Just Cause Requirement for Police Chief Dismissal

You asked (1) if any bills have been raised since 1990 to change the just cause requirement for dismissing police chiefs and (2) if there are any pertinent cases involving this law. This report summarizes two cases, one favoring the dismissed police chief, the other the town’s board of police commissioners.

Since 1990, five bills have been proposed to change the just cause requirement for dismissing police chiefs in Connecticut: one in 1990, 1991, and 1992, and two in 1993.

A 1990 bill (sHB 6021) and an identical 1991 bill (sHB 6937) (1) created a new procedure for police chiefs to challenge a dismissal or suspension of 10 days or more, allowing them to appeal such actions to a state trial referee and (2) explicitly required the town to prove the grounds for just cause by a preponderance of the evidence. sHB 6021 (summarized below) was reported favorably by the Judiciary, Planning and Development, and Labor and Public Employees committees. It died on the House calendar. sHB 6937 was reported favorably by the Judiciary and Labor committees and passed by the House. The Senate referred it to the Planning and Development Committee, which took no action on it.

A 1992 bill (HB 5474) and a 1993 bill (HB 5333) eliminated the just cause requirement, with the latter bill requiring dismissal for “cause” instead of “just cause. ” The committee heard HB 5474 but took no further action on it. It took no action on HB 5333.

In Clisham, the Supreme Court reversed a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal by the former Naugatuck police chief against his termination for just cause by the Naugatuck Board of Police Commissioners (Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners, 223 Conn. 354 (1992), 613 A. 2d 254). During the dismissal hearings, the plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify three members of the five-member board on the grounds that they were biased against him. The members did not recuse themselves. When the board voted unanimously to terminate his employment, he appealed to the Superior Court on the grounds that he had been denied a hearing by an impartial panel.

In Anziano, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the former Madison chief of police against his dismissal for just cause (Anziano v. Board of Police Commissioners (229 Conn. 703 (1994)). The appeal was based on Anziano’s claim that the board had violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court upheld Anziano’s dismissal and rejected all his specific claims. It agreed that Anziano had a property interest in his position and, thus, could not be dismissed without just cause and due process as required by state law (CGS § 7-278). Anziano conceded that he was afforded significant procedural rights.

CGS § 7-278 prohibits towns from dismissing police chiefs without a showing of just cause and outlines the steps involved in the dismissal process. sHB 6021 (which did not become law), would have created a new procedure for police chiefs to challenge a dismissal or suspension of 10 days or more, allowing them to appeal such actions to a state trial referee. Under current law, a chief may request a public hearing to challenge his dismissal and appeal to Superior Court. But there is no specific remedy for suspension, and a dismissed chief remains dismissed pending the outcome of his appeal. Under the bill, he would have remained in office pending the state trial referee's decision although a town could immediately remove him, with pay, in extraordinary circumstances involving claims of malfeasance in office.

The bill would have allowed the state trial referee to award the chief compensatory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees if the referee found that the town had pursued frivolous charges against him.

The bill did not change the just cause requirement for dismissal but explicitly required the town to prove the grounds for just cause by a preponderance of the evidence.

Once the chief received written notice under the bill, he would have 20 days to object and ask for a trial. He and the town would then have 10 days to agree on a trial referee. If they could not agree, the chief court administrator would assign one within another five days. The trial would have to begin within 30 days of the trial referee’s appointment; the parties would have to finish presenting evidence within 90 days of the beginning of trial; and the referee would have to issue his decision within 30 days of the trial’s conclusion. Deadlines could be extended only for extraordinary reasons. Thus, the maximum time from notice of dismissal to start of trial was 65 days. Under current law, the chief must ask for a trial within a maximum of 30 days of dismissal, but the law does not stipulate when the trial must begin or end.

On December 9, 1987, the Naugatuck Board of Police Commissioners gave the police chief Clisham written notice that he was being charged with 11 violations of department regulations. The charges involved physical assualt and murder threats. The board commenced a series of hearings on the charges on December 16, 1987 to decide whether it would dismiss the Clisham. At the first hearing, the chief made an oral motion that one member should recuse himself in “the interest of fairness. ” The parties agreed that in order to dismiss the police chief, the remaining five members would have to vote unanimously to do so.

At the January 26, 1988 hearing, the chief made an oral motion that another board member recuse himself because he was then a defendant in a civil action the chief had brought in U. S. district court. The board agreed that the member would recuse himself only if the chief would allow the remaining four members to preside and accept their action as final. The chief declined the offer and reminded the board that the town charter provides that the police chief can be removed only by unanimous vote of five board members. The member did not recuse himself.

At the August 30, 1988 hearing, the chief filed a motion to disqualify three board members on the grounds that one had expressed animosity toward him on prior occasions, another had publicly and repeatedly said that he should be removed from office, and a third had testified as a witness against him before a grand jury. The members did not recuse themselves.

At the February 14, 1989 meeting, the board voted unanimously to remove the chief, based on its determination that four of the 11 charges against him had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

After the board voted to remove him, the chief appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that (1) he was denied a hearing by an impartial panel in violation of his due process rights, (2) the board improperly based its decision to dismiss him on facts known at the time of his appointment, and (3) the board’s decision to remove him violated the unanimity requirement outlined in the municipality’s charter.

The Superior Court dismissed his appeal and he appealed to the Appellate Court, which sent the appeal to the Supreme Court.

According to the Court, the dispositive issue in the appeal was whether the board acted with the impartiality mandated by the constitutional guarantees of due process when it removed the chief from office. The Court held as follows:

1. The plaintiff timely asserted his claim that a board member was “impermissibly biased. ”

2. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrared a probability of bias too high to be constitutionally tolerable that existed both before and during the hearings, and participation [by certain board members] deprived the plaintiff of the fairness and imparitiality necessary to the fundamental fairness required by due process.

3. The board could not prevail on its claim that, because there was no provision for replacing a disqualified board member from his position, it would be a miscarriage of juistice to uphold the board’s decision merely because the town did not provide a procedure for replacing disqualified board members.

In Anziano, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the former Madison police chief against his dismissal for just cause (Anziano v. Board of Police Commissioners (229 Conn. 703)).

The case was brought by a former police chief dismissed for just cause by the Madison Board of Police Commissioners based on the board’s determination that two of 11 charges against him had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Before being dismissed, the chief received a written draft of the charges against him, evidence was taken at a total of 22 public hearings with the chief and his lawyer present, and the chief’s lawyer was allowed to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The board’s four-to-one vote to dismiss the chief was taken in a public meeting.

The chief appealed his dismissal on the grounds that the board had violated his constitutional right to due process. He supported his appeal with the following claims:

1. The board displayed bias and prejudice by hiring a private detective agency to investigate misconduct charges and by questioning witnesses before filing charges.

2. On mistaken advice of its lawyer, the board improperly shifted the burden of proof to the chief by requiring him to prove his defenses.

3. The board disregarded the terms of the chief’s employment contract.

4. The board improperly presumed the town purchasing rules and regulations applied to the police department.

5. The board precluded the full participation of one of its members who favored the chief.

6. The board prejudiced the chief’s due process rights by failing to adopt regulations regarding its dismissal procedures before beginning hearings on his case.

The Court upheld the chief’s dismissal and rejected all his specific claims. The Court agreed that the chief had a property interest in his position and, thus, could not be dismissed without just cause and due process as required by state law (CGS § 7-278). The plaintiff conceded that he was afforded significant procedural rights. The decision explicitly states that it does not reach the issue of whether the Constitution requires the high level of due process the chief received.

1. The Court has ruled in earlier cases, and the chief concedes, that, in general, professional disciplinary proceedings may combine investigatory and adjudicatory functions without violating due process. In rejecting the chief’s claim of bias in this particular case, the Court found that the board members who conducted the prehearing investigation did not take part in the judgement phase of the case. In addition, the Court found no evidence of personal animosity against the chief by any board member.

2. The advice of the board’s counsel that the plaintiff would have to prove any assertions he made in his own defense did not shift the burden of proof. Even if the advice was intended to do so, the record of the board’s proceedings shows that the board did not shift the burden in making its decision. Unless the chief could show substantial prejudice, the Court refused to disturb the board’s decision.

3. The claims that the board’s lawyer misstated the law regarding the applicability of the town purchasing rules, the chief’s employment contract, and voting by a member favorable to the chief, even if true, were irrelevant because the chief did not argue that the charges on which he was dismissed did not constitute just cause as required by both the law and his employment contract. The Court found that these claims also failed to show material prejudice.

4. With respect to the failure to adopt procedural regulations, the Court ruled that to prevail, the chief had to show some personal prejudice resulted from the board’s failure. Since the plaintiff had fair notice of the charges and a fair opportunity to defend himself, there was no such prejudice. Furthermore, the fact that the board had no special expertise in carrying out quasi-judicial proceedings was not a significant enough factor to persuade the Court that adoption of procedural regulations was a precondition for it to render sufficient due process to satisfy the Constitution.

1. Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioniers, 223 Conn. 354 (1992), 613 A. 2d 254;


September 1, 2004		2004-R-0687
JUST CAUSE REQUIREMENT FOR POLICE CHIEF DISMISSAL

By: Veronica Rose, Principal Analyst