Sec. 52-577c. Limitation of action for damages caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant. (a) For the purposes
of this section: (1) "Environment" means any surface water, ground water, drinking
water supply, land surface or subsurface strata or ambient air within the state or under
the jurisdiction of the state; (2) "exposure" means any contact, ingestion, inhalation or
assimilation, including irradiation; (3) "hazardous chemical substance or mixture"
means petroleum, a petroleum product or any chemical substance or mixture for which
there is a federal standard, including any law, requirement, tolerance, prohibition, action
level or similar legal authority adopted by an agency pursuant to federal law, including
any such standard or legal authority adopted by a state or local government pursuant to
federal law, generally intended to prevent, reduce or mitigate the risk of a disease or
class or type of diseases to an individual or individuals resulting from exposure to such
chemical substance or mixture; (4) "hazardous pollutant" means any designated, specified or referenced chemical considered to be a "hazardous substance" under Section
101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 USC 9601(14); (5) "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing
into the environment.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-577 and 52-577a, no action to
recover damages for personal injury or property damage caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant released into the environment
shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury or damage complained of is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to an action
brought against (1) any municipal waterworks system established and operated under
chapter 102 or any special act, (2) any regional water authority established under any
general statute or special act, or (3) any water company as defined in section 16-1.
(P.A. 84-287; P.A. 98-140, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 98-140 redefined "hazardous chemical substance or mixture" to include petroleum and petroleum
products.
Cited. 205 C. 219, 243. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Cited. 238 C. 800.
Cited. 31 CA 824, 852-854.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 238 C. 800. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 228 C. 905. Cited. 230 C. 12, 14, 16. Cited. 238 C. 800.
Cited. 31 CA 824, 825, 831, 845, 852, 853.
Sec. 52-577d. Limitation of action for damages to minor caused by sexual
abuse, exploitation or assault. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no
action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress,
caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such
person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority.
(P.A. 86-401, S. 6, 7; 86-403, S. 104, 132; P.A. 91-240; P.A. 02-138, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change; P.A. 91-240 changed "two" years to "seventeen" years and deleted phrase
"except that no such action may be brought more than seven years from the date of the act complained of"; P.A. 02-138
extended the limitation on bringing an action from seventeen to thirty years after the attainment of the age of majority,
effective May 23, 2002, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed prior to, on or after
said date.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations in criminal prosecution.
Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Court concluded that section as amended by expanding period of liability did not create a
substantive change in the law that would preclude its retroactive application. 224 C. 483, 484, 486-494. Cited. 230 C.
472, 484.
Cited. 39 CA 183-185, 187-195, 212-214.
Cited. 44 CS 527. Cited. 45 CS 136.
Sec. 52-577e. Limitation of action for damages caused by sexual assault. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-577 and 52-577d, an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by sexual assault may be brought at any time after the
date of the act complained of if the party legally at fault for such injury has been convicted
of a violation of section 53a-70 or 53a-70a.
(P.A. 02-138, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 02-138 effective May 23, 2002, and applicable to any cause of action arising from an incident committed
prior to, on or after said date.
Secs. 52-577f to 52-577o. Reserved for future use.
Sec. 52-577p. Transferred to Chapter 925, Sec. 52-557p.
Sec. 52-578. Limitation of action for damages caused by change of grade of
highway. No action shall be brought by the owner of land adjoining a public highway,
or of any interest in such land, for recovery of special damage to such property or interest
by reason of any change in the grade of such highway, or by reason of excavations in
such highway made in the process of repairing the same by the town, city or borough
in which such highway is situated, except within six years next after the right of action
accrues.
(1949 Rev., S. 8317.)
Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. Cited. 215 C. 464, 476.
Sec. 52-579. Limitation of suit on probate bond; exception. No action shall be
maintained against the surety on any probate bond unless brought within six years from
the final settlement of account of the principal in such bond and the acceptance of such
account by the Court of Probate; but this provision shall not apply to minors who are
parties in interest.
(1949 Rev., S. 8318.)
Cited. 139 C. 220. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Cited. 3 CA 602, 605.
Sec. 52-580. Settlement of partnership or joint accounts. In any case of partnership or of joint occupancy of real or personal property, the court before which any action
for the settlement or adjustment of the partnership or joint account is pending shall take
into consideration, in making the settlement, all the partnership or joint transactions
since the time of the last settlement, although more than six years may have elapsed
since the last settlement.
(1949 Rev., S. 8319; P.A. 82-160, S. 248.)
History: P.A. 82-160 replaced "estate" with "property" and rephrased the section.
Same rule applies in actions of book debt; 1 D. 250; but not, ordinarily, in other cases. 9 C. 365. See note to section
52-576.
Cited. 13 CS 175.
Sec. 52-581. Action on oral contract to be brought within three years. (a) No
action founded upon any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing,
or of which some note or memorandum is not made in writing and signed by the party
to be charged therewith or his agent, shall be brought but within three years after the
right of action accrues.
(b) This section shall not apply to causes of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.
(1949 Rev., S. 8320; 1961, P.A. 116, S. 24; P.A. 82-160, S. 249.)
History: 1961 act excepted causes of action governed by article 2 of title 42a; P.A. 82-160 deleted the exception for
"actions for a debt due by book or actions founded on proper subjects of book debt", rephrased the section and inserted
Subsec. indicators.
Applies to actions to recover unliquidated damages for a nonperformance of executory contracts. 52 C. 146. Cited. 56
C. 25. Applied to suit against surgeon for breach of implied contract to use reasonable care and skill, when. 103 C. 720;
127 C. 386; 119 C. 507 and 134 C. 259 and section 52-584. Applied to oral agreement to pay wages during incapacity and
to reemploy in consideration of waiver of right to damages for injury. 114 C. 732; 134 C. 259. Does not apply to action
by employee to recover overtime pay and liquidated damages under federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 246. History
of this section. Id., 258. Distinguished from section 52-576; this section is restricted to executory contracts. Id., 259. See
note to chapter 926. Proof of existence and performance of contract unenforceable because of statute of frauds is a sufficient
answer to defense of statute of limitations by showing that no action brought earlier could be maintained. 134 C. 536.
Applies only to executory contracts. 134 C. 585; 135 C. 179. Since contract was executed and all that remained was to
pay plaintiff, this section does not bar action. 134 C. 585. Statute of limitations to run from the time when the cause of
action accrues. 144 C. 170. When plaintiff's performance on oral contract has been completely executed, section 52-576
and not this section establishes applicable limitation period. 170 C. 243, 247-249. Cited. 210 C. 734, 746. Cited. 214 C.
464, 476. Cited. 217 C. 340, 355.
Cited. 17 CA 159, 160, 162, 163. Cited. 18 CA 525, 528, 530. Cited. 33 CA 702, 714. Cited. 39 CA 289, 292. Section's
three-year statute of limitations applies only to executory contracts and, therefore, did not apply to executed oral contract;
six-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-576 applied. 76 CA 599.
When statute begins to run. 3 CS 209. Applies to actions to recover unliquidated damages for nonperformance of
executory contracts. 8 CS 264. Cited. 9 CS 401; id., 522; 17 CS 61. History and scope discussed. 13 CS 174. Statute is
tolled from incurrence of legal not apparent damage. 14 CS 464. Applies to suits based upon oral contract of employment
under the Fair Labor Standards Acts of 1938. 15 CS 3. Procedure required herein cannot be circumvented to avoid the
three year limit set. 31 CS 434. Application restricted to executory contracts only in contrast to application of Sec. 52-576
to contracts where party has fully performed. 37 CS 735, 741. Cited. 39 CS 458, 461.
Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367.
Subsec. (a):
Permits statutory requirement of a contract in writing to be satisfied by juxtaposition of two documents, each denoting
the agreement of one of the parties, but not juxtaposition of two inconsistent documents. 83 CA 715. Assumes existence
of an underlying contractual commitment and addresses only the requirement of a written memorial thereof. Id.
Sec. 52-582. Petition for new trial. No petition for a new trial in any civil or
criminal proceeding shall be brought but within three years next after the rendition of
the judgment or decree complained of, except that a petition based on DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence that was not discoverable or available at the time of the original
trial may be brought at any time after the discovery or availability of such new evidence.
(1949 Rev., S. 8322; P.A. 00-80, S. 2, 3.)
History: P.A. 00-80 added exception authorizing a petition based on DNA evidence not discoverable or available at
time of original trial to be brought at any time after the discovery or availability of the new evidence, effective May 16,
2000, and applicable to any offense committed prior to, on or after that date.
The "rendition" is the time when the judgment was actually entered. 1 R. 54. Complaint for equitable relief from
judgment obtained without notice should be seasonably brought. 46 C. 605. Petition for new trial may be brought under
this section despite section 52-212, though judgment was by default. 93 C. 160; 97 C. 123. Cited. 138 C. 573; 140 C. 464.
Effect of three-year limitation not decided. 142 C. 20. "Rendition of judgment" is the judgment at the trial court where it
is sustained on appeal. 181 C. 58, 59. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Cited. 229 C. 397, 426. Cited. 230 C. 427, 435.
Cited. 3 CA 322, 328. Cited. 24 CA 152, 155. Cited. 25 CA 155, 158. Cited. 27 CA 621, 623, 624, 626, 627.
Must be determined solely upon its own issues and without regard to the questions raised by an appeal from the judgment.
20 CS 469. Imposition of sentence is final judgment in criminal cases and stay of execution does not affect time limit for
bringing appeal. 36 CS 53-55. Cited. Id. Cited. 37 CS 891, 895. Cited. 38 CS 534, 535.
Motion for new trial not equivalent to petition for new trial. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 388.
Sec. 52-583. Actions against sheriff or constable for default limited to two
years. No civil action shall be brought against any sheriff, sheriff's deputy or constable,
for any neglect or default in his office or duty, but within two years next after the right
of action accrues.
(1949 Rev., S. 8323.)
When right of action accrues. 26 C. 334. Assumpsit for money collected on execution, not within the statute. 1 R. 303.
Action against sheriff for default of deputy; deputy's suit on receipt held to constitute an acknowledgment of continuing
liability which prevented the running of the statute. 38 C. 195. Action against officer for neglecting to make demand of
garnishee, accrues at the expiration of the sixty days allowed for that purpose. 50 C. 526. Statute of limitations to run from
the time when the cause of action accrues. 144 C. 170. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Limited suits on former section 18-49 as to time of commencement. 7 CS 328.
Sec. 52-584. Limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by
negligence, misconduct or malpractice. No action to recover damages for injury to
the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton
misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the
injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years
from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be
interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally
closed.
(1949 Rev., S. 8324; 1957, P.A. 467; 1969, P.A. 401, S. 2.)
History: 1969 act changed deadline for bringing action from one year to two years from date injury is first sustained
or discovered or should have been discovered, effective October 1, 1969, and applicable to injuries first sustained on or
after that date.
See Sec. 52-190a re automatic ninety-day extension to allow reasonable inquiry in malpractice action.
See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.
See Sec. 52-594 re time limits for executor or administrator to bring personal action which survives to representatives
of a deceased person.
Cited. 34 C. 58; 114 C. 732; 123 C. 648; 128 C. 108; 144 C. 282; 148 C. 327; 154 C. 708. In case of death, failure to
appoint administrator will not stop statute running. 77 C. 110. Includes all corporations. 77 C. 529. Demurrer cannot raise
question of statute, as date of injury is immaterial. 81 C. 284; 82 C. 579; 83 C. 503. "Injury" means hurt; statute applies
to action by husband for negligent injury to wife. 83 C. 505. Action for damage to goods from fall of leased building held
to be in this section. 82 C. 578. Negligence of telegraph company in changing order for goods not within this section. 91
C. 35. Applied to action against surgeon for negligence in treatment; but not against him in contract. 103 C. 719; but see
119 C. 507. History of this section. 119 C. 502. Applies to all actions to recover for personal injuries whether due to
negligence or not. Id., 507. In malpractice action statute runs from act if injury was then complete, from termination of
treatment if injury arises from a course of treatment. 127 C. 385. Applies to actions against nonresidents begun under
section 52-62. 116 C. 648. Connecticut statute held applicable to action here under N. J. workmen's compensation law
although right of action thereunder did not arise until after expiration of the one-year period. 131 C. 665. See notes to
chapter 926. Ignorance that damage has been done does not prevent running of statute, except where there is something
tantamount to fraudulent concealment of cause of action. 135 C. 176. Does not apply to cause of action founded on absolute
liability from ultrahazardous activity of blasting. 137 C. 577. Cannot be construed as embodying an exception by implication
in favor of an unemancipated minor. 139 C. 218. An action for injury to the person is governed by the one-year statute of
limitations only if the injury is caused by negligence, by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice. 142 C. 452.
The enactment of a statute which may bar an action even before the cause of action accrues is not beyond the power of the
legislature and is consonant with the purpose of a statute of limitations which is to prevent the unexpected enforcement
of stale claims concerning which the persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution. 144 C.
170. The one-year period of limitation starts to run at the date when the defendant negligently does the act which results
in damages to the plaintiff. Id. When the act or omission complained of was not merely selling a defective cartridge but
permitting it to be available for future use without indicating its potential danger, such a claim was not an act or omission
completed at the time of the sale but of conduct continuing to the time of the injury. Id., 316. Running of statute of limitations
suspended between decedent's death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate. 153 C. 255.
Does not apply to action by riparian owners against water company for diversion of waters. 155 C. 477. Defense of statute
of limitations is not proper matter for plea to jurisdiction. 159 C. 416, 419. Cited. 168 C. 329. Action based on negligence
must, by this section, be brought within one year of injury complained of but in any event within three years "of the act
or omission complained of". 170 C. 289, 292, 294-299, 303. Cited. 185 C. 390, 400. Cited. 186 C. 632, 644. Cited. 188
C. 301, 302. Cited. 190 C. 8-10, 12. Cited. 192 C. 327-334; Id., 451, 453, 458, 460; Id., 497, 503; Id., 732, 734-736, 738.
Cited. 198 C. 660, 665. Cited. 199 C. 683, 687. Cited. 200 C. 562, 584. Cited. 201 C. 39-43, 45, 46, 48-50. Lack of
informed consent is malpractice under the statute. 205 C. 1, 3-6. Cited. Id., 255, 259. Cited. Id., 741, 742, 744, 751. Cited
206. C. 229, 232. Cited. 207 C. 204, 212, 213. Cited. Id., 496, 508, 509. Cited. Id., 599, 601. Cited. 209 C. 437, 441. Cited.
211 C. 199, 205, 206. Cited. 212 C. 509, 523, 525, 527. Application of three-year bar with respect to negligence occurring
prior to that period does not infringe upon Conn. Const. Art I, Sec. 10. 213 C. 282-286, 288, 289. Cited. 214 C. 242-244,
246, 247, 255. Cited. Id., 464, 476. Cited. 215 C. 377, 395. Cited. 216 C. 412-415. Cited. 218 C. 531, 532, 538, 541, 546.
219 C. 363, 366, 368. Cited. 225 C. 238, 241, 249. "Continuous treatment" and "continuing course of conduct" doctrines
discussed. 229 C. 256-258, 262, 263, 265. Cited. 232 C. 527, 531, 535. Cited. 237 C. 25, 26. Cited. 238 C. 800. Cited.
239 C. 265. Cited. 242 C. 1. Statute of limitations was tolled; judgment of appellate court in Grimes v. Housing Authority,
42 CA 324 reversed. Id., 236. Statute of limitations was tolled when employer received notice of an employee's timely
filed action against a third party tortfeasor and intervened within thirty-day period prescribed by Sec. 31-293. 246 C. 156.
Where improvements to real property contemplated by an architect's or engineer's services are not completed because of
the defect complained of, Sec. 52-584a, and not Sec. 52-584, applies to plaintiff's cause of action. 247 C. 293. Mental
suffering constitutes injury, even if unaccompanied by physical trauma to the body. 248 C. 21. Precondition of the continuing
course of conduct doctrine is that defendant must have committed an initial wrong upon plaintiff. 252 C. 193. Since there
was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the three-year repose section contained in the statute was tolled
by defendant's alleged ongoing failure to warn plaintiff of his concern for cancer thus triggering the continuing course of
conduct doctrine, it was improper for trial court to have concluded that there was no continuing course of conduct as a
matter of law and to have granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id., 363. Allegations in amended complaint
presented a new and different set of facts and were barred by statute of limitations since new facts did not relate back to
original complaint. 257 C. 58. Does not impose a duty on plaintiff to investigate, instead, it requires jury to consider all
the facts and circumstances in order to determine date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been discovered. 262 C. 797. Does not impose a heightened standard of discovery on health
care professionals regarding discovery of actionable harm. Id. Correct legal standard by which to evaluate timeliness of
causes of action in negligence restated. Limitation period for actions in negligence begins to run on date when injury is
first discovered or in exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. 268 C. 723. Ninety-day extension provided
in section 52-190a(b) applies equally to both the two-year statute of limitation and three-year statute of repose in this section.
269 C. 787. Legislature's purpose in distinguishing "injury or actionable harm" from "the act of omission complained of"
and providing a three-year statute of repose, was to avoid the "draconian effect" of running the two-year limitation period
from the date of defendant's negligence in cases in which plaintiff is unable to bring an action because he could not discover
an essential jurisdictional fact, despite the exercise of reasonable care. 271 C. 284. Two-year statute of limitations set forth
in statute does not begin to run until plainitff knows or reasonably should have known the identity of the tortfeasor. Plainitff's
ignorance of tortfeasor's identity will not excuse plaintiff's failure to bring a negligence action within three years of the
date of the act or omission complained of. Id.
Cited. 1 CA 7, 8; Id., 123-125, 135, 136. Cited. Id., 652, 653. Provides no exceptions for minors or insane persons. 3
CA 602-605. Cited. 6 CA 212-216, 226, 229. Cited. 11 CA 156-159. Cited. 14 CA 178-181. Cited. 16 CA 108, 111.
Cited. 18 CA 515, 516, 519. Cited. 19 CA 16, 18. Cited. 21 CA 524, 525. Cited. 22 CA 610-612, 614. Cited. 24 CA 239,
241. Cited. 25 CA 665-667. Cited. 29 CA 392. Cited. 31 CA 235, 236, 238. Cited. Id., 569-571. Cited. 32 CA 187, 189.
Cited. Id., 205, 210, 211. Cited. 33 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 378, 380-382, 385. Cited. Id., 422, 423, 425, 429, 432. Cited. Id.,
673, 674, 679. Cited. 34 CA 395, 398, 399. Cited. 38 CA 458-460, 466. Cited. Id., 829, 832. Cited. 42 CA 324; judgment
reversed, see 242 C. 236 et seq. Cited. 43 CA 397. Cited. 45 CA 775. Cited. 46 CA 712. The continuing course of conduct
doctrine does not apply after plaintiff discovers the harm. 59 CA 311. Service of prejudgment remedy document did not
toll the running of section, even though contained the words "the institution of this action" and included unsigned proposed
writ of summons and complaint, since unsigned writ and complaint does not have effect of commencing a civil action. 61
CA 234. Court declined to adopt rule that section is tolled when prejudgment remedy documents are served. Id. Where
plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity, the two-year statute of limitations applies in subsequent
suit against the state and the exception under Sec. 52-593 for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply.
62 CA 545. Statute of limitations not tolled by continuous course of conduct doctrine where pathology group failed to
diagnose plaintiff's disease, because to expect pathology group to provide follow-up treatment or to instruct patient on
follow-up care after a negative diagnosis when there is no awareness that the diagnosis is wrong and there is no ongoing
relationship is beyond the expectation of public policy. 66 CA 518. Because plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to
demonstrate that defendant physician had an awareness of risk to plaintiff subsequent to the surgical sterilization procedure,
plaintiff could not establish that defendant had a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute.
67 CA 565. Although genuine issue of material fact existed re defendant's initial alleged negligence, trial court properly
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant physician was aware
of a risk to plaintiff that would have triggered a continuing duty to warn her so as to toll the limitation period of statute.
Id., 576. Statutes of limitation are not tolled by an automatic bankruptcy stay; pursuant to federal law, if the statute of
limitations expires during the automatic bankruptcy stay, plaintiff has thirty days from notice of termination or expiration
of the stay within which to commence an action. 68 CA 79. Where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff's property
as belonging to another, the case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore the statute of limitations in this section
applies rather than the three year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. 79 CA 290. Doctrines of continuous treatment and
continuing course of conduct apply, as a matter of law, only to three-year limitation period and do not apply to toll time
period for discovery portion of statute. 82 CA 396. Claim cast in contractual language subject to three-year period of statute
because, in light of noneconomic relief sought, it more closely resembles claim based on tortious conduct arising out of
negligent performance or nonperformance of contractual duty than claim for breach of contract. 84 CA 1.
Cited. 1 CS 142; 8 CS 93; 9 CS 312; 10 CS 6; 11 CS 119; 17 CS 62; 18 CS 225; 23 CS 367; 24 CS 321 et seq. Includes
personal injuries whether or not due to negligence, citing 119 Conn. 500, 507. 3 CS 417. Injury means physical injury. 4
CS 293. Action for malpractice whether founded on tort or contract must be brought within one year. 6 CS 92; but see 11
CS 180. Cause of action otherwise barred by statute of limitations is not saved because it is asserted as a counterclaim. 9
CS 387. Statute should not be passed upon by demurrer unless matters in avoidance of it have been voluntarily inserted
in the complaint. 10 CS 419; 17 CS 1. This section carves out an action ex contractu resulting from tortious or negligent
conduct which caused a breach of contract. 12 CS 286. Withholding service for the purpose of allowing insurance company
to adjust claim will not estop the statute from tolling if the insurance company is not a party defendant. 14 CS 418. Legal
damage and apparent damage distinguished. Id., 464. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution is not limited by
this section but by section 52-577. 15 CS 434. See note to section 52-577 re 17 CS 62. Where amendment to complaint
made more than two years after accident was based on nuisance, it was not barred since it is a question of fact whether
nuisance resulted from positive act or negligence. 17 CS 114; 20 CS 36. Section controls limitation on action for damage
to plaintiff's fence caused by the crumpling of a stone ledge on defendant's property near the common boundary. 18 CS
308. Former statute: Claimed negligence against manufacturer from expulsion of automobile tire while being mounted on
rim held barred by statute because manufacture took place more than a year before action was begun; former statute
compared. 19 CS 293. Defendant employer and its insurer not required to intervene within the one-year period. 20 CS 31.
Prior statute compared. Id., 34. When wrong sued upon consists of continuing course of conduct, statute does not begin
to run until that course of conduct is completed. 22 CS 46. The statute of limitations bars the plaintiff from amending his
complaint in a personal injury action to add a claim for property damage more than one year after the collision. Id., 472.
Where the action is seasonably brought so far as this section is concerned, the legislature did not intend that this section
qualify the right of the employee under section 31-293 to join as a plaintiff within thirty days thereafter. 23 CS 106.
Counterclaim more than a year after the occurrence is barred unless it may be allowed under the exception. Held that
pleadings had been finally closed on the filing of a reply when they terminated in an issue of fact decisive of the merits of
the case. That the court might reopen the pleadings at any time to permit amendment did not mean that they were not closed
within the intendment of the statute. Id., 139. Where complaint is broad enough to permit proof of causes in tort and
contract, demurrer merely reaching tort action is insufficient. 24 CS 459. Where plaintiffs alleged only negligence in their
complaint, their motion to amend by charging defendant with wanton misconduct stated a new cause of action and could
not be granted since the statute of limitations had run. 25 CS 363. This section does not apply to the "Dog Injury" statute,
which is governed by section 52-577. 26 CS 294, 296. Impleading under section 52-102a barred by statute of limitations.
27 CS 46. Motion to amend complaint to expand or amplify original allegations does not change cause of action and is
not barred by statute of limitations. Id., 60, 62. Cited. 28 CS 162. Where one year period with respect to antemortem injuries
had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative under section 52-594 had year from date of death to
institute action. Id., 461, 463, 464. Ordinarily, statute of limitations does not commence to run against defendant (third
party plaintiff) and in favor of third-party defendant until judgment has been entered against defendant. 29 CS 9, 13. Statute
of limitation suspended between decedent's death and appointment of administrator in personal injury action against estate.
Id., 246. Cited. Id. The time does not begin to run in a case involving a failure to warn of a foreign object in a patient's
body until the object is discovered, unless reasonable diligence would have uncovered it earlier. 32 CS 118, 120. Cited.
34 CS 22, 26. Provisions of this section should not be extended to allow codefendant to interpose cross claim when statute
of limitations has run on the plaintiff's cause of action. Id., 247, 249, 250. Statute of limitation is tolled upon the death of
a tortfeasor until a fiduciary of his estate is properly appointed and qualified. 36 CS 121, 123, 125. Cited. Id., 269, 270.
Cited. 37 CS, 735, 736, 738; id., 899, 900. Cited. 38 CS 318, 319. Cited. 40 CS 266, 268. Cited. 42 CS 187, 188, 193, 196.
Cited. 44 CS 148, 155. Cited. Id., 527. Cited. 45 CS 136. Continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply to the two-year limitation. Term "injury" in the statute requires an actionable harm. Id., 154. Plaintiff claim fails to toll the statute;
defendant's assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this
case. 46 CS 386.
Action based on claim physician broke contract to achieve certain result from operation is not malpractice action.
Malpractice defined. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 135. Cause of action brought under section 52-572 not governed by one-year limitation
imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379. A defendant may be estopped by his agreement, conduct, representations
or fraud from asserting the bar of the statute; provided the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence upon which the judge
can base such a finding. Id., 686, 689. In a small claims action, according to the Practice Book, sections 900, 901, the
statute of limitation stops running when the case is entered in court even though the service of notice is not made within
the statutory period. Id., 690, 697. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 488. Where pleadings showed plaintiffs knew at date of accident
they had substantial injuries, they had not met burden of demonstrating an exception to usual running of this statute and
defendant's motion for summary judgment was correctly granted. Id., 85. Defendant insurer's discussions of settlement
did not estop it from pleading this statute as defense to plaintiff's action where there was no fraud on its part and final offer
had been made four months before statute barred action. Id., 127. When defendant accepted plaintiff's offer of settlement
of her cause of action for personal injuries, statute became inoperative as defense as contract had been made between the
parties. Id., 274.
Sec. 52-584a. Limitation of action against architect, professional engineer or
land surveyor. (a) No action or arbitration, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise,
(1) to recover damages (A) for any deficiency in the design, planning, contract administration, supervision, observation of construction or construction of, or land surveying
in connection with, an improvement to real property; (B) for injury to property, real or
personal, arising out of any such deficiency; (C) for injury to the person or for wrongful
death arising out of any such deficiency, or (2) for contribution or indemnity which is
brought as a result of any such claim for damages shall be brought against any architect,
professional engineer or land surveyor performing or furnishing the design, planning,
supervision, observation of construction or construction of, or land surveying in connection with, such improvement more than seven years after substantial completion of such
improvement.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, in the case of
such an injury to property or the person or such an injury causing wrongful death, which
injury occurred during the seventh year after such substantial completion, an action in
tort to recover damages for such an injury or wrongful death may be brought within one
year after the date on which such injury occurred, irrespective of the date of death, but
in no event may such an action be brought more than eight years after the substantial
completion of construction of such an improvement.
(c) For purposes of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, an improvement to real
property shall be considered substantially complete when (1) it is first used by the owner
or tenant thereof or (2) it is first available for use after having been completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed
changes to the contract or agreement, whichever occurs first.
(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of defense
by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such
an improvement at the time any deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the
proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring action.
(1969, P.A. 513, S. 1-5; 1972, P.A. 294, S. 36; P.A. 86-266, S. 2; P.A. 88-364, S. 70, 123; P.A. 98-137, S. 61, 62; 98-219, S. 33, 34.)
History: 1972 act removed actions and arbitrations brought against architectural designers from purview of section;
P.A. 86-266 deleted former Subsec. (d), thereby expanding the applicability of the seven-year statute of limitations for
actions against architects and engineers, relettering former Subsec. (e) accordingly; P.A. 88-364 made technical change
in Subsec. (a); P.A. 98-137 made provisions applicable to actions and arbitrations against land surveyors for any deficiency
in land surveying in connection with an improvement to property, effective October 1, 1998, and applicable to any action
or arbitration brought on or after said date with respect to a land survey performed or furnished on or after said date; P.A.
98-219 revised effective date of P.A. 98-137, but without affecting this section.
Cited. 205 C. 219, 242. Cited. Id., 741, 742, 744, 751. Held constitutional. 207 C. 496, 497, 499-502, 504, 505, 507-
510, 514-517. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Where improvements to real property contemplated by an architect's or engineer's
services are not completed because of the defect complained of, Sec. 52-584a, and not Sec. 52-584, applies to plaintiff's
cause of action. 247 C. 293.
Cited. 24 CA 81, 82, 84. Cited. 45 CA 775. Where forum was at issue, court properly declined to hear matter concerning
statute of limitations re contract when it could not determine with positive assurance that issues of timeliness were intended
by the parties to be excluded from the contract's arbitration clause. 62 CA 483.
Cited. 34 CS 22, 26.
Statute intended to create a seven-year absolute maximum on actions against architects and engineers while leaving
any other lesser limitations in place. 6 CA 212, 215, 222-229.
Subsec. (a):
Statute not applicable to surveyors who performed or finished surveys before October 1, 1998. 72 CA 236.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 6 CA 212, 222, 224.
Sec. 52-584b. Limitation of actions against attorneys in connection with title
certificates or opinions and title searches. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, no action, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, against an attorney to
recover for injury caused by negligence or by reckless or wanton misconduct in the
preparation of and the execution and delivery of an attorney's title certificate or opinion,
or the title search in connection therewith, shall be brought but within two years from
the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered, except that no such action may be brought more than
ten years from the date of such delivery. A counterclaim may be interposed in any such
action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.
(P.A. 81-32.)
Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Letter seeking approval to partition real property found not to be a title certificate or opinion within meaning of the
statute. 56 CA 363.
Sec. 52-585. Suit for forfeiture on penal statute limited to one year. No suit for
any forfeiture upon any penal statute shall be brought but within one year next after the
commission of the offense. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any civil
action brought by the state or a municipality, or any officer or agent thereof, to recover
a forfeiture or civil penalty.
(1949 Rev., S. 8325; P.A. 91-312, S. 44.)
History: P.A. 91-312 added provision re nonapplicability to any civil action brought by the state or a municipality to
recover a forfeiture or civil penalty.
Cited. 56 C. 23; 57 C. 54, 55. Amendment of declaration will not be allowed after the year. 4 D. 37. A bylaw prohibiting
any excavation in the highway held a penal statute. 64 C. 429. Statute giving additional compensation for cutting trees on
another's land not penal. 74 C. 134. Where statute gives forfeiture for each month's delay, no recovery can be had except
for year preceding action. 76 C. 559. Does not apply to action for liquidated damages for which employer is liable under
federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 134 C. 257. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Sec. 52-586. Scire facias against garnishee limited to one year. No writ of scire
facias against any garnishee shall be brought but within one year next after the right of
bringing it accrues.
(1949 Rev., S. 8326.)
Demand on execution within sixty days is prerequisite to right to bring scire facias; statute runs from time of demand.
97 C. 398; 104 C. 280; 105 C. 427. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Sec. 52-587. Suit on bond or recognizance for costs limited to one year. No
action shall be brought against the surety on any bond or recognizance for costs only,
given in any civil action, or on the appeal of any civil cause, or on any bail bond, except
within one year after final judgment has been rendered in the suit in which such bond
or recognizance was given.
(1949 Rev., S. 8327.)
It is no excuse that a petition for a new trial was pending during the whole of the year. 1 R. 249. A bond, in a bastardy
suit, may be sued within a year after the time for the last quarterly payment. K. 268. Judgment regarded as rendered at the
date of withdrawal, and not at the time of taxing costs. 48 C. 305. Claim against deceased surety, on bond for costs, may
be presented at any time within the probate limitation. Id., 384. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Sec. 52-588. Suit on note obtained by fraud. No action shall be brought on a
negotiable note, if the holder thereof has been notified in writing by the maker thereof,
or his attorney or agent, that such note was obtained of the maker in pursuance of a
conspiracy, or of a general intent to defraud, unless the same is brought within one year
after such notice was given, or six months after such note became due; nor shall any
claim on such note be maintained against the estate of any deceased person or insolvent
debtor, unless such claim is presented within the time above specified after notice as
aforesaid. If any such note is negotiated after it is due, the provisions of this section
shall be held to apply to any action or proceeding founded upon such note in as full a
manner as if the plaintiff had been the holder of such note at the time when such notice
was given.
(1949 Rev., S. 8328.)
Cited. 189 C. 401, 413-415. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Cited. 233 C. 304, 314.
Sec. 52-589. Action of forcible entry and detainer limited to six months. No
complaint for a forcible entry and detainer shall be brought but within six months after
the entry complained of.
(1949 Rev., S. 8329.)
Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Action in entry and detainer was time barred as a matter of law because it did not fall within the six-month statute of
limitations set forth in the statute. 71 CA 859.
Sec. 52-590. When defendant's absence from state to be excluded. In computing the time limited in the period of limitation prescribed under any provision of chapter
925 or this chapter, the time during which the party, against whom there may be any
such cause of action, is without this state shall be excluded from the computation, except
that the time so excluded shall not exceed seven years.
(1949 Rev., S. 8330; 1959, P.A. 429; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 87; P.A. 85-548, S. 4.)
History: 1959 act clarified language, specifying section applies to periods prescribed under chapter 925 or this chapter
and limited time excluded to seven years; 1963 act included periods prescribed in section 52-435a; P.A. 85-548 deleted
reference to Sec. 46b-160.
This applies, although both parties are and always have been nonresidents. 24 C. 442. A temporary absence is not within
the statute. 16 C. 113, 116; 105 C. 569. Ownership of attachable property in Connecticut does not give nonresident debtor
the right to invoke the aid of our statute of limitation. 55 C. 577. One who occupied apartment in New York with his wife
a considerable portion of the time held to be still a resident here. 92 C. 55. Periods during which defendant is within the
state may be added together to form statutory period; domicile in another state does not prevent one from having a usual
place of abode here; defendant may have two or more usual places of abode in two or more states; time excluded while
out of the state covers only absences which prevent service of process in actions in personam. 105 C. 571. Statute runs
against nonresident when he acquires a usual place of abode here; against a resident when he returns here. Id., 568. Not
applicable to actions against nonresidents begun under section 52-62. 116 C. 643. Cited. 131 C. 675. Cited. 225 C. 238, 241.
Cited. 31 CA 569, 571, 573.
When "usual place of abode" is acquired. 7 CS 145. Cited. 17 CS 222; id., 408. Statute of limitations should be raised
by special defense so that plaintiff may, in reply, plead this section. 18 CS 143. Where defendant had room at Yale University
and was absent therefrom only during summer vacation, his absence did not toll statute of limitations under this section.
27 CS 394. Cited. 40 CS 6, 8, 13. Cited. 42 CS 187, 196.
Sec. 52-591. When new action may be brought after time limited. When a judgment in favor of a plaintiff suing in a representative character, or for the benefit of third
persons, has been reversed, on the ground of a mistake in the complaint or in the proper
parties thereto, and, while the action was pending, the time for bringing a new action
has expired, the parties for whose special benefit the action was brought may commence
a new action in their individual names at any time within one year after the reversal of
the judgment, if the original action could have been so brought.
(1949 Rev., S. 8331; P.A. 82-160, S. 250.)
History: P.A. 82-160 made minor changes in wording.
Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Cited. 225 C. 13, 18. Cited. 234 C. 169, 180.
Sec. 52-592. Accidental failure of suit; allowance of new action. (a) If any action,
commenced within the time limited by law, has failed one or more times to be tried on
its merits because of insufficient service or return of the writ due to unavoidable accident
or the default or neglect of the officer to whom it was committed, or because the action
has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, or the action has been otherwise avoided
or defeated by the death of a party or for any matter of form; or if, in any such action
after a verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment has been set aside, or if a judgment of
nonsuit has been rendered or a judgment for the plaintiff reversed, the plaintiff, or, if
the plaintiff is dead and the action by law survives, his executor or administrator, may
commence a new action, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, for the
same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action or
after the reversal of the judgment.
(b) When any action has been brought against an executor or administrator or continued against an executor or administrator after the death of the defendant and has failed
for any of the causes listed in subsection (a) of this section, the plaintiff, or his executor
or administrator in case a cause of action survives, may commence a new action within
six months after the determination of the original action.
(c) If an appeal is had from any such judgment to the Supreme Court or Appellate
Court, the time the case is pending upon appeal shall be excluded in computing the time
as above limited.
(d) The provisions of this section shall apply to any defendant who files a cross
complaint in any action, and to any action between the same parties or the legal representatives of either of them for the same cause of action or subject of action brought to any
court in this state, either before dismissal of the original action and its affirmance or
within one year after the dismissal and affirmance, and to any action brought to the
United States circuit or district court for the district of Connecticut which has been
dismissed without trial upon its merits or because of lack of jurisdiction in such court.
If such action is within the jurisdiction of any state court, the time for bringing the action
to the state court shall commence from the date of dismissal in the United States court,
or, if an appeal or writ of error has been taken from the dismissal, from the final determination of the appeal or writ of error.
(e) The provisions of this section shall apply to any claim against the state for which
a notice of claim has been properly and timely filed with the clerk of the Office of the
Claims Commissioner in accordance with sections 4-147 and 4-148 and which thereafter
has been dismissed by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to section 4-142.
(1949 Rev., S. 8332; P.A. 79-267; P.A. 82-160, S. 251; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 50, 82; P.A. 98-20, S. 1, 2.)
History: P.A. 79-267 changed wording, referring to dismissal of action rather than erasure from docket and to setting
aside of judgment rather than arrest of judgment and deleting reference to abatement of writs, to conform to changes in
superior court rules; P.A. 82-160 reworded provisions and divided section into Subsecs; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 included
reference to appellate court in Subsec. (c); P.A. 98-20 added Subsec. (e) making section applicable to certain claims against
the state that have been dismissed by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to Sec. 4-142, effective April 24, 1998.
Original action held to have been defeated "for matter of form". 56 C. 591; 108 C. 485. Does not apply to provision in
insurance policy limiting right of action. 74 C. 514. Action for death by wrongful act is in this statute. 91 C. 395; 102 C.
69. Is valid; authorizes continuance of suit begun in state court before dismissal of suit in federal court. 93 C. 412. Where
action for death resulting from defendant's negligence is nonsuited, action can be recommenced within one year of date
of nonsuit, although more than one year has elapsed from date of accident. 102 C. 69. Allegations of new complaint may
set up different acts of negligence as long as cause of action remains the same. 108 C. 485. New action may substitute
action under wrongful death statute of New York for original complaint erroneously counting on Connecticut wrongful
death statute. Id., 444. Failure of officer to return writ to court is a default or neglect within the statute. 116 C. 29. An
appeal from a zoning board is not an "action" within the statute. 126 C. 603. Modifies section 52-555 if the circumstances
bring the case within its terms. 134 C. 386. Defective appeal from nonsuit falls within this section. 145 C. 99. Requirement
that new action must be "for the same cause" explained. 148 C. 327. Appeal from architectural examining board not an
"action" within meaning of this section. 153 C. 124, 125. Cited. 163 C. 388. Cited. 169 C. 646, 653. Cited. 189 C. 401,
412. Cited. 191 C. 150, 160. Cited. 192 C. 301, 306. Cited. 193 C. 28, 34. Cited. 198 C. 229, 233, 239. Cited. 206 C. 491-
495. Cited. 208 C. 230, 235. Cited. 210 C. 175, 179. Cited. Id., 721-726, 728, 729, 731-733. Cited. 211 C. 431, 435. Cited.
214 C. 464-467, 470-476. Cited. 216 C. 11, 14. Cited. Id., 412, 413, 416, 417. Cited. 225 C. 13, 18. Cited. 226 C. 831,
836. Cited. 234 C. 169, 180. Cited. 239 C. 265. Cited. Id., 574. Term "commenced", as used in sec. to describe an initial
action that "has failed ... to be tried on its merits because of insufficient service", cannot be construed to mean good,
complete and sufficient service of process. 268 C. 541.
Cited. 7 CA 245, 246, 248. Cited. 11 CA 156, 158. Cited. 18 CA 515-520. Cited. 22 CA 625-627. Cited. 23 CA 404,
406, 407, 409. "... should not be construed so liberally as to render statutes of limitation virtually meaningless." 24 CA
239, 241-243. Cited. 28 CA 653, 659. Cited. 29 CA 132, 137, 138, 139. Cited. 32 CA 187-190. Cited. 34 CA 732, 734,
738. Cited. 41 CA 297, 298. Since section uses "action" and "cause of action", and not "claim", to refer to what is allowed
to be brought under its provisions, trial court incorrectly concluded that savings provisions of section operate only to save
the exact state law claims that were dismissed without prejudice in federal court, but do not permit the bringing of additional
state law claims arising from same set of facts. 49 CA 715. Failure to return complaint for two and one-half years not
diligent as required for application of statute. 50 CA 632. Second action improperly dismissed without affording plaintiff
opportunity to present evidence on the issue of when he received notice of prior dismissal. Plaintiff who fails to receive
timely notice of dismissal of original action is not barred from pursuing the action pursuant to this section. 68 CA 238.
Plaintiff could not avail himself of the statute where alleged breach of contract occurred in 1993, where the action had
been dismissed for dormancy in 1997 and dismissed again in 1999 for failure to close the pleadings, and where plaintiff
failed to file a motion to open that dismissal or to proffer any explanation for his conduct. 69 CA 614. Plaintiff must have
commenced an original action before statute can be applied to save a subsequent action. 78 CA 235. Plaintiff not required
to plead or prove that statute was applicable to his action because defendants had not raised a statute of limitations defense.
Id., 783. Previous claims that were not tried on their merits not saved by statute because they were not commenced within
time periods set forth in applicable statutes of limitations; previous action cannot qualify as "original action" for purposes
of statute because action did not fail to be heard as matter of form, but as part of settlement by parties. 84 CA 1.
Cited. 15 CS 310; id., 505; 17 CS 409; 18 CS 482; 20 CS 377. Allegations necessary to bring the matter within the
purview of this section should appear either by anticipation in the complaint or in the reply to a defense of the statute. 17
CS 3. Analogous to section 52-125. Id., 409. Where plea in abatement is sustained, plaintiff may bring new action under
this section notwithstanding the statute of limitations. 18 CS 443. Obvious intention to make statute exceedingly broad
and sweeping in scope. "Any matter of form" refers to mode of procedure. Statute remedial in character. 22 CS 207. Where
plaintiff had brought a timely appeal under section 12-118 which was nonsuited, he is not entitled to rely on this section
to bring a new appeal on the same cause of action after the two-month limitation had run, since the proceeding involving
an appeal under section 12-107c(d) is not the type of action which comes within the saving protection of this section. 26
CS 168. Cited. 29 CS 246. Cited. 33 CS 174, 176. Fact that an abortive action was instituted in Connecticut to appoint an
administrator does not invoke statute so as to shorten period of the general statute of limitation. 36 CS 121, 124-126. Cited.
Id., 269-271. Cited. 40 CS 266, 268.
Where default judgment was rendered for defendant in small claims session on failure of plaintiff to prosecute, default
judgment was a "judgment of nonsuit" and plaintiff could commence new action under this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 3, 4.
Whether plaintiff is entitled to pursue his action under this statute presented under pleadings an issue of law properly
determined by court upon defendant's motion for summary judgment. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 487. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 643, 694.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 192 C. 138, 144. Cited. 210 C. 721, 722. Cited. 214 C. 464, 465, 470, 472. Specifically authorizes commencement
of new action where prior action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; appellate court judgment in Southport Manor
Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Foley, 20 CA 223, 226, reversed. 216 C. 11, 14, 17. "Original action" means first action filed
within time allowed by applicable statutes of limitations. Id., 412-419. Cited. 236 C. 701, 703. Disciplinary dismissals
are not excluded categorically from relief afforded by statute, and plaintiff claiming benefit of statute must be afforded
opportunity to show that plaintiff's noncompliance with court order was due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.
243 C. 569. Applies to actions otherwise barred by applicable statute of limitations, does not operate to save plaintiff's
action from contractual limitation period for bringing suit. 246 C. 378. Where a federal action and second state action were
for same cause, federal action was the "original action," i.e. first action filed within time allowed by the applicable statute
of limitations; Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 216 Conn. 412, affirmed; policy of the statute discussed. 250 C. 105. Appellate
court properly ruled that plaintiff's appeal of an initial action was moot because defendant acknowledged that this subsection
precluded any statute of limitations defense in the second action that wasn't applicable in the first action and therefore the
first action, which only differed in the manner and date of service and the return date, was moot. 265 C. 650.
Plaintiff limited to bringing new action within one year from end of original action, not the last action. 11 CA 156-
160. Cited. 22 CA 625, 626. Cited. 23 CA 404, 408. Cited. 24 CA 239, 241, 242. Not device for avoiding rules of res
judicata. 28 CA 653, 656, 658. Cited. 34 CA 732, 734, 736-739. Dismissal due to party's pattern of delay can result in
barring relief pursuant to this subsec. 62 CA 775. Plaintiff's original action was an "action" within meaning of this subsec.
despite the fact that defendant named in that action had died prior to commencement of the action. 71 CA 697. Applicability
of statute depends on particular nature of conduct involved, i.e, mere mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect vs.
egregious conduct. 72 CA 601.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 32 CA 187, 189, 190. Trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over federal due process claims not tried on the
merits in the federal courts. 54 CA 178.
Sec. 52-593. Action against wrong defendant; allowance of new action. When
a plaintiff in any civil action has failed to obtain judgment by reason of failure to name
the right person as defendant therein, the plaintiff may bring a new action and the statute
of limitations shall not be a bar thereto if service of process in the new action is made
within one year after the termination of the original action. If service of process in the
original action has been made upon an agent of the defendant named in the new action,
or if the defendant in the new action is a corporation and service in the original action
has been made upon an officer or agent of the corporation, notice of any claim for
damage shall be sufficient if given in the original action, pursuant to statutory provisions,
to any officer or agent of the defendant in the new action.
(1949 Rev., S. 8333; P.A. 82-160, S. 252.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
Where defendant in second suit is a street railway company upon whom no process was served in original action, this
statute does not cure lack of statutory notice. 105 C. 96. New action may be brought within one year regardless of originally
applicable statute of limitations. 105 C. 94; 109 C. 460. New action may set up different allegations if cause of action
remains the same. 108 C. 444. Appeal from architectural examining board not a "civil action" within meaning of this
section. 153 C. 124, 125. Cited. 169 C. 646, 653. Cited. 183 C. 504, 505, 507. Cited. 191 C. 150, 160. Cited. 214 C. 464,
476. Cited. 225 C. 13, 18. Cited. 234 C. 169, 180.
Cited. 18 CA 515-520. Cited. 22 CA 625-627. Cited 42 CA 345. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was
dismissed due to immunity under Sec. 4-165, the two-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies in subsequent suit
against the state and the exception under this section for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62
CA 545. Plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as result of defendant's alleged negligence
could not be saved from being time barred by statute because plaintiff named the proper party in his previous action which
was not dismissed for failure to name the proper party but was stayed pending resolution in arbitration; statute applies only
in circumstances in which plaintiff's original action failed by reason of naming the wrong defendant and such naming was
the product of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact as to identity of the truly responsible individual. 67 CA 668. Plaintiff
could not avail herself of statute's savings clause because dismissal of her first action was for dormancy, not for failure to
name the right person as defendant. 72 CA 302. Plaintiff not eligible for relief under section since she withdrew her action
in favor of a settlement and did not obtain judgment in the original action. 83 CA 843.
Effect of section on statute of limitations where proper party was sued in corporate rather than individual name. 9 CS
307. The original action was terminated at the date judgments of nonsuit were rendered and not at the date of determination
of later motions to set aside. 31 CS 302. Cited. 33 CS 176. Cited. 40 CS 266, 268.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 22 CA 625, 626.
Sec. 52-593a. Right of action not lost where process served after statutory period. When. (a) Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed
by section 4-183, a cause or right of action shall not be lost because of the passage of
the time limited by law within which the action may be brought, if the process to be
served is personally delivered to a state marshal authorized to serve the process and the
process is served, as provided by law, within thirty days of the delivery.
(b) In any such case, the state marshal making service shall endorse under oath on
such state marshal's return the date of delivery of the process to such state marshal for
service in accordance with this section.
(1967, P.A. 890; P.A. 82-160, S. 253; P.A. 88-317, S. 29, 107; P.A. 00-99, S. 116, 138, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 66, 181;
P.A. 03-224, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 88-317 inserted "Except in the case
of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section 4-183," at the beginning of Subsec. (a), effective July 1,
1989, and applicable to all agency proceedings commencing on or after that date; P.A. 00-99 replaced reference to officer
with state marshal and deleted provision re personal delivery to sheriff in Subsec. (a) and made technical changes in Subsec.
(b), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 substituted "state marshal" for "officer" in Subsec. (b), effective July 11,
2001; P.A. 03-224 increased time period for service of process from fifteen to thirty days in Subsec. (a) and made a technical
change in Subsec. (b), effective July 2, 2003.
Cited. 170 C. 5. Cited. 191 C. 150, 160. Cited. 214 C. 464, 466, 475, 476.
Cited. 10 CA 14, 17. Cited. 43 CA 397. Action commences on date that process was delivered to sheriff for service, if
defendant is served within fifteen days of delivery to the sheriff. 53 CA 725.
Appeal to court from decision of administrative agency is cause of action within meaning of this section. 33 CS 172,
176. Service of process which came into hands of deputy sheriff by mail was personally delivered to him within meaning
of this section. Id., 677-679. Cited. 34 CS 565, 566. Cited. 40 CS 299, 301. Cited. 41 CS 425, 426, 428.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 43 CA 397.
Cited. 42 CS 187, 190.
Sec. 52-594. Limit for executor or administrator to bring personal action that
survives. If the time limited for the commencement of any personal action, which by
law survives to the representatives of a deceased person, has not elapsed at the time of
the person's death, one year from the date of death shall be allowed to his executor or
administrator to institute an action therefor. In computing the times limited in this chapter, one year shall be excluded from the computation in actions covered by the provisions
of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 8334; P.A. 82-160, S. 254.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.
See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property.
Effect of statute. 90 C. 611. Cited. 191 C. 150, 160. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476. Cited. 223 C. 14, 17, 21, 22.
Cited. 3 CA 602, 605. Cited. 43 CA 397.
Cited. 8 CS 362. Statute does not reduce the time within which an action might have been brought had the plaintiff
survived. It adds one year from the date of death to the time otherwise allowable. 15 CS 434. Where one-year period with
respect to antemortem injuries had not expired when decedent died, his personal representative, under this section, had
year from date of death to institute action. 28 CS 461, 463, 464.
Sec. 52-595. Fraudulent concealment of cause of action. If any person, liable to
an action by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of such
action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such person so liable
therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon first discovers its existence.
(1949 Rev., S. 8335.)
This was previously the rule in equity proceedings. 19 C. 438. Fraudulent concealment affects surety on bond. 66 C.
64. Statute does not apply to action by receivers against directors of bank for negligence. 89 C. 451. Suspends running of
statutes until right is discovered. 93 C. 558. Must be pleaded specially. 143 C. 31. Cited. 188 C. 301. Cited. 189 C. 162,
182. Cited. 191 C. 150, 160, 162. Cited. 198 C. 660, 661, 665. Cited. 207 C. 204, 213, 215, 216. Cited. 214 C. 242, 243,
245, 256, 250, 252. Cited. 232 C. 527, 532.
Cited. 7 CA 245, 249. Cited. 15 CA 496, 500. Cited. Id., 677, 685. Cited. 16 CA 108, 112. Cited. 19 CA 16, 18-20.
Cited. 31 CA 235, 238, 241. Plaintiff's burden of proof under section discussed. 53 CA 102.
Cited. 17 CS 198. Cited. 42 CS 187, 192, 196.
Sec. 52-596. Actions for payment of remuneration for employment. No action
for the payment of remuneration for employment payable periodically shall be brought
but within two years after the right of action accrues, except that this limitation shall be
tolled upon the filing with the Labor Commissioner of a complaint of failure to pay
wages pursuant to the provisions of chapter 558.
(1949 Rev., S. 8336; P.A. 80-182.)
History: P.A. 80-182 added exception re filing of complaint for failure to pay wages with labor commissioner.
Does not apply to severance pay which is not within description of "payment of remuneration for employment payable
periodically." 155 C. 680. Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Cited and statute of limitations also cited. 11 CA 375, 378, 388, 389. Cited. 16 CA 232, 235, 239. Cited. 43 CA 435.
Sec. 52-597. Action for libel or slander. No action for libel or slander shall be
brought but within two years from the date of the act complained of.
(1951, S. 3233d.)
Cited. 214 C. 464, 476.
Sec. 52-598. Execution or action upon judgment for money damages. (a) No
execution to enforce a judgment for money damages rendered in any court of this state
may be issued after the expiration of twenty years from the date the judgment was entered
and no action based upon such a judgment may be instituted after the expiration of
twenty-five years from the date the judgment was entered, except that there shall be no
time limitation on the issuance of such execution or the institution of such action if the
judgment was rendered in an action to recover damages for personal injury caused by
sexual assault where the party legally at fault for such injury was convicted of a violation
of section 53a-70 or 53a-70a.
(b) No execution to enforce a judgment for money damages rendered in a small
claims session may be issued after the expiration of ten years from the date the judgment
was entered, and no action based upon any such judgment may be instituted after the
expiration of fifteen years from the date the judgment was entered.
(1953, S. 3234d; P.A. 76-59, S. 2; P.A. 77-452, S. 32, 72; P.A. 82-160, S. 255; P.A. 84-317, S. 1, 3; P.A. 02-138, S. 22.)
History: P.A. 76-59 essentially replaced previous provisions which simply stated "No action based upon a judgment
for money damages which has been rendered in any court of this state shall be instituted after the expiration of twenty-one years from the date of such judgment, provided no payments have been made on the same during such period"; P.A.
77-452 removed reference to "court of common pleas" small claims sessions in exception, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 84-317 increased the time limitation on executions to
enforce judgment for money damages rendered in small claims court from five to ten years from date judgment was entered
and institution of action based on any such judgment from ten to fifteen years from date judgment was entered; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception eliminating time limitation if judgment was rendered in action for damages
caused by sexual assault where party legally at fault was convicted of violating Sec. 53a-70 or 53a-70a.
Cited. 15 CA 752, 757. Cited. 38 CA 44, 52, 56. Cited. 45 CA 543.