintiff domicile in this state at the time of his marriage. 21 CS 359.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 208 C. 329. Cited. 226 C. 1.

      Cited. 3 CA 679. Cited. 4 CA 581. Cited. 10 CA 566. Cited. 13 CA 632. Cited. 27 CA 142. Cited. 41 CA 382.

      Cited. 41 CS 258.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 22 CA 410. Cited. 33 CA 214. Connecticut has subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution action brought by nonresident against Indian tribe member residing on a reservation in Connecticut. 243 C. 255.

      Sec. 46b-45. (Formerly Sec. 46-36). Service and filing of complaint. (a) A proceeding for annulment, dissolution of marriage or legal separation shall be commenced by the service and filing of a complaint as in all other civil actions in the Superior Court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides. The complaint may also be made by the Attorney General in a proceeding for annulment of a void marriage. The complaint shall be served on the other party.

      (b) If any party is an inmate of a mental institution in this state, a copy of the complaint shall be served on the Commissioner of Administrative Services personally or by registered or certified mail. If any party is confined in an institution in any other state, a copy shall be so served on the superintendent of the institution in which the party is confined.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 4; P.A. 74-169, S. 3, 18; P.A. 77-614, S. 70, 610; P.A. 78-230, S. 21, 54; 78-280, S. 2, 127.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 clarified provisions, substituting "service and filing of a complaint as in all other civil actions" for "making a complaint"; P.A. 77-614 replaced commissioner of finance and control with commissioner of administrative services; P.A. 78-230 divided section into Subsecs. and restated provisions; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties, a change effected as well in P.A. 78-230; Sec. 46-36 transferred to Sec. 46b-45 in 1979.

      See Sec. 46b-10 re reconciliation attempts ordered by court in action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment.

      Annotations to former sections 46-14 and 46-36:

      Proceedings are civil throughout, though crime must be proved if plaintiff is to succeed. 30 C. 107. Petition for divorce is purely statutory. 35 C. 54. Filing supplemental bill not to be sanctioned, but if respondent is present and makes no objection, he waives any error. Id., 54. Conveyance by husband to prevent attachment as fraudulent. 68 C. 580; 78 C. 414. Judgment for alimony as a judgment debt. 80 C. 609; 218 U.S. 1. Remarriage does not affect the obligation of husband to support former wife. 116 C. 636. Since this section does not provide any special mode of service of process, section 52-57 governing service of process in civil actions is applicable. The same is true for legal separation. In all ordinary situations, service on a person domiciled in, but absent from, the state by leaving a copy of the process at his usual place of abode in the state is reasonably calculated to give notice and therefore meets the requirements of due process of law for an in personam judgment. 150 C. 15. A motion to dismiss or erase reaches only defects appearing on the face of the record. Since nothing about the Nevada proceeding was apparent on the face of the record, the claimed fact that the plaintiff obtained a divorce under counterclaim in those proceedings did not furnish a ground for erasing the present action. Id. Cited. 173 C. 161.

      Cited. 16 CS 443. The marriage of a minor resulting in his emancipation does not permit him to sue in his own name in a divorce proceeding. 21 CS 376. Right of wife to an allowance to defend a divorce action discussed. Id., 497. Defendant's claim for support may properly be joined with her claim for divorce in cross complaint to plaintiff's action for divorce. 23 CS 352. Where parties gave no proof of Nevada divorce decree, nor of ground on which it was granted, court refused to make Nevada judgment its own by stipulation of parties. Also refused to award alimony to wife where Nevada divorce was obtained because of her misconduct. Id., 368. Divorce will not be granted where both parties are equally in the wrong, nor have we adopted a policy of comparative guilt. Id., 495. The mode of procedure in obtaining a legal separation and a divorce is identical. 26 CS 284. Cited. 31 CS 188.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 181 C. 225. Cited. 185 C. 249; Id., 491. Cited. 208 C. 329. Cited. 224 C. 749.

      Cited. 35 CA 449.

      Sec. 46b-45a. Allegation of pregnancy in pleadings. Disagreement as to paternity. Hearing. (a) If, during the pendency of a dissolution or annulment of marriage, the wife is pregnant, she may so allege in the pleadings. The parties may in their pleadings allege and answer that the child born of the pregnancy will or will not be issue of the marriage.

      (b) If the parties to a dissolution or annulment of marriage disagree as to whether or not the husband is the father of the child born of the pregnancy, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable period after the birth of the child to determine paternity.

      (P.A. 84-386.)

      Cited. 234 C. 51.

      Sec. 46b-46. (Formerly Sec. 46-39). Notice to nonresident party. Jurisdiction over nonresident for alimony and support. (a) On a complaint for dissolution, annulment, legal separation or custody, if the defendant resides out of or is absent from the state or the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown to the plaintiff, any judge or clerk of the Supreme Court or of the Superior Court may make such order of notice as such judge or clerk deems reasonable. After notice has been given and proved to the court, the court may hear the complaint if it finds that the defendant has actually received notice that the complaint is pending. If it does not appear that the defendant has had such notice, the court may hear the case, or, if it sees cause, order such further notice to be given as it deems reasonable and continue the complaint until the order is complied with. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the jurisdictional requirements of chapter 815p in a complaint for custody.

      (b) The court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident party as to all matters concerning temporary or permanent alimony or support of children, only if: (1) The nonresident party has received actual notice under subsection (a) of this section; and (2) the party requesting alimony meets the residency requirement of section 46b-44.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7330; P.A. 73-373, S. 9; P.A. 75-276; P.A. 78-230, S. 24, 54; P.A. 91-391, S. 3; P.A. 95-310, S. 1, 9; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-1, S. 52, 75; P.A. 03-19, S. 104.)

      History: P.A. 73-373 substituted complaints "for dissolution or annulment of marriage or for legal separation" for complaints "for divorce"; P.A. 75-276 added Subsec. (b) re court's jurisdiction over nonresident party in matters concerning alimony or support; P.A. 78-230 rephrased provisions and substituted "defendant" for "adverse party"; Sec. 46-39 transferred to Sec. 46b-46 in 1979 and reference to Sec. 46-35 renumbered to reflect its transfer; P.A. 91-391 amended Subsec. (a) by adding "or custody" after "legal separation" and adding "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the jurisdictional requirements of chapter 815o in a complaint for custody"; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the words "to all", which were omitted inadvertently during the preparation of the 1979 revision, were reinstated editorially by the Revisors in Subsec. (b) after the words "party as"); P.A. 95-310 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting Subdiv. (3) requiring both parties' domicile in state immediately prior to or at time of separation, effective January 1, 1996; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-1 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting "or support of children" from Subdiv. (2), effective January 1, 1998; P.A. 03-19 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003.

      Annotations to former section 46-17:

      Not indispensable that service of notice should be certified by oath of party serving. 23 C. 243. Notice contemplated is one which will be most likely to reach defendant. 133 C. 458. Pertains to divorce only and does not apply to annulment actions 142 C. 173. Cited. 147 C. 238. This statute authorizes but does not require an order of notice in a divorce action when the defendant resides out of or is absent from the state. Resort to the statute is unnecessary if the service utilized itself satisfies due process 150 C. 15. Cited. 199 C. 287. Cited. 226 C. 1.

      Where there was no service on the defendant in the manner directed, the result is not a mere defect or irregularity but a complete failure to effect any service whatever. 4 CS 140. Cited. 14 CS 204. Where defendant had once lived in Stamford but left there before the divorce action was commenced, notice of the action in a Stamford newspaper is not sufficient notice. Id., 321.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 199 C. 287. Cited. 208 C. 329. Cited. 222 C. 906. Order of notice requirement is permissive, not mandatory. 226 C. 1.

      Cited. 27 CA 142. Cited. 41 CA 382. Trial court correctly determined that defendant's contact with Connecticut was sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him and that exercise of such jurisdiction was reasonable and comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 54 CA 634.

      Cited. 41 CS 429.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 178 C. 308.

      Cited. 42 CA 254.

      Subsec. (b):

      Statute permits court to modify a dissolution judgment to require nonresident defendant to pay child support if latter had actual notice of modification proceedings. Reference to Subsec. (a) of statute discussed. 199 C. 287.

      Cited. 3 CA 679. Cited. 42 CA 254.

      Sec. 46b-47. (Formerly Sec. 46-40). Complaint for dissolution of marriage on ground of confinement for mental illness; procedure. (a) A copy of the writ and complaint in an action or cross action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation on the ground of confinement for mental illness shall be served on the adverse party, on the conservator, if any, and on the Commissioner of Administrative Services at Hartford. Service on the conservator, if resident outside the state, and on the commissioner, may be made by registered or certified mail. If the adverse party is confined in any other state, a copy shall be served on the superintendent of the institution in which the adverse party is confined.

      (b) If the conservator does not appear in court, or if the adverse party has no conservator, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the adverse party.

      (c) On motion of either party, the court shall appoint two or more psychiatrists who are diplomates of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and who are not on the staff of any state hospital for mental illness, who shall investigate the mental status of such person. Within a reasonable time thereafter, the psychiatrists shall report to the court the facts found by them together with their opinion as to the probability of further indefinite prolonged hospitalization for the mental illness. The testimony of no psychiatrists other than those appointed by the court shall be received upon the trial of such action.

      (d) The fees and expenses of the psychiatrists and of the guardian ad litem shall be fixed by the court and shall be paid by the plaintiff.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7331; 1951, S. 3003d; 1957, P.A. 502, S. 2; P.A. 73-373, S. 11; P.A. 74-169, S. 7, 18; P.A. 75-420, S. 4, 6; P.A. 77-614, S. 521, 610; P.A. 78-230, S. 25, 54.)

      History: P.A. 73-373 substituted actions for "dissolution of a marriage" for "divorce" actions; P.A. 74-169 applied provisions to legal separations and to cross actions and substituted "adverse party" for "defendant"; P.A. 75-420 replaced welfare commissioner with commissioner of social services; P.A. 77-614 substituted commissioner of human resources for commissioner of social services, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-230 divided section into Subsecs., restated provisions and substituted commissioner of administrative services for commissioner of social services, negating name change called for by P.A. 77-614; Sec. 46-40 transferred to Sec. 46b-47 in 1979.

      Annotations to former section 46-19:

      Cited. 4 CS 249. When defendant confined outside state, both superintendent and commissioner of welfare must be served. 17 CS 410.

      Sec. 46b-48. (Formerly Sec. 46-37). Dissolution of marriage or annulment upon conviction of crime against chastity; procedure. When any married person has been convicted in any court of an offense against chastity which would be ground for dissolution or annulment of the marriage, any person aggrieved may petition the Superior Court within four months of the conviction, and upon notice to the person convicted, the court may grant a dissolution or annulment of the marriage or such other relief as the court determines. No provision of this section shall be construed to affect the right of any aggrieved person to apply to the civil side of the court for similar relief.

      (1949 Rev., S. 7329; 1971, P.A. 870, S. 126; P.A. 73-373, S. 10; P.A. 78-230, S. 22, 54.)

      History: 1971 act applied provisions to convictions in any court rather than specifically in superior court and required that petition be made to superior court rather than to the court "before which such conviction was had", imposing four-month deadline where previously petition was required "at the same term", effective September 1, 1971, except that courts with cases pending retain jurisdiction unless pending matters deemed transferable; P.A. 73-373 replaced "divorce" with "dissolution of marriage"; P.A. 78-230 restated provisions; Sec. 46-37 transferred to Sec. 46b-48 in 1979.

      See Sec. 46b-10 re reconciliation attempts ordered by court in action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment.

      Sec. 46b-49. (Formerly Sec. 46-45). Private hearing. When it considers it necessary in the interests of justice and the persons involved, the court shall, upon the motion of either party or of counsel for any minor children, direct the hearing of any matter under this chapter and sections 17b-743, 17b-744, 45a-257, 46b-1, 46b-6, 47-14g, 51-348a and 52-362 to be private. The court may exclude all persons except the officers of the court, a court reporter, the parties, their witnesses and their counsel.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 13; P.A. 78-230, S. 30, 54; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-1, S. 53, 75.)

      History: P.A. 78-230 restated provisions and deleted reference to Sec. 46-5h; Sec. 46-45 transferred to Sec. 46b-49 in 1979 and internal section references revised as necessary to reflect transfer of those sections; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-1 made a technical change, effective January 1, 1998.

      See Sec. 46b-11 re closed hearings and records in family relations matters.

      Cited. 2 CA 132.

      Cited. 36 CS 352. Protecting stability of leading Fortune 500 corporation's shares of stock outweighed public's and media's right to access files and hearings in divorce proceedings of high ranking executive of such corporation. 45 CS 208.

      Sec. 46b-50. (Formerly Sec. 46-46). Number of witnesses in uncontested action. In any action under this chapter, where the complaint for dissolution of marriage or separation is uncontested, the judge in his sole discretion shall decide the number of witnesses required, if any, in addition to the plaintiff or defendant on a cross complaint, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51.

      (1972, P.A. 164, S. 3; P.A. 73-373, S. 40, 44; P.A. 74-338, 12, 93, 94; P.A. 78-230, S. 31, 54.)

      History: P.A. 73-373 replaced reference to divorce with reference to dissolution of marriage and added exception re Sec. 46-48(a); P.A. 74-338 made technical corrections; P.A. 78-230 rephrased section but made no substantive change; Sec. 46-46 transferred to Sec. 46b-50 in 1979 and reference to Sec. 46-48 revised to reflect its transfer.

      Sec. 46b-51. (Formerly Sec. 46-48). Stipulation of parties and finding of irretrievable breakdown. (a) In any action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation the court shall make a finding that a marriage breakdown has occurred where (1) the parties, and not their attorneys, execute a written stipulation that their marriage has broken down irretrievably, or (2) both parties are physically present in court and stipulate that their marriage has broken down irretrievably and have submitted an agreement concerning the custody, care, education, visitation, maintenance or support of their children, if any, and concerning alimony and the disposition of property. The testimony of either party in support of that conclusion shall be sufficient.

      (b) In any case in which the court finds, after hearing, that a cause enumerated in subsection (c) of section 46b-40 exists, the court shall enter a decree dissolving the marriage or granting a legal separation. In entering the decree, the court may either set forth the cause of action on which the decree is based or dissolve the marriage or grant a legal separation on the basis of irretrievable breakdown. In no case shall the decree granted be in favor of either party.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 8; P.A. 74-169, S. 6, 18; 74-338, S. 92, 94; P.A. 78-230, S. 33, 54.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 clarified Subsec. (a) by specifying execution of written stipulation or personal stipulation "where both parties are physically present in court" that marriage is irretrievably broken and referred to legal separation in Subsec. (b) deleting detailed description of court's finding that marriage is irretrievably broken or that parties have lived apart for eighteen months and there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled; P.A. 74-338 made technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 78-230 restated provisions and deleted Subsec. (c) which had stated that defenses of recrimination and condonation to action for dissolution of marriage were abolished; Sec. 46-48 transferred to Sec. 46b-51 in 1979 and reference to Sec. 46-32 revised to reflect its transfer.

      Annotations to former section 46-48:

      Cited. 174 C. 602. Cited. 177 C. 173.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 190 C. 657.

      Cited. 40 CA 570. Cited. 45 CA 737.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 186 C. 311.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 185 C. 156.

      Cited. 38 CS 37.

      Sec. 46b-52. Recrimination and condonation abolished. The defenses of recrimination and condonation to any action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation are abolished.

      (P.A. 78-230, S. 2, 54.)

      Cited. 185 C. 156.

      Cited. 4 CA 575.

      Sec. 46b-53. (Formerly Sec. 46-41). Conciliation procedures; privileged communications. (a) On or after the return day of a complaint seeking the dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation and prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period specified in section 46b-67 either spouse or the counsel for any minor children of the marriage may submit a request for conciliation to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall forthwith enter an order that the parties meet with a conciliator mutually acceptable to them or, if the parties cannot agree as to a conciliator, with a conciliator named by the court. The conciliator shall, in any case, be a clergyman, a physician, a domestic relations officer or a person experienced in marriage counseling.

      (b) Within such ninety-day period or within thirty days of the request, whichever is later, there shall be two mandatory consultations with the conciliator by each party to explore the possibility of reconciliation or of resolving the emotional problems which might lead to continuing conflicts following the dissolution of the marriage. Failure of the plaintiff or defendant to attend these consultations except for good cause shall preclude further action on the complaint until the expiration of six months from the date of the return day; provided the court may order the termination of such stay, upon the motion of either party and for good cause shown. Further consultations may be held with the consent of both parties, or, if the conciliator recommends one or more additional consultations and either one of the parties agrees, the court may order such additional consultations.

      (c) All communications during these consultations shall be absolutely privileged, except that the conciliator shall report to the court whether or not the parties attended the consultations.

      (d) The reasonable fees of the conciliator shall be paid by one or both of the parties as the court directs. No fee shall be charged by a domestic relations officer for such services. If the parties are unable to pay the fees which may be charged by the conciliator, only a domestic relations officer may be named as the conciliator.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 6; P.A. 74-169, S. 5, 18; P.A. 75-530, S. 11, 35; P.A. 78-230, S. 26, 54; P.A. 02-132, S. 80.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 specified that each party must consult at least twice with conciliator; P.A. 75-530 referred to return day of complaint rather than its date of filing, authorized domestic relations officers to serve as conciliators, added proviso re termination of stay in proceedings and added exception re conciliators' fees; P.A. 78-230 divided section into Subsecs. and rephrased provisions; Sec. 46-41 transferred to Sec. 46b-53 in 1979 and reference to Sec. 46-44 revised to reflect its transfer; P.A. 02-132 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provisions re one or more additional consultations.

      See Sec. 46b-10 re reconciliation attempts ordered by court in action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment.

      Cited. 23 CA 330.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 5 CA 649.

      Sec. 46b-53a. Mediation program for persons filing for dissolution of marriage. Privileged communications. (a) A program of mediation services for persons filing for dissolution of marriage may be established in such judicial districts of the Superior Court as the Chief Court Administrator may designate. Mediation services shall address property, financial, child custody and visitation issues.

      (b) All oral or written communications made by either party to the mediator or made between the parties in the presence of the mediator, while participating in the mediation program conducted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, are privileged and inadmissible as evidence in any court proceedings unless the parties otherwise agree.

      (P.A. 87-316, S. 8; 87-589, S. 36, 87; P.A. 93-92.)

      History: P.A. 87-589 made technical change; P.A. 93-92 added Subsec. (b) re privileged communications made by parties to mediator or in presence of mediator.

      Sec. 46b-54. (Formerly Sec. 46-43). Counsel for minor children. Duties. (a) The court may appoint counsel for any minor child or children of either or both parties at any time after the return day of a complaint under section 46b-45, if the court deems it to be in the best interests of the child or children. The court may appoint counsel on its own motion, or at the request of either of the parties or of the legal guardian of any child or at the request of any child who is of sufficient age and capable of making an intelligent request.

      (b) Counsel for the child or children may also be appointed on the motion of the court or on the request of any person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section in any case before the court when the court finds that the custody, care, education, visitation or support of a minor child is in actual controversy, provided the court may make any order regarding a matter in controversy prior to the appointment of counsel where it finds immediate action necessary in the best interests of any child.

      (c) Counsel for the child or children shall be heard on all matters pertaining to the interests of any child, including the custody, care, support, education and visitation of the child, so long as the court deems such representation to be in the best interests of the child.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 16; P.A. 74-169, S. 9, 18; P.A. 75-530, S. 13, 35; P.A. 78-230, S. 28, 54.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 rephrased provision re appointment of counsel for children, deleting requirement that counsel be appointed "in any case where an agreement has been submitted with respect to such child or children as provided in subsection (a) of section 46-42"; P.A. 75-530 referred to return day of complaint rather than its date of filing and added general reference to hearing of counsel on all matters pertaining to "interests" of child or children; P.A. 78-230 divided section into Subsecs. and restated provisions; Sec. 46-43 transferred to Sec. 46b-54 in 1979 and reference to Sec. 46-36 revised to reflect its transfer.

      Annotations to former section 46-43:

      Cited. 174 C. 244.

      Cited. 7 CA 720.

      Counsel for minor child appointed where motion brought to change order for the child's custody. It's in child's best interest to appoint independent counsel where motion made to change custody order. 31 CS 340. Cited. 33 CS 100.

      Annotations to present section:

      Appointment of counsel for minor child is in discretion of court and court did not abuse discretion in failing to appoint counsel. 180 C. 533. Cited. 181 C. 622. Cited. 186 C. 311. Cited. 196 C. 260. Cited. 198 C. 138. Cited. 207 C. 725. Cited. 231 C. 928. Under certain limited circumstances minor children may appeal from trial court judgment concerning support obligations of the parents; judgment of appellate court reversed. 235 C. 82. Cited. 241 C. 767. Attorneys appointed by court pursuant to section are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken during, or activities necessary to, performance of functions that are integral to the judicial process, and defendant attorney entitled to absolute immunity because complaint not grounded on any conduct by defendant in which she acted outside usual role of an attorney for minor children. 274 C. 533. Trial court may protect minor's interests in dissolution action solely through appointment of an attorney, rather than also requiring simultaneous appointment of a guardian ad litem or naming of a next friend. 276 C. 526.

      Cited. 8 CA 50. Cited. 11 CA 189. Cited. 18 CA 622. Cited. 23 CA 509. Cited. 35 CA 421; Id., 449. Cited. 37 CA 194. Cited. 40 CA 675. Appointment of attorney to represent a minor child rests within the sound discretion of court. 78 CA 493. Attorneys appointed pursuant to section are entitled to qualified quasi-judicial immunity, and such immunity is properly pleaded as a special defense and the issue raised by using either motion to strike or motion for summary judgment. 81 CA 382.

      Cited. 35 CS 237.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 224 C. 776.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 32 CA 152.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 224 C. 776.

      Cited. 39 CA 162. Trial court did not err in permitting attorney for the minor child to assert psychologist-patient privilege as basis for an oral motion in limine re communications made by the child, where defendant failed to request appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child. 72 CA 193. Duties of guardian ad litem may subsume those traditionally performed by counsel when counsel is the child's sole representative. 76 CA 693.

      Sec. 46b-55. (Formerly Sec. 46-63). Attorney General as party. Paternity establishment. (a) The Attorney General shall be and remain a party to any action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment, and to any proceedings after judgment in such action, if any party to the action, or any child of any party, is receiving or has received aid or care from the state. The Attorney General may also be a party to such action for the purpose of establishing, enforcing or modifying an order for support or alimony if any party to the action is receiving support enforcement services pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.

      (b) If any child born during a marriage, which is terminated by a divorce decree or decree of dissolution of marriage, is found not to be issue of such marriage, the child or his representative may bring an action in the Superior Court to establish the paternity of the child within one year after the date of the judgment of divorce or decree of dissolution of the marriage of his natural mother, notwithstanding the provisions of section 46b-160.

      (1971, P.A. 712, S. 1-4; P.A. 73-373, S. 42; P.A. 74-183, S. 271, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 234, 681; P.A. 78-230, S. 47, 54; P.A. 86-359, S. 32, 44.)

      History: P.A. 73-373 substituted "dissolution of marriage" for "divorce" in Subsec. (a), deleted former Subsecs. (b) and (c) re appointment of attorney to protect child's interests and re action to establish paternity of child who is determined not to be issue of the marriage in question and relettered former Subsec. (d) accordingly, adding references to decrees of dissolution of marriage; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas in Subsec. (b), effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-230 rephrased provisions but made no substantive change; Sec. 46-63 transferred to Sec. 46b-55 in 1979 and reference to Sec. 52-435a revised to reflect that section's transfer; P.A. 86-359 amended Subsec. (a) to permit attorney general to be party to action for purpose of establishing, enforcing or modifying order of support or alimony if any party to action is receiving support enforcement services.

      See chapter 815y re paternity matters.

      Annotations to former section 46-63:

      Cited. 31 CS 188. Cited. 34 CS 187; Id., 628.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 180 C. 114. Cited. 185 C. 180.

      Cited. 11 CA 43. Cited. 37 CA 856.

      Cited. 40 CS 6.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 188 C. 98; Id., 354. Cited. 200 C. 656. Cited. 219 C. 703. Cited. 236 C. 719.

      Cited. 15 CA 745.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 234 C. 51. Cited. 235 C. 82.

      Cited. 34 CA 129; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 51.

      Sec. 46b-56. (Formerly Sec. 46-42). Orders re custody, care, education, visitation and support of children. Best interests of the child. Access to records of minor child by noncustodial parent. Orders re therapy, counseling and drug or alcohol screening. (a) In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children, and at any time after the return day of any complaint under section 46b-45, the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815p. Subject to the provisions of section 46b-56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. The court may also make any order granting the right of visitation of any child to a third party to the action, including, but not limited to, grandparents.

      (b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to: (1) Approval of a parental responsibility plan agreed to by the parents pursuant to section 46b-56a; (2) the award of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents, which shall include (A) provisions for residential arrangements with each parent in accordance with the needs of the child and the parents, and (B) provisions for consultation between the parents and for the making of major decisions regarding the child's health, education and religious upbringing; (3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child; or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child.

      (c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child's cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.

      (d) Upon the issuance of any order assigning custody of the child to the Commissioner of Children and Families, or not later than sixty days after the issuance of such order, the court shall make a determination whether the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to keep the child with his or her parents prior to the issuance of such order and, if such efforts were not made, whether such reasonable efforts were not possible, taking into consideration the best interests of the child, including the child's health and safety.

      (e) In determining whether a child is in need of support and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide support, the court shall take into consideration all the factors enumerated in section 46b-84.

      (f) When the court is not sitting, any judge of the court may make any order in the cause which the court might make under this section, including orders of injunction, prior to any action in the cause by the court.

      (g) A parent not granted custody of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.

      (h) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, when a motion for modification of custody or visitation is pending before the court or has been decided by the court and the investigation ordered by the court pursuant to section 46b-6 recommends psychiatric or psychological therapy for a child, and such therapy would, in the court's opinion, be in the best interests of the child and aid the child's response to a modification, the court may order such therapy and reserve judgment on the motion for modification.

      (i) As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 15; P.A. 74-169, S. 8, 18; P.A. 75-530, S. 12, 35; P.A. 77-488, S. 2; P.A. 78-230, S. 27, 54; 78-318, S. 28; P.A. 80-29; P.A. 81-402, S. 1; P.A. 84-42; P.A. 93-319, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-137; P.A. 01-186, S. 12; May 9 Sp. Sess. P.A. 02-7, S. 35; P.A. 03-19, S. 105; P.A. 05-258, S. 3.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 made minor changes in wording; P.A. 75-530 replaced reference to filing date of complaint with reference to return day of complaint; P.A. 77-488 added provision authorizing court to make orders re visitation rights for third parties such as grandparents; P.A. 78-230 divided section into Subsecs. and restated provisions; P.A. 78-318 qualified court's power to make orders re care, custody and visitation by adding "if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of Ch. 815o"; Sec. 46-42 transferred to Sec. 46b-56 in 1979 and references to other sections within section revised as necessary to reflect their transfer; P.A. 80-29 authorized assignment of joint custody in Subsec. (a); P.A. 81-402 amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the court is subject to the provisions of Sec. 46b-56a in assigning custody and changed the order of possible custody assignments so that "to the parents jointly" is listed first, and amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the court may consider the causes for the dissolution or legal separation if the causes are relevant in a determination of the best interests of the child; P.A. 84-42 added Subsec. (e) re access of noncustodial parent to academic, medical, hospital or other health records of minor children; P.A. 93-319 added a provision in Subsec. (b) requiring the court to consider whether a party has completed a parenting education program when making or modifying a custody or visitation order, effective January 1, 1994, and applicable to actions pending on, or filed on or after, that date; P.A. 99-137 added Subsec. (f) re order of psychiatric or psychological therapy for a child if it would be in the best interests of the child and would aid the child's response to a modification of custody or visitation; P.A. 01-186 added Subsec. (g) re court-ordered participation in counseling and drug or alcohol screening; May 9 Sp. Sess. P.A. 02-7 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision requiring the court upon issuance of any order assigning custody of the child to the Commissioner of Children and Families, or not later than sixty days thereafter, to make a determination whether the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to keep the child with his or her parents prior to the issuance of such order and, if such efforts were not made, whether such reasonable efforts were not possible considering the best interests of the child, effective August 15, 2002; P.A. 03-19 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 05-258 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting "at any time" and replacing "education and support of the children and of care, custody and visitation" with "custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children" re court making or modifying proper order, replacing "assign the custody of any child to the parents jointly," with "assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody" and replacing "third party" with "third party to the action" re visitation rights, amended Subsec. (b) by replacing former Subdivs. (1) and (2) and other provisions re custody or visitation order with provisions re consideration of rights, responsibilities and involvement of both parents and new Subdivs. (1) to (4) re provisions that may be included in orders, added new Subsec. (c) re best interests of the child and factors that court may consider, designated provisions of existing Subsec. (b) re order assigning custody to Commissioner of Children and Families as new Subsec. (d) and made a technical change therein, and redesignated existing Subsecs. (c) to (g) as new Subsecs. (e) to (i) and made technical changes therein.

      Annotations to former section 46-23:

      Settlement of child not affected by award of custody. 2 C. 20. Defendant not bound to defray expenses of divorce suit containing prayer for custody of children. 18 C. 424. Court has continuing jurisdiction over custody, whether child in this state or elsewhere. 131 C. 690. Refers to children of the marriage. 134 C. 316. Cited. 140 C. 254. Cited. 142 C. 558. Where controversy is between mother and grandparents, the former has prior right to custody. 146 C. 104. Gives court power to open a judgment after the expiration of the term in which it was rendered. 165 C. 95. Cited. Id., 735. Cited. 168 C. 144.

      Court is without jurisdiction to make custodial or support orders for minor children after denying a decree of divorce. 1 CS 149. Where no order for custody of the child was made part of the divorce judgment, there can be no order to "annul or vary" as the statute provides. 3 CS 352. Cited. 11 CS 248. Statute relates only to matter of custody of minor children. Id., 398. If no order for the support of minor children is made a part of the divorce judgment, the court may not pass such an order thereafter. 13 CS 119. Court cannot award custody of husband's illegitimate child to wife. 14 CS 391. Cited. 16 CS 70; Id., 87. Orders of the superior court with respect to custody and support are incidental to its exclusive jurisdiction of divorce. 19 CS 372. Cited. 27 CS 296. Cited. 30 CS 49. Appointment of independent counsel is in best interest of a child where motion made to change order for its custody. 31 CS 340.

      Circuit court has no jurisdiction of action to recover payments made for support of minor son to former wife in compliance with superior court decree of divorce since such support matters are within continuing exclusive jurisdiction of superior court. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 318.

      Annotations to former section 46-24:

      Court will not take daughter from custody of mother, when child is well cared for, and not liable to be by father. 2 R. 461. Power of court to modify order, even where children have been removed to foreign jurisdiction. 83 C. 479. Jurisdiction of superior court limited to habeas corpus and orders incidental to divorce decree; distinction between custody of person and custody of estate. 97 C. 442. To recognize foreign judgment determining custody accords with or public policy. 131 C. 388. Applies only to children of the marriage. Superior court will not interfere with petition for adoption pending before probate court. 134 C. 312. Cited. 140 C. 254. Grants wide discretion and any condition imposed can be assailed only on abuse of that discretion. 141 C. 235. Cited. 142 C. 558. Plaintiff sought to modify decree granting custody of children to former husband on the ground that former husband not legally married to his present wife who previously had obtained an Alabama divorce; held that plaintiff had no standing to question validity of the Alabama divorce unless it was to prove lack of moral character in present wife because divorce was obtained through fraud or perjury. 148 C. 1. Decree of Florida court re custody of child is entitled to full faith and credit in this state, and since the Florida court could modify the decree upon proof that circumstances had materially changed, the courts of this state can so act on similar proof. Id., 255.

      Cited. 1 CS 150. This statute did not give the superior court any original independent jurisdiction to entertain matters involving custody of minor children apart from that which it already had incident to divorce and in habeas corpus proceedings. 10 CS 275. Court may award custody of child to defendant who had not asked for it in the pleadings. 11 CS 246. Cited. Id., 398. Aliter. Id., 252. Court cannot award for support to wife for husband's illegitimate child. 14 CS 391. Superior court has the power to enter an order for support conditioned upon the granting to the defendant of the rights of visitation to which he may be entitled. 18 CS 20. Orders of superior court with respect to custody and support are incidental to the jurisdiction over divorce. 19 CS 372. Cited. 20 CS 278. Court refused to entertain habeas corpus proceedings for custody of child (1) because plaintiff had not exhausted remedies in a juvenile court decision on this issue and (2) because proceedings affecting the custody of the child were then pending in probate court. 21 CS 73. Fact that superior court originally awarded custody of a child in a divorce action does not mean that it retains exclusive jurisdiction over custody of the child. Id. Connecticut court may grant custody of children to a wife whose husband obtained a valid divorce out of state if the court which granted such divorce could make such an order regarding custody after the time of the divorce. Id., 378. Cited. 28 CS 129.

      Circuit court has no jurisdiction of action to recover payments made for support of minor son to former wife in compliance with superior court decree of divorce since such support matters are within continuing exclusive jurisdiction of superior court. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 318.

      Annotations to former section 46-42:

      Cited. 171 C. 433. Cited. 172 C. 341. Decision of trial court with respect to custody and care of minor children must stand unless court has abused its discretion. 173 C. 161. Discussion of ante nuptial agreements relating to property rights upon dissolution of the marriage. 181 C. 482.

      Annotations to present section:

      Cited. 177 C. 47. Court has no authority to issue an order of support against a husband as neither the biological or adoptive parent of the child. 180 C. 114. Court did not exceed its authority by setting aside certain personal property for the use of the minor children. Id., 528. Cited. 181 C. 622. Cited. 182 C. 545. Restrictions on visitation rights discussed. 184 C. 36. Cited. 185 C. 275. Until entry of final decree the court has discretion to modify custody without first finding material change of circumstances since previous award. 186 C. 118. Cited. Id., 709. Cited. 190 C. 345. Statute read together with Sec. 46b-61 and Sec. 46b-93 provide that it is permissible under certain circumstances to award child support even though child is not within this jurisdiction. 191 C. 92. Cited. 196 C. 10; Id., 260. Cited. 201 C. 50. Cited. 212 C. 441. Temporary custody order is final judgment for purposes of appellate review. Appellate court's dismissal of appeal reversed. 224 C. 749. Sec. 46b-56 et seq. cited. 236 C. 582. Cited. 239 C. 336. Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to order pendente lite child support, regardless of whether child at issue is considered a "child of the marriage". 248 C. 487.

      Cited. 2 CA 472. Cited. 4 CA 94. Cited. 8 CA 50. Cited. 13 CA 300. Cited. 14 CA 296. Cited. 18 CA 622. Cited. 19 CA 146. Cited. 22 CA 802. Cited. 25 CA 693. Cited. 35 CA 421. Cited. 37 CA 397. Cited. 41 CA 716. Cited. 42 CA 583; Id., 651. Substantial modification of visitation order requires evidentiary hearing to determine best interest of child. 54 CA 50. Court had sufficient evidence to modify custody order even without the benefit of prejudgment psychological evaluation of defendant. 61 CA 175. Trial court properly decided parental relocation with child pursuant to statutory best interest of child standard because the interests and circumstances of the parties at the postjudgment stage differ from those existing at time of the dissolution. 68 CA 173. Central to courts' review of modifications of custody orders under section is the concept that courts must be guided by best interests of the child. 72 CA 528. Although both parties to marital dissolution action agreed to unrestricted authority of the arbitrator-attorney for the minor children in the event of a controversy by binding arbitration with no express language restricting the breadth of issues, no reservation of explicit rights and no contingency for court review, the very limited review runs afoul of statute which requires that court exercising its equitable jurisdiction re custody assure itself that its judgment will serve best interests of the child and was an improper delegation of judicial authority. 83 CA 115.

      Cited. 35 CS 237. Cited. 41 CS 258; Id., 429. Does not confer parents, acting as grandparents, whose son's parental rights have been terminated, the authorization to bring a habeas corpus petition to seek custody of a grandchild. 47 CS 273.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 183 C. 353. Cited. 185 C. 249. Cited. 201 C. 229. Cited. 207 C. 217.

      Joint custody discussed. 5 CA 649. Cited. 7 CA 745. Cited. 41 CA 861; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 490. Cited. 43 CA 327.

      Subsec. (b):

      Court not obligated to interview each child before decision on custody. 178 C. 254. Cited 179 C. 287. Court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody to mother in accordance with thirteen-year-old child's wish despite mother's failure to appear at the hearing. 180 C. 132. While the rights, wishes and desires of the parents must be considered it is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child which must control the decision of the court. Id., 533. Statute which vests discretion in trial court to determine the best interest of a child in awarding custody without objective guidelines is not unconstitutionally vague. Id., 705. Neither applicable statutes nor case law recognize any presumption in custody matters. 181 C. 622. Cited. 183 C. 353. Cited. 201 C. 229. Cited. 207 C. 48; Id., 217. Cited. 212 C. 63. Cited. 224 C. 776. Cited. 235 C. 82. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 767.

      Court must resolve issue of custody in the best interests of the child whatever agreements have been made between the parents. 1 CA 356. Cited. 5 CA 649. Cited. 23 CA 509. Cited. 24 CA 426; Id., 804. Cited. 38 CA 263. Visitation by respondent mother was not in child's best interest when respondent had not been consistent in maintaining visitation with the child, scheduled visits had not gone well, the child had become attached to her aunt and uncle, respondent had not related naturally or interacted appropriately with the child and respondent's visits had been upsetting to the child. 63 CA 493.

      Cited. 38 CS 37.

      Subsec. (c):

      Cited. 186 C. 191.

      Subsec. (e):

      Cited. 201 C. 229.

      Sec. 46b-56a. Joint custody. Definition. Presumption. Conciliation. Parental responsibility plan. Modification of orders. (a) For the purposes of this section, "joint custody" means an order awarding legal custody of the minor child to both parents, providing for joint decision-making by the parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of continuing contact with both parents. The court may award joint legal custody without awarding joint physical custody where the parents have agreed to merely joint legal custody.

      (b) There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child or children of the marriage. If the court declines to enter an order awarding joint custody pursuant to this subsection, the court shall state in its decision the reasons for denial of an award of joint custody.

      (c) If only one parent seeks an order of joint custody upon a motion duly made, the court may order both parties to submit to conciliation at their own expense with the costs of such conciliation to be borne by the parties as the court directs according to each party's ability to pay.

      (d) In any proceeding before the Superior Court involving a dispute between the parents of a minor child with respect to the custody, care, education and upbringing of such child, the parents shall file with the court, at such time and in such form as provided by rule of court, a proposed parental responsibility plan that shall include, at a minimum, the following: (1) A schedule of the physical residence of the child during the year; (2) provisions allocating decision-making authority to one or both parents regarding the child's health, education and religious upbringing; (3) provisions for the resolution of future disputes between the parents, including, where appropriate, the involvement of a mental health professional or other parties to assist the parents in reaching a developmentally appropriate resolution to such disputes; (4) provisions for dealing with the parents' failure to honor their responsibilities under the plan; (5) provisions for dealing with the child's changing needs as the child grows and matures; and (6) provisions for minimizing the child's exposure to harmful parental conflict, encouraging the parents in appropriate circumstances to meet their responsibilities through agreements, and protecting the best interests of the child.

      (e) The objectives of a parental responsibility plan under this section are to provide for the child's physical care and emotional stability, to provide for the child's changing needs as the child grows and to set forth the authority and responsibility of each parent with respect to the child.

      (f) If both parents consent to a parental responsibility plan under this section, such plan shall be approved by the court as the custodial and access orders of the court pursuant to section 46b-56, unless the court finds that such plan as submitted and agreed to is not in the best interests of the child.

      (g) The court may modify any orders made under this section in accordance with section 46b-56.

      (P.A. 81-402, S. 2; P.A. 05-258, S. 4.)

      History: P.A. 05-258 added Subsecs. (d) to (g) re parental responsibility plan and modification of orders.

      Sec. 46b-56 et seq. cited. 236 C. 582.

      Joint custody discussed. 5 CA 649. Cited. 25 CA 366. Trial court did not abuse discretion when giving parent safe discretion re attendance at private school where there was joint custody. 55 CA 18. Section applies only where parents are sole petitioners for custody of child and there is agreement of both parents to share joint custody. 90 CA 744.

      Subsec. (a):

      Cited. 207 C. 217.

      Subsec. (b):

      Cited. 195 C. 202. Cited. 207 C. 217.

      Sec. 46b-56b. Presumption re best interest of child to be in custody of parent. In any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent, which presumption may be rebutted by showing that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody.

      (P.A. 85-244, S. 2, 3; P.A. 86-224; 86-403, S. 81, 132.)

      History: P.A. 86-224 added provision re grounds for rebuttal of presumption; P.A. 86-403 made technical changes.

      Sec. 46b-56 et seq. cited. 236 C. 582. Cited. 237 C. 233. Cited. 241 C. 767. Statutory presumption rebutted. Trial court required to determine issue of custody on basis of child's best interest without regard to presumption in favor of the parent. 244 C. 403.

      Cited. 6 CA 707. Cited. 24 CA 402; Id., 426. Cited. 40 CA 675.

      Cited. 44 CS 169.

      Sec. 46b-56c. Educational support orders. (a) For purposes of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private occupational school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor's or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. An educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age.

      (b) (1) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and no educational support order may be entered thereafter unless the decree explicitly provides that a motion or petition for an educational support order may be filed by either parent at a subsequent date. If no educational support order is entered at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and the parents have a child who has not attained twenty-three years of age, the court shall inform the parents that no educational support order may be entered thereafter. The court may accept a parent's waiver of the right to file a motion or petition for an educational support order upon a finding that the parent fully understands the consequences of such waiver.

      (2) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of an order for support pendente lite pursuant to section 46b-83.

      (3) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order of support pursuant to section 46b-61 or 46b-171 or similar section of the general statutes, or at any time thereafter.

      (4) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order pursuant to any other provision of the general statutes authorizing the court to make an order of support for a child, subject to the provisions of sections 46b-212 to 46b-213v, inclusive.

      (c) The court may not enter an educational support order pursuant to this section unless the court finds as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact. After making such finding, the court, in determining whether to enter an educational support order, shall consider all relevant circumstances, including: (1) The parents' income, assets and other obligations, including obligations to other dependents; (2) the child's need for support to attend an institution of higher education or private occupational school considering the child's assets and the child's ability to earn income; (3) the availability of financial aid from other sources, including grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the higher education to be funded considering the child's academic record and the financial resources available; (5) the child's preparation for, aptitude for and commitment to higher education; and (6) evidence, if any, of the institution of higher education or private occupational school the child would attend.

      (d) At the appropriate time, both parents shall participate in, and agree upon, the decision as to which institution of higher education or private occupational school the child will attend. The court may make an order resolving the matter if the parents fail to reach an agreement.

      (e) To qualify for payments due under an educational support order, the child must (1) enroll in an accredited institution of higher education or private occupational school, as defined in section 10a-22a, (2) actively pursue a course of study commensurate with the child's vocational goals that constitutes at least one-half the course load determined by that institution or school to constitute full-time enrollment, (3) maintain good academic standing in accordance with the rules of the institution or school, and (4) make available all academic records to both parents during the term of the order. The order shall be suspended after any academic period during which the child fails to comply with these conditions.

      (f) The educational support order may include support for any necessary educational expense, including room, board, dues, tuition, fees, registration and application costs, but such expenses shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student at the time the child for whom educational support is being ordered matriculates, except this limit may be exceeded by agreement of the parents. An educational support order may also include the cost of books and medical insurance for such child.

      (g) The court may direct that payments under an educational support order be made (1) to a parent to be forwarded to the institution of higher education or private occupational school, (2) directly to the institution or school, or (3) otherwise as the court determines to be appropriate.

      (h) On motion or petition of a parent, an educational support order may be modified or enforced in the same manner as is provided by law for any support order.

      (i) This section does not create a right of action by a child for parental support for higher education.

      (j) An educational support order under this section does not include support for graduate or postgraduate education beyond a bachelor's degree.

      (k) The provisions of this section shall apply only in cases when the initial order for parental support of the child is entered on or after October 1, 2002.

      (P.A. 02-128, S. 1.)

      Although trial court failed to make necessary finding that it was more likely than not that parties would have provided support for their daughter's college education had the family remained intact, its failure to comply with section was harmless, given ample evidence in the record to support such a finding, and given plaintiff's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that court's failure to make the finding was harmful. 96 CA 102.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (1): Use of "shall" means it is mandatory that court inform parents that if no educational support order is entered at the time of dissolution neither party may obtain such an order in future. 86 CA 719.

      Subsec. (h):

      Contrary to plaintiff's claims, because, pursuant to this subsec. an educational support order may be enforced in same manner as provided by law for any support order, trial court had authority to enforce the order by requiring that security be given, it acted within its discretion and authority in establishing a trust as means of securing the order, and did not abuse its discretion in funding the order with proceeds from sale of Vermont property. 96 CA 102.

      Sec. 46b-56d. Relocation of parent with minor child. Burden of proof. Factors considered by court. (a) In any proceeding before the Superior Court arising after the entry of a judgment awarding custody of a minor child and involving the relocation of either parent with the child, where such relocation would have a significant impact on an existing parenting plan, the relocating parent shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose, (2) the proposed location is reasonable in light of such purpose, and (3) the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

      (b) In determining whether to approve the relocation of the child under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, but such consideration shall not be limited to: (1) Each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation; (2) the quality of the relationships between the child and each parent; (3) the impact of the relocation on the quantity and the quality of the child's future contact with the nonrelocating parent; (4) the degree to which the relocating parent's and the child's life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the relocation; and (5) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements.

      (P.A. 06-168, S. 1.)

      Sec. 46b-57. (Formerly Sec. 46-47). Third party intervention re custody of minor children. Preference of child. In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody of minor children, and on any complaint under this chapter or section 46b-1 or 51-348a, if there is any minor child of either or both parties, the court, if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815p, may allow any interested third party or parties to intervene upon motion. The court may award full or partial custody, care, education and visitation rights of such child to any such third party upon such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. Before allowing any such intervention, the court may appoint counsel for the child or children pursuant to the provisions of section 46b-54. In making any order under this section, the court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent preference.

      (P.A. 73-373, S. 17; P.A. 74-169, S. 10, 18; P.A. 78-230, S. 32, 54; 78-318, S. 29; P.A. 03-19, S. 106.)

      History: P.A. 74-169 made minor changes in wording and made appointment of counsel for child or children optional rather than mandatory, substituting "may" for "shall"; P.A. 78-230 restated provisions; P.A. 78-318 qualified court's power to allow third party intervention and to award custody, etc. to third party by adding "if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815o"; Sec. 46-47 transferred to Sec. 46b-57 in 1979 and references to other sections within provisions revised as necessary to reflect their transfer; P.A. 03-19 made technical changes, effective May 12, 2003.

      Annotations to former section 46-47:

      Cited. 174 C. 244.

      Cited. 7 CA 720.

      Cited. 33 CS 100.

      Annotations to present section:

      Motion to intervene under statute was barred by absence of controversy; timeliness and "interested third parties" discussed. 185 C. 502. Cited. 193 C. 393. Former intervention not a requirement to a valid order of custody. 196 C. 10. Cited. 235 C. 82. Sec. 46b-56 et seq. cited. 236 C. 582. Cited. 239 C. 336. Cited. 241 C. 767.

      Cited. 2 CA 132; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 51. Cited. 11 CA 43. Cited. 34 CA 129. Cited. 35 CA 421. Cited. 40 CA 675.

      Cited. 35 CS 237.

      Sec. 46b-58. (Formerly Sec. 46-58). Custody, maintenance and education of adopted children. The authority of the Superior Court to make and enforce orders and decrees as to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children in any controversy before the court between husband and wife brought under the provisions of this chapter is extended to children adopted by both parties and to any natural child of one of the parties who has been adopted by the other.

      (1963, P.A. 414; P.A. 73-373, S. 31; P.A. 78-230, S. 43, 54.)

      History: P.A. 73-373 made no substantive change; P.A. 78-230 made minor changes in wording and deleted reference to Sec. 46-5h; Sec. 46-58 transfe