REPORT ON BILLS FAVORABLY REPORTED BY COMMITTEE

TITLE OF BILL:

RESOLUTION ACCEPTING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CLAIMS COMMISSIONER WITH REGARD TO THE CLAIM OF MARK J. SILHAVY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF SABINA SILHAVY.

SPONSORS OF BILL:

REASONS FOR BILL:

Claims made against the state for amounts over $7,500.00 must come before the General Assembly.

Substitute Language: Overturns the Claims Commissioner’s decision and gives the right to sue.

RESPONSE FROM ADMINISTRATION/AGENCY:

Nothing submitted.

NATURE AND SOURCES OF SUPPORT:

Nothing submitted.

NATURE AND SOURCES OF OPPOSITION:

Robert Wynne, Counsel for the Estate of Sabina Silhavy – Seeks the right to sue the state. Sabina Silhavy was a 79-year-old grandmother of six, mother of three. On October 31, 1996, she was murdered by Richard Kennison in her Manchester home. Mr. Kennison was a persistent felony offender, who had been released from prison approximately eight weeks prior to this incident. At 3:00 p.m. the following day, Mark Silhavy went to check on his mother and found her dead. She was dead for over 12 hours. She was beaten beyond recognition and stabbed six times; twice in the neck, once between the eyes, three more times in the chest; and her throat was slashed.

Three weeks prior, Mr. Kennison moved into the neighbor’s house, which was his brother’s. He was under the supervision of the Adult Probation Dept., and had moved there without their knowledge and in violation of his probation. To just give the Committee some background on Mr. Kennison, he had an extensive violent criminal and psychiatric history (rape, attempted murder, mixed personality disorder with prominent antisocial features and substance abuse). Even Mr. Kennison’s own attorney contacted the Dept. of Correction upon his incarceration in 1985 to tell them that this man needed psychiatric help and if he merely served his 25-year sentence and was released, he was concerned about what might happen. Ten months before his release, doctors evaluated him and indicated his explosive personality presented an imminent danger to women. They concluded that his release at that time would not be compatible with the welfare of society.

September 6, 1996, by virtue of serving good time, Mr. Kennison was released early. Throughout this time, the Probation Dept. psychiatrists and psychologists each believed that Mr. Kennison’s re-offense potential fell within the severe range. He also should have engaged in a specialized sex offender treatment program, which he did not. He was presented as an extremely disturbed individual with a propensity for assaulting women. He was not an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment.

It is our claim, that, (1) at the time the Dept. of Correction had the ability to commit him to Whiting, pursuant to 17A-498 and 17A-515, they could have committed him there involuntarily. (2) He was under the supervision and control of the Adult Probation Department, but he was not released into a halfway house. He was ultimately released into the hands of the person who could least control him; his mother’s.

Our claim was that at the point Mr. Kennison moved from his mother’s house without telling Adult Probation or getting their permission, Probation could have initiated proceedings to have him in for violation of probation put back in jail. That didn’t happen. If Probation had monitored him more closely, according to their plan, which they admitted they did not, they would have discovered that his brother, Mr. Kulbeth, with whom he lived after his mother, introduced him to drugs and alcohol and partied with him during his brief periods of freedom. They would have found out that he was kicked out of his mother’s house, and he didn’t move out, which is what he told his probation officer. The probation officer knew about this three weeks before the death of Mrs. Silhavy.

The Claims Commissioner denied our case not on the facts, but on the issue of proximate cause, and also said that Mrs. Silhavy didn’t fall into a class of protected victims. We believe that she did. This decision is inconsistent with the Noda case that came through this committee. It is our belief that, with the knowledge they had, there was a duty to control and supervise him, and that if they had done so, they could have prevented what happened to Mrs. Silhavy.