You asked for a summary of Dixon v. United Illuminating Company, 232 Conn. 758, 1995.

SUMMARY

In Dixon v. United Illuminating Company, the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the Workers' Compensation Commission chairman did not have the authority to transfer a contested case to a different workers' compensation district in response to a claim that the employer was not being treated fairly. The chairman made his decision after a private conversation with a representative of the employer.

The court noted that under the law in effect at the time, a party who claimed that a commissioner was biased could move to have the commissioner disqualify himself and the commissioner's ruling on that motion was subject to review by the Compensation Review Board.

The court concluded that the chairman's transfer order was an impermissible substitute for a motion by the employer to disqualify the commissioner.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim for the death of his wife who had been employed by the United Illuminating Company. The underlying claim had been filed in the fourth district, where it had been the subject of several informal conferences before workers' compensation commissioner John A. Arcudi. It had reached the stage where the plaintiff and the defendant were in the process of exchanging discovery materials.

By letter dated March 14, 1994, the chairman, Jesse Frankl, unilaterally ordered the case transferred from the fourth district to the third district. His transfer letter provided as follows: "Please transfer the above-captioned file [Kenneth Dixon vs. United Illuminating] to the New Haven office. If a formal hearing has been scheduled, please cancel same and reschedule another case in its stead. "

The plaintiff then filed a motion in the fourth district for a hearing "concerning the circumstances of the letter ordering transfer and that the request for transfer be stayed pending hearing and determination of the same. " In her motion, the plaintiff represented that the matter was pending in the fourth district before commissioner Arcudi, who had determined or was in the process of determining certain motions and who had indicated that he would assign the matter for a formal hearing in May, 1994. Citing CGS § 31-278, the plaintiff represented further that she had not been notified of a request for, and had not consented to, a transfer, and was unaware of any basis for the disqualification or incapacity of commissioner Arcudi.

The motion was referred to chairman Frankel, who issued a written ruling denying the motion. In that ruling, he explained the factual background that gave rise to the transfer as follows: "In the course of my duties as Chairman, I was approached by a representative of the employer who claimed that the employer was not being treated fairly by the Fourth District in various workers' compensation cases pending in that district. When asked for specific cases, as opposed to general dissatisfactions, the employer identified this particular case. " In a footnote to the ruling the chairman noted: "The representative of the employer was not the attorney representing the respondent-employer. "

The chairman also stated, "In the course of my duties as Chairman, I am often approached by parties, most often claimants, who are dissatisfied with the manner and/or efficiency with which their cases are being processed. When I am satisfied that this agency is not fulfilling its obligation to efficiently process cases or where a litigant in a contested case raises a serious claim of lack of fair treatment, I have in the past ordered that the matter be transferred to another district or that the matter be specially assigned to a commissioner-at-large to handle the disposition of the case. At all times, I have undertaken such transfers and/or special assignment of commissioners pursuant to my administrative powers, as set forth in General Statutes § 31-280(b). . . . I followed this procedure in the present case. "

LEGAL ISSUES

The issues in this case concern the scope of the chairman's authority to transfer a pending claim from one workers' compensation district to another pursuant to CGS §31-280, and more particularly, subdivisions (6), (14) and (16) of subsection (b) of that statute.

This statute states in relevant part:

"The chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall: ...(6) Allocate the resources of the commission to carryout the

purposes of this chapter; ...(14) Control the hearing calendars of

the compensation commissioners, and if necessary, preside over

informal hearings in regard to compensation under the provisions

of this chapter in order to facilitate the timely and efficient

processing of cases; ...(16) Direct and supervise all administrative

affairs of the commission.... "

The chairman denied the motion and the plaintiff appealed to the Compensation Review Board (board).

The board, acting pursuant to CGS § 31-324, sent the case to the Appellate Court on the following questions: 1. (a) Did the chairman of the workers' compensation commission properly deny claimant's motion for hearing on order of transfer and motion to stay? (b) Was that denial a proper exercise of the chairman's authority pursuant to CGS § 31-280, specifically subdivisions (6), (14) and (16) of subsection (b)? 2. Does the compensation review board have jurisdiction over appeals taken from the chairman's exercise of powers conferred to him by that statute? In the alternative: May a party aggrieved by the chairman's ruling on a motion relating to an order of transfer seek review and redress before the compensation review board given the limitations of CGS § 31-301 as to the compensation review board's appellate jurisdiction?

The Appellate Court sent the case to the Supreme Court without deciding it pursuant to CGS § 31-324.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS

The plaintiff contended that the transfer order was invalid because: (1) the chairman's refusal to grant her motion for a hearing on his summary transfer of the case denied her due process of law; (2) the specific provisions of CGS § 31-278 rather than the general administrative powers granted to the chairman under CGS §31-280(b), govern the transfer of cases from one commissioner to another; and (3) viewing the chairman's order as a ruling on a motion for disqualification of a commissioner for bias, the board has appellate jurisdiction over such a ruling.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

The defendant claimed that: (1) the chairman's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a hearing was a proper exercise of his administrative power under (CGS § 31-280(b)(6), (14), (16) and did not deny the plaintiff due process; and (2) that the board has no appellate jurisdiction over the chairman's exercise of his administrative powers under CGS § 31-280(b).

COURT'S DECISION AND CONCLUSIONS

The Supreme Court concluded that the chairman's transfer of the case was not a proper exercise of his administrative powers under CGS § 31-280. Thus, it vacated the transfer order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Court agreed with the defendant that when the chairman acts pursuant to his administrative power to transfer a case under CGS §31-280(b), no hearing is required. It also agreed that the board has no appellate jurisdiction over the chairman's exercise of that power. But it concluded, that in this case, the chairman's transfer was not a valid exercise of his administrative power under CGS §31-280(b); and instead, was the functional equivalent of the granting of a motion to disqualify commissioner Arcudi for bias. As such, it did not fall within the chairman's administrative authority.

The Court went on to state that the chairman's authority to administer the workers' compensation system under that statute does not include the authority to adjudicate. In this case, according to the Court, the chairman overstepped his authority by deciding a question, namely, whether a commissioner should be disqualified for bias, for which the normal adjudicative process provides a mechanism for resolution by allowing an appeal to the Compensation Review Board. Then Court concluded that the chairman had no more administrative authority to transfer this case on the basis of the defendant's claim of bias than if the defendant had claimed that the commissioner had made an erroneous legal ruling. In either situation, according to the Court, the appropriate remedy would have been through the normal adjudicative, rather than the administrative, process.

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