You asked for a summary of the Connecticut Supreme Court's employment discrimination ruling in Perodeau v. City of Hartford, 259 Conn. 729 (2002).

SUMMARY

This case came to the Supreme Court from the federal district court, which asked the Supreme Court to rule on two questions of state law (part of the larger case before the federal court). The plaintiff, a city of Hartford police detective who is a single parent, brought the action against the city and a number of his supervisors in federal court seeking damages for what he alleged was discriminatory employment practices and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He alleged that his transfer, from the evidentiary services division to the north police services area for burglary duty, was punishment for his refusal to work unscheduled shifts know as "callbacks. " The district court dismissed all claims against the individual defendants except for two claims based on state law, for which it sought a ruling from the Connecticut Supreme Court.

The questions were:

1. whether state employment discrimination law imposes liability on individual employees or just on employers, and

2. whether an individual municipal employee can be held liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from conduct that takes place during employment, rather than as part of employment termination.

The court ruled individual employees are not liable in either question.

BACKGROUND

Michael Perodeau, Sr. , the plaintiff, claimed (1) his supervisor falsely accused him of refusing callback shifts, (2) it was the policy and custom of the evidentiary services unit to accommodate officers when they could not cover callbacks, (3) officers in other divisions were allowed to limit their callbacks for business or family reasons, and (4) single mother officers in other divisions were not forced to take callbacks. In addition to the alleged discrimination, Perodeau also claimed he was retaliated against for filing a complaint against the city.

DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY

The court unanimously ruled that the state employment discrimination statute (CGS § 46a-60(a)(1)) does not hold individual employees liable for discrimination even if their actions meet the statutory definition of a discriminatory practice. This turned on the interpretation of the definition of "employer" in CGS § 46a-51(10): "...means any person or employer with three or more persons in his employ. ..." The plaintiff argued the phrase "with three or more persons in his employ" modified only "employer" and not "person. " This reading would mean "person" could be read to include any employee. The court disagreed ruling that the definition does not encompass employees as well as employers. The court said it is clear that "person" and "employer" are both modified by the phrase "with three or more persons in his employ. "

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS LIABILITY

Majority Ruling

The court also ruled, with two justices dissenting, that individual employees may not be found liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from actions during continuing employment, as distinguished from conduct during employment termination. The majority opinion expressed concern over reaching this ruling as employers have a duty not to subject their employees to emotional distress, but they noted that duty is outweighed by other factors. They stated in many jobs it is reasonable to expect some level, or even significant, emotional distress as an inevitable part of the job. The court ruled that allowing such lawsuits over negligent infliction of emotional distress could (1) have a chilling effect that would hinder managers and fellow employees from carrying out their necessary duties, (2) open the door to a wave of spurious claims, and (3) ultimately be so costly as to outweigh any social benefits gained.

Dissent

Chief Justice William Sullivan wrote that the majority decision was arbitrary in distinguishing between negligent infliction of emotional distress in terminations and in ongoing employment. He asserted that the majority appeared to be attempting to curb the expansion of emotional distress claims in the wake of Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co. , 175 Conn. 337, 345, 398 A. 2d 1180 (1978). In Montinieri, the Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction by a trial court that expanded the preexisting standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to include claims in which the plaintiff has not alleged bodily injury or illness or a risk of physical harm. Sullivan argues that although the Montinieri ruling was misguided, he could find no principle on which to base the distinction between termination-related distress as in Montinieri and distress resulting from ongoing employment.

Justice Fleming Norcott, writing separately, agreed with Chief Justice Sullivan, but stated he was not prepared to conclude that Montinieri was misguided and reserved opinion on that for a future case directly on that point.

JM: ts