You asked whether municipalities may impose training requirements on liquor servers such as bartenders. The Office of Legislative Research is not authorized to provide legal opinions, and this memo should not be considered one.

SUMMARY

The statutes do not specifically address your question. It does not appear that any municipality currently requires such training, and we have found no directly relevant court cases. The courts have consistently held that municipalities only have those powers granted to them by the state. However, a 2001 state Supreme Court decision dealing with cigarette vending machines suggests that municipalities could have the authority to require server training pursuant to the police powers granted them under CGS § 7-148.

MUNICIPAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUOR SERVERS

Municipalities are “creatures of the state” and have no powers beyond those that the state has expressly or impliedly granted them. Webster v. Town of Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131 (1864). The standard for determining whether a municipality has a power by implication is whether the power is (1) necessarily implied or incident to its express powers or (2) indispensable to attainment and maintenance of the law’s declared objects and purposes. The issue with regard to an implied power is whether it is necessary, rather than merely convenient. Fahy v. Town of Trumbull, 22 Conn. Supp. 105 (1960). In determining whether a municipality has the authority to adopt a provision, the state Supreme Court has held that the courts are not to look for statutory prohibition against such an enactment. Instead, they must look for statutory authority for it. Simons v. Canty, 195 Conn. 534 (1985).

While the statutes do not expressly authorize a municipality to require alcohol servers to complete training, such a requirement might be authorized under the municipality’s police powers granted by CGS § 7-148. Among other things, this section allows municipalities to adopt ordinances to:

Arguably, underage drinking threatens public health and safety, thereby justifying an ordinance that requires servers to undergo training to help identify underage patrons.

A 2001 Supreme Court case considers municipal powers to adopt health and safety ordinances, under CGS § 7-148, and may be relevant to server training requirements. In Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 105 (2001) the Supreme Court held that municipalities can prohibit cigarette vending machines within their boundaries.

The trial court had found that (1) the town and state both had a legitimate interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens by regulating tobacco products and preventing minors access to cigarettes; (2) in spite of the laws barring minors from buying tobacco, they had little difficulty in buying cigarettes from machines; and (3) the town's ordinance was rationally related to the goal of preventing youth access to tobacco. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the state law governing cigarette vending machines (CGS § 12-289a) preempted the ordinance. The court held that, although the law allows municipalities to impose more restrictive conditions on vending machines than the statute provides, the legislature had not granted municipalities the power to ban

vending machines outright. (The dissent in the case contrasted this statute with CGS § 30-9, which allows municipalities to ban the sale of liquor. ) The court accordingly declared the ordinance invalid.

The Supreme Court’s majority opinion, written by Justice Katz, began with a discussion of legal principles underlying a municipality's police powers and the court's deference to their exercise. Justice Katz then discussed how the court determines whether a local ordinance is preempted by statute. She noted that preemption occurs when the legislature has demonstrated an intent to occupy the entire field of regulation or when a local ordinance irreconcilably conflicts with a statute. This test was developed in an earlier case, Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc. , 234 Conn. 234 (1995). Justice Katz also noted that (1) the legislature had clearly anticipated municipalities adopting public health regulations when it granted them broad police powers and (2) if the legislature had wanted to preempt a municipality from adopting an ordinance banning vending machines, it could have done so explicitly.

The majority upheld the ordinance, in part, based on the fact that the legislature did not explicitly preempt municipal regulations that went beyond the state regulation. It cited Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 544, which held that “[w]here a municipal ordinance merely enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more than a statute, there is no conflict unless the legislature has limited the requirements in all cases. ”

If a municipality were to adopt an ordinance requiring server training, it appears that the courts would first review whether this was a valid exercise of the muncipality’s police power. If the court concluded that it was, the next issue would be whether state law preempted such an ordinance.

One difference between such an ordinance and the ordinance at issue in Modern Cigarette is that the legislature specifically granted municipalities power to regulate cigarette vending machines, while it is silent on server training. The fact that the legislature has considered, but not adopted, state server training requirements may also be relevant.

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