Anonymous Tip as a Basis of Making a Motor Vehicle Stop

You asked whether a police officer may stop a motorist based on an anonymous tip that the motorist was driving in an erratic or unsafe manner. Our office is not authorized to give legal opinions and this report should not be considered one.

A stop by the police of a motorist is constitutionally valid only if the police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the motorist had committed or is about to commit a crime. The test is whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion. The police officer’s decision must be based on more than a hunch or speculation. The Connecticut Supreme Court has not ruled on the circumstances under which an anonymous tip that a motorist is driving in an erratic or unsafe manner may form the basis for an officer to validly stop that motorist. But one Appellate Court and several Superior Court decisions have addressed this issue.

The Appellate Court upheld the validity of the stop of a motorist for suspected drunk driving based on an anonymous phone call from a nightclub employee (State v. Balanos). The court reasoned that the tip was sufficient because the caller’s identity was ascertainable, the caller was an employee of an establishment that sold alcohol and thus presumably had the experience to judge whether someone was under the influence, and the arresting officer corroborated by his own observation the information the caller relayed concerning the make, model, and color of the motorist’s car, and the direction the car was traveling. The court was also influenced by the state’s pervasive interest in preventing drunk driving, and the accidents, injuries, and deaths that are caused by drunk driving.

The Appellate Court decision is binding on Superior Court judges. Thus, a Superior Court judge faced with the identical fact pattern would also have to uphold the validity of the stop. On the other hand, a Superior Court decision is not binding on other Superior Court judges.

One Superior Court judge decided that an anonymous tip from a single source who is not identifiable, relayed through the dispatcher, is not enough to justify an officer to stop the motorist. Under such circumstances, the court observed that the officer would probably have to observe the erratic or unsafe driving before he could legally stop the vehicle. But the judge noted that an officer might be justified in stopping a motorist if additional facts were present such as where there is more than one source or where one of the sources is identifiable (Schenfield v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles).

In a second case, two people provided anonymous tips that a motorist was driving erratically. One of them followed the defendant and continued to give the police information about the motorist’s driving. The court concluded that the police were justified in stopping the motorist. The court focused on the fact that more than one person complained and that the identity of at least one of them was readily ascertainable thus making her information trustworthy (State v. Alihodzic)

In a third case, the court found the police stop of a motorist was valid primarily because of the large number of similar anonymous calls to police about the motorist’s erratic driving (State of Connecticut v. Robert H. Hall).

In a fourth case the court upheld a stop based on an anonymous detailed tip plus police corroboration of that tip (State v. Marks).

Following is a brief background and a summary of the Appellate Court and Superior Court cases.

Brief investigatory seizures and detentions of motorists are permitted by our state and federal constitutions when the police have a reasonable and articuable suspicion that the occupants of a vehicle have engaged, are engaged, or are about to engage in criminal activity (State v. Anderson, p. 441; State v. Pierog, 33 Conn. App. 107, 111 (1993)).

Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion. The police officer's decision must be based on more than a hunch or speculation. In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion (State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 496, 692 A. 2d 1233 (1997)).

Whether or not a stop is constitutionally valid depends upon all of the facts known to the police officers when they detain a motor vehicle. In determining whether the detention was justified in a given case, a court must consider if based upon the whole picture the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of criminal activity. A court reviewing the legality of a stop must therefore examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived from such information (State v. Donahue, page 644).

In Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990), the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the stop of a motor vehicle based on a corroborated anonymous telephone tip. The caller indicated that a woman would be leaving a particular apartment at a certain time and driving a described motor vehicle to a named motel. The caller indicated that the female would be in possession of cocaine. When the police went to the location, they observed a woman leave the apartment, enter the described car and drive towards the motel. The court upheld the stop of the automobile because the detailed anonymous tip predicted future behavior which was all corroborated by the police. Since the caller had the ability to predict future behavior, it demonstrated insider information and therefore a greater indicia of reliability. See also State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 645 A. 2d 529 (1994).

Since White, courts have struggled with how detailed anonymous tips must be to justify a seizure by police. Approximately ten years later, in Florida v. J. L. , 529 U. S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000), the U. S. Supreme Court found inadequate a tip that a young black male was standing at a particular bus stop wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun. When the police arrived at the bus stop, they observed three young black males with one wearing a plaid shirt. No suspicious conduct was observed by the police. A frisk of the defendant in that case led to the discovery of a gun. Unlike White, the caller did not provide any predictive information. Florida prosecutors argued that there was enough corroboration because the defendant was wearing the plaid shirt as indicated by the caller. But, the Court found that all this does is identify the person referred to in the call. There was no indication that the tipster had any knowledge of concealed criminal activity, nor did the caller indicate how he obtained his information.

In State v. Balanos, the defendant was charged with drunk driving. The Appellate Court held that the police officer was justified in pulling the motorist over because he had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was operating under the influence (58 Conn. App. 365 (2000)).

After midnight, a police officer received a dispatch that an individual was leaving a nightclub. The officer was told that a nightclub employee had called to report that an intoxicated person had left the nightclub and was driving a car east on Route 1. The caller further identified the car by make, model, and color.

The nightclub is on Route 1, and the officer knew that employees had reported intoxicated drivers in the past. Within a few minutes of receiving the information, the officer noticed a red Pontiac Grand Am that fit the description he had received pass by his location. He followed the Grand Am for approximately one mile, but noted no irregular operation. He stopped the Grand Am at a safe place in the area of a shopping center. This area is approximately three

miles from the nightclub. The defendant was the only person in the car, and the officer noticed that his eyes were glassy and that his actions were slow and unsteady. He also smelled an odor of liquor on the defendant’s breath. After administering field sobriety tests, he arrested the defendant for operating his motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The trial court concluded that the officer lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant because (1) prior to the stop, he did not know the name of the nightclub employee who had furnished the information, (2) he had no information that this particular employee had any training in detecting intoxicated drivers, (3) the employee did not state that he had observed the defendant driving erratically, (4) there was no corroboration as to the identity of the defendant, and (5) he did not observe any erratic driving by the defendant.

The Appellate Court concluded that under the facts of this case, the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant committed or was about to commit a crime. It reasoned as follows. First, although the officer did not know the informant’s identity at the time that he received the information, the informant’s identity was ascertainable because he was an employee of a nightclub familiar to the police through past contacts. When an informant provides sufficient information so that he may be located and held accountable for providing false information, the officer is justified in assuming the caller is being truthful.

Second, it is reasonable to infer that the employee who furnished the information knew when a person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor because of his job in a nightclub that serves alcoholic beverages. Additionally, the court noted that laymen may testify as to their opinion of whether a person is intoxicated.

Third, the information was corroborated by the officer’s own observations as to the make, model, color, and, more importantly, the direction the car was traveling.

Fourth, the state has a pervasive interest in preventing drunk driving and the attendant tragedies that often result from the operation of a motor vehicle by intoxicated persons. Because of this pervasive public interest, the officer was not required to wait for erratic driving or an accident to occur before pulling over the defendant.

In Schenfield v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court Judge Maloney held that a police officer may not stop a vehicle solely on the basis of an anonymous tip from a single source, relayed through a dispatcher, that the vehicle was being driven erratically (1997 WL 345629, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. 621, June 17, 1997). In such a case, the officer must first personally observe some behavior that raises the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify the seizure. But the court emphasized that its ruling is confined to the specific factual circumstances of this case. It stated that in a case where the informant is identified, or where there are multiple informants, or where the officer speaks directly to the informant, or where the incident reported involves an accident or other emergency, and depending on all of the other circumstances, the officer may well be justified in stopping the suspect motorist.

In State v. Alihodzic, (2002 WL 31045981, 32 Conn. L Rpt. 705, (2002)), Judge Owens concluded that the police had reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor. Therefore, he held that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was lawful.

The police received phone calls from two different informants that the defendant was driving erratically. The first informant provided the name of the street that the defendant was traveling on. The second informant provided the police with the make, color, and license plate number of the defendant’s automobile. The arresting officer verified this information.

The informant followed the defendant and remained on the phone with the police until he was stopped. The court assumed she was describing to the dispatcher the erratic behavior that she was witnessing as documented in the follow-up police report. According to the court, she clearly intended to make her identity known to the police and to be held accountable for the information that she provided. These facts were sufficient for Judge Owens to find that the police had reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor.

In State of Connecticut v. Robert H. Ball, Superior Court Judge Dyer concluded after analyzing all the surrounding circumstances that the police had reasonable and articuable suspicion to detain a motorist arrested for driving under the influence (2000 WL 327244, (March 13, 2000)).

At approximately 5: 30 p. m. , Trooper Holston started receiving numerous 911 telephone calls to the State Police about a red Isuzu motor vehicle on Route 95 south. He estimated that he received between 10 and 20 calls about this vehicle over a short period of time. He believed that most of the calls originated from cell phones, and were presumably from other motorists traveling on Route 95. The unidentified callers complained that the red Isuzu was being operated erratically, and was weaving in and out of traffic. Trooper Holston also received a report that the Isuzu, which contained a white male operator and a white male passenger, had possibly collided with another vehicle. The callers described the color and model of the vehicle, and reported that its marker plate read 146-JSY. Trooper Holston checked motor vehicle records and learned that the plate number reported was assigned to a red Isuzu.

Trooper Holston radioed Trooper Velazquez, who was on patrol in his cruiser on Route 95 south and passing over the Gold Star Memorial Bridge. Trooper Holston relayed the information that he received about the Isuzu's erratic operation. He also provided the suspected vehicle's description, marker plate number, and direction of travel to Trooper Velazquez.

Trooper Velazquez drove in a southerly direction through heavy traffic on Route 95. Near Exit 73, he observed a red Isuzu that contained two white male occupants and had plate number 146-JSY. As his cruiser neared the suspect vehicle, Trooper Velazquez saw other motorists pointing at the red Isuzu. The trooper pulled behind the Isuzu and signaled for it to stop with his siren and lights. The operator complied and pulled over at a location immediately south of Exit 73 on Route 95. Trooper Velazquez approached and spoke with the operator. He produced his operator's license, and told Trooper Velazquez that he had consumed three or four beers.

Trooper Velazquez did not observe the defendant operate erratically, or commit any motor vehicle violation. He testified that he did not follow the defendant's vehicle for an appreciable distance because he was concerned about the heavy volume of traffic, and the reports that the defendant had been operating erratically and had possibly struck another vehicle. For these reasons, he believed that it was safer to stop the defendant immediately.

As the result of Trooper Velazquez’ investigation, the defendant was arrested for operating under the influence.

The court concluded that all of the facts known to Trooper Velazquez, and the inferences which he could reasonably derive from them, created reasonable and articuable suspicion that the defendant had been, or was, committing a crime. This justified his decision to stop and detain the defendant for further investigation. In making this determination, the court balanced the nature of the intrusion the defendant suffered against the importance of the governmental interest that prompted the intrusion. The court found that the public safety interests in this case clearly outweighed the harm caused to the defendant by the investigatory stop. Based upon the allegations and information received by the State Police, the court found that the trooper's actions were necessary to investigate alleged dangerous criminal activity, and to prevent possible loss of life or injury on a crowded highway.

In State v. Marks, the defendant was arrested by the Middletown Police Department on December 15, 1999 at approximately 10: 20 P. M. for operating under the influence of alcohol (2000 WL 33298828, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 660, (December 7, 2000)).

Officer Kerkes stopped the defendant’s automobile based on a dispatch of a motorist’s call concerning the vehicle in question. He had no recollection of his initial stop of the defendant’s vehicle or any relevant acts concerning this case. Officer Inglis arrived after the stop of the defendant’s vehicle and took over the investigation because Officer Kerkes was “going off shift. ”

The caller’s information was specific as to the car’s location, description, and plate number. There was no evidence that Officer Kerkes observed any type of erratic or unlawful driving by the defendant before the stop. The stop of the defendant’s car led to his arrest for operating under the influence based on an odor of alcohol, the observation of alcohol in the vehicle, admissions concerning drinking at Foxwoods Casino, and his failing the field sobriety tests. After his arrest the defendant consented to breath tests which showed a blood alcohol content of . 186 and . 168 percent.

The 911 tape contained a conversation between a dispatcher and an apparent anonymous concerned citizen that lasts almost five minutes. During the recording, the caller described in detail the erratic driving of the defendant’s automobile while the caller remained a safe distance behind. The caller named to the dispatcher the stores he was passing on as he followed the automobile. He gave a description and plate number of the vehicle. The anonymous caller gave a play-by-play description of every erratic and dangerous move the vehicle made on the road. The caller eventually turned off the main road indicating to the police that the suspect was going over the Arrigoni Bridge from Portland to Middletown. The defendant's car was stopped on the Middletown side of the Arrigoni Bridge.

The court held that the stop was proper under the circumstances. The court noted that although the caller’s identity was not ascertainable as in Bolanos, the following factors did exist:

1. the detailed nature and content of the anonymous information;

2. first hand observations by the caller;

3. the 911 tape; and

4. police corroboration as to the make, color, plate number, and direction the car was traveling.

The court held that the detailed recorded anonymous call in this case to the dispatcher established reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s automobile.


October 20, 2004		2004-R-0802
ANONYMOUS TIP AS A BASIS OF MAKING A MOTOR VEHICLE STOP

By: George Coppolo, Chief Attorney