Sec. 52-190a. Prior reasonable inquiry and certificate of good faith required
in negligence action against health care provider. (a) No civil action shall be filed
to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or
after October 1, 1987, whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such
injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney
or party filing the action has made a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances
to determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence
in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint or initial pleading shall contain
a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action that such reasonable inquiry gave
rise to a good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant.
For the purposes of this section, such good faith may be shown to exist if the claimant
or his attorney has received a written opinion, which shall not be subject to discovery
by any party except for questioning the validity of the certificate, of a similar health
care provider, as defined in section 52-184c, which similar health care provider shall
be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section, that there appears to be evidence
of medical negligence. In addition to such written opinion, the court may consider other
factors with regard to the existence of good faith. If the court determines, after the
completion of discovery, that such certificate was not made in good faith and that no
justiciable issue was presented against a health care provider that fully cooperated in
providing informal discovery, the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall
impose upon the person who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may also submit the
matter to the appropriate authority for disciplinary review of the attorney if the claimant's
attorney submitted the certificate.
(b) Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the action will be filed, an automatic
ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to allow the reasonable
inquiry required by subsection (a) of this section. This period shall be in addition to
other tolling periods.
(P.A. 86-338, S. 12; P.A. 87-227, S. 9; P.A. 03-202, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 87-227 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provision that "No action, accruing on or after October 1, 1986,
shall be filed to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death" with "No civil action shall be filed to recover
damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987"; P.A. 03-202 amended
Subsec. (a) by deleting provision re form prescribed by rules of the superior court and making technical changes.
P.A. 86-338 cited. 214 C. 1, 6, 7. Good faith certificate is not jurisdictional. 215 C. 701, 702, 705-710, 713. Cited. 236
C. 681, 690. Cited. 242 C. 1. In workers compensation case where city sought to intervene in employee's negligence action
against physician, the city as a would-be intervenor was not required to file a good faith certificate where employee had
filed such a certificate and the city asserted no additional claims. 253 C. 429. Applies only to civil actions to recover
damages and does not apply to apportionment complaints under Sec. 52-102b which seek only apportionment of liability.
269 C. 10.
Cited. 26 CA 497-499, 501. Cited. 33 CA 378, 380, 383, 384, 386. Cited. 37 CA 105, 123. Fall by person dependent
on a wheelchair while transferring from wheelchair to an exercise mat at physical therapy facility during scheduled session,
where transfers were a stated goal of therapy, is medical malpractice. 61 CA 353.
Cited. 41 CS 169, 173-175.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 215 C. 701, 705, 709, 712. Cited. 242 C. 1.
Cited. 33 CA 378.
Cited. 41 CS 169, 170, 172.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 242 C. 1. Ninety-day extension provided in subsec. applies equally to both the two-year statute of limitation and
three-year statute of repose in Sec. 52-584. 269 C. 787.
Cited. 33 CA 378, 381-383, 385. Cited. 43 CA 397.
Sec. 52-191. Precedence of actions in favor of the state. All civil actions brought
by or on behalf of the state, including informations on the relation of a private individual,
shall have precedence over all other civil actions in respect to the order of trial, except
actions upon probate bonds.
(1949 Rev., S. 7945; P.A. 82-160, S. 92.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
Sec. 52-191a. Precedence of certain actions involving zoning ordinances and
regulations. Any civil action wherein one of the issues is the interpretation of a zoning
ordinance or regulation that is the basis of a pending criminal prosecution under section
8-12 shall be privileged in assignment for trial.
(February, 1965, P.A. 109, S. 2.)
Sec. 52-191b. Precedence of proceedings involving planning commissions.
Any legal proceeding to which any municipal planning commission is a party shall be
considered a privileged matter with respect to the order of trial.
(1971, P.A. 274.)
Sec. 52-191c. Precedence of actions involving terminally ill persons. (a) Any
civil action to which a terminally ill person is a party shall be privileged in assignment
for trial. For the purpose of this section, "terminally ill" means in the final stage of an
incurable or irreversible medical condition which will result in death within a relatively
short time, in the opinion of the attending physician.
(b) The judges of the Superior Court may, in accordance with the provisions of
section 51-14, adopt rules for the precedence of actions pursuant to this section.
(P.A. 98-54.)
Sec. 52-192. Precedence of other cases in order of trial. Any objections made
to the acceptance of the report of a committee or auditor, or award of an arbitrator, shall
be heard and determined promptly and without delay after return of the report or award,
unless a continuance is granted for cause. Appeals from probate and from the actions
of commissioners appointed by courts of probate, actions brought by or against executors
or administrators of estates, actions brought by or against conservators of the estates of
incapable persons, actions brought by or against guardians of the estates of minors,
actions brought by receivers of insolvent corporations by order of the court by which
such receivers were appointed, actions brought by or against any person sixty-five years
of age or older or who reaches the age of sixty-five during the pendency of the action,
actions in which a party has been ordered to post security with the Department of Motor
Vehicles or has posted security with the Department of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to
the requirements of section 14-117, appeals from any action of the Commissioner of
Environmental Protection in accordance with section 25-17, appeals under the provisions of section 14-57, partitions and foreclosure cases, including cases in which a bond
has been substituted for a mechanic's lien, shall have precedence over all other civil
actions in respect to the order of trial, except as provided in section 52-191.
(1949 Rev., S. 7946; 1957, P.A. 78, S. 1; March, 1958, P.A. 14, S. 2; 1959, P.A. 102; 1961, P.A. 329; 509, S. 1; 1963,
P.A. 162; 1967, P.A. 819; 1971, P.A. 872, S. 156; P.A. 82-160, S. 93; P.A. 92-118, S. 8.)
History: 1959 act added partitions and foreclosures; 1961 acts added appeals under section 14-57; 1963 act added cases
where bond has been substituted for mechanic's lien; 1967 act added actions where party has been ordered to or has
posted security with motor vehicle department; 1971 act replaced water resources commission with commissioner of
environmental protection; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 92-118 added provision re precedence in order of trial
for actions brought by or against executors or administrators of estates, conservators of estates of incapable persons and
guardians of the estates of minors; (Revisor's note: In 1997 references to "Motor Vehicle Department" were changed
editorially by the Revisors to "Department of Motor Vehicles" for consistency with customary statutory usage).
See Sec. 49-39 re privileged status of action to foreclose a mechanics' lien with respect to order of trial.
Cited. 63 C. 307. Cited. 179 C. 415, 424. Cited. 229 C. 634, 643. Cited. 230 C. 828, 833.
Privilege given to "persons" over sixty-five years of age does not extend to corporate entities in existence over sixty-five years. Legislative intent construed. 22 CS 156.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 26 CA 322, 324. Cited. 44 CA 154.
Sec. 52-192a. Offer of judgment by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Computation of interest. (a) After commencement of any civil action based upon contract
or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the
plaintiff may, not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a
written "offer of judgment" signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, directed
to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the
action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum certain. The plaintiff shall give notice
of the offer of settlement to the defendant's attorney or, if the defendant is not represented
by an attorney, to the defendant himself or herself. Within sixty days after being notified
of the filing of the "offer of judgment" and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury
or an award by the court, the defendant or the defendant's attorney may file with the
clerk of the court a written "acceptance of offer of judgment" agreeing to a stipulation
for judgment as contained in plaintiff's "offer of judgment". Upon such filing, the clerk
shall enter judgment immediately on the stipulation. If the "offer of judgment" is not
accepted within sixty days and prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award
by the court, the "offer of judgment" shall be considered rejected and not subject to
acceptance unless refiled. Any such "offer of judgment" and any "acceptance of offer
of judgment" shall be included by the clerk in the record of the case.
(b) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff
made an "offer of judgment" which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains
from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the
sum certain stated in the plaintiff's "offer of judgment", the court shall add to the amount
so recovered twelve per cent annual interest on said amount, computed from the date
such offer was filed in actions commenced before October 1, 1981. In those actions
commenced on or after October 1, 1981, the interest shall be computed from the date
the complaint in the civil action was filed with the court if the "offer of judgment" was
filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint. If such offer was
filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint, the interest
shall be computed from the date the "offer of judgment" was filed. The court may award
reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and
shall render judgment accordingly. This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the
contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance
with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.
(P.A. 76-316, S. 2; P.A. 77-269, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-60; 79-250, S. 1; P.A. 81-315, S. 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 94; 82-228; P.A.
83-295, S. 9; P.A. 92-110, S. 1; P.A. 94-20; P.A. 01-71, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 77-269 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that provisions apply to "all claims, except claims which were
assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976" rather than to claims "accruing after October 1, 1976"; P.A. 79-60 raised
annual interest on offer of judgment from six to twelve per cent in Subsec. (b); P.A. 79-250 authorized court to award
attorney's fees not exceeding three hundred and fifty dollars and specified that provisions do not abrogate contractual
rights concerning recovery of attorney's fees in Subsec. (b); P.A. 81-315 amended provisions in Subsec. (b) concerning
computation of interest on judgments in actions commenced on or after October 1, 1981; P.A. 82-160 made minor technical
changes to Subsecs. (a) and (b) and deleted Subsec. (c) which had provided "This section shall apply to all claims, except
claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976"; P.A. 82-228 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the
provision allowing a plaintiff to file a new offer of judgment after rejection and to continue to file offers up until trial, and
amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on the amount of the verdict rather than on the amount
"contained in such offer" and by deleting a provision concerning what constituted the largest offer of judgment for purposes
of computing interest; P.A. 83-295 amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on and added to the
"amount so recovered" rather than the "verdict"; P.A. 92-110 amended Subsec. (a) to authorize a plaintiff to file an offer
of judgment in any civil action "seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought" rather than
in any civil action "for the recovery of money only"; P.A. 94-20 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to
be accepted prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court; P.A. 01-71 amended Subsec. (a) to
require an offer of judgment to be filed not later than thirty days before trial and increase from thirty to sixty days the time
period for filing an acceptance of the offer of judgment and made technical changes throughout section for purposes of
gender neutrality.
In the context of the statute, reference to "verdict" incorporates a recovery awarded by the court. Prejudgment and
postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301-310. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity
not expressly waived. 205 C. 542, 544, 556, 558, 559. Cited. 206 C. 100-102. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials.
208 C. 82, 91, 93. Cited. 211 C. 648, 652, 653. Cited. 225 C. 146, 150, 154, 162, 163. Cited. 227 C. 914, 915. Cited. 228
C. 206, 208, 213, 230. Cited. 229 C. 525-528. Cited. 231 C. 745, 749. Cited. 234 C. 169, 170, 174, 175, 179, 181, 182.
Cited. 239 C. 144. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. Id., 769. Cited. Id., 802. Cited. 240 C. 49. Cited. Id., 287. Cited. Id., 799. Cited.
241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of
statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect
on this section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining
whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment
rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314.
Cited. 3 CA 111, 117. Cited. Id., 570, 573, 574. Cited. 8 CA 254, 255, 261, 267, 269. Cited. 13 CA 712, 719. Cited.
21 CA 366, 367, 369. Cited. Id., 549-556. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court "will not
permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff's offer of judgment merely because his contract
obligations were made in another state." 22 CA 640, 648, 650-656. Cited. 25 CA 67, 77, 78, 82. Cited. 26 CA 231, 234,
239. Cited. Id., 322, 325, 326. Cited. 30 CA 664, 667. Cited. 31 CA 806-809, 811-816. Cited. 32 CA 118, 122. Cited. 33
CA 662-664. Cited. Id., 842, 844. Cited. 35 CA 504, 506. Cited. 36 CA 653, 656. Cited. 38 CA 685, 687, 701-704. Cited.
42 CA 239. Cited. Id., 712. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 154. Cited. 45 CA 165. Cited. Id., 543. Cited. 46 CA 37.
Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA
100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent
of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 192 C. 301, 305. Cited. 234 C. 169, 180. Cited. 239 C. 708.
Cited. 3 CA 570, 571. Cited. 31 CA 806, 814. Cited. 44 CA 154. Although the required attorney's signature on an
offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney's law partner with attorney's permission, the document is in substantial
compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 188 C. 213, 222-224. Cited. 192 C. 301, 305, 306. Cited. 208 C. 82-85, 87, 90, 92, 93. Cited. 211 C. 648, 650,
652. Cited. 234 C. 169, 179, 180. Cited. 239 C. 708. Cited. Id., 769. Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application
to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1.
Cited. 3 CA 570-572, 574, 575. Cited. 8 CA 254, 267-271. Cited. 21 CA 366, 369. Cited. Id., 549, 554, 555. Cited.
31 CA 806, 810, 812, 814. Cited. 33 CA 662, 663. Cited. 38 CA 685, 686, 702-704. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 154.
Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney's fees. 47 CA 517.
Sec. 52-193. Offer of judgment by defendant. In any action on contract, or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the defendant
may, not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written
notice signed by the defendant or the defendant's attorney, directed to the plaintiff or
the plaintiff's attorney, offering to allow the plaintiff to take judgment for the sum named
in such notice.
(1949 Rev., S. 7942; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 175; P.A. 92-110, S. 2; P.A. 01-71, S. 2.)
History: 1959 act deleted reference to actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 92-110 authorized the defendant to file
an offer of judgment in any action "seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought" rather
than in any action "for the recovery of money only"; P.A. 01-71 required an offer of judgment to be filed not later than
thirty days before trial and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
Not applicable to foreclosure suits. 27 C. 146. Statute construed. 33 C. 217. Cited. 163 C. 445. Cited. 192 C. 301, 305.
Cited. 239 C. 708.
Cited. 17 CA 219-221, 223.
Cited. 10 CS 166.
Sec. 52-194. Acceptance of defendant's offer of judgment. In any action, the
plaintiff may, within ten days after being notified by the defendant of the filing of an
offer of judgment, file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of the offer signed
by himself or his attorney. Upon the filing of the written acceptance, the court shall
render judgment against the defendant as upon default for the sum so named and for
the costs accrued at the time of the defendant's giving the plaintiff notice of the offer.
No trial may be postponed because the period within which the plaintiff may accept the
offer has not expired, except at the discretion of the court.
(1949 Rev., S. 7943; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 111; P.A. 82-160, S. 95.)
History: 1959 act deleted provisions for actions before justices of the peace; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
See note to Sec. 52-193.
Cited. 163 C. 445. Cited. 239 C. 708. Language of section unambiguously provides that written acceptance of a party's
offer of judgment against defendant must result in court's rendering judgment against defendant. 258 C. 299.
Cited. 10 CS 166.
Sec. 52-195. Effect of failure to accept defendant's offer. Costs. (a) If the plaintiff does not, within the time allowed for acceptance of the offer of judgment and before
the commencement of the trial, file his notice of acceptance, the offer shall be deemed
to be withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence.
(b) Unless the plaintiff recovers more than the sum named in the offer of judgment,
with interest from its date, he shall recover no costs accruing after he received notice
of the filing of such offer, but shall pay the defendant's costs accruing after he received
notice. Such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees in an amount not to exceed
three hundred fifty dollars.
(c) This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any
party concerning the recovery of attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of
any written contract between the parties to the action. The provisions of this section
shall not apply to cases in which nominal damages have been assessed upon a hearing
after a default or after a demurrer has been overruled.
(1949 Rev., S. 7944; P.A. 79-250, S. 2; P.A. 82-160, S. 96.)
History: P.A. 79-250 specified that costs may include attorney's fees not exceeding three hundred fifty dollars and that
provisions do not abrogate contractual rights re recovery of attorney's fees; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted
Subsec. indicators.
See note to Sec. 52-193.
Cited. 163 C. 445. The phrase which states "such costs may include reasonable attorney's fees" modifies only the term
"defendants costs" in the immediately preceding clause of the statute. 188 C. 213, 216-219, 223-225. Cited. 239 C. 708.
Cited. 8 CA 254, 267, 271.
Cited. 10 CS 166. Reasonableness of offer of judgment discussed. 39 CS 467, 469.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 239 C. 708.
Cited. 8 CA 254, 270.
Sec. 52-195a. (Formerly Sec. 52-256). Unliquidated damages; tender. Any
party upon whom a claim for unliquidated damages is made may tender to the claimant
a sum of money in payment thereof, which tender may be pleaded and in all respects
be as effectual as a tender in case of a claim for debt.
(1949 Rev., S. 8002.)
History: Sec. 52-256 transferred to Sec. 52-195a in 1983.
Annotations to former section 52-256:
General issue and tender repugnant; costs. 67 C. 74. Tender bars costs. 80 C. 233; 87 C. 158. Waiver of defects in
tender; 67 C. 585; 76 C. 705; tender of money due on contract excused where other party cannot perform. 88 C. 64. Not
now necessary to pay money into court. 87 C. 157.
Sec. 52-195b. Referral of civil action involving motor vehicle to alternative
dispute resolution program. Expedited process case. Privileged case. (a) In any civil
action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a private passenger motor
vehicle the parties may agree to refer the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution
program. Such referral shall be made within sixty days of the return date. The duration
of the referral shall not exceed ninety days unless the court, for good cause shown,
extends the time period. The court shall stay the time periods within which all further
pleadings, motions, requests, discovery and other procedures must be filed or undertaken
until (1) such time as the alternative dispute resolution process is completed or (2) the
time period set by the court for the referral has elapsed, whichever occurs first.
(b) (1) If the alternative dispute resolution process does not result in a resolution
of the dispute, the parties shall report the lack of resolution to the court promptly but in
no event later than five days after the expiration of the stay provided in subsection (a)
of this section.
(2) Any such action wherein each plaintiff has limited his own claim, exclusive of
interest and costs, to a maximum of seventy-five thousand dollars may, with the consent
of all parties, be brought as an expedited process case in accordance with section 51-15 and shall be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.
(3) Any such action wherein at least one plaintiff has not limited his own claim,
exclusive of interest and costs, to a maximum of seventy-five thousand dollars, shall
be privileged with respect to assignment for trial.
(c) If an agreement is reached between the parties on any issues, the neutral party
shall report such agreement to the court and the parties shall seek the entry of an appropriate order from the court.
(d) If the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to an alternative dispute resolution
program consisting of binding arbitration, the parties shall report to the court upon
completion of such arbitration. The arbitration award may be confirmed in the same
manner as any other arbitration award as provided in chapter 909.
(e) The alternative dispute resolution process under this section shall be deemed to
be settlement negotiations for evidentiary and confidentiality purposes.
(P.A. 93-297, S. 3, 29.)
History: P.A. 93-297 effective January 1, 1994.
Sec. 52-195c. Time period for payment of settlement amount. (a) When an action to recover damages has been settled, any settling defendant shall tender all sums
due from such settling defendant to any settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent not
later than thirty days after receipt by the person or office designated in writing to the
settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent by the settling defendant at the time of settlement of a duly executed release and a withdrawal discontinuing any court action, if any
such action is pending, that are tendered by such settling plaintiff or plaintiff's agent
and are executed by or on behalf of the settling plaintiff. If no such person or office is
so designated, a settling plaintiff may tender such settlement documents to the settling
defendant's attorney or the representative of the settling defendant's insurer with whom
the settlement agreement was reached and such settling defendant shall tender all sums
due from such settling defendant to any settling plaintiff or such plaintiff's agent not later
than thirty days after receipt of such settlement documents by the settling defendant's
attorney or the representative of the settling defendant's insurer.
(b) In an action that requires judicial approval of the settlement, the plaintiff shall
also tender a copy of the order of the Probate Court or other order approving such
settlement with the duly executed release and withdrawal discontinuing any pending
court action executed on behalf of the plaintiff.
(c) In the event that a settling defendant or insurer fails to promptly tender all sums
as required by subsection (a) of this section, a default judgment shall be entered by the
court on behalf of any unpaid plaintiff against such defendant twenty days after such
plaintiff files a motion for a default judgment with the court and serves such motion
upon the representative of the insurer with whom the settlement was reached or the
defendant with whom the settlement was reached. Such motion shall be accompanied
by an affidavit executed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney setting forth the terms
of such settlement with supporting documentation attached.
(d) Any insurer or defendant with whom the settlement was reached that fails to
tender settlement proceeds within the time limit set forth in this section shall be liable
for interest at a rate of twelve per cent a year on the amount of such settlement proceeds
computed from the date such time limit expired.
(e) As used in this section, "tender" means either to personally deliver or cause to
be delivered or to mail by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. An insurer
or a defendant may otherwise prove tender by presenting evidence that the settlement
sums due from such insurer or such defendant were received by the settling plaintiff or
such plaintiff's agent.
(P.A. 97-58, S. 3.)
Sec. 52-196. Motion to continue or postpone. Whenever in any action pending
in the Superior Court a motion for a postponement or continuance is made by either
party and such motion is granted, the court may require the party making the same to
pay to the adverse party such sum by way of indemnity as it deems reasonable.
(1949 Rev., S. 7930; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 112; P.A. 74-183, S. 85, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 129, 681.)
History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for city court; P.A. 74-183 removed actions pending in circuit court from
purview of section, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974;
P.A. 76-436 removed actions pending in court of common pleas from purview of section reflecting transfer of all trial
jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978.
Discretion of court to grant continuances. 69 C. 186; 75 C. 308; id., 314; 78 C. 654; 79 C. 383; 81 C. 474; 92 C. 658;
100 C. 4. Informalities in adjournment of justice court from time to time waived if parties eventually appear and are heard.
104 C. 294. Where defendant's motion for mistrial was, in essence, one for continuance or postponement because of illness
of necessary witness, trial court did not err in denying motion when not informed of the facts at the time. 157 C. 561.
Sec. 52-197. Motion for disclosure. Rules. (a) In any civil action, the court, upon
motion of either party, may order disclosure of facts or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents by any party thereto, material to the moving party's
cause of action or defense, and within the knowledge, possession or power of the adverse
party.
(b) The judges of the Supreme Court shall make rules to carry out the provisions
of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 7949; 1957, P.A. 651, S. 30; P.A. 82-160, S. 97.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.
Discovery to be responsive to the motion. 20 C. 486. Cited. 59 C. 243; id., 508; 63 C. 569; 125 C. 9. Applies only where
the matter lies within the exclusive knowledge or possession of the adverse party. 61 C. 594; 90 C. 261. Statute simply
designed to enable a court of law to exercise clearly defined powers of a court of equity. 61 C. 596. Right of court to compel
production of documents on trial. 79 C. 121. Errors in action on demurrer to motion waived by replacing it with another.
90 C. 270. Denial of motion addressed to defense that would be unavailing is harmless. 91 C. 554. Where demurrer to
complaint is sustained and plaintiff does not plead over, motion does not lie. 95 C. 301. Form of motion. 77 C. 387. Does
not abrogate independent action for discovery in equity. 126 C. 386. A trial tests the court's ruling on a motion for disclosure
for it then appears whether the mover was hampered in the preparation and presentation of his case by the denial of his
motion. 147 C. 321. Party cannot assert lack of notice to produce or want of a subpoena duces tecum if, by his own
testimony, either would have been futile. Id., 496. An answer to an interrogatory is not, without more, a judicial admission
in the same sense as admissions in the pleadings or in open court. 148 C. 202. Relation to constitutional separation of
powers. History (dissent). 166 C. 501. Cited. 212 C. 661, 665. Cited. 229 C. 716, 752. Cited. 230 C. 1, 5.
Cited. 4 CA 339, 350. Cited. 14 CA 267, 270.
Motion to inspect a trolley car is not within the statute. 5 CS 161. Cited. Id., 291; 8 CS 137; id., 246; 9 CS 44; 19 CS
147. An independent equitable action for discovery may be maintained notwithstanding this section. 7 CS 76. The facts
desired by the defendant to be disclosed by the plaintiff must be material to the defendant's cause. 16 CS 54. Disclosure
may be ordered as to any matter concerned solely with damages as well as to issues of liability. 17 CS 40. Disclosure of
written statements of witnesses and defendants refused. 21 CS 165. Disclosure of whether there is liability insurance, and
the amount and terms thereof, held not within the rules of disclosure. Id., 168, but see section 52-200a. Connecticut's
disclosure rules are not as broad as the federal rules. Id., 170. Court refused request for pretrial disclosure of confidential
corporate information required to establish damages before the right to obtain damages of any kind had been proved. Id.
In a criminal case the accused cannot compel the prosecution to produce documents which he himself has made. Furthermore, facts sought to be disclosed must be shown to be exclusively within the knowledge of the state. 23 CS 41. Plaintiff
alleging loss of earnings not required to produce copies of income tax returns. 25 CS 147. Cited. 26 CS 338, 341. Cited.
28 CS 53. Discovery not available in appeal from administrative agency, when. 30 CS 299. Cited. 31 CS 129. Motion not
allowed where an overwhelming volume of inquiry was proposed and the information was obtainable from other defendants.
31 CS 335. Discovery is available in summary process proceeding. 36 CS 47, 48.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 14 CA 267, 269.
Sec. 52-197a. Transferred to Chapter 368a, Sec. 19a-17b.
Sec. 52-197b. Discovery outside country to be in accordance with treaty or
convention or court order. (a) If an applicable treaty or convention including, but
not limited to, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, provides for
discovery outside the United States of America, the discovery methods agreed to in such
treaty or convention shall be employed.
(b) If an applicable treaty or convention renders discovery inadequate or inequitable
but does not prohibit additional discovery, the Superior Court may, upon application,
order additional discovery under such terms and conditions as the court deems just and
equitable.
(P.A. 91-324, S. 2.)
Cited. 229 C. 716, 752.
Sec. 52-198. Disclosure; examination of officer of corporation. If a corporation
is party to an action, the opposite party may examine the president, treasurer, secretary,
clerk or any director or other officer thereof in the same manner as if he were a party
to the suit.
(1949 Rev., S. 7950.)
Cited. 212 C. 661, 665, 671-674. Cited. 229 C. 716, 752.
Sec. 52-199. Questions which need not be answered. Self-incrimination. (a) In
any hearing or trial, a party interrogated shall not be obliged to answer a question or
produce a document the answering or producing of which would tend to incriminate
him, or to disclose his title to any property if the title is not material to the hearing or trial.
(b) The right to refuse to answer a question, produce a document or disclose a title
may be claimed by the party interrogated or by counsel in his behalf.
(1949 Rev., S. 7951; P.A. 82-160, S. 62.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.
See Sec. 51-35 re witnesses' imprisonment for refusal to testify and protection against self-incrimination.
See Sec. 54-84 re option of accused to testify or remain silent during trial.
Answers to interrogatories did not expose defendant to self-degradation and self-incrimination. 137 C. 404. Privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations. 212 C. 661, 662, 665-668, 670-676. Cited. 229 C. 716, 752.
The term "any hearing or trial" includes the taking of a deposition. 31 CS 66. Cited. 32 CS 306.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 32 CA 811, 818. Cited. 37 CA 456, 461; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq.
Sec. 52-200. Disclosure not conclusive. When either party in any action has obtained from the other party a disclosure on oath, respecting the matters alleged in any
pleading, the disclosure shall not be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like
any other testimony.
(1949 Rev., S. 7952.)
Cited. 186 C. 275, 278. Cited. 194 C. 35, 38. Cited. 212 C. 661, 665. Cited. 228 C. 42, 51. Cited. 229 C. 716, 752.
Cited. 2 CA 523, 529. Cited. 4 CA 641, 645. Cited. 11 CA 518, 525. Cited. 13 CA 725, 727. Cited. 40 CA 449, 450.
Sec. 52-200a. Defendant's insurance liability policy limits and insurer's duty
to indemnify subject to discovery. In any civil action founded upon negligence, both
the defendant's insurance liability policy limits and whether or not the insurer has disclaimed its duty to indemnify shall be subject to discovery upon written motion of the
plaintiff. Any such motion and disclosure shall be excluded from the file submitted to
the jury.
(1967, P.A. 485; P.A. 78-142.)
History: P.A. 78-142 reworded provisions and made "whether or not the insurer has disclaimed its duty to indemnify"
subject to discovery upon written motion of plaintiff.
Cited. 212 C. 661, 665. Cited. 229 C. 716, 752.
Statute is not unconstitutional interference by legislature with judicial department. Public policy often requires legislation to facilitate administration of justice. 28 CS 32. Applies to pending cases at its enactment and is not unconstitutional
infringement on judiciary rule making power. 29 CS 195 et seq.
Sec. 52-201. Action on nonnegotiable instruments; defense. Assignment. Section 52-201 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7953; 1959, P.A. 133, S. 10-102.)
Sec. 52-202. Transferred to Chapter 925, Sec. 52-570a.
Sec. 52-203. Demand for receipt not to vitiate a legal tender. The requirement
or demand for a receipt for such amount of lawful money as may be offered or tendered
on account, or in payment or in part payment of any indebtedness, shall not prevent
such offer or tender from being regarded or held to be a legal tender.
(1949 Rev., S. 7955.)
Sec. 52-204. Recovery of expenditures by husband or parent. In any civil action
arising out of personal injury or property damage, as a result of which personal injury
or property damage the husband or parent of the plaintiff has made or will be compelled
to make expenditures or has contracted indebtedness, the amount of such expenditures
or indebtedness may be recovered by the plaintiff, provided a recovery by the plaintiff
shall be a bar to any claim by such husband or parent, except in an action in which the
husband or parent is a defendant.
(1949 Rev., S. 7947; 1951, S. 3181d.)
Cited. 117 C. 686; 153 C. 363. Damages due to incapacity of wife by reason of personal injury are recoverable by her
and not her husband; but right to recover sums actually paid by husband because of her incapacity is in him. 125 C. 390.
In absence of endorsement on writ by husband, wife may recover expenditures if it is not reasonably probable that husband
would have to pay them but probable that she will be called upon to do so. 129 C. 361. When a minor child is injured by
the negligent act of a third party, two independent causes of action spring into existence; first, the right of action by the
child for personal injuries; second, a right of action by the parent for consequential damages. 147 C. 333. Cited. 165 C.
490, 506. Cited. 200 C. 290, 308.
Husband must endorse his consent upon the complaint prior to service on defendant. 4 CS 147. Transfer by parent of
his right of action for consequential damages has all the attributes of an assignment. 7 CS 480. Cited. 19 CS 480. Vicarious
contributory negligence or concurring negligence of parent does not bar plaintiff's recovery of consequential damages. 28
CS 493, 497, 498. Wife may sue for husband's medical expenses for which she is legally liable. 32 CS 156.
Sec. 52-205. Court may determine order in which issues shall be tried. In all
cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may order
that one or more of the issues joined be tried before the others.
(1949 Rev., S. 7939.)
Cited. 63 C. 560; 149 C. 430. When legal issues of fact should be determined by jury before court tries equitable issues.
98 C. 221. General claim for jury list does not secure jury trial of equitable issues of fact; special order necessary under
section 52-218. 100 C. 248. The court may determine the issues on the cross complaint first. 135 C. 558.
Illness of plaintiff's attorney reason to bifurcate trial. 50 CA 577.
Sec. 52-206. Writings; admission of their execution. (a) Either party to a civil
action may, by a written notice, call upon the other to admit the existence and due
execution of any document, material to the issue, saving all just exceptions.
(b) If the opposing party neglects or refuses to make such a requested admission
within a reasonable time after the receipt of such notice, the costs of proving the document shall be paid by the party neglecting or refusing to make the admission regardless
of the result of the action unless the court finds that the neglect or refusal was reasonable.
(1949 Rev., S. 7959; P.A. 82-160, S. 98.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.
Sec. 52-207. Defense based on Sunday contract. No person who has received a
valuable consideration for a contract, express or implied, made on a Sunday prior to
June 9, 1976, may defend any action upon the contract on the ground that it was made
on a Sunday, until he has restored the consideration.
(1949 Rev., S. 7980; P.A. 76-415, S. 6; 76-435, S. 81, 82; P.A. 82-160, S. 99.)
History: P.A. 76-415 specified applicability to contracts made on Sunday "prior to October 1, 1976"; P.A. 76-435
changed effective date from October 1, 1976, to June 9, 1976, amending section text accordingly; P.A. 82-160 rephrased
the section.
See Sec. 53-300a re validity of Sunday real estate contracts.
Defendant must pay the reasonable value or agreed price, where a return of the identical consideration is practically
impossible. 73 C. 624. Court should instruct jury as to whether certain date is Sunday. 81 C. 490. That contract was made
on Sunday should be pleaded. 85 C. 635. See notes to sections 53-300, 53-301. In action by assignee to enforce bond for
deed, defendant who received nothing as result of assignment may defend on ground it was made on Sunday. 133 C. 649.
Cited. 66 C. 275; 155 C. 55. Cited. 177 C. 304, 310.
Cited. 14 CS 407. Sunday contract not demurrable if there is nothing to indicate that deposit allegedly accepted by
defendant has been returned. 20 CS 443.
Sec. 52-208. Reception of evidence objected to as inadmissible. Whenever evidence offered upon the trial of any civil action is objected to as inadmissible, the court
or committee trying such action shall not admit such evidence subject to the objection,
unless both parties agree that it be so admitted; but, if either party requests a decision,
such court or committee shall pass upon such objection and admit or reject the testimony.
(1949 Rev., S. 7960.)
Does not apply to evidence received in advance of its logical place. 53 C. 558. New trial ordinarily granted for an
infraction of statute, unless the error appears to have been harmless. 68 C. 63. Admitting evidence with an offer to consider
later a motion to strike it out is equivalent of admitting it subject to objection. 130 C. 232. Cited. 132 C. 646. To avail
himself of the rule that grounds upon which evidence is claimed to be inadmissible must be stated, a party must state the
grounds for his claim of admissibility. 148 C. 208.
Cited. 5 CA 118, 120.
Sec. 52-209. Argument of counsel; time limit. In a trial before the Superior Court,
counsel shall not occupy more than one hour in argument, unless the court, on motion
for special cause, before the commencement of the argument, allows a longer time.
Interlocutory questions arising during the trial of an action shall not be argued by counsel
unless the court requests it.
(1949 Rev., S. 7962; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 113; P.A. 76-436, S. 404, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 100.)
History: 1959 act deleted provision for appeal from trial before justice of the peace; P.A. 76-436 removed trials before
court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July
1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section.
The constitutional right of the accused to be heard by counsel is subject to a reasonable time limit. 47 C. 535. Party
represented by two counsel in superior court may occupy two hours in argument, dividing the time as they may agree. 55
C. 18. Discretion of court to extend time for argument. 95 C. 79. Cited. 122 C. 611. Cited. 217 C. 671, 678.
Where presentation of evidence lasted three and one-half days and plaintiff's counsel did not move for additional time
until after the argument had begun, rule of court limiting him to one hour was not an abuse of discretion. 15 CS 305.
Sec. 52-210. Motion for nonsuit. If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a civil action,
the plaintiff has produced his evidence and rested his cause, the defendant may move
for judgment as in case of nonsuit, and the court may grant such motion, if in its opinion
the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case.
(1949 Rev., S. 7977.)
This does not impair right of trial by jury. 24 C. 468. Cannot be granted because suit was brought without authority.
26 C. 529. Cases of nonsuit. 23 C. 485; 24 C. 40; id., 207; 30 C. 492. When to be granted. 93 C. 96; 97 C. 312. Refusal to
nonsuit not reviewable on application of defendant. 51 C. 512. A nonsuit should not be granted where there is substantial
evidence to support plaintiff's claim. 58 C. 279; 70 C. 74; 71 C. 29. Nor on a jury trial upon the ground that the allegations
of the complaint, if proved, would not support a judgment. 66 C. 196. Nor because the court is satisfied that the witnesses
are not credible. Id., 206. Statute salutary. 76 C. 41. If law applied to facts proved does not make out case, nonsuit is proper;
77 C. 321; so, where plaintiff's evidence brings case within statute of limitations; 64 C. 430; 71 C. 24; or statute of frauds;
82 C. 293; or plaintiff fails to make out prima facie case; 66 C. 313; 104 C. 78, 746; or bases case on surmise or conjecture;
82 C. 403; 83 C. 231; 84 C. 401; 86 C. 509; id., 546; or offers no substantial evidence. 70 C. 74; 84 C. 403. But not proper
if plaintiff makes out prima facie case; 71 C. 24; 104 C. 78; or offers substantial evidence; 82 C. 236; 83 C. 261; though
it is weak; 83 C. 20; or evidence is conflicting; 70 C. 505; or issue involves determination of credibility of witness; 94 C.
350; 96 C. 230; 116 C. 69; or reasonable men might differ. 87 C. 119. Sufficiency of allegations of complaint not in
question. 82 C. 236. Court must construe evidence most favorably to plaintiff. 83 C. 20; 116 C. 69. Motion need not specify
grounds. 77 C. 559. Proper as to one of several defendants. 79 C. 379; 82 C. 685. Court may permit reopening of case to
supply proof. 68 C. 33. Discretion of court in refusing to grant. 77 C. 136; id., 334; id., 462; 79 C. 266; id., 379; 80 C. 298;
106 C. 13. Form motion takes immaterial if no evidence offered which could sustain recovery. 90 C. 617. Grant carries
costs but does not determine issues; form of judgment file. 94 C. 80. Has no place on hearing in damages after default. 94
C. 244. Rules same in court and jury cases. 96 C. 230. All inferences to be drawn in favor of plaintiff. Id., 222. Only
evidence considered is that offered by plaintiff to support complaint, not that pertinent to affirmative defense. 97 C. 312;
100 C. 42. Nature of nonsuit; is entirely different from erasure or dismissal for want of jurisdiction. 98 C. 231. Does not
apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Denial of motion for nonsuit serves no other
purpose than to establish fact that prima facie case is made. 132 C. 402. Upon a motion for nonsuit, unless it appears that
no relief could be granted under the pleadings, their legal sufficiency is not open to question. 134 C. 502. Nonsuit may be
granted only when plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. 143 C. 230. Cited. 140 C. 643; 145 C. 99; 147 C.
260; 152 C. 699. See note to section 52-80. Cited. 185 C. 1, 2. Where granting of a nonsuit must depend in any appreciable
degree upon court's passing on credibility of a witness nonsuit should not be granted. Id., 195, 196.
Cited. 30 CA 664, 675. Cited. 43 CA 83.
Motion for dismissal is unknown to Connecticut law. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 8 (Diss. Op.).
Sec. 52-211. Refusal to set aside nonsuit; appeal. If a nonsuit has been so granted
in the Superior Court, the plaintiff may either (a) during the same term or session of the
court and before its next return day, file a written motion to set aside such judgment;
and, if such motion is denied, may appeal from such denial; and to enable him to do so
the court shall state the whole evidence so produced as aforesaid that it may become a
part of the record or (b) appeal pursuant to section 51-197a directly from the judgment
of nonsuit. If such judgment is set aside, either on motion or appeal, the cause shall be
proceeded with as though no nonsuit had been granted.
(1949 Rev., S. 7978; 1953, S. 3183d; 1969, P.A. 310; P.A. 74-183, S. 86, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 130, 681.)
History: 1969 act allowed plaintiff option of filing appeal pursuant to Sec. 52-263 directly from judgment of nonsuit;
P.A. 74-183 added reference to appeals filed pursuant to Sec. 51-265; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from
purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court and substituted reference to Sec. 51-197a
for reference to Secs. 52-263 and 51-265, effective July 1, 1978.
A motion for a nonsuit cannot be reserved for advice of supreme court. 33 C. 445. Formerly the refusal to set aside a
nonsuit could be reviewed only on a motion in error. 43 C. 167; 44 C. 465. No appeal lies until the court has denied the
written motion to set aside the judgment. 72 C. 707. Cited. 51 C. 512; 140 C. 643. Motion to set aside need not state
grounds; 77 C. 559; must be reasonably made; discretion of court. 75 C. 314. If granted for variance between pleading and
evidence, remedy is new action. 82 C. 236. Motion to set aside must be made. 72 C. 707; 75 C. 317; 106 C. 14. Refusal
to grant not ground of exception. 64 C. 481. Appellant must furnish court with transcript of evidence. 82 C. 132; id., 142;
83 C. 316. Questions presented; finding necessary if rulings on evidence are to be reviewed. 71 C. 339; 89 C. 382. Time
allowed for appeal; certification of evidence not an extension. 83 C. 316. The granting of a nonsuit will not prevent an
appeal from rulings leading up to it. 73 C. 1. Granting or refusing nonsuit regarded on appeal as an exercise of the court's
discretion. 75 C. 314; 79 C. 266; 80 C. 299. Only question ordinarily open is, has plaintiff failed for any reason to make
out prima facie case. 94 C. 80; 104 C. 746. Evidence to be taken in light most favorable to plaintiff. 95 C. 206; id., 442;
101 C. 52, 79. Does not apply to judgments entered upon nonsuits for failure to plead. 116 C. 31. Exclusive method of
attacking the court's action in rendering a judgment of nonsuit is to appeal from the denial of the plaintiff's motion to set
aside the judgment. 143 C. 226; 145 C. 99. Applies only to nonsuit for failure to make out a prima facie case. 147 C. 260.
Cited. 152 C. 699. See note to section 52-210.
Failure to move to have nonsuit set aside not a bar to plaintiff's right to bring new action for the same cause within one
year. Motion to erase improper way to attack court's jurisdiction. 20 CS 377.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 8 (diss. op.).
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 34 CS 606, 608.
Sec. 52-212. Opening judgment upon default or nonsuit. (a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside,
within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case
reinstated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable,
upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing
reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed
at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the
plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause
from prosecuting the action or making the defense.
(b) The complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant
or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall
particularly set forth the reason why the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.
(c) The court shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of the complaint or
written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin him against enforcing
the judgment or decree until the decision upon the complaint or written motion.
(1949 Rev., S. 7963, 7964; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 114; 1967, P.A. 849; P.A. 74-183, S. 87, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 131, 681;
P.A. 82-160, S. 102.)
History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for municipal court which was abolished; 1967 act clarified rights of plaintiff;
P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of its functions to court of common pleas,
effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer
of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec.
indicators.
Refusal to open a judgment of default, upon motion, may be reviewed where the question is purely one of law; 51 C.
391; but otherwise the motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 69 C. 362. Action by court where substitute
complaint improperly allowed after default. 86 C. 313. Formerly did not include nonsuit. Averments in complaint. 75 C.
317. Petition for new trial may be brought after the four-month period has elapsed. 93 C. 161. Effect of judgment of default;
this only further procedure permitted. 97 C. 123. Default resulting from party's own neglect will not be opened. 138 C.
27. No abuse of discretion in denying motion when it appears the defendant has no defense or has not been prevented from
appearing by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause. 139 C. 532. Judgment of nonsuit for failure to appear should be
opened if plaintiff can show reasonable cause. 147 C. 260. A motion to open judgment which stated merely that an
appearance was entered as soon as defendant's attorney received notice of the action, held not a reasonable cause for
opening judgment. 148 C. 435. Cited. 123 C. 491; 144 C. 389; 150 C. 191, 195; 152 C. 699. Statement that defendant
failed to secure substitute counsel because of confusion attendant upon bankruptcy proceedings did not particularly set
forth the reason why defendant failed to appear. Statute construed. Relief under statute discretionary. 154 C. 294. Prior to
1967 amendments, last two sentences applied to written motions as well as complaints. Id., 297. Where no attempt was
made to show any mistake, accident or other reasonable cause for default, there was no abuse of discretion in court's denial
of motion to reopen judgment. 156 C. 6. Since, on appeal, defendant requested no finding and none was made, he failed
to show cause why his motion to open default judgment against him should have been granted or to establish error in trial
court's denial of motion. 159 C. 352, 358. Relief under statute ordinarily should not be granted if failure to comply with
order of court resulted from moving party's own negligence. Id., 427, 432. Defendant precluded from attacking a finding
as unsupported by the evidence as he failed to request a transcript of the record pursuant to section 51-70a. 168 C. 184.
Whether proceeding under common law or statute, action of trial court in granting or refusing application to open judgment
is generally within discretion of such court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless trial court has clearly
abused its discretion. 172 C. 520, 523, 524. Cited. 176 C. 579-581. Cited. 179 C. 290, 292; id., 671, 672. Cited. 187 C.
509, 510. Cited. 188 C. 145, 151. Continuing jurisdiction under this statute not affected by provisions of Sec. 49-35c(b).
Id., 253, 255, 258. Cited. 190 C. 679, 685; Id., 707, 710. Cited. 193 C. 128, 130-134. Cited. Id., 160, 168. Cited. 196 C.
233-235, 241. Cited. Id., 355, 358. Cited. 200 C. 697, 699. Cited. 208 C. 230, 235-237, 239. Cited. 214 C. 464, 472. Cited.
216 C. 341, 352. Cited. 224 C. 263, 284, 285. Cited. 225 C. 705, 718, 719. Cited. 231 C. 462, 466. Cited. 236 C. 78, 82, 83.
Cited. 1 CA 282, 283; Id., 298, 301, 302. Cited. 5 CA 230, 232, 234, 235. Cited. 6 CA 504. Cited. 9 CA 320, 324, 325.
Cited. Id., 355, 361, 363. Cited. 10 CA 160, 161. Cited. 14 CA 172, 174. Cited. Id., 236, 240. Cited. 15 CA 308, 309, 311.
Cited. 18 CA 589, 595. Cited 19 CA 8, 12, 13. Cited. 22 CA 424, 427. Cited. 28 CA 7, 8. Section requires date of judgment
not be included in time calculation. 29 CA 465-468. Cited. 30 CA 541, 545. Cited. 31 CA 634, 638. Cited. 35 CA 236,
237. Cited. 40 CA 404, 405. Cited. 42 CA 119. Cited. 45 CA 137. Cited. 46 CA 54. Trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider
a motion to open judgment filed outside the four-month period and may refuse to consider procedurally defective motions.
51 CA 1. Negligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of statute to set aside a default judgment. 63 CA
544. It is axiomatic that the right to move to open and vacate a judgment assumes that the party who is to exercise the right
be given opportunity to know that there is a judgment to open. Plaintiff that demonstrated it did not receive notice of entry
of nonsuit in timely manner allowed to file motion to open within four months of receiving notice. 68 CA 68. Court has
intrinsic power, independent of statutory provision, to vacate any judgment obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake.
78 CA 684.
Cited. 7 CS 250; 19 CS 288. Judgment of nonsuit not reopened to allow filing of substituted complaint where the action
had been in court over a year previously and counsel did not see fit to plead over within the time provided by rules of court.
8 CS 372. Judgment in uncontested divorce action set aside where appearance of defendant's counsel by accident or
inadvertence was not entered. 16 CS 111. Statute refers to a final judgment and not to judgment by default. 17 CS 118. A
default is not a judgment but an interlocutory order of court, the effect of which is to preclude defendant from making any
further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned. A judgment upon default, on the other hand, is the final judgment
in the case which is entered after the default and after a hearing in damages. A motion to set aside a default may be filed
at any time before entry of judgment, may be informal in nature and may be granted for such reason as the court sees fit.
24 CS 81. Trial court's refusal to open a default judgment because of defendant's negligence in failing to appear was not
an abuse of discretion on the record. 31 CS 540. Failure of defendants to appear on date set by court order of final assignment
for trial because they relied on assistant court clerk's advice the action had been reassigned to a later date, not "reasonable
cause" for opening default judgment. Id., 549. Cited. 33 CS 554, 555, 557. Cited. Id., 775, 776. Cited. 34 CS 501, 504,
505. Cited. Id., 559. In order not to frustrate the remedial purpose of the statute the time limit provisions must be construed
as a limitation on the prejudiced party rather than as a jurisdictional barrier to the exercise of judicial power. 35 CS 581,
587. Cited. Id., 598, 601. Cited. 36 CS 626, 628; 37 CS 676-678. Cited. 38 CS 731-733. Default judgment should not be
opened where defendant received actual notice of the action but chose to ignore authority of the court. 45 CS 563.
Failure to move to open judgment resulted in waiver of claim of discharge in bankruptcy. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 386. Cited.
3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 7. Mere negligence or inattention of a party is no ground for vacating a judgment on default against him.
Id., 397. Where plaintiff's motion to open judgment on default was denied, he was not precluded from petitioning for a
new trial. Determination of motion was not res judicata. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 201. Granting motion to open judgment on default
abuse of discretion where facts show failure to appear and defend due to defendant's negligence. Id., 396. Granting of
motion to open judgment is interlocutory ruling, reviewable upon appeal from final judgment, and appeal was not allowed
as this was not final action of circuit court. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 289. Opening judgment after
default, unless based on pure error of law, lies in sound discretion of court. Id., 291.
Subsec. (a):
Defendant's motion to open judgment was properly denied since a party must meet both parts of two prong test and
defendant failed to allege any purported defense to the action. 193 C. 160, 167. Cited. 212 C. 741, 747. Cited. 234 C. 783, 790.
Cited. 13 CA 223, 224, 227, 228. Cited. 27 CA 755, 760; judgment reversed, see 225 C.757 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 541,
546. Cited. 38 CA 506, 514. Cited. 39 CA 253, 257. Cited. 40 CA 590, 592. Cited. 43 CA 645. Cited. 44 CA 381. cited.
Id., 724. Cited. 45 CA 137. Cited. 46 CA 5. Cited. Id., 54. Negligence is not sufficient reason to open a judgment of default.
78 CA 466.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 10 CA 1, 4.
Sec. 52-212a. Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months
only. Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has
continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may
not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months
following the date on which it was rendered or passed. The continuing jurisdiction
conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section
17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening
a judgment terminating parental rights. The parties may waive the provisions of this
section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an
amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the
provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a
judgment terminating parental rights.
(P.A. 77-576, S. 28, 65; P.A. 82-160, S. 103; P.A. 93-51; P.A. 98-241, S. 14, 18; P.A. 00-137, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 93-51 added provisions re reopening of judgments terminating parental
rights; P.A. 98-241 changed reference from Subsec. (i) to Subsec. (h) of Sec. 17a-112, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-137
changed reference from Subsec. (h) to Subsec. (o) of Sec. 17a-112.
Judgments obtained by fraud may be attacked at any time. 180 C. 129, 130. Cited. 181 C. 463, 466-469. A motion to
open and vacate a judgment is addressed to the court's discretion. 184 C. 461, 465. Cited. 185 C. 495, 497, 500. Cited.
187 C. 509, 510. Cited. 191 C. 555, 558. Cited. 196 C. 517, 518. Cited. Id., 579, 581. Cited. 211 C. 648, 652. Cited. 214
C. 23, 35. Cited. 215 C. 143, 146. Cited. 217 C. 394, 398. Cited. 223 C. 68, 77. Cited. Id., 155, 169. Court held legislature
intended provisions of Sec. 17a-112 and this section to coexist so superior court has limited jurisdiction to open judgment
for termination of parental rights for four months after its rendering but not thereafter in absence of waiver or consent. 224
C. 263, 271, 281-288, 291, 302. Cited. 225 C. 757, 767. Cited. Id., 804, 806. Prohibits trial court from entertaining motion
to open and modify divorce decree with respect to nondisability military retired or retainer pay; time limitations on opening
not preempted by federal law division of military retirement benefits. 226 C. 219, 221, 222. Cited. Id., 831, 833. Cited.
228 C. 85, 89. Cited. 232 C. 405, 413. Judgment of appellate court in Jenks v. Jenks, 34 CA 462 et seq. reversed. Id., 750,
753. Cited. 236 C. 78, 82, 83. Cited. 239 C. 375. Section limits trial court's general authority to grant relief from a judgment,
but does not limit its personal jurisdiction over the parties. 249 C. 94. Defendant did not prevail on its claim that, in the
absence of a finding of contempt, court lacked jurisdiction to enter postjudgment orders after expiration of the four-month
statutory period for opening a judgment. Court's continuing jurisdiction to enter orders in vindication of a prior judgment
is grounded in its inherent powers and not its contempt powers and exercise of that jurisdiction in this case not barred by
availability of appellate remedies. 260 C. 232.
Cited. 2 CA 543, 547, 548. Cited. 5 CA 417, 419, 420. Cited. 8 CA 254, 261. Cited. 9 CA 446, 447. Cited. 10 CA 160,
161. Cited. Id., 669, 674. Cited. 11 CA 171, 175. Cited. 15 CA 308, 310. Cited. 18 CA 166, 171. Cited. Id., 589, 594, 596.
Cited. 19 CA 213, 215. Cited. 22 CA 4, 7, 9. Cited. Id., 396, 399. Cited. Id., 424, 426. Cited. 27 CA 755, 759, 760; judgment
reversed, see 225 C. 157 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 465-467. Cited. Id., 482, 483. Cited. 32 CA 203 204. Cited. 33 CA 197,
204. Cited. 34 CA 419, 422-424. Cited. Id., 641, 645. Cited. 36 CA 73, 75, 76. Defendant's filing of pleadings after
judgment of dismissal could not have constituted a waiver of the four-month period for opening judgment of dismissal.
37 CA 56-58, 60, 61. Cited. Id., 397, 401. Cited. 38 CA 340, 344, 347. Cited. Id., 745, 748-750. Cited. 39 CA 258, 262.
Cited. 40 CA 115, 126. Cited. Id., 590, 592. Cited. Id., 733, 740. Cited. 42 CA 119. Cited. Id., 409. Cited. 44 CA 588.
Cited. Id., 771. Cited. 45 CA 137. Cited. Id., 352. Cited. 46 CA 54. Cited. Id., 614. In absence of fraud, mistake, duress
or accident, trial court was without jurisdiction to order rescission of stipulated judgment where request for rescission was
made more than four months after entry of judgment. 49 CA 203. Four-month limitation period does not apply because
the entry of nonsuit was a clerical error. 55 CA 655. Judgment against defendant that was contrary to law shocks the judicial
conscience and violates principles of equity, and court's denial of motion to open judgment, although filed more than four
months after rendition of judgment, perpetuated the injustice. 59 CA 351. Discussion of "otherwise provided by law"
provision. Failure to file renewed motion to open judgment within four-month limitation period. 69 CA 349. Because trial
court did not make an express finding of mutual mistake, it lacked authority to open the judgment beyond the four-month
period. 78 CA 734.
Secs. 52-213 and 52-214. Justice of the peace to keep docket, entry fee. Jury
in suit before justice of the peace. Sections 52-213 and 52-214 are repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7552, 7940; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 204.)
Sec. 52-215. Dockets. Jury cases. Court cases. In the Superior Court a docket
shall be kept of all cases. In such docket immediately following the names of the parties
and their attorneys in all jury cases shall be entered the word "jury". The following-named classes of cases shall be entered in the docket as jury cases upon the written
request of either party made to the clerk within thirty days after the return day: Appeals
from probate involving the validity of a will or paper purporting to be such, appeals
from the actions of commissioners on insolvent estates, and, except as hereinafter provided, civil actions involving such an issue of fact as, prior to January 1, 1880, would
not present a question properly cognizable in equity, except that there shall be no right
to trial by jury in civil actions in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand
does not exceed two hundred fifty dollars or in a summary process case. When, in any
of the above-named cases an issue of fact is joined, the case may, within ten days after
such issue of fact is joined, be entered in the docket as a jury case upon the request of
either party made to the clerk; and any such case may at any time be entered in the
docket as a jury case by the clerk, upon written consent of all parties or by order of
court. All issues of fact in any such case shall be tried by the jury, provided the issues
agreed by the parties to be tried by the court may be so tried. All cases not entered in
the docket as jury cases under the foregoing provisions, including actions in which an
account is demanded and judgment rendered that the defendant shall account, writs of
habeas corpus and ne exeat, complaints for dissolution of marriage and all other special
statutory proceedings which, prior to January 1, 1880, were not triable by jury, shall be
entered on the docket as court cases, and shall, with all issues of law and issues of fact,
other than those hereinbefore specified, which may be joined in actions entered on the
docket as jury cases, be disposed of as court cases.
(1949 Rev., S. 7936; 1953, S. 3178d; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 115; 1967, P.A. 33, S. 1; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 5; P.A. 74-183, S.
88, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 132, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 104.)
History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for city court, latter having been abolished; 1967 act added language "in any
civil case triable by jury under the provisions of section 51-266", allowing entrance of such cases in docket as jury cases
when an issue of fact is joined; 1971 act deleted references to presumption that requests for jury trial are requests for six-person jury unless jury of twelve is specifically requested; P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court from purview of section,
reflecting transfer of its functions to court of common pleas and clarified applicability re civil actions by adding exception
specifying that there is no right to jury trial where amount, legal interest or property in demand is two hundred fifty dollars
or less or in summary process cases and by deleting reference to civil cases triable by jury under Sec. 51-266, effective
December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial
jurisdiction to superior court, and substituted "dissolution of marriage" for "divorce" where appearing, effective July 1,
1978; P.A. 82-160 deleted from the list of court cases "actions wherein the plaintiff sues for a debt due by book to balance
books a