CHAPTER 952*
PENAL CODE: OFFENSES

*Cited. 191 C. 73, 77. Cited. 192 C. 571, 573. Cited. 202 C. 629, 639, 641. Cited. 204 C. 630, 636. Cited. 209 C. 75, 93.
Person convicted, pursuant to chapter 359 (368p), to be sentenced in accordance with this chapter where no inconsistency results. 31 CS 350.

Table of Contents

Sec. 53a-24. Offense defined. Application of sentencing provisions to motor vehicle and drug selling violators.
Sec. 53a-25. Felony: Definition, classification, designation.
Sec. 53a-26. Misdemeanor: Definition, classification, designation.
Sec. 53a-27. Violation: Definition, designation.
Sec. 53a-28. Authorized sentences.
Sec. 53a-28a. Enforcement of orders of financial restitution.
Sec. 53a-29. Probation and conditional discharge: Criteria; periods.
Sec. 53a-30. *(See end of section for amended version of subsection (a) and effective date.) Conditions of probation and conditional discharge.
Sec. 53a-31. Calculation of periods of probation and conditional discharge.
Sec. 53a-32. Violation of probation or conditional discharge. Arrest. Hearing. Disposition.
Sec. 53a-32a. Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders.
Sec. 53a-33. Termination of probation or conditional discharge.
Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect.
Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981: Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms.
Sec. 53a-35a. Imprisonment for any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981: Definite sentences; terms authorized.
Sec. 53a-35b. "Life imprisonment" defined.
Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor: Maximum and minimum sentences.
Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term.
Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment.
Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing court or judge. Statement by victim.
Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program.
Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants.
Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program.
Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program.
Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences.
Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences.
Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release.
Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual assault of a minor.
Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment or criminal violation of protective order. Authorized sentences.
Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order.
Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender. Authorized sentences.
Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies.
Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors.
Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations.
Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain.
Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree.
Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal.
Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence.
Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence.
Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after October 1, 1980.
Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of sentence for crime punishable by death.
Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Confinement and examination. Release.
Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation.
Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense.
Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation.
Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy.
Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing.
Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification.
Sec. 53a-54a. Murder.
Sec. 53a-54b. Capital felony.
Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder.
Sec. 53a-54d. Arson murder.
Sec. 53a-55. Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-55a. Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-56. Manslaughter in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-56a. Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-56b. Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-57. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-58. Criminally negligent homicide: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-58a. Negligent homicide with a motor vehicle.
Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences.
Sec. 53a-59a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One year not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-62. Threatening: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-65. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent.
Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint.
Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences.
Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C felony: Nine months not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C felony: Two years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree. Adultery: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-83. Patronizing a prostitute: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-84. Sex of parties immaterial.
Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions.
Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-90.
Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties.
Sec. 53a-91. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony.
Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony: One year not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree.
Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-100. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-103a. Burglary in the third degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One year not suspendable.
Sec. 53a-104. Affirmative defense to burglary.
Sec. 53a-105. Conviction for burglary and other offense authorized, when.
Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass.
Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction.
Sec. 53a-110b.
Sec. 53a-110c.
Sec. 53a-110d. Simple trespass of railroad property: Infraction.
Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony.
Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-113. Arson in the third degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-114. Reckless burning: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-115. Criminal mischief in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-116. Criminal mischief in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-117a. Criminal mischief in the fourth degree: Class C misdemeanor.
Secs. 53a-117b to 53a-117d.
Sec. 53a-117e. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-117f. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-117g. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Secs. 53a-117h to 53a-117j.
Sec. 53a-117k. Damage to railroad property in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-117l. Damage to railroad property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-117m. Damage to railroad property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-118. Definitions generally.
Sec. 53a-119. Larceny defined.
Sec. 53a-119a. Shoplifting and library theft; detention, questioning, presumption of crime.
Sec. 53a-119b. Using motor vehicle or vessel without owner's permission. Interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle. First offense: Class A misdemeanor. Subsequent offense: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-120. Theft of services; service and credit card defined.
Sec. 53a-121. Value of property or services.
Sec. 53a-122. Larceny in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-123. Larceny in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-124. Larceny in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-125. Larceny in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-125a. Larceny in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-125b. Larceny in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-126. Larceny by receiving stolen property.
Sec. 53a-126a. Criminal trover in the first degree: Class D felony, first offense; Class C felony, subsequent offense.
Sec. 53a-126b. Criminal trover in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-127. Diversion from state of benefit of labor of employees: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-127a. Unlawful entry into coin machine; possession of key to enter: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-127b. Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-127c. Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-127d. Cheating: Class D felony or class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-127e. Possession of a cheating device: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-127f. Possession of a shoplifting device: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-128. Issuing a bad check. Penalties.
Sec. 53a-128a. Credit card crimes. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-128b. False statement to procure issuance of credit card.
Sec. 53a-128c. Credit card theft. Illegal transfer. Fraud. Forgery.
Sec. 53a-128d. Illegal use of credit card. Presumption of knowledge of revocation.
Sec. 53a-128e. Illegal furnishing of money, goods or services on credit card.
Sec. 53a-128f. Unlawful completion or reproduction of credit card.
Sec. 53a-128g. Receipt of money, goods or services obtained by illegal use of credit card.
Sec. 53a-128h. Certain defenses denied.
Sec. 53a-128i. Penalties for credit card crimes.
Sec. 53a-129. Misapplication of property: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-130a. Impersonation of a police officer: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-131. Unlawfully concealing a will: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-132. False entry by an officer or agent of a public community: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-133. Robbery defined.
Sec. 53a-134. Robbery in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-135. Robbery in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-136. Robbery in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty.
Sec. 53a-137. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-138. Forgery in the first degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-140. Forgery in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-141. Criminal simulation: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-142. Forgery of symbols: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-143. Unlawfully using slugs: Definitions.
Sec. 53a-144. Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-145. Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-146. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-147. Bribery: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-148. Bribe receiving: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-149. Bribery of a witness: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-150. Bribe receiving by a witness: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-151. Tampering with a witness: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-151a. Intimidating a witness: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-152. Bribery of a juror: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-153. Bribe receiving by a juror: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-154. Tampering with a juror: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-155. Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-156. Perjury: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-157.
Sec. 53a-157a. False statement in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-157b. (Formerly Sec. 53a-157). False statement in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-158. Bribery of a labor official: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-159. Bribe receiving by a labor official: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-160. Commercial bribery: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-161. Receiving a commercial bribe: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-161a. Bid rigging: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-161b. Disclosure of bid or proposal: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-161c. Receiving kickbacks: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-161d. Paying a kickback: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-162. Rigging: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-163. Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-164. Participation in a rigged contest: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-165. Hindering prosecution defined.
Sec. 53a-166. Hindering prosecution in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-167. Hindering prosecution in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-167a. Interfering with an officer: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-167b. Failure to assist a peace officer or fireman: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-167c. Assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel.
Sec. 53a-168. Escape: Definitions.
Sec. 53a-169. Escape in the first degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-170. Escape in the second degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-171. Escape from custody: Class C felony or class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-171a. Aiding escape from hospital or sanatorium: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-172. Failure to appear in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-173. Failure to appear in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-174. Unauthorized conveyance of items into correctional or humane institution or to inmate: Class D felony. Unauthorized conveyance of letter into or from, or use of false name to enter, correctional institution: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-174a. Possession of weapon or dangerous instrument in correctional institution: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-175. Riot in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-176. Riot in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-177. Unlawful assembly: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-178. Inciting to riot: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-179. Criminal advocacy: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-179a. Inciting injury to persons or property: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-179b. Rioting at correctional institution: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-179c. Inciting to riot at correctional institution: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-180. Falsely reporting an incident: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-180a. Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-180b. Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-181. Breach of the peace: Class A or B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-181a. Creating a public disturbance: Infraction.
Sec. 53a-181b. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-181c. Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-181d. Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-181e. Stalking in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Secs. 53a-181f to 53a-181i.
Sec. 53a-181j. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-181k. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-181l. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-182. Disorderly conduct: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-182a. Obstructing free passage: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-182b. Harassment in the first degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-183a. Obstructing or interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife: Class C misdemeanor.
Secs. 53a-184 and 53a-184a. Intoxication by drug; definition, commitment, treatment, penalty. Intoxication by alcohol or drug; definition, commitment, dismissal of criminal proceedings, unclassified misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-185. Loitering on school grounds: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-186. Public indecency: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-187. Definitions. Applicability.
Sec. 53a-188. Tampering with private communications: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-189. Eavesdropping: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-189a. Voyeurism: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-189b. Disseminating voyeuristic material: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-190. Bigamy: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-191. Incest: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-192. Coercion: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony.
Sec. 53a-193. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-194. Obscenity: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-195. Defense.
Sec. 53a-196. Obscenity as to minors: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-196a. Employing a minor in an obscene performance: Class A felony.
Sec. 53a-196b. Promoting a minor in an obscene performance: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-196c. Importing child pornography: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-196d. Possessing child pornography: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-197. Disseminating indecent comic books: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-198. Failing to identify a comic book publication: Violation.
Sec. 53a-199. Injunction against promoting any obscene material or performance.
Sec. 53a-200. Institution of action for adjudication of obscenity.
Sec. 53a-201. Presentation of material or evidence depicting performance. Probable cause determination. Time for trial and decision.
Sec. 53a-202. Third party may be made a party.
Sec. 53a-203. Jury trial.
Sec. 53a-204. Evidence.
Sec. 53a-205. Judgment.
Sec. 53a-206. Injunction and restraining order.
Sec. 53a-207. Service of process on nonresidents.
Sec. 53a-208. Extradition.
Sec. 53a-209. Penalties.
Sec. 53a-210. Levy of fine against property.
Sec. 53a-211. Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or silencer: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-212. Stealing a firearm. Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-213. Drinking while operating motor vehicle: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-214. Criminal lockout: Class C misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-215. Insurance fraud: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-216. Criminal use of firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-217. Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-217a. Criminally negligent storage of a firearm: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-217b. Possession of a weapon on school grounds: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-217d. Criminal possession of body armor: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-217e. Negligent hunting. Penalties. Fines deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and the Conservation Fund. Suspension of hunting license. Forfeiture of hunting weapon. Prima facie evidence of hunting.
Sec. 53a-218. Interference with a cemetery or burial ground: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-219. Unlawful possession or sale of gravestones: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-220. Interference with a memorial plaque: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-221. Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-222. Violation of conditions of release: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-223. (Formerly Sec. 53a-110b). Criminal violation of a protective order: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-223a. (Formerly Sec. 53a-110c). Criminal violation of a standing criminal restraining order: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-250. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-251. Computer crime.
Sec. 53a-252. Computer crime in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-253. Computer crime in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-254. Computer crime in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-255. Computer crime in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-256. Computer crime in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-257. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain.
Sec. 53a-258. Determination of degree of crime.
Sec. 53a-259. Value of property or computer services.
Sec. 53a-260. Location of offense.
Sec. 53a-261. Jurisdiction.
Secs. 53a-262 to 53a-274.
Sec. 53a-275. Money laundering. Definitions.
Sec. 53a-276. Money laundering in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-277. Money laundering in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-278. Money laundering in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-279. Money laundering in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-280. Money laundering. Alternative fine.
Sec. 53a-281. Money laundering. Corporate fines.
Sec. 53a-282. Money laundering. Presumptions.
Secs. 53a-283 to 53a-289.
Sec. 53a-290. "Vendor fraud" defined.
Sec. 53a-291. Vendor fraud in the first degree: Class B felony.
Sec. 53a-292. Vendor fraud in the second degree: Class C felony.
Sec. 53a-293. Vendor fraud in the third degree: Class D felony.
Sec. 53a-294. Vendor fraud in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-295. Vendor fraud in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 53a-296. Vendor fraud in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor.


PART I*
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION

*Secs. 53a-24−53a-27 cited. 27 CA 225, 232.

Sec. 53a-24. Offense defined. Application of sentencing provisions to motor vehicle and drug selling violators. (a) The term "offense" means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or any other state, federal law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or is deemed to be an infraction. The term "crime" comprises felonies and misdemeanors. Every offense which is not a "crime" is a "violation". Conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, the provisions of sections 53a-28 to 53a-44, inclusive, shall apply to motor vehicle violations. Said provisions shall apply to convictions under section 21a-278 except that the execution of any mandatory minimum sentence imposed under the provisions of said section may not be suspended.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 24; 1972, P.A. 294, S. 39; P.A. 75-380, S. 15; 75-577, S. 8, 126; P.A. 92-260, S. 8.)
History: 1972 act added provision in Subsec. (b) re applicability of Secs. 53a-28 to 53a-44 with respect to convictions under Sec. 19-480a; P.A. 75-380 amended Subsec. (a) to include breach of federal and other states' laws as offense; P.A. 75-577 included infractions in exception to "offense" definition in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 166 C. 449. Cited. 209 C. 98, 125. Cited. 226 C. 191, 198, 199. Cited. 229 C. 716, 721.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 689−691, 693, 694, 699, 700, 716, 717, 720, 723, 726, 727. Cited. 24 CA 195, 210. Cited. 27 CA 225, 232. Cited. 41 CA 454, 463−465, 472. Cited. 45 CA 722.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 529; id., 551, 560.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 226 C. 191, 198, 199. Cited. 228 C. 758, 762.
Cited. 6 CA 505, 509. Cited. 9 CA 686, 691−693, 696, 698, 716, 719, 723. Cited. 22 CA 108, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 225, 233. Cited. 41 CA 454, 463, 464, 466, 472.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530, 531; id., 551, 560.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 694, 719.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530.

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Sec. 53a-25. Felony: Definition, classification, designation. (a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is a felony.
(b) Felonies are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C, (4) class D, (5) unclassified and (6) capital felonies.
(c) The particular classification of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it. Any offense defined in any other section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) shall be deemed an unclassified felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 25; P.A. 73-137, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 9.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added capital felonies classification in Subsec. (b); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsecs. (a) and (c) and amended Subdiv. (6) of Subsec. (b) to delete "for which the sentence of death may be imposed as provided in sections 53a-46a and 53a-54b".
See Secs. 53a-35 and 53a-35a re sentences for felonies.
See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.
Cited. 170 C. 601, 603. Police officer may arrest without previous complaint or warrant any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony. 171 C. 105, 113. Cited. 196 C. 305, 306.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720, 727. Cited. 28 CA 91, 96.
Cited. 36 CS 551, 560.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 11 CA 11, 19.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 731. Cited. 11 CA 11, 19.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530.

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Sec. 53a-26. Misdemeanor: Definition, classification, designation. (a) An offense for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year is a misdemeanor.
(b) Misdemeanors are classified for the purposes of sentence as follows: (1) Class A, (2) class B, (3) class C and (4) unclassified.
(c) The particular classification of each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section defining it. Any offense defined in any other section of the general statutes which, by virtue of an expressly specified sentence, is within the definition set forth in subsection (a) shall be deemed an unclassified misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 26; P.A. 92-260, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (b).
See Sec. 53a-36 re sentences for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.
Cited. 202 C. 443, 445.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 719, 720, 726, 727. Cited. 41 CA 476, 478. Cited. 43 CA 1.
Cited. 36 CS 551, 560.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 692.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 692, 719, 723, 731.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530, 531.

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Sec. 53a-27. Violation: Definition, designation. (a) An offense, for which the only sentence authorized is a fine, is a violation unless expressly designated an infraction.
(b) Every violation defined in this chapter is expressly designated as such. Any offense defined in any other section which is not expressly designated a violation or infraction shall be deemed a violation if, notwithstanding any other express designation, it is within the definition set forth in subsection (a).
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 27; P.A. 75-577, S. 4, 126.)
History: P.A. 75-577 excluded offenses expressly designated as infractions from consideration as violation.
See chapter 881b (Sec. 51-174m et seq.) re infractions.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 690, 692, 718−720, 723, 731. Cited. 40 CA 762, 767. Cited. 41 CA 454, 463−465.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 723, 727. Cited. 27 CA 225, 232. Cited. 41 CA 454, 463.
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530; id., 551, 560.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 36 CS 527, 530, 531.
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PART II*
SENTENCES AND SENTENCING PROCEDURE

*Annotations to former section 54-111:
Cited. 20 CS 175.
Commitment to probation officer is not penal in character and does not reduce unexpired portion of sentence. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367.
Annotations to former section 54-112:
Under the adult probation act, a court may suspend execution of the sentence and place defendant on probation, at any time, both during and after the term or session of court at which judgment was pronounced, irrespective of whether execution has begun. The partial execution of a sentence would not, in a proper case, deprive the court of power to open judgment. 23 CS 176.
Annotations to former section 54-113:
Cited. 153 C. 206.
Probation compared with parole. 6 CS 353. Probation is not ordered for the purpose of punishment for the wrong for which there has been a conviction; purpose is reformatory, not punitive. 20 CS 176.
Annotations to former section 54-114:
Cited. 8 CS 190; 17 CS 447; 19 CS 433. Sentence imposed by court is same sentence execution of which has been suspended and lesser sentence ordered to be served is part of original sentence. 27 CS 108, 109; id., 128, 130.
Where provisions of section had been followed, defendant was not entitled to appeal as constitutional requirements were fulfilled. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367.
Annotations to former section 54-116:
What action by court permitted; law valid; sentence does not run while accused at large on parole. 88 C. 500. Does not apply to justices of the peace. 102 C. 28. History of former section. 111 C. 287. Cited. 115 C. 597.
Where the execution of a sentence is suspended indefinitely without committing the accused to the custody of a probation officer, the court cannot revoke the suspension. 8 CS 188. Cited. 15 CS 273; 19 CS 433. Where court suspends sentence indefinitely without committing the accused to custody of a probation officer, no right of revocation exists; history of legislation reviewed. 17 CS 449.
Circuit court or judge thereof has power and authority to modify execution of sentence of minor for violation of Sec. 17-379 to Connecticut State Farm for Women. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 204, 207.
Annotations to former section 54-117:
Averment "against statute" does not vitiate and may be rejected as surplusage. 3 D. 103. Assault with intent to kill, a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 3 C. 114; 5 C. 330. High crime and misdemeanor is an immoral and unlawful act, not strictly a felony. 6 C. 217; id., 476. Nuisance does not constitute. 6 C. 418; but see 7 C. 431. Solicitation to commit adultery a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 7 C. 270. Escape from prison without prison breach or violence an offense at common law. 7 C. 452. Attempt to steal offense at common law. 30 C. 500. Conspiracy a crime at common law; and punishable under this statute. 69 C. 725; 75 C. 210; 77 C. 227; 86 C. 434; 124 C. 562; 126 C. 84; 127 C. 604. High crime, felony, misdemeanor, defined. 86 C. 434; id., 627. Conspiracy to commit assault is high crime and misdemeanor. 86 C. 434. Conspiracy to commit crime is not merged in crime itself. 99 C. 114. Definition of merger; when merger exists; is a doctrine of very limited application. 108 C. 215. Identity of offenses. Id., 214.
Annotations to former section 54-118:
Allegation of too many prior convictions held surplusage; state may prove such as it can. 94 C. 706. For proper method of proceeding under this statute, see note to Sec. 54-62. Cited. 147 C. 296; 149 C. 489; 152 C. 632; 153 C. 40; id., 208; id., 211; 154 C. 37, 38. Prima facie case made when state establishes identity, imposition of sentence and issuance of mittimus. 151 C. 552. Where record shows prior conviction, defendant has burden to show he was not incarcerated. Id. While identity of full name of defendant with that of person named in prior out-of-state conviction is some evidence that each name refers to same person, it is not adequate alone to constitute proof without a reasonable doubt that defendant was person named in out-of-state judgment. 153 C. 33. Where information charging defendant as a second offender was correct except for a mistake in naming the crime committed and he pleaded guilty to the charge, raising no claim of error, held he established no right to relief by habeas corpus in absence of showing that he had suffered prejudice or injustice. 153 C. 599, 602. Cited. 155 C. 298; 158 C. 126. Cited. 163 C. 419.
Cited. 17 CS 366; 27 CS 235. Defendant incorrectly sentenced as an habitual criminal may be resentenced as a second offender. 26 CS 464. Sentence of not less than seven nor more than twelve years for bank robber who was second offender was reasonable. 27 CS 119−121. Cited. 28 CS 154, 159.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 690 (fn. 1).
Annotations to former section 54-119:
Penalty of "fine and imprisonment" permits either. 75 C. 351.
Cited. 15 CS 273.
Annotations to former section 54-121:
If statute fixes minimum penalty, court may not give sentence for less period. 84 C. 470. Prior convictions must be alleged; 94 C. 703; 96 C. 172; and should be in original, not a supplemental, information. 110 C. 298. But accused should first be tried for present crime and jury should not be told of claimed prior convictions; if convicted, issue of prior convictions should then be submitted to jury. 96 C. 172 et seq. The words "state prison or penitentiary" do not include federal penitentiary. 110 C. 302. No limitation upon minimum for third offender other than that it should not be for less than one year. 110 C. 412; 130 C. 111. Defendant who escaped without completing imprisonment on second conviction, held properly punished as a third offender for crime of escape. 130 C. 109, 110. Statute is constitutional. Id. Application of statute with relation to separate sentences; whether to run concurrently or consecutively is for court to determine. 132 C. 303, 304. If sentences on two or more counts are to run concurrently, a direction to that effect should be given, and a maximum and a minimum should be fixed for each offense. 126 C. 220; 132 C. 303. Counts specifying a minimum but no maximum are invalid. 126 C. 221. Cited. 129 C. 166; 147 C. 506; 152 C. 470; 153 C. 673. When a maximum and a minimum term are fixed under one count and only one period under each of the other counts, the terms run consecutively. 143 C. 559. Person may be sentenced as a third offender even though it is known that he is a fourth offender. 147 C. 506. Defendant charged a denial of equal protection since other persons, similarly circumstanced, were not sentenced as third offenders, held not a valid defense unless there is a showing of intentional or arbitrary action amounting to an unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. Id. Second offender provision does not create new crime; fact of former conviction is element merely in determining degree of criminality of second offense. 149 C. 72. While identity of full name of defendant with that of person named in prior out-of-state conviction is some evidence that each name refers to same person, it is not adequate alone to constitute proof without a reasonable doubt that defendant was person named in out-of-state judgment. 153 C. 33. See note to section 54-92a. Cited. 157 C. 399. Cited. 163 C. 232.
Fixing a maximum on one count is an order that such sentence should run consecutively and not concurrently. 4 CS 204. Statute does not direct sentence in two or more separate cases. Id., 364. Cited. 13 CS 164; 22 CS 177; 26 CS 71. Where defendant in two separate criminal cases received sentences in both on the same day, to run consecutively, minimum sentence in second valid under this section. 16 CS 76. Statute does not constitute a new and separate offense; state's attorney not required to present every third offender as an habitual criminal. 20 CS 384. Where one previous felony conviction violated defendant's constitutional right to counsel, it should not be counted as a previous conviction under this statute. 26 CS 464. Being presented as first offender for sentence does not require court to close eyes to defendant's prior life. 27 CS 236. Where maximum sentence was same for first offender on rape charge (Sec. 53-238) as under this statute, sentence confirmed on review. Id. Sentence fixing minimum terms on several counts to run consecutively is improper by reason of this section. 27 CS 316. Where concurrent sentence is intended, court must so direct and minimum and maximum terms should be fixed on all counts. Id.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 690 (fn. 1).
Annotations to part II of chapter 952:
Sec. 53a-28 et. seq. cited. 207 C. 152, 167. Sec. 53a-28 et seq. cited. 240 C. 639. Probation Act cited. Id.
Sec. 53a-28 et seq. cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-28 et seq. cited. 39 CA 722, 728.

Sec. 53a-28. Authorized sentences. (a) Except as provided in section 17a-699 and chapter 420b, to the extent that the provisions of said section and chapter are inconsistent herewith, every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced in accordance with this title.
(b) Except as provided in section 53a-46a, when a person is convicted of an offense, the court shall impose one of the following sentences: (1) A term of imprisonment; or (2) a sentence authorized by section 18-65a or 18-73; or (3) a fine; or (4) a term of imprisonment and a fine; or (5) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (6) a term of imprisonment, with the execution of such sentence of imprisonment suspended, entirely or after a period set by the court, and a fine and a period of probation or a period of conditional discharge; or (7) a fine and a sentence authorized by section 18-65a or 18-73; or (8) a sentence of unconditional discharge; or (9) a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole as provided in section 54-125e.
(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, if a person is convicted of an offense that resulted in injury to another person or damage to or loss of property, the court shall order the offender to make financial restitution if it determines that financial restitution is appropriate. In determining whether financial restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider: (1) The financial resources of the offender and the burden restitution will place on other obligations of the offender; (2) the offender's ability to pay based on installments or other conditions; (3) the rehabilitative effect on the offender of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (4) other circumstances that the court determines makes restitution appropriate or inappropriate. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury. Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering or other intangible losses, but may include the costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense.
(d) A sentence to a period of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with sections 53a-29 to 53a-34, inclusive, shall be deemed a revocable disposition, in that such sentence shall be tentative to the extent that it may be altered or revoked in accordance with said sections but for all other purposes it shall be deemed to be a final judgment of conviction.
(e) When sentencing a person to a period of probation who has been convicted of (1) a misdemeanor that did not involve the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person or (2) a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed, the court shall consider, as a condition of such sentence of probation, ordering the person to perform community service in the community in which the offense or violation occurred. If the court determines that community service is appropriate, such community service may be implemented by a community court established in accordance with section 51-181c if the offense or violation occurred within the jurisdiction of a community court established by said section.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 28; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 10; P.A. 73-137, S. 7; 73-639, S. 3; P.A. 75-633, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 11; P.A. 95-175, S. 1; P.A. 97-199, S. 1; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11, S. 62, 65; P.A. 98-234, S. 2; P.A. 00-196, S. 38.)
History: 1971 act added exception re Ch. 359 in Subsec. (a) and deleted references to "reformatory" sentences in Subdivs. (2) and (7) of Subsec. (b), adding reference to Secs. 18-73 and 18-75 in Subdiv. (7) for conformity; P.A. 73-137 deleted references to Secs. 53a-46 and 53a-93 and added reference to Secs. 53a-46a and 53a-54b in Subsec. (b); P.A. 73- 639 added references to Sec. 18-65 in Subdivs. (2) and (7) of Subsec. (b); P.A. 75-633 deleted reference to Secs. 18-65 and 18-75 in Subdiv. (1), adding reference to Sec. 18-65a and deleted reference to Sec. 18-75 in Subdiv. (7) of Subsec. (b); P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference to "chapter 368p" with "section 17a-656 and chapter 420b" and replace "such chapter is" with "the provisions of said section and chapter are" and amended Subsec. (b) to delete from the exclusionary provision references to Secs. 53a-45, 53a-54b and 53a-92, to make a technical change in Subdivs. (2) and (6) and to replace reference to "Sec. 18-65" with "Sec. 18-65a" in Subdiv. (7); P.A. 95-175 inserted new Subsec. (c) re order of financial restitution and considerations required prior to order and relettered former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 97-199 added Subsec. (e) re order of community service in community where offense occurred, implemented by community court; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11 changed effective date of P.A. 97-199 from October 1, 1997, to July 1, 1997, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 98-234 amended Subsec. (b) to add Subdiv. (9) authorizing a sentence of a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole as provided in Sec. 54-125e; P.A. 00-196 amended Subsec. (e) to delete provisions re ordering community service as a condition of accelerated rehabilitation, said provisions being reenacted as part of Sec. 54-56e by same public act, and to make technical changes.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Court does not have sentencing options as provided in this section where Sec. 53a-36 provides for a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment. 180 C. 557, 559−561. Cited. 197 C. 337, 353, 357. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 674, 678. Cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Cited. 207 C. 270, 275. Cited. 208 C. 420, 428, 429. Cited. 210 C. 519, 524, 526. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Cited. 30 CA 416, 421−423. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq.
Person convicted under section 19-481(a) required to be sentenced in accord with this chapter where sentence not inconsistent with chapter 359. 31 CS 350. Does not provide for sentence of confinement with condition restricting authority of commissioner of correction to award "good time." 35 CS 545, 548. Cited. Id. Section contains no authority for order of restitution unless it is a condition of probation or conditional discharge. Id., 675, 678.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 35 CS 675, 678.
Subsec. (b):
Subdivs. (3) and (8) cited. 182 C. 595, 603. Subdiv. (6) cited. 196 C. 655, 658. Cited. Id., 655, 658, 661. Cited. 198 C. 671, 678. Cited. 206 C. 608, 616. Cited. 216 C. 40, 61.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608.
Subdivs. (5) and (6) cited. 35 CS 675, 678.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 34 CA 1, 7.

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Sec. 53a-28a. Enforcement of orders of financial restitution. All financial obligations ordered pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28 may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by the party or entity to whom the obligation is owed. Such obligations may be enforced at any time during the ten-year period following the offender's release from confinement or within ten years of the entry of the order and sentence, whichever is longer.
(P.A. 95-175, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-29. Probation and conditional discharge: Criteria; periods. (a) The court may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of any crime, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; (2) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or assistance which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision; and (3) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.
(b) The court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an offense, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; and (2) probation supervision is not appropriate.
(c) When the court imposes a sentence of conditional discharge the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed but shall be subject, during the period of such conditional discharge, to such conditions as the court may determine. The court shall impose the period of conditional discharge authorized by subsection (d) of this section and shall specify, in accordance with section 53a- 30, the conditions to be complied with. When a person is sentenced to a period of probation the court shall impose the period authorized by subsection (d) of this section and may impose any conditions authorized by said section 53a-30. When a person is sentenced to a period of probation, he shall pay to the court a fee of two hundred dollars and shall be placed under the supervision of the Office of Adult Probation.
(d) The period of probation or conditional discharge, unless terminated sooner as provided in section 53a-32 or 53a-33, shall be as follows: (1) For a felony, except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, not more than five years; (2) for a class A misdemeanor, not more than three years; (3) for a class B misdemeanor, not more than two years; (4) for a class C misdemeanor, not more than one year; and (5) for an unclassified misdemeanor, not more than one year if the authorized sentence of imprisonment is three months or less, or not more than two years if the authorized sentence of imprisonment is in excess of three months, or where the defendant is charged with failure to provide subsistence for dependents, a determinate or indeterminate period.
(e) The period of probation, unless terminated sooner as provided in section 53a- 32, shall be not less than ten years nor more than thirty-five years for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a- 71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 29; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 124, 129; P.A. 79-585, S. 8, 15; P.A. 89-219, S. 6, 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 12; P.A. 93-340, S. 12, 19; P.A. 95-142, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act repealed former Subsec. (e) requiring probation officer to make recommendation as to advisability of continuing probation after probationer has been on probation for a year and allowing person on probation to be heard by court with respect to continuance or discontinuance of probation; P.A. 79-585 replaced commission on adult probation with office of adult probation in Subsec. (c); P.A. 89-219 amended Subsec. (c) to require a person sentenced to a period of probation to pay to the court a fee of two hundred dollars; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes and amended Subsec. (d) to replace "hereinafter provided" with "provided in section 53a-32 or 53a-33" and to replace in Subdiv. (5) "less than three months" with "three months or less"; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (d) to add exception in Subdiv. (1) re Subsec. (e) and added Subsec. (e) to authorize a period of probation of not more than thirty-five years for conviction of a sexual assault under certain circumstances, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (e) to delete reference to an early termination of probation as provided in Sec. 53a-33, establish a minimum period of probation of ten years, include a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Sec. 53-21 and delete the provisions that limited the applicability of the Subsec. to where the conviction is of a second or subsequent violation or the defendant was eighteen years of age or older and the victim was under thirteen years of age.
Cited. 170 C. 128, 129. Cited. 197 C. 337, 354, 357. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 678. Cited. 200 C. 268, 279, 286. Cited. 204 C. 52, 56. Cited. 210 C. 519, 524, 526. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50. Cited. 229 C. 285, 297.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Cited. 30 CA 416, 422. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 250.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 675, 678. Cited. 210 C. 519, 525.
Cited. 22 CA 108, 112.
Cited. 37 CS 853, 857.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 603. Cited. 198 C. 671, 678.
Subsec. (d):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 72, 84.

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Sec. 53a-30. *(See end of section for amended version of subsection (a) and effective date.) Conditions of probation and conditional discharge. *(a) When imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order that the defendant: (1) Work faithfully at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of study or of vocational training that will equip the defendant for suitable employment; (2) undergo medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (3) support the defendant's dependents and meet other family obligations; (4) make restitution of the fruits of the defendant's offense or make restitution, in an amount the defendant can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance; (5) if a minor, (A) reside with the minor's parents or in a suitable foster home, (B) attend school, and (C) contribute to the minor's own support in any home or foster home; (6) post a bond or other security for the performance of any or all conditions imposed; (7) refrain from violating any criminal law of the United States, this state or any other state; (8) if convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and any sentence of imprisonment is suspended, participate in an alternate incarceration program; (9) reside in a residential community center or halfway house approved by the Commissioner of Correction, and contribute to the cost incident to such residence; (10) participate in a program of community service labor in accordance with section 53a-39c; (11) participate in a program of community service in accordance with section 51-181c; (12) if convicted of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, undergo specialized sexual offender treatment; (13) if convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor, a nonviolent sexual offense or a sexually violent offense, as defined in section 54-250, or of a felony that the court finds was committed for a sexual purpose, as provided in section 54-254, register such person's identifying factors, as defined in section 54-250, with the Commissioner of Public Safety when required pursuant to section 54-251, 54-252 or 54-253, as the case may be; (14) be subject to electronic monitoring; (15) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.
(b) When a defendant has been sentenced to a period of probation, the Office of Adult Probation may require that the defendant comply with any or all conditions which the court could have imposed under subsection (a) which are not inconsistent with any condition actually imposed by the court.
(c) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, the court may modify or enlarge the conditions, whether originally imposed by the court under this section or otherwise, and may extend the period, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any.
(d) The period of participation in an alternate incarceration program, unless terminated sooner, shall not exceed the period of probation authorized by section 53a-29 or two years, whichever is less.
(e) The court may require that the person subject to electronic monitoring subject to subsection (a) of this section pay directly to the electronic monitoring service provider a fee for the cost of such electronic monitoring services. If the court finds that the person subject to electronic monitoring is indigent and unable to pay the costs of electronic monitoring services, it shall waive such costs. Any contract entered into by the judicial branch and the electronic monitoring service provider shall include a provision stating that the total cost for electronic monitoring services shall not exceed five dollars per day. Such amount shall be indexed annually to reflect the rate of inflation.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 30; 1971, P.A. 781, S. 1; P.A. 73-231; P.A. 78-188, S. 4, 8; P.A. 79-585, S. 9, 15; P.A. 82-298, S. 8; P.A. 86-403, S. 88, 132; P.A. 89-383, S. 4, 16; 89-390, S. 19, 37; P.A. 90-213, S. 4, 56; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 4, 10; P.A. 93-340, S. 13, 19; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 3; P.A. 97-199, S. 3; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11, S. 62, 65; P.A. 99-183, S. 12, 13; P.A. 00-141, S. 1.)

*Note: On and after July 1, 2001, subsection (a) of this section, as amended by section 1 of public act 00-141, is further amended by section 5 of public act 00-72 to read as follows:
"(a) When imposing sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court may, as a condition of the sentence, order that the defendant: (1) Work faithfully at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of study or of vocational training that will equip the defendant for suitable employment; (2) undergo medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (3) support the defendant's dependents and meet other family obligations; (4) make restitution of the fruits of the defendant's offense or make restitution, in an amount the defendant can afford to pay or provide in a suitable manner, for the loss or damage caused thereby and the court may fix the amount thereof and the manner of performance; (5) if a minor, (A) reside with the minor's parents or in a suitable foster home, (B) attend school, and (C) contribute to the minor's own support in any home or foster home; (6) post a bond or other security for the performance of any or all conditions imposed; (7) refrain from violating any criminal law of the United States, this state or any other state; (8) if convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and any sentence of imprisonment is suspended, participate in an alternate incarceration program; (9) reside in a residential community center or halfway house approved by the Commissioner of Correction, and contribute to the cost incident to such residence; (10) participate in a program of community service labor in accordance with section 53a-39c; (11) participate in a program of community service in accordance with section 51-181c; (12) if convicted of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a- 72b, undergo specialized sexual offender treatment; (13) if convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor, a nonviolent sexual offense or a sexually violent offense, as defined in section 54-250, or of a felony that the court finds was committed for a sexual purpose, as provided in section 54-254, register such person's identifying factors, as defined in section 54-250, with the Commissioner of Public Safety when required pursuant to section 54-251, 54-252 or 54-253, as the case may be; (14) be subject to electronic monitoring; (15) if convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53- 37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l, participate in an anti-bias crime education program; (16) satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation. The court shall cause a copy of any such order to be delivered to the defendant and to the probation officer, if any."
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 30; 1971, P.A. 781, S. 1; P.A. 73-231; P.A. 78-188, S. 4, 8; P.A. 79-585, S. 9, 15; P.A. 82-298, S. 8; P.A. 86-403, S. 88, 132; P.A. 89-383, S. 4, 16; 89-390, S. 19, 37; P.A. 90-213, S. 4, 56; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 4, 10; P.A. 93-340, S. 13, 19; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 3; P.A. 97-199, S. 3; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11, S. 62, 65; P.A. 99-183, S. 12, 13; P.A. 00-72, S. 5, 12; 00-141, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act authorized court to order defendant to reside in residential community center and contribute to costs; P.A. 73-231 authorized court to order that defendant shall reside in a halfway house approved by commissioner of correction; P.A. 78-188 restated Subdiv. (4) in Subsec. (a) and required offender to submit to restitution investigation if necessary; P.A. 79-585 replaced commission on adult probation with office of adult probation in Subsec. (b); P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting provision re restitution investigation as provided in Sec. 54-110a; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (c), substituting "conditional discharge" for "conditional release"; P.A. 89-383 amended Subsec. (a) to add a new Subdiv. (8) authorizing the court to order certain defendants to participate in an alternate incarceration program, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and added Subsec. (d) limiting the period of participation in an alternate incarceration program, effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 89-390 amended Subsec. (a) to add a new Subdiv. (9) authorizing the court to order the defendant to participate in a program of special alternative incarceration in accordance with Sec. 53a-39b, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly; P.A. 90-213 amended Subsec. (a) to add a new Subdiv. (11) authorizing the court to order the defendant to participate in a program of community service labor in accordance with Sec. 53a-39c, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9 amended Subsec. (a) to eliminate former Subdiv. (9) authorizing court to order defendant to participate in a program of special alternative incarceration in accordance with Sec. 53a-39b, renumbering remaining Subdivs. accordingly; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) to add a new Subdiv. (11) authorizing the court to order the defendant to undergo specialized sexual offender treatment when convicted of sexual assault under certain circumstances, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383 which had discontinued alternative incarceration program as of July 1, 1994, and reenacted and continued existence of section, effective July 1, 1994; P.A. 95-142 amended Subdiv. (11) of Subsec. (a) to include a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Sec. 53-21 and delete provisions that limited the applicability of said Subdiv. to where the conviction is of a second or subsequent violation or the defendant was eighteen years of age or older and the victim was under thirteen years of age; P.A. 97-199 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new Subdiv. (11) re participation in program of community service and by renumbering existing Subdivs. (11) and (12) as Subdivs. (12) and (13), respectively; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11 changed effective date of P.A. 97-199 from October 1, 1997, to July 1, 1997, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-183 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new Subdiv. (13) re registration of identifying factors with the Commissioner of Public Safety by certain sexual offenders and renumbering existing Subdiv. (13) as Subdiv. (14), effective July 1, 1999; P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new provision, designated as Subdiv. (15), re participation in an anti-bias crime education program and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2001; P.A. 00-141 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes and add Subdiv. (14) re electronic monitoring, and added Subsec. (e) re electronic monitoring services.
Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 204 C. 52, 56. Cited. 207 C. 152, 153, 158, 167, 168. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50. Cited. 240 C. 639.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 338, 341. Cited. 14 CA 272, 282. Cited. 19 CA 304, 318. Cited. 22 CA 199, 205. Cited. Id., 449, 457. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 33 CA 432, 447. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Cited. 39 CA 722, 730. Cited. 45 CA 722.
Cited. 35 CS 536, 539. Requiring defendant to sell his gun collection was a condition reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Id., 570, 577. Cited. 41 CS 229, 248. Cited. 42 CS 574, 583, 593, 597.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 169 C. 223, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited. 169 C. 223, 231. Subdiv. (7) cited. 196 C. 305, 306. Cited. 207 C. 152, 171. Subdiv. (7) cited. Id., 152, 171−173. Subdiv. (9) cited. Id. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. 240 C. 639. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (12) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (9) cited. 3 CA 410, 414. Subdiv. (4) cited. 7 CA 326, 352. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 432, 447. Subdiv. (11) cited. Id., 432, 447. Subdiv. (7) cited. 39 CA 722, 723, 725. Cited. 42 CA 460. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (12) cited. Id. Cited. 45 CA 722. Subdiv. (7) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (4) cited. 35 CS 675, 678. Cited. 37 CS 853, 857, 858. Subdiv. (7) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 39 CS 504, 509. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575, 580, 597. Subdiv. (12) cited. Id., 574, 597. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 574, 598.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 152, 158. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287.
Cited. 3 CA 410, 411. Cited. 33 CA 103, 105. Cited. 42 CA 768.
Cited. 37 CS 853, 857. Cited. 42 CS 574, 583, 585, 588, 591−595, 597.
Subsec. (c):
Special condition on probation administration properly imposed one year after sentencing in exercise of court's discretion. 207 C. 152, 159, 168, 170.
Cited. 33 CA 103, 105. Cited. 37 CA 72, 84. Cited. 39 CA 722, 730. Cited. 42 CA 768.
Cited. 42 CS 574, 592, 593, 595.

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Sec. 53a-31. Calculation of periods of probation and conditional discharge. (a) A period of probation or conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed, except that, where it is preceded by a sentence of imprisonment with execution suspended after a period of imprisonment set by the court, it commences on the day the defendant is released from such imprisonment. Multiple periods, whether imposed at the same or different times, shall run concurrently.
(b) Issuance of a warrant or notice to appear for violation pursuant to section 53a- 32, shall interrupt the period of the sentence as of the date of such issuance until a final determination as to the violation has been made by the court. During the interrupted period, the court may impose any of the conditions of release set forth in section 54- 64a. In the absence of a warrant or notice to appear for violation pursuant to section 53a-32, if the defendant has failed to comply with any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, such failure shall not relieve the Office of Adult Probation from the responsibility of supervising the defendant.
(c) In any case where a person who is under a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is also under an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence authorized under section 18-65a or 18-73, imposed for some other offense by a court of this state, the service of the sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge unless the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is revoked prior to parole or satisfaction of the sentence of imprisonment.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 31; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 11; P.A. 87-282, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 13; P.A. 97-151, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act substituted sentences "authorized under section 18-73 or 18-75" for "reformatory" sentences in Subsec. (c); P.A. 87-282 amended Subsec. (c) to delete obsolete reference to repealed Sec. 18-75; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add reference to Sec. 18-65a; P.A. 97-151 amended Subsec. (b) to authorize the court to impose any of the conditions of release set forth in Sec. 54-64a during the interrupted period and provide that, in the absence of a warrant or notice to appear for violation, the failure of the defendant to comply with any conditions of probation or conditional discharge does not relieve the Office of Adult Probation from the responsibility of supervising the defendant.
Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Held: Term "release" as used in section includes physical release from custody whether by mistake or not and probation commences by operation of law on date of actual release from imprisonment. 36 CA 440, 441, 443, 444, 446, 448.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 24 CA 575, 578. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Cited. 36 CA 440, 441, 445, 446. Cited. 39 CA 722, 728.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 9 CA 59, 73. Cited. 37 CA 72, 83. Cited. 39 CA 722, 730, 731.

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Sec. 53a-32. Violation of probation or conditional discharge. Arrest. Hearing. Disposition. (a) At any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice shall be personally served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Whenever a defendant has, in the judgment of such defendant's probation officer, violated the conditions of such defendant's probation, the probation officer may, in lieu of having such defendant returned to court for proceedings in accordance with this section, place such defendant in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program established pursuant to section 53a-39d. Whenever a sexual offender, as defined in section 54-260, has violated the conditions of such person's probation by failing to notify such person's probation officer of any change of such person's residence address, as required by said section, such probation officer may notify any police officer that such person has, in such officer's judgment, violated the conditions of such person's probation and such notice shall be sufficient warrant for the police officer to arrest such person and return such person to the custody of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. Any probation officer may arrest any defendant on probation without a warrant or may deputize any other officer with power to arrest to do so by giving such other officer a written statement setting forth that the defendant has, in the judgment of the probation officer, violated the conditions of the defendant's probation. Such written statement, delivered with the defendant by the arresting officer to the official in charge of any correctional center or other place of detention, shall be sufficient warrant for the detention of the defendant. After making such an arrest, such probation officer shall present to the detaining authorities a similar statement of the circumstances of violation. Provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to any defendant arrested under the provisions of this section. Upon such arrest and detention, the probation officer shall immediately so notify the court or any judge thereof. Thereupon, or upon an arrest by warrant as herein provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hearing on the violation charges. At such hearing the defendant shall be informed of the manner in which such defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of such defendant's probation or conditional discharge, shall be advised by the court that such defendant has the right to retain counsel and, if indigent, shall be entitled to the services of the public defender, and shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence in such defendant's own behalf.
(b) If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 32; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 12; P.A. 86-403, S. 89, 132; P.A. 95-142, S. 7; P.A. 98-130; P.A. 99-187, S. 4.)
History: 1971 act clarified Subsec. (b) to specify that lesser sentence may be imposed when a sentence is revoked; P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b), substituting "conditional discharge" for "conditional release"; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision re the arrest and return of a sexual offender who has violated the conditions of his probation by failing to notify his probation officer of a change of address and amended Subsec. (b) to rephrase provisions, insert Subdiv. indicators, add Subdiv. (3) authorizing an extension of the period of probation or conditional discharge and prohibit revocation of probation or conditional discharge unless a violation is established "by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence" rather than by "reliable and probative evidence"; P.A. 98-130 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any lesser sentence imposed upon revocation may include a term of imprisonment followed by a period of probation; P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision authorizing a probation officer to place a defendant who, in such officer's judgment, has violated the conditions of such defendant's probation in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program in lieu of returning such defendant to court for violation of probation proceedings and to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.
Cited. 165 C. 73. Defendant's right to counsel hereunder is of "constitutional dimension," and tests of competency are met. 167 C. 639. Order of probation revocation was upheld where defendant moved from receiving state of Maine to Massachusetts without reporting to Connecticut parole authorities and was convicted of possession of drugs in Massachusetts. Id. Cited. 169 C. 223, 227−229. Cited. 170 C. 118, 128. In determining issue of "unnecessary delay" principles applicable to sixth amendment "speedy trial" determinations may be considered. 192 C. 321−323, 326. Cited. 193 C. 35, 45. Cited. 195 C. 461, 463. Cited. 204 C. 52, 57. Cited. 207 C. 152, 156, 157. Cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 219 C. 629, 631. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 226 C. 191, 193, 195. Cited. 228 C. 487, 489. "Fair preponderance of the evidence" standard for determining whether probation has been violated. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Davis, 29 CA 801, 813, reversed. 229 C. 285−290, 293, 295, 298. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470. Cited. 240 C. 639. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 3 CA 410, 411. Cited. 6 CA 394. Cited. 7 CA 131−134. Cited. 9 CA 59, 71−73. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 11 CA 251, 252. Cited. 12 CA 679, 680. Cited. 13 CA 638, 639. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 264, 265. Cited. 18 CA 368−370. Cited. 19 CA 304, 318. Cited. 20 CA 572, 573. Cited. 22 CA 303, 304. Cited. 23 CA 642, 643, 645, 647; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629 et seq. Cited. 27 CA 225, 227−229. Cited. Id., 780, 781. Standard of proof needed to find a violation of probation discussed. 29 CA 801, 803, 807; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 346, 351, 354, 355. Cited. 31 CA 278, 310; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 385 et seq.; see also 37 CA 801 et seq. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 33 CA 162, 163, 165, 166, see also 35 CA 520 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 2, 7. Cited. Id., 46, 47. Cited. Id., 537−539. Cited. 35 CA 107, 108. Proper standard of proof in revocation of probation proceeding is that of a fair preponderance of the evidence; previous consideration of case, 33 CA 162, remanded for reconsideration, 229 C. 916; original judgment reversed and case remanded for new probation revocation hearing. Id., 520, 521, 523, 524. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446. Cited. 37 CA 72, 74. Cited. 38 CA 762−764, 766. Cited. 39 CA 175, 177. Cited. Id., 267, 277. Cited. Id., 722−724, 730, 731. Cited. 40 CA 395, 396, 400. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 566. Reaffirmed prior holding that proper standard of proof for revocation of probation hearing proceeding is a fair preponderance of evidence and that revocation is on consideration of the whole record. 52 CA 557.
Cited. 42 CS 574, 586.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 219 C. 629, 635. Cited. 229 C. 285, 290, 295.
Cited. 10 CA 395, 402. Cited. 18 CA 368, 372. Cited. 19 CA 304, 310, 312, 317. Cited. 25 CA 421, 427; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 8, 9. Cited. Id., 537, 539. Cited. 38 CA 762, 766. Cited. 42 CA 768.
Cited. 42 CS 574, 590.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 169 C. 223, 233. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Cited. 219 C. 629, 635. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50. Cited. 228 C. 487, 495. Cited. 229 C. 285, 290, 293. Court's discretion to provide right of allocution to defendant during probation revocation proceeding is identical to discretion provided at time of original sentencing. 243 C. 339.
Cited. 1 CA 70, 71. Cited. 3 CA 410, 414. Cited. 10 CA 395, 402. Cited. 11 CA 251, 258. Cited. 18 CA 368, 376. Cited. 20 CA 572, 576, 578. Cited. 22 CA 303, 309. Cited. 23 CA 642, 653; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 629 et seq. Cited. 27 CA 225, 226, 247. Cited. 29 CA 801, 807; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 346, 350. Cited. 31 CA 660, 663. Cited. 33 CA 162, 168, see also 35 CA 520 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 1, 8. Cited. Id., 46, 55. Cited. Id., 537, 539. Cited. 36 CA 440, 444. Cited. 37 CA 72, 83. Cited. 38 CA 762, 767, 771. Cited. 39 CA 722, 728, 729. Cited. 40 CA 395, 396, 403. Cited. 42 CA 768. Trial court has broad discretion in continuing or revoking sentence of probation. 50 CA 46.

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Sec. 53a-32a. Violation of probation by certain sexual offenders. If a defendant who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a- 71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, and was ordered to undergo sexual offender treatment as a condition of probation, becomes ineligible for such treatment because of his refusal to acknowledge that he committed the act or acts charged, such defendant shall be deemed to be in violation of the conditions of his probation and be returned to court for proceedings in accordance with section 53a-32.
(P.A. 97-151, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-33. Termination of probation or conditional discharge. The court or sentencing judge may at any time during the period of probation or conditional discharge, after hearing and for good cause shown, terminate a sentence of probation or conditional discharge before the completion thereof, except a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 33; P.A. 92-260, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 11.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added "a sentence of"; P.A. 95-142 specified that a sentence of probation or conditional discharge may be terminated "before the completion thereof" and precluded termination of a sentence of probation imposed for conviction of a violation of Subdiv. (2) of Sec. 53-21 or Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
Cited. 165 C. 73. Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 219 C. 752, 762. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306. Cited. 225 C. 46, 50.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446.

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Sec. 53a-34. Unconditional discharge: Criteria; effect. (a) The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose a sentence of conditional discharge under section 53a-29, if the court is of the opinion that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's release.
(b) When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment, probation supervision or conditions. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 34.)
Cited. 170 C. 128. Cited. 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 188 C. 557, 559. Cited. 222 C. 299, 306.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 46. Cited. 32 CA 1, 4. Cited. 34 CA 1, 7. Sec. 53a-31 et seq. cited. 36 CA 440, 446.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 603.

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Sec. 53a-35. Imprisonment for any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981: Indeterminate sentences; maximum and minimum terms. (a) For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate sentence, except as provided in subsection (d). When such a sentence is imposed the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) and the minimum term shall be as provided in subsection (c) or (d).
(b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, life imprisonment; (2) for a class B felony, a term not to exceed twenty years; (3) for a class C felony, a term not to exceed ten years; (4) for a class D felony, a term not to exceed five years; (5) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime; and (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five years; (2) for a class B, C or D felony the court may fix a minimum term of not less than one year nor more than one-half of the maximum term imposed, except that (A) where the maximum is less than three years the minimum term may be more than one- half the maximum term imposed or (B) when a person is found guilty under section 53a-59(a)(1), section 53a-59a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the minimum term shall be not less than five years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60c, the minimum term shall be not less than three years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced, or when a person is found guilty under section 53a-60b,the minimum term shall be not less than two years and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (3) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c), except as provided in subdivision (2) of said subsection (c), when a person is sentenced for a class C or D felony or for an unclassified felony, the maximum sentence for which does not exceed ten years, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less; except when a person is found guilty under sections 53a-55a, 53a-56a, 53a-60a, 53a-70a, 53a-72b, 53a-92a, 53a-94a, 53a-102a and 53a-103a, the court shall not fix a term of less than one year.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 35; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 13; P.A. 73-137, S. 8; P.A. 74-186, S. 9, 12; P.A. 75-380, S. 14; 75-411, S. 3; P.A. 76-435, S. 2, 82; P.A. 77-422, S. 5; P.A. 80-442, S. 9, 28; P.A. 83-587, S. 76, 96.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to minimum sentence terms in Subsec. (d), required that sentence be specified in the sentence in Subsec. (b), amended Subsec. (c) to add exception re Subsec. (d), to raise minimum term for Class A felony from one to ten years and maximum term from ten to twenty-five years, to clarify exception re maximum term of three years by specifying minimum terms and to add Subdiv. (3) re unclassified felonies and amended Subsec. (d) to add exception re Subsec. (c)(2) and to include applicability re unclassified felonies; P.A. 73-137 removed reference to death sentence imposed for class A felony in accordance with Sec. 53a-46 in Subsec. (b)(1) and added Subdiv. (6) re capital felonies; P.A. 74-186 removed reference to guilt under Subdivs. (2) or (4) of Sec. 53a-60(a) in Subsec. (c) (2)(B); P.A. 75-380 added exception in Subsec. (d) re required one-year term; P.A. 75-411 deleted reference to guilt under Sec. 53a- 135(a)(2) in Subsec. (c)(2)(B); P.A. 76-435 added exception in Subsec. (d) as amended by P.A. 75-380; P.A. 77-422 expanded exception in Subsec. (c) (2)(B) re required three-year and two-year minimum terms and added reference to guilt under Sec. 53-59a; P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (a) to limit applicability to felonies committed prior to July 1, 1981, effective on that date; P.A. 83-587 substituted "53a-59a" for "53-59a" in Subsec. (c).
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 182 C. 595, 597−599, 602. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335; Id., 639, 642. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 403−406. Cited. 19 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited. Id., 571, 574, 575. Cited. Id., 631, 635. Cited. 24 CA 612, 617. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Courts may impose a definite sentence for a felony of one year or less. 31 CS 350. Cited. 33 CS 705.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 278. Cited. 189 C. 114, 116. Cited. 196 C. 655, 658.
Cited. 12 CA 403, 405. Cited. 19 CA 571, 575.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 114, 116, 117. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Cited. 211 C. 591, 612. Subdiv. (4) cited. 231 C. 545, 556. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 545, 557.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 575. Subdiv. (1) cited. 24 CA 612, 615, 623. Cited. Id., 612, 618, 619. Cited. 46 CA 450.
Subsec. (c):
Subdiv. (2)(B). Rational relationship exists between the protection of public health and safety and the imposition of nonsuspendable sentence for violent crime of second degree robbery, an essential element of which is threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 171 C. 677, 681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 595, 599; 189 C. 114, 117. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 182 C. 595, 601, 603. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 144, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 326, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 413, 427. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 488, 502, 503. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 121, 124. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 343, 345. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 591, 612.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 403, 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 403, 406. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618.

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Sec. 53a-35a. Imprisonment for any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981: Definite sentences; terms authorized. For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a capital felony, a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a; (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life; (3) for a class A felony other than murder, a term not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years; (4) for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than five years nor more than forty years; (5) for a class B felony other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a-55a, a term not less than one year nor more than twenty years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-59(a)(1), 53a-59a, 53a-70a, 53a- 94a, 53a-101(a)(1) or 53a-134(a)(2), the term shall be not less than five years nor more than twenty years; (6) for a class C felony, a term not less than one year nor more than ten years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-56a, the term shall be not less than three years nor more than ten years; (7) for a class D felony, a term not less than one year nor more than five years, except that for a conviction under section 53a-60b or 53a-217, the term shall be not less than two years nor more than five years, for a conviction under section 53a-60c, the term shall be not less than three years nor more than five years, and for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years; (8) for an unclassified felony, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(P.A. 80-442, S. 10, 28; P.A. 86-220; P.A. 92-260, S. 15; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 86-220 amended Subdiv. (1) to add "imprisonment without the possibility of release" to reflect revision made by P.A. 85-366; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (6) to add reference to "Sec. 53a-217" and provision that "for a conviction under section 53a-216, the term shall be five years", to reflect existing minimum mandatory sentences prescribed in said sections; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 added a new Subdiv. (4) to provide a term of not less than five years nor more than forty years for the class B felony of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under Sec. 53a-55a, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and amended Subdiv. (5) to provide that the specified sentence is for a class B felony "other than manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm under section 53a- 55a" and delete a reference to Sec. 53a-55a, reflecting the separate sentencing provisions established for Sec. 53a-55a in Subdiv. (4).
See Sec. 53a-41 re fines for felonies.
Cited. 196 C. 655, 659. Cited. 197 C. 337, 353, 355, 357. Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 200 C. 268, 279. Cited. Id., 664, 674. Cited. 201 C. 598, 600. Cited. 210 C. 519, 525. Cited. 211 C. 258, 282−285. Cited. 212 C. 31, 47. Definite sentencing scheme for any felony under this section implicitly repealed indeterminate sentencing aspect of Sec. 21a-278(a). 214 C. 378, 382−384, 386−388. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Cited. 230 C. 109, 114, 115, 118. Cited. 234 C. 139, 143, 166. Cited. Id., 735, 748. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited. 12 CA 403−407. Cited. 19 CA 571, 573−575. Cited. 23 CA 201, 205. Cited. 32 CA 759, 764. Cited. 35 CA 714, 720. Cited. 42 CA 348.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 392, 393. Cited. 235 C. 206, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 34 CA 58, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 202 C. 93, 99. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759.
Cited. 15 CA 416, 444.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728. Cited. 10 CA 486, 493.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 211 C. 258, 284. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385.

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Sec. 53a-35b. "Life imprisonment" defined. A sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a- 46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life.
(P.A. 80-442, S. 11, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 3; P.A. 95-19, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-442 effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added provision re life imprisonment without the possibility of release; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
Cited. 198 C. 92, 94. Cited. 201 C. 276, 277. Cited. 207 C. 374, 386. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285. Cited. 219 C. 752, 759. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 234 C. 139, 144, 166.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 24 CA 612, 618, 622.

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Sec. 53a-35c. Availability of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release shall not be available as a sentence for an offense committed prior to October 1, 1985.
(P.A. 85-366, S. 4.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

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Sec. 53a-36. Imprisonment for misdemeanor: Maximum and minimum sentences. A sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, a term not to exceed one year except that when a person is found guilty under section 53a- 61(a)(3) or 53a-61a, the term shall be one year and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, a term not to exceed six months; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, a term not to exceed three months; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, a term in accordance with the sentence specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 36; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 14; P.A. 77-422, S. 6; P.A. 92-260, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act added exception re guilt under Sec. 53a-61(a)(3) in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-422 expanded exception to include guilt under Sec. 53a-61a; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (1) to consolidate statutory references and delete redundant language.
See Sec. 53a-42 re fines for misdemeanors.
Cited. 169 C. 223. Cited. 178 C. 145, 153. Court in sentencing of defendant found guilty under Sec. 53a-61a must impose a mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557, 559−561, 564. Cited. 194 C. 198, 209. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 223 C. 635, 666.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631, 635. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 189 C. 114, 117.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 184 C. 434, 438.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 194 C. 198, 199.
Cited. 12 CA 481, 494.

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Sec. 53a-37. Multiple sentences: Concurrent or consecutive, minimum term. When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and to the undischarged term or terms in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. The court shall state whether the respective maxima and minima shall run concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other, and shall state in conclusion the effective sentence imposed. When a person is sentenced for two or more counts each constituting a separate offense, the court may order that the term of imprisonment for the second and subsequent counts be for a fixed number of years each. The court in such cases shall not set any minimum term of imprisonment except under the first count, and the fixed number of years imposed for the second and subsequent counts shall be added to the maximum term imposed by the court on the first count.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 37; P.A. 73-639, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 73-639 added provisions clarifying court's sentencing powers in cases where person is to be sentenced for two or more counts each of which constitutes a separate offense.
Cited. 178 C. 427, 432, 436. Statute provides for three sentencing options where multiple sentences are imposed at same time. 178 C. 634−639. Section authorizes multiple sentences with consecutive minimum and maximum terms. 179 C. 381−384. Cited. Id., 384−387. Cited. 184 C. 366, 367; Id., 434, 439. Cited. 185 C. 473, 478. Cited. 190 C. 327, 335. Cited. 192 C. 471, 477. Cited. 197 C. 413, 427, 428. Cited. Id., 485, 503. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55. Cited. Id., 685, 701−703. Cited. 207 C. 270, 276. Cited. Id., 276. Cited. 208 C. 420, 422. Cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Does not impose limits on trial court's common law inherent sentencing power to stay execution of a criminal sentence. 225 C. 46, 52−54. Cited. 228 C. 384, 389.
Cited. 7 CA 131, 135. Cited. Id., 367, 377. Cited. 9 CA 365−367. Cited. Id., 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 17 CA 307, 311. Cited. 20 CA 572, 575, 576. Cited. 26 CA 10, 12. Cited. 34 CA 503, 507.
Cited. 30 CS 71. Cited. 36 CS 168, 169.

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Sec. 53a-38. Calculation of terms of imprisonment. (a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced.
(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.
(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.
(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).
Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124−129. Cited. 230 C. 17, 18.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 124, 131; Id., 124, 126−129, 131.
Cited. 33 CA 205, 213.
Cited. 40 CS 354, 356.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 23−26, 28, 32−34. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 568, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 384, 388, 390. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 384, 390.
Cited. 34 CA 503, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 503, 508, 509. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 343, 347−349. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697, 699. Cited. 216 C. 220, 224.
Cited. 30 CA 190, 195, 196. Cited. 39 CA 455, 461, 463, 464.

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Sec. 53a-39. Reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant by sentencing court or judge. Statement by victim. (a) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of three years or less, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.
(b) At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years, upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(d) At a hearing held by the sentencing court or judge under this section, such court or judge shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the court or judge for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence of the defendant should be reduced, the defendant discharged or the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the court or judge and the court or judge shall make such statement a part of the record at the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, "victim" means the victim, the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 39; P.A. 82-428, S. 1, 4; P.A. 84-505, S. 3, 6; P.A. 85-354, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-538, S. 1, 3, 5; P.A. 90- 261, S. 7, 19; P.A. 94-119; P.A. 95-175, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 82-428 specified applicability to definite sentences "of three years or less"; P.A. 84-505 authorized the sentencing court or judge to order certain defendants discharged on intensive probation, effective June 13, 1984, to July 1, 1987; P.A. 85-354 added provisions to require applications for the intensive probation program to be referred to the office of adult probation for assessment and recommendations, to specify that the period of intensive probation shall not exceed the unexpired portion of the sentence, to authorize the court or judge to place on regular probation a defendant who successfully completes intensive probation, to specify the period of such regular probation, and to require a defendant discharged on intensive probation to comply with the probation conditions ordered by the court or required by the office of adult probation; P.A. 87-538 prohibited the discharge on intensive probation of a defendant sentenced for a class A felony, authorized the placement in the intensive probation program of a defendant with a definite sentence which includes suspension of incarceration after a period of at least two years but not more than five years, followed by a period of probation, if he has served at least one-half of the unsuspended portion of his sentence prior to release, and reenacted and continued in effect on and after July 1, 1987, the provisions of this section previously effective from June 13, 1984, until July 1, 1987; P.A. 90-261 deleted all provisions re the discharge of a defendant on intensive probation; P.A. 94-119 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) authorizing the sentencing court or judge at any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years to reduce the sentence or order the defendant discharged and added Subsec. (c) making the section inapplicable to any sentence imposed for an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence; P.A. 95-175 added Subsec. (d) re statement by victim re reduction of sentence or discharge of defendant.
See Sec. 51-195 re sentence review by review division.
Cited. 184 C. 366, 368. Cited. 187 C. 109, 124. Cited. 200 C. 664, 674. Cited. 208 C. 420, 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 519, 526, 527. Cited. 214 C. 717, 718, 722−725. Does not confer continuing jurisdiction on trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of acquittal. 230 C. 427, 432−434. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 3 CA 497−502. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 32, 45. Term "sentence" refers to the aggregate or total effective sentence. 19 CA 631−639. Cited. 20 CA 467−469. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 22 CA 601, 605. Cited. 23 CA 201, 203, 205, 206. Nothing in this section or any other statute confers on trial court jurisdiction to entertain a motion for acquittal after service of a sentence has commenced. 32 CA 1, 3−5. Section does not violate separation of powers doctrine. 39 CA 632−635.
When the original sentence was defective, commitment for violation of probation is illegal. 31 CS 350. Cited. 40 CS 238, 241, 242. Cited. 41 CS 229, 251.

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Sec. 53a-39a. Alternate incarceration program. (a) In all cases where a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, other than a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 21a-278, 21a-278a, 53a-55, 53a-56, 53a-56b, 53a-57, 53a-58 or 53a-70b or any other offense for which there is a mandatory minimum sentence which may not be suspended or reduced by the court, after trial or by a plea of guilty without trial, and a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement or the statutory penalty provides for a term of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion, order an assessment for placement in an alternate incarceration program to be conducted by the Office of Adult Probation. If the Office of Adult Probation recommends placement in an alternate incarceration program, it shall also submit to the court a proposed alternate incarceration plan. Upon completion of the assessment, the court shall determine whether such defendant shall be ordered to participate in such program as an alternative to incarceration. If the court determines that the defendant shall participate in such program, the court shall suspend any sentence of imprisonment and shall make participation in the alternate incarceration program a condition of probation as provided in section 53a-30.
(b) An alternate incarceration program includes, but shall not be limited to, an intensive probation program, any community service program approved by the Chief Court Administrator and any residential or nonresidential program approved by the Chief Court Administrator which provides care, supervision and supportive services such as employment, psychiatric and psychological evaluation and counseling, and drug and alcohol dependency treatment. Any defendant placed in an alternate incarceration program shall comply with any other conditions of probation ordered by the court or required by the Office of Adult Probation, as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of section 53a-30.
(P.A. 89-383, S. 3, 16; P.A. 94-128, S. 1, 3.)
History: P.A. 89-383, S. 3 effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994; P.A. 94-128 negated effect of P.A. 89-383, reenacting and continuing existence of section, effective July 1, 1994.

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Sec. 53a-39b. Special alternative incarceration program for young male defendants. (a) For purposes of this section, "eligible defendant" means a male person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one years who (1) is not convicted of a capital felony, a class A felony or a violation of section 53a-54d, 53a-55, 53a-55a, 53a-56, 53a- 56a, 53a-56b, 53a-57, 53a-58, 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a- 72b or 53a-134 and (2) has never served a term of imprisonment in an adult correctional institution.
(b) In addition to any other terms or conditions of probation provided for under this chapter, the court may, as a condition of a sentence of probation for a period of not less than one year nor more than five years, order that an eligible defendant shall satisfactorily complete a program of incarceration for a period of not less than one hundred eighty days in a special alternative incarceration unit of the Department of Correction.
(c) The Department of Correction may transfer an inmate to a regular incarceration unit if the commissioner determines after a hearing that the inmate is not benefiting from the special alternative incarceration program.
(P.A. 89-390, S. 18, 37; P.A. 90-230, S. 75, 101; 90-261, S. 10, 19; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9, S. 5, 10.)
History: P.A. 90-230 added "alternative" to "special incarceration unit"; P.A. 90-261 amended Subsec. (a) to revise the list of offenses making a defendant ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (b) to increase the period required to be served in a special alternative incarceration unit from "ninety days" to "not less than one hundred eighty days", amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes and added Subsec. (d) to authorize the transfer of an inmate not benefiting from the special alternative incarceration program to a regular incarceration unit; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 91-9 deleted former Subsec. (c) authorizing court to order an eligible defendant to participate in a special alternative incarceration program if court determines that defendant has no limitation which would prevent him from participating in strenuous physical activity and relettered remaining Subsec. accordingly.

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Sec. 53a-39c. Community service labor program. (a) There is established, within available appropriations, a community service labor program for persons charged with a violation of section 21a-267 or 21a-279 who have not previously been convicted of a violation of section 21a-267, 21a-277, 21a-278 or 21a-279. Upon application by any such person for participation in such program the court may grant such application and (1) if such person has not previously been placed in the community service labor program, the court may either suspend prosecution and place such person in such program or, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with section 53a-30; or (2) if such person has previously been placed in such program, the court may, upon a plea of guilty without trial where a term of imprisonment is part of a stated plea agreement, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with said section 53a-30. No person may be placed in such program who has twice previously been placed in such program.
(b) Any person for whom prosecution is suspended and who is placed in the community service labor program pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall agree to the tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to such crime and to a waiver of such person's right to a speedy trial. A pretrial community service labor program established under this section for persons for whom prosecution is suspended shall include a drug education component. If such person satisfactorily completes the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned, such person may apply for dismissal of the charges against such person and the court, on reviewing the record of such person's participation in such program and on finding such satisfactory completion, shall dismiss the charges. If the program provider certifies to the court that such person did not successfully complete the program of community service labor to which such person was assigned or is no longer amenable to participation in such program, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty for such person and immediately place the case on the trial list.
(c) The period of participation in a community service labor program shall be a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 3, 56; P.A. 97-248, S. 11, 12; P.A. 99-148, S. 2, 4.)
History: P.A. 97-248 amended Subsec. (a) to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously participated in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i, and amended Subsec. (b) to require a pretrial community service labor program established for persons for whom prosecution is suspended to include a drug education component, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 99-148 amended Subsec. (a) to make eligible for the program persons charged with a violation of Sec. 21a-267, to make ineligible for the program persons who have previously been convicted of a violation of Sec. 21a-267 and to delete the provision that made persons who previously participated in the drug education program established under Sec. 54-56i ineligible for the program, amended Subsec. (c) to replace provisions that specified differing periods of participation in the program depending upon whether the violation was of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of Sec. 21a-279 with provisions requiring a period of participation consisting of a minimum of fourteen days for a first violation and thirty days for a second violation involving a plea of guilty and conviction, and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 1999.
Program intended to avoid unnecessary trials and expenditures of resources, so defendant's application for program when trial nearly complete is justification for denying application. 51 CA 126.

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Sec. 53a-39d. Pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. (a) Not later than October 1, 1998, the Chief Court Administrator shall establish a pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program. Eligibility for participation in the program shall be limited to (1) individuals who are eligible to be sentenced by the court to a period of probation, pursuant to section 53a-29, and have been ordered by the court, as a condition of such probation, to participate in the program, (2) individuals who are eligible to be released on bail under section 54-63d or 54-64a and have been required by the bail commissioner or the court, as a condition of release, to participate in the program, (3) individuals who have been sentenced to a period of probation and, in the judgment of their probation officers, have violated the conditions of such probation and been referred to the program by their probation officers pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-32, and (4) individuals who have been ordered by the court, as a condition of probation, to participate in the program pursuant to subsection (d) of section 54-56e or subsection (b) of section 54-76j and shall be based upon criteria, including a limit on the maximum number of eligible participants, established by the Chief Court Administrator.
(b) Any person entering such program shall, as a condition of participating in such program, agree to: (1) Submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests, (2) detention in a halfway house facility for a period of two days each time such test produces a positive result, (3) comply with all rules established by the halfway house if detained in such facility, and (4) waive the right to a hearing.
(c) Participants in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program shall submit to periodic urinalysis drug tests. If the test produces a positive result, the participant shall be detained in a halfway house facility for a period of two days.
(d) Any person who has submitted to a urinalysis drug test pursuant to subsection (c) of this section that produced a positive result may request that a second urinalysis drug test be administered, at such person's expense, to confirm the results of the first test, except that if the participant is determined to be indigent, based upon financial affidavits, the Judicial Department shall pay the cost of the test. The second drug test shall be a urinalysis drug test, separate and independent of the initial test. The participant shall be detained in a halfway house pending the results of the second test. If such second test does not produce a positive result, the participant, if detained in a halfway house, shall be released and the fee, if paid by the participant, shall be refunded to the participant.
(e) A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of probation may be charged with a violation of probation, if the participant's probation officer determines that the participant has violated the conditions of probation or the conditions of the program. A participant enrolled in the zero-tolerance drug supervision program as a condition of release may be charged with a violation of the conditions of such person's release, if a bail commissioner determines that the participant has violated the conditions of such person's release or the conditions of the program.
(f) Not later than January 1, 2000, the chairman of the Board of Parole, the Commissioner of Correction and the Chief Court Administrator shall submit a report on the pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal justice.
(P.A. 98-145, S. 3, 4; P.A. 99-187, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 99-187 amended Subsec. (a) to expand eligibility for the program by adding Subdiv. (2) to include individuals eligible to be released on bail who have been required as a condition of release to participate in the program, adding Subdiv. (3) to include individuals sentenced to a period of probation who have violated the conditions of probation and been referred to the program by their probation officers, and adding Subdiv. (4) to include individuals ordered by the court to participate in the program as a condition of probation under the accelerated rehabilitation or youthful offender programs, and amended Subsec. (e) to make existing provisions applicable to a participant enrolled in the program "as a condition of probation" and add provision that a participant enrolled in the program as a condition of release may be charged with violation of the conditions of such person's release if a bail commissioner determines there has been a violation of the conditions of release or conditions of the program.
See Secs. 18-100e and 54-125f re pilot zero-tolerance drug supervision program established by Commissioner of Correction and chairman of Board of Parole, respectively.

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Sec. 53a-40. Persistent offenders: Definitions; defense; authorized sentences. (a) A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who:
(1) (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree, or assault in the first degree, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) murder, sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117, or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive, 53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83, 53-86, 53-238 and 53- 239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iv) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph; or
(2) (A) Stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (B) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for any of the following crimes: (i) Murder, manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in the first or second degree or assault in the first degree, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (ii) prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, assault with intent to kill under section 54-117, or any of the crimes enumerated in sections 53-9, 53-10, 53-11, 53-12 to 53-16, inclusive, 53-19, 53-21, 53-69, 53-78 to 53-80, inclusive, 53-82, 53-83 and 53-86 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes; or (iii) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subparagraph (A) of this subdivision or this subparagraph.
(b) A persistent dangerous sexual offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for (A) any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or (B) prior to October 1, 1975, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1975, or prior to October 1, 1971, in this state, any of the crimes enumerated in section 53-238 or 53-239 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1968, or any predecessor statutes in this state, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, or (C) in any other state, any crimes the essential elements of which are substantially the same as any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection or this subdivision.
(c) A persistent serious felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present felony, convicted of and imprisoned under an imposed term of more than one year or of death, in this state or in any other state or in a federal correctional institution, for a crime. This subsection shall not apply where the present conviction is for a crime enumerated in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the prior conviction was for a crime other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.
(d) A persistent serious sexual offender is a person, other than a person who qualifies as a persistent dangerous sexual offender under subsection (b) of this section, who qualifies as a persistent serious felony offender under subsection (c) of this section and the felony of which such person presently stands convicted is a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b and the prior conviction is for a violation of section 53-21 of the general statutes, revised to January 1, 1995, involving sexual contact, committed prior to October 1, 1995, a violation of subdivision (2) of section 53-21 or a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
(e) A persistent larceny offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of larceny in the third degree in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982, or larceny in the fourth, fifth or sixth degree, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present larceny, twice convicted of the crime of larceny.
(f) A persistent felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a felony other than a class D felony, and (2) has been, at separate times prior to the commission of the present felony, twice convicted of a felony other than a class D felony.
(g) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of being a persistent offender under this section that (1) as to any prior conviction on which the state is relying the defendant was pardoned on the ground of innocence, and (2) without such conviction, the defendant was not two or more times convicted and imprisoned as required by this section.
(h) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and, if such person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime, been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life.
(i) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous sexual offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a- 28 which together constitute a sentence of imprisonment for life, as defined in section 53a-35b.
(j) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 53a-35a if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.
(k) When any person has been found to be a persistent serious sexual offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose a sentence of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute the maximum sentence specified by section 53a-35a for the next more serious degree of felony.
(l) When any person has been found to be a persistent larceny offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-36 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony authorized by section 53a-35, if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed prior to July 1, 1981, or authorized by section 53a-35a, if the crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on or after July 1, 1981.
(m) When any person has been found to be a persistent felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony; provided the sentence imposed may not be less than three years, and provided further three years of the sentence so imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 40; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 15; P.A. 73-616, S. 40; P.A. 76-336, S. 20; P.A. 80-442, S. 12, 28; P.A. 83- 4, S. 1, 2; P.A. 85-603; P.A. 92-260, S. 18; P.A. 94-37, S. 1; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 48.)
History: 1971 act removed requirements that offenders under Subsecs. (a) and (b) have been previously convicted and imprisoned "two or more times" and "at separate times" and redefined persistent larceny offender as one who stands convicted of larceny in "the third or fourth degree" rather than in "the second or a lesser degree" in Subsec. (c); P.A. 73- 616 corrected section reference re assault with intent to kill, substituting Sec. 54-117 for Sec. 53-117 in Subsec. (a); P.A. 76-336 substituted sexual assault in first or third degree or sexual assault in first or third degree with a firearm for "rape" in Subsec. (a) and specified applicability of conviction for crimes enumerated in Secs. 53a-72, 53a-75 or 53a-78 prior to October 1, 1975; P.A. 80-442 specified applicability of Subsec. (b) to persistent "serious" felony offenders, inserted new Subsec. (d) re persistent felony offenders, relettering as necessary, amended Subsecs. (f) to (h), formerly (e) to (g), re crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981, and added Subsec. (i) re extended incarceration effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-4 amended Subsec. (c) to reflect the establishment of six degrees of larceny pursuant to P.A. 82-271 by including persons convicted of larceny in the third degree "in violation of the provisions of section 53a-124 in effect prior to October 1, 1982" and larceny in the "fifth or sixth" degree; P.A. 85-603 made a technical change to Subsec. (h) and rewrote some of the language of said Subsec. to reflect said change; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace an obsolete reference to the offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with its revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in the first degree", and made other minor technical changes in Subsecs. (a), (b) and (d); P.A. 94-37 amended Subsec. (f) to revise the penalty for a person found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender by replacing the provision that permitted the court to impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized for a class A felony with the provision requiring the court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than forty years and by adding the provision requiring the court to sentence such person to a term of imprisonment of not more than life if such person has been twice convicted and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated in Subsec. (a)(2); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (a) to delete from category of a persistent dangerous felony offender a person who stands convicted of sexual assault in the first or third degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree or sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm and has been previously convicted and imprisoned for more than one year for any of said crimes or any predecessor statutes, or an attempt to commit any of said crimes, to revise and restructure Subsec. to reflect such deletion and to revise Subdiv. and Subpara. indicators accordingly, added new Subsec. (b) re persistent dangerous sexual offender, new Subsec. (d) re persistent serious sexual offender, new Subsec. (i) re penalty for persistent dangerous sexual offender and new Subsec. (k) re penalty for persistent serious sexual offender, relettering intervening and remaining Subsecs. accordingly, and made provisions of section gender neutral.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 157 C. 466. Cited. 168 C. 395.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 176 C. 270, 272. Cited. 180 C. 660, 661. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 188 C. 27, 28. Cited. 191 C. 180, 182. Cited. 192 C. 471, 475. Cited. 194 C. 573. Cited. Id., 692, 699. Cited. 195 C. 326−330. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. 198 C. 158, 159, 166−168. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. 203 C. 506, 519, 521, 523, 524. Cited. 207 C. 619, 620. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 226 C. 601, 611. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 12 CA 1, 30, 31. Cited. 31 CA 140, 148. Cited. 36 CA 401, 406. Cited. 45 CA 390. Admission of certified copy of judgment sufficient to prove persistent dangerous felony offender. 50 CA 521.
Subsec. (a):
Constitutionality of dangerous felony offender statutes has long been upheld. 173 C. 545, 548, 554, 557. Nothing in statute precludes state from offering probative evidence to clarify an official judgment of conviction in order to prove defendant a second offender. 194 C. 573, 574, 586−589. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 573, 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 692, 693, 695. No viable basis for challenge to statute on the grounds of vagueness. 195 C. 326, 329−333. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 326, 330. Cited. Id., 475, 476. Cited. 193 C. 273, 275, 282. Cited. 200 C. 350. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 458. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdivs. (1) and (2)(B) cited. 202 C. 509, 511. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Cited. Id., 506, 509, 519−522. Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Cited. 210 C. 573, 579. Cited. 213 C. 97, 99. Cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Cited. 224 C. 445, 447. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 19 CA 571, 572. Cited. 29 CA 274, 276. Cited. 37 CA 672, 674. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 131. Jury improperly found defendant to be a persistent dangerous felony offender because his conviction of attempted assault in the first degree is not one of the qualifying felonies enumerated in subsection. 51 CA 171.
Cited. 43 CS 77, 82.
Subsec. (b):
Presentence report used to prove that defendant was not persistent felony offender under this subsection. 169 C. 263− 266. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Failure to allege imprisonment under provisions of the statute not considered reversible error where proof of imprisonment was established during trial and defendant failed to request complete statement of facts. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 278. Cited. 195 C. 326, 331. Cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 161, 166, 167. Cited. 224 C. 397, 398, 400, 418, 419. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 232 C. 455, 459. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
Cited. 9 CA 133, 135. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 29, 30. Cited. Id., 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 438, 440. Cited. 20 CA 586, 587. Cited. 31 CA 140, 141. Cited. Id., 178, 180. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 405, 407. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 39 CA 82, 86. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Cited. 240 C. 317.
"By pleading nolo contendere to the charge of being a persistent larceny offender, defendant waived her right to appeal this issue." 4 CA 676, 677, 682. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 97, 100. Cited. 21 CA 331, 332. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 232.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 195 C. 326, 329−333. Cited. 198 C. 158, 167. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339. Language of section and its legislative purpose require sequence of offense, conviction and punishment for each prior felony before enhanced penalty as a persistent offender attaches. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Cited. 41 CA 391, 393, 404−406.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 176 C. 270, 271. Cited. 194 C. 573, 587. Cited. 195 C. 326, 328, 329, 331. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. 187 C. 264, 278. Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 207 C. 276, 285. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 19 CA 571, 572, 574.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 227 C. 751, 754. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 12 CA 1, 29, 32. Cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (h):
Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.
Cited. 21 CA 331−335, 338. Cited. 37 CA 228, 231, 232.
Subsec. (i):
Cited. 184 C. 215, 217. Cited. 234 C. 324, 338, 339.

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Sec. 53a-40a. Persistent offenders of crimes involving bigotry or bias. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l, and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of a violation of section 46a-58, 53-37a, 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a- 181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving bigotry or bias, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall: (1) In lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a if the crime is a felony, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony, or (2) in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36 if the crime is a misdemeanor, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony as authorized by section 53a-35a.
(P.A. 90-137, S. 2; P.A. 00-72, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 00-72 amended Subsec. (a) to replace reference in Subdiv. (1) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a- 181b" with reference to Sec. "53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l" and to replace reference in Subdiv. (2) to "subsection (a) or (c) of section 53a-181b" with reference to "section 53a-181j, 53a-181k or 53a-181l or section 53a-181b in effect prior to October 1, 2000" and amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality.

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Sec. 53a-40b. Additional term of imprisonment authorized for offense committed while on release. A person convicted of an offense committed while released pursuant to sections 54-63a to 54-63g, inclusive, or sections 54-64a to 54-64c, inclusive, other than a violation of section 53a-222, may be sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to (1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if the offense is a felony, or (2) a term of imprisonment of not more than one year if the offense is a misdemeanor.
(P.A. 90-213, S. 54; P.A. 98-90, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 98-90 excepted convictions under Sec. 53a-222 from provisions of section.

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Sec. 53a-40c. Psychological counseling required for person convicted of sexual assault of a minor. Any person convicted of a violation of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a where the victim of the sexual assault was a person ten years of age or under shall, in addition to any fine or term of imprisonment imposed, be sentenced to undergo psychological counseling.
(P.A. 93-340, S. 15.)

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Sec. 53a-40d. Persistent offenders of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment or criminal violation of protective order. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment or criminal violation of a protective order is a person who (1) stands convicted of assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223 or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108, and (2) has, within the five years preceding the commission of the present crime, been convicted of a capital felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or 53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a- 60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a- 216, assault under section 53a-61, stalking under section 53a-181d, threatening under section 53a-62, harassment under section 53a-183, criminal violation of a protective order under section 53a-223 or criminal trespass under section 53a-107 or 53a-108 or has been released from incarceration with respect to such conviction, whichever is later.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent offender of crimes involving assault, stalking, trespass, threatening, harassment or criminal violation of a protective order, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that an increased penalty will best serve the public interest, the court shall, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-36, impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section 53a-36 for the next more serious degree of misdemeanor, except that if the crime is a class A misdemeanor the court shall impose the sentence of imprisonment for a class D felony, as authorized by section 53a-35a.
(P.A. 95-193, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-40e. Standing criminal restraining order. (a) If any person is convicted of a violation of section 53a-59, 53a-59a, 53a-60, 53a-60a, 53a-60b, 53a-60c, 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-181c, 53a-181d or 53a-181e, or of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a, against a family or household member as defined in subdivision (2) of section 46b-38a, the court may, in addition to imposing the sentence authorized for the crime under section 53a-35a, if the court is of the opinion that the history and character and the nature and circumstances of the criminal conduct of such offender indicate that a standing criminal restraining order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public, issue a standing criminal restraining order which shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown.
(b) Such standing criminal restraining order may include but is not limited to enjoining the offender from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the victim; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the victim; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the victim.
(c) Every standing criminal restraining order of the court made in accordance with this section shall contain the following language: "This order shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown. In accordance with section 53a- 223a, violation of a standing criminal restraining order issued by the court pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or both."
(P.A. 96-228, S. 1; P.A. 98-15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 41, 121; P.A. 99-186, S. 13.)
History: (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (c) the reference in public act 96-228 to "section 1 of this act" was deemed by the Revisors to be a reference to section 2 of that act and therefore codified as "section 53a-110c"); P.A. 98-15 amended Subsec. (a) to add references to Secs. 53a-181c, 53a-181d and 53a-181e; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective June 24, 1998; P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec.(a) to make provisions applicable to any person convicted "of attempt or conspiracy to violate any of said sections or section 53a-54a".

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Sec. 53a-40f. Persistent operating while under the influence felony offender. Authorized sentences. (a) A persistent operating while under the influence felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a- 60d and (2) has, prior to the commission of the present crime and within the preceding ten years, been convicted of a violation of section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a) of section 14-227a or been convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as section 53a-56b or 53a-60d or subsection (a) of section 14-227a.
(b) When any person has been found to be a persistent operating while under the influence felony offender, and the court is of the opinion that his history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence authorized by section 53a-35a for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by said section for the next more serious degree of felony.
(P.A. 97-291, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-41. Fines for felonies. A fine for the conviction of a felony shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A felony, an amount not to exceed twenty thousand dollars; (2) for a class B felony, an amount not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars; (3) for a class C felony, an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars; (4) for a class D felony, an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars; (5) for an unclassified felony, an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 41; P.A. 92-256, S. 1; 92-260, S. 19; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A felony from ten to twenty thousand dollars, for a class B felony from ten to fifteen thousand dollars, and for a class C felony from five to ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260 amended Subdiv. (3) to replace "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92-256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-35a re terms of imprisonment for felonies.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.

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Sec. 53a-42. Fines for misdemeanors. A fine for the conviction of a misdemeanor shall be fixed by the court as follows: (1) For a class A misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars; (2) for a class B misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars; (3) for a class C misdemeanor, an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars; (4) for an unclassified misdemeanor, an amount in accordance with the fine specified in the section of the general statutes that defines the crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 42; P.A. 92-256, S. 2; 92-260, S. 20; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11, S. 50, 70.)
History: P.A. 92-256 increased the maximum fine for a class A misdemeanor from one to two thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260 replaced "law" with "section of the general statutes"; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-11 changed effective date of P.A. 92- 256 but did not affect the date applicable to this section.
See Sec. 53a-36 re terms of imprisonment for misdemeanors.
See Sec. 54-74 re remission of fine.
Cited. 178 C. 145, 153; 180 C. 557, 561. Cited. 217 C. 73, 90.
Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720. Cited. 32 CA 656, 660; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 722, 727.

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Sec. 53a-43. Fines for violations. A fine for a violation shall be fixed by the court in an amount not to exceed five hundred dollars. In the case of a violation defined in any other section of the general statutes, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified in the section that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with such section.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 43.)
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

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Sec. 53a-44. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained money or property through the commission of any felony, misdemeanor or violation, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under section 53a-41, 53a-42 or 53a-43, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section, the term "gain" means the amount of money or the value of property derived.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 44; P.A. 92-260, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in punctuation.
Cited. 231 C. 514, 528.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 693, 717, 719, 720.

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Sec. 53a-45. Murder: Penalty; waiver of jury trial; finding of lesser degree. (a) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(b) If a person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a jury trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.
(c) The court or jury before which any person indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54- 46a is tried may find such person guilty of homicide in a lesser degree than that charged.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 45; P.A. 73-137, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 13, 28; P.A. 82-298, S. 4; P.A. 83-210, S. 2, 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 22.)
History: P.A. 73-137 added reference to capital felonies in Subsec. (a) and substituted reference to Sec. 53a-46a for reference to Sec. 53a-46, deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed person indicted for murder to plead guilty with consent of court and state's attorney in which case court would sentence him as for a Class A felony, relettering former Subsecs. (c) and (d) accordingly; P.A. 80-442 specified punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a and deleted reference to death sentenced under Sec. 53a-46a in Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 82-298 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that court shall be composed of three judges designated by chief court administrator, who shall also name one such judge to preside, where previously one judge was the judge presiding at the session and the other two were designated by the chief justice of the supreme court; P.A. 83-210 amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by inserting "or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception for "murder under section 53a-54d", amended Subsec. (b) to replace provision that such judges or a majority of them "shall determine the question of guilt or innocence and shall, as provided in said section 53a-46a, render judgment and impose sentence" with "shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly", and amended Subsec. (c) to replace "him" with "such person".
See annotations to part IV.
Cited. 187 C. 6, 28.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 435, 438.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 180 C. 382, 404. Cited. 190 C. 639, 640. Cited. 198 C. 77, 90. Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 381.
Subsec. (c):
Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 399, 400, 402, 403, 407. Cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 71, 72. Cited. 187 C. 6, 28. Cited. 188 C. 542, 546. Cited. 190 C. 639, 652. Cited. 193 C. 695, 732. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Manslaughter is not lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 422, 427. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. Id., 368, 372. Cited. 206 C. 346, 359. Cited. 210 C. 78, 105. Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 214 C. 57, 63. Cited. 225 C. 55, 65. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 231 C. 115, 140. Cited. 240 C. 727.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 187. Cited. 17 CA 502, 521; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 164.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 429.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 359.

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Sec. 53a-46. Sentencing proceedings; appeal. Section 53a-46 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 46; 1972, P.A. 56, S. 1; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

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Sec. 53a-46a. Imposition of sentence for capital felony. Hearing. Special verdict. Mitigating and aggravating factors. Factors barring death sentence. (a) A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for a capital felony only if a hearing is held in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) For the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor concerning the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in subsection (i). Such hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates that none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) of this section exists or that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists. Such hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing if (A) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (B) the defendant was convicted after a trial before three judges as provided in subsection (b) of section 53a-45; or (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause, or (3) before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
(c) In such hearing the court shall disclose to the defendant or his counsel all material contained in any presentence report which may have been prepared. No presentence information withheld from the defendant shall be considered in determining the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. Any information relevant to any mitigating factor may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in such trials. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any mitigating or aggravating factor. The burden of establishing any of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) shall be on the state. The burden of establishing any mitigating factor shall be on the defendant.
(d) In determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine whether a particular factor concerning the defendant's character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.
(e) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d).
(f) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and (3) (A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i), the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
(g) If the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists, or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
(h) The court shall not impose the sentence of death on the defendant if the jury or, if there is no jury, the court finds by a special verdict, as provided in subsection (e), that at the time of the offense (1) he was under the age of eighteen years or (2) his mental capacity was significantly impaired or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution or (3) he was criminally liable under sections 53a-8, 53a-9 and 53a-10 for the offense, which was committed by another, but his participation in such offense was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution or (4) he could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of commission of the offense of which he was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
(i) The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following: (1) The defendant committed the offense during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of, a felony and he had previously been convicted of the same felony; or (2) the defendant committed the offense after having been convicted of two or more state offenses or two or more federal offenses or of one or more state offenses and one or more federal offenses for each of which a penalty of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed, which offenses were committed on different occasions and which involved the infliction of serious bodily injury upon another person; or (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value; or (6) the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value; or (7) the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 4; P.A. 80-332, S. 1; 80-442, S. 14, 28; P.A. 85-366, S. 1; P.A. 93-306, S. 12; P.A. 95-19, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 80-332 restated provisions and referred to mitigating or aggravating factors throughout, replacing references to factors set forth in Subsecs. (f) and (g); P.A. 80-442 referred to imposition of sentence in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1) rather than to sentence for a Class A felony in Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 85-366 added a new Subsec. (d) to specify the procedure for the determination by a jury or court of the existence of a mitigating factor and to add a definition of mitigating factors, relettered the remaining Subsecs. and amended Subsec. (f) to replace "a sentence in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(1)" with "a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release"; P.A. 93-306 amended Subsec. (h) to add as an aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense with an assault weapon; P.A. 95-19 revised section to permit the jury or court to make findings as to whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors and require the court to sentence the defendant accordingly, while retaining provision that the existence of certain factors concerning the defendant will operate to automatically bar the imposition of the death sentence, and, more specifically, amended Subsec. (b) to provide that the separate hearing shall not be held if the state stipulates "that any factor set forth in subsection (h) exists" rather than "that one or more mitigating factors exist" and make technical changes, amended Subsec. (c) to make technical changes, amended Subsec. (e) to require the jury or court to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to "the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d)" rather than "the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor", amended Subsec. (f) to revise the circumstances that must be found for the court to impose the death sentence by requiring the court to sentence the defendant to death if the jury or court finds "that (1) none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, (2) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and (3)(A) no mitigating factor exists or (B) one or more mitigating factors exist but are outweighed by one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i)" rather than "that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist and that no mitigating factor exists", designated provisions of Subsec. (f) re the circumstances that must be found for the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release as new Subsec. (g) and amended said Subsec. to require the court to impose said sentence if the jury or court finds "that (1) any of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exist, or (2) none of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exists or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) exist and one or more mitigating factors exist, but the one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) do not outweigh the one or more mitigating factors" rather than "that none of the factors set forth in subsection (h) exists or that one or more mitigating factors exist", redesignated former Subsec. (g) as new Subsec. (h) and amended said Subsec. to replace the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds that "any mitigating factor exists" and that "the mitigating factors to be considered concerning the defendant shall include, but are not limited to" the five enumerated factors with the provision that the court shall not impose the death sentence if the jury or court finds any of the enumerated factors and deleted former Subdiv. (3) as a factor that would in and of itself bar the imposition of the death sentence the circumstance that at the time of the offense the defendant "was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution", renumbering Subdivs. (4) and (5) as Subdivs. (3) and (4), respectively, redesignated former Subsec. (h) re aggravating factors as new Subsec. (i) and amended said Subsec. to replace the provision requiring the court to impose the death sentence if no mitigating factor is present and the jury or court finds one of the enumerated factors with "The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following:".
See Sec. 53a-35b re definition of "life imprisonment".
See Sec. 53a-35c re availability of sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.
Former Sec. 53-10 unconstitutional. 164 C. 162. Cited. 197 C. 436, 440. Cited. 207 C. 374, 375, 382, 383, 390, 392, 393, 399. Cited. 209 C. 225, 227. Cited. 212 C. 258, 260, 264. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 225 C. 559, 562. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 189, 193, 229, 235, 236, 245, 252−254, 257−259, 268, 286. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 735, 748. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 211, 214, 236, 247, 252, 257, 260. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334, 335, 338. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720. Cited. 32 CA 296, 308. Cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 278. Cited. 237 C. 332, 337. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383−385, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 238, 266−271, 273. Cited. 235 C. 206, 257, 259. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334. Cited. 241 C. 57.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 207 C. 374, 383, 386, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 240, 281−284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 218, 229, 234, 251, 255. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Imposition of death penalty premised on two unanimous findings by trier of fact that (1) existence of aggravating factor proved beyond a reasonable doubt by state; (2) existence of a mitigating factor not proved by defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. 207 C. 374, 382, 383, 386−388, 390, 392−394. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237, 239, 240, 243, 244. Cited. 235 C. 206, 215, 236, 247.
Subsec. (f):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 165. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 391. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. 221 C. 430, 432. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237−240, 258, 285. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 235 C. 206, 219, 238, 245−247. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (g):
Cited. 199 C. 163, 166. Cited. 207 C. 374, 382, 384. Cited. 212 C. 258, 262. Cited. 230 C. 183, 237. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 183, 272, 284. Cited. 235 C. 206, 207, 247, 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 229. Cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 828.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 364, 366.
Subsec. (h):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 209 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (4): Meaning of "especially cruel" must include intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing. 212 C. 258, 259, 265, 266, 270, 271. Cited. Id., 258, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 258, 265. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 230 C. 183, 185, 190, 193, 242, 252, 255, 256, 258−262, 265, 274, 276, 278. Cited. Id., 183, 237, 259, 261. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 206, 214, 219, 220. Cited. Id., 206, 221, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. 242 C. 409.

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Sec. 53a-46b. Review of death sentence. (a) Any sentence of death imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 53a-46a shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rules. In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate said sentence and remand for imposition of a sentence in accordance with subdivision (1) of section 53a-35a.
(b) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that: (1) The sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or (2) the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating factor specified in subsection (i) of section 53a-46a.
(c) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal and, if an appeal is taken, the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall then render its decision on the legal errors claimed and the validity of the sentence.
(P.A. 80-332, S. 2; P.A. 81-472, S. 151, 159; P.A. 85-366, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 23; P.A. 95-16, S. 3, 5; 95-19, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 85-366 made a technical change to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-46a by same public act; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 95-16 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting Subdiv. (3) that had required the Supreme Court to affirm the death sentence unless it determines the sentence to be excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, effective April 12, 1995; P.A. 95-19 made a technical change.
Cited. 212 C. 258, 271. Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on due process rights. 230 C. 183, 185, 188, 191, 193, 236, 239. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 234 C. 735, 737, 738, 746. Cited. 235 C. 206, 211, 212, 250. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 206, 226, 227. Cited. 238 C. 389.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (3): Class of similar cases to include all convictions of a capital felony after October 1, 1973, resulting from a trial or from a plea whether or not convictions were followed by imposition of death penalty. 225 C. 559, 560, 563. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 183, 258, 259, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. 234 C. 735, 736, 740, 741, 759−763. Subdiv. (3): Prohibition against disproportionality discussed. Id., 735−738, 740−742, 745, 747, 748, 750, 752, 760−762. Cited. Id., 735, 763. Cited. 235 C. 206, 216, 227. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 220, 226, 228. Subdiv. (3) cited. 237 C. 332, 338. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): Court concluded that statutory proportionality review scheme is constitutional and that it involves the precedent seeking method of comparative, rather than traditional, proportionality review. Id.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 237 C. 332, 336, 338. P.A. 95-16, Sec. 3(b) cited. Id.

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Sec. 53a-46c. Applicability of death penalty provisions in effect on and after October 1, 1980. The provisions of sections 53a-46a and 53a-46b in effect on and after October 1, 1980, shall be applicable to any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony under subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of section 53a-54b on or after June 13, 1983.
(P.A. 83-327, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 24.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced "on October 1, 1980" with "on and after October 1, 1980".
Does not violate prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment nor infringe on rights to due process. 230 C. 183, 185, 236. Death penalty statutes cited. Id. Cited. 238 C. 389. Capital sentencing statutes cited. Id. Death penalty statutes cited. Id.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 720.

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Sec. 53a-46d. Victim impact statement read in court prior to imposition of sentence for crime punishable by death. A victim impact statement prepared by a victim advocate to be placed in court files in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 54-220 may be read in court prior to imposition of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of a crime punishable by death.
(P.A. 00-200, S. 6.)

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Sec. 53a-47. Disposition of person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Confinement and examination. Release. Section 53a-47 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 47; P.A. 75-476, S. 5, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 2, 115, 127; P.A. 81-301, S. 2; P.A. 83-486, S. 2; P.A. 85-506, S. 31, 32.)
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PART III*
INCHOATE OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 54-197:
To constitute conspiracy there need be no formal agreement between the parties; conspiracy may be established by proof of separate acts of individual conspirators with common purpose. 129 C. 540. Principles stated which prevent a charge of conspiracy against certain participants in unlawful acts. 132 C. 335. Conspiracy is a distinct offense, entirely independent of the unlawful act which is its purpose. 134 C. 183. Conspiracy may be inferred from activities of accused persons. 138 C. 292. Where a prima facie case is made out, court is entitled to take into consideration the fact that defendant failed to testify. 139 C. 229. Declaratory judgment that a violation would exist. 142 C. 53. Cited. 145 C. 124; 150 C. 230; 152 C. 167. No formal agreement need be proven; it is enough if there is a mutual purpose to do the forbidden act. 147 C. 296. Information charging a conspiracy may properly allege acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Information charged that defendants conspired to commit larceny and in pursuance of the conspiracy stole copper wire worth $2000. Since larceny statute made theft of property worth more than $50 a felony, effect of the information was to charge a conspiracy to commit a felony. Not necessary for state to prove that the unlawful object of the conspiracy was ever successfully accomplished or that any larceny was ever committed in any amount. Confessions made by two conspirators were not admissible to prove guilt of third conspirator. Since court made that clear in instructions to jury, third conspirator could not complain of admission of confessions in evidence. 149 C. 640. Fact that one or more persons jointly charged with the commission of a crime pleaded guilty is not admissible, on trial of another person so charged, to establish that the crime was committed. A plea of guilty is, in effect, a confession of guilt which, having been made by one of those charged with the crime, can be no more than hearsay as to another who is so charged. The state must prove the whole case against any accused. 150 C. 195. Where one of alleged coconspirators is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal convictions of other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Crime of conspiracy at common law is unlawful combination and accomplishment of objectives of conspiracy is not material. 157 C. 330. Once defendant had been proved to be member of conspiracy, declarations of coconspirators in furtherance of conspiracy could be used against him. 158 C. 412. Warrant authorizing search for "...paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197" was general warrant and therefore was illegal and did not meet constitutional requirement that search warrant particularly describe things to be seized. 160 C. 28, 33−37. Admission of evidence that defendant denied he knew coconspirators was reversible error when interrogation was made in absence of defendant's counsel. 159 C. 608. Essence of crime of conspiracy is unlawful combination coupled with act done and not accomplishment of act. 160 C. 140, 149. Common law conspiracy deemed a separate and distinct crime. 162 C. 215. Cited. 163 C. 231.
Cited. 8 CS 330; 22 CS 173; 27 CS 130, 131. Person convicted of violating act cannot be sent to Kentucky hospital by petitioning review division of superior court. 25 CS 7. Cited. 27 CS 380; 28 CS 240. Conspiracy common law crime, when. 29 CS 344. Cited. 29 CS 333. Cited. 30 CS 211.
Crime of conspiracy is a separate offense and does not merge in the act which is executed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 51. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 548.
Annotations to former section 54-198:
Must be specific intent to commit crime and same overt act adopted to effectuate such intent. 141 C. 731. Cited. 143 C. 368; 156 C. 391.
Cited. 19 CS 267.

Sec. 53a-48. Conspiracy. Renunciation. (a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.
(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 517, 518. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 645. Generally may prosecute and sentence defendant for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as presumption of legislative intent (dissent noted); exception to rule when more persons than required participate. 171 C. 105. Abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. Id. Cited. Id., 524, 528. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. Id., 338, 339, 344. Cited. Id., 376. Cited. 176 C. 131, 132. Cited. 177 C. 370, 371. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68; id., 163, 164; id., 649, 650. A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under this section is before jury. Id., 704, 708. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 262, 263; id., 595, 600. Cited. 184 C. 369, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 186 C. 426, 427; id., 648, 649; id., 696, 707. Cited. 187 C. 109, 111; id., 264, 265; id., 513, 514. Cited. 188 C. 515, 516, 529; id., 542, 543; id., 671, 675. Cited. 189 C. 201, 202; id., 337, 339. Cited. 190 C. 259, 260. Cited. 191 C. 360, 362. Cited. 194 C. 18, 20. Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 183, 185. Cited. Id., 598, 604. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 326, 327. Cited. Id., 413, 415. Cited. Id., 644, 656. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result," therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1−3, 5. Cited. Id., 14, 16. Cited. 200 C. 113, 114. Cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Cited. 201 C. 489, 490, 496, 497, 501. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526, 527, 529. Cited. 204 C. 240, 241, 250, 257, 258. Cited. Id., 630, 636, 637. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 209 C. 1, 6. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438, 439. Cited. 211 C. 289, 293. Cited. 212 C. 195, 196, 199−203. Cited. Id., 387, 389. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 233−235. Conspiracy charge against a defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator. Conspiracy statute as "bilateral" in nature discussed. Id., 243, 250. Cited. Id., 422, 424. Cited. Id., 708, 711, 721. Cited. 215 C. 716, 718. Cited. Id., 739, 743. Cited. 216 C. 801. Cited. 218 C. 349−351. Cited. Id., 432, 433, 435. Cited. 220 C. 602, 604, 606. Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771. Cited. 221 C. 447, 449. Cited. Id., 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 243, 245, 248, 263. Cited. Id., 384, 386. Cited. 224 C. 322, 323. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 1, 3. Cited. Id., 32, 35. Cited. Id., 207, 210, 211. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 679, 682, 683. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 176, 178. Cited. Id., 514, 517. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 380. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. 242 C. 93.
Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 5 CA 347, 348. Cited. Id., 491, 492, 494. Cited. Id., 599, 600, 604. Cited. 8 CA 119, 120. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 481, 490. Cited. Id., 667, 671. Cited. 9 CA 548, 549. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451, 453, 455. Cited. 11 CA 397−399. Cited. Id., 621, 623. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited. Id., 445−447. Cited. Id., 605, 607. Cited. Id., 807. Cited. 15 CA 122, 123, 125. Cited. 15 CA 328, 329. Cited. Id., 539, 540. Cited. 16 CA 18, 20, 33. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Cited. Id., 648, 650. Cited. 19 CA 554, 555, 562− 564. Cited. Id., 640, 641. Cited. 21 CA 299, 301, 309, 311, 313. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 392, 403. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 22 CA 449, 450. Cited. Id., 567, 569, 577. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. Id., 615, 617. Cited. Id., 667, 670. Cited. 24 CA 316, 318. Cited. Id., 493, 494. Cited. 26 CA 94, 100. Cited. Id., 667, 668. Cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. 27 CA 596, 597. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 126, 128, 134. Cited. Id., 416, 420. Cited. 29 CA 359, 361. Cited. Id., 843, 844. Cited. 30 CA 190−192. Cited. Id., 232, 241. Cited. Id., 550, 558. Cited. Id., 654, 655. Cited. Id., 712, 713. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226. Cited. 33 CA 253, 254. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716, 717. Cited. Id., 839, 841−843, 846, 848, 849. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 200. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 556−558, 570, 571. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755, 764. Cited. Id., 774, 775. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id., 777, 778, 800. Cited. Id., 868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 224, 226. Cited. Id., 333, 336, 342. Cited. Id., 526, 540. Cited. Id., 550, 553. Cited. 40 CA 515, 520. Cited. Id., 789, 791. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. Id., 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495, 498. Cited. 42 CA 472. Cited. Id., 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. 45 CA 110. Cited. Id., 282. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 791.
Cited. 29 CS 344. Cited. 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging conspiracy. 35 CS 96, 97. Cited. 36 CS 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528, 531; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 301, 302, 308; id., 374, 375; id., 593, 594, 596.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 527, 529. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 186 C. 696, 697. Cited. 187 C. 264, 271. Cited. 189 C. 752, 754. Cited. 192 C. 383−385. Cited. 195 C. 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 644, 645, 654. Cited. 199 C. 389, 391. Cited. 200 C. 586, 587. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290, 298, 300. Cited. 202 C. 520, 528. Cited. 203 C. 420, 421. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242. Cited. 207 C. 118, 120. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. Id., 195, 197, 200. Cited. Id., 485, 488. Cited. 213 C. 243, 244. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Cited. 218 C. 151−153. Cited. 221 C. 595, 598. Cited. 223 C. 384, 386. Cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Cited. 227 C. 32, 35, 41. Cited erroneously as Subsec. (1). Id., 363, 365. Cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 537, 538. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. Id., 467. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 296. Appellate court in State v. Torres, 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict, judgment of appellate court reversed. Id., 485.
Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 9 CA 313, 314, 317. Cited. 10 CA 447, 452. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. Id., 605, 609. Cited. Id., 688, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. 16 CA 89, 90. Cited. Id., 245, 248. Cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. 19 CA 179−181, 186. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Cited. 20 CA 665, 666. Cited. 21 CA 386, 400. Cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Cited. 23 CA 502−504. Cited. Id., 602, 604. Cited. Id., 667, 669, 670. Cited. Id., 746, 747; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 493, 498. Cited. 25 CA 3, 4. Id., 21, 22. Cited. Id., 318, 319. Cited. 26 CA 94, 95, 99. Cited. Id., 279, 280. Cited. 27 CA 558, 560. Cited. 28 CA 126, 134. Cited. Id., 161, 162, 168. Cited. Id., 306−308. Cited. Id., 474, 475. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 29 CA 59, 60, 62. Cited. Id., 207, 211. Cited. Id., 843, 844, 858. Cited. 30 CA 232, 234. Cited. Id., 550, 551, 557. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371. Cited. 32 CA 842, 843. Cited. 33 CA 122, 123. Cited. Id., 339, 340; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 409, 410. Cited. Id., 647, 648, 650, 657. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 742. Cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 454, 455. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. Id., 488, 489. Cited. Id., 556, 557. Cited. Id., 672, 673. Cited. Id., 753, 755. Cited. 37 CA 156, 158. Cited. Id., 360, 361. Cited. Id., 456, 458; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176 et seq. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 38 CA 434, 435. Cited. Id., 481, 483. Cited. Id., 536, 538. Cited. Id., 777, 778. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 224, 226. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 336. Cited. Id., 526, 528. Cited. Id., 550, 553. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 515, 516. Cited. Id., 526, 527, 533. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. 42 CA 500. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. Id., 687. Cited. 43 CA 488. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 338. Cited. Id., 499. Cited. 45 CA 270. Cited. 46 CA 640.
Cited. 44 CS 490.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 40 CA 526, 532, 533.

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Sec. 53a-49. Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense. (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.
(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)
History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to "affirmative" defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.
Cited. 169 C. 377, 380. Cited. Id., 581. Cited. 173 C. 254, 255. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 325. Cited. Id., 360, 362, 363. Cited. 174 C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 142, 144. Cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2. Cited. 180 C. 481, 482. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208; Id., 430, 432; Id., 595, 596, 598, 600. Cited. 183 C. 29, 30. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164; Id., 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Cited. 189 C. 383, 385. Cited. 193 C. 70, 76. Cited. 193 C. 602, 603. Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. Id., 241, 242. Cited. Id., 408−410, 412. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612, 618. Cited. 196 C. 36, 38. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. 199 C. 14, 16. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited. 200 C. 30, 31. Cited. 201 C. 174, 176. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 289, 294, 297, 300. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509, 510. Cited. Id., 520, 527, 529. Cited. 203 C. 445, 446. Cited. Id., 484, 486. Cited. 204 C. 630, 636, 637. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 1, 10, 12. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 42, 44. Cited. 210 C. 519, 521. Cited. Id., 652, 689, 692. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. Id., 716, 718. Cited. 216 C. 585, 586, 602. Cited. Id., 647, 649, 661. Cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Cited. 220 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 765, 767, 768, 774. Cited. 221 C. 109, 112. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 222 C. 718, 719, 724. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 301, 302, 311, 316, 318−320. Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. Id., 393, 395, 396. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 235 C. 397, 398. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 469, 470. Cited. Id., 502, 503, 505, 516, 518. Cited. Id., 748, 750. Cited. 236 C. 266, 267. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 413. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345. Cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 257, 258. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. Id., 496, 497, 504, 506. Cited. Id., 545, 548. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. Id., 587, 588. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 163, 170. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. Id., 395, 396. Cited. Id., 604−606. Cited. Id., 685. Cited. 13 CA 69, 74, 75. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 704, 705, 712. Cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Cited. Id., 284, 285. Cited. 17 CA 359, 360. Cited. 19 CA 618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. Id., 386, 387, 403. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. Id., 449, 450. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 110. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 334, 335. Cited. Id., 433, 434, 441. Cited. Id., 578, 579, 582. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Cited. Id., 64, 66. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28, 29, 35. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 33 CA 339, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 223, 224, 226. Cited. 35 CA 51, 53. Cited. Id., 138, 139, 148, 153. Cited. Id., 740, 743. Cited. 36 CA 161, 162. Cited. Id., 336, 337. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. Id., 733, 735. Cited. 38 CA 777, 779. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. 39 CA 1, 5. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 23. Cited. Id., 267, 268, 271. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 483, 484. Cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 751−753. Cited. 42 CA 472. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 252. Cited. Id., 599. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45 CA 390. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 734.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 464, 465. Cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178 C. 689, 690, 694. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 430, 435. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 585, 587; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 585−588, 592, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 303−305. Cited. 189 C. 303, 307, 309. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 822, 832. Cited. 194 C. 258, 272, 276. Cited. Id., 258, 259, 271, 272, 275. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 258, 272, 276, 277. Cited. 195 C. 651, 655. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 62. Cited. 199 C. 255, 257. Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. Id., 44, 45. Cited. Id., 607. Cited. 201 C. 289, 290. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 520, 526. Cited. Id., 520, 528. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 528, 532. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 616, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 673−675. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 202, 203. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 733, 736. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 652, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25, 27. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 441, 442. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582, 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 31−33. Cited. Id., 50, 52. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 585, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 408. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 652, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 765, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 928. Cited. 221 C. 402, 403. Cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 718, 721−726. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 718, 721, 722, 724. Cited. Id., 718, 722, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524−526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 616, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 229 C. 60, 62. Cited. Id., 125, 127. Cited. Id., 839, 840. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 431, 440; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 235 C. 502, 505, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 502, 515. Cited. 238 C. 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 485.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. 5 CA 586, 587, 589. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 257, 260, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 496, 505. Cited. Id., 545, 546. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 545, 547. Subdiv. (2) cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 163, 164, 170. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 69, 74. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 237, 238. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 222, 225; Id., 416, 417; Id., 704, 708. Cited. 21 CA 386, 401. Cited. 22 CA 449, 452. Subdiv. (2) cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 663, 664. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692, 693. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 264, 266, 267. Cited. Id., 624, 637−639. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 639, 640. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 25 CA 104, 105, 110. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 104, 106, 110, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 104, 110, 111. Cited. Id., 298, 305. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 441−443. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 441−444. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578, 582. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 52, 53. Cited. Id., 65, 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242−244. Cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 433, 434. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 779, 780. Cited. Id., 73, 74. Cited. 27 CA 601, 602. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549, 551, 556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 39, 60, 63−65. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 26, 29, 31. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 470, 471, 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Cited. Id., 385, 386. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 350; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 368, 369. Subdiv. (1) Id., 647, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. Id., 718, 720, 734. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 536, 537. Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 18, 19, 24. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Cited. Id., 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 333, 340. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 333, 341. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 387, 388. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 287, 288, 294, 294, 296. Cited. 42 CA 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 488. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 578. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 619. Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2) cited re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. Id.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 232. Cited. 43 CS 46, 64.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 430, 435. Cited. 194 C. 258, 277. Cited. 205 C. 616, 617, 620. Cited. 209 C. 34, 41, 43. Cited. 211 C. 555, 587, 588.
Cited. 15 CA 704, 706, 708, 709, 711−713, 715.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 200 C. 30, 35. Cited. 221 C. 915.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165.

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Sec. 53a-50. Effect of motivation on renunciation. For purposes of this part, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 51.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 600.
Cited. 17 CA 128, 130. Cited. 23 CA 160, 165.

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Sec. 53a-51. Classification of attempt and conspiracy. Attempt and conspiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted or is an object of the conspiracy, except that an attempt or conspiracy to commit a class A felony is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 52.)
Cited. 182 C. 595, 598, 600−602. Cited. 184 C. 369, 377. Cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Cited. 202 C. 520, 527. Cited. 204 C. 630, 637. Cited. 211 C. 18, 26. Cited. 213 C. 708, 713. Cited. 235 C. 502, 515, 517.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 10 CA 447, 456. Cited. 21 CA 299, 309. Cited. 22 CA 567, 578. Cited. 29 CA 843, 859− 861. Cited. 33 CA 253, 261, 262. Cited. 36 CA 190, 205.

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Sec. 53a-52. Conviction; sentencing. Section 53a-52 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 53; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
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PART IV*
HOMICIDE

*Annotations to former section 53-9:
Necessity of stating degree of crime in indictment; 38 C. 399; 47 C. 117; of alleging deliberation and premeditation where it alleges first degree. 50 C. 198. Unlawful homicide perpetrated in commission of rape is in the first degree; 72 C. 729; so in commission of robbery or in attempt to rob. 110 C. 307; id., 559; 123 C. 670; 126 C. 59; 132 C. 44. Homicide caused by driving automobile recklessly. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 437; 109 C. 491. What mental capacity necessary for first degree murder; 57 C. 509; charge as to defense of insanity; 87 C. 7; 96 C. 242; burden of proof; id., 639; when court need not charge as to it. 87 C. 285. Actual malice must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 43 C. 518; 64 C. 305; 78 C. 25. Malice is implied, if homicide is wilful, deliberate and premeditated; 46 C. 336; 109 C. 138; but not in the case of sufficient provocation or uncontrollable passion. 74 C. 181. Malice is implied where an unlawful homicide is unattended by extenuating circumstances. 110 C. 307; id., 559. What constitutes malice; 64 C. 305; 74 C. 181; 128 C. 44; charge as to it; 79 C. 590; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 98 C. 463; 103 C. 484; 106 C. 351; rebutted by reasonable belief that victim committed adultery with accused's wife; 74 C. 177; 87 C. 5; 92 C. 71; evidence of statements by accused and feeling towards victim; 74 C. 177; 83 C. 261; 84 C. 472; 87 C. 5; 88 C. 177; malice presumed from circumstances of atrocity. 84 C. 152. Theft as motive. 79 C. 590; 90 C. 126. Intoxication admissible on question of deliberation; 40 C. 143; 41 C. 587; 49 C. 382; where indulged in to nerve person to carry out preconceived plan; 48 C. 97; as bearing on malice; 64 C. 305; as a defense. 83 C. 165; 87 C. 291; 88 C. 208. Self-defense; 57 C. 313; 79 C. 590; 83 C. 261; 106 C. 455; 105 C. 349; or defense of home; 57 C. 313; 88 C. 360. Suicide of victim as a defense; her statements as to intent. 77 C. 267. Alibi. 84 C. 152; 98 C. 466. Charge as to corpus delicti. 81 C. 22. See note re 152 C. 15, infra. Burden and amount of proof; reasonable doubt; 77 C. 267; 79 C. 590; 81 C. 22; 87 C. 573; 109 C. 139; as to malice. 78 C. 25. Homicide in general; nature and definition of degrees. 72 C. 729; 74 C. 180. When court should charge as to excuse, justification or extenuation. 84 C. 470; 87 C. 285; 98 C. 463; 103 C. 484. Murder in second degree; 87 C. 5; 128 C. 44; 131 C. 60; in case of poisoning; 19 C. 393. What facts will reduce crime to manslaughter. 74 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 79 C. 590; 87 C. 585. Under indictment for murder accused cannot be found guilty of any crime except murder in first or second degree or manslaughter. 132 C. 41. Bad prison food no justification. 38 C. 127. Effect of plea of not guilty; 87 C. 285; of plea of guilty; 78 C. 18; 88 C. 208. Confession or admissions by accused; 18 C. 180; 78 C. 18; 92 C. 65 et seq.; 103 C. 478; declarations before grand jury. 56 C. 413. Momentary absence of accused from trial. 82 C. 59. Evidence equivalent to that of two witnesses; for jury to determine. 78 C. 18; 90 C. 126; 93 C. 246; 103 C. 467; 106 C. 714. Appeal as supersedeas; 82 C. 59; if decided before time set for execution by reprieve, supreme court need not set another day. 81 C. 22. Clothes of victim as evidence; 82 C. 59; so empty cartridge shells found in accused's room. 74 C. 649. Where four indicted together, charge that state had not made out a case as to three upheld. 87 C. 285. Abandonment of enterprise by one before murder. 47 C. 139; 97 C. 329; 110 C. 309. Evidence of other unconnected crimes generally inadmissible; when such evidence is admissible. 92 C. 530; 97 C. 266; 103 C. 480; 120 C. 631. When separate trials should be given persons jointly accused. 92 C. 62; 97 C. 323; 98 C. 461; 147 C. 194. Time required for deliberation. 93 C. 246; 110 C. 561; 120 C. 629. Degree of murder is for jury; power of court to set aside. Id., 244; 106 C. 705. Admissibility of dying declarations. 90 C. 387; 93 C. 337. Mental tests of accused; expert testimony as to insanity; reading medical textbooks. 96 C. 250. Conspiracy to steal; homicide in perpetration; abandonment of enterprise by some of conspirators. 97 C. 329. Change of venue; alibi; testimony of accomplice. 98 C. 466; 105 C. 333. When witnesses should be segregated. 103 C. 473. Premeditation is necessary for first degree murder. 106 C. 352. As to use and effect of verdict of not guilty on ground of insanity, see 39 C. 595; 96 C. 243. Possession of a deadly weapon as bearing on existence of malice. 109 C. 138; 110 C. 308. An inference of guilt may be drawn from failure of accused to take stand and deny facts within his knowledge which tend to prove his guilt; 109 C. 144, 496; 108 C. 463; but failure of accused to take stand must not be commented on. Id. In prosecution for homicide by reckless operation of an automobile, conduct of accused in leaving victims lying in road without stopping, unexplained, supports an inference of guilt. 109 C. 494. Rule concerning responsibility of conspirators to commit an unlawful act for a homicide by one of them in carrying it out. 126 C. 59; 132 C. 44, 45. Has not changed common-law definition of murder but provides more severe penalty when certain features are present. 128 C. 44. Actual intent to kill not necessary in second degree murder. 131 C. 60. Jury may determine case under original charge by finding accused guilty of a lesser offense where such a conviction is warranted and is the only one warranted upon the evidence. 137 C. 114. Unskillful or improper treatment of wound by surgeons does not relieve defendant of responsibility for his crime. Id. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the presence of malice in the one and its absence in the other. Court's charge held sufficient. 139 C. 89. Charge on intoxication and alcoholic psychosis sustained. Id., 317. A killing in an attempted robbery is murder in the first degree even though killing itself is accidental. Id., 475. Cited. 141 C. 656; 143 C. 167; 145 C. 60; 154 C. 272, 286. A wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder in the first degree. 142 C. 117. Court refuses to adopt "Durham" rule. 146 C. 137. Assault with intent to rob within perpetration or attempted perpetration of a robbery. 146 C. 227. Even if there is a confession, there must be extrinsic corroborative evidence which will, when taken in connection with the confession, establish the corpus delicti in the mind of the trier beyond a reasonable doubt. 147 C. 95. Standard to determine sanity or mental capacity of the defendant to commit murder. Id. Adoption of Wigmore definition of "corpus delicti." Previous definitions overruled. 152 C. 15. Charge re what constitutes malice upheld. 152 C. 81. History discussed; claim that guilty plea to second degree murder should have been taken before three judges, that jury should have determined degree of homicide and that sentence should have been imposed by three judges, disallowed. 153 C. 320 et seq. Absence of element of wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder in indictment for murder in first degree justifies jury verdict of guilty of murder in second degree. 154 C. 624. Malice aforethought defined. Id., 627. Court should have permitted defendant to change his plea where it appeared trial court's concern that defendant be exposed to possible electrocution if found guilty on trial for first degree murder was prime basis for denial; defendant must decide risk. 157 C. 492. Length of time necessary to form specific intent may be long or short. 158 C. 341. Voluntary drunkenness, while no excuse for crime, may make person mentally incapable of intent of premeditation which is element of murder in first degree. Id. Preconviction bail in capital cases is governed by section 8 of article first of constitution as well as Sec. 54-53. Cited. 159 C. 264. Evidence produced by state was adequate to show defendants were in danger of being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under exception provided in section 8 of article I of state constitution. 159 C. 285. Cited. 159 C. 347. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 166 C. 630. Trial judges direction to jury not coercive in context of circumstances in which given. 167 C. 408.
Where accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder, fact that court in imposing sentence did not consist of a presiding judge and two other judges and that no witnesses were heard and that the degree of crime was not determined by a majority of the judges did not invalidate the conviction. 20 CS 127. Cited. 26 CS 175.
Annotations to former section 53-10:
Failure of deceased to exercise due care not a defense. 110 C. 61. Act of accused need not be immediate cause of the death. Id., 62. Cited. 139 C. 401; 141 C. 656; 150 C. 459; 152 C. 344; 154 C. 272, 275. Not retroactive. 142 C. 29. Constitutionality of statute re recommendation for life imprisonment. 145 C. 60. Death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of eighth amendment to U. S. constitution and court will not vitiate legislative determination of punishment for crimes. 158 C. 341. Preconviction bail in capital cases is to be governed by Sec. 54-53 in light of section 8 of article first of state constitution. 159 C. 264. Cited. 161 C. 219. Cited. 169 C. 13.
Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600−602. Cited. 154 C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotation to former section 53-13:
The intentional inflicting of a wound from which death ensues within a year and a day may be either murder or manslaughter. 44 C. 540. If blow produces condition which results in death, this sufficient; reasonable doubt. 87 C. 573. By reckless driving of automobile. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 457; 109 C. 491. One who engages with others in a common purpose to carry on an activity in a reckless manner or with wanton disregard for the safety of others is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, even though he is not present when the homicide occurs. 138 C. 281. Distinction between murder and manslaughter is the presence of malice in the one and its absence in the other. 139 C. 89. Cited. 153 C. 325. Cited. 163 C. 305.
Cited. 22 CS 175; id., 497, 499; 23 CS 248; 25 CS 473; 26 CS 216; 27 CS 73. Sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years in state prison confirmed by review division where defendant had in jealousy killed woman with whom he lived after observing her with another man. 27 CS 353. Sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years should stand where defendant entered a fight between his two companions, knocked victim to the ground and stabbed him with his knife. Id., 370.
Annotations to former section 53-17:
What constitutes "gross negligence." 120 C. 234. Cited. 130 C. 147. Contributory negligence no defense to gross or wilful misconduct or gross negligence. 154 C. 23. Age of accused not a criterion in determination of his gross or wilful misconduct or his gross negligence. Id. Statute does not require actual contact between accused's vehicle and deceased or vehicle in which deceased was riding. Id.
Cited. 25 CS 84; 26 CS 36; 27 CS 232.
Annotations to chapter 952, part IV:
Unconstitutionally broad discretion. 164 C. 162. Cited. 184 C. 597, 598.
Sec. 53a-54a et seq. cited. 45 CA 591.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.

Secs. 53a-53 and 53a-54. Homicide defined. Murder defined; affirmative defenses; evidence of mental condition; classification. Sections 53a-53 and 53a-54 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 54, 55; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

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Sec. 53a-54a. Murder. (a) A person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.
(b) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease, mental defect or other mental abnormality is admissible, in a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, on the question of whether the defendant acted with intent to cause the death of another person.
(c) Murder is punishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section 53a-35a unless it is a capital felony or murder under section 53a-54d.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 15, 28; P.A. 83-486, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 26.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify punishment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(2), deleting reference to death penalty imposed as provided by Sec. 53a-46a for capital felony, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a) by replacing "acted" with "committed the proscribed act or acts"; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) to add exception for murder under Sec. 53a-54d.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 171 C. 241. Cited. 173 C. 414, 415. Cited. 176 C. 508, 509; 177 C. 1, 2, 8−10. Cited. 178 C. 450, 452, 460; Id., 626, 627. Cited. 179 C. 1, 2; Id., 431, 432. Cited. 180 C. 141, 142. Constitutionally permissible for a jury to find a defendant indicted for murder guilty of homicide in a lesser degree where the evidence supports such a finding although the state of mind required is different. Id., 382, 383. Cited. Id., 589, 590. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66; Id., 388−390; Id., 497, 498; Id., 603, 604, 606. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 261, 262; Id., 476, 477. Cited. 188 C. 626, 629, 642. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 308; Id., 346, 347. 190 C. 639, 642. Cited. 191 C. 233, 235; Id., 545, 546. Cited. 194 C. 408−411. Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 483. Cited. Id., 530, 560. Cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Cited. 196 C. 667, 676. Cited. 197 C. 60, 61. Cited. Id., 180, 181. Cited. Id., 337, 340. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 507, 509, 522. Cited. 198 C. 124, 126. Cited. Id., 209, 210. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 542, 543. Cited. Id., 560. Cited. Id., 573, 574. Cited. Id., 644, 646. Cited. 199 C. 102. Cited. Id., 155, 159. Cited. Id., 163, 164, 166, 178, 179. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited. 200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 175. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 198. Cited. Id., 276, 280. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. Id., 605, 606. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19. Cited. Id., 75. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. Id., 316, 317. Cited. 203 C. 212, 213. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 205 C. 279, 280, 282. Cited. Id., 298, 300. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616, 619. Cited. 206 C. 182, 183. Cited. Id., 213, 214. Cited. Id., 323, 325. Cited. Id., 346, 348, 349. Cited. Id., 512, 513. Cited. Id., 678. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. Id., 646−648. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 229, 239. Cited. Id., 290, 292. Cited. Id., 622, 623. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81, 106. Cited. Id., 304, 305. Cited. Id., 519, 521. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696. Cited. 211 C. 215, 216. Cited. Id., 289, 292, 296, 316. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 325, 326. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 612, 613. Cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Cited. Id., 243, 244, 255. Cited. Id., 388, 389. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 579, 580. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. Id., 708, 721. Cited. 214 C. 57, 59. Cited. Id., 77, 78, 82. Cited. Id., 118. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 495. Cited. Id., 616, 617. Cited. 215 C. 231, 232, 253. Cited. Id., 277, 278, 281. Cited. 215 C. 570, 579, 580. Cited. Id., 646−648. Cited. Id., 695, 697. Cited. Id., 739, 742. Cited. 216 C. 139, 140, 142, 148, 149. Cited. Id., 188, 189. Cited. Id., 282, 296. Cited. Id., 301, 302. Cited. Id., 585, 602. Cited. Id., 699, 710, 718. Cited. 218 C. 349, 350. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 717. Cited. 219 C. 16, 20. Cited. Id., 596, 597. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 220 C. 169, 171. Cited. Id., 270, 272. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 602−604, 606. Cited. Id., 765, 767, 771, 774. Cited. 221 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 93, 94. Cited. Id., 109, 111, 112. Cited. 222 C. 506, 510. Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 678. Cited. 224 C. 63, 64. Cited Id., 168, 171. Cited. Id., 372, 373, 378. Cited. 225 C. 55, 56, 74. Cited. Id., 114, 116, 120. Cited. Id., 524−526. Cited. Id., 609, 610. Cited. 226 C. 20, 28. Cited. Id., 237, 238. Cited. Id., 497, 499. Cited. 227 C. 231, 233. Cited. Id., 301, 302, 309−311, 316, 318−320. Cited. Id., 417, 419. Cited. Id., 456, 457, 476. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 228 C. 62, 76. Cited. Id., 118, 128. Cited. Id., 281, 282, 303. Cited. Id., 412, 414. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 328, 333. Cited. Id., 691, 694, 701. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. Id., 115, 116. Cited. Id., 235, 237. Cited. 233 C. 44, 51. Cited. Id., 215, 216. Cited. 234 C. 139, 142. Cited. Id., 324, 334, 339, 350. Cited. Id., 381, 382. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Cited. Id., 274, 275, 322. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. 236 C. 189, 196. Failure of trial court to instruct jury on extreme emotional disturbance was error; judgment of appellate court affirming judgment of trial court in State v. Person, 36 CA 448 reversed, Id., 342, 351. Affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cited. Id. Cited. Id., 514, 516, 517. Cited. 237 C. 58, 59. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. Id., 364, 368. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Under appropriate circumstances defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, the same person; judgment of appellate court in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 588. Cited. 239 C. 56. Cited. Id., 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 727. Cited. Id., 743. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 605. Cited. Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 318.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 184. Cited. Id., 223, 224. Cited. Id., 470, 472. Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 12 CA 32, 33. Cited. Id., 217. Cited. 17 CA 502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. Id., 602, 623. Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 440−442. Cited. Id., 609, 612. Cited. Id., 674, 675, 682. Cited. 22 CA 669, 670. Cited. 24 CA 115, 116. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Cited. Id., 433, 444. Cited. Id., 456, 461. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265. Cited. 27 CA 1−3. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. 28 CA 416. Cited. Id., 548, 549, 556. Cited. Id., 425, 426. Cited. Id., 608, 609, 611. Cited. Id., 771, 772, 774. Cited. 29 CA 386, 388. Cited. Id., 452, 453. Cited. Id., 499, 501, 504. Cited. 30 CA 677, 679, 681. Cited. 32 CA 170, 172. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 763. Cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 35 CA 438, 439, 444, 447. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. Id., 762, 763. Cited. 36 CA 250, 251. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 364, 365, 370, 371. Cited. Id., 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 506, 507. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 37 CA 749, 750, 754. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. Id., 434, 435. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 23; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id., 242−244, 252. Cited. Id., 224−226, 236. Cited. Id., 632, 633. Cited. 40 CA 151, 163. Cited. Id., 318, 322. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. 41 CA 604, 613. Cited. Id., 809. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 549. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 70. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 476. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 261. Cited. Id., 584. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Cited. Id., 734.
Cited. 40 CS 38. Cited. Id., 498, 500. Cited. 42 CS 10, 11. Cited. 42 CS 426, 427, 432. Cited. 43 CS 367, 370.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 172 C. 65, 69. "Extreme emotional disturbance" guidelines. 177 C. 1, 3, 4, 7. Cited. 177 C. 487, 489, 491, 512. Cited. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 181 C. 268; Id., 284, 285; Id., 406, 408. Cited. 182 C. 66, 68; Id., 142, 168; Id., 388, 395; Id., 585, 587, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Id., 603, 607. Cited. 184 C. 121, 122, 125. Cited. 186 C. 414, 415, 419, 422, 423; id., 574−576, 585, 586. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8. Cited. 189 C. 303, 304, 306. Cited. 190 C. 219, 233. Cited. 191 C. 27, 28. Cited. 192 C. 700. Cited. 193 C. 474, 475. Cited. Id., 646, 667. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383, 387. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559. Cited. 195 C. 166, 167, 170. Cited. Id., 232, 233. Cited. Id., 651, 652, 655. Cited. 196 C. 557, 558. Cited. 197 C. 106−108. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 198 C. 53, 62. Cited. Id., 77, 79. Cited. 199 C. 102, 104. Cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Cited. Id., 553−555, 560. Cited. Id., 607, 608. Cited. Id., 642, 643, 650. Cited. Id., 743, 744. Charge on this defense was inadequate under the circumstances. 201 C. 174−176, 179, 180. Cited. Id., 244, 245. Cited. Id., 368, 372, 373. Cited. Id., 534, 535. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 429, 430. Cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Cited. Id., 578. Cited. Id., 723, 724. Cited. 206 C. 229, 231, 239. Cited. Id., 300, 301. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. 207 C. 374, 385. Cited. 208 C. 125, 128. Cited. Id., 455, 456. Cited. 209 C. 596, 597. Cited. 210 C. 481, 483. Cited. Id., 619−621. Cited. 211 C. 441, 442. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. Id., 351, 352. Cited. Id., 593, 594. Cited. 213 C. 708, 710, 711. Cited. 214 C. 122, 123. Cited. Id., 146, 147, 149. Cited. Id., 161, 162. Cited. Id., 344, 347. Cited. Id., 540, 541. Cited. 215 C. 739, 740, 743. Cited. 216 C. 492, 493. Cited. Id., 585−587, 593. Cited. Id., 699, 701, 702, 708, 717. Cited. 217 C. 243, 244. Interpretation of section not to require reasonableness of a defendant's extreme emotional disturbance to be determined solely from his subjective viewpoint. Id., 648, 649, 651−655, 657, 658. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 383. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. Id., 714, 716. Cited. Id., 747, 748. Cited. Id., 766−768. Cited. 219 C. 16, 17, 19. Cited. Id., 234, 235. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 220 C. 285, 298. Cited. Id., 385, 388. Cited. Id., 408. Cited. 221 C. 128, 129. Cited. Id., 430, 431. Cited. 222 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 506, 508. Cited. Id., 718−720, 725, 726. Cited. 223 C. 41, 42, 44. Cited. Id., 127, 128. Cited. Id., 207, 209. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 384−386. Cited. Id., 411, 412. Cited. Id., 535, 537. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. 224 C. 196, 197. Cited. Id., 325, 326. Cited. 225 C. 114, 116, 118, 122, 127. Cited. Id., 609, 610, 627. Cited. 226 C. 237, 253. Cited. 227 C. 301, 309. Cited. Id., 389, 391. Cited. Id., 448, 449. Cited. 228 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 118, 119. Cited. Id., 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 328, 329. Cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. 232 C. 537, 538. Cited. 233 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 106, 108. Cited. Id., 174, 189. Cited. Id., 517. Cited. Id., 813, 815. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209, 251. Cited. Id., 397, 398. Cited. Id., 413, 414. Cited. 236 C. 189, 191, 202. Cited. Id., 342, 343, 345, 356. Cited. Id., 388, 390. Cited. 237 C. 518. Cited. 238 C. 253. Cited. Id., 313. Cited. 239 C. 481. Cited. 240 C. 210. Cited. Id., 395. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Cited. Id., 502. Cited. Id., 665. Cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 485. Cited. 243 C. 205. Term "death" as used in Penal Code includes irreversible cessation of functioning of brain. 244 C. 761.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 182. Cited. Id., 367, 370. Cited. Id., 457−459. Cited. 8 CA 496, 497, 504−506. Cited. Id., 147, 148; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Cited. Id., 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Cited. 10 CA 697, 699. Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 22 CA 199, 201. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 23 CA 692, 693. Cited. 24 CA 624, 625, 627. Cited. Id., 692, 693. Cited. 25 CA 433, 434. Cited. 26 CA 242−245. Cited. Id., 259, 260. Cited. 27 CA 73, 74, 92. Cited. Id., 403, 404. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. 28 CA 231, 238. Cited. Id., 416. Cited. Id., 469. Cited. 29 CA 499, 501. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. 30 CA 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Cited. 32 CA 438−440. Cited. Id., 687, 689. Cited. Id., 759, 761. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. Id., 122, 123. Cited. Id., 782, 783. Cited. 34 CA 58, 59, 93; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 96, 97; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537 et seq. Cited. Id., 317, 318, 321. Cited. Id., 368, 369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 153. Cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et seq. Cited. Id., 541, 543. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 417, 418. Cited. Id., 516, 517. Cited. Id., 805, 806. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Cited. 37 CA 252, 253; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 388 et seq. Cited. Id., 404, 405, 414. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. Id., 749, 753. Cited. 38 CA 371, 374. Cited. 39 CA 18, 19, 24; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Cited. Id., 224, 238. Cited. 40 CA 47, 48. Cited. Id., 60, 61. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 470, 471. Cited. 41 CA 361, 362, 365−367. Cited. Id., 495. Cited. Id., 515, 517. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 555. Cited. 43 CA 252. Cited. Id., 830. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. Id., 198. Cited. Id., 231. Cited. Id., 338. Cited. Id., 790. Cited. 45 CA 148. Cited. Id., 207. Cited. Id., 297. Cited. 46 CA 216. Cited. Id., 285. Cited. Id., 600. Cited. Id., 640. Cited. Id., 684. Statute sets forth a standard that is objective in its overview, but subjective as to defendant's belief. 48 CA 784.
Subsection must be read without the word "affirmative". The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the offense charged without imposing any burden on the defendant. 33 CS 28, 81. Unborn not included in definition of "person". 40 CS 498, 499.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 603, 606. Evidence of mental capacity admissible when defendant is charged with commission of crime under which state must prove defendant acted recklessly. 195 C. 232, 240, 241. Cited. 218 C. 349, 351, 379.
Cited. 17 CA 602, 623. Cited. 44 CA 70.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 180 C. 171, 173. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153. Cited. 193 C. 144, 151, 153. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 376, 380, 383. Cited. Id., 392, 393. Cited. Id., 416, 418. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 560. Cited. 196 C. 655, 661, 662. Cited. 200 C. 721, 722. Cited. 201 C. 244, 245. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 401. Cited. 205 C. 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638−640. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385. Cited. 216 C. 282, 285, 294, 295. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488.
Cited erroneously as Sec. 53a-54(c). 41 CA 530, 532.

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Sec. 53a-54b. Capital felony. A person is guilty of a capital felony who is convicted of any of the following: (1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility, or any fireman, while such victim was acting within the scope of his duties; (2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain; (3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted of intentional murder or of murder committed in the course of commission of a felony; (4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder, under sentence of life imprisonment; (5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be returned to safety; (6) the illegal sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of the use by him of such cocaine, heroin or methadone; (7) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree; (8) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction; or (9) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.
(P.A. 73-137, S. 3; P.A. 77-604, S. 39, 84; 77-614, S. 486, 610; P.A. 80-335; P.A. 85-144; P.A. 92-260, S. 27; P.A. 95-16, S. 4; P.A. 98-126, S. 1; P.A. 00-99, S. 120, 154.)
History: P.A. 77-604 substituted "chief inspector or inspector in the division of criminal justice" for "county detective" in Subdiv. (1); P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-335 added Subdivs. (7) and (8) making murder in course of committing sexual assault in first degree and murder of two or more persons at same time a capital felony; P.A. 85-144 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding "economic" and deleting the proviso that the seller was not, at the time of such sale, a drug-dependent person; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subdivs. (1) and (3); P.A. 95-16 added Subdiv. (9) re murder of a person under sixteen years of age; P.A. 98-126 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace "an official of the Department of Correction authorized by the Commissioner of Correction to make arrests in a correctional institution or facility" with "an employee of the Department of Correction or a person providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope of his employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor is confined in such institution or facility"; P.A. 00-99 amended Subdiv. (1) to replace reference to sheriff and deputy sheriff with provision re state marshal exercising statutory authority and judicial marshal in performance of duties, effective December 1, 2000.
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54c re felony murder.
Cited. 194 C. 416, 418. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 199 C. 163, 174, 177, 178. Cited. 201 C. 276, 288. Cited. 211 C. 289, 296. Cited. 215 C. 570, 581. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 218 C. 486, 488. Cited. 230 C. 183, 188, 201, 236. Cited. 234 C. 324, 340, 341. Cited. Id., 735, 738. Cited. 235 C. 206. Cited. 237 C. 332, 334. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 36 CA 364−366, 370, 377, 378. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. 43 CA 549. Cited. 45 CA 207.
Cited 42 CS 426, 427.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Conviction for felony murder under Sec. 53a-54c cannot serve as the predicate murder for the crime of capital felony under this section; term "murder" in capital felony statute may be applied only to intentional murder. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (2):
Capital felony murder discussed. 199 C. 163, 164, 173, 174, 176, 178. Cited. 203 C. 420−422, 424. Cited. 215 C. 570, 576−578, 581−583. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 144; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 234 C. 324−326, 329, 331, 334, 336, 338, 339, 341, 343, 347, 349, 350. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 616, 617. Cited. 45 CA 390.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 197 C. 436, 439, 461. Cited. 213 C. 388, 390. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195, 200−202, 228. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 36 CA 364, 378. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 230 C. 183, 201. Cited. 233 C. 174, 189. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 205 C. 298, 299. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 229. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. 206 C. 213, 214. Cited. 207 C. 374, 377. Cited. 208 C. 125, 127, 145. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230, 239. Cited. 212 C. 258, 259. Cited. 213 C. 708, 711. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 218 C. 349−351. Cited. 221 C. 430, 431. Cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Cited. 230 C. 183, 194, 195. Cited. 233 C. 813, 815. Cited. 234 C. 324, 341, 342. Cited. 235 C. 206, 209. Only an intentional murder can be a predicate murder to capital felony charge under this section. 238 C. 828. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93.
Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 377, 380. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 604, 617.

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Sec. 53a-54c. Felony murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(P.A. 74-186, S. 11, 12; P.A. 76-336, S. 21; P.A. 79-570, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 28.)
History: P.A. 76-336 replaced rape in first degree, deviate sexual intercourse in first degree and sexual contact in first degree with sexual assault in first degree, sexual assault in first degree with firearm, sexual assault in third degree and sexual assault in third degree with firearm; P.A. 79-570 removed murder resulting from commission of or attempt to commit arson from purview of section; P.A. 92-260 replaced obsolete reference to offense of "sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm" with revised name of "aggravated sexual assault in the first degree"; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the indicators (A), (B), (C) and (D) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively for consistency with statutory usage).
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
Cited. 171 C. 683, 687. Cited. 176 C. 257, 258. Cited. 177 C. 677, 679. Cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Cited. 179 C. 78−80. Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599, 601, 602, 604. Cited. 181 C. 151, 153; id., 187, 188. Cited. 182 C. 419, 420; id., 580. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 300, 311. Cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543, 545, 550. Cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Cited. 191 C. 636, 638−641, 644; id., 659−663. Cited. 193 C. 70, 72, 75. Cited. Id., 144, 145, 151. Cited. Id., 350, 352. Cited. 194 C. 223, 224. Cited. Id., 279, 285. Cited. Id., 416, 419. Cited. Id., 530, 559, 565. Cited. 195 C. 505, 506. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 423, 429. Cited. 197 C. 396, 397, 401. Cited. Id., 436, 438, 460. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 92, 110. Cited. Id., 255, 256, 269. Cited. Id., 386, 387. Cited. Id., 397, 399. Cited. Id., 435, 436. Cited. Id., 506, 507, 515. Cited. Id., 517, 518, 537. Cited. Id., 638. Cited. Id., 644, 646. Cited. 199 C. 110, 111. Cited. 200 C. 323, 324, 336. Cited. Id., 721. Cited. 201 C. 34, 35, 37. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 399, 401, 416−418. Cited. Id., 462, 464, 465. Cited. 202 C. 18, 19, 21, 24, 26. Cited. Id., 39, 40. Cited. 203 C. 4−6. Cited. Id., 212, 213, 217, 239, 243. Cited. 204 C. 377−379, 385, 387. Cited. 205 C. 298, 300. Cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. Id., 507, 508. Cited. Id., 616, 619. Cited. Id., 638−640. Cited. 206 C. 157, 158. Cited. Id., 657, 667. Cited. 207 C. 1, 2, 12, 13. Cited. 208 C. 52, 54. Cited. 209 C. 34, 35. Cited. Id., 75, 76, 78. Cited. Id., 290−292. Cited. Id., 564, 565. Cited. Id., 636, 637. Cited. 210 C. 78, 81. Cited. Id., 652, 654, 696, 697. Cited. Id., 751, 752. Cited. 211 C. 289, 296. Cited. 212 C. 387, 389. Cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited. Id., 454, 457. Cited. Id., 493−495, 501. Cited. 215 C. 695, 698. Cited. 216 C. 282−285, 293, 295−297. Cited. Id., 367, 368. Cited. Id., 699, 700, 708, 710, 715, 717−719, 726. Cited. 218 C. 85, 87. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited. Id., 447, 448. Cited. Id., 486, 488. Cited. 219 C. 743, 744. Cited. 220 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 385, 386, 388. Cited. Id., 417, 418, 420, 426, 428, 429, 431. Cited. 221 C. 315, 316. Cited. Id., 635−637. Cited. Id., 643, 644, 666, 668. Cited. Id., 685, 687. Cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Cited. 223 C. 299, 301. Cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. Id., 635, 637. Cited. Id., 834−836. Cited. 225 C. 270, 271, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 348, 350−352. Cited. 227 C. 101, 102. Cited. 229 C. 691, 694. Cited. 230 C. 88, 90. Cited. Id., 183, 201, 224. Cited. Id., 351, 352, 354, 362. Cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Cited. 234 C. 97, 98. Cited. 235 C. 595, 596. Cited. Id., 748, 749. Cited. Id., 802−804. Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. Id., 518. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. Id., 828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 1. Cited. Id., 322. Conviction for felony murder under this section cannot serve as predicate for the crime of capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(1). Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93. Cited. Id., 125. Cited. Id., 409. Cited. Id., 666. Cited. 247 C. 662.
Cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Cited. 12 CA 385. Cited. 24 CA 723. Cited. 27 CA 794, 795. Cited. 29 CA 573, 574. Cited. Id., 771, 772. Cited. 30 CA 381, 383. Cited 31 CA 771, 773; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88−90, 92, 94. Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. Id., 431−433. Cited. 33 CA 90, 92. Cited. 35 CA 762, 766. Cited. 36 CA 364, 365, 370, 375. Cited. Id., 506, 507. Cited. Id., 556, 558. Cited. 38 CA 581, 582. Cited. 41 CA 515−517. Self-defense not available as a defense to charge of felony murder. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 472. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. 45 CA 32. Cited. Id., 187. Cited. Id., 390. Cited. Id., 658. Reaffirmed prior holding that self-defense not a valid defense to charge of felony murder. 51 CA 798.
Cited. 36 CS 141. Cited. 41 CS 385−387. Cited 42 CS 426, 427.

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Sec. 53a-54d. Arson murder. A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits arson and, in the course of such arson, causes the death of a person. Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, any person convicted of murder under this section shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall not be eligible for parole.
(P.A. 79-570, S. 1.)
Cited. 191 C. 636, 644. Does not violate defendant's right to due process and equal protection. 196 C. 655−665. Cited. Id., 667, 668, 670, 675. "... when two or more persons are the victims of a single episode there are as many offenses as there are victims." 198 C. 92−94, 103, 110. Cited. 204 C. 377, 386. Cited. 210 C. 22. Cited. Id., 519, 526. Cited. 211 C. 258, 283, 284. Cited. Id., 289, 296. Cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Cited. 214 C. 378, 385. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 828. Cited. 240 C. 727. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 41 CA 476, 478, 479.
Cited. 42 CS 426, 427.

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Sec. 53a-55. Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.
(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 56; P.A. 73-137, S. 9; P.A. 83-486, S. 5.)
History: P.A. 73-137 substituted reference to Sec. 53a-54a for reference to Sec. 53a-54 in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by replacing "acts" with "committed the proscribed act or acts".
Cited. 168 C. 610. Cited. 169 C. 309, 322. Cited. 170 C. 81. Cited. 180 C. 171, 177. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 182 C. 66, 68, 77. Cited. 188 C. 542, 544. Cited. 190 C. 639, 650. Cited. 192 C. 85, 87. Cited. 193 C. 632, 640. Cited. Id., 646, 666, 668. Cited. Id., 695, 697, 704, 730. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 428. Cited. 200 C. 553, 558. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 202 C. 429, 430. Cited. 210 C. 78, 106. Cited. Id., 652, 654. Cited. 211 C. 591, 592. Cited. 213 C. 38, 40. Cited. 215 C. 695, 697. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701, 708−710. Cited. 217 C. 498−500. Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Cited. 225 C. 559, 561. Cited. 226 C. 237. 250. Cited. 233 C. 174−176, 189, 192. Cited. 234 C. 139, 161. Cited. 236 C. 342, 351.
Cited. 7 CA 223, 224, 233. Cited. 8 CA 307. Cited. 15 CA 74, 76, 82; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591. et seq. Cited. 16 CA 223. Cited. 24 CA 115, 117. Cited. 37 CA 722, 728. Cited. 40 CA 189, 191. Cited. Id., 374, 376. Cited. 41 CA 565, 566. Cited. Id., 604, 613. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited. 44 CA 62. Cited. 46 CA 216.
Cited. 33 CS 28.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1): It is incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury as intent to achieve a result is an element of the crime charged. 165 C. 400, 403. Cited. 174 C. 89, 90, 95−98. Cited. 176 C. 107, 108. Subdiv. (3): The conduct proscribed does not require infliction of a physical blow. 176 C. 227−229, 231−233, 236. Subdiv. (1) cited. 177 C. 538, 539. Subdiv. (3) cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Subdivs. (1) and (3); Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 181 C. 187, 200; id., 406, 408, 417. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 66, 71. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 66, 72, 73. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 403, 404; 183 C. 394, 395; 185 C. 63, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. 188 C. 237, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 653, 654. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 303, 308, 309. Subdiv. (1): Attempt to commit is not cognizable. Id., 303−310. Subdiv. (1) cited. 190 C. 219, 220; id., 576, 577. Cited. Id., 639, 650−652. Subdiv. (3) cited. 193 C. 632−634, 639, 643. Cited. 646, 667, 668. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 646, 668. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 646, 669. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 729. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 695, 729, 731. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 120, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 279−281, 294. Cited. Id., 376, 377. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 519, 520, 526. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54. Cited. Id., 209, 210. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 220, 221. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 454, 458, 459. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 454, 459. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 454, 459, 461, 462. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 454, 459, 462, 463. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 155, 158, 159, 161. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 155, 159. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 417, 419, 446. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 224, 225. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 453, 454; Id., 453, 458; 201 C. 534, 556, 558, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 534, 556, 558, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 598, 601. Subdiv. (3) cited. 202 C. 520, 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 520, 526. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629, 631, 635, 641−643. Subdiv. (1) cited. 203 C. 466, 467; 204 C. 120, 121. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 279−281. Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 278, 279. Subdiv. (1) cited. 207 C. 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 133, 135. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 441−444. Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 612, 613. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 500, 502. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 579, 580. Subdiv. (3) cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 66. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 57, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 77, 85, 87. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 220, 221. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699, 701, 708, 709, 715, 717. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 708, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 217 C. 498, 501, 503. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 498−503. Subdiv. (2) cited. 218 C. 766, 769. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 21. Subdiv. (3) cited. 220 C. 169, 172. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 285, 288, 298, 299. Subdiv. (3) cited. 222 C. 444, 447, 448. Cited. 223 C. 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 546, 547. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 55, 63, 69. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 55, 63, 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 55, 64. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 476. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 566, 567, 570, 575. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 611, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 147, 148. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 147, 148. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 281, 303. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 183, 223. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 115, 137. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv (2) cited. Id., 115, 139. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 484, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 106, 118. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 174, 175, 189, 190. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 174, 189. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 215, 223. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 517. Subdiv. (3) cited. 235 C. 413, 414. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 595, 596. Cited. 236 C. 189, 198. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 342, 344. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 342, 344, 345. Subdiv. (3) cited. 238 C. 253. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 727. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 799. Subdiv. (3) cited. 241 C. 502.
Subdiv. (3): To be guilty of violating this statute "a person must have the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct." 5 CA 571−573, 576−578. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 457, 458, 560. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 656. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 147, 148; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. 11 CA 425, 427; Id., 628, 630, 631. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 628−631; 13 CA 175, 176. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA 502, 504; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 602, 604, 605. Subdiv. (3) cited. 18 CA 423, 424. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 576, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 609, 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 674, 682. Subdiv. (3) cited. 20 CA 410, 411. Subdiv. (3) cited. 21 CA 138, 145. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 265, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 321, 322. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 340, 341, 344, 350. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 507, 508. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 521, 522. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 669, 670. Subdiv. (3) cited. 23 CA 431, 432. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502−505. Subdiv. (1) cited. 24 CA 115, 117. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 692, 695. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 456, 457, 460−462. Cited. Id., 456, 461. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 467. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (3) cited. 26 CA 165, 166. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 242, 243. Cited. Id., 259, 261. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 259, 266−268, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 27 CA 1−3, 5, 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 520, 521. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 34, 35, 37, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 81, 82, 87−89. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 231, 233. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 771, 773. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 771−775, 777, 778. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 825−827, 829− 831. Cited. 29 CA 68, 69; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 162, 163; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 394, 396. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 452, 453. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 533, 534. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 754, 755, 758. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 773, 774. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 26, 27. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 232, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 385, 386. Subdiv. (3) cited. 32 CA 687, 688, 695−697. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 687, 695. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 854−856. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 116, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 782, 783, 791, 792. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 236, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 368, 369; see also 233 C. 517 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 141. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 374, 375; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 438, 439, 444, 446. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 438, 444. Cited. 37 CA 180, 181. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 180, 184, 185. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 404, 414. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Cited. Id., 722, 723. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 722, 728, 729. Cited. 38 CA 801, 802. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 815, 818. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 224, 240, 242. Subdiv. (1) cited Id., 242, 253. Subdiv. (3) cited. 40 CA 151, 152, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 831, 832. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 382. Subdiv. (3) cited. 43 CA 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 488. Cited. 44 CA 790. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 731. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 216. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Evidence presented at trial concerning a healthy one-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. 47 CA 188. Subdiv. (1): Criminal liability as an accessory to manslaughter in the first degree has long been recognized under this state's jurisprudence. 49 CA 121.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 44 CS 417.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 211 C. 591, 612.

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Sec. 53a-55a. Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the first degree as provided in section 53a-55, and in the commission of such offense he uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, machine gun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with subdivision (4) of section 53a-35a of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 3; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 1.)
History: July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision that any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with Sec. 53a-35a(4) and increase the nonsuspendable sentence from one year to five years.
Cited. 190 C. 639, 640, 650, 653. Cited. 192 C. 85, 87. Cited. 193 C. 695, 730, 731. Cited. 198 C. 77, 78. Cited. Id., 454, 455, 458, 475. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 225 C. 559, 561.
Cited. 10 CA 357. Cited. 11 CA 425, 427. Cited. 17 CA 97, 98. Cited. 21 CA 801. Cited. 23 CA 502−505. Cited. 25 CA 734, 735. Cited. 26 CA 259, 260, 262, 265, 278. Cited. 33 CA 116, 117. Cited. 37 CA 722, 723, 728. Cited. 39 CA 224, 226, 236. Cited. Id., 242, 244, 252.
Subsec. (a):
Court's instructions on intent as element of manslaughter unconstitutional since they could be interpreted as creating a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption. 180 C. 171, 173, 177. Cited. 195 C. 160, 161. Cited. 199 C. 383, 384. Cited. 203 C. 466, 467. Cited. 206 C. 346, 348, 350. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 33 CA 116, 117.
Cited. 26 CA 259, 260. Subdiv. (1) cited. 27 CA 263, 265. Cited. 37 CA 722, 723. Cited. 39 CA 224, 238.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 206 C. 346, 358. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 7 CA 223, 235.

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Sec. 53a-56. Manslaughter in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when: (1) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or (2) he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force, duress or deception, to commit suicide.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 57.)
Cited. 169 C. 309, 322. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 188 C. 542, 544, 545. Cited. 195 C. 232, 234. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421, 428. Cited. 199 C. 631, 633. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 202 C. 629, 632. Cited. 210 C. 78, 106. Cited. 212 C. 593, 607. Cited. 213 C. 579, 583. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 217 C. 498, 500. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 227 C. 566, 570. Cited. 236 C. 342, 344.
Cited. 7 CA 180, 181, 183. Cited. 11 CA 425, 426, 428. Cited. 19 CA 674, 682. Cited. 21 CA 654, 655. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 26 CA 448, 454. Cited. 32 CA 687, 695. Cited. Id., 759, 761, 764. Cited. 37 CA 722, 729. Cited. 42 CA 348. Cited re evidence sufficient to sustain conviction. 51 CA 814.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 174 C. 89, 90, 95. Subdiv. (1): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 63, 66. Cited. 187 C. 6, 29. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 632, 640. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 232, 237. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 155, 159. Subdiv. (1) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 593, 608. Cited. 213 C. 579, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 579, 585, 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 66. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 18, 21. Cited. Id., 16, 22. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 55, 63, 64, 69. Cited. 226 C. 20, 21. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 20, 22, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Cited. Id., 147, 149, 152, 155. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 115, 137. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 253.
Cited. 5 CA 157, 158. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 338. Cited. 7 CA 180, 183. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 628−632. Cited. 17 CA 502, 511; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 430, 431. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 25 CA 456, 467. Subdiv. (1) cited. 26 CA 448, 449, 458. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 771, 773. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 825, 830. Cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99, 101; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 854, 855. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 722, 729. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 815, 818. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 47, 48.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 202 C. 629, 638.

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Sec. 53a-56a. Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the second degree as provided in section 53a-56, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 4.)
Cited. 199 C. 631, 633, 636, 643. Cited. 201 C. 174, 187. Cited. 207 C. 191, 192. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Cited. 228 C. 281, 303.
Cited. 10 CA 697−699.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-56b. Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug.
(b) Manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class C felony and the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 1; P.A. 83-534, S. 8; P.A. 85-147, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes the death of another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 193 C. 632, 640. Cited. 213 C. 74, 76, 80. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 229 C. 228, 230.
Cited. 5 CA 378, 379. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 11 CA 122, 123, 125−128, 130, 132. Cited. Id., 473, 481. Cited. 12 CA 129, 130. Cited. Id., 294, 295, 297, 298, 300−303. Cited. 16 CA 358, 360−363, 365, 366. Cited. 18 CA 223−225. Cited. 21 CA 138, 139, 144, 145. Cited. 22 CA 108, 109. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720, 722. Cited. 29 CA 825, 831, 834. Cited. 34 CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 664. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 11 CA 122−124, 126. Sec. 53a-57 not a lesser included offense. Id., 473, 474, 481. Cited. 20 CA 495, 496. Cited. 21 CA 138, 139, 141, 143, 144. Cited. 29 CA 825, 831, 834.

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Sec. 53a-57. Misconduct with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when, with criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, he causes the death of another person.
(b) Misconduct with a motor vehicle is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 58; P.A. 76-16; P.A. 82-403, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 76-16 defined "intoxication" for purposes of section; P.A. 82-403 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the provision that a person is guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle when he causes the death of another person "in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle" and by deleting the definition of "intoxication".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 174 C. 112, 113, 116. Cited. Id., 118. Cited. 176 C. 445, 446; id., 451, 454, 455, 459. Cited. 188 C. 620, 621. Cited. 202 C. 629, 638−640. Cited. 207 C. 336, 337. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 222 C. 444, 449. Cited. 229 C. 228, 230.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Violation of Sec. 14-222a, negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, is a lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle. 9 CA 686−689, 695, 710, 721, 723. Not a lesser included offense of Sec. 53a-56b(a). 11 CA 473, 474, 481, 482. Cited. 15 CA 392, 393. Cited. 16 CA 497, 507. Cited. 21 CA 138, 144. Cited. 22 CA 108, 111. Cited. 23 CA 720. Cited. 28 CA 283, 284, 289. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826, 831, 833−835, 837, 839. Cited. 30 CA 428, 429. Cited. 34 CA 655, 665.
Cited. 35 CS 519, 521. Cited. 36 CS 527, 529.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 451, 452, 454.
Cited. 3 CA 137, 138. Cited. 11 CA 473, 474. Cited. 20 CA 495, 497. Cited. 23 CA 720, 723. Cited. 29 CA 825, 826, 832.

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Sec. 53a-58. Criminally negligent homicide: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person, except where the defendant caused such death by a motor vehicle.
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 59.)
Cited. 174 C. 89, 95. Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382, 403, 408. Cited. 181 C. 406, 412. Cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78. Cited. 187 C. 6, 29. Cited. 195 C. 232, 242. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 525. Cited. Id., 629, 640, 641. Cited. 204 C. 410, 411, 426. Cited. Id., 429, 433. Cited. 212 C. 593, 607, 608. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590, 592. Cited. 216 C. 699, 710. Cited. 223 C. 273, 275. Cited. 226 C. 237, 250. Cited. 227 C. 456, 476. Cited. 228 C. 118, 127. Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury on this lesser included offense. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Ray, 30 CA 95, reversed. Id., 147, 149, 155. Cited. Id., 281, 303. Cited. 238 C. 253.
Cited. 17 CA 502, 519; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 26 CA 448, 454. Cited. 28 CA 388, 389. Cited. Id., 771, 773. Cited. 30 CA 95, 99, 101, 103; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. Id., 232, 243. Cited. 32 CA 687, 695. Cited. 35 CA 438, 444.
Cited. 40 CS 498, 501.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 201 C. 174, 187−189. Cited. 202 C. 629, 639. Cited. 213 C. 579, 590. Cited. 214 C. 57, 61, 68. Cited. 223 C. 273, 275. Cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Cited. 231 C. 115, 137.
Cited. 24 CA 586, 588. Cited. 34 CA 368, 382; see also 233 C. 517 et seq.

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Sec. 53a-58a. Negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. Section 53a-58a is repealed.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 5; P.A. 81-26, S. 2.)
See Sec. 14-222a re negligent homicide with a motor vehicle.
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PART V*
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-11:
Court had authority to impose consecutive life sentences for two second degree murders. 152 C. 600−602. Cited. 154 C. 622, 624.
Cited. 25 CS 473.
Annotations to former section 53-12:
Person charged with assault with intent to murder may be convicted of assault with intent to kill. 8 C. 498; 9 C. 260; 19 C. 392; 90 C. 383. A man who is assailed under such circumstances as to authorize a reasonable belief that the assault is with design to take his life is justified in killing his assailant. 32 C. 83; 105 C. 349; 106 C. 455. Evidence of threats by third party against party assaulted, inadmissible. 53 C. 536; but see 63 C. 47. Assault with intent to murder may be prosecuted by information of state's attorney. 60 C. 92. What constitutes; ill-will towards victim; malice and intent. 84 C. 470; 106 C. 351. Specific intent necessary; insanity as a defense. 84 C. 81. Malice aforethought required, but intent need not be premeditated. 106 C. 351. Definition of malice aforethought. Id. Reputation of deceased for violence, where accused claims self-defense, is admissible only when such reputation was known to accused; and only when hostile demonstrations of deceased would not have warranted extreme defensive measures except when considered in light of such knowledge. Id., 456. Reputation may never be shown by proof of specific acts of violence; id., 457; nor to establish probability that deceased was the aggressor. Id., 459. Cited. 140 C. 398; 149 C. 656; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303, 156 C. 341. Evidence of other subsequent criminal acts committed by defendants against person whom they are charged with assaulting may be received in evidence as admission by conduct. 159 C. 169. Cited. 167 C. 539. Cited. 178 C. 534, 536.
Annotations to former section 53-14:
Facts of assault held to justify inference of intention to maim and disfigure. 95 C. 145. General verdict of guilty where information is under this statute and also charges aggravated assault under Sec. 53-16. Id. Failure to charge that verdict of simple or aggravated assault was possible held no error when verdict of robbery by violence returned: lesser crime necessarily included in verdict as returned. 105 C. 765. There is a distinction between force used by a robber in removing property from the person and the violence which aggravates a simple robbery and makes it robbery with violence. The latter force may be exercised at any time, so long as it forms a part of the transaction in which the robbery is committed. 143 C. 368. Cited. 140 C. 613; 149 C. 694; 152 C. 628; 153 C. 584; 155 C. 593. Plaintiff's plea of guilty entered knowingly, voluntarily and on advice of counsel was waiver of defective bench warrant on which he was arrested as it was consent to jurisdiction of the court. 157 C. 143. Jury could reasonably find violent intent required by this section where defendant committed robbery with gun. History of section reviewed. 157 C. 464. Pretrial lineup identification of defendant by storeowner he had robbed two hours before was proper evidence. 159 C. 143. Cited. 160 C. 37. Cited. 160 C. 85. Cited. 160 C. 519. Cited. 165 C. 104. Cited. 169 C. 38.
Cited. 22 CS 493; 23 CS 82; 24 CS 120; 305; 386; 26 CS 53; 77. Brutality of defendant in repeatedly clubbing his victim with a tire iron justified sentence of court below as the least protection to which society is entitled. 27 CS 340. Where seventeen-year-old defendant had robbed a grocery store and violently attacked its seventy-three-year-old proprietor, sentence of indefinite term at Connecticut Reformatory was affirmed as defendant had prior extensive juvenile record. Id., 360. Cited. 28 CS 15; id., 196.
Annotation to former section 53-15:
Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotations to former section 53-16:
Razor may be found to be a deadly or dangerous weapon. 95 C. 145; and so may a sawed-off billiard cue. 106 C. 352. Accused entitled to instruction as to simple assault, when. 131 C. 135. Cited. 140 C. 398; 154 C. 41, 42; id., 302, 303. Elements of crime discussed. 146 C. 527. Defendant who rushed three men to scene of assault, himself wrestled with police officers and otherwise resisted their authority could reasonably have been found by trial jury to have abetted his son in committing aggravated assault on one of the officers. 155 C. 531. Intent is a question of fact, determination of which should stand unless conclusion drawn by trier is unreasonable. 157 C. 351. Subsequent assaults by defendant on his wife and officers called in to protect her were admissible evidence where defense was self-defense and accidental injury. 158 C. 149. Cited. 167 C. 539. Cited. 165 C. 61.
Cited. 22 CS 208; 24 CS 355; 27 CS 430.
Razor found deadly and dangerous within meaning of statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 446, 448. Fact that assault was not directed against actual victim does not excuse or mitigate crime. Id. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 652.
Annotation to former section 53-19:
Cited. 169 C. 38.
Annotations to former section 53-174:
An assault with "intent to drown and suffocate" not within this statute. 5 C. 330. A breach of the peace under this section may be committed without assault or battery. 29 C. 72. Assailing party with scurrilous and abusive language is a "mocking" under this section. 34 C. 279. Effect of provision concerning libelous publications. 90 C. 98. Elements necessary where offense is tumultuous behavior. 75 C. 205. Interrupting a school under former statute. 26 C. 607; 28 C. 232; 82 C. 321. Does not define breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it; it may be committed in other ways. 126 C. 5. Not necessary that information contain an allegation that publications were maliciously made if there is no mention of privilege. 148 C. 208. Not necessary to prove a breach of the peace to support a conviction of libel. Id. Cited. 97 C. 138; 124 C. 557; 145 C. 124; 147 C. 704; 148 C. 77; 153 C. 208; 157 C. 226. Cited. 162 C. 383. Cited. 165 C. 288, 291, 294.
Annotations to former statute prohibiting acts calculated to intimidate: To threaten and use means to intimidate a company against its will to abstain from keeping in its employ workmen of its own choice is within the prohibition of the statute. 55 C. 70, 71; 92 C. 168. Statute as applied to strike. 77 C. 237; 79 C. 13; id., 416. Necessary allegations of information; intimidation need not result. 80 C. 614; 81 C. 696. Notice by bricklayers' union to contractors and employers that members would not work if nonunion men were employed held no violation of this statute on particular facts. 92 C. 168. Does not require proof of assault and battery. No specific intent is essential. It is sufficient that the acts intentionally committed cause serious disquietude on the part of those in the vicinity. 140 C. 586. Cited. 142 C. 605.
Cited. 5 CS 507; 22 CS 361; 23 CS 294; id., 344; id., 455; 24 CS 354; 25 CS 483; 27 CS 128. "Peace" defined: It is not the law that there is no breach of the peace unless public repose is disturbed. Numerous abusive and indecent telephone calls held breach of the peace. (Now see Sec. 53a-183.) Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for violation of this section, there should have been presentence investigation and report as defendant could have been detained therein for as much as two years. 26 CS 504, 505. Petitioner by habeas corpus petition challenged her commitment for indefinite term for breach of peace, when section 17-360 provides maximum sentence of one year for this misdemeanor and sentence ordered modified. 28 CS 9.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200; id., 611; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 224, 227; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68; id., 90; id., 413, 416; id., 476, 477; id., 538. Abusive and threatening language uttered over telephone constituted violation. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 288. (Now see Sec. 53-174a.) Defendant's contention that conduct involving one or two persons and occurring in an isolated place could not constitute breach of the peace was without merit. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 648. Time is not an essential element of crime of breach of peace unless date is material to the defense. Id., 649. Mere presence of defendant as inactive companion would not make him an accessory to breach of peace. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 138. Breach of peace may be found if alleged offensive act is of such a character that it naturally tends to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity where act is likely to exercise its malignity. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423. "Provokes contention" does not require that blows be struck. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 550, 552. Statute provides its own definition of "mocking." Id. Although defendant did not take part in assault, he is guilty under statute because everyone is party to an offense who directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming a part thereof. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 610, 613. Defendant properly charged with breach of peace when he violated curfew imposed by mayor of New Haven when riotous conditions existed in the city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Right to constitutional procedural safeguards applicable to charges of misdemeanor. Id., 178. Evidence of defendant magazine salesman's forcible amorous assault on complainant housewife in her home warranted his conviction of crime of breach of peace by assault. Id., 186. Statute does not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it and defendant garage owners threatened assault on complaining witness in his shop warranted his conviction under it. Id., 298. Constitutionality of this statute properly raised by demurrer upon ground it is unconstitutionally vague. Demurrer overruled as language used in statute is plain and unambiguous and legislative intent clearly expressed. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 311; 517. Section does not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it. It may be committed in ways other than those specified. Offensive acts must be of such character that they tend naturally to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 583. Evidence of prior altercation between defendant and victim's son which led immediately to attack on the father admissible on question of motive. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 607. There was sufficient evidence on which trial court found defendant had committed assault and battery and appeal court cannot retry case. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 14. Defendant in resisting an unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of peace. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 90, 402, 403, 404, 405, 431.
Annotations to former section 53-207:
Cited. 23 CS 427, 428, 429.
Annotations to former section 54-117:
Averment "against statute" does not vitiate and may be rejected as surplusage. 3 D. 103. Assault with intent to kill, a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 3 C. 114; 5 C. 330. High crime and misdemeanor is an immoral and unlawful act, not strictly a felony. 6 C. 217; id., 476. Nuisance does not constitute. 6 C. 418; but see 7 C. 431. Solicitation to commit adultery a high crime and misdemeanor at common law. 7 C. 270. Escape from prison without prison breach or violence an offense at common law. 7 C. 452. Attempt to steal offense at common law. 30 C. 500. Conspiracy a crime at common law; and punishable under this statute. 69 C. 725; 75 C. 210; 77 C. 227; 86 C. 434; 124 C. 562; 126 C. 84; 127 C. 604. High crime, felony, misdemeanor, defined. 86 C. 434; id., 627. Conspiracy to commit assault is high crime and misdemeanor. 86 C. 434. Conspiracy to commit crime is not merged in crime itself. 99 C. 114. Definition of merger; when merger exists; is a doctrine of very limited application. 108 C. 215. Identity of offenses. Id., 214. Cited. 162 C. 2.
Cited. 29 CS 305. Obstructing justice offense restricted in application. 29 CS 305.

Sec. 53a-59. Assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or (4) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person and while aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.
(b) Assault in the first degree is a class B felony provided (1) any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and (2) any person found guilty under subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim of the offense is a person under ten years of age or if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in section 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 60; P.A. 80-442, S. 16, 28; P.A. 92-87, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 3; P.A. 95-142, S. 12; P.A. 99-240, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) requiring at least five years' imprisonment for person found guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re causing serious physical injury to another person while aided by two or more other persons actually present; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (5) re causing physical injury to another person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) by adding Subdiv. (2) requiring the defendant to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (b) to make the nonsuspendable sentence of Subdiv. (2) applicable if the victim of the offense is a witness, as defined in Sec. 53a-146, and the actor knew the victim was a witness.
Cited. 171 C. 264. Whether physical injury sustained by victim was "serious" was question of fact for the jury. 175 C. 204, 207. Cited. 191 C. 142. Cited. 193 C. 333, 334. Cited. 196 C. 18, 21. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 203 C. 484, 486, 488. Cited. 207 C. 233, 234. Cited. 209 C. 34, 38. Cited. 211 C. 441, 449. Cited. 215 C. 739, 743. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405. Cited. 227 C. 301, 302, 312. Cited. 239 C. 467. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 389.
Cited. 3 CA 607, 623. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 11 CA 621, 623, 625. Cited. Id., 699, 700, 703, 706. Cited. 13 CA 139, 140. Cited. 14 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 309, 320. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 19 CA 654, 656. Cited. 20 CA 437, 438. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 21 CA 557, 565. Cited. 25 CA 171, 172. Cited. 34 CA 103, 116. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109, 110. Cited. Id., 609, 615. Cited. Id., 762, 763, 766. Cited. 36 CA 336, 337. Cited. 37 CA 180, 185. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Cited. Id., 645, 646. Cited. 42 CA 624. Cited. 43 CA 549. Cited. 44 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 691.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 428, 429, 431. Cited. 172 C. 94, 95. Cited. Id., 275. Cited. 173 C. 254−256. Evidence victim suffered various broken facial bones and spent eleven days in hospital was sufficient to show the "serious physical injury" required for conviction. Id., 389. Cited. 174. C. 16, 17. Cited. Id., 604, 605. Subdiv. (3) cited. 175 C. 204, 205, 207; 176 C. 138, 139. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118; id., 448−450; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 460, 467; id., 501. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 588, 594; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq.; Subdiv. (1) cited. 183 C. 29, 30. Subdiv. (3) cited. 184 C. 400, 402−404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 63, 65. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 372, 373; 186 C. 1, 2, 7; id., 17, 18, 25; id., 654−657, 663, 664, 673; 187 C. 199, 200, 201, 214 (Diss. Op.); id., 681, 683; 189 C. 61; id., 303, 306, 310; 190 C. 219, 233. Subdiv. (3) cited. 191 C. 12, 13. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 632−634, 639, 643. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 89, 90. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 475, 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 651, 652, 655. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 395, 401. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 602, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 23, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 155, 159. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 322, 327. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322, 327, 328. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650; 202 C. 259, 260; Id., 463, 464, 488. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629, 631, 635. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 207, 208. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 370, 371; Id., 673, 675. Subdiv. (3) cited. 208 C. 38−41. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 322, 323. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 619, 621. Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 441, 443−445. Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 97, 98. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 122, 123; Id., 344, 347. Cited. Id., 717, 720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 188, 189; Id., 492, 493. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 585, 586, 592, 593, 602. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (3) cited. 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 16, 21. Cited. Id., 363, 365. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 363, 365, 367−370. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 408, 409; 221 C. 402, 403, 405; Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 444, 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 718, 720. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452, 455. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 524−526. Cited. 227 C. 301, 311, 312. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 301, 312, 315, 316, 318−320. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Assault statute cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 518, 519. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 711, 713. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 751, 752. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 751−753. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 234, 235. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 335, 336. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 125, 127. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 178, 179. Subdiv. (3) cited. 230 C. 608, 610. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 473, 474. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 746. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 748, 750, 751. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 694. Subdiv. (1): Under appropriate circumstances a defendant can simultaneously intend to cause death of, and serious physical injury to, same person; judgment of appellate court in State v. Williams, 39 CA 18 reversed. Id., 748. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 239 C. 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 481. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 665. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 802. Subdiv. (3) cited. 242 C. 143. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 389. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 485. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 723. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 745. Subdiv. (3): Criminal conduct can arise by an omission to act when there is a legal duty to do so and defendant who had established a familial relationship with victim's mother and her children, had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the children and had taken care of the children as though he were their father, had a legal duty to protect victim from abuse and breach of that duty exposed defendant to criminal liability. 245 C. 209. Subdiv. (5) cited. 247 C. 662.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 609, 616. Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 607, 608. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40, 42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 124, 125, 140, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 124, 138, 140. Cited. Id., 124, 138, 141. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 124, 140, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476, 477. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 309, 310. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 119, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 545, 547−549. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 548, 549; Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (3) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 169, 170; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 330, 331. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 103, 104. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 176, 177; Id., 302, 303; Id., 462−464; Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 643−645, 651. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 499; Id., 621, 622, 625. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699−702. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 217; Id., 655, 656; 13 CA 12; Id., 120, 121; Id., 237, 238. Id., 237, 238; Id., 687, 688; Id., 824. Subdiv. (3) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 140; Id., 309, 310. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 496. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 511, 512; 15 CA 34, 35, 47. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532, 534. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 706, 710, 711, 712, 715. Subdiv. (1) cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 206, 207. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 346, 347. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 390, 391. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 17 CA 391, 394. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 174, 175. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 654, 656. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 688, 689, 716; 22 CA 199, 201. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 340, 341. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610−613. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610−611; 23 CA 28, 29; Id., 315, 316; Id., 663, 664; Id., 692, 693; 24 CA 152, 153; Id., 264, 266; Id., 316, 318; Id., 556, 559; Id., 563, 567−569; Id., 624, 625, 627; 25 CA 171, 173, 175. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 171, 173, 175; Id., 243, 245. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 275, 276, 278, 279. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434; Id., 578, 579, 582; Id., 619−621. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 26 CA 52, 53; Id., 114, 116, 124; Id., 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 331, 332, 337, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 367, 368; Id., 433, 434, 436; Id., 641, 642, 647, 653, 654; 27 CA 73, 74, 92, 93. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 73, 93. Cited. Id., 322−324. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 324, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322−327, 330, 332, 333. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 34, 35. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 290, 291, 302, 304. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 290, 301, 302. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 402, 404, 413. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 825, 829, 830. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 833, 834; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 29 CA 59, 60, 62−64. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704, 705. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 744, 745. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 9, 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 232, 234, 237, 239. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 406, 407; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 606, 607, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 553, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 122, 123. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 103, 104. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 223, 224, 226, 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261, 262, 271. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691, 692. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 807, 808, 812. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 51, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 51, 52, 59, 61, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 139. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 609, 616. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 506, 507. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 697. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 805, 807. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 831, 852. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 180−182, 184. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 464, 466. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 749, 752. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 777, 786. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 18, 19; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 748 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 18, 19, 23, 24. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 564. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 387, 388, 395. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 484. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 515−517. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 624, 625. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 565, 566. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 42 CA 307. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 371. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 205. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 488. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 578. Cited. 44 CA 6. Subdiv. (1) cited. id. Subdiv. (1) cited. id., 26. Cited. Id., 231. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 499. Subdiv. (1) cited. 45 CA 270. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 591. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Offenses described in Subdivs. (1) and (4) are two separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 53 CA 581.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 219 C. 363, 365. Cited. 221 C. 402, 405.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 548.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CS 347, 353.

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Sec. 53a-59a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree, when such person commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59(a)(2), 53a-59(a)(3) or 53a-59(a)(5) and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant or being a person with mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant or was a person with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 17, 28; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 4; P.A. 99-122, S. 1; 99-186, S. 14.)
History: P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (c) requiring five years' imprisonment for persons found guilty under section provisions, effective July 1, 1981; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 53a- 59(a)(5); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the first degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the first degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Cited. 230 C. 608, 610.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Cited. 20 CA 467. Cited. Id., 521, 522. Cited. 35 CA 609, 615, 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 502, 517.
Cited. 28 CA 402, 403. Cited. 40 CA 387, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-59b. Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree when he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or confined in any institution or facility of the Department of Correction and commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59 and the victim of such assault is an employee of the Department of Correction acting in the performance of his duties.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(c) Assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree is a class B felony. If any person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a violation of this section which occurred while such person was confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction, such term of imprisonment shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.
(P.A. 93-246, S. 2.)
See Sec. 53a-167c re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of Parole or probation officer.

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Sec. 53a-60. Assault in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or (5) he is a parolee from a correctional institution and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Parole, he causes physical injury to such employee or member.
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 5.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (6) in Subsec. (a) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) by changing "committed to" to "in the custody of" and adding phrase "confined in any institution or facility of the department of correction"; P.A. 93-246 amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (a) to delete from the scope of the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to add "other than by means of the discharge of a firearm" to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act.
Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 172 C. 275. Cited. 173 C. 254, 258, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166; id., 520, 522. Cited. 193 C. 144, 145, 153. Cited. Id., 232, 243. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 23, 24. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661, 664. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 231 C. 545, 546, 555, 556, 560, 562, 563. Cited. 237 C. 238, 239.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. Id., 612−615. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id., 320, 321. 336. Cited. Id., 679, 681. Cited. 13 CA 667, 671. Cited. 17 CA 200, 201. Cited. 20 CA 75, 76, 80. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Cited. 35 CA 138, 148. Cited. Id., 431, 432. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. 37 CA 338, 346. Cited. 38 CA 598, 599. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Cited. 34 CS 531, 540, 541.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 175 C. 155−157, 160, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. 184 C. 520, 521. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 63, 66, 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (5) cited. 190 C. 143, 144. Subdiv. (1) cited. 193 C. 48, 56. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 119, 127. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408, 412. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 636. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 651, 653. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 405, 406. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 424, 425. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 322, 327. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 322, 328. Subdiv. (2) cited. 201 C. 103, 104; Id., 289, 290; 202 C. 520, 523, 524; 204 C. 207, 208; Id., 714, 716. Subdiv. (1) cited. 209 C. 733, 736. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 151, 154. Subdiv. (2) cited. 219 C. 721, 722; 220 C. 385, 388; 221 C. 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 556, 559. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 244, 264. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 245, 246, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 618, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 711, 713. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 751, 753. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 147, 149, 152. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 910. Subdiv. (5) cited. 230 C. 591, 593. Subdiv. (5) cited. 231 C. 545−549, 551−563. Cited. Id., 545, 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (5) cited. 235 C. 748, 751. Subdiv. (5) cited. 237 C. 238, 239. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 481.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 40, 49. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 40, 42, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 701, 702, 706. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 377, 378. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 35. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 161, 162, 167, 168; 10 CA 50, 51; Id., 330, 331, 336, 344; Id., 462, 463; Id., 643−645, 652; 11 CA 665, 666; 13 CA 386, 387; 14 CA 463, 464; id., 472−474; Id., 493, 494, 497; Id., 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704, 710. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 226, 227. Subdiv. (2) cited. 19 CA 245, 246. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 75, 76, 84. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 586, 587. Subdiv. (5) cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 447−449. Cited. Id., 447, 450. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 502, 506. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 705, 706. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 705, 711. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 264, 266. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 565; Id., 624, 625, 627. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 685, 686, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 275, 278. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565−567; 26 CA 114, 116; Id., 145, 146; Id., 242, 243. Subdiv. (3) cited. 27 CA 73, 88. Cited. Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 290, 302. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 95, 96, 99; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. 31 CA 58, 59. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 140, 141, 145. Subdiv. (5) cited. 32 CA 224−226, 237−243. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 448, 449. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 647, 650. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 1, 3. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 691. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 138, 139, 148, 151, 153. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 138, 148. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 641, 642. Cited. Id., 805, 807. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346, 347. Cited. Id., 338, 346, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 338, 347. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 437, 438. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 777, 786. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 868, 869, 876. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 757, 758. Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 333−335, 338, 339, 341. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565, 567. Cited. 43 CA 205. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 252. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 125. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 307. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 24. Cited. Id., 741.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 494, 497.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 556.

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Sec. 53a-60a. Assault in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a firearm when he commits assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-60, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree and assault in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 5.)
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 23 CA 502, 506. Cited. 45 CA 591.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 424, 425. Cited. 200 C. 642, 643, 650. Cited. 201 C. 368, 369. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-60b. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree: Class D felony: Two years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second degree under section 53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree upon the same incident of assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant or being a person with mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant or was a person with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99- 186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560. Cited. 199 C. 146, 147, 153. Cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Cited. 230 C. 400, 402.
Cited. 5 CA 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 420, 431. Cited. 33 CA 616.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 33 CA 616. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-60c. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm: Class D felony: Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm when such person commits assault in the second degree with a firearm under section 53a-60a and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or assault in the second degree with a firearm and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all of such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant or being a person with mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant or was a person with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 3; P.A. 80-442, S. 19, 28; P.A. 99-122, S. 3; 99-186, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that three years of sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree with a firearm", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99- 186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree with a firearm" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree with a firearm" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).
Cited. 180 C. 557, 560.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.

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Sec. 53a-60d. Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug.
(b) Assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle is a class D felony and the court shall suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty under this section for one year.
(P.A. 82-403, S. 2; P.A. 83-534, S. 9; P.A. 85-147, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 83-534 amended Subsec. (b) to require the court to suspend the motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege of any person found guilty for one year; P.A. 85-147 deleted "while intoxicated" from the title of the offense and a provision that defined "intoxication" to include intoxication by alcohol or by drug or both, and replaced elements of offense of "when, in consequence of his intoxication while operating a motor vehicle, he causes serious physical injury to another person" with "when, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, he causes serious physical injury to another person as a consequence of the effect of such liquor or drug".
See Sec. 14-111g re motor vehicle operator's retraining program.
Cited. 219 C. 752, 757. Cited. 222 C. 672, 674. Cited. 224 C. 730, 731, 734. Cited. 226 C. 191, 201. Cited. 230 C. 572, 573. Nothing said in General Assembly proceeding concerning an amendment to this section to remedy an unrelated aspect changed the rule of law; judgment of appellate court in State v. Leroy, 33 CA 232, reversed. 232 C. 1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 16.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 9 CA 686, 730. Cited. 16 CA 472, 475. Cited. 21 CA 138, 143, 144. Cited. 22 CA 142, 144, 159, 165−167, 169, 170. Cited. 23 CA 215, 216. Cited. Id., 720−722. Cited. 25 CA 282, 284, 293. Cited. 26 CA 805, 806, 808. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554, 556, 571. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 557, 564. Cited. Id., 655, 665. Cited. 36 CA 710, 713. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283. Cited. 40 CA 359, 360, 364, 365.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 232 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 16 CA 472, 473, 477. Cited. 32 CA 553, 554. Cited. 33 CA 232, 233; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 655, 666. Cited. 38 CA 282, 283.

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Sec. 53a-61. Assault in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person; or (3) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument or an electronic defense weapon.
(b) Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which may not be suspended or reduced.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 62; P.A. 86-287, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 30.)
History: P.A. 86-287 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subsec. (a)(3) to reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence for conviction under Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a).
Cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 171 C. 264. Cited. 173 C. 254, 259. Cited. 184 C. 157, 158, 162. Cited. 189 C. 1, 7. Cited. 190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 349. Cited. Id., 408, 412. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191. Cited. 200 C. 544, 545. Cited. 202 C. 520, 521, 524. Cited. Id., 629, 631. Cited. 205 C. 352. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. Id., 52, 53. Cited. 222 C. 299, 302. Cited. Id., 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 677, 680. Cited. 228 C. 487, 488. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Cited. 233 C. 813, 816. Cited. 234 C. 78, 81.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 8 CA 545, 548. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70. Cited. Id., 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 11 CA 499, 501. Cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Cited. Id., 585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 708, 709. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 17 CA 234, 235. Cited. 20 CA 6, 8. Cited. Id., 75, 80. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 24 CA 57, 58. Cited. Id., 556, 577. Cited. 25 CA 421, 422; judgment reversed, see 222 C. 299 et seq. Cited. Id., 472, 473. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. Id., 439, 440. Cited. 27 CA 786, 787. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 588−590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. Id., 683, 684. Cited. 30 CA 346, 348. Cited. 31 CA 497, 502. Cited. 35 CA 107, 109. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 338, 348. Cited. Id., 733, 743. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806, 828, 829. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. 42 CA 810. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 282. Cited. 46 CA 131.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348. Cited. 41 CS 505, 508.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 177 C. 248; 180 C. 167, 168. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 353, 355. Subdiv. (1) cited. 184 C. 366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 185 C. 63, 76, 78, 79. Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; 193 C. 48, 56. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 119, 126, 127. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 195 C. 232, 243. Cited. 197 C. 115, 117. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 202 C. 629, 635, 660. Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 657, 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 110, 112. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Subdiv. (1) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C. 487, 489; Subdiv. (2) cited. 222 C. 444, 447. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 41, 42. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, 590, reversed. 226 C. 601, 602, 606, 613. Cited. Id., 601, 602, 612. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 606, 613, 615. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 610, 612. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 813, 815.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 40, 41, 49, 50. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 40, 49, 50. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 590, 591, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 27, 31. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 257, 258. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 545, 547; 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 10 CA 709−712. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 499−502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 655, 656; 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 667, 668. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 554, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 75, 77, 86; Id., 101, 102. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 663, 664; 24 CA 518, 519; 26 CA 114, 116; Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 331, 332, 346, 348; 27 CA 322, 327, 330. Cited. Id., 322, 329, 330. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322, 330. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 581, 585−588, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586−588, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id., 581, 588−590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited 29 CA 524, 525. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 704, 705. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 126. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 51, 59, 61, 65. Cited. 37 CA 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 338, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 419, 420. Subdiv. (1) cited Id., 832, 833. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 565, 567. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 445. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 768. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 591. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CS 520, 521.

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Sec. 53a-61a. Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree when such person commits assault in the third degree under section 53a-61 and (1) the victim of such assault has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault is a person with mental retardation, as defined in section 1-1g, and the actor is not a person with mental retardation.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the third degree and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree upon the same incident of assault but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant or being a person with mental retardation, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant or was a person with mental retardation.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded person in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year which shall not be suspended or reduced.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 31; P.A. 99-122, S. 4; 99-186, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (c) by adding provision re one-year mandatory nonsuspendable sentence to reflect preexisting sentencing requirement of Sec. 53a-36(1); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the third degree", where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99- 186 changed the name of the offense from "assault of a victim sixty or older in the third degree" to "assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the third degree" where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).
See Sec. 53a-36 re mandatory nonsuspendable sentence.
Court, in sentencing a defendant convicted under this section, must impose a one-year mandatory nonsuspendable term of imprisonment and does not have option of imposing a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge. 180 C. 557−559.
Cited. 5 CA 590, 594, 595. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.

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Sec. 53a-62. Threatening: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of threatening when: (1) By physical threat, he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury, or (2) he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent to terrorize another, to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or (3) he threatens to commit such crime in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.
(b) Threatening is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 63.)
Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Cited. 182 C. 585, 592; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 193 C. 602, 612. Cited. 195 C. 636. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264. Cited. 207 C. 565, 567. Cited. 208 C. 689, 695. Cited. 209 C. 34, 38. Cited. Id., 52, 53. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 224 C. 494, 496. Cited. 227 C. 829, 832. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 190, 191. Cited. Id., 496, 500, 504−506. Cited. 9 CA 161, 162. Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 25 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 334, 336. Cited. 26 CA 481, 482, 487; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 494 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 588−590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id., 708, 712. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498. Cited. 33 CA 103, 104. Cited. 40 CA 805, 806. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49.
Cited. 37 CS 664, 665. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 169 C. 566, 567. Cited. 175 C. 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 182 C. 585, 588; part of ruling in State v. Jacobowitz, in which court had ruled that a defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which the defendant had had proper notice overruled, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 485, 486. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 689, 690. Cited. 226 C. 601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 226 C. 601, 603, 606, 613. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Tanzella, 28 CA 581, 590, reversed. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 601, 606. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 613, 615. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409.
Subdiv. (2): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and in this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 496, 504. Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 386, 387; Id., 438, 439. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 643, 644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 28 CA 581, 586, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 581, 586, 603; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. Id., 581, 589, 590; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 262, 263. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 733, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 307, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 617, 618. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 515, 517. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 584, 585, 592. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 701, 702.

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Sec. 53a-63. Reckless endangerment in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 64.)
Cited. 179 C. 617, 618. Cited. 194 C. 408, 412. Cited. 200 C. 607, 608. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 238 C. 313. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 648.
Cited. 2 CA 617. Cited. 3 CA 163. Cited. 8 CA 496, 500, 501. Cited. Id., 631, 632. Cited. 32 CA 84, 86. Cited. 33 CA 103, 104. Cited. Id., 743, 749; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 47, 49. Cited. 43 CA 578. Cited. 44 CA 6.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 348; id., 359, 360. Cited. 42 CS 574, 575.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 227 C. 301, 320. Cited. 233 C. 502, 513. Cited. 237 C. 348, 352.
Cited. 3 CA 289, 290. Cited. 8 CA 153, 155. Cited. 10 CA 659, 661. Cited. 18 CA 477, 478. Cited. 24 CA 330, 331. Cited. 26 CA 145, 146. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.

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Sec. 53a-64. Reckless endangerment in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to another person.
(b) Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 65.)
Cited. 194 C. 408, 412.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 14 CA 6, 7. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16, 20, 27. Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498, 502.
Cited. 35 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 661. Cited. 38 CS 619−621. Cited. 40 CA 643, 645.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 618, 625.
Cited. 3 CA 166, 167. Cited. 24 CA 662, 665; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 618 et seq.
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PART VI*
SEX OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-217:
Cited. 118 C. 505; 139 C. 247; 140 C. 610; 152 C. 197. Corroboration is not essential but in its absence court should weigh complainant's credibility with care. 128 C. 126. Assault in this statute includes a touching; consent not a defense. 129 C. 603. Not required to plead over to complaint amended re date of alleged commission. 151 C. 189. Defendant could put his character in issue but only as to sexual morality and decency, the specific traits involved in action. 157 C. 99. Cited. 160 C. 366; 161 C. 303.
Cited. 25 CS 433; 27 CS 44.
Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Annotations to former section 53-218:
Marriage in fact must be proved. 6 C. 446. Solicitation to commit adultery a crime. 7 C. 270. Testimony of more than one act inadmissible under single charge of adultery. 10 C. 373. What evidence held inadmissible to prove marriage. 40 C. 145. Involves moral turpitude and is an infamous crime. 112 C. 274.
Although this statute specifies conduct is adulterous only if woman is married, in action for divorce from husband based on adultery, marital status of other woman irrelevant. 22 CS 147.
Annotations to former section 53-219:
What constitutes offense of lascivious carriage. 5 D. 81. Meaning of "lascivious." 120 C. 166. Cited. 129 C. 603.
Cited. 9 CS 165; 23 CS 299. Meaning of lascivious conduct discussed. 24 CS 99.
History discussed. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 187 to 189. Statute was intended to apply only to conduct between persons of different sexes. Id., 190. Fact that sexual activity is conducted privately behind locked doors between a willing male and female is no defense. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 698. Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57. In police investigation of defendant's conduct in violation of this section, officer's observance of defendant through her bedroom window and subsequent arrest on speedy information held no invasion of her constitutional rights. Disclosure of identity of informant was not required. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 35. Cited. Id., 42.
Annotations to former section 53-224:
Definition of seduction. 27 C. 320; 76 C. 136.
Annotations to former section 53-226:
Cited. 125 C. 328. No justification for reading into the statutory crime of lewdness any unexpressed additional requirement of openness. 146 C. 365.
Cited. 23 CS 296.
Word "offering," means a mere offering of the body without physical contact. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 597, 598. Lewdness includes immoral and degenerate conduct between persons of the same sex and the proposal or offer for lewdness as well as the act itself is a crime. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 31, 32. There was no entrapment of defendant where officer did not solicit commission of offense but merely offered the opportunity for its commission. Id., 32, 33. Scienter of defendants shown by facts proved by testimony of police officers of repeated warnings and advice to defendants of prostitutes who frequented their bar. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594.
Annotations to former section 53-227:
Elements of crime. 82 C. 216. Cited. 113 C. 291; 128 C. 180.
Conviction under this statute is cause for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-229:
Cited. 113 C. 291.
Cited. 9 CS 166.
Annotations to former section 53-230:
State must prove what facts. 17 C. 472; 38 C. 525; 96 C. 315. Term "house of ill-fame" synonymous with bawdy house. 33 C. 92. In prosecution for disorderly house, not necessary to show reputation of house. Id., 259. Evidence of character for chastity may be rebutted by showing that accused kept a house of ill-fame. 33 C. 269. Term "house" means any building kept for purpose named. 36 C. 79. What complaint not bad for duplicity. 38 C. 38; 66 C. 9. To sustain information for keeping house "reputed" to be one of ill-fame, fact that it is such a house must be proved; 82 C. 111; 96 C. 315; statute is valid. 83 C. 550; id., 56. Not necessary to prove that accused knew character of house; his knowledge is immaterial. 96 C. 316. Cited. 125 C. 328; 153 C. 149.
Single act of lewdness not enough to constitute lewdness under this statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 595.
Annotations to former section 53-231:
Bond must conform to statutory requirements. 9 C. 350. This section constitutional. 31 C. 574. See note to former section 53-230, supra. Cited. 168 C. 74.
Annotations to former section 53-235:
Cited. 9 CS 166; 23 CS 296.
Annotations to former section 53-238:
Evidence showing constancy in accusation admissible. 8 C. 100; 44 C. 155; 47 C. 466; 93 C. 321. Conviction may be had on uncorroborated testimony of a nine-year-old girl as to principal fact. 29 C. 389. Evidence as to general good character of accused admissible. 33 C. 269. Jury must be satisfied that act was without consent of prosecutrix, but there is no rule of law that she should make the utmost resistance. 45 C. 264; see also 72 C. 44. Rape may be committed on child under ten years of age. 46 C. 362. Unnecessary to allege that prosecutrix was ten or more years of age. 50 C. 579. Resistance; putting in fear. 72 C. 44. Intoxication or insanity of complainant; charges by her against other men; liberality in applying rules, where only she and accused are witnesses. 80 C. 546. What constitutes abuse of minor; 81 C. 97; election between counts; declarations of victim; id., 1; 93 C. 321; woman may be guilty of abuse of minor, as accessory; 82 C. 213; previous unchastity or consent no defense; cross-examination of complainant. Id., 454. When husband and wife under age of sixteen live together voluntarily, the former is not guilty of crime under this section. 113 C. 288, 294. Cited. 113 C. 786; 118 C. 505; 128 C. 324; 132 C. 278; id., 684; 154 C. 302, 303. Joint trial before jury of defendant and another for crimes of rape against complainant at about the same time and place proper. 154 C. 517. Cited. 155 C. 593. Hospital record of complaining witness' medical examination on day of rape admitted in evidence as business record pursuant to section 52-180. 158 C. 22, 461. Cited. 162 C. 317. Cited. 175 C. 512, 523.
In case lacking much of brutality, aggravation in assault and surprise attack on wholly innocent victim characteristic of majority of cases, sentence of eight to twelve years on review reduced to five to twelve years. 22 CS 42. Cited. 22 CS 493; 27 CS 235; 29 CS 94, 187.
Annotation to former section 53-238:
Cited. 166 C. 96.
Annotations to former section 53-239:
Proof of rape will sustain complaint for assault with intent to rape. 7 C. 56. Person charged with rape may be convicted of assault with intent to rape. 19 C. 392. Any language in complaint charging exertion of physical force sufficient without use of words "with actual violence." 31 C. 213. This section is in affirmation of common law and a verdict of "attempt to commit rape" sufficient. 70 C. 114. Various matters of evidence considered; reputation of accused and complainant. 84 C. 222. Is infamous crime within meaning of section 46-13. 128 C. 129. Corroboration of complainant's testimony not essential to proof of guilt. 133 C. 600. Cited. 152 C. 703; 154 C. 517, 521. Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotation to former section 53-241:
Statute applies in court where person is originally presented or in court to which he is bound over or appeals. 132 C. 685.
Annotations to chapter 952, part VI:
Cited. 192 C. 154, 158, 163. Secs. 53a-65 through 53a-90 cited. 202 C. 333, 340. Secs. 53a-65−53a-90 cited. 230 C. 43, 78.
Cited. 35 CA 173, 181.

Sec. 53a-65. Definitions. As used in this part, except section 53a-70b, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) "Actor" means a person accused of sexual assault.
(2) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Its meaning is limited to persons not married to each other. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal opening of the victim's body.
(3) "Sexual contact" means any contact with the intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person or any contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor or for the purpose of degrading or humiliating such person.
(4) "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders such person incapable of appraising the nature of such person's conduct.
(5) "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling such person's conduct owing to the influence of a drug or intoxicating substance administered to such person without such person's consent, or owing to any other act committed upon such person without such person's consent.
(6) "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
(7) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(8) "Intimate parts" means the genital area, groin, anus, inner thighs, buttocks or breasts.
(9) "Psychotherapist" means a physician, psychologist, nurse, substance abuse counselor, social worker, clergyman, marital and family therapist, mental health service provider or other person, whether or not licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.
(10) "Psychotherapy" means the professional treatment, assessment or counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition.
(11) "Emotionally dependent" means that the nature of the patient's or former patient's emotional condition and the nature of the treatment provided by the psychotherapist are such that the psychotherapist knows or has reason to know that the patient or former patient is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist.
(12) "Therapeutic deception" means a representation by a psychotherapist that sexual contact by or sexual intercourse with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the patient's treatment.
(13) "School employee" means a teacher, substitute teacher, school administrator, school superintendent, guidance counselor, psychologist, social worker, nurse, physician, school paraprofessional or coach employed by a local or regional board of education or a private elementary or secondary school or working in a public or private elementary or secondary school.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 66; P.A. 75-619, S. 1; P.A. 81-27, S. 2; P.A. 85-341, S. 1; P.A. 87-259; P.A. 92-260, S. 32; P.A. 93-340, S. 1; P.A. 94-221, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted definitions of "deviate sexual intercourse", "female" and "forcible compulsion", added definitions of "actor", "use of force" and "intimate parts", redefined "sexual intercourse" in detail where previously defined as having "its ordinary meaning" and made minor changes in wording of remaining definitions; P.A. 81-27 exempted section 53a-70b from applicability of definitions in this section; P.A. 85-341 amended definition of sexual contact to include "contact of the intimate parts of the actor with a person not married to the actor for the purpose of sexual gratification of the actor"; P.A. 87-259 amended definition of sexual contact to include contact made for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in the definition of sexual intercourse by repositioning language; P.A. 93-340 added definitions of "psychotherapist", "psychotherapy", "emotionally dependent" and "therapeutic deception"; P.A. 94-221 added the definition of "school employee".
Cited. 170 C. 111. Statute includes definition of sexual intercourse and provides that "penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio ...". It specifically omits cunnilingus, therefore penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 765, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216, 220, 221. Cited. 191 C. 453, 463. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160, 161. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 210 C. 110, 127.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited. Id., 316, 322. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 174, 180.
Former section 53-216 cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 44, 45.
Subdiv. (2):
Court properly defined the term "cunnilingus" since statute contained no specific definitions. Penetration is not an essential element of the crime where cunnilingus is charged. 186 C. 757, 763, 765. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271, 273. Cited. 198 C. 285, 289. Cited. Id., 617, 621. Cited. 201 C. 211, 215, 216. Cited. 202 C. 509, 514. Cited. 207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 740. Cited. 210 C. 110, 115, 117, 123−125, 127−129. Cited. 211 C. 18, 35. Cited. 224 C. 397, 412, 413, 415. Cited. 226 C. 618, 660.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. Id., 701, 709. Cited. 11 CA 102, 110, 117−119. Cited. Id., 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 451, 455. Cited. 23 CA 712, 714. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 626; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 133, 139. Withdrawal of consent communicated to the other person followed by a compelling use of force to continue sexual intercourse would constitute sexual assault. 35 CA 173, 180, 181. Cited. 38 CA 56, 59−61. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Cited. Id., 287, 296. Cited. 43 CA 785. Applies least penetration doctrine. 50 CA 715.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 386, 410. Cited. 224 C. 397, 417. Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 725, 730. Cited. 8 CA 607, 613. Cited. 11 CA 102, 114. Cited. 15 CA 251, 278. Cited. 20 CA 694, 698. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627, 636; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 291. Cited. 31 CA 452, 454.
Subdiv. (6):
Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 205 C. 386, 398.
Subdiv. (7):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 766. Subpara. (B) cited. 189 C. 611, 629. Subpara. (B) cited. 202 C. 509, 514; 205 C. 386, 391, 393. Cited. 228 C. 552, 570.
Cited. 7 CA 489, 493. Cited. 11 CA 316, 319. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 454. Cited. 16 CA 75, 79. Subpara. (B) cited. 18 CA 694, 698. Cited. 21 CA 411, 419. Cited. 30 CA 281, 288.
Subdiv. (8):
Cited. 186 C. 757, 767. Cited. 187 C. 216, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 619. Cited. 192 C. 154, 160. Cited. 207 C. 456, 463.
Cited. 11 CA 316, 321. Cited. 20 CA 694, 697. Cited. 25 CA 653, 657; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 395, 405. Cited. Id., 625, 627; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq. Cited. 28 CA 402, 408.

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Sec. 53a-66. Lack of consent. Section 53a-66 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 67; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)

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Sec. 53a-67. Affirmative defenses. (a) In any prosecution for an offense under this part based on the victim's being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under fourteen, relettering Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70b; P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b.
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 196. Cited. 202 C. 86, 91.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of "cohabitation" and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative defense under statute. 181 C. 426, 432−434. Cited. 198 C. 190, 191, 193, 195, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 739−741, 752. Cited. 233 C. 813, 850.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 730. Cited. 10 CA 709, 712, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 116. Sec. 53a-67(c) (Revised to 1972) cited. Id. Cited. 25 CA 384, 389. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.

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Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)

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Sec. 53a-70. Sexual assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Nonsuspendable sentences. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse.
(b) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court, and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359; P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from twenty-one to eighteen reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual "assault" for sexual "misconduct" and made the offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that one year of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person under thirteen years of age; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re committing sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) by specifying in Subdiv. (2) that the actor be more than two years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to two years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under ten years of age and to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same public act.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317; id., 398, 399. Repealed section 53a-72 cited. 175 C. 512, 513, 516. Cited. 182 C. 412, 413. Cited. 184 C. 258, 259. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52; id., 449, 450; id., 521, 522. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217, 218, 220, 221. Cited. 190 C. 20, 21. Cited. 191 C. 604, 615, 616. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Cited. Id., 297, 298. Cited. Id., 692−696, 698. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. 265. Cited. 197 C. 280, 281. Cited. Id., 298, 299. "Does not include sexual intercourse with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious" but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of unconsciousness. 198 C. 53, 60, 61. Cited. Id., 190, 193. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 281, 282. Cited. Id., 481, 494. Cited. Id., 693−695, 711. Cited. 200 C. 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 659, 660. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 98, 99. Cited. Id., 441, 442. Cited. Id., 571, 572. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. 207 C. 646, 652. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738−741, 743, 744, 747, 748, 750, 752−757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127, 128. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132−134, 136, 139, 143, 144. Cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Cited 212 C. 31, 33. Cited. 215 C. 257, 258. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. Id., 538, 542, 543. Cited. 219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558. Cited. 223 C. 180−182. Cited. Id., 731, 733. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399, 403, 414. Cited. Id., 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610. Cited. Id., 618, 646. Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210. Cited. Id., 616, 623. Cited. Id., 677, 679. Cited. 228 C. 456, 458. Cited. 230 C. 43, 47. Cited. 235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 689.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 345; id., 378, 379. Cited. Id., 724, 725, 735. Cited. 3 CA 148, 149. Cited. Id., 374, 375, 388. Cited. Id., 650, 652. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 556. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 589. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258, 261−263. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 44, 45. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. Id., 216, 218. Cited. Id., 345, 346. Cited. Id., 399. Cited. Id., 528, 529, 538. Cited. Id., 620, 621, 626. Cited. 10 CA 457, 458. Cited. Id., 520, 521. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 714. Court concluded the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102, 112, 118. Cited. Id., 236. Cited. Id., 238, 239. Cited. Id., 316, 319, 321. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 333, 334. Cited. Id., 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 274. Cited. 16 CA 75, 76, 78, 80. Cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Cited. 18 CA 134, 135, 146. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140, 142, 145. Cited. 20 CA 737, 738. Cited. 22 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 562, 563. Cited. 23 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 221, 222. Cited. Id., 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 24, 25. Cited. Id., 295, 296. Cited. 25 CA 334, 335. Cited. Id., 503, 505. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. 26 CA 151, 152. Cited. Id., 433, 434. Cited. Id., 674, 676, 678, 680. Cited. 28 CA 548, 551, 556. Cited. Id., 581, 583, 589, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 642, 643. Cited. 32 CA 773, 775. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 755. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 38 CA 56, 60. Cited. Id., 777, 779. Cited. 39 CA 267, 268. Cited 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619, 620. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 44 CA 548. Cited. 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators, discussed. 47 CA 159.
Cited. 41 CS 229, 231, 232, 236. Cited 43 CS 46, 66, 67.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 179 C. 328, 329; 180 C. 101, 102; Id., 565. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 455. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Cited. 186 C. 757, 758, 763, 766. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Cited. Id., 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 574, 576. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 703, 713. Cited. 189 C. 106, 107; id., 611, 612, 625, 628−630; id., 631, 633. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 631, 645. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105, 108; id., 327, 329. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 440, 441. Cited. Id., 496, 498. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 193 C. 457, 459. Cited. 194 C. 258, 259, 274. Cited. Id., 594, 595. Cited. Id., 692, 694, 696−698. Cited. 197 C. 50−52. Cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. 198 C. 53, 54, 60. Cited. Id., 190, 191, 200. Cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Cited. Id., 405, 406. Cited. Id., 430, 432. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 199 C. 62, 63. Cited. Id., 399, 400. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 488. Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 259, 260. Cited. Id., 509−511, 514. Cited. 203 C. 385, 386. Cited. 204 C. 714, 716. Cited. 206 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 132, 134, 151. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531, 532. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43. Cited. 207 C. 646, 647. Cited. 209 C. 143−145. Cited. Id., 416−418. Cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Cited. Id., 110, 112, 115, 123, 127. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 359, 382. Cited. 211 C. 18, 20, 25. Cited. 212 C. 31−33. Cited. 213 C. 593, 602. Cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2) Cited. Id., 717, 719. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540. Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 218 C. 447, 448. Cited. 219 C. 269, 271. Cited. Id., 283, 284. Cited. Id., 489, 510. Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. Id., 487, 489. Cited. Id., 698, 700. Cited. 221 C. 264, 265. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 223 C. 52, 53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 450, 452. Cited. Id., 519, 520. Cited. 226 C. 601, 602, 610, 611. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 601, 610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 601, 611. Cited. Id., 618−620, 644. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 644, 645, 649, 650. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 616, 617, 619, 620, 624. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 395. Cited. Id., 456, 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 456, 469. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 456, 472. Cited. Id., 552, 554, 570. Cited. Id., 582, 584. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 756, 757. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 529, 530, 536. Cited. Id., 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 580, 584, 586. Cited. 230 C. 43, 46, 47, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 707, 708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 403, 409. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 145, 146. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 502, 517. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 659, 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 284−286. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 694. Cited. 241 C. 784. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 823. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 409. Cited. Id., 445. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523.
Cited. 1 CA 344, 346. Cited. Id., 724, 735. Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. Id., 672. Cited. 7 CA 149, 150. Cited. Id., 489, 493. Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 8 CA 35. Cited. Id., 148, 149. Cited. Id., 177, 178. Cited. Id., 387, 388. Cited. Id., 528, 538, 539, 541. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 626. Cited. 9 CA 208, 209. Cited. Id., 340, 341. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. Id., 709, 711, 712, 716, 717. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 110, 112. Cited. Id., 316, 320, 322, 323. Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 13 CA 60, 61. Cited. Id., 67. Cited. Id., 76, 85. Cited. 14 CA 40. Cited. Id., 451, 452. Cited. Id., 657, 658. Cited. Id., 688, 689, 692. Cited. Id., 710, 712. Cited. 15 CA 222, 225. Cited. 16 CA 75, 80. Cited. 17 CA 525, 526. Cited. 18 CA 134, 135, 137. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 643, 644. Cited. Id., 730. Cited. 19 CA 111, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 618, 619. Cited. Id., 631, 633. Cited. 20 CA 101, 102. Cited. Id., 193, 194. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 22 CA 329, 330. Cited. Id., 477, 478. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 243, 245, 251. Cited. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 653, 654; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Cited. Id., 725, 726. Subdiv. (2) cited. 26 CA 81, 82. Cited. Id., 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 433, 434, 436. Cited. Id., 574, 575. Cited. 27 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 705, 706. Cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Cited. Id., 195, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 360, 361, 363, 366; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529 et seq. Cited. Id., 402, 404. Cited. Id., 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 409, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 724, 725. Cited. 30 CA 56. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 281, 282, 285, 287. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 915. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 178, 179. Cited. Id., 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 217, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 483, 485. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 773, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 184, 185; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 457, 458. Cited. 34 CA 276, 278. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 173, 175. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 728−730. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 190, 191, 196, 202. Cited. Id., 216, 217. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 228, 229. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 56, 58. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 231, 232. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 777, 785, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 45, 46. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 832, 833. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 132, 133, 142, 146, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 233, 234. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 204, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 257. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 287, 288, 296. Cited. Id., 317, 318. Cited. 42 CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 552. Cited. Id., 680. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 704. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 715. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 785. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 457. Cited. Id., 548. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 66. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 756. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were not properly preserved for appellate review. Trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv. (1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 23 CA 564, 567; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq.

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Sec. 53a-70a. Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree: Class B felony: Five years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70, and in the commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a deadly weapon, (2) with intent to disfigure the victim seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of the victim's body, such person causes such injury to such victim, (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life such person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to the victim, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such victim, or (4) such person is aided by two or more other persons actually present. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and aggravated sexual assault in the first degree upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Aggravated sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of twenty years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 9; P.A. 80-442, S. 20, 28; P.A. 87-246; P.A. 92-87, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 80-442 substituted "deadly weapon" for "firearm" and reference to specific firearms where occurring and increased portion of sentence which may not be suspended or reduced from one year to five years in Subsec. (b), effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 87-246 changed the name of the offense from sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly weapon to aggravated sexual assault in the first degree and amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (2) re disfiguring the victim or destroying, amputating or disabling a member or organ of the victim and Subdiv. (3) re recklessly engaging in conduct creating a risk of death to the victim and thereby causing serious physical injury to the victim; P.A. 92-87 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re commission of the offense while aided by two or more other persons actually present; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of twenty years and made provisions of section gender neutral.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 240, 242, 257. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416. Cited. 210 C. 110, 117, 127. Cited. Id., 315−317. Cited. 211 C. 672, 674. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 542, 543. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 12 CA 179, 180, 187. Cited. 19 CA 111, 113, 116, 139, 140, 145; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43. Cited. 210 C. 110, 112, 115, 123, 128. Cited. Id., 315, 317. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517.
Cited. 19 CA 111, 142, 143; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726.

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Sec. 53a-70b. Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio or cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse or fellatio and does not require emission of semen. Penetration may be committed by an object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal opening of the victim's body; and
(2) "Use of force" means: (A) Use of a dangerous instrument; or (B) use of actual physical force or violence or superior physical strength against the victim.
(b) No spouse or cohabitor shall compel the other spouse or cohabitor to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor, or by the threat of the use of force against such other spouse or cohabitor which reasonably causes such other spouse or cohabitor to fear physical injury.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class B felony.
(P.A. 81-27, S. 1.)
Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 190, 193, 195, 196, 199. Cited. 209 C. 733, 735, 738−741, 743−745, 747, 748, 750, 752−757. Cited. 210 C. 110, 125. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 10 CA 709, 716. Cited. 11 CA 102, 112. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21, 29. Cited. Id., 497, 498, 501, 503, 506. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 620.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 497, 503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 497, 506.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 733, 735.
Cited. 10 CA 709−714. Cited. 28 CA 581, 591; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498, 503, 506. Cited. 36 CA 718, 720. Cited. 41 CA 604, 619.

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Sec. 53a-71. Sexual assault in the second degree: Class C felony: Nine months not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person and: (1) Such other person is thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person; or (2) such other person is mentally defective to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse; or (3) such other person is physically helpless; or (4) such other person is less than eighteen years old and the actor is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such person's welfare; or (5) such other person is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (6) the actor is a psychotherapist and such other person is (A) a patient of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs during the psychotherapy session, (B) a patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual intercourse occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (7) the actor accomplishes the sexual intercourse by means of false representation that the sexual intercourse is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (8) the actor is a school employee and such other person is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor.
(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class C felony for which nine months of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 72; P.A. 75-619, S. 4; P.A. 82-428, S. 3; P.A. 83-326, S. 1; P.A. 85-341, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 2; P.A. 94-221, S. 18; P.A. 00-161, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 75-619 restated Subsec. (a) to conform with changes made in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, referred to sexual "assault" rather than to sexual "misconduct" and made the offense a Class C felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that nine months of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated "to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse", redesignated as Subdiv. (3) a victim who is "physically helpless" and renumbered the remaining Subdivs.; P.A. 85-341 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the applicable age from fifteen to sixteen years; P.A. 93-340 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to specify that the other person be thirteen years of age or older and the actor be more than two years older than such person, added Subdiv. (6) re sexual intercourse between a psychotherapist and a patient or former patient and added Subdiv. (7) re sexual intercourse accomplished by false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (8) concerning school employees and students; P.A. 00-161 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by deleting provision re the act of engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was reclassified as sexual assault in the first degree under Sec. 53a-70 by same public act, and by making a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 180 C. 54, 56. Cited. 185 C. 199, 200. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 73, 74, 91; id., 348, 349. Cited. 189 C. 321, 325. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Cited. 199 C. 47, 55. Cited. 201 C. 211, 212, 214, 216. Cited. 207 C. 374, 378. Cited. 209 C. 225, 230. Cited. 211 C. 455, 457. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2. Cited. 228 C. 393, 396. P.A. 93-340, Sec. 2 cited. Id. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 409.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 11 CA 102, 118. Cited. 13 CA 378, 379. Cited. 14 CA 688, 693. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254, 278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 25 CA 270−272; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 527, 534, 535. Cited. 33 CA 133, 134, 139. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. Id., 754, 756. Cited. 36 CA 383, 384. Cited. 38 CA 56, 60. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 45 CA 116. Term "years" in Subsec. (a)(1) means periods of 365 or 356 days, not calendar years. Subsec. (a)(1) not void for vagueness as applied to defendant in this case despite lack of judicial gloss on meaning of "years" and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection. 47 CA 68.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 315, 324; 180 C. 167, 168; 181 C. 426, 427, 430. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 382, 383; 187 C. 73, 91; 188 C. 565, 566; id., 644, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 321, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3): The terms "responsibility" and "general supervision" discussed; dissent regarded construction of those terms by majority as much narrower than origin warranted. Id., 321, 322, 324−328, 330−332. Subdiv. (1) cited. 190 C. 84, 85; 191 C. 453, 454, 463; 192 C. 154, 155, 163. Cited. Id., 154, 164. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 666, 667. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 53, 61. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 481, 493, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 734, 735. Cited. 201 C. 211, 215. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 187, 189. Subdiv. (3) cited. 205 C. 386, 388. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 528, 531, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 51, 53. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 244−246, 250, 265−268, 272, 274, 275. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 359, 362. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 185, 186. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 462. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv. (1) cited. 215 C. 653, 654; 219 C. 283, 284; 220 C. 345−348, 360. Subdiv. (1) cited. 224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 393, 396. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 552, 554. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 610, 612, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 839, 840. Subdiv. (1) cited. 230 C. 43, 46−48, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 321, 322. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 296. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 409. Court determined defendant was more than two years older than victim by calculating the difference in age based on birthdates rather than calendar years. 248 C. 543. Statute not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate defendant's right to equal protection under the law. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 7 CA 46, 48. Cited. 8 CA 190, 196. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. 9 CA 426−428. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 591, 592; 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 493, 496. Subdiv. (4) cited. 14 CA 244, 245. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 244, 245, 247. Subdiv. (1) cited. 15 CA 222, 224−227. Cited. Id., 222, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA 174, 175. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 186, 187. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 447, 448. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 525, 526. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 646, 647. Subdiv. (1) cited. 20 CA 40, 41. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 263, 264. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 288, 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 737, 738. Cited. Id., 737, 753. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 241, 242; Id., 712, 713; 24 CA 146, 147; 25 CA 235, 238. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 243, 245, 251; 26 CA 625, 626, 635, 637; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq; Id., 674, 676, 679, 680; Id., 758, 759. Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 91, 92. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 527, 528, 531, 533, 534, 536, 539, 540. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 120, 121. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 773−775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 205, 206. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 46, 48. Cited. 36 CA 383, 384. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 213, 214. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 125, 126, 133. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 731, 732, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 132, 133, 148. Cited. 41 CA 139, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 142. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 667. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 785. Subdiv. (2) cited. 45 CA 289. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 512.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-72. Rape in the first degree: Class B felony. Section 53a-72 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 73; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 125; P.A. 75-619, S. 7.)

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Sec. 53a-72a. Sexual assault in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 5; P.A. 80-346, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 33.)
History: P.A. 80-346 designated previous Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) and added Subdiv. (2) re incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by amending Subsec. (a)(1)(B) to replace "which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person" with "which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself" and amending Subsec. (a)(2) to replace "such person" with "the actor" or "him or her" as appropriate.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 186 C. 45, 52. Cited. 187 C. 216, 218, 221. Cited. 191 C. 604, 618. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 194 C. 258, 271. Cited. 199 C. 121, 123. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. Id., 386, 394. Cited. 207 C. 403, 404. Cited. 214 C. 89, 91. Cited. 224 C. 656, 663; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 1 CA 724−726, 735. Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 15, 16. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. Id., 648, 649. Cited. 10 CA 591. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) (A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148. Cited. 205 C. 27, 28. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 388. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 386, 391, 393. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 209 C. 416−418. Subdiv. (2) cited. 210 C. 244, 246, 247, 265, 266, 272, 274. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 224 C. 397, 404. Subdiv. (1) cited. 225 C. 519, 520. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 580, 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 557, 559. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 512. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 502, 512, 514. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 237 C. 284−286. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 576. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694.
Cited. 1 CA 724, 734. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 724, 735. Subdiv. (1) cited. 2 CA 333, 334. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA 591, 593. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 236. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 244, 245, 247. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 273, 274. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 694, 695, 697−699. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 530, 532. Subdiv. (1) (B) cited. 23 CA 221, 226. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see 200 C. 400 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 25 CA 653, 657, 658; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52 et seq. Subdiv. (1) (B) cited. Id., 725, 726; 26 CA 395, 396, 398, 400. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 29 CA 724, 725. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 287. Subdiv. (1) cited. 32 CA 217, 218, 220; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 743, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 36 CA 228, 229. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 100, 102. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 762, 763. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CA 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 742, 743. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 139, 140. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 287, 288, 294. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 43 CA 578. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 756.

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Sec. 53a-72b. Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C felony: Two years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a, and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of ten years.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase from one year to two years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of ten years and made provisions of section gender neutral.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 240 C. 743.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 715.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-73. Rape in the second degree: Class C felony. Section 53a-73 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 74; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

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Sec. 53a-73a. Sexual assault in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree when: (1) Such person intentionally subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) under fifteen years of age, or (B) mentally defective or mentally incapacitated to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact, or (C) physically helpless, or (D) less than eighteen years old and the actor is such person's guardian or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such person's welfare, or (E) in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over such other person; or (2) such person subjects another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent; or (3) such person engages in sexual contact with an animal or dead body; or (4) such person is a psychotherapist and subjects another person to sexual contact who is (A) a patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs during the psychotherapy session, or (B) a patient or former patient of the actor and such patient or former patient is emotionally dependent upon the actor, or (C) a patient or former patient of the actor and the sexual contact occurs by means of therapeutic deception; or (5) such person subjects another person to sexual contact and accomplishes the sexual contact by means of false representation that the sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose by a health care professional; or (6) such person is a school employee and subjects another person to sexual contact who is a student enrolled in a school in which the actor works or a school under the jurisdiction of the local or regional board of education which employs the actor.
(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 75-619, S. 6; P.A. 83-326, S. 2; P.A. 93-340, S. 3; P.A. 94-221, S. 19.)
History: P.A. 83-326 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to impose liability when the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated "to the extent that he is unable to consent to such sexual contact", redesignated as Subpara. (C) a victim who is "physically helpless" and relettered the remaining subparagraphs; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (4) re sexual contact by a psychotherapist with a patient or former patient and Subdiv. (5) re sexual contact accomplished by means of false representation that it is for a bona fide medical purpose; P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (6) concerning school employees and students.
See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.
See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.
See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.
Cited. 175 C. 315, 317. Proof of specific interest required under statute precludes this from being a lesser included offense under Sec. 53-21. 186 C. 45, 49, 51−53. Cited. 192 C. 154, 164. Cited. 204 C. 683, 685. Cited. 205 C. 386, 394, 396. Cited. 210 C. 396, 397. Cited. Id., 582, 583. Cited. 211 C. 455, 458. Cited. 224 C. 1, 2.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 388. Cited. 6 CA 150. Cited. 8 CA 607, 608. Cited. 11 CA 80, 81. Cited. Id., 102, 118. Cited. 14 CA 40, 41. Cited. 15 CA 251, 254, 278. Cited. Id., 289, 290. Cited. 18 CA 459, 460. Cited. 25 CA 270, 271; judgment reversed in part, see 224 C. 1 et seq. Judgment of acquittal in State v. Sirimanochanh, (26 CA 625, 221 C. 917 and 224 C. 656) reversed and case remanded to trial court with direction to render judgment reinstating conviction under this section. 31 CA 452, 454, 455. Cited. 34 CA 473, 474. Cited. 35 CA 173, 181. Cited. 43 CA 458. Cited. Id., 715.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 183 C. 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 192 C. 37, 39. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 154−156, 161, 163. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 200 C. 440, 441. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 734, 735. Subdiv. (1)(C) cited. 205 C. 386, 388, 393, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 386, 388, 409, 410. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 386, 409. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 555, 582. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 555, 557, 582. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 215 C. 653, 654. Subdiv. (1)(A): Defendant waived claim that violation of this section is not a lesser included offense of violation of Sec. 53a-71(a)(1). Judgment of appellate court in State v. Sirimanochanh, 26 CA 625, reversed and case remanded for determination of evidence sufficiency. 224 C. 656, 658; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 207, 210, 211. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 230 C. 43, 47, 48.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 12 CA 395, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 396. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 18 CA 297, 298. Subdiv. (1)(E) cited. Id., 694, 698. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 19 CA 44, 45. Subdiv. (1)(D) cited. 20 CA 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 365, 366. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 530, 532. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 26 CA 625, 627, 636, 637; judgment reversed, see 224 C. 656 et seq.; judgment reversed, see 31 CA 452 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 674, 679. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 409, 410, 414. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 31 CA 452, 454. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 33 CA 205, 207. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 34 CA 428, 429. Cited. Id., 473, 474. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 38 CA 125, 126. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 45 CA 116. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. Id., 289. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 512. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (1)(A): This offense and the offense of risk of injury to a child are not the same offense for double jeopardy. 49 CA 409.

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Secs. 53a-74 to 53a-81. Rape in the second degree. Deviate sexual intercourse in the first and second degree. Sexual contact in the first, second and third degree. Adultery: Class A misdemeanor. Sections 53a-74 to 53a-81, inclusive, are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 75−82; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 126−129; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 79, 80; P.A. 75-619, S. 7; P.A. 91-19, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-82. Prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.
(b) Prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 83.)
Meaning of statutory language is clear and is sufficient to warn ordinary person of the prohibited conduct. 37 CS 506−517.

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Sec. 53a-83. Patronizing a prostitute: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute when: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he pays a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with him; or (2) he pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in sexual conduct with him; or (3) he solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 84.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 4 CA 520, 530.

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Sec. 53a-83a. Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle when he, while occupying a motor vehicle: (1) Pursuant to a prior understanding, pays a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with him; or (2) pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person or a third person will engage in sexual conduct with him; or (3) solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with him in return for a fee; or (4) engages in sexual conduct for which a fee was paid or agreed to be paid.
(b) Patronizing a prostitute from a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 93-265, S. 2; P.A. 97-279, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 97-279 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision that subjected any motor vehicle used in the commission of the offense to forfeiture to the state in accordance with Secs. 54-36j to 54-36l, inclusive.

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Sec. 53a-84. Sex of parties immaterial. In any prosecution for prostitution or patronizing a prostitute, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual conduct engaged in, contemplated or solicited is immaterial, and it shall be no defense that: (1) Such persons were of the same sex; or (2) the person who received, agreed to receive or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to pay such fee was a female.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 85.)

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Sec. 53a-85. Promoting prostitution: Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-86 to 53a-89, inclusive:
(1) A person "advances prostitution" when, acting other than as a prostitute or as a patron thereof, he knowingly causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.
(2) A person "profits from prostitution" when acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person whereby he participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 86.)

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Sec. 53a-86. Promoting prostitution in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree when he knowingly: (1) Advances prostitution by compelling a person by force or intimidation to engage in prostitution, or profits from coercive conduct by another; or (2) advances or profits from prostitution of a person less than sixteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 87.)
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Sentencing under both risk of injury and promoting prostitution statutes not a double jeopardy violation. 53 CA 627.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 185 C. 199, 200; 191 C. 453, 454.

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Sec. 53a-87. Promoting prostitution in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree when he knowingly: (1) Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or owning, either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes; or (2) advances or profits from prostitution of a person less than eighteen years old.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 88; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 81.)
History: 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(2) from nineteen to eighteen, reflecting change in age of majority.
Cited. 199 C. 47, 55.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 732.

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Sec. 53a-88. Promoting prostitution in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.
(b) Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P. A. 828, S. 89.)

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Sec. 53a-89. Permitting prostitution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of permitting prostitution when, having possession or control of premises which he knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he fails to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.
(b) Permitting prostitution is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 90.)
Cited. 185 C. 199, 200.

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Sec. 53a-90. Transferred to Chapter 961, Part II, Sec. 54-102a.

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Sec. 53a-90a. Enticing a minor. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of enticing a minor when such person uses an interactive computer service to knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of age to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a criminal offense. For purposes of this section, "interactive computer service" means any information service, system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(b) Enticing a minor is a class A misdemeanor for a first offense, a class D felony for a second offense and a class C felony for any subsequent offense.
(P.A. 99-113.)
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PART VII*
KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-27 and present part VII of chapter 952:
Cited. 155 C. 592. Evidence produced by this state was sufficient to show proof was evident that defendants were in danger of being convicted of capital offense under this section, hence bail could be denied under section 8 of article I of state constitution. 159 C. 285. Prosecution where necessary elements of two or more distinct offenses combined in same act, when. 164 C. 95. Fraudulent restraint in kidnapping, defined. Id., 95. Restraint for sexual gratification within purview of kidnapping statute. Id., 95. Cited. 166 C. 96. Cited. 169 C. 38. Cited. 206 C. 40, 55.
Cited. 24 CS 386.

Sec. 53a-91. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent. As used herein "without consent" means, but is not limited to, (A) deception and (B) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (B) using or threatening to use physical force or intimidation.
(3) "Relative" means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 92; P.A. 92-260, S. 35.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsecs. (1) and (2) to replace Subdiv. indicators "(a)" and "(b)" with "(A)" and "(B)", respectively.
Language is clear and does not lend itself to any equivocal interpretation. 173 C. 165, 168. Cited. 191 C. 604, 617. Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 216 C. 647, 661. Cited. 219 C. 489, 492. Cited. 226 C. 618, 623.
Cited. 20 CA 437−439.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 177 C. 335, 342; 179 C. 328, 338; 180 C. 565, 566. Cited. 188 C. 406, 416. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254. Subpara. (a) cited. 198 C. 147, 152, 153. Cited. Id., 430, 434. Cited. Id., 537, 542, 550. Cited. 202 C. 520, 539. Cited. 209 C. 733, 760. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 173, 178, 180. Cited. Id., 716, 727. Cited. 219 C 489, 502, 503, 510. Cited. 225 C. 347, 350. Cited. 237 C. 284, 313, 314.
Cited. 5 CA 586, 590. Cited. 13 CA 667, 672. Cited. 17 CA 339, 340, 343. Cited. 19 CA 396, 400. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282. Cited. 31 CA 312, 330. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (2):
Subdiv. (b): Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv. (a): Cited. 177 C. 335, 342. Subdiv. (b): Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id., 637, 639, 641; 178 C. 634, 635. Cited. 179 C. 328, 338. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 199 C. 537, 542, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 590. Subdiv. (a) cited. Id., 586, 597. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id. Cited. 209 C. 733, 757, 760. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 215 C. 716, 727. Cited. 219 C. 489, 500, 501, 510. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 489, 501. Cited. 225 C. 347, 350. Subdiv. (B) cited. 36 CA 190, 196. Cited. 46 CA 486. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id.

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Sec. 53a-92. Kidnapping in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and: (1) His intent is to compel a third person (A) to pay or deliver money or property as ransom or (B) to engage in other particular conduct or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or (2) he restrains the person abducted with intent to (A) inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or (B) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or (C) terrorize him or a third person; or (D) interfere with the performance of a government function.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 93, 94; P.A. 73-137, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 36.)
History: P.A. 73-137 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) making kidnapping a first degree offense when abducted person dies during abduction or before his return to safety and provisions in that Subsec. re circumstances which determine the presumption of death and provisions in Subsec. (b) re imposition of death penalty and re sentence for Class A felony when accused enters guilty plea and court and state's attorney consent; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) (1) to insert Subpara. indicators and made other technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 165−167. Cited. 197 C. 436, 461. Cited. Id., 588, 591. Cited. 198 C. 671, 673. Cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Cited. 201 C. 276, 284. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 212 C. 31, 32. Cited. 225 C. 347, 349. Cited. 227 C. 677, 679. Cited. 235 C. 711, 713. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114.
Cited. 24 CA 13, 14. Cited. 39 CA 632, 633. Cited. 46 CA 691. Cited. Id., 741.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2)(A): Language sufficiently warns ordinary person in clear and concise terms of prohibited conduct intended. 173 C. 165, 168. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 173 C. 165, 166, 168; 177 C. 335, 343. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 185 C. 339, 340, 354. Subdiv. (2) cited. 189 C. 346, 347. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 194 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 692, 694, 695. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 436, 438. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 588−592. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 198 C. 147, 148, 151. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 285, 287. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 405, 406. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id., 671, 672. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 199 C. 399, 400. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 200 C. 268, 286. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 586, 587, 591; 201 C. 517, 519; Id., 559, 560; 202 C. 259, 260; Id., 509, 510; 203 C. 385, 386. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. 204 C. 1, 2. Cited. Id., 240, 242. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 714, 716. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 205 C. 132, 134. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 673−675. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43, 54. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 733, 735, 761. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 210 C. 110−112. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 199, 200. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 315, 316. Subdiv. (2) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 212 C. 31, 32, 38−40. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 388, 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 89, 91. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 215 C. 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 716, 718, 719, 727; 216 C. 647, 649; 217 C. 243, 244, 248, 250. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; 219 C. 93, 96. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 160, 161. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id.; Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 283, 284. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 489, 491, 492, 494−496, 500−503. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 489, 491, 494−496; 220 C. 270, 272. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 345, 347, 348. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 487, 489. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 698, 700; 221 C. 264, 265; 222 C. 556, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 347, 348, 350. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 450, 452. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 519, 520. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 618−620. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 227 C. 1, 9, 11. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 153, 155. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 228 C. 582, 584, 588. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 229 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 231 C. 195, 196. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 403, 408. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 145, 147. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (2)(A): Determined to be not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 237 C. 284−287, 313, 314. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 694. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 238 C. 389. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C): Section not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 242 C. 445.
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 8 CA 177, 178. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 25 CA 428, 430. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 195, 196. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 33 CA 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 34 CA 276, 277. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 36 CA 190, 191, 196. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 216, 217. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 641, 642. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 718, 720. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 774, 775. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. Id., 464, 465. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 38 CA 777, 778, 785. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id., 579, 600. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 41 CA 317, 318; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 445 et seq. Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 43 CA 715. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 44 CA 307. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 46 CA 810. Holding witnesses at gunpoint prior to firing fatal shot into a murder victim was kidnapping with intent to advance or accomplish the murder. 47 CA 134. Unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense, discussed. Id., 159.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 65.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 674.
Cited. 8 CA 177, 178.

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Sec. 53a-92a. Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm: Class A felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a- 92, and in the commission of said crime he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm is a class A felony for which one year of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 9.)
Cited. 198 C. 671, 673, 676, 678, 679. "Effect of enactment of statute (was) to link a more serious crime with a less serious penalty"; equal protection rights violated. 200 C. 268, 286, 289. Cited. 204 C. 240, 257. Cited. 205 C. 262, 264. Cited. Id., 673, 674. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673.
Cited. 40 CA 60, 61.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 198 C. 671, 679. Cited. 210 C. 110, 111. Cited. Id., 315, 316. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
The statute "has created an irreconcilable conflict in the statutes governing mandatory minimum sentences for kidnapping in the first degree ... until the legislature takes corrective action the sentencing provisions of (this statute) govern all prosecutions for kidnapping in the first degree"; statutory construction discussed. 198 C. 671, 676, 680. Cited. 200 C. 268, 287. Equal protection rights discussed. Id. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-93. Proceeding to determine sentence for kidnapping in first degree. Section 53a-93 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 95; P.A. 73-137, S. 15.)

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Sec. 53a-94. Kidnapping in the second degree: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Cited. 177 C. 335, 336, 342; id., 637, 639, 641. Cited. 178 C. 549, 550; id., 634, 635. Cited. 185 C. 163, 164. Cited. 186 C. 179, 180. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407; id., 697, 702, 713. Cited. 190 C. 822, 823. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 617. Cited. 196 C. 430, 431. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. Id., 190, 191. Cited. 199 C. 537, 538. Cited. 200 C. 586, 606. Cited. 202 C. 343, 344. Cited. Id., 520, 521, 523. Cited. 206 C. 40, 53. Cited. Id., 685, 687, 709. Cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673. Cited. 213 C. 388, 396. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 12 CA 268. Cited. Id., 613. Cited. 20 CA 437. Cited. 21 CA 411, 412. Cited. 27 CA 786, 787. Cited. 35 CA 740, 744. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 46 CA 486. Cited. Id., 691.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600−602. Cited. 179 C. 328, 329, 338. Cited. 180 C. 565. Cited. 182 C. 449, 451, 460. Cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Cited. 188 C. 406, 415. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Cited. 191 C. 604, 605. Cited. 192 C. 166, 167. Cited. 197 C. 485, 486. Cited. 198 C. 314, 315. Cited. 199 C. 537, 550. Cited. 200 C. 586, 588. Cited. 202 C. 520, 523. Cited. 238 C. 784.
There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697, 708.

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Sec. 53a-94a. Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm: Class B felony: Three years not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section 53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699, 713. Cited. 200 C. 523, 524. Cited. 201 C. 115, 116. Cited. 211 C. 672, 673, 677−679.
Cited. 9 CA 648, 649. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 210 C. 110, 114. Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-95. Unlawful restraint in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose such other person to a substantial risk of physical injury.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 97; P.A. 92-260, S. 38.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "the latter" with "such other person".
Cited. 171 C. 395, 397. Cited. 182 C. 353, 354; id., 366, 367, 382. Cited. 187 C. 216, 217; id., 348, 349. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 617. Cited. 194 C. 297, 298. Cited. 195 C. 253, 254, 265. Cited. 197 C. 298, 299. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited. 198 C. 430. Cited. 199 C. 193, 194. Cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. 201 C. 659, 660. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 205 C. 352, 353. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 223 C. 180, 182. Cited. 224 C. 397, 399. Cited. 226 C. 601, 603. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 237 C. 284, 309. Cited. 242 C. 689.
Cited. 3 CA 374, 375. Cited. 5 CA 424, 425. Cited. Id., 586, 587, 590. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 7 CA 701, 702. Cited. 8 CA 620, 621. Cited. 9 CA 631, 632; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 352 et seq. Cited. 10 CA 217, 218. Cited. 13 CA 554−556. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340, 343. Specific intent required. Id. Cited. Id., 391, 392. Cited. Id., 490, 491. Cited. 22 CA 477, 478. Cited. 28 CA 581, 583, 592; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 312, 314. Cited. 36 CA 805, 807. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 701, 702. Cited. 42 CA 78. Cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Cited. 43 CS 211, 212.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 500, 501; 176 C. 227, 228. Cited. 179 C. 381, 382. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 197 C. 50−52. Cited. Id., 602, 603. Cited. 198 C. 430−432, 434, 435. Cited. Id., 598, 600. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 205 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 61, 63. Cited. Id., 437, 439. Cited. Id., 528, 531. Cited. 206 C. 40, 42, 43, 53, 54. Cited. 209 C. 143, 145. Cited. 222 C. 87, 88. Cited. 227 C. 32, 49. Cited. Id., 153, 155. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 241 C. 784. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 387, 388. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. Id., 566, 567. Cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Cited. Id., 208, 209. Cited. 13 CA 667, 668. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712. Cited. 18 CA 134, 137. Cited. Id., 730, 731. Cited. 19 CA 631, 633. Cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Cited. Id., 467, 468. Cited. 25 CA 725, 726. Cited 26 CA 574, 575. Cited. Id., 641, 642. Cited. 31 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 312, 329. Cited. 32 CA 178, 179. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 777, 785. Cited. 39 CA 45, 46. Cited. Id., 789, 790. Cited. Id., 832, 833. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257, 279. Cited. Id., 701, 702. Cited. Id., 817, 818. Cited. 42 CA 78. Cited. Id., 445. Cited. 43 CA 715. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117.

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Sec. 53a-96. Unlawful restraint in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the second degree when he restrains another person.
(b) Unlawful restraint in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 98.)
Cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Cited. 191 C. 604, 616, 618. Cited. 197 C. 602, 603. Cited. 206 C. 100, 102. Cited. 211 C. 672, 678. Cited. 224 C. 397, 400. Cited. 231 C. 195, 196.
Cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282. Cited. 31 CA 497, 498. Cited. 46 CA 486.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600. Cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Cited. Id., 602, 603.
Cited. 29 CA 524, 525. Cited. 30 CA 281, 282, 285.

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Sec. 53a-97. Custodial interference in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits custodial interference in the second degree as provided in section 53a-98: (1) Under circumstances which expose the child or person taken or enticed from lawful custody or the child held after a request by the lawful custodian for his return to a risk that his safety will be endangered or his health materially impaired; or (2) by taking, enticing or detaining the child or person out of this state.
(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 99; P.A. 81-280, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 39; P.A. 95-206, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by including in Subdiv. (1) risk to a child held after a request by the lawful custodian for his return; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 95-206 amended Subsec. (a) by classifying the detention of a child or person out of this state as a violation of custodial interference in the first degree.
Cited. 182 C. 353, 355. Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 663, 666, 668.
Cited. 34 CS 219, 221.

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Sec. 53a-98. Custodial interference in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when: (1) Being a relative of a child who is less than sixteen years old and intending to hold such child permanently or for a protracted period and knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; (2) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person or any person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution; or (3) knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he holds, keeps or otherwise refuses to return a child who is less than sixteen years old to such child's lawful custodian after a request by such custodian for the return of such child.
(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 100; P.A. 81-280, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-280 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) concerning the failure to return a child to his lawful custodian after a request by the custodian for the child's return.
Cited. 226 C. 652, 661, 664, 666, 668.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 652, 664.

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Sec. 53a-99. Substitution of children: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than one year old and, intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a child other than the one entrusted.
(b) Substitution of children is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 101.)
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PART VIII*
BURGLARY, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, ARSON,
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Burglary:
Annotations to former section 53-68:
Burglary must be charged to have been committed in night season. 16 C. 33. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C. 57. Taking of life to prevent a burglary justifiable. 31 C. 485. Error to charge that when building is left secure at night and found early in morning broken open, presumption is that it was broken open at night. 35 C. 515. Entering with intent to commit a felony and breaking out is burglary. 43 C. 493. Night season is when there is not enough daylight to discern features of another. 47 C. 182; 108 C. 405. This crime is one involving moral turpitude. 121 C. 678. Cited. 132 C. 575; 147 C. 296; 153 C. 40. Definition of "nighttime" discussed. 153 C. 540, 542. Cited. 161 C. 283.
Cited. 23 CS 41; 25 CS 433; 26 CS 71; 27 CS 42. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for four counts of burglary under this section, in addition to counts of breaking and entering, larceny and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. 27 CS 105−107.
Annotations to former section 53-69:
Evidence that person was armed when he emerged from house sufficient to prove that he was armed when burglary was committed. 47 C. 181. Cited. 154 C. 302, 303; 160 C. 42.
Annotations to former section 53-71:
Essential elements of crime; evidence admissible. 96 C. 162; 97 C. 261; 146 C. 518. Cited. 153 C. 451. Burglars' tools jettisoned by defendant while he was being observed by witness and found immediately on his apprehension at place of crime, held properly admitted into evidence. 155 C. 463. Cited. 161 C. 371.
Discovery of burglar's tools sufficient to allow police to search without warrant. 25 CS 216. Cited. 25 CS 229; 27 CS 323. Requirement that accused prove lawful excuse for having burglar tools in his possession at night is unconstitutional as defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty and burden of proof is on state. 28 CS 28.
Annotations to former section 53-73:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Evidence that defendant, immediately after his niece's house was robbed, had bills on his person in denomination of those stolen and a cut on his wrist, when entry had been made by breaking glass, and had been seen on premises before the entry, held ample grounds for conviction on trial by jury. 155 C. 297. It must be established that crime took place in daytime in order to convict defendant. 161 C. 283. Cited. 161 C. 303.
Cited. 4 CS 260; 27 CS 65. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for four counts of violations under this section, in addition to counts of burglary, larceny and theft of a motor vehicle, should stand. 27 CS 105−107. Review of sentence. 27 CS 124−126. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Annotation to former section 53-74:
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No legal distinction between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. 158 C. 124.
Annotations to former section 53-75:
Cited. 153 C. 540, 541 (fn). Trial court properly determined as matter of law that breaking and entering locked fur storage vault within store otherwise open to public was breaking and entering of building. 156 C. 391.
Cited. 27 CS 392.
Garage held to be a "building ... used as place for the custody of property" within meaning of this statute. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 276. Conviction based on identification by witness who observed defendant after crime at request of police officers upheld. Rulings in U. S. v. Wade (388 U.S. 318) and Gilbert v. California (388 U. S. 263) not retroactive. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 172.
Annotations to former section 53-76:
If one confederate gets inside without breaking and entering and opens door to others, all are guilty of breaking and entering. 125 C. 213. History of statutes concerning burglary. 132 C. 576. Statute may apply to building partly occupied as dwelling if it is also occupied for custody of certain property. Id., 579. Cited. 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644; 150 C. 489; 152 C. 627, 633; 153 C. 451; id., 540, 541 (fn). Defendant's appeal from admission in evidence of burglary tools found immediately after he was observed disposing of them denied as trier of facts could have reasonably determined that articles were in his possession. 155 C. 463. Jury could have inferred from circumstantial evidence that some part of defendant's body had entered building. Codefendant's statement that he dropped defendant off at premises and half hour later picked him up was admissible only as to codefendant. 156 C. 378. Motion to suppress evidence obtained after search of defendant's person on his arrest for disorderly conduct denied. 157 C. 485. Cited. 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 283; 371; 404. Cited. 162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Discussion of maximum sentence. 17 CS 367. Cited. 19 CS 267; 22 CS 270; 23 CS 5; id., 41; id., 355; 25 CS 451, 454, 457; id., 489; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 42; id., 65; id., 149; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 271; 27 CS 285; id., 290; 27 CS 318; 322; 323; id., 341; id., 347; id., 392. Term of not less than three years nor more than four years on basis of fourth felony conviction was fair and just after conviction under this section. Id., 371. Cited. 29 CS 471.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 275; 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530.
Annotations to former section 53-77:
Cited. 19 CS 267. Defendant found guilty hereunder and sentenced to indefinite term in state reformatory resentenced to term not to exceed two years. 28 CS 132.
In trial for offense under this statute, court held it not mandatory to order mistrial when, on poll of jury, one juror announced verdict contrary to that announced by foreman. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 153.
Annotations to former section 53-78:
History and construction of this statute. 125 C. 214. Cited. 132 C. 575. Cited. 166 C. 81, 83.
Annotation to former section 53-80:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Arson:
Annotations to former section 53-82:
Burning of schoolhouse is arson. 2 R. 516; but see 10 C. 145. A barn eighteen rods from dwelling house and separated by highway not subject of arson at common law; 6 C. 48; but otherwise under Sec. 53-83. 109 C. 31. That building is property of another must be alleged and proved. 12 C. 489. An unfinished dwelling not subject of arson at common law. 20 C. 247. House burned should be described as house occupied. 29 C. 344; 63 C. 331. Charge of burning with intent to defraud insurance company. 105 C. 117; id., 328. State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company. 45 C. 273. Evidence reviewed and held sufficient to warrant conviction. 105 C. 117; id., 333. Proofs of loss submitted to insurance company admissible though made by accused after fire. 105 C. 122. Motive need not be proved; and, while malice is an essential ingredient of crime of arson, it does not require ill-will but merely deliberation and action without justification or excuse; so, conviction sustained where accused set fire for excitement it would produce. 107 C. 631. Dwelling is "burned" if the slightest portion is burned or charred as distinguished from being merely smoked or discolored. Id., 633. Conviction of accessory to arson. 109 C. 394. Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. 136 C. 201. Cited. 149 C. 25; 150 C. 169. In re latter case, conviction affirmed; proof of voluntariness of confession prerequisite to its admissibility if made during illegal detention. 151 C. 246. See 371 U. S. 471.
Annotations to former section 53-83:
Evidence held sufficient to warrant conclusion that defendant set fire wilfully and maliciously. 137 C. 179; 149 C. 25; 150 C. 171; 156 C. 328. Cited. 163 C. 176.
Annotations to former section 53-85:
Plea of nolo contendere for attempted arson, which was subsequently nolled, held bar to prosecution of arson as violation of double jeopardy. 25 CS 96. The two offenses need not be identical in nature, a similarity being sufficient. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-86:
State need not prove legal corporate existence of insurance company. 45 C. 273.
Trespass and injury to property:
Annotations to former section 53-45:
See Sec. 1-1 for definition of "public buildings." Complaint must set out with particularity the "injury." 62 C. 131. "Wilfully" means in a spirit of wantonness or with an evil intent or guilty purpose. 71 C. 742. An amendatory act is presumed not to change the existing law further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. The word "deface" was removed from statute and only the word "injury" left. Painting a swastika on building held to be an injury. 149 C. 577, 579. Reversed, 375 U. S. 85. (a) Cited. 153 C. 599.
Cited. 22 CS 203.
Annotation to former section 53-81:
Cited. 27 CS 244.
Evidence of witness who on trial contradicted his prior written statements and testimony by defendant held sufficient to sustain judgment of defendant's guilt. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423.
Annotations to former section 53-103:
Cited. 124 C. 313; 319 U. S. 147.
Conviction under this statute not admissible to impeach witness's credibility. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 389. Comparison of this section and Sec. 53-108 in regard to phrase "without right" in former and absence in latter. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 532. Whether proof of scienter is essential is matter of legislative intent. No proof of specific intent to commit crime of trespass needed under this section. Id. That defendant thought he had lawful right to be where he was does not negate his trespass; honest mistake of law does not excuse him from consequences of his act. Id.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotation to former section 53-107:
Owner of garden upon which fowls of another trespassed is liable in damages for spreading poison thereon and killing fowls; force used to repel such trespass must be reasonable; notice to owner of fowls of intent to spread poison no defense. 14 C. 1.
Annotations to former section 53-108:
It is no defense that defendant entered upon lands, etc., for purpose of fishing without guilty intent. 60 C. 229. Cited. 125 C. 214. Prima facie evidence discussed. 148 C. 481.
Comparison of this section and Sec. 53-103 in regard to presence of phrase "without right" in latter and its absence here. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 524, 532.
Annotations to former section 53-124:
Former statute cited. 66 C. 568; 141 C. 731.
Annotations to former section 53-126:
Cited. 145 C. 124. Cited. 162 C. 53.
Cited. 23 CS 216, 218; 24 CS 378; 27 CS 347. Balance of sentence of defendant suspended by review division where he had not been represented by counsel at time sentence was imposed and his damage to landlord's property was not more than one hundred and twenty-five dollars. Id., 387.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 136; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 476.
Annotations to former section 53-127:
Cited. 72 C. 470; 73 C. 117.
Annotation to former section 53-197:
Cited. 23 CS 43.

Sec. 53a-100. Definitions. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) "Building" in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) "dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present; (3) "night" means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.
(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-101 to 53a-106, inclusive: A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40.)
History: P.A. 74-186 included railroad cars in definition of "building"; P.A. 79-570 included buildings "with a valid certificate of occupancy" in definition of "building"; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in definition of "building".
Cited. 191 C. 180, 184, 185. Cited. 195 C. 598, 601, 603, 606. Cited. Id., 611, 613. Cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Cited. 210 C. 199, 203, 206. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 384.
"... failure of the court to define the phrase `enters unlawfully,' misled the jury ...". 6 CA 24, 25, 28, 30, 31. Cited. 30 CA 95, 107; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 714, 723−726. Cited. 44 CA 62.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 542, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. 209 C. 322, 342, 343. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 199, 205, 206. Subdiv. (1) cited. 218 C. 273, 274, 277−280. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 523. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 119, 126. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 440, 443, 444. Cited. 34 CA 823, 824. Subdiv. (3) cited. 38 CA 231, 236. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 488. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 210 C. 199, 203, 206, 207. Cited. 216 C. 367, 379, 380.
Cited. 8 CA 528, 540. Cited. 19 CA 179, 188, 192. Cited. 24 CA 563, 571. Cited. 39 CA 1, 4. Cited. 42 CA 507.

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Sec. 53a-101. Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and: (1) He is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or (2) in the course of committing the offense, he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone.
(b) An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing" the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.
(c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28.)
History: P.A. 80-442 specified in Subsec. (c) that five years of imposed sentence may not be suspended or reduced when person is guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981.
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 174 C. 500, 506. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500, 509. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463, 467. Cited. 210 C. 199. Cited. 216 C. 563, 565. Cited. 220 C. 112, 114. Cited. 222 C. 331, 335. Cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited. 229 C. 691, 694.
1 CA 724, 725, 735. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 24 CA 563, 568. Cited. 29 CA 704, 705, 712. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418, 424. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726. Cited. 46 CA 118. There was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 170 C. 162. Cited. 174 C. 500, 501. Subdiv. (1) cited. 175 C. 398, 399. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in section 53a-3(7) to support finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140, 141, 146. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 564, 565; 180 C. 481, 482; id., 557, 560. Subdiv. (2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 600. Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (1) cited. 185 C. 211, 212, Subdiv. (2) cited. 186 C. 599, 600. Subdiv. (1) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 574, 576; 189 C. 383, 384, 398. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 611, 612. Cited. Id., 611, 625, 627, 628. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 496, 497, 500, 505−509. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 496, 507, 509. Subdiv. (2) cited. 194 C. 241, 244. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 157, 158, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 225−227. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 413, 415. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 62, 63. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Cited. Id., 586, 596. Subdiv. (1) cited. 203 C. 159, 160. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 714, 716. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 485, 486. Cited. 209 C. 416, 417. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 199, 200. Cited. Id., 199, 203, 205−207. Subdiv. (2) cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (1) cited. 217 C. 419, 420; 219 C. 269, 271; 221 C. 430, 431. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.; Id., 447, 449; Id., 685, 687. Subdiv. (1) cited. 223 C. 41, 42. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 245, 257, 263, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 99, 301. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 524, 526. Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 32, 48. Cited. Id., 616, 622. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 802, 804. Cited. 241 C. 702. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 784. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 445. Cited. Id., 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Cited. 6 CA 667−669, 674, 675. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 670, 675. Subdiv. (1) cited. 697, 698. Cited. Id., 701, 706. Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 631, 632. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 208, 209. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 176. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 662, 663. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 554−556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (1) cited. id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (1) cited. 15 CA 342, 343. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 184, 186. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 318, 319. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 455, 456. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 391, 392. Subdiv. (1) cited. 19 CA 179−181, 187. Cited. Id., 179, 192. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 245− 247, 250, 253−255. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 244, 245. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 692, 693. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 556, 557, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 556, 559. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 563, 565, 567, 569. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 563, 567, 569. Cited. Id., 563, 568. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 428−430. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 565−567. Subdiv. (1) cited. 26 CA 641, 642. Subdiv. (2) cited. 27 CA 73, 75; Id., 786, 787; Id., 794, 795. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 402, 403. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 704, 705, 709. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 312, 313, 327. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited 38 CA 481, 482. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. 39 CA 45, 50. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 45, 46, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 60, 61. Cited. 41 CA 255, 273. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 255, 257, 276, 277. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 255, 270, 276. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 317, 318. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 817, 818, 825. Cited. Id., 817, 825. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 78. Subdiv. (2) cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 187. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 261.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 190 C. 496, 509.
Cited. 29 CA 704, 711.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.
Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. 19 CA 245, 255. Cited. 30 CA 416, 418.

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Sec. 53a-102. Burglary in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 104.)
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 169 C. 263, 264. Cited. Id., 556, 567. Cited. 175 C. 315. Cited. 184 C. 258, 259. Instruction characterizing burglary as a crime against the person likely to involve danger to life was not in error. 188 C. 542, 553. Cited. Id., 715, 716. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 195 C. 611, 612. Cited. 197 C. 574, 575, 581. Cited. 198 C. 671, 672. Cited. 204 C. 1−3. Cited. 205 C. 456, 463, 467. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Cited. 216 C. 273, 274. Cited. 220 C. 417, 426. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 689.
Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 9 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 349−351. Cited. Id., 656, 657. Cited. 11 CA 575, 576, 583. Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 34, 57. Cited. 16 CA 333, 334. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397, 401. Cited. 20 CA 369, 370. Cited. Id., 586, 587. Cited. 23 CA 201, 202. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803, 812; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 31 CA 94, 103. Cited. Id., 370, 376. Cited. 34 CA 599, 600, 606. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 236. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. 40 CA 553, 554. Cited. 41 CA 169, 170. Cited. Id., 255, 277.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 181 C. 172, 173, 177. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543. Cited. 189 C. 631, 633. Cited. 190 C. 440, 442. Cited. 199 C. 88, 89. Cited. 200 C. 523, 525, 538. Cited. 202 C. 676, 677. Cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Cited. 205 C. 456, 459. Cited. 214 C. 493, 495. Cited. 216 C. 699, 701. Cited. 220 C. 400, 402. Cited. 223 C. 635, 637, 638. Cited. 241 C. 784.
Cited. 1 CA 260, 262. Cited. 6 CA 697. Cited. 14 CA 710, 712, 715. Cited. 21 CA 260, 261. Cited. 23 CA 564, 565; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400 et seq. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 606, 607. Cited. 31 CA 370, 371, 376. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263. Cited 36 CA 774, 775. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 231, 232. Cited. Id., 531, 532. Cited. Id., 643, 645. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. 42 CA 78.

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Sec. 53a-102a. Burglary in the second degree with a firearm: Class C felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree with a firearm when he commits burglary in the second degree as provided in section 53a- 102, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary in the second degree and burglary in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Burglary in the second degree with a firearm is a class C felony for which one year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 11; P.A. 76-435, S. 4, 68, 82; P.A. 92-260, S. 41.)
History: P.A. 76-435 made technical corrections, adding simple burglary in the second degree in Subsec. (a) and specifying in Subsec. (b) that burglary in second degree with a firearm is a Class C, rather than Class B, felony; P.A. 92- 260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 188 C. 697, 699. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 199 C. 255, 275.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-103. Burglary in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.
(b) Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 105.)
Cited. 161 C. 283. Cited. 173 C. 317, 318. Cited. 174 C. 253, 254. Cited. 176 C. 299, 300. Cited. 182 C. 52, 53; id., 176, 177; id., 242, 243. Cited. 183 C. 225; id., 444, 445. Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 215, 216; id., 369, 377. Cited. 186 C. 648, 649. Cited. 187 C. 6, 8; id., 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364; id., 717, 718. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500. Cited. 191 C. 146; id., 180, 182, 185. Cited. 193 C. 35−37. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199, 204, 205. Cited. Id., 210. Cited. Id., 213, 214. Cited. Id., 361, 362. Cited. Id., 438, 439. Cited. Id., 623, 624. Cited. 196 C. 185. Cited. 197 C. 247, 261. Cited. 198 C. 1, 2. Cited. 199 C. 30−32. Cited. Id., 308, 309. Cited. 202 C. 615, 617. Cited. 216 C. 814. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275−277. Cited. 219 C. 489, 491. Cited. 220 C. 417, 418, 429. Cited. 223 C. 731, 733. Cited. 232 C. 455, 458, 459. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682. Cited. 237 C. 390, 392. Cited. 239 C. 235. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 2 CA 537, 538. Cited. 3 CA 132, 133. Cited. Id., 359, 362. Cited. Id., 503. Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. Id., 680, 681. Cited. 8 CA 478, 479, 481, 490. Cited. 9 CA 141, 142, 144. Cited. 10 CA 258, 259. Cited. Id., 279, 280. Cited. Id., 447, 448, 451. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3, 19. Cited. Id., 196, 197. Cited. Id., 375, 376, 383. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. Id., 220, 221. Cited. 14 CA 119, 120, 126. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 16 CA 184. Cited. Id., 601, 602. Cited. 18 CA 368, 369. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 52, 60. Cited. 20 CA 205, 207. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 22 CA 440, 441. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. Id., 151, 152. Cited. Id., 201, 202. Cited. 24 CA 295, 296. Cited. 25 CA 503, 505. Cited. 30 CA 190, 192. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 405, 406, 409, 412, 420. Cited. Id., 714, 716, 726. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. Id., 364, 372, 373. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 231, 234. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited. Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39 CA 1, 2, 4. Cited. Id., 579, 580, 599. Cited. 42 CA 507. Cited. 44 CA 162. Cited. 45 CA 566.
Cited. 33 CS 706. Cited. Id., 750. Cited. 38 CS 407.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 177 C. 140, 147. Cited. 181 C. 254, 255. Cited. 184 C. 369, 370. Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 191 C. 180, 181, 184. Cited. 194 C. 213, 216. Cited. Id., 665, 666, 672, 675. Cited. 197 C. 247, 248. Cited. 198 C. 369, 370. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. 218 C. 447−449.
Cited. 4 CA 514. Cited. 6 CA 24, 25. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 75, 76. Cited. 8 CA 491, 493. Cited. Id., 528, 540. Cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. 10 CA 279, 280. Cited. Id., 503, 511. Cited. 13 CA 438, 439. Cited. 14 CA 309, 310; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50 et seq. Cited. 15 CA 531, 532. Cited. 17 CA 490, 492. Cited. 22 CA 440, 443. Cited. 23 CA 151, 155. Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 34 CA 751, 752; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 405, 412. Cited. Id., 699, 700. Cited. 36 CA 177, 178. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42. Cited. Id., 228, 229, 233. Cited. 38 CA 225, 226. Cited. Id., 481, 482. Cited. 39 CA 579, 594. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 184 C. 369, 377.

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Sec. 53a-103a. Burglary in the third degree with a firearm: Class D felony: One year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree with a firearm when he commits burglary in the third degree as provided in section 53a-103, and in the commission of such offense, he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of burglary in the third degree and burglary in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Burglary in the third degree with a firearm is a class D felony for which one year of the sentence imposed shall not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 75-380, S. 12.)
Cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 637, 639. Cited. 184 C. 215, 216. Cited. 190 C. 496, 500.
Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 14 CA 710, 717. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 216 C. 282, 295. Cited. 219 C. 93, 95.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-104. Affirmative defense to burglary. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for burglary that the building was abandoned.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 106.)
Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.

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Sec. 53a-105. Conviction for burglary and other offense authorized, when. Section 53a-105 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 107; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)

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Sec. 53a-106. Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools when he manufactures or has in his possession any tool, instrument or other thing adapted, designed or commonly used for advancing or facilitating offenses involving unlawful entry into premises, or offenses involving forcible breaking of safes or other containers or depositories of property, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such character.
(b) Manufacturing or possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 108; P.A. 92-260, S. 42.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.
Cited. 181 C. 172, 180. Cited. 182 C. 242, 243, 250.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 6 CA 24. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229.
Cited. 33 CS 706.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 182 C. 366, 367, 382.
Cited. 5 CA 599, 606.

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Sec. 53a-107. Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court.
(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 109; P.A. 80-58; P.A. 91-381, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 43; P.A. 95-214, S. 4; P.A. 99-240, S. 5.)
History: P.A. 80-58 added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that entering or remaining in building or other premises in violation of a restraining order is criminal trespass in the first degree; P.A. 91-381 amended Subsec. (a) by adding "pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c" after "issued"; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing references to "such person" with "he" or "him" as appropriate; P.A. 95-214 amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r and to make provisions gender neutral.
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 204 C. 441, 442.
Cited. 12 CA 172, 173, 175, 177, 178. Cited. 18 CA 303, 310. Cited. 19 CA 245, 254, 255. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726. Cited. 43 CA 1.
Word "owner" must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555, 556, 558, 559. Cited. 37 CS 853.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 216 C. 647, 649. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 342, 343.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 11 CA 24, 25; 12 CA 258, 261. Subdiv. (1) cited. 18 CA 303, 304, 306; 19 CA 245, 249, 250, 253, 254. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 45, 46. Cited. 35 CA 262, 263, 267. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 262, 267. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 448, 449; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 19 CA 245, 255.

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Sec. 53a-108. Criminal trespass in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in a building.
(b) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 110.)
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 215 C. 257, 259. Section not applicable based on defendant's knowledge. 245 C. 657.
Cited. 12 CA 375, 383, 384. Cited. 19 CA 245, 256. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. Id., 721, 722. Cited. 24 CA 489. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376. Cited. 35 CA 107, 110. Cited. Id., 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 24 CA 541, 542. Cited. 31 CA 370, 376.

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Sec. 53a-109. Criminal trespass in the third degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so: (1) He enters or remains in premises which are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders, or fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, or which belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) he enters or remains in any premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing.
(b) Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 111; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 20; P.A. 92-260, S. 44.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (2) in Subsec. (a) specifying that person's entering or remaining in premises for purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing although he knows he is not licensed or privileged to do so is criminal trespass in the third degree; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes and deleted redundant language in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 203 C. 466, 473. Cited. Id., 624, 640. Cited. 240 C. 708.
Cited. 20 CA 599, 606, 607. Cited. 24 CA 195, 203. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 558.

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Sec. 53a-110. Affirmative defenses to criminal trespass. It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for criminal trespass that: (1) The building involved in the offense was abandoned; or (2) the premises, at the time of the entry or remaining, were open to the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or (3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain, or that he was licensed to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 112.)
Cited. 202 C. 86, 91. Cited. 215 C. 82, 101. Cited. Id., 257, 273.
Cited. 18 CA 303, 311. Cited. 20 CA 599, 606−608. Cited. 35 CA 714, 726.
Cited. 35 CS 555, 563.
Subdiv. (3):
Cited. 215 C. 257, 273.

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Sec. 53a-110a. Simple trespass: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters any premises without intent to harm any property.
(b) Simple trespass is an infraction.
(P.A. 83-276, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 45.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 12 CA 258−262. Cited. 20 CA 599−608. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. 30 CA 45, 46, 50. Cited. 31 CA 370, 378.

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Sec. 53a-110b. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223.

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Sec. 53a-110c. Transferred to Part XXI, Sec. 53a-223a.

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Sec. 53a-110d. Simple trespass of railroad property: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of simple trespass of railroad property when, knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on railroad property without lawful authority or the consent of the railroad carrier.
(b) Simple trespass of railroad property is an infraction.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229 clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to "building" definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 174 C. 135, 136. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 194 C. 279, 281, 283−286. Cited. 197 C. 158, 162−164. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 200 C. 685, 686, 693. Cited. 204 C. 4, 5. Cited. Id., 769, 770. Cited. 210 C. 519− 521. Cited. 216 C. 678, 679. Cited. 219 C. 605, 606. Cited. 220 C. 796, 798. Cited. 222 C. 469, 470. Cited. 227 C. 829, 832. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681, 683. Cited. 236 C. 31, 33. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 8 CA 581, 597. Cited. 12 CA 32, 34. Cited. 35 CA 527, 528. Cited. Id., 714, 715, 717, 724. Cited. 36 CA 454, 456−458. Cited. 40 CA 789, 791. Cited. 46 CA 350.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 183 C. 1, 2, 5. Subdiv. (1) cited. 187 C. 109, 111. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (1) cited. 191 C. 412, 413. Cited. Id., 636, 638, 645. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 1, 2. Cited. 200 C. 30, 31. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for a defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268, 279, 280. Cited. 202 C. 93, 98. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 377, 378. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 769, 775−777, 785. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 201, 202. Cited. 207 C. 118, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 161, 162. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 161, 162; Id., 752, 753; 215 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited. 216 C. 585−587, 595; 218 C. 747, 748. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 605, 606, 608, 615, 618, 619. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 605, 606, 608, 618, 619. Subdiv. (1) cited. 221 C. 713, 715. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C. 1, 2, 6−12. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 1, 2, 6− 12, 16. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 10−12. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. 235 C. 679, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 240 C. 708. Subdiv. (3) cited. 241 C. 57. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Sec. 53a-111(a)(4), therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Sec. 53a-111(a)(3). Evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.
Cited. 10 CA 147, 148. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 343, 344. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (4) cited. 30 CA 164, 165, 168, 179; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 164, 168; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 823−826, 829. Subdiv. (3) cited. 36 CA 454−456. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 753, 755, 762. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 360, 369. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 39 CA 800, 801, 803, 805. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 800, 805.

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Sec. 53a-112. Arson in the second degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, (1) he starts a fire or causes an explosion and (A) such act subjects another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury; or (B) such fire or explosion was intended to conceal some other criminal act; or (C) such fire or explosion was intended to subject another person to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured or protected by the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or (2) a fire or explosion was caused by an individual hired by such person to start such fire or cause such explosion.
(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 114; P.A. 79-570, S. 4; P.A. 80-229, S. 2; P.A. 82-290, S. 2; P.A. 84-4.)
History: P.A. 79-570 made second degree arson a Class B, rather than a Class C felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition of Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting (1) intent to destroy or damage a building of another (2) fires or explosions caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds and (3) subjecting another building to risk of destruction or damage and adding (1) fires or explosions intended to conceal some criminal act and (2) fires or explosions caused by person hired to set fire or cause explosion; P.A. 84-4 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) by adding Subpara. (C) re a fire or explosion intended to subject another person to a deprivation of certain rights, privileges or immunities.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 178 C. 67, 68. Cited. 189 C. 228, 230. Cited. 191 C. 636, 645. Cited. 194 C. 617−619. Cited. 195 C. 600, 601, 603−605. "... more reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable (under the statute) for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled." 197 C. 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. Cited. 199 C. 389, 399. Cited. 204 C. 769, 776. Cited. 219 C. 605, 615, 616. Cited. 236 C. 375, 379.
Term "another person" includes firefighters. 8 CA 581, 582, 597. Cited. 17 CA 466, 469, 470.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 174 C. 73. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 189 C. 201, 202. Subdiv. (1)(B)(2) cited. Id., 752, 754. Subdiv. (1) (B) cited. 195 C. 128, 129. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 598, 599. Cited. 197 C. 158, 159, 162. Cited. 199 C. 14, 15. Cited. Id., 389, 390. Subdiv. (1) cited. 202 C. 93, 95, 99. Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 215 C. 716, 719.
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 10 CA 422, 423. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 17 CA 466, 467. Cited. 28 CA 9, 11.

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Sec. 53a-113. Arson in the third degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of arson in the third degree when he recklessly causes destruction or damage to a building, as defined in section 53a-100, of his own or of another by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.
(b) Arson in the third degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 115; P.A. 73-639, S. 6; P.A. 79-570, S. 5; P.A. 80-229, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 46.)
History: P.A. 73-639 specified applicability to destruction or damage of person's own building in Subsec. (a); P.A. 79- 570 made third degree arson a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition in Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 177 C. 545, 546. Cited. 191 C. 636, 645. Cited. 194 C. 210. Cited. 197 C. 158, 164. Cited. 198 C. 92, 105. "There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result"; therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-48 is not a crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1, 2, 4, 5. Cited. 200 C. 268, 278, 279. Cited. 202 C. 520, 526. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Cited. 6 CA 680, 681. Cited. 22 CA 53, 54. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716.
Cited. 41 CS 525.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 235 C. 185, 189.
Cited. 10 CA 361, 362. Cited. 35 CA 94, 96, 103; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185 et seq.

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Sec. 53a-114. Reckless burning: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of reckless burning when he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's, and thereby recklessly places a building, as defined in section 53a-100, of another in danger of destruction or damage.
(b) Reckless burning is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 116; P.A. 79-570, S. 6; P.A. 80-229, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 47.)
History: P.A. 79-570 made reckless burning a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition in Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 197 C. 158, 163, 164. Cited. 200 C. 268, 278, 279.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 41 CA 701, 703.

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Sec. 53a-115. Criminal mischief in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages tangible property of another in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with tangible property of a utility or mode of public transportation, power or communication, and thereby causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public, or (3) with intent to cause damage to any electronic monitoring equipment owned or leased by the state or its agent and required as a condition of probation or conditional discharge pursuant to section 53a-30, or as a condition of release pursuant to section 54-64a, and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such electronic monitoring equipment and thereby causes an interruption in its ability to function, or (4) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with (A) any tangible property owned by the state, a municipality or a person for fire alarm or police alarm purposes, (B) any telecommunication system operated by the state police or a municipal police department, (C) any emergency medical or fire service dispatching system, (D) any fire suppression equipment owned by the state, a municipality, a person or a fire district, or (E) any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality, a person, a fire district or a private water company.
(b) Criminal mischief in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 117; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 21; P.A. 83-330, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 48; P.A. 00-141, S. 4.)
History: 1971 act added Subdiv. (3) in Subsec. (a) re tampering with fire or police alarms; P.A. 83-330 amended Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) to designate damaging or tampering with fire or police alarms as Subpara. (A) and to add Subparas. (B) to (E) re damaging or tampering with telecommunication systems, emergency medical or fire service dispatching systems, fire suppression equipment and fire hydrants or hydrant systems; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 00-141 amended Subsec. (a) by making technical changes, adding new Subdiv. (3) re intentional damage to electronic monitoring equipment and redesignating former Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (4).
Cited. 197 C. 326, 327.
Cited. 46 CA 118.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 191 C. 412, 413. Subdiv. (1) cited. 240 C. 708.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 29 CA 59, 60.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CS 400.

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Sec. 53a-116. Criminal mischief in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to tangible property of another and having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he damages tangible property of another in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars; or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he damages or tampers with tangible property of a public utility or mode of public transportation, power or communication, and thereby causes a risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public.
(b) Criminal mischief in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 118.)
Cited. 11 CA 805.
Cited. 38 CS 301, 302.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 236 C. 266, 267.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 680, 681.

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Sec. 53a-117. Criminal mischief in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he: (1) Intentionally or recklessly (A) damages tangible property of another, or (B) tampers with tangible property of another and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage; or (2) damages tangible property of another by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful or destructive force or substance, such as, but not limited to, fire, explosives, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material.
(b) Criminal mischief in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 119; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 22.)
History: 1971 act specified that use of harmful or destructive force or substance is "not limited to" fire, explosives, etc. in Subsec. (a)(2).
Cited. 184 C. 157, 158. Cited. 190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 194 C. 347, 350. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287.
Cited. 1 CA 647, 651. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 9 CA 59, 60, 70. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. 14 CA 526, 527. Cited. Id., 804. Cited. 18 CA 303, 306. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 36 CA 364, 373.
Cited. 35 CS 587, 588, 595, 596; Id., 675, 677. Cited. 36 CS 89. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756. Cited. 38 CS 665, 666. Cited. 194 C. 347, 350.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 221 C. 788, 790. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 31, 53.
Subdiv. (1)(B) cited. 39 CS 504, 508. Subdiv. (1) (A) cited. 1 CA 647, 652. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 7 CA 75, 76. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA 326, 327. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 24 CA 473, 474; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788 et seq. Cited. 29 CA 801, 803, 812; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 37 CA 733, 735. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. 38 CA 225, 226.

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Sec. 53a-117a. Criminal mischief in the fourth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe he has a right to do so, he intentionally or recklessly (1) damages or tampers with any fire hydrant or hydrant system owned by the state or a municipality, fire district or private water company, or (2) damages, tampers with or removes any tangible property owned by the state, a municipality or a person for fire alarm, smoke detection and alarm, fire suppressant or police alarm purposes.
(b) Criminal mischief in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-330, S. 2; P.A. 84-546, S. 125, 173; P.A. 85-132.)
History: P.A. 84-546 changed "public alarm purposes" to "police alarm purposes"; P.A. 85-132 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) by prohibiting removal of any of the specified property and by including property used for smoke detection and alarm or fire suppressant purposes.
Cited. 20 CA 101, 102.

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Secs. 53a-117b to 53a-117d. Reserved for future use.

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Sec. 53a-117e. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "tenant", "landlord" and "premises" shall have the meanings set forth in section 47a-1.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other provision of the general statutes.
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 96-74, S. 1; P.A. 98-107, S. 1, 6.)
History: P.A. 98-107 rephrased Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1998.

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Sec. 53a-117f. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that a tenant has a right to do so, such tenant (1) intentionally damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or (2) recklessly damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "tenant", "landlord" and "premises" shall have the meanings set forth in section 47a-1.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other provision of the general statutes.
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 96-74, S. 2; P.A. 98-107, S. 2, 6; P.A. 00-196, S. 40.)
History: P.A. 98-107 amended Subsec. (a) to rephrase provisions and add provision re reckless damage of the tangible property of the landlord in an amount exceeding fifteen hundred dollars, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-196 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).

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Sec. 53a-117g. Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A tenant is guilty of criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that he has a right to do so, he recklessly damages the tangible property of the landlord of the premises in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "tenant", "landlord" and "premises" shall have the meanings set forth in section 47a-1.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a person under any other provision of the general statutes.
(d) Criminal damage of a landlord's property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-107, S. 3, 6.)
History: P.A. 98-107 effective July 1, 1998.

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Secs. 53a-117h to 53a-117j. Reserved for future use.

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Sec. 53a-117k. Damage to railroad property in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to railroad property and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such property in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with railroad property and thereby causes an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public.
(b) Damage to railroad property in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 3.)

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Sec. 53a-117l. Damage to railroad property in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause damage to railroad property and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages such property in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or (2) with intent to cause an interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public and having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person damages or tampers with railroad property and thereby causes a risk of interruption or impairment of railroad service rendered to the public.
(b) Damage to railroad property in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 4.)

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Sec. 53a-117m. Damage to railroad property in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of damage to railroad property in the third degree when, having no reasonable ground to believe that such person has a right to do so, such person: (1) Intentionally or recklessly (A) damages railroad property, or (B) tampers with railroad property and thereby causes such property to be placed in danger of damage, or (2) damages railroad property by negligence involving the use of any potentially harmful or destructive force or substance including, but not limited to, fire, explosives, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, poison gas or radioactive material.
(b) Damage to railroad property in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-149, S. 5.)
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PART IX*
LARCENY, ROBBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-28:
Violation of this statute necessarily involves an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. 146 C. 227. Cited. 160 C. 42. Cited. 162 C. 6.
Annotations to former section 53-40:
Words "such communication" mean a communication by spoken words as well as one transmitted on a piece of paper. 146 C. 605. Cited. 147 C. 704; 151 C. 547.
Sentence of three to seven years found proper by Review Division in view of heinous nature of crime and defendant's poor juvenile record. 25 CS 5.
Annotations to former section 53-56:
Cited. 94 C. 701. Taking must be without excuse or color of right, i.e., felonious. 96 C. 421. See note to former Sec. 53-63, infra.
Annotations to former section 53-57:
Under information charging theft of motor vehicle, accused cannot be convicted of taking motor vehicle without permission. 113 C. 103. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within provisions of this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum). Evidence taken from stolen motor vehicle in possession of driver, after arrest of driver and detention of vehicle, not admitted into evidence as removed without a search warrant, under rule in Chimel v. California. 395 U. S. 752. 158 C. 641. Since larceny is continuing offense, operating stolen car in Connecticut is theft of that car in state regardless of where defendant had first stolen it. 159 C. 201. Cited. 166 C. 289. Cited 169 C. 38.
Cited. 23 CS 5; 24 CS 310; id., 388; 27 CS 108; id., 220; id., 272. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence if not more than five years in reformatory for one count of theft of motor vehicle under this section, in addition to counts of burglary, breaking and entering and larceny, should stand. 27 CS 105−107.
Annotations to former section 53-58:
Offense not within provisions of Sec. 53-63. 77 C. 140. Cited. 95 C. 602. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within provisions of this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum).
Annotations to former section 53-59:
Stealing horse in one state and bringing it into this state is punishable here. 3 C. 186. Value of horse of no consequence. 77 C. 140. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum).
Annotation to former section 53-61:
Information charging theft of "chickens" sufficient. 85 C. 323.
Annotations to former section 53-63:
What description of property sufficient. 6 C. 103. Finder of goods knowing owner and not returning them guilty of larceny; 9 C. 529; but finder must originally take with felonious intent. 22 C. 161. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C. 57. Jurisdiction of superior court when jury finds value of property to be less than fifteen dollars. 24 C. 316. Duplicity cured by verdict. 28 C. 231. Bailee opening and converting part or all of package animo furandi is guilty of larceny. 29 C. 49. Bringing stolen goods into this state is larceny here. 33 C. 264. Dog not the subject of larceny at common law. 31 C. 128; 48 C. 336. Prosecution for stealing dog may be based on this statute. 127 C. 690. Theft of horse distinct offense; so of bicycle. 77 C. 136. Larceny defined; 70 C. 269; nature and elements. 72 C. 643; 75 C. 55; 95 C. 38; id., 191; 96 C. 421. Securing property by threat. 70 C. 398. Appropriation by one entrusted with possession; accepting with intent to appropriate. 79 C. 714; 96 C. 426. Embezzlement distinguished. 83 C. 449; 102 C. 659. Taking property lost or mislaid; subsequent intent to appropriate. 89 C. 564. Does not apply to fixture unless it has been detached; lessee in possession as owner; purpose of alleging value; effect of general verdict. 83 C. 286. Taking goods to secure claimed debt held not larceny. 95 C. 35. Securing property by fraud is larceny. Id., 193. Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536. Cited. 110 C. 411; 127 C. 400; 139 C. 626; 143 C. 559; 149 C. 643, 644, 648; 153 C. 555; 154 C. 259. Elements of larceny are (1) wrongful taking and carrying away of personalty of another, (2) felonious intent to deprive owner of it permanently, (3) lack of consent of owner. 140 C. 118. (a) Larceny of goods from trading stamp redemption center falls within the provisions of this subsection. 153 C. 215. When principal is tricked into parting with possession by agent who, at time of his taking, has felonious intent to convert the property to his own use, offense is larceny and not embezzlement. 154 C. 255. Statute embraces common-law crime of larceny. Id. (b) Where larceny of goods falls within provisions of subsection (a), burden of proving additional element essential to bring it into provisions of subsection (b) rests on state. 153 C. 215. Goods stolen from trading stamp redemption center were not "goods offered or exposed for sale" within meaning of this subsection. Id. Circumstantial evidence held ample for conviction. 155 C. 297. Cited. 156 C. 391; 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434; 161 C. 117. Charge stating that it is unnecessary to prove breaking and entering for conviction of larceny upheld. 161 C. 117. Cited. 161 C. 371, 404. Cited. 162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163.
Cited. 22 CS 198, 200; 23 CS 319; 24 CS 127; 26 CS 464; 27 CS 65; id., 149; id., 220; id., 237; id., 244; 27 CS 272. Concealment includes all acts done which render discovery or identification of property more difficult. 24 CS 392. Where maximum sentence that could have been imposed under this section would be aggregate of one hundred twenty days except for reformatory commitment, sentence of not more than two years without parole possibility for nine months too severe. 27 CS 81. (a) Cited. 25 CS 454, 457; id., 489. In view of defendant's long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for one count of larceny under this section, in addition to counts of burglary, breaking and entering and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. 27 CS 105−107. Cited. 27 CS 318, 322; id., 341; id., 347. Sentence of defendant modified where codefendants had received lesser penalties and theft had been for benefit of one codefendant. Id., 398. Cited. 28 CS 240; 357.
Proof of ownership of property or that it is property of another need not be offered prior to admission of property as exhibit. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 53. Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 116, 118, 119. Subsec. (b). Intent of defendant not to pay for purchases he took out of supermarket through checkout operated by his wife may be established as inference from proved facts and circumstances, especially that he had not paid for them. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 682. Evidence, though conflicting, was adequate to support finding of trial court that defendant took goods of complainant store without paying for same and without its consent. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 214. Cited. Id., 530. Carrying of merchandise through checkout counter of cash-over-the-counter self-service store constituted exportation of the goods although immediately thereafter store's security agent apprehended defendant. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 648. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 526, 527, 556. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 615.
Annotation to former section 53-64:
Cited. 133 C. 604.
Annotation to former section 53-105:
Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.
Annotations to former section 53-354:
Collector of town taxes is a town officer or agent within meaning of this section. 73 C. 97. Former statute held not to support a prosecution of officers of a corporation trustee for misappropriation acting as such officers for the corporation. 112 C. 39. Whether corporation may be prosecuted for embezzlement, quaere. 114 C. 359. Cited. 128 C. 158.
Annotations to former section 53-355:
Applies to national bank officer purloining special deposit. 34 C. 296. Whether this section applies to a consignee of goods to be sold, quaere. 56 C. 500. Charge of embezzling "moneys" cannot be supported by proof of embezzling a chose in action. 70 C. 265. Distinguished from larceny; claim collector as "agent"; retaining money to meet expenses of other collections. 83 C. 449; 102 C. 659. Elements of crime; agency need not exist before receipt of goods embezzled. Id., 660. Violation of this statute is distinguished from larceny in that latter is always characterized by a felonious taking. Id. Proof of fraudulent conversion; wide latitude in receiving evidence of fraudulent intent. 112 C. 54. Essentials of proof. 114 C. 458. Broker selling stock as owner is not agent of purchaser. Id., 463. Intent of accused to restore stock taken does not absolve him of guilt for unlawful appropriation. 115 C. 306. Defendant may be tried in any jurisdiction where any part of the embezzlement was committed. 128 C. 157. Not embezzlement by agent when title to property is intentionally transferred to defendant; may be obtaining under false pretenses. Id., 158. Possible for a person to embezzle from a corporation the stock in which is wholly owned by him. 147 C. 589. In a prosecution for embezzlement the range of relevant evidence is wide, especially as it bears on the essential element of an intent to defraud, which involves a state of mind and can generally be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Id. Defendant bookkeeper of corporation whose checks she embezzled held to be an agent within meaning of statute. History of statute reviewed. 156 C. 233.
Cited. 25 CS 354.
Annotations to former section 53-360:
What facts within this section. 12 C. 111. Particular kind of false pretense must be alleged. 27 C. 320. Mere naked assertion may be false pretense. Id., 591. Evidence of pecuniary ability inadmissible to rebut motive. Id. False pretense must be made before property is obtained. 43 C. 479. Distinguished from conspiracy to defraud. 75 C. 209. Conviction under this statute forfeits privileges of an elector. 86 C. 624. Liability of bank to depositor in damages for his arrest under this section when bank negligently returned check marked "no account." 131 C. 167. A mere promise to do an act, even though the promisor has, at the time, no intention of keeping it, is not within the statute. 137 C. 140. Cited. 150 C. 197; 153 C. 599. Where one of alleged coconspirators to violate this section is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal convictions of other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Cited. 158 C. 266; 161 C. 43.
Court not empowered to decide whether extradition from Florida was illegal or not. 25 CS 141. Cited. 12 CS 44; 22 CS 345; 25 CS 347; id., 354; 27 CS 283. Sentencing for several crimes under this section modified on appeal. 27 CS 18. Sentence in excess of jurisdiction of circuit court is not invalid in its entirety but only for period in excess of one year. 28 CS 424.
Statute violated when goods were obtained by postdated check. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99. Subsequent return of goods did not purge offense. Id. Not error to deny motion for new trial even if witness's testimony was false but it appears that result reached on new trial would not be different. Id., 257. Court held that pretense must relate to an existing or past fact and not to some future transaction. Id., 392. A false pretense is an untrue representation of some fact or circumstance calculated to mislead. The representation may be by conduct as well as words. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 516. History discussed. Id., 517.
Annotations to former section 53-361:
States a rule for criminal prosecution and does not state a rule effective in a civil action under section 52-562. 136 C. 222.
Not an additional remedy in a civil action; refers solely to a criminal prosecution. 16 CS 160. Action for defamation against bank for failure to honor checks discussed. 20 CS 115. Unless notice of dishonor was given, no statutory presumption of intent to defraud can arise. Conviction for the crime is still possible, but more difficult. 23 CS 374. The trier could consider defendant's check transactions immediately preceding and following the drawing and delivery of the check in question as relevant not only to issue of intent but also to question of defendant's knowledge. Id.
Crime distinguished from false pretenses, Sec. 53-360. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99. Must be evidence of intent to defraud. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 349. Three elements in definition of offense. Id.
Annotations to former section 53-364:
An employee of selectmen to assist in care of paupers an "agent" within meaning of this section. 58 C. 104.
Accused, guilty of embezzlement, may be prosecuted as an agent of the state for a lesser crime under this section; state held to be "public community." 6 CS 252.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 387.
Annotations to present part IX of chapter 952:
Cited. 43 CA 801. Part IX of penal code cited. Id. Cited. 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-118. Definitions generally. (a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) "Property" means any money, personal property, real property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind. Commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam and water constitute property, but the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of wires, pipes, conduits or other equipment shall be deemed a rendition of a service rather than a sale or delivery of property. (2) "Obtain" includes, but is not limited to, the bringing about of a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legal interest therein, whether to the obtainer or another. (3) To "deprive" another of property means (A) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (B) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property. (4) To "appropriate" property of another to oneself or a third person means (A) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit, or (B) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person. (5) An "owner" means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder. (6) To "receive" means to acquire possession, control or title, or to lend on the security of the property. (7) "Service" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation service, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, and the supplying of equipment for use. (8) "Check" means any check, draft or similar sight order for the payment of money which is not postdated with respect to the time of issuance. (9) "Drawer" of a check means a person whose name appears thereon as the primary obligor, whether the actual signature be that of himself or of a person purportedly authorized to draw the check in his behalf. (10) "Representative drawer" means a person who signs a check as drawer in a representative capacity or as agent of the person whose name appears thereon as the principal drawer or obligor. (11) A person "issues" a check when, as a drawer or representative drawer thereof, he delivers it or causes it to be delivered to a person who thereby acquires a right against the drawer with respect to such check. One who draws a check with intent that it be so delivered is deemed to have issued it if the delivery occurs. (12) A person "passes" a check when, being a payee, holder or bearer of a check which previously has been or purports to have been drawn and issued by another, he delivers it, for a purpose other than collection, to a third person who thereby acquires a right with respect thereto. (13) "Funds" means money or credit. (14) A drawer has "insufficient funds" with a drawee to cover a check when he has no funds or account whatever, or funds in an amount less than that of the check; and a check dishonored for "no account" shall also be deemed to have been dishonored for "insufficient funds". (15) "Credit" means an arrangement or understanding with a bank or depository for the payment of a check, draft or order in full on presentation.
(b) A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.
(c) A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.
(d) In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 120; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 23.)
History: 1971 act added Subdivs. (6) to (15) in Subsec. (a) defining "receive", "service", "check", "drawer", "representative drawer", "issues", "passes", "funds", "insufficient funds" and "credit".
Cited. 201 C. 489, 493. Cited. 233 C. 552, 553.
Cited. 19 CA 695, 696, 702. Cited. 43 CA 801. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 32 CS 650.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 186 C. 555, 568. Subdiv. (5) cited. 196 C. 225, 229. Subdiv. (3) cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Subdiv. (5) cited. 223 C. 243, 252. Subdiv. (4)(A) cited. 233 C. 552, 556. Subdiv. (4)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 242 C. 666. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Subdiv. (4) cited. 11 CA 684, 687. Subdiv. (3) cited. 14 CA 272, 276. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 386, 402. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 449, 454. Cited. 34 CA 751, 770; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. 35 CA 566, 567. Subdiv. (4)(B) cited. Id., 566, 567, 576, 577, 579. Subdiv. (4)(A) cited. Id., 566, 576, 578, 579. Subdiv. (5) cited. 43 CA 801. Subdiv. (6) cited. 45 CA 6. Subdiv. (5) cited. 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (1) cited. 47 CA 1. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (10) cited. 35 CS 536, 540. Subdiv. (1): Applicability of a penal code definition to the products liability statute may be inapposite. 40 CS 120, 122.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 45 CA 369.

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Sec. 53a-119. Larceny defined. A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. Larceny includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Embezzlement. A person commits embezzlement when he wrongfully appropriates to himself or to another property of another in his care or custody.
(2) Obtaining property by false pretenses. A person obtains property by false pretenses when, by any false token, pretense or device, he obtains from another any property, with intent to defraud him or any other person.
(3) Obtaining property by false promise. A person obtains property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or does not believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct. In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise was not performed.
(4) Acquiring property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake. A person who comes into control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the recipient is guilty of larceny if, with purpose to deprive the owner thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to it.
(5) Extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: (A) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or (B) cause damage to property; or (C) engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or (D) accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or (E) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (F) cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or (G) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or (H) use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or (I) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.
(6) Defrauding of public community. A person is guilty of defrauding a public community who (A) authorizes, certifies, attests or files a claim for benefits or reimbursement from a local, state or federal agency which he knows is false; or (B) knowingly accepts the benefits from a claim he knows is false; or (C) as an officer or agent of any public community, with intent to prejudice it, appropriates its property to the use of any person or draws any order upon its treasury or presents or aids in procuring to be allowed any fraudulent claim against such community. For purposes of this subdivision such order or claim shall be deemed to be property.
(7) Theft of services. A person is guilty of theft of services when: (A) With intent to avoid payment for restaurant services rendered, or for services rendered to him as a transient guest at a hotel, motel, inn, tourist cabin, rooming house or comparable establishment, he avoids such payment by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, by stealth, or by any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false; or (B) (i) with intent to obtain railroad, subway, bus, air, taxi or any other public transportation service without payment of the lawful charge therefor or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such transportation service which has been rendered to him, he obtains such service or avoids payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, or (ii) with intent to obtain the use of equipment, including a motor vehicle, without payment of the lawful charge therefor, or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such use which has been permitted him, he obtains such use or avoids such payment therefor by means of any false or fraudulent representation, fraudulent concealment, false pretense or personation, trick, artifice or device, including, but not limited to, a false representation as to his name, residence, employment, or driver's license; or (C) obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.
(8) Receiving stolen property. A person is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property knowing that it has probably been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner. A person who accepts or receives the use or benefit of a public utility commodity which customarily passes through a meter, knowing such commodity (A) has been diverted therefrom, (B) has not been correctly registered or (C) has not been registered at all by a meter, is guilty of larceny by receiving stolen property.
(9) Shoplifting. A person is guilty of shoplifting who intentionally takes possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or other mercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use, without paying the purchase price thereof. A person intentionally concealing unpurchased goods or merchandise of any store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such article with the intention of converting the same to his own use without paying the purchase price thereof.
(10) Conversion of a motor vehicle. A person is guilty of conversion of a motor vehicle who, after renting or leasing a motor vehicle under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such vehicle to a particular place at a particular time, fails to return the vehicle to such place within the time specified, and who thereafter fails to return such vehicle to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the vehicle by registered mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement or, in the absence of such address, to his last-known address as recorded in the records of the motor vehicle department of the state in which he is licensed to operate a motor vehicle. It shall be a complete defense to any civil action arising out of or involving the arrest or detention of any person to whom such demand was sent by registered mail that he failed to return the vehicle to any place of business of the lessor within one hundred twenty hours after the mailing of such demand.
(11) Obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine. A person obtains property through fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when he obtains property by knowingly using in a fraudulent manner an automated teller machine with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person. In any prosecution for larceny based upon fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the machine was located. In any prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine, (A) all such instances in any six-month period may be combined and charged as one offense, with the value of all property obtained thereby being accumulated, and (B) the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in any of the towns in which a machine which was fraudulently used was located. For purposes of this subsection, "automated teller machine" means an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36-193a.
(12) Library theft. A person is guilty of library theft when (A) he conceals on his person or among his belongings a book or other archival library materials, belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility with the intention of removing the same from the library facility without authority or without authority removes a book or other archival library materials from such library facility or (B) he mutilates a book or other archival library materials belonging to, or deposited in, a library facility, so as to render it unusable or reduce its value. The term "book or other archival library materials" includes any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual material in any format, magnetic or other tape, electronic data-processing record, artifact or other documentary, written or printed material regardless of physical form or characteristics, or any part thereof, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of a library facility. The term "library facility" includes any public library, any library of an educational institution, organization or society, any museum, any repository of public records and any archives.
(13) Conversion of leased property. (A) A person is guilty of conversion of leased personal property who, with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person, after renting or leasing such property under an agreement in writing which provides for the return of such property to a particular place at a particular time, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property or any part thereof, and who thereafter fails to return such property to the agreed place or to any other place of business of the lessor within one hundred ninety-two hours after the lessor shall have sent a written demand to him for the return of the property by registered or certified mail addressed to him at his address as shown in the written agreement, unless a more recent address is known to the lessor. (B) Any person, being in possession of personal property other than wearing apparel, received upon a written lease, who, with intent to defraud, sells, conveys, conceals or aids in concealing such property, or any part thereof, shall be prima facie presumed to have done so with the intention of converting such property to his own use. (C) A person who uses a false or fictitious name or address in obtaining such leased personal property shall be prima facie presumed to have obtained such leased personal property with the intent of converting the same to his own use or that of a third person. (D) "Leased personal property", as used in this subdivision, means any personal property received pursuant to a written contract, by which one owning such property, the lessor, grants to another, the lessee, the right to possess, use and enjoy such personal property for a specified period of time for a specified sum.
(14) Failure to pay prevailing rate of wages. A person is guilty of failing to pay the prevailing rate of wages when he (A) files a certified payroll, in accordance with section 31-53 which he knows is false, in violation of section 53a-157a, and (B) fails to pay to an employee or to an employee welfare fund the amount attested to in the certified payroll with the intent to convert such amount to his own use or to the use of a third party.
(15) Theft of utility service. A person is guilty of theft of utility service when he intentionally obtains electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service that is available only for compensation: (A) By deception or threat or by false token, slug or other means including, but not limited to, electronic or mechanical device or unauthorized use of a confidential identification or authorization code or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (B) by tampering or making connection with or disconnecting the meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment or by manufacturing, modifying, altering, programming, reprogramming or possessing any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof or by disguising the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by a supplier of electric, gas, water, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service, without the consent of such supplier, in order to avoid payment for the service by himself or another person; or (C) with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service the charge or compensation for which is measured by a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service, by tampering with such meter or device or by attempting in any manner to prevent such meter or device from performing its measuring function, without the consent of the supplier of the service. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person to whom the service is billed has the intent to obtain the service and to avoid making payment for the service if, without the consent of the supplier of the service: (i) Any meter, pipe, cable, conduit, conductor, attachment or other equipment has been tampered with or connected or disconnected, (ii) any device, software or equipment or part or component thereof has been modified, altered, programmed, reprogrammed or possessed, (iii) the identity or identification numbers of any device or equipment utilized by the supplier of the service have been disguised, or (iv) a meter or other mechanical measuring device provided by the supplier of the service has been tampered with or prevented from performing its measuring function. The presumption does not apply if the person to whose service the condition applies has received such service for less than thirty-one days or until the service supplier has made at least one meter or service reading and provided a billing statement to the person as to whose service the condition applies. The presumption does not apply with respect to wireless radio communications.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 121; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 24; 1972, P.A. 188, S. 1, 2; P.A. 73-639, S. 21; P.A. 75-225; P.A. 76-109; P.A. 79-268; P.A. 81-224; 81-263, S. 1; P.A. 83-417, S. 1; P.A. 84-248, S. 1; 84-301, S. 1; 84-546, S. 161, 173; P.A. 85- 339, S. 1; P.A. 91-162, S. 17, 18; P.A. 92-260, S. 49; P.A. 93-392, S. 5; P.A. 95-246, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act deleted "Committing the crime of" preceding actual crimes in Subdivs. (6) to (8), specified actions which constitute theft of services or receiving stolen property in Subdivs. (7) and (8), deleting references to those crimes as defined in Secs. 53a-120 and 53a-126 respectively, and added Subdiv. (9) re shoplifting; 1972 act added Subpara. (B) in Subdiv. (7)(2) re fraud in avoiding payment for use of equipment, including motor vehicles and added Subdiv. (10) re conversion of motor vehicle; P.A. 73-639 revised Subdiv. (10) to clarify title of crime where previously crime described was simply referred to as larceny; P.A. 75-225 deleted provision in Subdiv. (3) which required that finding be based on evidence establishing that case facts and circumstances are "wholly consistent with guilty intent or belief and wholly inconsistent with innocent intent or belief", and that evidence excludes "to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed"; P.A. 76-109 applied provisions of Subdiv. (7) to community antenna television service; P.A. 79-268 specified applicability of Subdiv. (7) (3) re "gas, electricity, water and steam service" for consistency with Subdiv. (7)(5); P.A. 81-224 amended Subdiv. (8) to include receiving the use or benefit of public utility services which have been diverted from or incorrectly registered on a meter as larceny by receiving stolen property; P.A. 81-263 amended Subdiv. (6) by adding the provision that a person is guilty of defrauding a public community who authorizes or files a false claim for benefits from a local, state or federal agency or accepts the benefits from a false claim; P.A. 83-417 added Subdiv. (11) re obtaining property through fraudulent use of an automatic teller machine; P.A. 84-248 added Subdiv. (12) defining crime of library theft and the Revisors editorially added a subdivision catchline to conform with previously existing Subdivs.; P.A. 84-301 amended Subdiv. (11) by replacing "automatic" with "automated", adding provisions re prosecution for larceny based upon more than one instance of fraudulent use, and adding definition of "automated teller machine"; P.A. 84-546 made technical change in Subdiv. (12); P.A. 85-339 added Subdiv. (13) re conversion of leased personal property; P.A. 91-162 amended Subdiv. (13) to delete refusal to return leased personal property or failure to return leased personal property to a certain place within a certain time as elements of the offense of conversion of leased personal property in order to protect consumers leasing personal property under consumer rent-to-own agreements, as defined in Sec. 42-240a, from being charged with the offense of conversion of leased personal property upon their refusal or failure to return such property to the lessor; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subdiv. (6) and made technical changes in Subpara. indicators in Subdivs. (6) to (8), inclusive; P.A. 93-392 added Subdiv. (14) re failure to pay prevailing rate of wages; P.A. 95-246 amended Subdiv. (7) to delete Subpara. (C) re theft of gas, electricity, water, steam, telecommunication or community antenna service, Subpara. (D) re tampering with a meter or measuring device to avoid payment for service the charge or compensation of which is measured by such meter or device and Subpara. (E) re tampering with the equipment of a supplier of gas, electricity, water, steam, telephone or community antenna television service, relettering former Subpara. (F) as Subpara. (C), and added Subdiv. (15) re theft of utility service; (Revisors's note: In 1999 the words in Subdiv. (8)(C) "as not been registered" were replaced editorially with "has not been registered" to correct a clerical error).
Annotations to former section 53-65:
Cited. 165 C. 163.
Cited. 31 CS 296. Cited. 31 CS 434.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 170 C. 463, 466. Inference based on possession of recently stolen property; meaning of "possession;" mere presence of passenger in motor vehicle containing recently stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. 171 C. 127. Cited. 172 C. 571. Cited. 174 C. 338, 342. Cited. 176 C. 239, 242, 243. Cited. 178 C. 163, 164, 167; id., 689, 694. Cited 179 C. 576, 587. Cited. 180 C. 662, 663, 665, 675, 679. Cited. 181 C. 172, 173, 177; id., 254, 255; id., 299, 312; id., 388, 396. Cited. 182 C. 449, 460; id., 476, 477. Cited. 183 C. 299, 303; id., 386, 387. Cited. 185 C. 211, 212. Cited. 186 C. 1, 7; id., 426, 427; id., 555, 557, 571 (Diss. Op.), 572 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 188 C. 671, 674; id., 681, 682, 696. Cited. 189 C. 114, 115, 121; id., 383, 385. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199, 204. Cited. Id., 223. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. Id., 225−227. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 17, 18. Cited. Id., 201, 203. Cited. Id., 247, 261. Cited. 198 C. 1, 2, 20. Cited. 199 C. 207, 223. Cited. 200 C. 310, 312, 322. Cited. 200 C. 586, 587. Cited. 201 C. 489, 493. Cited. 209 C. 564, 575, 576. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687, 689. Cited. 211 C. 101, 102, 114. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 213 C. 422, 424. Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited. Id., 161, 163. Cited. Id., 717, 720. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 221 C. 685−687. Cited. 223 C. 243, 252. Cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Cited. 227 C. 611, 612. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 439; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 455, 458. Cited. Id., 740, 742. Cited. 233 C. 527, 528, 530. Cited. Id., 552, 553. Cited. 235 C. 502, 505, 515. Cited. 241 C. 439. Cited. Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 666.
Cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Cited. 3 CA 633, 634. Cited. 4 CA 544, 556. Cited. 5 CA 599, 604. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. Id., 326, 334, 336. Cited. Id., 532, 533. Cited. 8 CA 125, 141. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. Id., 141, 142, 144. Cited. Id., 313, 314, 319. Cited. Id., 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 447, 448. Cited. 11 CA 102, 103. Cited. Id., 161, 162, 164, 165, 167. Cited. 12 CA 1, 19, 24. Cited. Id., 163, 171. Cited. Id., 408, 410, 412. Cited. 13 CA 12. Cited. Id., 576, 577. Cited. Id., 596, 601. Cited. 14 CA 472, 474. Cited. 15 CA 641, 642, 644, 645. Cited. 19 CA 111, 137, 138; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 521, 530. Cited. Id., 695, 706. Cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Cited. Id., 665, 666. Cited. 21 CA 431, 432. Cited. 25 CA 298, 304. Cited. Id., 646, 648. Cited. 26 CA 52, 53. Cited. 28 CA 469. Cited. Id., 521, 527. Cited. 30 CA 190, 191. Cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 56. Cited. 33 CA 303, 309. Cited. Id., 339, 351. Cited. Id., 368, 369, 372, 377. Cited. Id., 603, 604. Cited. 34 CA 250, 251; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 599, 600. Cited. Id., 694, 695, 699, 700. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 566, 567. Cited. 37 CA 482, 488. Cited. Id., 589, 594. Cited. Id., 619, 621, 627. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 643, 645, 647. Cited. 39 CA 96, 97. Cited. Id., 579, 593. Cited. 41 CA 584, 585. Cited. Id., 695, 696. Cited. 42 CA 599. Cited. 43 CA 499. Cited. Id., 801. Cited. 44 CA 294. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. Id., 46. Cited. Id., 369. Cited. Id., 455. Cited. 46 CA 269. Cited. Id., 414. Cited. Id., 616. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 778. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 32 CS 650. Cited. Id., 653. Cited. 34 CS 612, 616. Cited. 36 CS 570, 573. Cited. 37 CS 678, 684. Statutory definition of larceny does not modify common law rule that proof of the identity of the owner of stolen property is not an element of the crime of larceny. Id., 809, 812. Cited. 37 CS 853. Cited. 38 CS 1, 5; id., 593, 595. Cited. 39 CS 27, 30; id., 363, 364.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 178 C. 480, 481. Cited. 188 C. 681, 696. Cited. 199 C. 462, 464, 467, 471. Cited. 203 C. 682, 686. Cited. 208 C. 420, 421. Cited. 233 C. 552, 556.
Cited. 9 CA 365. Cited. 11 CA 684, 685, 687. Cited. 19 CA 521, 522. Cited. 35 CA 566, 576, 577. Cited. 46 CA 414. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Subsec. (2):
Cited. 169 C. 581. Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 180 C. 662, 664, 665. Cited. 188 C. 681, 696. Cited. 194 C. 96, 97. Cited. Id., 233, 239. Cited. 195 C. 421, 422. Cited. 198 C. 348, 350, 351. Cited. 242 C. 345.
Cited. 4 CA 69, 74. Cited. 11 CA 161, 166. Cited. 14 CA 88, 91, 102. Cited. 25 CA 298, 306. Cited. 28 CA 306−308. Cited. Id., 521, 527.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 178 C. 163, 167, 169−172; Id., 649, 650. Cited. 180 C. 662, 665. Cited. 188 C. 681, 696. Cited. 190 C. 541, 542, 549.
Subsec. (5):
Subdiv. (E) cited. 237 C. 501.
Cited. 7 CA 367, 372. Cited. 21 CA 386, 402. Subdiv. (H) cited. Id. Cited. 22 CA 449, 451, 454. Subdiv. (E) cited. 37 CA 62, 63; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq. Cited. 40 CA 151, 160.
Subsec. (6):
Cited. 233 C. 527, 528. Subdiv. (B) cited. Id., 527, 528. Subdiv. (C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (A) cited. Id., 527, 528, 530.
Cited. 7 CA 326, 331−334. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 326, 328, 332, 337, 338, 340. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 272, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 17 CA 486, 487. Cited. 27 CA 635, 641. Subdiv. (A) cited. 34 CA 694, 699, 700. Also cited as 53a-119(6)(1). Id., Subdiv. (6)(C) cited. Id., 694, 705. Cited. 43 CA 499. Cited. 44 CA 187.
Subsec. (7):
Subdiv. (F): Charging in the conjunctive discussed; judgment of appellate court in State v. Wohler, 30 CA 571, 576, reversed. 231 C. 411−413.
Subdiv. (4) cited. 10 CA 486, 493, 494. Cited. 11 CA 161, 167. Cited. 25 CA 298, 304. Subdiv. (F) cited. 30 CA 571, 572; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411 et seq. Subdiv. (F) cited. 38 CA 277, 279.
For conviction of offense of theft of services rendered at hotel, motel, inn or comparable establishment, the state must show that accused had been transient guest thereat. 34 CS 603, 604. Cited. 38 CS 1, 5. Subdiv. (b) cited. Id., 593, 595.
Subsec. (8):
Cited. 178 C. 416, 417, 419. Instruction on intent unnecessary under this statute. 181 C. 299, 300, 311, 315, 316. Cited. 186 C. 426, 427. Cited. 188 C. 325, 326, 328. Cited. 190 C. 191, 192, 199, 201, 207 (Diss. Op.), 211 (Diss. Op.). Mens rea and scienter discussed. 192 C. 405, 407, 409, 411−413, 422, 423. Cited. 195 C. 421−423. Cited. 196 C. 115, 116. Cited. 200 C. 113, 116. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 1 CA 270. Cited. 5 CA 129, 130. Cited. 8 CA 13, 14. Cited. Id., 125, 126, 139. Cited. 11 CA 161, 165. Cited. 12 CA 408, 411, 412, 414. Cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Cited. Id., 641, 642, 645. Cited. 16 CA 402, 403. Cited. 25 CA 149, 150, 153. Cited. 26 CA 33, 34, 43, 44. Cited. 31 CA 614, 617. Cited. 37 CA 40, 41, 50, 51. Cited. 39 CA 96, 97, 103. Cited. 43 CA 613. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. Id., 369.
Cited. 31 CS 510. Mental element required is knowledge or belief that the property probably has been stolen. There must be more than mere suspicion or conjecture. Use of word "probably" as a specification of degree of certainty clarifies law. 35 CS 531, 533, 534. Cited. 36 CS 603, 608.
Subsec. (9):
Cited. 13 CA 578, 583. Cited. 14 CA 88, 89, 91, 95, 102.
Cited. 37 CS 678.
Subsec. (10):
Cited. 39 CS 27, 30, 33.
Subsec. (13):
Subdiv. (A) cited. 29 CA 283, 289; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795 et seq.

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Sec. 53a-119a. Shoplifting and library theft; detention, questioning, presumption of crime. (a) Any owner, authorized agent or authorized employee of a retail mercantile establishment, who observes any person concealing or attempting to conceal goods displayed for sale therein, or the ownership of such goods, or transporting such goods from such premises without payment therefor, may question such person as to his name and address and, if such owner, agent or employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the person so questioned was then attempting to commit or was committing larceny of such goods on the premises of such establishment, may detain such person for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned by such owner, authorized agent or authorized employee pursuant to the provisions of this section shall promptly identify himself by name and address. No other information shall be required of such person until a police officer has taken him into custody. For the purposes of this subsection, "reasonable grounds" shall include knowledge that a person has concealed unpurchased merchandise of such establishment while on the premises or has altered or removed identifying labels on such merchandise while on the premises or is leaving such premises with such unpurchased or concealed or altered merchandise in his possession.
(b) Whenever an employee or authorized agent of a library facility, as defined in subdivision (12) of section 53a-119, has reasonable grounds to believe that a person (1) is removing or is attempting to remove, without authority, a book or other archival library materials, as defined in said subdivision (12) of section 53a-119, from a library facility or (2) is intentionally mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials, such employee or authorized agent may question such person as to his name and address and may detain such person for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the premises. Any person so questioned by such employee or agent shall promptly identify himself by name and address. For the purposes of this subsection, reasonable grounds shall include knowledge that a person (A) has concealed a book or other archival library materials while on the library facility premises or is removing such book or material from the library facility premises without authority or (B) has mutilated, defaced or destroyed a book or other archival library materials belonging to or deposited in a library facility.
(c) In any civil action by a person detained under the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section against the person so detaining him or the principal or employer of such person arising out of such questioning or detention by any such owner, agent or employee, evidence that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff was, at the time in question, committing or attempting to commit larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials shall create a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was so committing or attempting to commit larceny or mutilating, defacing or destroying a book or other archival library materials.
(P.A. 73-617, S. 2; P.A. 84-248, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 50.)
History: P.A. 84-248 inserted new Subsec. (b) authorizing employees or authorized agents of library facilities to detain and question any person who, on reasonable grounds, is suspected of attempting to commit library theft, relettering former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), and adding provision re "mutilating, defacing or destroying library books or archival library materials"; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b) and (c).
Transgression of this statute results in merchants inability to assert statutory privilege in a civil proceeding but does not require exclusion of evidence in a related criminal prosecution. 39 CS 392, 394−396.

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Sec. 53a-119b. Using motor vehicle or vessel without owner's permission. Interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle. First offense: Class A misdemeanor. Subsequent offense: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of using a motor vehicle without the owner's permission when: (1) He operates or uses, or causes to be operated or used, any motor vehicle unless he has the consent of the owner; or (2) he obtains the consent of the owner to the use of his motor vehicle by fraud or fraudulent means, statement or representations.
(b) A person is guilty of using a vessel, as defined in section 15-127, without the owner's permission when: (1) He operates or uses, or causes to be operated or used, any vessel unless he has the consent of the owner; or (2) he obtains the consent of the owner to the use of his vessel by fraud or fraudulent means, statement or representations.
(c) A person is guilty of interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle when: (1) He puts into motion the engine of any motor vehicle while it is standing without the permission of the owner except that a property owner or his agent may remove any motor vehicle left without authorization on such owner's property in accordance with section 14-145; or (2) with intent and without right to do so, he damages any motor vehicle or damages or removes any of its parts or components.
(d) Using a motor vehicle or a vessel without the owner's permission or interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle is a class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a class D felony for each subsequent offense.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 18; P.A. 80-292, S. 10; 80-341, S. 3; P.A. 81-351, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-292 replaced previous Subsec. (b) provision which made use of motor vehicle without owner's permission a Class B misdemeanor with new provisions specifying first such offense as Class A misdemeanor and subsequent offenses as Class D felonies; P.A. 80-341 inserted new Subsec. (b) re use of vessel without owner's permission, relettering and revising former Subsec. (b) as necessary to reflect its insertion; P.A. 81-351 inserted new Subsec. (c) on interfering or tampering with a motor vehicle, relettering former Subsec. (c) accordingly.
Cited. 195 C. 567, 569. Cited. 231 C. 195, 209.
Cited. 14 CA 169, 170. Cited. 21 CA 645, 646. Cited. 25 CA 181, 184. Cited. 26 CA 165, 166. Cited. 27 CA 49, 50, 55. Cited. 32 CA 483, 487. Cited. 36 CA 364, 373. Cited. 37 CA 276, 278. Cited. 45 CA 369.
Cited. 37 CS 901. Cited. 43 CS 211.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 206 C. 657, 659.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 361, 362. Cited. 27 CA 49, 52, 53. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 613. Subdiv. (1) cited. 45 CA 369.
Subsec. (c):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 119, 120, 123, 124, 127. Cited. 39 CA 1, 2, 5. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 613.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 45 CA 369.

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Sec. 53a-120. Theft of services; service and credit card defined. Section 53a- 120 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 122; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
See Sec. 53a-118 for definitions applicable to larceny, robbery and related offenses.

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Sec. 53a-121. Value of property or services. (a) For the purposes of this part, the value of property or services shall be ascertained as follows: (1) Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property or services at the time and place of the crime or, if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property or services within a reasonable time after the crime. (2) Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, written instruments, except those having a readily ascertainable market value such as some public and corporate bonds and securities, shall be evaluated as follows: (A) The value of an instrument constituting evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed the amount due or collectible thereon, such figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any portion thereof which has been satisfied; (B) the value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument. (3) When the value of property or services cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than fifty dollars.
(b) Amounts included in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 123.)
Cited. 182 C. 52, 53, 64, 65. Cited (Diss. Op.). Id., 397, 402. Cited. 191 C. 180, 190, 191. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 9 CA 313, 319. Cited. 19 CA 521, 522. Cited. 25 CA 298, 307. Cited. 37 CA 62, 63; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501 et seq.
Evidence of trade-in value insufficient to establish market value or replacement cost for purposes of statute. 35 CS 531, 535, 536.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 176 C. 239, 242; 178 C. 416, 421. Subdiv. (1) cited. 181 C. 172, 182, 183; 182 C. 397−399, 401, 402. Cited. 190 C. 191, 201, 205. Subdiv. (1) cited. 196 C. 225, 229, 230. Cited. Id., 166, 172. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 247, 262. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 396, 406. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 308, 313. Subdiv. (1) cited. 200 C. 113, 120. Cited. 241 C. 439. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 5 CA 129, 132. Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 408, 410. Cited. 33 CA 339, 351; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 269.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 177 C. 243. Cited. 178 C. 649, 650. Cited. 199 C. 462, 464, 471. Cited. 228 C. 926. Cited. 232 C. 431, 435, 440; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 505, 508, 514−518. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 33 CA 339, 351−353; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 34 CA 250, 254. Cited. 47 CA 1.

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Sec. 53a-122. Larceny in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the first degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The property or service, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion, (2) the value of the property or service exceeds ten thousand dollars, (3) the property consists of a motor vehicle, the value of which exceeds ten thousand dollars, or (4) the property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value of such property exceeds two thousand dollars.
(b) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any of the above. In any prosecution under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence (A) that the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) that such person possesses such motor vehicle with larcenous intent.
(c) Larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 124; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 25; P.A. 73-639, S. 7; P.A. 81-248, S. 1; 81-351, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 1; P.A. 86-275, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 51; P.A. 00-103, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act deleted detailed description of extortionist acts in Subsec. (a)(1), i.e. threat of physical injury, damage to property, etc., and made first degree larceny a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 73-639 made first degree larceny a Class B felony; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 81-351 included property consisting of a motor vehicle having a value exceeding two thousand dollars in the definition of larceny in the first degree inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 82-271 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) by increasing from two to ten thousand dollars the value of the property or service obtained and by adding Subdiv. (4) concerning defrauding a public community; P.A. 86-275 amended Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) to increase the value of a motor vehicle subject to the section from in excess of two thousand dollars to in excess of ten thousand dollars; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) by rephrasing language; P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining "motor vehicle" and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent.
Inference based on possession of recently stolen property (driver versus passenger of motor van containing stolen property); meaning of "possession." 171 C. 119, 127. Mere presence of passenger in vehicle containing stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. Id., 127. Cited. 174 C. 253, 254. Cited. Id., 338, 339. Cited. 183 C. 383. Cited. 186 C. 648, 649. Cited. 188 C. 715, 722. Cited. 189 C. 717, 718. Cited. 190 C. 559, 560. Cited. 194 C. 361, 362. Cited. 196 C. 185. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. Id., 247, 262. Cited. 199 C. 30, 32. Cited. Id., 207, 223, 224. Cited. 202 C. 86. Cited. 204 C. 52. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Cited. 237 C. 501. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. Id., 439.
Cited. 3 CA 359, 362. Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. Id., 347, 348. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. 7 CA 326, 331, 334, 336. Cited. Id., 532, 533. Cited. 9 CA 349, 351. Cited. 12 CA 585, 587. Cited. 14 CA 272, 278. Cited. 20 CA 810. Cited. 21 CA 431, 436. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 34 CA 599, 600. Cited. Id., 751, 766; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 36 CA 364, 374. Cited. 37 CA 40, 42, 50, 51. Cited. 45 CA 455.
Cited. 31 CS 501.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 169 C. 581; 176 C. 239, 242; 177 C. 243. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 427, 429. Subdiv. (2) cited. 178 C. 163, 164, 166, 169; id., 416, 417, 419; id., 480, 481; id., 649, 650; 180 C. 182; id., 662, 663, 665. 181 C. 172, 173, 177, 182; id., 254, 255; id., 299, 300, 311; 182 C. 52, 54, 62. Subdiv. (2) cited. 183 C. 225; 185 C. 211, 212; 188 C. 671, 674, 676; id., 681, 682; id., 715, 716; Subdiv. (1) cited. 189 C. 114, 115. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 201, 202; id., 337, 339; id., 383, 385; 190 C. 541, 542; 192 C. 405, 407, 472. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 421, 422. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 225, 227, 228, 230. Subdiv. (3) cited. 197 C. 17, 18. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 247, 248. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 413, 415. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 629, 630. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 348, 350, 351. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 369, 370. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 14, 16. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 207, 208. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 420, 421. Subdiv. (3) cited. 214 C. 132, 133; Id., 717, 720. Subdiv. (2) cited. 218 C. 151, 152; 219 C. 93, 95. Subdiv. (3) cited. 221 C. 685, 687. Subdiv. (3) cited. 227 C. 611, 612. Subdiv. (3) cited. 232 C. 691, 693. Subdiv. (4) cited. 233 C. 527, 528, 530. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 552, 554. Cited. 235 C. 502, 517. Cited. 242 C. 345.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 3 CA 359, 360, 365. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 633, 634. Subdiv. (2) cited. 4 CA 251. Subdiv. (2) cited. 5 CA 129−131. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 292. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 326, 331−333. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 326, 328, 331− 333. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (3) cited. 8 CA 125, 141. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 376, 377. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 121, 122. Cited. Id., 313, 319. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 365. Subdiv. (2) cited. 10 CA 447, 448, 451. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 684, 685, 689. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 576, 577. Subdiv. (2) cited. 15 CA 416, 417. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 402, 403. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 359, 360. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 486, 487. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 354, 355. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 665, 666. Subdiv. (1) cited. 21 CA 386, 387. Subdiv. (1) cited. 22 CA 449, 450. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Subdiv. (3) cited. 25 CA 149, 150; Id., 181, 182; 26 CA 279, 280. Cited. 28 CA 306−308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 306, 308. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 521, 522, 525−527, 530. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 521, 522, 525, 527, 530. Subdiv. (3) cited. 29 CA 394, 396. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 190, 191. Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 614, 617. Subdiv. (2) cited. 33 CA 368, 369. Subdiv. (4) cited. 34 CA 694, 695, 699, 701, 702. Cited. Id., 751, 753; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 751, 753, 758; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 35 CA 566−568. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740, 742. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (2) cited. 37 CA 40−42, 51. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 589, 594. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 619, 621. Cited. 38 CA 481, 482. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 643, 645, 653. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 96, 97, 103. Subdiv. (2) cited. 41 CA 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 499. Subdiv. (4) cited. 44 CA 187. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 476. Cited. 45 CA 455. Subdiv. (2) cited. 47 CA 1.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 52, 62.

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Sec. 53a-123. Larceny in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the second degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The property consists of a motor vehicle, the value of which exceeds five thousand dollars, (2) the value of the property or service exceeds five thousand dollars, (3) the property, regardless of its nature or value, is taken from the person of another, (4) the property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value of such property is two thousand dollars or less, or (5) the property, regardless of its nature or value, is obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses or false promise and the victim of such larceny is sixty years of age or older or is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section 1-1f.
(b) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any of the above. In any prosecution under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence (A) that the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) that such person possesses such motor vehicle with larcenous intent.
(c) Larceny in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 125; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 26; P.A. 73-639, S. 8; P.A. 81-248, S. 2; 81-263, S. 2; 81-351, S. 4; 81- 472, S. 152, 159; P.A. 82-271, S. 2; P.A. 86-275, S. 2; P.A. 97-180; P.A. 00-103, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act applied second degree larceny to cases where property is a motor vehicle and made second degree larceny a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor; P.A. 73-639 specified that taking property, regardless of its nature or value, from another's person is second degree larceny; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 81-263 added Subdiv. (4) in Subsec. (a) re property obtained by defrauding a public community where the value of the property is less than two thousand dollars; P.A. 81-351 amended the definition of larceny of a motor vehicle to that with a value of two thousand dollars or less, inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 81- 472 made technical corrections; P.A. 82-271 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) by increasing from five hundred dollars to five thousand dollars the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing the classification from a class D to a class C felony; P.A. 86-275 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) to increase the value of a motor vehicle subject to the section from two thousand dollars or less to a value which exceeds five thousand dollars; P.A. 97-180 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (5) re property obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses or false promise from an aged, blind or disabled victim; P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining "motor vehicle" and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent.
Cited. 173 C. 545. Cited. 182 C. 176, 177. Cited. 183 C. 386, 387. Cited. 188 C. 542, 543. Cited. 190 C. 559, 560. Cited. 194 C. 438, 439. Cited. Id., C. 650, 651. Cited. 196 C. 305, 306. Cited. Id., 567, 568. Cited. 197 C. 166, 172. Cited. Id., 201, 203. Cited. Id., 247, 262. Cited. Id., 309. Cited. 198 C. 1, 2, 20. Cited. 199 C. 30, 31. Cited. Id., 308, 309. Cited. Id., 462, 464. Cited. 200 C. 113, 120. Cited. 202 C. 615, 617. Cited. 203 C. 484, 486. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 213 C. 233, 234. Cited. Id., 233, 236. Cited. 216 C. 273, 274. Cited. 235 C. 679, 683. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 2 CA 537, 538. Cited. 5 CA 113, 114. Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 8 CA 125, 141, 142. Cited. Id., 478, 481, 484, 487, 488. Cited. 9 CA 349, 350. Cited. 13 CA 420, 431. Cited. Id., 576. Cited. Id., 596, 597. Secs. 53a-122−53a-125b cited. 14 CA 272, 278. Cited. Id., 472, 474. Cited. 16 CA 433, 435. Cited. 17 CA 460, 461. Cited. 19 CA 495, 497. Cited. 20 CA 271, 272. Cited. Id., 369, 370. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 35 CA 566, 568. Cited. Id., 714, 717. Cited. 39 CA 810, 811. Cited. 44 CA 187. Cited. Id., 294. Cited. 46 CA 691.
Requisites for accepting plea of guilty. 31 CS 501. Cited. 32 CS 650. Cited. 35 CS 531, 535. Cited. 38 CS 549.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 129, 130. Subdiv. (2) cited. 169 C. 247, 249. Subdiv. (3) cited. 174 C. 129, 130, 133. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 427, 429; id., 689, 690. Subdiv. (2) cited. 181 C. 299, 300. Subdiv. (1) cited. 182 C. 476, 477; 186 C. 426, 427. Subdiv. (2) cited. 187 C. 264, 265, 271; 188 C. 325, 326; id., 671, 675, 676; 190 C. 191, 192, 199, 200; 191 C. 180, 181, 188. Subdiv. (1) cited. 195 C. 421−423. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 36, 37. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 36−38. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 203. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 308, 312. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 113, 114, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 462, 468. Subdiv. (2) cited. 206 C. 657, 659. Cited. 207 C. 118, 120. Subdiv. (1) cited. 208 C. 365, 366. Subdiv. (1) cited. 210 C. 652, 654. Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 101−103, 114, 115. Subdiv. (2) cited. 212 C. 223, 225, 237. Subdiv. (4) cited. 213 C. 233, 234, 236, 243. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 422, 424. Subdiv. (1) cited. 215 C. 716, 719. Subdiv. (3) cited. 219 C. 160, 161; 220 C. 487, 489. Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 243, 248. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 455, 458. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 552, 554. Subdiv. (3) cited. 235 C. 67, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 784. Cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (3) cited. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (3): Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. 246 C. 132.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 1 CA 270. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 378, 379. Subdiv. (3): Larceny from the person requires an actual trespass to the person of the victim and therefore taking a radio which was in the vicinity of the victim, but not on the victim's person, did not constitute larceny under this section. 1 CA 642−644. Subdiv. (3) cited. 3 CA 126. Cited. 8 CA 125, 141. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 125, 126, 139. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 478, 481, 485, 488. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 478, 488. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 491, 493. Subdiv. (3) cited. 11 CA 102, 103, 120. Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 408−410. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 685. Subdiv. (1) cited. 13 CA 12. Subdiv. 92) cited. Id., 554−556. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 596, 601, 603. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 169, 170. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 272, 273, 275. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 472−474, 476, 477. Cited. Id., 493, 503. Subdiv. (3) cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 697, 698. Subdiv. (1) cited. 26 CA 52, 54. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 114, 116. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 279, 280. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 306−308. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 606, 607. Subdiv. (3) cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 51, 56−58. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 94, 103. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 312, 314. Subdiv. (3) cited. 32 CA 21, 23. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 468−470, 485, 487, 489. Subdiv. (2) cited. 34 CA 250, 251. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 699, 701. Subdiv. (3) cited. 35 CA 740, 743. Subdiv. (2) cited. 38 CA 643, 650, 651. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 579, 593. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 840, 841. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (3) cited. 41 CA 391, 393. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 584, 585. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 817, 818. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. 42 CA 810. Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 414. Cited. Id., 616. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CS 603, 604. Subdiv. (2) cited. 36 CS 603, 604; 37 CS 527, 528.

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Sec. 53a-124. Larceny in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the third degree when he commits larceny, as defined in section 53a-119, and: (1) The property consists of a motor vehicle, the value of which is five thousand dollars or less; (2) the value of the property or service exceeds one thousand dollars; (3) the property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, held or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or (4) the property consists of a sample, culture, microorganism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects or records a secret scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any phase or part thereof. A process, invention or formula is "secret" when it is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the owner thereof or selected persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent, and when it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.
(b) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle, construction equipment, agricultural tractor or farm implement or major component part of any of the above. In any prosecution under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, evidence of (1) forcible entry, (2) forcible removal of ignition, or (3) alteration, mutilation or removal of a vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence (A) that the person in control or possession of such motor vehicle knows or should have known that such motor vehicle is stolen, and (B) that such person possesses such motor vehicle with larcenous intent.
(c) Larceny in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 126; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 27; P.A. 73-639, S. 9; P.A. 81-248, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 3; P.A. 88-170; P.A. 92-260, S. 52; P.A. 00-103, S. 3.)
History: 1971 act deleted former Subdiv. (5) in Subsec. (a) which classified obtaining property or service, regardless of its nature or value, by extortion as third degree larceny; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subdiv. (4) in Subsec. (a) which classified taking property from the person of another, regardless of its nature or value, as third degree larceny; P.A. 81- 248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a) by increasing from fifty dollars to one thousand dollars the value of the property or service obtained and amended Subsec. (c) by changing the classification from a class B misdemeanor to a class D felony; P.A. 88-170 amended Subsec. (a) by adding property consisting of a motor vehicle, the value of which is five thousand dollars or less and inserted new Subsec. (b) stating that in any prosecution under Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (a), evidence of forcible entry, forcible removal of ignition or alternation, mutilation or removal of vehicle identification number shall be prima facie evidence of larcenous intent, relettering former Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining "motor vehicle" and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent.
See Sec. 53a-212 re stealing a firearm.
Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 258, 260; id., 434, 438. Cited. 185 C. 260, 261, 267. Cited. 187 C. 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364. Cited. 190 C. 715, 717. Cited. 191 C. 180, 192. Cited. 194 C. 198, 204. Cited. Id., 233, 234. Cited. Id., 623, 624. Cited. 197 C. 247, 262. Cited. 200 C. 586, 587. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 232 C. 431, 439; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 3 CA 503. Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 8 CA 13, 14, 21. Cited. Id., 342, 343. Cited. Id., 478, 480, 485, 487, 490. Cited. Id., 667, 672, 672D. Cited. 9 CA 141, 142, 144. Cited. 10 CA 258, 259. Cited. 12 CA 196, 197. Cited. 14 CA 159, 160. Secs. 53a-122−53a-125b cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. 18 CA 368, 369. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50. Cited. 20 CA 810. Cited. 23 CA 201, 202. Cited. 25 CA 298, 307. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 32 CA 476, 477. Cited. 33 CA 339, 351; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 368, 369. Cited. 38 CA 643, 644, 651. Cited. 41 CA 751−753. Cited. 46 CA 691.
Cited. 36 CS 578, 581; id., 583; id., 603, 604. Cited. 37 CS 678, 679; id., 796, 797, 802. Cited. 184 C. 95, 96; id., 258, 260; id., 434, 438. Cited. 185 C. 260, 261, 267. Cited. 187 C. 292, 293; id., 444, 447. Cited. 189 C. 364. Cited. 190 C. 715, 717. Cited. 191 C. 180, 192.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 239 C. 235.
Cited. 38 CA 643, 651. Cited. 39 CA 579, 581. Cited. 46 CA 269.
Subsec. (a)(1):
Cited. 176 C. 239, 242. Cited. 178 C. 287, 288. Cited. 179 C. 576, 578. Cited. 182 C. 397, 400. Cited. 186 C. 222, 224. Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 190 C. 104, 105. Cited. 195 C. 567, 569. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 88, 89. Cited. 214 C. 132, 133. Cited. 221 C. 685, 687. Cited. 230 C. 351, 354.
Cited. 6 CA 697, 698. Cited. 8 CA 478, 488. Cited. 10 CA 486, 493. Cited. 12 CA 1, 3. Cited. 14 CA 256. Cited. 15 CA 122, 123. Cited. 19 CA 521, 522. Cited. 21 CA 431, 432. Cited. 26 CA 279, 280. Cited. 37 CA 219. Cited. Id., 482, 483. Cited. 38 CA 643, 647, 648, 650−652. Cited. 41 CA 695, 696. Cited. 43 CA 613.
Subsec. (a)(2):
Cited. 232 C. 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 740, 742. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504, 505, 514, 515. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 24 CA 697, 698. Cited. 25 CA 298, 300. Cited. 28 CA 306, 308. Cited. 33 CA 339, 340; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. Id., 603, 604, 608. Cited. 38 CA 643, 645, 647, 648, 650−652. Cited. 39 CA 579, 593. Cited. 46 CA 269.
Former subsec. (a)(4):
Cited. 169 C. 161.
Cited. 33 CS 669. Cited. Id., 706. Cited. 34 CS 603. Cited. Id., 656.

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Sec. 53a-125. Larceny in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the fourth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds five hundred dollars.
(b) Larceny in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 127; P.A. 81-248, S. 4; P.A. 82-271, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing the value of the property or service obtained from fifty dollars or less to in excess of five hundred dollars and amended Subsec. (b) by changing the classification from a class C to a class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 172 C. 571. Cited. 176 C. 239, 242. Cited. 178 C. 416, 421. Cited. 179 C. 576, 587. Cited 181 C. 388, 396−399. Cited. 182 C. 242, 244. Cited. 194 C. 198, 199. Cited. 197 C. 247, 262. Cited. Id., 396, 406. Cited. 202 C. 443, 445. Cited. 209 C. 34, 38. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 218 C. 273, 275. Cited. 232 C. 431, 439; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 4 CA 514, 515. Cited. 5 CA 612, 613. Cited. 7 CA 326, 336. Cited. 9 CA 133, 134. Cited. 12 CA 1, 19. Cited. 14 CA 119, 120. Secs. 53a-122−53a-125b cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. Id., 526, 527. Cited. 15 CA 641, 642, 644. Cited. 20 CA 586, 587. Cited. 22 CA 440, 441. Cited. 26 CA 33, 34. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 33 CA 339, 355; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 405, 406. Cited. 38 CA 20, 22.
Cited. 34 CS 612. Cited. 35 CS 531, 536. Cited. 36 CS 603, 605, 607. Cited. 37 CS 755, 756; id., 853. Cited. 38 CS 593, 594. Cited. 39 CS 363, 364; id., 392.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 176 C. 239, 242. Cited. 232 C. 431, 434; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504, 515.
Cited. 3 CA 359, 365. Cited. 6 CA 164, 165. Cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Cited. 11 CA 805. Cited. 14 CA 119, 125. Cited. 31 CA 312, 314. Cited. 33 CA 339, 355, 356; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 20, 22. Cited. Id., 643, 645.

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Sec. 53a-125a. Larceny in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the fifth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service exceeds two hundred fifty dollars.
(b) Larceny in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 82-271, S. 5.)
Cited. 201 C. 125, 126. Cited. 203 C. 682, 686. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Secs. 53a-122−53a-125b cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 53. Cited. 21 CA 331−333. Cited. 24 CA 556, 557, 559. Cited. Id., 563, 567. Cited. 25 CA 298, 304. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229. Cited. 46 CA 118.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 231 C. 411, 412.
Cited. 7 CA 75, 76. Cited. 30 CA 571, 572; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 411 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 277, 279.

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Sec. 53a-125b. Larceny in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service is two hundred fifty dollars or less.
(b) Larceny in the sixth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 82-271, S. 6.)
Cited. 201 C. 559, 560. Cited. 202 C. 369, 371. Cited. 203 C. 682, 686. Cited. 208 C. 387, 388. Cited. 210 C. 435, 438. Cited. 212 C. 50, 52. Cited. 213 C. 233, 236. Cited. 237 C. 613. Cited. 241 C. 439.
Cited. 3 CA 132, 133. Cited. 4 CA 676, 677. Cited. 5 CA 599, 600, 604. Cited. 10 CA 130, 131. Cited. Id., 503, 504. Cited. 13 CA 214, 215. Cited. Id., 438, 440. Cited. Id., 578, 579. Cited. 14 CA 88, 90, 91. Cited. Id., 205, 207. Cited. Id., 272, 278. Cited. Id., 309, 310. Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 17 CA 273, 274. Cited. 19 CA 48, 50, 51, 60. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. 28 CA 195, 196. Cited. 29 CA 843, 860. Cited. 33 CA 432, 434. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229, 231. Cited. 39 CA 384, 386. Cited. 44 CA 125. Cited. 46 CA 778.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 214 C. 161, 163.
Cited. 24 CA 502, 503. Cited. 28 CA 469. Cited. 37 CA 228, 229. Cited. Id., 482, 488. Cited. 38 CA 643, 647. Cited. 39 CA 384, 386. Cited. 45 CA 6.

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Sec. 53a-126. Larceny by receiving stolen property. Section 53a-126 is repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 128; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
See Sec. 53a-119 (8) re receipt of stolen property.

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Sec. 53a-126a. Criminal trover in the first degree: Class D felony, first offense; Class C felony, subsequent offense. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the first degree when he forcibly enters or forcibly removes the ignition of the motor vehicle of another and uses the motor vehicle without the consent of such owner, and such use results in damage to or diminishes the value of such motor vehicle or subjects such owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.
(b) Criminal trover in the first degree is a class D felony for a first offense and a class C felony for each subsequent offense.
(P.A. 94-114, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-126b. Criminal trover in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal trover in the second degree when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he uses the personal property of another without the consent of such owner, and such use results in damage to or diminishes the value of such property or subjects such owner to economic loss, fine or other penalty.
(b) Criminal trover in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 94-114, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-127. Diversion from state of benefit of labor of employees: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of diversion from the state of benefit of labor of employees when he fraudulently procures for himself or another, from any employee of the state or any department thereof, the benefit of any labor which the state or any department thereof is entitled to receive from such employee during his hours of employment or fraudulently aids or assists in procuring or attempting to procure the benefit of any such labor.
(b) Diversion from the state of benefit of labor of employees is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 129; P.A. 92-260, S. 53.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 223.

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Sec. 53a-127a. Unlawful entry into coin machine; possession of key to enter: Class A misdemeanor. (a) No person shall, with intent to commit larceny: (1) Enter, or force an entrance into, alter or insert any part of an instrument into any coin machine, as defined in section 53a-143; or (2) knowingly possess a key or device, or a drawing, print or mold thereof, adapted and designed to open or break into any such coin machine.
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 753; P.A. 84-546, S. 126, 173; P.A. 92-260, S. 54.)
History: P.A. 84-546 made technical grammar change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a).

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Sec. 53a-127b. Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of fraudulent use of an automated teller machine when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he knowingly uses in a fraudulent manner an automated teller machine for the purpose of obtaining property. For purposes of this section, "automated teller machine" means an unmanned device at which banking transactions including, without limitation, deposits, withdrawals, advances, payments and transfers may be conducted, and includes, without limitation, a satellite device and point of sale terminal as defined in section 36-193a.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the automated teller machine was located.
(c) Fraudulent use of an automated teller machine is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-417, S. 2; P.A. 84-301, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 84-301 replaced "automatic" with "automated" and added definition of "automated teller machine".
See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.

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Sec. 53a-127c. Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain when he: (1) Engages in the business for profit or economic gain of tampering or making connection with the equipment of a supplier of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise measured, in whole or in part, without the consent of such supplier, for the purpose of supplying such service on one or more occasions to two or more households, or (2) engages in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale to any person other than the supplier of an electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service which is not metered or otherwise measured, in whole or in part, any decoder, descrambler or other device, the principal function of which defeats the electronic signal encryption jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by such supplier for the purpose of restricting the delivery of such service to persons who pay for such service, or (3) without the consent of the supplier of such service and with intent to defraud such supplier, engages in the business for profit or economic gain of connecting or disconnecting the meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments of such supplier or in any other manner tampers or connects with such meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device, equipment or component in violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection if such person has five or more decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control.
(b) Theft of electric, gas, water, steam, telecommunications, wireless radio communications or community antenna television service for profit or economic gain is a class D felony.
(P.A. 84-496; P.A. 89-281, S. 2; P.A. 94-215, S. 1; P.A. 95-246, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 89-281 added theft of cable service and made provisions applicable to one engaging in business for economic gain in Subsecs. (a) and (b); P.A. 94-215 substituted "electric, gas, water, steam" for "utility" where appearing and amended Subsec. (a) to add "or other device" in Subdiv. (2), add Subdiv. (3) re connecting, disconnecting or tampering with the meters, pipes, cables, conduits, conductors or attachments of a supplier without the consent of such supplier and with intent to defraud such supplier, and add provision making it a rebuttable presumption that a person is engaged in the business for profit or economic gain of offering for sale a decoder, descrambler or other device if he has five or more decoders, descramblers or other devices in his possession or under his control; P.A. 95-246 included theft of "telecommunications" and "wireless radio communications" service and added "equipment or component" in provision re a rebuttable presumption.
See Sec. 52-570f re civil action and relief authorized for theft of service.

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Sec. 53a-127d. Cheating: Class D felony or class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of cheating when, in the course of playing or conducting any lawful gambling game, he: (1) Knowingly uses an altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check or knowingly marks, loads or tampers with any cards or dice or substitutes for cards or dice provided by the operator of a lawfully operated game of chance any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) knowingly uses any device, instrument, article or substance with intent to cheat or defraud or to alter or affect the otherwise random results of any lawfully operated game of chance; or (3) intentionally places, increases or attempts to increase a winning wager or decreases or attempts to decrease a losing wager after that period of time during which the rules of a lawfully operated game of chance permit a wager to be placed or after the results of the game in which the wager has been placed become known.
(b) Cheating is a class D felony, except that a violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-193, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-127e. Possession of a cheating device: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a cheating device when, while on premises where lawful gambling is to be conducted, he knowingly possesses or has under his control: (1) Any altered or counterfeit chip, token, tile, pull tab, wagering slip or check or any cards or dice that have been marked, loaded or tampered with; or (2) any device, instrument or other thing adopted, designed or commonly used to facilitate the alteration of the normal play or operation of a piece of gaming equipment or to facilitate the unauthorized removal of any money or other contents from any gaming equipment; or (3) any other device, instrument or thing which, under the circumstances in which it is used or possessed, manifests an intent that it be used by the actor or another person to alter the normal play or operation of a lawfully operated game of chance or to commit cheating as provided in section 53a-127d or larceny as provided in section 53a-119.
(b) Possession of a cheating device is a class D felony.
(P.A. 98-193, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-127f. Possession of a shoplifting device: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a shoplifting device when such person has in such person's possession any device, instrument or other thing specifically designed or adapted to advance or facilitate the offense of larceny by shoplifting, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-119, by defeating any antitheft or inventory control device, under circumstances manifesting an intent to use the same in the commission of larceny by shoplifting.
(b) Possession of a shoplifting device is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-9.)

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Sec. 53a-128. Issuing a bad check. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of issuing a bad check when: (1) As a drawer or representative drawer, he issues a check knowing that he or his principal, as the case may be, does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time of issuance that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation; or (2) he passes a check knowing that the drawer thereof does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time the check is passed that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation.
(b) For the purposes of this section, an issuer is presumed to know that the check or order, other than a postdated check or order, would not be paid, if: (1) The issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued; or (2) payment was refused by the drawee for insufficient funds upon presentation within thirty days after issue and the issuer failed to make good within eight days after receiving notice of such refusal. For the purposes of this subsection, an issuer is presumed to have received notice of such refusal if the drawee or payee provides proof of mailing such notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the issuer at his last known address.
(c) Issuing a bad check is: (1) A class D felony if the amount of the check was more than one thousand dollars; (2) a class A misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than five hundred dollars but not more than one thousand dollars; (3) a class B misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than two hundred fifty dollars but not more than five hundred dollars; or (4) a class C misdemeanor if the amount of the check was two hundred fifty dollars or less.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 130; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 28; P.A. 80-109; P.A. 81-225; P.A. 83-137.)
History: 1971 act removed former Subsec. (a) containing applicable definitions, but see Sec. 53a-118(a); P.A. 80-109 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re presumption that issuer has received notice of drawee's refusal to pay; P.A. 81- 225 included proof of mailing by payee as acceptable in presuming that issuer has received notice; P.A. 83-137 amended Subsec. (c) to reclassify the offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony or a class A, B or C misdemeanor depending upon the amount of the check.
Cited. 202 C. 443, 444.
Cited. 20 CA 811.
Cited. 34 CS 584. Ability of court to order personal restitution in amount of bad corporate check when there is no finding as to the ability of the defendant to pay or as to the extent of his gain. Restitution properly ordered against individual defendant issuer of bad corporate check. 35 CS 536−538, 540.

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Sec. 53a-128a. Credit card crimes. Definitions. As used in this section and sections 53a-128b to 53a-128i, inclusive:
(a) "Cardholder" or "holder of a card" means the person named on the face of a credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer;
(b) "Credit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, as a credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on credit;
(c) "Expired credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because the term shown on it has elapsed;
(d) "Issuer" means the person which issues a credit card, or its agent duly authorized for that purpose;
(e) "Participating party" means any person or any duly authorized agent of such person, which is obligated by contract to acquire from another person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, a sales slip, sales draft or instrument for the payment of money, evidencing a credit card transaction, and from whom, directly or indirectly, the issuer is obligated by contract to acquire such sales slip, sales draft, instrument for the payment of money and the like;
(f) "Receives" or "receiving" means acquiring possession, custody or control;
(g) "Revoked credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 29; P.A. 92-260, S. 55.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
See Sec. 54-1d(b) re consolidation of offenses.
Subsec. (b):
A merchant account identification card and a telephone card are within meaning of "credit card". 246 C. 402.

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Sec. 53a-128b. False statement to procure issuance of credit card. Any person who makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, any false statement in writing, knowing it to be false and with intent that it be relied on, respecting his identity or that of any other person or his financial condition or that of any other person, for the purpose of procuring the issuance of a credit card, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 30.)

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Sec. 53a-128c. Credit card theft. Illegal transfer. Fraud. Forgery. (a) Any person who takes a credit card from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the consent of the cardholder or of the issuer or who, with knowledge that it has been so taken, receives the credit card with intent to use it or to sell it, or to transfer it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder is guilty of credit card theft and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i. Taking a credit card without consent includes obtaining it by conduct defined or known as statutory larceny, common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretense, false promise or extortion.
(b) Any person who receives a credit card that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, and who retains possession, custody or control thereof with intent to use it or to sell it or to transfer it to any person other than the issuer or the cardholder, is guilty of credit card theft and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(c) Any person other than the issuer who sells a credit card or any person who buys a credit card from a person other than the issuer violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(d) Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, obtains control over a credit card as security for debt violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(e) Any person, other than the issuer, who, during any twelve-month period, receives credit cards issued in the names of two or more persons which he has reason to know were taken or retained under circumstances which constitute credit card theft or a violation of section 53a-128b or subsection (c) or (d) of this section violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i.
(f) Any person who, with intent to defraud a purported issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, falsely makes or falsely embosses a purported credit card or utters such a credit card is guilty of credit card forgery and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i. A person "falsely makes" a credit card when he makes or draws, in whole or in part, a device or instrument which purports to be the credit card of a named issuer but which is not such a credit card because the issuer did not authorize the making or drawing, or when such person so alters a credit card which was validly issued. A person "falsely embosses" a credit card when, without the authorization of the named issuer, he completes a credit card by adding any of the matter, other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before it can be used by a cardholder.
(g) Any person other than the cardholder or any person authorized by him who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, signs a credit card, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 31.)
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 37 CS 527, 528.

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Sec. 53a-128d. Illegal use of credit card. Presumption of knowledge of revocation. Any person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, or a person providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, (1) uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a credit card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128b or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, or (2) obtains money, goods, services or anything else of value by representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder of a specified card or by representing that he is the holder of a card and such card has not in fact been issued, or (3) uses a credit card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128c or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, as authority or identification to cash or to attempt to cash or otherwise to negotiate or transfer or to attempt to negotiate or transfer any check or other order for the payment of money, whether or not negotiable, if such negotiation or transfer or attempt to negotiate or transfer would constitute a violation of section 53a-128 violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of value obtained in violation of this subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i, if such value does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period. Knowledge of revocation shall be presumed to have been received by a cardholder four days after it has been mailed to him, at the address set forth on the credit card or at his last-known address, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and, if, the address is more than five hundred miles from the place of mailing, by air mail. If the address is located outside the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone or Canada, notice shall be presumed to have been received ten days after mailing by registered or certified mail.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 32.)
Cited. 204 C. 441, 444.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 37 CS 527, 528.

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Sec. 53a-128e. Illegal furnishing of money, goods or services on credit card. (a) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer, or participating party, the cardholder, or any other person furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card obtained or retained in violation of section 53a-128c or a credit card which he knows is forged, expired or revoked, violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of value furnished in violation of this subsection does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i if such value does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period.
(b) Any person who is authorized by an issuer or a participating party to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a participating party, the cardholder, or any other person fails to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value which he represents in writing to the issuer or participating party that he has furnished violates this subsection and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i, if the difference between the value of all money, goods, services and anything else of value actually furnished and the value represented to the issuer or participating party to have been furnished does not exceed five hundred dollars in any six-month period; and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i if such difference does exceed five hundred dollars in any such six-month period.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 33.)

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Sec. 53a-128f. Unlawful completion or reproduction of credit card. Any person, other than the cardholder, having under his possession, custody or control two or more incomplete credit cards, or possessing a purported distinctive element of a credit card, with intent to complete such incomplete credit cards or to utilize such purported distinctive element in the production or reproduction of any credit card, without the consent of the issuer, or a person having under his possession, custody or control, with knowledge of its character, a distinctive element of any credit card or any machinery, plates or any contrivance designed to produce or reproduce instruments purporting to be the credit cards of an issuer, or of any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group, who has not consented to the production or reproduction of such cards, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (b) of section 53a-128i. A credit card is "incomplete" if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer, or any issuer in a group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group, requires to appear on the credit card, before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed, imprinted or written on it. A "distinctive element" of a credit card is any material or component used in the fabrication of credit cards, which, by virtue of such element's chemical or physical composition, color or design, is unique to the credit cards issued by a particular issuer or group of issuers utilizing a common distinctive element or elements in credit cards issued by all members of such group.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 34; P.A. 92-260, S. 56.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.

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Sec. 53a-128g. Receipt of money, goods or services obtained by illegal use of credit card. Any person who receives money, goods, services or anything else of value obtained in violation of section 53a-128d, knowing or believing the same to have been so obtained, violates this section and is subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (a) of section 53a-128i. Any person who obtains at a discount price a ticket issued by an airline, railroad, steamship or other transportation company which was acquired in violation of section 53a-128d without reasonable inquiry to ascertain that the person from whom it was obtained had a legal right to possess it shall be presumed to know that such ticket was acquired under circumstances constituting a violation of said section.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 35.)

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Sec. 53a-128h. Certain defenses denied. In any prosecution for violation of sections 53a-128a to 53a-128i, inclusive, the state is not required to establish and it is no defense: (1) That a person other than the defendant who violated said sections has not been convicted, apprehended or identified; or (2) that some of the acts constituting the violation did not occur in this state or were not a violation or elements of a violation where they did occur.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 36.)

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Sec. 53a-128i. Penalties for credit card crimes. (a) Any person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) Any person who is subject to the penalties of this subsection shall be guilty of a class D felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 37.)

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Sec. 53a-129. Misapplication of property: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of misapplication of property when, knowingly possessing personal property of another pursuant to an agreement that the same will be returned to the owner at a future time, he loans, leases, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such property without the consent of the owner thereof in such manner as to create a risk that the owner will not be able to recover it or will suffer pecuniary loss.
(b) In any prosecution under this section, it shall be a defense that, at the time the prosecution was commenced, (1) the defendant had recovered possession of the property, unencumbered as a result of the unlawful disposition, and (2) the owner had suffered no material economic loss as a result of the unlawful disposition.
(c) Misapplication of property is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 131.)
Cited. 180 C. 662, 679. Cited. 194 C. 223.

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Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft when such person intentionally obtains personal identifying information of another person without the authorization of such other person and uses that information for any unlawful purpose including, but not limited to, obtaining, or attempting to obtain, credit, goods, services or medical information in the name of such other person without the consent of such other person. As used in this section, "personal identifying information" means a motor vehicle operator's license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, mother's maiden name, demand deposit number, savings account number or credit card number.
(b) Identity theft is a class D felony.
(P.A. 99-99.)

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Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when he: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (2) pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (3) pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such public servant is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.
(b) Criminal impersonation is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 132; P.A. 97-123, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 97-123 amended Subdiv. (3) of Subsec. (a) to exclude from the offense a person pretending to be "a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety" and include the wearing or display of a "shield".
Cited. 194 C. 213−215. Cited. Id., 233, 234. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 225 C. 650, 652.
Held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 2 CA 204, 209. Cited. 18 CA 694, 695. Cited. 32 CA 724, 726, 727. Cited. 40 CA 643, 667, 671.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 213, 220. Subdiv. (1): Statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name. Id., 213, 221, 222. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 233, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 146, 148. Subdiv. (1) cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 502, 504.
Cited. 2 CA 204, 205, 209. Cited. 32 CA 724, 728. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 339, 340; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 589, 594. Subdiv. (3) cited. 40 CA 643, 645, 665, 669−671. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 303.

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Sec. 53a-130a. Impersonation of a police officer: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of impersonation of a police officer when he pretends to be a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such police officer is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another person to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.
(b) Impersonation of a police officer is a class D felony.
(P.A. 97-123, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-131. Unlawfully concealing a will: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully concealing a will when, with intent to defraud, he conceals, secrets, suppresses, mutilates or destroys a will, codicil or other testamentary instrument.
(b) Unlawfully concealing a will is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 133.)

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Sec. 53a-132. False entry by an officer or agent of a public community: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false entry by an officer or agent of a public community when (1) as an officer or agent of a public community, he makes any intentionally false entry on the books of the public community or (2) he intentionally attests or certifies by placing his signature upon process that he has personally served the same, when he has not done so.
(b) False entry by an officer or agent of a public community is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 134; P.A. 84-108, S. 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 57.)
History: P.A. 84-108 inserted new Subsec. (b) providing that person who intentionally attests or certifies by signature upon process that he has personally served process when he has not done so is guilty of false entry, relettering former Subsec. (b) as (c); P.A. 92-260 combined former Subsecs. (a) and (b) and rephrased language, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b), and amended relettered Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense.
Annotations to former section 53-364:
State has been held to be a "public community" and an employee has been held to be an "agent" within the meaning of the statute. 159 C. 544, 577.

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Sec. 53a-133. Robbery defined. A person commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of: (1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 135.)
See Sec. 53a-119 for definition of "larceny".
Annotation to former section 53-28:
Violation of this statute necessarily involves an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. 146 C. 227.
Annotations to former section 53-67:
Cited. 154 C. 37, 38; 157 C. 466.
Sentence of not less than seven nor more than twelve years for bank robber who was second offender was reasonable. 27 CS 119−121.
Annotations to present section:
Defendant's ability to carry out threat of immediate physical force is not essential element of robbery. 175 C. 569, 573. Cited. 176 C. 239, 243. Cited. 178 C. 689, 694. Cited. 179 C. 576, 587. Cited. 180 C. 599, 601. Cited. 181 C. 388, 396. Cited. 182 C. 430, 435; id., 449, 460. Cited (1975 revision). 183 C. 299, 303, 311. Cited. 185 C. 402, 410. Cited. 186 C. 555. 566, 571 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 189 C. 114, 115. Cited. 190 C. 822, 831. Cited. 195 C. 567, 573. Cited. 196 C. 122, 130. Cited. Id., 395, 400. Cited. 199 C. 207, 223. Cited. 201 C. 289, 294, 295, 297−300. Cited. Id., 489, 493, 494. Cited. 202 C. 349, 353, 357, 361, 364. Cited. 206 C. 621, 622. Cited. Id., 657, 658, 667. Cited. 209 C. 564, 575. Cited. 210 C. 652, 687, 688. Cited. 211 C. 398, 400. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 216 C. 367, 388, 389. Cited. 219 C. 489, 498−500. Cited. 223 C. 243, 250. Cited. Id., 595, 596, 603. Cited. 225 C. 270, 277. Cited. Id., 347, 352. Cited. 230 C. 183, 262. Cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Cited. 235 C. 748, 750. Cited. 241 C. 322. Cited. 242 C. 523. Cited. Id., 666. Use of force considered to be in course of robbery or attempted robbery within meaning of statute if it occurs during continuous sequence of events surrounding the taking or attempted taking, even though some time immediately before or after. 248 C. 472.
Cited. 1 CA 642, 645. Cited. 8 CA 545, 555. Cited. Id., 620, 625, 627. Cited. 9 CA 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 330, 331. Cited. Id., 474. Cited. 12 CA 163, 171. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421. Cited. 19 CA 111, 137; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 554, 555, 559, 560, 563. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 702, 704, 705. Cited. 20 CA 513, 516−518. Cited. 21 CA 299, 308. Cited. 24 CA 27, 28, 34, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 646, 648. Cited. 27 CA 601, 604. Cited. 28 CA 161, 165, 166. Cited. Id., 612, 616. Cited. Id., 721, 732. Cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 54, 56, 57. Cited. 32 CA 193, 194. Cited. 33 CA 184, 186; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707 et seq. Cited. Id., 311, 313. Cited. 34 CA 223, 231. Cited. 35 CA 699, 711, 712. Cited. Id., 839, 841, 844. Cited. 36 CA 401, 409. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. Id., 581, 582, 586. Cited. 39 CA 63, 64. Cited. Id., 478, 479. Cited. Id., 579, 595. Cited. Id., 617, 618. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. Id., 255, 257. Cited. Id., 584, 585. Cited. 43 CA 801. Cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 45 CA 6. Cited. 46 CA 616. Cited. Id., 691. Cited. Id., 778. Term "purpose" is synonymous with the terms "object" and "intent". 51 CA 541. Completion of crime not required for conviction under section. Id.
Subdiv. (1):
Cited. 181 C. 388, 394. Cited. 202 C. 349, 356, 358, 362, 364. Cited. 210 C. 652, 688.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 622, 624−626. Cited. 19 CA 111, 112, 135, 136; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 423, 424. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 704, 705. Cited. 20 CA 513, 516, 518. Cited. 24 CA 27, 34, 35; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 104, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 601, 604, 605. Cited. 28 CA 612, 616.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 202 C. 349, 361, 362, 364. Cited. 210 C. 652, 688. Cited. 216 C. 367, 368, 388, 389.
Cited. 8 CA 620, 624, 625. Cited. 19 CA 111, 112, 134−137; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538 et seq. Cited. Id., 695, 696, 702−705. Cited. 20 CA 27, 30. Cited. Id., 513, 516, 518, 519. Cited. 24 CA 27, 34, 25; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Cited. 25 CA 104, 106, 111, 112. Cited. 27 CA 601, 605.
Cited. 41 CS 525, 533.

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Sec. 53a-134. Robbery in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133 or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (1) Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (2) is armed with a deadly weapon; or (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or (4) displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm, except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a weapon from which a shot could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.
(b) Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 136; P.A. 75-411, S. 1; P.A. 80-442, S. 22, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 58.)
History: P.A. 75-411 removed reference to dangerous instruments in Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) and added Subdivs. (3) and (4); P.A. 80-442 added proviso in Subsec. (b) specifying that five years of sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to specify that "the crime" is "the crime of robbery as defined in section 53a-133".
See also annotations to Part V.
Cited. 172 C. 74, 75. Cited. 175 C. 569, 571, 573. Cited. 182 C. 511, 513. Cited. 185 C. 473, 474. Cited. 186 C. 179, 180; id., 555, 571 (Diss. Op.). Cited. 190 C. 822, 831. Cited. 196 C. 305, 306. Cited. Id., 309, 311. Cited. Id., 430, 431. Cited. 199 C. 47, 50. Cited. Id., 207, 223. Cited. Id., 273, 274. Cited. Id., 377, 378. Cited. Id., 591, 593. Cited. 200 C. 310, 311, 314. Cited. Id., 465, 466. Cited. 201 C. 34, 38. Cited. 202 C. 39, 40. Cited. Id., 86, 91. Cited. 203 C. 494, 495. Cited. 204 C. 52. Cited. Id., 240, 241, 258. Cited. 212 C. 31, 45. Cited. 214 C. 454, 457. Cited. 218 C. 479, 481. Cited. 230 C. 109, 112. Cited. 231 C. 43, 45. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 241 C. 413. Cited. 242 C. 125. Cited. Id., 648.
Cited. 8 CA 545, 547. Cited. 9 CA 373, 377. Cited. 10 CA 659, 665. Cited. 11 CA 699, 700. Cited. Id., 709, 710. Cited. 12 CA 268, 269. Cited. Id., 655, 656. Cited. 13 CA 133, 134. Cited. Id., 708. Cited. 14 CA 472, 474. Cited. 15 CA 34, 35. Cited. 15 CA 197, 198. Cited. 19 CA 423, 426. Cited. 20 CA 521, 522. Cited. 22 CA 216, 219, 227. Cited. 28 CA 581, 589; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Cited. 32 CA 38, 40. Cited. 35 CA 201. Cited. Id., 839, 843. Cited. 36 CA 59, 60. Cited. Id., 448, 453; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Cited. Id., 581, 582. Cited. Id., 868, 869. Cited. 39 CA 45. Cited. 40 CA 250, 260. Cited. 41 CA 147, 148. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 801. Cited. 45 CA 32. Cited. 46 CA 684. Cited. Id., 691. Court cannot properly instruct jury of elements of section without first instructing jury of elements of Sec. 53a-133. 51 CA 541. Sufficiency of evidence to convict defendant as a principal in robbery. Id.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2): "Miranda" warning not a ritualistic formula and words which convey its substance are sufficient. 167 C. 309. Cited. 169 C. 242, 243. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 683−685. Subdiv. (2) cited. 170 C. 332, 333. Subdiv. (2): Participation of two persons not necessary, so Wharton's rule is inapplicable. 171 C. 105. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 395, 397. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (2) cited. 172 C. 22, 23. Subdiv.(2) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (1) cited. 174 C. 16, 18. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 129, 130. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 142−144. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 452, 459. Subdiv. (2) cited. 175 C. 250, 251. Subdiv. (2): Requirement of weapon's operability is imposed by section 53a-3(6). Id., 569, 572. Subdiv. (4): Essential element of subsection is defendant's representation of having a firearm, not the firearm's operability. Affirmative defense of inoperability does not violate due process. 175 C. 569−576. Subdiv. (4) cited. 176 C. 239, 240, 242; id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (2) cited. 177 C. 335, 336; id., 370, 371; id., 379, 380; id., 637, 639. Subdiv. (1) cited. 178 C. 116, 118. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 287, 288, 293. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 427, 429. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 564, 565; id., 634; id., 689, 690, 694; 179 C. 46, 47; id., 576−578, 586; 180 C. 557, 560. Subdiv. (1): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599, 601. Subdiv. (2) cited. 181 C. 237, 238; id., 388, 390, 397, 399. Subdiv. (4) cited. 181 C. 237−239, 243. Cited. 181 C. 426, 428. Subdiv. (2) cited. 182 C. 262, 263, 269, 270; id., 366, 367, 382. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 430−432, 435. Cited. Id., 430, 436. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 449, 451, 460, 467. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 533, 534, 543. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 595, 596, 598, 599, 602; 183 C. 280, 281; 185 C. 163, 164. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.; id., 260, 261, 267; id., 402, 404. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 473, 476. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 607. Subdiv. (1) cited. 186 C. 1, 2, 7. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 222, 224. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 261, 262; id., 426, 427; id., 555, 566. Subdiv. (3) cited. 187 C. 681, 683. Subdiv. (2) cited. 188 C. 372, 373. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 406, 407, 414. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 432, 470; id., 515, 516. Subdiv. (3) cited. 189 C. 114, 115; id., 183, 184. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 268, 269, 271, 274; id., 337−339; id., 429, 430. Subdiv. (2) cited. 190 C. 822, 823, 831, 832. Subdiv. (4) cited. 191 C. 564, 565; id., 670, 671; 192 C. 618, 619, 625, 630. Subdiv. (3) cited. 193 C. 48, 51. Subdiv. (4) cited. 193 C. 238, 239. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 457, 459. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 526−528. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 602, 603. Subdiv. (3) cited. 194 C. 89, 90. Subdiv. (4) cited. 195 C. 183, 185. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 326, 327. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 444, 445, 449. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 552, 553. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 567, 568, 573, 575. Subdiv. (2) cited. 196 C. 36−38. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 115, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. 122, 123. Subdiv. (2) cited. 157, 158. Subdiv. (4): Essential element is the representation by a defendant that he has a firearm, not the specific identifying characteristic of the weapon alleged in the information. Id., 395, 396, 398−401. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 567, 568. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 685, 686, 688. Subdiv. (2) cited. 197 C. 106, 107. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 115, 117. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 413, 415. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 629, 630. Subdiv. (4) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 203. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 285, 287. Cited. Id., 314, 315. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 328, 329. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (3) cited. 198 C. 592, 593. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 680, 681. Subdiv. (4) cited. 199 C. 5, 6. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 47, 48. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 62, 63. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 146, 147. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 207, 208. Cited. Id., 207, 223. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 255, 257. Cited. Id., 473, 481. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 473, 474, 480. Subdiv. (3) cited. 200 C. 9, 10. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 44, 45. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 310, 311, 314. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 310, 316. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 350, 351, 357, 359. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 523, 524. Subdiv. (3) cited. 201 C. 289, 290, 295, 299. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 333, 334. Subdiv. (4) cited. 202 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 259, 260. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 349, 350, 353, 354. Cited. 203 C. 81, 82. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 159, 160. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 445, 446. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 506, 508, 514, 517, 518. Subdiv. (2) cited. 204 C. 240, 241, 257. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 330, 331. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 377, 383. Subdiv. (2) cited. 205 C. 673, 674. Subdiv. (4) cited. 206 C. 40, 43. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 621, 622. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. 207 C. 152, 154. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 323, 324. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619, 620. Subdiv. (2) cited. 208 C. 38−41. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 202, 203. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 365, 366. Subdiv. (3) cited. 209 C. 416−418. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 458, 459. Subdiv. (3) cited. 210 C. 199, 200. Subdiv. (3) cited. 211 C. 18, 20. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 398, 399. Subdiv. (4) cited. 212 C. 6, 8. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 31, 33, 45. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 387, 389, 390. Subdiv. (3) cited. 213 C. 422, 424, 432. Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 38, 39. Subdiv. (4): Judgment of appellate court in State v. Horne, 19 CA 111, reversed. 215 C. 538, 540, 542. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 695, 698. Subdiv. (2) cited. 216 C. 282, 284. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 367, 368. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 801; 217 C. 419, 420. Subdiv. (1) cited. 218 C. 85, 87. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 151, 152. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 432−435. Subdiv. (4) cited. 219 C. 93, 95. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 269, 271. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.; Id., 489, 490, 496, 500, 510. Subdiv. (2) cited. 220 C. 385, 388; Id., 652, 653. Subdiv. (4) cited. 221 C. 447−449. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 643, 645. Subdiv. (1) cited. 222 C. 117, 119. Subdiv. (4) cited. 223 C. 243, 245. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 243, 250. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 243, 258, 261. Subdiv. (2) cited. 299, 301. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 595, 596, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 635, 637, 638. Subdiv. (4) cited. 224 C. 711, 713. Subdiv. (2) cited. 225 C. 270, 271, 277. Subdiv. (2) cited. 226 C. 601, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 601, 609. Subdiv. (4) cited. 227 C. 363, 365. Subdiv. (2) cited. 228 C. 234, 235. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 384−386. Subdiv. (2) cited. 230 C. 351, 353. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 686, 687. Subdiv. (4) cited. 232 C. 455, 457. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 691, 693. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 707, 709. Subdiv. (2) cited. 233 C. 44, 52. Subdiv. (4) cited. 235 C. 67, 68, 72, 77, 79. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 402, 403. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 748, 750. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 802, 804. Subdiv. (3) cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 342, 349. Subdiv. (3) cited. 238 C. 784. Subdiv. (2) cited. 239 C. 235. Subdiv. (3) cited. 240 C. 317. Subdiv. (2) cited. 241 C. 1. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 165. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 322. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. 242 C. 93. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 125. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 296. Subdiv. (2) cited. 247 C. 662.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 1 CA 584, 585. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 642, 643, 644, 646. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 697, 698. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 2 CA 127, 128. Subdiv. (2) cited. 6 CA 247, 248, 250, 251. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 697, 698. Subdiv. (2) cited. 7 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (3). cited. Id., 27, 28. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 95, 96. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 149, 150. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 217, 218. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 445, 446, 452. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 445, 446, 452, 455. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 503, 504. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 528. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 715, 716. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 726, 727, 730, 733. Subdiv. (2) cited. 8 CA 119, 120, 123. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 399, 400. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 454−456. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 467. Cited. Id., 491, 493. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 545, 546, 553, 555. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 545, 553. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 566, 567. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 667, 672, 672A, 672B, 672C, 672D. Subdiv. (2) cited. 9 CA 79, 80. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 275. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 313, 314. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 373, 374. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 548, 549. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 587, 588. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 648, 649. Subdiv. (3) cited. 10 CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 103, 104. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 330, 331, 336, 344. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 404, 405. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 474. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 624, 625. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 643, 650. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 659, 660, 666, 667. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 659−661, 664, 666. Cited. Id., 659, 664. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 80, 89. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 397−403. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 699−701. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 163, 164. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 217. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 662, 663. Subdiv. (2) cited. 13 CA 76, 83, 86. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 554−556. Subdiv. (2) cited. 14 CA 67, 68. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 108, 109. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 463, 464. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 472, 474, 476. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 493, 494, 497. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 657, 658. Subdiv. (4) cited. 15 CA 161, 163. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 416, 417. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 502. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 539, 540. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 586. Subdiv. (2) cited. 16 CA 38, 39. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 206, 207. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 284, 285; Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 390, 391. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 402, 403. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 50, 51. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 359. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 490, 491. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 648, 650. Subdiv. (4) cited. 19 CA 111, 113, 116, 140; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 53 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 179, 180, 186. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 423, 424. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 554, 555, 558, 562−564. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 20 CA 27− 29. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 27, 29. Cited. Id., 212. Cited. Id., 467, 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 513, 514. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 643−645. Cited. Id., 643, 646. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 665, 666. Subdiv. (3) cited. 21 CA 48, 49. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 244, 245. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 299−301, 305−307, 309, 311, 313. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 299, 307. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. 22 CA 98, 99; Id., 216 227. Cited. Id., 329, 330. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 27, 28; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 152, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 316−318, 320, 321, 324, 325. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 316−318, 320, 321, 325. Cited. Id., 316, 326. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 518, 519; Id., 729−731. Subdiv. (2) cited. 25 CA 104, 106. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 255; Id., 565, 567; Id., 646−648; 26 CA 114, 116. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 242, 244. Subdiv. (3) cited. 27 CA 601, 602. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 654, 655, 665. Subdiv. (2) cited. 28 CA 64, 66. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 161, 162, 165, 168, 169. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 402, 404, 405. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 444, 445. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 474, 475. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 581, 588; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601 et seq. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 612−615, 617. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 645, 646. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 721, 722. Subdiv. (4) cited. 29 CA 207, 211. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 274, 276. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 421, 422. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 679−681. Subdiv. (2) cited. 30 CA 68, 69. Subdiv. (2) cited. 31 CA 614, 615, 617, 618. Cited. Id., 614, 617. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 660, 661. Subdiv. (4) cited. 32 CA 21, 23. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 193, 194. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 476, 477. Subdiv. (3) cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 147. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 184, 185. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 288, 289. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 311, 313. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 457, 458. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 468, 470, 476, 477, 481−483. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 468, 482. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 849, 850. Subdiv. (2) cited. 34 CA 223, 224, 226. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 261, 262. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 610, 611. Subdiv. (3) cited. 35 CA 279, 280. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 699, 700. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 740 742, 743. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 781, 782. Subdiv. (3): Robbery in the second degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-135(a)(1) is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to this section. Id., 839, 841, 843− 846, 849. Subdiv. (4) cited. 36 CA 401, 405. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 556−558, 570. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 718, 720. Cited. Id., 831, 832. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. 37 CA 35, 36. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 219. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 482− 484, 486, 489, 491. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 482, 490. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 589, 594. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 619, 621. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 672, 674, 689, 690. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 733, 735, 739. Cited. 38 CA 20, 21. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 581, 582. Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 45, 46, 53. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 45, 54. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 63, 64, 79, 81. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 82, 84, 86, 92, 93. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 82, 86, 92, 93. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 384, 386, 400−402. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 384, 400. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 478, 479. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 502, 503, 513, 514. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 579, 580, 595. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 617, 618. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 840, 841. Subdiv. (4) cited. 40 CA 21, 22. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 250, 252. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 328, 329. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 526, 527. Subdiv. (4) cited. 41 CA 47−49. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 391, 392. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 515, 517. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 695, 696. Subdiv. (2) cited. 42 CA 472. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 669. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 810. Subdiv. (4) cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 801. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 26. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 280. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 476. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 561. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 6. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 270. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 390. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 658. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 684. A showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Id.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 595, 599. Cited. 207 C. 412, 416.

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Sec. 53a-135. Robbery in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he commits robbery as defined in section 53a-133 and (1) he is aided by another person actually present; or (2) in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom he or another participant in the crime displays or threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
(b) Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 137; P.A. 75-411, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 59.)
History: P.A. 75-411 clarified Subsec. (a)(2), including references to display of weapon and to actions in course of commission of crime or in course of immediate flight from commission of crime; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add "as defined in section 53a-133".
Cited. 171 C. 47, 48. Cited. Id., 105, 118. Cited. 174 C. 142, 143. Cited. 176 C. 270. Cited. 178 C. 287, 293. Cited. 179 c. 576, 587. Cited. 182 C. 207, 208. Cited. 183 C. 156, 157, 162. Cited. 185 C. 260, 264. Cited. 191 C. 506, 507. Cited. 197 C. 309. Cited. 198 C. 158, 165, 166. Cited. 201 C. 125, 132, 133. Cited. Id., 489, 490, 494, 501. Cited. 202 C. 224, 226. Cited. 203 C. 506, 518. Cited. 204 C. 630, 631. Cited. 210 C. 435, 436, 438. Cited. 224 C. 445, 447, 451, 452. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Cited. 2 CA 11, 12. Cited. 12 CA 375, 376. Cited. 13 CA 420, 431. Cited. 14 CA 159, 160. Cited. Id., 205−207. Cited. 36 CA 401, 403, 409. Cited. 37 CA 35, 38. Cited. 39 CA 384, 401. Cited. 43 CA 801.
Subsec. (a):
(2): Cited. 169 C. 161. (2): Cited. 173 C. 545. (2): Cited. 174 C. 142, 143, 145. (1): Cited. Id., 142, 143, 145, 146. (2): Cited. 176 C. 227, 228; id., 367, 368. (1): Cited. 179 C. 98. (2): Cited. Id., 381, 382. (1): Cited. 182 C. 476, 477. (2): Cited. Id., 533, 543, 544; 183 C. 156, 162; 184 C. 366; 187 C. 602, 603. Cited. 190 C. 327, 329. Subdiv. (1) cited. 194 C. 241, 242. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 297, 298. Subdiv. (1) cited. 197 C. 677, 678. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 158, 160, 163−166. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 158, 164. Cited. Id., 158, 165. Subdiv. (1) cited. 199 C. 557, 558. Subdiv. (2) cited. 200 C. 350, 351, 358, 359. Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 125, 126, 129−132. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 489, 494. Subdiv. (2) cited. 203 C. 506, 518. Cited. 209 C. 143−145. Subdiv. (1) cited. 211 C. 1, 2. Subdiv. (1) cited. 229 C. 178, 179. Subdiv. (1) cited. 230 C. 608, 610. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 686, 688. Subdiv. (2) cited. 235 C. 67, 72, 77−79. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 145, 147. Cited. Id., 502, 517.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 6 CA 247, 248, 250, 251. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 656, 657. Subdiv. (1) cited. 10 CA 330, 336. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 12 CA 239, 240. Subdiv. (1) cited. 16 CA 264, 265. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 455, 456. Subdiv. (2) cited. 17 CA 247, 248. Subdiv. (1) cited. 25 CA 428−430; 26 CA 779, 780. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 47, 48, 54, 56− 58. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 147. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 184, 188, 195. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 468, 470, 477, 480− 483. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 468, 482. Subdiv. (1): Robbery in second degree pursuant to this section is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree pursuant to Sec. 53a-134(a)(3). 35 CA 839, 841, 843−846, 848, 849. Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 774, 775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 35, 36, 38. Subdiv. (2) cited. 39 CA 384, 401, 402. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 817, 818. Subdiv. (2) cited. 43 CA 801.

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Sec. 53a-136. Robbery in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of robbery in the third degree when he commits robbery as defined in section 53a-133.
(b) Robbery in the third degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 138; P.A. 92-260, S. 60.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to add "as defined in section 53a-133".
Cited. 169 C. 247, 249. Cited. 171 C. 105, 118. Cited. 181 C. 388, 396−399. Cited. 185 C. 260, 264. Cited. 188 C. 591, 592. Cited. 190 C. 428, 429. Cited. 192 C. 618, 629. Cited. 197 C. 314. Cited. 198 C. 285, 287. Cited. 199 C. 557, 558. Cited. 202 C. 224. Cited. 205 C. 61, 63. Cited. 209 C. 23, 27. Cited. 210 C. 435, 439. Cited. 218 C. 432, 434, 435. Cited. 219 C. 160, 161. Cited. 239 C. 235. Rational basis exists for legislature to classify larceny from the person as a more serious offense than simple robbery and therefore the classification did not violate defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. 246 C. 132.
Cited. 5 CA 500, 501. Cited. 7 CA 27, 28, 31. Cited. 8 CA 454, 455. Cited. Id., 620, 621. Cited. 13 CA 420, 421, 431. Cited. Id., 596, 597, 601, 603. Cited. 14 CA 205, 207. Cited. 16 CA 318, 319. Cited. Id., 433, 435. Cited. 17 CA 226, 231. Cited. 19 CA 423, 426. Cited. 20 CA 513, 514. Cited. Id., 643, 650. Cited. 21 CA 248, 249. Cited. Id., 291, 292. Cited. 22 CA 216, 217. Cited. 24 CA 316, 323. Cited. Id., 518, 524. Cited. 26 CA 114, 116. Cited. 27 CA 780, 781. Cited. 35 CA 839, 842, 848. Cited. 39 CA 579, 580, 600. Cited. Id., 810, 811. Cited. 40 CA 250, 260. Cited. 44 CA 307. Cited. 46 CA 616. Cited. Id., 778.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 402, 404. Cited. 192 C. 618, 626. Cited. 201 C. 125, 133. Cited. Id., 559, 560. Cited. 211 C. 101, 103. Cited. 220 C. 487, 489. Cited. 242 C. 523.
Cited. 8 CA 35, 36. Cited. 10 CA 330, 336. Cited. 13 CA 596, 601. Cited. 14 CA 493, 503. Cited. 35 CA 201. Cited. 38 CA 531, 532. Cited. 41 CA 255, 257. Cited. Id., 584, 585. Cited. 44 CA 307.
Cited. 33 CS 599. Cited. 37 CS 520, 521.

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Sec. 53a-136a. Robbery involving occupied motor vehicle. Penalty. Any person who commits robbery by taking a motor vehicle from the person of another knowing that such motor vehicle is occupied by such other person shall be imprisoned for a term of three years which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for such offense.
(P.A. 93-204.)
Cited. 46 CA 691.
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PART X*
FORGERY AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-346:
Writing must be introduced before any other evidence can be admitted. 1 R. 534. But it may be shown that accused destroyed it or acknowledged the forgery. 2 R. 93. An order for groceries subject of forgery. 5 D. 254. Meaning of "utter"; venue where forged check is uttered in one county but drawn on a bank in another. 96 C. 432. Cited. 114 C. 178; 158 C. 266.
Cited. 22 CS 173; 25 CS 354; 27 CS 283. In civil action court construed term "falsely" to imply that paper is false, not genuine, regardless of the truth or falsehood of statement it contains. 24 CS 498. An agent may commit forgery by making or signing an instrument in disobedience of his instructions or by exceeding his authority. Id. Cited. 28 CS 15.
Annotations to former section 53-348:
Proof of passing counterfeit money inadmissible until money is produced. 1 R. 152; but see 2 R. 88. Prosecution for counterfeiting when barred by statute of limitations. 1 R. 171. Possession at one time of several forged notes with intent to pass them a single offense. 7 C. 414. Possession of unsigned bank note inadmissible to show knowledge in prosecution for passing counterfeit coin. 9 C. 344. What evidence held admissible to show guilty knowledge. 19 C. 237. Legislative history of section. 149 C. 37. Clear legislative intent to make counterfeiting of federal money or uttering of counterfeit federal money a crime against the state and punishable in state courts. Id., 39. U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, does not keep matter solely within federal jurisdiction; both federal and state governments may deal with the matter, the former to protect its currency, the latter to protect its citizens against fraud. Id., 41.
Annotations to present part X of chapter 952:
Secs. 53a-137 through 53a-145 cited. 11 CA 161, 162. Cited. 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-137. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this part:
(1) "Written instrument" means any instrument or article containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
(2) "Complete written instrument" means one which purports to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof. An endorsement, attestation, acknowledgment or other similar signature or statement is deemed both a complete written instrument in itself and a part of the main instrument in which it is contained or to which it attaches.
(3) "Incomplete written instrument" means one which contains some matter by way of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a complete written instrument.
(4) A person "falsely makes" a written instrument when he makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or drawer, but which is not such either because the ostensible maker or drawer is fictitious or because, if real, he did not authorize the making or drawing thereof.
(5) A person "falsely completes" a written instrument when, by adding, inserting or changing matter, he transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete one, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, so that such complete instrument appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer.
(6) A person "falsely alters" a written instrument when, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, he changes a written instrument, whether it be in complete or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter, transposition of matter, or in any other manner, so that such instrument in its thus altered form appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer.
(7) "Forged instrument" means a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 139.)
Cited. 235 C. 502, 504.
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 165. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610.
Subsec. (1):
Cited. 37 CA 72, 79.
Subsec. (2):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561, 563.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 611.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561.
Subsec. (4):
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166, 167.
Subsec. (5):
Cited. 207 C. 555, 561. Cited. 235 C. 502, 512.
Subsec. (7):
Cited. 34 CS 606, 611.

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Sec. 53a-138. Forgery in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent if completed: (1) Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities or other valuable instruments issued by a government or governmental instrumentality; or (2) part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or claims against a corporate or other organization or its property.
(b) Forgery in the first degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 140; P.A. 76-292, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 76-292 made first degree forgery a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 37 CA 72, 80.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.

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Sec. 53a-139. Forgery in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent if completed: (1) A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status; or (2) a public record or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed in or with a public office or public servant; or (3) a written instrument officially issued or created by a public office, public servant or governmental instrumentality; or (4) a prescription of a duly licensed physician or other person authorized to issue the same for any drug or any instrument or device used in the taking or administering of drugs for which a prescription is required by law.
(b) "Drugs" as used in this section includes all drugs except controlled drugs as defined in section 21a-240.
(c) Forgery in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 141; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 38; P.A. 76-292, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act removed exception re narcotic drugs in Subsec. (b); P.A. 76-292 made second degree forgery a Class D felony rather than a Class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 201 C. 125, 126. Cited. 207 C. 555, 560.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 28 CA 521, 523, 530, 532. Cited. 37 CA 72, 80. Cited. 42 CA 790. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. Cited. 47 CA 1.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1). Cited. 169 C. 581. Subdiv. (2) cited. 195 C. 421, 423. Subdiv. (2) cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 158, 160. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 146, 148. Cited. 201 C. 125, 149, 151, 153. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 125, 149, 150. Subdiv. (1) cited. 207 C. 555, 556, 559. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 5 CA 473, 474. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 1, 2. Subdiv. (2) cited. 24 CA 493, 494. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. 28 CA 521, 523. Subdiv. (1) cited. 37 CA 72, 78. Subdiv. (1) cited. 42 CA 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. 47 CA 1.

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Sec. 53a-140. Forgery in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of forgery in the third degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument, or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged.
(b) Forgery in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 142; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 39.)
History: 1971 act referred to issuance of instrument which person knows to be forged rather than to alteration of such an instrument.
Cited. 194 C. 233, 234. Cited. 204 C. 441, 444. Cited. 207 C. 109, 110. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433, 437; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 469, 470.
Cited. 8 CA 342, 343. Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Cited. 33 CA 339, 349; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 72, 73, 78−80. Cited. Id., 437, 442. Cited. 42 CA 790. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 194 C. 233, 238. Cited. 232 C. 431, 433; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 235 C. 502, 504, 509, 512.
Cited. 33 CA 339, 340, 349; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431 et seq.; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 437, 442. Cited. 42 CA 790.
Cited. 34 CS 606, 610. Cited. Id., 656, 660.

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Sec. 53a-141. Criminal simulation: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal simulation when: (1) With intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object in such manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it does not in fact possess; or (2) with knowledge of its true character and with intent to defraud, he issues or possesses an object so simulated.
(b) Criminal simulation is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 143.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.

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Sec. 53a-142. Forgery of symbols: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of forgery of symbols of value when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument or issues or possesses any written instrument which he knows to be forged, which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or represent if completed part of an issue of tokens, public transportation transfers, certificates or other articles manufactured and designed for use as symbols of value usable in place of money for the purchase of property or services.
(b) Forgery of symbols of value is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 144.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 162, 166. Forgery statute, Sec. 53a-138 et seq. cited. 47 CA 1.

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Sec. 53a-143. Unlawfully using slugs: Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-144 and 53a-145:
(1) "Coin machine" means a coin box, turnstile, vending machine or other mechanical or electronic device or receptacle designed (A) to receive a coin or bill or token made for the purpose, and (B) in return for the insertion or deposit thereof, automatically to offer, to provide, to assist in providing or to permit the acquisition of some property or some service.
(2) "Slug" means an object or article which, by virtue of its size, shape or any other quality, is capable of being inserted or deposited in a coin machine as an improper substitute for a genuine coin, bill or token.
(3) "Value" of a slug means the value of the coin, bill or token for which it is capable of being substituted.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 145.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166.

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Sec. 53a-144. Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the first degree when he makes, possesses or disposes of slugs with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit them in a coin machine, and the value of such slugs exceeds one hundred dollars.
(b) Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 146.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166.

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Sec. 53a-145. Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the second degree when: (1) With intent to defraud the owner of a coin machine, he inserts or deposits a slug in such machine; or (2) he makes, possesses or disposes of a slug with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit it in a coin machine.
(b) Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 147.)
Cited. 11 CA 161, 166. Cited. 12 CA 74, 78.
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PART XI*
BRIBERY, OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES

*Perjury:
Annotations to former section 53-143:
Swearing falsely before church tribunal may constitute perjury. 2 C. 40. Falsely and corruptly taking poor debtor's oath constitutes perjury. 11 C. 415. Evidence in original trial admissible to show materiality of testimony. 77 C. 201; 93 C. 6. Materiality of testimony is a question of law. 92 C. 661. What testimony is material. Id., 662. Testimony of one witness may be sufficient to convict. 93 C. 7, 12. Character evidence for accused is limited to specific trait involved; i.e., character for truth and veracity. Id., 10. History of this section. 127 C. 720. Felonious intent is essential element of crime. 139 C. 690. Judgment that defendant was guilty of perjury was set aside where court had no jurisdiction of his person because of defective bench warrant. 159 C. 96.
Cited. 23 CS 298. Applicable to perjured witness at coroner's hearing. 29 CS 305.
Bribery:
Annotation to former section 53-147:
Where defendants were tried and convicted on information that they conspired to offer money to police officers, crime charged was conspiracy as set forth in Sec. 54-197, not bribery. 157 C. 330.
Annotations to former section 53-148:
Unnecessary that thing offered or given be to induce witness to testify falsely. 122 C. 635. Disbarment proceeding is a "civil proceeding" within the statute. Id. Testimony of what complainant heard said to defendant was admissible as verbal act to show relationship of persons is a criminal conspiracy. 157 C. 392.
Intent of section. Proceeding involving right to practice law is civil. 4 CS 161. Cited. Id., 306. Cited. 29 CS 305.
Annotation to former section 53-149:
Cited. 142 C. 285.
Annotation to former section 53-150:
Cited. 142 C. 285.
Annotation to former section 53-261:
Section cannot be enlarged to cover employee who had no authority to, nor did in fact, procure or contract for anything in behalf of state. 25 CS 269.
Annotations to former section 53-262:
A member of a board of education accepting a gratuity, not within the statute. 121 C. 160. Conspiracy by an agent of the state to receive share of real estate commissions. 126 C. 60. Cited. 129 C. 250.
Intent of statute is to prohibit person who has authority to make contracts or transact business on behalf of public or private corporation from accepting any payment, commission, compensation or gratuity of any kind from person with whom he makes contract or transacts business. It cannot be extended to include employee who has no authority or control or, in fact, exercised no authority or control over the contract. 25 CS 268.
Annotations to former section 53-266:
Cited. 16 CS 410; 25 CS 259, 260, 271.
Annotation to former section 53-267:
Cited. 22 CS 252.
Annotations to present part XI of chapter 952:
Cited. 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-146. Definitions. For purposes of this part:
(1) An "official proceeding" is any proceeding held or which may be held before any legislative, judicial, administrative or other agency or official authorized to take evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner or notary or other person taking evidence in connection with any proceeding.
(2) "Benefit" means monetary advantage, or anything regarded by the beneficiary as a monetary advantage, including benefit to any person or entity in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested.
(3) "Public servant" is an officer or employee of government, elected or appointed, and any person participating as advisor, consultant or otherwise, paid or unpaid, in performing a governmental function.
(4) "Government" includes any branch, subdivision or agency of the state or any locality within it.
(5) "Labor official" means any duly appointed or elected representative of a labor organization or any duly appointed or elected trustee or representative of an employee welfare trust fund.
(6) "Witness" is any person summoned, or who may be summoned, to give testimony in an official proceeding.
(7) "Juror" is any person who has been drawn or summoned to serve or act as a juror in any court.
(8) "Physical evidence" means any article, object, document, record or other thing of physical substance which is or is about to be produced or used as evidence in an official proceeding.
(9) "Person selected to be a public servant" means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public servant.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 148; P.A. 80-479, S. 1; P.A. 99-240, S. 12.)
History: P.A. 80-479 substituted "monetary advantage" for "gain or advantage" in Subdiv. (2), specified "paid or unpaid" advisors or consultants in Subdiv. (3) and added Subdiv. (9) defining "person selected to be a public servant"; P.A. 99-240 made definitions applicable to new Sec. 53a-151a but specific reference not added since said Sec. already included in existing reference to "this part" and made a technical change in Subdiv. (2) for purposes of gender neutrality.
Cited. 200 C. 664, 668.
Cited. 2 CA 204, 209.
Subsec. (3):
Cited. 172 C. 458, 468. Cited. 201 C. 379, 385.
Cited. 22 CA 449, 456. Cited. 40 CA 643, 669.

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Sec. 53a-147. Bribery: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery if he promises, offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a public servant or a person selected to be a public servant, any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion, recommendation or vote as a public servant or a person selected to be a public servant.
(b) Bribery is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 149; P.A. 80-479, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 80-479 included bribery of persons selected to be public servants in provisions and bribery consisting of promises of benefits for recipient's decision, opinion, recommendation of vote, deleting reference to "other exercise of discretion".
Offense of offering gratuity requires element of proof, specific intent, which is not needed to prove greater offense of bribery. 172 C. 458, 467. It is no defense for crime of bribery that police officer had no authority to take action desired by bribe given. Id., 458, 468. Covers crime of bribery in broad terms and is not limited to administration of justice and attempts to influence legislation. Id. Cited., 458, 460, 465−469. Sec. 29-9 is not lesser included offense to this charge, and acceptance of guilty plea to said section was nullity. Id., 608.
Cited. 1 CA 524. Cited. 5 CA 125, 129. Cited. 9 CA 15, 16. Cited. 14 CA 322, 329. Cited. 21 CA 386, 387.

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Sec. 53a-148. Bribe receiving: Class D felony. (a) A public servant or a person selected to be a public servant is guilty of bribe receiving if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another person any benefit for, because of, or as consideration for his decision, opinion, recommendation or vote.
(b) Bribe receiving is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 150; P.A. 80-479, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 61.)
History: P.A. 80-479 applied provisions to persons selected to be public servants and reworded Subsec. (a); P.A. 92- 260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "another" with "another person".
Offense under Sec. 29-9 is not a lesser included offense. 201 C. 379, 381−385. Cited. 208 C. 411, 413. Cited. 214 C. 657, 658, 668. Cited. 229 C. 716, 719.
Cited. 5 CA 125−129. Cited. 14 CA 322, 323. Cited. 17 CA 486, 487. Cited. 22 CA 449, 450, 456.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 14 CA 322, 323, 330. Cited. 20 CA 386, 392. Cited. 22 CA 449, 455.

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Sec. 53a-149. Bribery of a witness: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery of a witness if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a witness any benefit to influence the testimony or conduct of such witness in, or in relation to, an official proceeding.
(b) Bribery of a witness is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 151.)
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 192 C. 98, 99.
Cited as 53a-149a [sic]. 12 CA 74, 75, 83.

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Sec. 53a-150. Bribe receiving by a witness: Class D felony. (a) A witness is guilty of bribe receiving by a witness if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his testimony or conduct in, or in relation to, any official proceeding.
(b) Bribe receiving by a witness is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 152.)

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Sec. 53a-151. Tampering with a witness: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce a witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any official proceeding.
(b) Tampering with a witness is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 153.)
Cited. 193 C. 526, 531. Cited. 196 C. 242, 251. Cited. 197 C. 369, 370. Cited. 200 C. 664−672. Cited. 204 C. 330, 331. Cited. 228 C. 147, 149. Cited. Id., 918. Cited. 230 C. 686, 688, 690, 694. Cited. Id., 698, 723.
Cited. 1 CA 647. Cited. 12 CA 74, 75, 82. Cited. 26 CA 758, 759. Cited. 30 CA 95, 96; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147 et seq. Cited. 33 CA 143, 144, 149. Cited. 46 CA 741.
Cited. 39 CS 428, 429. Cited. 41 CS 525, 529, 530. Cited. 43 CS 46, 54.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 230 C. 686, 688.
Cited. 33 CA 143, 144. Cited. 41 CA 584, 585.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 200 C. 664, 674.

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Sec. 53a-151a. Intimidating a witness: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidating a witness when, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, such person uses, attempts to use or threatens the use of physical force against a witness or another person with intent to (1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of the witness in the official proceeding, or (2) induce the witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning the witness to testify or absent himself or herself from the official proceeding.
(b) Intimidating a witness is a class C felony.
(P.A. 99-240, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-152. Bribery of a juror: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery of a juror if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a juror any benefit as consideration for the juror's decision or vote.
(b) Bribery of a juror is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 154; P.A. 73-639, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 73-639 made bribery of a juror a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony.

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Sec. 53a-153. Bribe receiving by a juror: Class C felony. (a) A juror is guilty of bribe receiving by a juror if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another person any benefit as consideration for his decision or vote.
(b) Bribe receiving by a juror is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 155; P.A. 73-639, S. 11; P.A. 92-260, S. 62.)
History: P.A. 73-639 made bribe receiving by a juror a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "another" with "another person".

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Sec. 53a-154. Tampering with a juror: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with a juror if he influences any juror in relation to any official proceeding to or for which such juror has been drawn, summoned or sworn.
(b) Tampering with a juror is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 156.)
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2). Cited. 170 C. 601, 602.
Cited. 38 CS 464, 465.

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Sec. 53a-155. Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending, or about to be instituted, he: (1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in such official proceeding.
(b) Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 157.)
Cited. 1 CA 540, 542, 543. Cited. 6 CA 394. Cited. 25 CA 624, 625.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 214 C. 540, 541, 547, 549, 551. Cited. Id., 540, 547−549, 551. Subdiv. (1) cited. 236 C. 514, 516. Cited. 237 C. 339, 341.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 1 CA 540, 541, 548.

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Sec. 53a-156. Perjury: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of perjury if, in any official proceeding, he intentionally, under oath, makes a false statement, swears, affirms or testifies falsely, to a material statement which he does not believe to be true.
(b) Perjury is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 158.)
Cited. 175 C. 279. 291. Cited. 189 C. 92, 93. Cited. 200 C. 243, 251. One-witness-plus-corroboration rule discussed. 204 C. 472, 479, 480.
Cited. 4 CA 359, 360. Cited. 5 CA 552. Cited. 17 CA 395, 396.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 193 C. 474, 497. Cited. 204 C. 472, 473.
Cited. 5 CA 552. Cited. 10 CA 605, 606.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728.

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Sec. 53a-157. Transferred to Sec. 53a-157b.

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Sec. 53a-157a. False statement in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of false statement in the first degree when he intentionally makes a false written statement on a certified payroll submitted pursuant to section 31-53 which he does not believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a contracting authority or the labor commissioner in the exercise of his authority or the fulfillment of his duties under chapter 557.
(b) False statement in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 93-392, S. 7.)

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Sec. 53a-157b. (Formerly Sec. 53a-157). False statement in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of false statement in the second degree when he intentionally makes a false written statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable, which he does not believe to be true and which statement is intended to mislead a public servant in the performance of his official function.
(b) False statement in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 159; P.A. 93-392, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 93-392 amended Subsecs. (a) and (b) to classify the intentional making of a false written statement other than on a certified payroll as false statement "in the second degree"; Sec. 53a-157 transferred to Sec. 53a-157b in 1995.
Annotations to former section 53a-157:
Cited. 186 C. 265, 269. Cited (Diss. Op.). 187 C. 544, 569. Cited. 200 C. 310, 312. Cited. Id., 743, 755. Cited. 221 C. 93, 101. Cited. 227 C. 1, 23. Cited. 238 C. 588.
Cited. 9 CA 686, 728. Cited. 28 CA 733, 737. Cited. 34 CA 694, 702. Cited. 35 CA 714, 716. Cited. 36 CA 556, 563, 564.
Cited. 38 CS 340, 341. Cited. 40 CS 145, 148.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 233 C. 527, 529.
Cited. 6 CA 143, 146. Cited. 34 CA 694, 695.
Cited. 38 CS 695−697, 700.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 9 CA 686, 727.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 233 C. 527, 529. Cited. 235 C. 679, 682.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 233 C. 527, 529.

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Sec. 53a-158. Bribery of a labor official: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bribery of a labor official if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon a labor official any benefit with intent to influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or duties as such labor official.
(b) Bribery of a labor official is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 160.)

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Sec. 53a-159. Bribe receiving by a labor official: Class D felony. (a) A labor official is guilty of bribe receiving by a labor official if he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or duties as such labor official.
(b) Bribe receiving by a labor official is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 161.)
Cited. 229 C. 479, 283.

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Sec. 53a-160. Commercial bribery: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of commercial bribery when he confers, or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee, agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter's employer or principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.
(b) Commercial bribery is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 162.)
Cited. 14 CA 236, 241.

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Sec. 53a-161. Receiving a commercial bribe: Class A misdemeanor. (a) An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of receiving a commercial bribe when, without consent of his employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs.
(b) Receiving a commercial bribe is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 163.)
Cited. 229 C. 479, 483.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (5) cited. 37 CA 500, 501, 509; judgment reversed in part, see 237 C. 633 et seq.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 20 CA 386, 392.

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Sec. 53a-161a. Bid rigging: Class D felony. No person, firm, corporation, association or partnership who bids, or intends to bid, for any contract to be awarded by any commission, agency or department of the state or any political subdivision of the state shall induce or attempt to induce any other person, firm, corporation, association or partnership to submit or not to submit a bid or proposal for the purpose of restricting competition. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class D felony.
(P.A. 80-454, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-161b. Disclosure of bid or proposal: Class A misdemeanor. Unless otherwise required by law, the prices quoted in a bid or proposal for any contract to be awarded by any commission, agency or department of the state or any political subdivision of the state shall not be disclosed by the bidder or offeror prior to the opening, in the case of a bid, or prior to the award, in the case of a proposal, directly or indirectly to any other bidder or offeror or to any competitor. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 80-454, S. 2.)
Cited. 14 CA 322, 328, 330.

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Sec. 53a-161c. Receiving kickbacks: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of receiving kickbacks when he: (1) By force, intimidation or threat of procuring dismissal from employment induces any person who is employed in the construction, completion or repair of any public building, public work, or building or work financed in whole or in part by loans or grants from the state, or who has a contract with the state, to give up any part of the compensation to which he is entitled; (2) knowingly solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit, in cash or in kind, from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence such person's conduct in relation to referring an individual or arranging for the referral of an individual for the furnishing of any goods, facilities or services to such other person under contract to provide goods, facilities or services to a local, state or federal agency; or (3) by force, intimidation or threat, such person induces another person who has a contract with the state to give up any part of the compensation to which such other person is entitled. For the purposes of this section and section 53a-161d, "refer" means to send, direct or recommend and "referral" means the act of sending, directing or recommending. For purposes of this subsection, "benefit" shall not include forms of remuneration listed in 42 CFR Section 1001.952.
(b) Receiving kickbacks is a class D felony.
(P.A. 80-290; P.A. 96-169, S. 11.)
History: P.A. 96-169 substituted "when he: (1) By" for "whenever he by", added Subdivs. (2) and (3) and added definitions of "refer", "referral" and "benefit".
Cited. 229 C. 479, 482, 483.

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Sec. 53a-161d. Paying a kickback: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of paying a kickback when he knowingly offers or pays any benefit, in cash or kind, to any person with intent to influence such person: (1) To refer an individual, or to arrange for the referral of an individual, for the furnishing of any goods, facilities or services for which a claim for benefits or reimbursement has been filed with a local, state or federal agency; or (2) to purchase, lease, order or arrange for or recommend the purchasing, leasing or ordering of any goods, facilities or services for which a claim of benefits or reimbursement has been filed with a local, state or federal agency.
(b) Paying a kickback is a class D felony.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 12; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 38, 121.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998.

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Sec. 53a-162. Rigging: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of rigging if, with intent to prevent a publicly exhibited sporting or other contest from being conducted in accordance with the rules and usages purporting to govern it, he: (1) Confers or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon, or threatens any injury to, a participant, official or other person associated with the contest or exhibition; or (2) tampers with any person, animal or thing.
(b) Rigging is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 164.)

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Sec. 53a-163. Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging if he knowingly solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit the giving of which would be criminal under section 53a-162.
(b) Soliciting or accepting benefit for rigging is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 165.)

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Sec. 53a-164. Participation in a rigged contest: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of participation in a rigged contest if he knowingly engages in, sponsors, produces, judges or otherwise participates in a publicly exhibited sporting or other contest knowing that the contest is not being conducted in compliance with the rules and usages purporting to govern it, by reason of conduct which would be criminal under section 53a-162.
(b) Participation in a rigged contest is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 166; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 40.)
History: 1971 act substituted "section 53a-162" for "this section" in Subsec. (a).

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Sec. 53a-165. Hindering prosecution defined. As used in sections 53a-166 and 53a-167, a person "renders criminal assistance" when, with intent to prevent, hinder or delay the discovery or apprehension of, or the lodging of a criminal charge against, a person whom he knows or believes has committed a felony or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a felony, or with intent to assist a person in profiting or benefiting from the commission of a felony, he: (1) Harbors or conceals such person; or (2) warns such person of impending discovery or apprehension; or (3) provides such person with money, transportation, weapon, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or (4) prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against him; or (5) suppresses, by an act of concealment, alteration or destruction, any physical evidence which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against him; or (6) aids such person to protect or expeditiously profit from an advantage derived from such crime.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 167.)
Cited. 223 C. 595, 604.
Subdiv. (4):
Cited. 205 C. 17, 18.
Subdiv. (5):
Cited. 7 CA 470, 471, 476.

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Sec. 53a-166. Hindering prosecution in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the first degree when he renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed a class A or class B felony or an unclassified offense for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than ten years.
(b) Hindering prosecution in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 168; P.A. 78-37, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 78-37 classified rendering assistance to person who committed an unclassified offense punishable by maximum imprisonment of more than ten years as hindering prosecution in the first degree.
Cited. 200 C. 310, 316. Cited. 223 C. 595, 604.
Cited. 7 CA 470, 471, 473, 474, 476. Cited. 22 CA 601, 602, 606.
Cited. 38 CS 521, 523.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 28 CA 721, 722, 733.

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Sec. 53a-167. Hindering prosecution in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of hindering prosecution in the second degree when he renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed a class C or class D felony or an unclassified offense for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for ten years or less but more than one year.
(b) Hindering prosecution in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 169; P.A. 78-37, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 78-37 classified assisting person who committed an unclassified offense punishable by maximum imprisonment of one to ten years as hindering prosecution in second degree.
Cited. 205 C. 17, 18.
Cited. 1 CA 540, 543. Cited. 30 CA 712, 713.

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Sec. 53a-167a. Interfering with an officer: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when he obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or fireman in the performance of his duties.
(b) Interfering with an officer is a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 50; P.A. 76-225.)
History: P.A. 76-225 reworded Subsec. (a) to eliminate redundant reference to interference with peace officer or fireman and made interference with an officer a Class A misdemeanor rather than a Class D felony.
Annotation to former section 53-165:
Cited. 168 C. 395.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 182 C. 242, 244. Cited. 189 C. 1. Cited. 191 C. 433, 435. Cited. 194 C. 347, 350. Cited. 195 C. 668, 676. Cited. 198 C. 43, 44. Cited. 205 C. 456, 457, 459, 467−469, 471−474. Cited. 211 C. 389, 391. Cited. 220 C. 38, 40. Cited. 230 C. 400, 402. Cited. 234 C. 78, 80, 81. Cited. 236 C. 214, 215.
Cited. 1 CA 540, 543. Cited. 1 CA 709, 718. Cited. 5 CA 616, 618−622. Statute meets requirement of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407, 408, 411, 415, 416. Cited. 7 CA 257, 258. Cited. 8 CA 153, 154, 157. Cited. 10 CA 486, 494. Cited. Id., 532, 534. Cited. 12 CA 364, 365. Cited. 14 CA 10, 12, 20, 29. Cited. 15 CA 58, 59. Cited. Id., 161, 182. Cited. 18 CA 104, 106. Cited. 21 CA 326. Cited. 22 CA 10, 11. Cited. Id., 683, 685. Cited. 23 CA 83, 84. Cited. Id., 447−449. Cited. Id., 479, 480, 483. Cited. 24 CA 473, 474; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788 et seq. Cited. Id., 598, 599, 606−608. Cited. 27 CA 49, 50, 55, 56. Cited. Id., 103, 104, 108, 113. Cited. 28 CA 369, 370. Cited. 30 CA 45, 46. Cited. 31 CA 178, 180. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq. Cited. 37 CA 276, 277, 296−298. Cited. 38 CA 56, 58. Cited. 40 CA 601, 602, 609, 613. Cited. 42 CA 507. Cited. 43 CA 76. Cited. 45 CA 369. Cited. 46 CA 118.
Cited. 33 CS 4. Construed. 33 CS 515. Intention to interfere is necessary element of offense; charge to jury also required knowledge of officer's duty; unlawful entry by officer would not be "in the performance of his duties," so proof of lawfulness is essential element of state's case and section 53a-23 is applicable. 34 CS 531. Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction. Id., 549, 550. Cited. 36 CS 89. Cited. 37 CS 767, 774. Cited. 38 CS 364, 365; id., 400; id., 665, 666. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348. Cited. 43 CS 46, 74.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 205 C. 456, 459. Cited. 221 C. 788, 790.
Defendant acted with the intent to interfere with the performance of the officers' duties; defendant's act does not have to be successful. 1 CA 669, 670, 679. Cited. Id., 709, 710, 714−720, 722. Cited. 5 CA 496, 497. Cited. Id., 616, 619, 620. Cited. 6 CA 407, 416. Cited. 9 CA 255. Cited. 14 CA 10, 18. Cited. 17 CA 104−106. Cited. 21 CA 260, 261. Cited. 23 CA 123, 125. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. Id., 473, 474; judgment reversed in part, see 221 C. 788 et seq. Cited. Id., 489. Cited. 25 CA 3, 5. Cited. 31 CA 178, 180. Cited. 32 CA 224, 238. Cited. 33 CA 509, 510. Cited. 37 CA 276, 277, 295. Cited. 40 CA 601, 602, 610. Cited. 41 CA 584, 585. Cited. 45 CA 369. Cited. 46 CA 791.
Cited. 39 CS 347, 354.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 13 CA 667, 668.

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Sec. 53a-167b. Failure to assist a peace officer or fireman: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of failure to assist a peace officer or fireman when, commanded by a peace officer or fireman authorized to command assistance, he refuses to assist such officer or fireman in the execution of his duties.
(b) Failure to assist a peace officer or fireman is a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 51.)
Cited. 216 C. 820. Section not facially unconstitutional under fourth or fourteenth amendments. 217 C. 73−75, 77−79, 81, 83, 87−90, 92, 94. Cited. 218 C. 483−486.
Cited. 22 CA 683, 684, 686. Cited. 31 CA 443, 447.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 22 CA 683, 684.

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Sec. 53a-167c. Assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel. (a) A person is guilty of assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel when, with intent to prevent a reasonably identifiable peace officer, fireman or employee of an emergency medical service organization, as defined in section 53a-3, emergency room physician or nurse, employee of the Department of Correction, employee or member of the Board of Parole, probation officer, employee of the judicial branch assigned to provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission of a delinquent act or employee of the Department of Children and Families assigned to provide direct services to children and youth in the care or custody of the department from performing his or her duties, and while such peace officer, fireman, employee, physician, nurse, member or probation officer is acting in the performance of his or her duties, (1) such person causes physical injury to such peace officer, fireman, employee, physician, nurse, member or probation officer, or (2) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any rock, bottle, can or other article, object or missile of any kind capable of causing physical harm, damage or injury, at such peace officer, fireman, employee, physician, nurse, member or probation officer, or (3) such person uses or causes to be used any mace, tear gas or any like or similar deleterious agent against such peace officer, fireman, employee, physician, nurse, member or probation officer, or (4) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any paint, dye or other like or similar staining, discoloring or coloring agent or any type of offensive or noxious liquid, agent or substance at such peace officer, fireman, employee, physician, nurse, member or probation officer, or (5) such person throws or hurls, or causes to be thrown or hurled, any bodily fluid including, but not limited to, urine, feces, blood or saliva at such peace officer, fireman, employee, physician, nurse, member or probation officer.
(b) Assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel is a class C felony. If any person who is confined in an institution or facility of the Department of Correction is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for assault of an employee of the Department of Correction under this section, such term shall run consecutively to the term for which the person was serving at the time of the assault.
(P.A. 73-639, S. 19; P.A. 90-157, S. 2; 90-250, S. 2; P.A. 93-246, S. 1; P.A. 94-62; P.A. 98-41; P.A. 99-26, S. 28; 99-204.)
History: P.A. 90-157 applied provisions to assaults of employees of an emergency medical service organization; P.A. 90-250 applied provisions to employees of the department of correction, specified that assault must occur while peace officer, fireman or correction department employee is acting in performance of his duties and added provision re consecutive sentences for persons sentenced for assault of correction department employees; P.A. 93-246 applied provisions to assault of an employee or member of the board of parole or probation officer; P.A. 94-62 applied the provisions to emergency room physicians and emergency room nurses; P.A. 98-41 applied provisions to an assault of an employee of the Judicial Branch assigned to provide pretrial secure detention and programming services to juveniles accused of the commission of a delinquent act or an assault of an employee of the Department of Children and Families performing duties at Long Lane School; P.A. 99-26 revised the category of employees of the Department of Children and Families to which provisions apply by replacing an employee "performing duties at Long Lane School" with an employee "assigned to provide direct services to children and youth in the care or custody of the department"; P.A. 99-204 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (5) re throwing or hurling any bodily fluid at specified personnel and changed the name of the offense to "assault of public safety or emergency medical personnel" where appearing.
See Sec. 53a-59b re assault of an employee of the Department of Correction in the first degree.
Cited. 214 C. 195, 196. Cited. 231 C. 545−547, 555, 557−559, 562, 563. Cited. 234 C. 78, 80. Cited. 236 C. 31, 33, 36. Cited. 237 C. 454, 455. Cited. Id., 633.
Cited. 3 CA 353, 354. Cited. 10 CA 486, 494. Cited. 12 CA 364, 365. Cited. 14 CA 10, 12, 29, 36−38. Cited. 27 CA 103, 105. 32 CA 224, 239, 240. Cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 342. Cited. 40 CA 601, 602, 604, 606, 613. Cited. 43 CA 61. Cited. Id., 76. Cited. 46 CA 118.
Cited. 33 CS 4. Cited. 39 CS 347, 348.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1) cited. 201 C. 605, 606, 628, 630. Subdiv. (1) cited. 205 C. 370, 371. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 910. Subdiv. (1) cited. 231 C. 545, 547−549, 551−556, 558, 560−563. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 502, 504, 513. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Wolff, 37 CA 500 reversed in part to affirm judgment of trial court with respect to charges under this section. 237 C. 633.
Cited. 1 CA 709, 710. Subdiv. (1) cited. 9 CA 169, 171; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370, 385. Subdiv. (1) cited. 14 CA 10, 11, 16, 18, 21, 36, 38. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 10, 11, 16, 18, 21, 36, 38, 39. Cited. Id., 10, 27. Subdiv. (1) cited. 23 CA 160, 161, 172; Id., 315, 316. Cited. Id., 447, 449. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.; Id., 663, 664. Cited erroneously as Sec. 53- 167c(a)(1). 28 CA 469. Subdiv. (1) cited. 30 CA 606, 607, 610. Subdiv. (1) cited. 31 CA 178, 179. Cited. 32 CA 224, 225. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 224, 226, 237−243. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 224, 238. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 509, 510. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 743, 744, 748B; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 35 CA 431, 432, 434. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 699, 700. Cited. 37 CA 338, 339, 346−348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 338, 347, 348. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 500, 501. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 635, 636. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Cited. Id., 306, 315. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 333, 335. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 657, 659. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (1) cited. 43 CA 480. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 578. Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 264. Subdiv. (1) cited. 46 CA 118. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CS 347, 353.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 231 C. 545, 557.
Cited. 32 CA 224, 239.
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PART XII*
ESCAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-154:
Cited. 25 CS 451; 27 CS 283.
Annotations to former section 53-155:
Cited. 302 U. S. 54.
One fleeing from state in breach of his parole is guilty of escape. 68 C. 450. On the record, held that escape from prison farm was in fact one from prison. 130 C. 111. Cited. 165 C. 371. Cited. 166 C. 178.
Cited. 25 CS 252; 28 CS 16.
Annotations to former section 53-157:
Escape from jail a crime at common law. 7 C. 387. Escape from jail of person imprisoned on void warrant no crime. 7 C. 456. Jailer's license no defense to escape. 16 C. 51. Cited. 302 U. S. 54.
Cited. 27 CS 275.
Annotations to former section 53-158:
As used in this section, "correctional institution" refers to what was formerly known as a jail and is now a community correctional center. 166 C. 178.
Cited. 4 CS 215. Failure to sentence under, error, when. 30 CS 144.
Annotations to former section 53-159:
Cited. 4 CS 215; 24 CS 310.
Annotations to former section 53-162:
The essential elements of the common law and Sec. 53-162 crime of escape from custody are identical and the former is not a lesser offense included in the law. 165 C. 522, 530.
Cited. 23 CS 16, 17.
Annotations to former section 53-162a:
Defendant guilty of offense even where officer in charge gave him permission. 151 C. 159. Authorization by guard not equivalent to being "authorized by law." Id.
Annotations to former section 53-165:
Offense within this statute to obstruct indifferent person lawfully deputed to serve process. 39 C. 249. Refusal to turn over property to attaching officer who has lost possession of it after attachment no offense under this statute. 74 C. 64. Cited. 132 C. 228; 145 C. 141; 153 C. 149. No one has a right, unless under the most exceptional circumstances, to obstruct an officer who is armed with process lawful upon its face and who is in the performance of his duty. 147 C. 76.
Cited. 13 CS 113. There must be actual opposition or resistance, making necessary, under the circumstances, the use of force. 24 CS 7.
Failure to allege officer "was concerned in administration of justice while executing his duties" was not fatal. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 156. For violation, personal abuse must hinder officer in performing his duties. Id., 169. Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200. Even though defendant who was arrested as a result of speedy information resisted arrest because he mistakenly believed a warrant was necessary, he was guilty under this section since the intent requisite to the crime of resisting arrest is the intent to resist or obstruct an officer while he is making a lawful arrest, not the intent to violate the criminal law. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 467, 468. Defendant who volunteered to accompany officer to confront complaining witness but then ran away and, in course of tussle with officers to apprehend him, was placed under arrest on speedy information found guilty under statute. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530, 534. Purpose of statute is to enforce orderly behavior in important mission of preserving the peace and any act intended to thwart that purpose is a violation. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 534, 540. Physical strength need not be involved nor need act be wholly or partially successful or such as to defeat or delay officer's performance of duty. Id. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 311, 355. Statute was violated by defendants who, after being placed under arrest, refused to leave police cruiser and enter police wagon, necessitating their being carried bodily to wagon. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 583. State failed to prove defendant committed offense beyond reasonable doubt where there was no battery by defendant, who was five foot, eighty-five pound female, against police officer, who was over six feet and weighed one hundred eighty-three pounds. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 587. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 431.

Sec. 53a-168. Escape: Definitions. For purposes of sections 53a-169 to 53a-171, inclusive:
(1) "Correctional institution" means the facilities defined in section 1-1 and any other correctional facility established by the Commissioner of Correction.
(2) "Custody" means restraint by a public servant pursuant to an arrest or court order other than a Probate Court order directed against a person who is not in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction when such order is issued.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 170; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 41; P.A. 80-216, S. 1.)
History: 1971 act replaced reference to Sec. 53a-170 with reference to Sec. 53a-171; P.A. 80-216 clarified meaning of custody as it applies to probate court orders.
Cited. 240 C. 97.
Cited. 37 CA 276, 284.
Subdiv. (2):
Cited. 37 CA 276, 281. Cited. Id., 733, 735, 744.

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Sec. 53a-169. Escape in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of escape in the first degree (1) if he escapes from a correctional institution or (2) if he escapes from any public or private, nonprofit halfway house, group home or mental health facility or community residence to which he was transferred pursuant to subsection (e) of section 18-100 or section 18-100c and he is in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or is required to be returned to the custody of said commissioner upon his release from such facility or (3) if he escapes from a work detail or school on the premises of the correctional institution or (4) if he fails to return from a furlough authorized under section 18-101a or (5) if he fails to return from work release or education release as authorized under sections 18-90a and 18-100 or (6) if he escapes from a hospital for mental illness in which he has been confined under the provisions of section 17a-582, 17a-584, 17a-593, 17a-594 or 17a-596 or (7) if, while under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, but not confined to a hospital for mental illness, he leaves the state without authorization of the board.
(b) Escape in the first degree is a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 171; P.A. 73-639, S. 12; P.A. 74-338, S. 47, 94; P.A. 78-92, S. 2; P.A. 80-216, S. 2; P.A. 82-12; P.A. 84-236, S. 1; P.A. 85-506, S. 25, 32; P.A. 89-383, S. 2, 16; P.A. 98-39.)
History: P.A. 73-639 replaced offense of escape from a correctional institution with offense of escape in the first degree which includes escapes from correctional institutions and escapes from work details or schools on institution premises; P.A. 74-338 specified failure to return from furlough as first degree escape; P.A 78-92 specified escapes from halfway house, group home or mental health facility and failure to return from work-release or education release as first degree escape; P.A. 80-216 specified escape from halfway house, group home or mental health facility is first degree escape if escapee is in correction commissioner's custody or is to be returned to his custody upon release from the facility; P.A. 82- 12 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (6) concerning a person who escapes from a state hospital or treatment facility; P.A. 84-236 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to include escapes from community residences; P.A. 85-506 amended Subdiv. (6) of Subsec. (a) to replace "state hospital or other treatment facility" with "hospital for mental illness" and replace reference to repealed Sec. 53a-47 with "section 17-257c, 17-257e, 17-257n, 17-257o or 17-257q", and added Subdiv. (7) concerning a person under the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board who leaves the state; P.A. 89-383 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to include a person who escapes from his abode to which he was released pursuant to Subsec. (f) of Sec. 18-100, effective July 5, 1989, to July 1, 1994 (Revisor's note: The amendment to this section contained in P.A. 89-393 was deleted by the Revisors following its expiration on July 1, 1994); P.A. 98-39 amended Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (a) to add reference to Sec. 18-100c.
See Sec. 18-101a re consideration of prisoner's failure to return from furlough as crime of escape.
Illegal confinement is no defense to escape from correctional institution. 169 C. 438, 441. Cited. 184 C. 157, 166. Held constitutional as to both due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment to U.S. constitution. Id., 222− 225. Defendant's acts did not constitute violation of statute as it was amended as of date of acts as he was not then under jurisdiction of commissioner of correction. 185 C. 517, 519, 522, 523, 525, 526. Cited. 216 C. 402, 405, 406, 408, 409, 411. Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 234 C. 301, 309.
Cited. 36 CA 440, 445. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Cited. Id., 407, 410. Cited. Id., 789, 790.
Cited. 35 CS 544, 547.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 184 C. 222, 223, 226. Subdiv. (2) cited. 213 C. 38, 48. Subdiv. (2): Proof of single failure to report insufficient to prove guilt of "escape". 216 C. 402−411. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id., 402, 408. Subdiv. (7) cited. Id. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 402, 409. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2): Decision of appellate court in State v. Jemison, 35 CA 1, 2−5, overruled to the extent that it permits conviction for escape to rest solely on jury's finding that defendant repeatedly did not report to supervising officer as scheduled. 234 C. 301, 302, 306, 308−311. Subdiv. (1) cited. 235 C. 748, 751. Subdiv. (2) cited. 236 C. 209, 210. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 266, 267. Subdiv. (1) cited. 241 C. 322.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 29 CA 817, 818. Subdiv. (4) cited. 35 CA 1, 8; see also 234 C. 301 et seq. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id.; see also 234 C. 301 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 680, 681. Subdiv. (1) cited. 39 CA 333, 336. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 789, 790. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 407, 408, 411. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 813, 815.
Subdiv. (3): Equating failure to return from parole with escape held not violative of constitutional right to due process and equal protection. 36 CS 71, 72.

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Sec. 53a-170. Escape in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of escape in the second degree if he escapes from any correctional institution while employed at work outside such correctional institution.
(b) Escape in the second degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 173; P.A. 73-639, S. 14; P.A. 92-260, S. 63.)
History: P.A. 73-639 substituted "escape in the second degree" for "escape while at work"; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.

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Sec. 53a-171. Escape from custody: Class C felony or class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of escape from custody if such person (1) escapes from custody, or (2) has been convicted as delinquent, has been committed to the Department of Children and Families, and (A) fails to return from a leave authorized under section 17a-8a, or (B) escapes from a state or private facility or institution in which such person has been assigned or placed by the Commissioner of Children and Families.
(b) If a person has been arrested for, charged with or convicted of a felony, escape from such custody is a class C felony, otherwise, escape from custody is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 172; 1971, P.A. 16; P.A. 00-209, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act changed escape from custody after arrest or charge for, or conviction of, a felony from a Class D to a Class C felony; P.A. 00-209 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re a person who has been convicted as delinquent and fails to return from an authorized leave or escapes from a facility or institution in which such person was assigned or placed and to make technical changes.
Cited. 173 C. 35, 39, 41, 45. Cited. 188 C. 406, 407. Cited. 196 C. 309−311. Cited. 197 C. 588, 589. Cited. 207 C. 270, 272. Cited. 211 C. 398, 400. Cited. 220 C. 270, 272.
Cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. Id., 615, 616, 621. Cited. 24 CA 287, 288. Cited. 36 CA 691−694. Cited. 37 CA 276, 278, 280−282, 284. Cited. Id., 733, 735.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 3 CA 684, 685. Cited. 12 CA 604, 605. Cited. 23 CA 160, 161. Cited. 36 CA 691, 692. Cited. 37 CA 276, 278, 282. Cited. Id., 733, 735, 744.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 173 C. 35, 36, 49.
Cited. 37 CA 276, 285, 286.

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Sec. 53a-171a. Aiding escape from hospital or sanatorium: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium when he aids the escape from a hospital or sanatorium of any person committed thereto as mentally ill or as drug dependent.
(b) Aiding escape from a hospital or sanatorium is a class A misdemeanor.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 42; P.A. 76-336, S. 11.)
History: P.A. 76-336 reworded Subsec. (a) for clarity and grammatical sense inserting "when he aids the escape from a hospital or sanatorium".

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Sec. 53a-172. Failure to appear in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the first degree when (1) while charged with the commission of a felony and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of his bail bond or promise to appear, or (2) while on probation for conviction of a felony, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called for a violation of probation hearing.
(b) Failure to appear in the first degree is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 174; P.A. 92-260, S. 64; P.A. 98-26, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language; P.A. 98-26 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re failure to appear for a violation of probation hearing.
Cited. 176 C. 421, 422, 425−427. Cited. 221 C. 407, 408. Cited. 222 C. 556, 558, 559, 583. Cited. 227 C. 829−831, 845−847. Cited. 229 C. 285, 287. Cited. Id., 529, 543. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114, 135. Cited. 242 C. 296.
Cited. 4 CA 154−157. Cited. 6 CA 402, 403. Cited. 12 CA 621, 622. Cited. 17 CA 556, 558. Cited. 20 CA 205, 207. Cited. 27 CA 279, 281. Cited. 29 CA 801, 802; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 285 et seq. Cited. 30 CA 190, 192. Cited. 34 CA 191, 193−195, 197, 199. Cited. 36 CA 691, 692. Cited. 37 CA 437, 438. Cited. 39 CA 816, 819. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. Id., 552.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 223 C. 283, 285. Cited. 236 C. 112, 114. Cited. 242 C. 296.
Cited. 13 CA 413, 414. Cited. 24 CA 316, 318. Cited. 25 CA 575, 576. Cited. 30 CA 9, 10. Cited. 34 CA 191, 192, 195. Cited. 37 CA 437, 438, 449. Cited. 39 CA 816, 817. Cited. 41 CA 47−49. Cited. 43 CA 142.

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Sec. 53a-173. Failure to appear in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of failure to appear in the second degree when (1) while charged with the commission of a misdemeanor or a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed and while out on bail or released under other procedure of law, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called according to the terms of his bail bond or promise to appear, or (2) while on probation for conviction of a misdemeanor or motor vehicle violation, he wilfully fails to appear when legally called for a violation of probation hearing.
(b) Failure to appear in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 175; P.A. 87-343, S. 2, 4; P.A. 92-260, S. 65; P.A. 98-26, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 87-343 included persons charged with a motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language; P.A. 98-26 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re failure to appear for a violation of probation hearing.
Cited. 227 C. 829−831, 845−847. Cited. 234 C. 301, 303.
Cited. 6 CA 247, 250. Cited. 8 CA 542, 543. Cited. 11 CA 644, 645. Cited. 13 CA 638, 639. Cited. 17 CA 226, 231. Cited. 20 CA 811. Cited. 38 CA 85, 86. Cited. 43 CA 142. Cited. 45 CA 722.
Cited. 35 CS 587, 588, 596, 597.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 38 CA 85, 86.

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Sec. 53a-174. Unauthorized conveyance of items into correctional or humane institution or to inmate: Class D felony. Unauthorized conveyance of letter into or from, or use of false name to enter, correctional institution: Class A misdemeanor. (a) Any person not authorized by law who conveys or passes, or causes to be conveyed or passed, into any correctional or humane institution or the grounds or buildings thereof, or to any inmate of such an institution who is outside the premises thereof and known to the person so conveying or passing or causing such conveying or passing to be such an inmate, any controlled drug, as defined in section 21a-240, any intoxicating liquors, any firearm, weapon, dangerous instrument or explosive of any kind, any United States currency, or any rope, ladder or other instrument or device for use in making, attempting or aiding an escape, shall be guilty of a class D felony. The unauthorized conveying, passing or possession of any rope or ladder or other instrument or device, adapted for use in making or aiding an escape, into any such institution or the grounds or buildings thereof, shall be presumptive evidence that it was so conveyed, passed or possessed for such use.
(b) Any person not authorized by law who conveys into any such institution any letter or other missive which is intended for any person confined therein, or who conveys from within the enclosure to the outside of such institution any letter or other missive written or given by any person confined therein, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person or visitor who enters or attempts to enter a correctional institution or facility by using a misleading or false name or title shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 176; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 43; 1972, P.A. 12; P.A. 73-639, S. 16.)
History: 1971 act applied provisions to humane institutions and replaced reference to "narcotic or hypnotic" drugs with reference to "controlled" drugs in Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (c) re use of false or misleading name in entrance in or attempt to enter a correctional facility; 1972 act specified conveyance of U.S. currency into correctional or humane institution or to one of its inmates as Class D felony; P.A. 73-639 prohibited conveyance of any "dangerous instrument".
Cited. 42 CA 264.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 42 CA 264.

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Sec. 53a-174a. Possession of weapon or dangerous instrument in correctional institution: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution when, being an inmate of such institution, he knowingly makes, conveys from place to place or has in his possession or under his control any firearm, weapon, dangerous instrument, explosive, or any other substance or thing designed to kill, injure or disable.
(b) Possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution is a class B felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 55; P.A. 73-639, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 73-639 applied provisions with respect to possession of dangerous instruments.
Cited. 169 C. 428, 431. Cited. 195 C. 1, 2, 9. Cited. 227 C. 711, 714. Cited. Id., 751, 753. Cited. 230 C. 591, 593. Cited. 240 C. 97.
Cited. 39 CA 789, 790.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 230 C. 591, 593. Cited. 235 C. 748, 749. Cited. 240 C. 97.
Cited. 32 CA 448, 449. Cited. 36 CA 41, 42. Cited. 39 CA 789, 790. Cited. 44 CA 499.
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PART XIII*
RIOT AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-167a:
Cited. 164 C. 69. Specific intent not required. Id.
Cited. 23 CS 231. Claim of prisoner convicted under this statute of brutal treatment may not be considered in habeas corpus proceeding. 25 CS 519.
Annotations to former section 53-168:
This section applies to responses to questions put by police as well as to report by person who himself goes to police for some action. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 193.
Annotations to former section 53-169:
Justice cannot order person engaged in riot bound over without complaint and warrant. 4 C. 112.

Sec. 53a-175. Riot in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when simultaneously with six or more other persons he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm, and in the course of and as a result of such conduct, a person other than one of the participants suffers physical injury or substantial property damage occurs.
(b) Riot in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 177.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 246.

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Sec. 53a-176. Riot in the second degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of riot in the second degree when, simultaneously with two or more other persons, he engages in tumultuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave risk of causing public alarm.
(b) Riot in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 178.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 246.

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Sec. 53a-177. Unlawful assembly: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of unlawful assembly when he assembles with two or more other persons for the purpose of engaging in conduct constituting the crime of riot, or when, being present at an assembly which either has or develops such a purpose, he remains there with intent to advance that purpose.
(b) Unlawful assembly is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 179.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 246.

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Sec. 53a-178. Inciting to riot: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of inciting to riot when he advocates, urges or organizes six or more persons to engage in tumultuous and violent conduct of a kind likely to cause public alarm.
(b) Inciting to riot is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 180; P.A. 92-260, S. 66.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace "create" with "cause".

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Sec. 53a-179. Criminal advocacy: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal advocacy when (1) he advocates the overthrow of the existing form of government of this state or any subdivision thereof by imminent dangerous action, or (2) with knowledge of its contents, he publishes, sells or distributes any document which advocates such imminent dangerous action.
(b) Criminal advocacy is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 181.)
Annotation to former section 53-1:
Cited. 325 U.S. 10.
Annotation to former section 53-5:
Construed, applied and upheld. 96 C. 607.
Annotation to former section 53-6:
Cited. 96 C. 607.
Annotation to present section:
Cited. 197 C. 436, 443.

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Sec. 53a-179a. Inciting injury to persons or property: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of inciting injury to persons or property when, in public or private, orally, in writing, in printing or in any other manner, he advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits the unlawful burning, injury to or destruction of any public or private property or advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or solicits any assault upon any organization of the armed forces of the United States, as defined by section 27-103, or of this state, as defined by section 27-2, or the police force of this or any other state or upon any officer or member thereof or the organized police or fire departments of any municipality or any officer or member thereof, or the killing or injuring of any class or body of persons, or of any individual.
(b) Inciting injury to persons or property is a class C felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 52.)
Annotations to former section 53-44:
Cited. 166 C. 81, 83, 88.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 234 C. 78, 80.
Cited. 36 CA 821, 822. Section not void for vagueness and overbreadth. 48 CA 148.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 36 CA 821, 822.
Statute not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth; requirement of intent that must be read into statute preserves it from constitutional demise under first amendment. 41 CS 525, 526, 528, 530, 531, 537. Cited. 43 CS 46, 54, 74.

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Sec. 53a-179b. Rioting at correctional institution: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of rioting at a correctional institution when he incites, instigates, organizes, connives at, causes, aids, abets, assists or takes part in any disorder, disturbance, strike, riot or other organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of such institution.
(b) Rioting at a correctional institution is a class B felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 53.)
Cited. 190 C. 143−151. Cited. 227 C. 711−713, 742. Cited. 227 C. 751, 753. Cited. 237 C. 454, 455, 469−471, 474. Cited. 240 C. 97.
Statute not constitutionally vague or overbroad. 30 CA 224, 227, 229, 230. Cited. 32 CA 224−226, 245−250. Cited. 44 CA 264.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 237 C. 454, 471−474.
Cited. 30 CA 224, 225, 227. Cited. 32 CA 224, 226. Cited. 39 CA 333, 336.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 74.

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Sec. 53a-179c. Inciting to riot at correctional institution: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of inciting to riot at a correctional institution when he incites, instigates, organizes, connives at, causes, aids, abets or takes part in any meeting of inmates of a correctional institution, the purpose of which is to foment unrest, disorder, disturbance, strike, riot or other organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of the institution.
(b) Inciting to riot at a correctional institution is a class C felony.
(1971, P.A. 871, S. 54.)
Cited. 32 CA 224, 249.

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Sec. 53a-180. Falsely reporting an incident: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he: (1) Initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which it is likely that public alarm or inconvenience will result; or (2) reports, by word or action, to any official or quasi- official agency or organization having the function of dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion or other catastrophe or emergency which did not in fact occur or does not in fact exist; or (3) gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (A) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur, (B) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur, or (C) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 182; P.A. 81-353, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-353 increased the penalty from a class B to a class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 188 C. 161, 175. Cited. 200 C. 743, 755. Cited. 216 C. 301, 314. Cited. 219 C. 529, 551. Cited. Id., 557, 564. Cited. 221 C. 93, 101. Cited. 223 C. 635, 666. Cited. 224 C. 627, 644. Cited. 227 C. 1, 23. Cited. 238 C. 588.
Cited. 14 CA 548, 549. Cited. 19 CA 396, 397. Cited. 29 CA 843, 852. Cited. 36 CA 556, 563, 564.
Cited. 34 CS 666, 669.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 186 C. 265, 268.

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Sec. 53a-180a. Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death when he commits the crime of falsely reporting an incident as provided in section 53a-180, and such false report results in the serious physical injury or death of another person.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident resulting in serious physical injury or death is a class D felony.
(P.A. 81-353, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 67.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make technical changes in the name of the offense.

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Sec. 53a-180b. Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death when he commits the crime of falsely reporting an incident as provided in section 53a-180 and such false report is of the alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of the serious physical injury or death of another person.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident concerning serious physical injury or death is a class D felony.
(P.A. 97-147, S. 2.)
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PART XIV*
BREACH OF THE PEACE, CREATING A PUBLIC DISTURBANCE,
INTIMIDATION BASED ON BIGOTRY OR BIAS, STALKING,
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, OBSTRUCTING FREE PASSAGE
AND HARASSMENT

*Annotations to former section 53-174:
An assault with "intent to drown and suffocate" not within this statute. 5 C. 330. A breach of the peace under this section may be committed without assault or battery. 29 C. 72. Assailing party with scurrilous and abusive language is a "mocking" under this section. 34 C. 279. Effect of provision concerning libelous publications. 90 C. 98. Elements necessary where offense is tumultuous behavior. 75 C. 205. Interrupting a school under former statute. 26 C. 607; 28 C. 232; 82 C. 321. Does not define breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it; it may be committed in other ways. 126 C. 5. Not necessary that information contain an allegation that publications were maliciously made if there is no mention of privilege. 148 C. 208. Not necessary to prove a breach of the peace to support a conviction of libel. Id. Cited. 97 C. 138; 124 C. 557; 145 C. 124; 147 C. 704; 148 C. 77; 153 C. 208; 157 C. 226. Cited. 162 C. 383. Cited. 165 C. 288, 291, 294.
Annotations to former statute prohibiting acts calculated to intimidate: to threaten and use means to intimidate a company against its will to abstain from keeping in its employ workmen of its own choice is within the prohibition of the statute. 55 C. 70, 71; 92 C. 168. Statute as applied to strike. 77 C. 237; 79 C. 13; id., 416. Necessary allegations of information; intimidation need not result. 80 C. 614; 81 C. 696. Notice by bricklayers' union to contractors and employers that members would not work if nonunion men were employed held no violation of this statute on particular facts. 92 C. 168. Does not require proof of assault and battery. No specific intent is essential. It is sufficient that the acts intentionally committed cause serious disquietude on the part of those in the vicinity. 140 C. 586. Cited. 142 C. 605.
Cited. 5 CS 507; 22 CS 361; 23 CS 294; id., 344; id., 455; 24 CS 354; 25 CS 483; 27 CS 128. "Peace" defined; it is not the law that there is no breach of the peace unless public repose is disturbed. Numerous abusive and indecent telephone calls held breach of the peace. (Now see Sec. 53a-183.) Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for violation of this section, there should have been presentence investigation and report as defendant could have been detained therein for as much as two years. 26 CS 504, 505. Petitioner by habeas corpus petition challenged her commitment for indefinite term for breach of peace, when Sec. 17-360 provides maximum sentence of one year for this misdemeanor and sentence ordered modified. 28 CS 9.
Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 200; id., 611; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 224, 227; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 68; id., 90; id., 413, 416; id., 476, 477; id., 538. Abusive and threatening language uttered over telephone constituted violation. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 288. (Now see Sec. 53-174a.) Defendant's contention that conduct involving one or two persons and occurring in an isolated place could not constitute breach of the peace was without merit. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 648. Time is not an essential element of crime of breach of peace unless date is material to the defense. Id., 649. Mere presence of defendant as inactive companion would not make him an accessory to breach of peace. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 138. Breach of peace may be found if alleged offensive act is of such a character that it naturally tends to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity where act is likely to exercise its malignity. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 423. "Provokes contention" does not require that blows be struck. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 550, 552. Statute provides its own definition of "mocking." Id. Although defendant did not take part in assault, he is guilty under statute because everyone is party to an offense who directly or indirectly counsels or procures any person to commit the offense or do any act forming a part thereof. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 610, 613. Defendant properly charged with breach of peace when he violated curfew imposed by mayor of New Haven when riotous conditions existed in the city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Right to constitutional procedural safeguards applicable to charges of misdemeanor. Id., 178. Evidence of defendant magazine salesman's forcible amorous assault on complainant housewife in her home warranted his conviction of crime of breach of peace by assault. Id., 186. Statute does not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it and defendant garage owner's threatened assault on complaining witness in his shop warranted his conviction under it. Id., 298. Constitutionality of this statute properly raised by demurrer upon ground it is unconstitutionally vague. Demurrer overruled as language used in statute is plain and unambiguous and legislative intent clearly expressed. Id., 384. Cited. Id., 311; 517. Section does not define crime of breach of peace but merely specifies certain ways of committing it. It may be committed in ways other than those specified. Offensive acts must be of such character that they tend naturally to cause serious disquietude on part of those in vicinity. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 583. Evidence of prior altercation between defendant and victim's son which led immediately to attack on father, admissible on question of motive. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 607. There was sufficient evidence on which trial court found defendant had committed assault and battery and appeal court cannot retry case. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 14. Defendant in resisting unlawful arrest was not guilty of breach of peace. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 42. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 90, 402, 403, 404, 405, 431.
Annotations to former section 53-175:
Disorderly conduct arrest proper where defendant refused to answer police officer's questions and gathered a crowd by his shouting. 157 C. 485.
Conduct to be disorderly under this section must take place in a public place. 23 CS 430. Constitutionality upheld; disorderly conduct involves annoyance to or interference with someone in a public place by conduct which is offensive or disorderly. 24 CS 7. What constitutes disorderly conduct; sit-in demonstrations in waiting rooms of business office, although nonabusive, nonviolent and nonboisterous, held to be disorderly conduct. 24 CS 337.
Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 57; id., 533. Defendant was correctly charged with disorderly conduct when he violated curfew order of mayor of New Haven imposed to prevent continuance of riots in that city. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22. Waiving Viet Cong flag is expression of ideas and not incitement to violence under statute. Lower court will not rule unconstitutional laws of long regarded social importance and a public policy of wide general support. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 402 et seq.
Annotations to former section 53-183:
"Permit" covers not only a voluntary turning loose, but also failure to use reasonable care to restrain. 104 C. 499. Need not be confined by halter. 136 C. 440. To establish a violation it must be shown that the animals were at large on the highway without a keeper either by the voluntary act of the defendant or by reason of his negligent failure to restrain them. 146 C. 470.
Owner of horse not required to respond in damages where horse was at large on the highway because the barnyard gate had been cut by a person unknown to the owner. 10 CS 384.
Annotations to former section 53-186:
Cited. 104 C. 499.

Sec. 53a-181. Breach of the peace: Class A or B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of breach of the peace when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place; or (2) assaults or strikes another; or (3) threatens to commit any crime against another person or his property; or (4) publicly exhibits, distributes, posts up or advertises any offensive, indecent or abusive matter concerning any person; or (5) in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture; or (6) creates a public and hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which he is not licensed or privileged to do; or (7) places a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device in a public place. For purposes of this section, "public place" means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.
(b) Breach of the peace is a class B misdemeanor, except that violation of subdivision (7) of subsection (a) of this section is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 183; P.A. 92-260, S. 68; P.A. 98-55.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to replace in Subdiv. (6) "public, hazardous or physically offensive condition" with "public and hazardous or physically offensive condition" and amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense; P.A. 98-55 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (7) re placing a nonfunctional imitation of an explosive or incendiary device in a public place and add definition of "public place" and amended Subsec. (b) to add exception making a violation of Subdiv. (7) a class A misdemeanor.
Cited. 190 C. 371, 411. Cited. 191 C. 433, 436. Cited. 194 C. 347, 358, 360. Cited. 195 C. 668, 672, 676. Cited. 205 C. 456, 474. Cited. 217 C. 73, 76. Cited. 237 C. 613. Cited. Id., 633. Cited. 243 C. 115.
Cited. 3 CA 410, 411. Cited. 6 CA 334, 335. Cited. 6 CA 407, 408. Cited. 9 CA 255. Cited. 10 CA 499, 500. Cited. 12 CA 74, 75, 79. Cited. Id., 306, 308. Cited. Id., 481, 487. Cited. 13 CA 139, 149. Cited. 14 CA 6. Cited. Id., 10, 12, 16. Cited. Id., 548, 549. Cited. 15 CA 641, 642. Cited. 17 CA 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. 28 CA 344, 359. Cited. 29 CA 683, 684. Cited. 36 CA 135, 136.
Cited. 33 CS 93. Cited. 34 CS 548, 549. Obscene gesture must be erotic in a significant way and must appeal to prurient interest in sex or portray sex in patently offensive way. Id., 575. Not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. 35 CS 587− 590. Cited. 36 CS 89; id., 609, 610. Whether defendant's vituperations addressed to the police officer constituted breach of the peace under statute discussed. 38 CS 349, 352. Cited. 39 CS 359−361. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52, 65.
Notice of conduct to be precise. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 667. History prior to penal code. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668. Cited. Id., 751, 752.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (5) cited. 194 C. 347, 358. Cited. 195 C. 668, 676. Cited. 198 C. 43, 44. Subdiv. (5) cited. 205 C. 456, 475, 476. Subdiv. (2) cited. 214 C. 378, 379. Subdiv. (1) cited. 227 C. 153, 155. Subdiv. (1) cited. 233 C. 903. Subdiv. (1): Does not require proof of actual physical contact on part of defendant with a victim; when applied to speech, parameters of the violent, threatening or tumultuous behavior prohibited by section are consistent with "fighting words"; judgment of appellate court in State v. Szymkiewicz, 36 CA 625 et seq. reversed. 237 C. 613. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 613. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 633.
Cited. 1 CA 669, 670. Subdiv. (5): This part of the statute is confined to language which constitutes "fighting" words and defendant's repeated vile, racist and threatening epithets were of such a nature. Id., 669, 678. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 709, 714. Statute meets requirements of fair notice to defendant. 6 CA 407, 408, 411, 415. Cited. Id., 407, 415. Cited. 10 CA 499, 500. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 74, 88, 89. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id., 74, 82, 88, 89. Cited. 13 CA 139, 149. Subdiv. (6) cited. 14 CA 10, 16. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 440, 441. Subdiv. (6) cited. 27 CA 103, 105, 110, 113. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 103, 110. Cited. 36 CA 625; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 625−629. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id., 625, 629. Cited. 37 CA 500, 507, 509; judgment reversed in part, see 237 C. 633 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CA 306, 307. Subdiv. (1) cited. 41 CA 847, 848. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (5) cited. 38 CS 349, 353. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id., 581, 582. Subdiv. (5) cited. Id. Cited. 39 CS 504, 509.

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Sec. 53a-181a. Creating a public disturbance: Infraction. (a) A person is guilty of creating a public disturbance when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) annoys or interferes with another person by offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise.
(b) Creating a public disturbance is an infraction.
(P.A. 83-276, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 69.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change.
Cited. 228 C. 795, 798. Cited. 243 C. 115.
No right to jury trial. 9 CA 255−257. Cited. 12 CA 258, 263, 267. Cited. Id., 481, 482, 487, 493, 494, 498. Cited. 24 CA 195, 196. Cited. Id., 541, 542. Cited. 28 CA 344, 359. Cited. 32 CA 656, 665; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 345 et seq.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 228 C. 795, 811. Cited. 237 C. 613. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 258, 263, 267. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 481, 483. Subdiv. (2): "Offensive conduct" defined. Id., 481, 483, 486, 488. Subdiv. (1): Legislative intent to proscribe conduct which actually involves physical violence or portends imminent physical violence. Id., 481, 483, 486, 488, 490, 491. Cited. Id., 481, 485. Cited. 36 CA 625, 629; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613 et seq.

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Sec. 53a-181b. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias: Class D felony. Section 53a-181b is repealed, effective October 1, 2000.
(P.A. 90-137, S. 1, 3; P.A. 00-72, S. 11.)

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Sec. 53a-181c. Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he commits stalking in the second degree as provided in section 53a-181d and (1) he has previously been convicted of this section or section 53a-181d, or (2) such conduct violates a court order in effect at the time of the offense, or (3) the other person is under sixteen years of age.
(b) Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 92-237, S. 1.)
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 47, 51.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 46 CA 661.

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Sec. 53a-181d. Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when, with intent to cause another person to fear for his physical safety, he wilfully and repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such other person and causes such other person to reasonably fear for his physical safety.
(b) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 92-237, S. 2.)
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.
Cited. 44 CA 84. Held to be not unconstitutionally vague. 46 CA 661.
Constitutionality of statute under attack for vagueness or overbreadth discussed. 43 CS 46−48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 60−64, 67, 69−71, 74−76.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 44 CA 84. Cited. 46 CA 661.

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Sec. 53a-181e. Stalking in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of stalking in the third degree when he recklessly causes another person to reasonably fear for his physical safety by wilfully and repeatedly following or lying in wait for such other person.
(b) Stalking in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 95-214, S. 1.)
See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

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Secs. 53a-181f to 53a-181i. Reserved for future use.

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Sec. 53a-181j. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation of such other person, causes serious physical injury to such other person or to a third person.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the first degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 00-72, S. 1.)
See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

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Sec. 53a-181k. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree when such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation of such other person, does any of the following: (1) Causes physical contact with such other person, (2) damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of such other person, or (3) threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection, if there is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection will occur.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 00-72, S. 2.)
See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

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Sec. 53a-181l. Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree when such person, with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person or group of persons because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation of such other person or persons: (1) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property, or (2) threatens, by word or act, to do an act described in subdivision (1) of this subsection or advocates or urges another person to do an act described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, if there is reasonable cause to believe that an act described in said subdivision will occur.
(b) Intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 00-72, S. 3.)
See Sec. 52-571c re action for damages and other relief for violation of this section.

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Sec. 53a-182. Disorderly conduct: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys or interferes with another person; or (3) makes unreasonable noise; or (4) without lawful authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons; or (5) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or (6) congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a reasonable official request or order to disperse.
(b) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 184.)
Annotation to former section 53-175:
However forceful and persuasive arguments may be compelling determination that Connecticut disorderly conduct statute, section 53-175 is unconstitutional as containing no ascertainable standard of quiet, circuit court should leave such decision to higher courts. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 73, 77.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 188 C. 557, 558. Cited. 194 C. 347, 356. Cited. 224 C. 914. Cited. 228 C. 795−798, 806, 809, 811. Cited. 234 C. 78, 80, 81. Cited. 237 C. 613. Cited. Id., 633.
Cited. 5 CA 616, 619. Cited. 9 CA 15, 16. Cited. Id., 255, 257. Cited. 11 CA 24, 25. Cited. 12 CA 258, 263. Cited. Id., 306−308, 312, 313. Cited. Id., 364, 365. Cited. Id., 481, 493, 494. Cited. 17 CA 156. Cited. Id., 234, 236. Cited. Id., 339, 340. Cited. 22 CA 303, 304. Cited. 26 CA 157, 162. Cited. 28 CA 344, 359. Cited. 29 CA 283, 284, 287−289; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795 et seq. Cited. 36 CA 106, 108; judgment reversed, see 234 C. 78 et seq.
Cited. 34 CS 612. Cited. 36 CS 129, 130. Cited. 37 CS 767, 768, 772, 776. Cited. 38 CS 472, 473. Cited. Id., 665−667.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 179 C. 328, 330. Subdiv. (1) Cited. 194 C. 347, 348, 350, 353, 354. Subdiv. (3): Under statute disorderly conduct may occur in a place that is not public. Id., 347−351, 353−355. Cited. Id., 347, 349. Subdiv. (6) cited. Id., 347, 358. Subdiv. (2) cited. 221 C. 788, 790. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 228 C. 795−797, 800, 801, 811− 813, 815, 818−820. Subdiv. (2): Plain language of section unconstitutionally vague, court construed it to provide it with constitutional content for the future. Judgment of appellate court in State v. Indrisano, 29 CA 283, 287, reversed. 228 C. 795−797, 800, 801, 815−819. Cited. Id., 795, 809−812, 819. Cited. 230 C. 183, 262. Subdiv. (1) cited. 237 C. 619. Cited. Id., 633.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 8 CA 153, 154. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 517, 521, 522. Subdiv. (2) cited. 11 CA 24, 25, 28, 30−33, 35. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id., 24, 25, 29−33. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 24, 32, 33, 35, 36. Subdiv. (3) cited. 12 CA 258, 267. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 481, 488, 494. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 481, 494. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id. Cited. 29 CA 283, 284, 288; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 795 et seq. Subdiv. (1) cited. 36 CA 625, 628, 629; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 613 et seq. Subdiv. (2) cited. 40 CA 643, 645. Cited. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2): Held unconstitutional on its face where conduct occurred prior to judicial gloss placed on statute. Id.
Expression of political views found not to constitute disorderly conduct. 33 CS 93. Subdiv. (2): Failure of charge to limit application of section to "fighting words" deprived defendant of freedom of speech constitutional guarantee. 34 CS 689−691, 694, 695, 698. Cited. 37 CS 767, 773. Subdiv. (1) cited. Id., 767, 773, 774. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 767, 773−775. Subdiv. (1) cited. 38 CS 665, 668, 669. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.

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Sec. 53a-182a. Obstructing free passage: Class C misdemeanor. (a) Unless a person is engaging in any activity which is expressive of rights guaranteed under the constitution of the United States or the constitution of this state, a person is guilty of obstructing free passage when, after being warned by a law enforcement officer not to do so, he (1) stands, sits or lies in or upon any public street, curb, crosswalk, walkway area, mall or the portion of private property utilized for public use, so as to obstruct unreasonably the free passage of pedestrians thereon, or (2) obstructs unreasonably or prevents free access to the entrance to any building open to the public.
(b) Obstructing free passage is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 83-221; P.A. 92-260, S. 70.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (a) to make technical changes.
Cited. 28 CA 344, 359.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 70.

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Sec. 53a-182b. Harassment in the first degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when, with the intent to harass, annoy, alarm or terrorize another person, he threatens to kill or physically injure that person or any other person, and communicates such threat by telephone, or by telegraph, mail, computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm and has been convicted of a capital felony, a class A felony, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86 or 53a-122, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a- 153, or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a- 72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216. For the purposes of this section, "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) For purposes of this section, such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the telephone call was made or where it was received.
(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the first degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 90-282, S. 1; P.A. 95-143, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a) to include communication of the threat by computer network.
Cited. 45 CA 408.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 52, 65.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 45 CA 408.

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Sec. 53a-183. Harassment in the second degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when: (1) By telephone, he addresses another in or uses indecent or obscene language; or (2) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he communicates with a person by telegraph or mail, by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network, by computer network, as defined in section 53a-250, or by any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or (3) with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm.
(b) For purposes of this section such offense may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the telephone call was made, or at the place where it was received.
(c) The court may order any person convicted under this section to be examined by one or more psychiatrists.
(d) Harassment in the second degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 185; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 44; P.A. 89-103, S. 2; P.A. 90-282, S. 2; P.A. 95-143, S. 2.)
History: 1971 act substituted "telegraph" for "telephone" in Subsec. (a) (2); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include communicating by electronically transmitting a facsimile through connection with a telephone network; P.A. 90- 282 changed name of offense to harassment in the second degree; P.A. 95-143 amended Subsec. (a) to include in Subdiv. (2) communication by computer network.
Annotation to former section 53-183:
Conversation sought to be introduced to show bias of witness properly excluded as hearsay. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 60.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 204 C. 4, 6. Cited. 209 C. 52, 53.
Cited. 4 CA 520, 523. Cited. 5 CA 79, 80. Cited. 8 CA 598, 599. Cited. 43 CA 527. Cited. 44 CA 84.
Cited. 39 CS 428, 429. Cited. 43 CS 46, 52.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (3) cited. 223 C. 731, 733.
Subdiv. (3): Harassment and threatening are separate and distinct crimes and this case harassment is not a lesser included offense of threatening. 1 CA 647, 649. Subdiv. (2) cited. 4 CA 520, 525, 526. Subdiv. (3) cited. 5 CA 79, 83, 84. Subdiv. (3) cited. 25 CA 503, 505. Subdiv. (2): Section does not require state to prove defendant engaged in a direct communication with the person whom he intended to harass. 40 CA 544−546, 549−553. Subdiv. (3) cited. 41 CA 847, 848. Subdiv. (3) cited. 43 CA 527. Subdiv. (3): Is not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied to defendant's conduct. 46 CA 661. Subdiv. (2): Not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. 49 CA 617.
Subdiv. (3): Freedom of speech subject to reasonable regulation of place and manner of exercise. Not necessary to limit application of statute to "fighting words." The prohibition is against purposeful harassment by means of device readily susceptible of abuse; trespasser upon our privacy. 34 CS 689, 690, 695, 696, 698. Subdiv. (3) cited. 43 CS 46, 71. Cited. Id., 46, 74.

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Sec. 53a-183a. Obstructing or interfering with the lawful taking of wildlife: Class C misdemeanor. (a) No person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent such taking.
(b) A person violates this section when he intentionally or knowingly: (1) Drives or disturbs wildlife for the purpose of disrupting the lawful taking of wildlife where another person is engaged in the process of lawfully taking wildlife; (2) blocks, impedes or otherwise harasses another person who is engaged in the process of lawfully taking wildlife; (3) uses natural or artificial visual, aural, olfactory or physical stimuli to affect wildlife behavior in order to hinder or prevent the lawful taking of wildlife; (4) erects barriers with the intent to deny ingress or egress to areas where the lawful taking of wildlife may occur; (5) interjects himself into the line of fire; (6) affects the condition or placement of personal or public property intended for use in the lawful taking of wildlife in order to impair its usefulness or prevent its use; or (7) enters or remains upon private lands without the permission of the owner or his agent, with intent to violate this section.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "taking" and "wildlife" shall be defined as in section 26-1.
(d) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 85-351; P.A. 90-322.)
History: P.A. 90-322 amended Subsec. (a) to revise the elements of the offense by replacing "harass" with "obstruct", adding provision that the obstruction or interference occur "at the location where the activity is taking place" and deleting as an element interference or harassment of another person engaged in "acts in preparation" for the lawful taking of wildlife, inserted new Subsec. (b) to enumerate specific intentional or knowing acts that constitute a violation, and Subsec. (c) to define "taking" and "wildlife" and relettered former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (d).
Cited. 226 C. 265, 266, 269−278.
Cited. 43 CS 46, 54, 69.

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PART XV
INTOXICATION

Secs. 53a-184 and 53a-184a. Intoxication by drug; definition, commitment, treatment, penalty. Intoxication by alcohol or drug; definition, commitment, dismissal of criminal proceedings, unclassified misdemeanor. Sections 53a-184 and 53a-184a are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 186; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 45; P.A. 74-280, S. 22, 25; P.A. 75-479, S. 11, 12, 25; P.A. 76-300, S. 2, 3, 4; P.A. 86-371, S. 34, 45; P.A. 89-390, S. 36, 37.)

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PART XVI
LOITERING IN OR ABOUT SCHOOL GROUNDS.
PUBLIC INDECENCY

Sec. 53a-185. Loitering on school grounds: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of loitering on school grounds when he loiters or remains in or about a school building or grounds, not having any reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or any other license or privilege to be there.
(b) Loitering on school grounds is a class C misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 187; P.A. 92-260, S. 71.)
History: P.A. 92-260 amended Subsec. (b) to make a technical change in the name of the offense.

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Sec. 53a-186. Public indecency: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of public indecency when he performs any of the following acts in a public place: (1) An act of sexual intercourse as defined in subdivision (2) of section 53a-65; or (2) a lewd exposure of the body with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desire of the person; or (3) a lewd fondling or caress of the body of another person. For the purposes of this section, "public place" means any place where the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others.
(b) Public indecency is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 188; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 46; P.A. 76-336, S. 22; P.A. 92-260, S. 72.)
History: 1971 act substituted "A person" for "Any person" for consistency with other statutes; P.A. 76-336 specified sexual intercourse as defined in Sec. 53a-65 and deleted reference to acts of deviate sexual conduct in Subsec. (a) for conformity with changes enacted re sex offenses; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by repositioning and rephrasing language.
Annotations to former section 53-220:
Cited. 37 CA 534, 535, 543, 544.
Cited. 7 CS 265; 23 CS 177.
Word "wantonly" implies turpitude, and that the act done was of wilful and wicked purpose. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 443. Criminal intent is essential ingredient of offense. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 452. Offense is not against observer merely, but against the state. Id. Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 596; 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 480. Review of cases concerned with crime of indecent exposure. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 657. Lewd and offensive conduct not fairly within ambit of statute in absence of proof of actual exposure. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 530, 532, 533. Offense does not depend upon number present at exposure. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 202.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 18 CA 482, 483. Cited. 29 CA 591, 597−599. Cited. 37 CA 534, 535, 543, 544.
Cited. 38 CS 661, 662.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 37 CA 534, 535. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 534, 537, 542, 544.
Cited. 38 CS 313, 315. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.
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PART XVII*
TAMPERING WITH PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS,
EAVESDROPPING AND VOYEURISM

*See chapter 959a re wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
Annotations to former section 53-140:
Admissibility of evidence obtained by officers in violation of this section in federal courts. 277 U. S. 438, 479; 302 U. S. 379; 308 U. S. 338.
Annotations to present part XVII of chapter 952:
Sec. 53a-187−53a-189 eavesdropping statutes cited. 238 C. 692.

Sec. 53a-187. Definitions. Applicability. (a) The following definitions are applicable to sections 53a-188 and 53a-189: (1) "Wiretapping" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic communication or a communication made by cellular radio telephone by a person other than a sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. The normal operation of a telephone or telegraph corporation and the normal use of the services and facilities furnished by such corporation pursuant to its tariffs shall not be deemed "wiretapping". (2) "Mechanical overhearing of a conversation" means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment. (3) "Unlawfully" means not specifically authorized by law. For purposes of this section, "cellular radio telephone" means a wireless telephone authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to operate in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones.
(b) This section and sections 53a-188 and 53a-189 shall not apply to wiretapping by criminal law enforcement officials in the lawful performance of their duties and do not affect the admissibility of evidence in any proceedings other than a prosecution for eavesdropping or tampering with private communications.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 189; P.A. 86-403, S. 90, 132; P.A. 89-103, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 86-403 made technical change in Subsec. (b); P.A. 89-103 amended Subsec. (a) to add reference to communications made by cellular radio telephone in the definition of wiretapping and to define "cellular radio telephone".
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 212 C. 195, 209, 210. Cited. 224 C. 593, 619. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (1). Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Subdiv. (2). Cited. Id. Subdiv. (1) cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. 224 C. 593, 619, 620. Subdiv. (1) cited. 238 C. 692. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. Id.
Cited. 15 CA 529, 530.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Cited. 224 C. 593, 621. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Cited. 15 CA 529−531.

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Sec. 53a-188. Tampering with private communications: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of tampering with private communications when: (1) Knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, he obtains from an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, by connivance, deception, intimidation or in any other manner, information with respect to the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication; or (2) knowing that he does not have the consent of the sender or receiver, and being an employee, officer or representative of a telephone or telegraph corporation, he knowingly divulges to another person the contents or nature of a telephonic or telegraphic communication.
(b) Tampering with private communications is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 190.)
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Cited. 238 C. 692.

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Sec. 53a-189. Eavesdropping: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in wiretapping or mechanical overhearing of a conversation.
(b) Eavesdropping is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 191.)
See Sec. 52-570d re prohibition on recording private telephonic communications and civil remedies for violation thereof.
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 197 C. 326, 327. Cited. 212 C. 195, 210. Cited. 216 C. 541, 545, 553. Cited. 224 C. 593, 619, 620. Cited. 238 C. 692.
Cited. 8 CA 673, 689. Cited. 15 CA 529, 530.
Cordless telephone conversations are protected telephonic communications. 45 CS 497.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 524, 544. Cited. 238 C. 692.

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Sec. 53a-189a. Voyeurism: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of voyeurism when, with malice or intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of such person or any other person, such person knowingly photographs, films, videotapes or otherwise records the image of another person (1) without the knowledge and consent of such other person, (2) while such other person is not in plain view, and (3) under circumstances where such other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
(b) Voyeurism is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 99-143, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-189b. Disseminating voyeuristic material: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of disseminating voyeuristic material when such person disseminates a photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of another person without the consent of such other person and knowing that such photograph, film, videotape or image was taken, made or recorded in violation of section 53a-189a.
(b) Disseminating voyeuristic material is a class D felony.
(P.A. 99-143, S. 2.)

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PART XVIII
BIGAMY AND INCEST

Sec. 53a-190. Bigamy: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of bigamy when he marries or purports to marry another person in this state if either is lawfully married; or so marries or purports to marry another person in any other state or country in violation of the laws thereof, and knowingly cohabits and lives with such other person in this state as husband and wife.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of bigamy that at the time of the subsequent marriage or purported marriage: (1) The actor reasonably believed, based on persuasive and reliable information, that the prior spouse was dead; or (2) a court had entered a judgment purporting to terminate or annul any prior disqualifying marriage and the actor did not know that such judgment was invalid; or (3) the single person did not know that the other person was legally married.
(c) Bigamy is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 192; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 47; P.A. 92-260, S. 73.)
History: 1971 act substituted "A person" for "Any person" for conformity with other statutes; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Annotations to former section 53-221:
Former statute cited. 129 C. 572. Cited. 142 C. 178.
Cited. 22 CS 180. Omission, since 1875, of language declaring bigamous marriage to be null and void at most merely left validity of such marriages to be determined by general principles of common law. 26 CS 259.

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Sec. 53a-191. Incest: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of incest when he marries a person whom he knows to be related to him within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.
(b) Incest is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 193; P.A. 80-346, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 74.)
History: P.A. 80-346 substituted "such person" for "he" or "him", eliminating unnecessary distinctions based on sex and removed reference to engaging in sexual intercourse with relative as incest; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing "such person" with "he" or "him" as appropriate.
Annotations to former section 53-223:
In information for incest alleged to have been committed by accused with his legitimate daughter, actual marriage between accused and his daughter's mother must be proved. 6 C. 446. Applies to half-brother and half-sister. 132 C. 165. Relatively high penalty clearly reflects the strong public policy of this state. 148 C. 288. Does not apply to uncle-in-law and niece-in-law. 158 C. 461.
Consent is not essential element in establishing crime of incest. 29 CS 95. Cited. 29 CS 186, 187.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 210 C. 244, 247. Relationship as half-uncle and half-niece is void. 213 C. 637−639, 641, 642, 645, 646, 656.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 189 C. 321, 322.

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PART XIX
COERCION

Sec. 53a-192. Coercion: Class A misdemeanor or class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct which such other person has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which such other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in such other person a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will: (1) Commit any criminal offense; or (2) accuse any person of a criminal offense; or (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair any person's credit or business repute; or (4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution based on subdivision (2), (3) or (4) of subsection (a) of this section that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other person to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior or making good a wrong done.
(c) Coercion is a class A misdemeanor except, if the threat is to commit a felony, coercion is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 194; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 48; P.A. 92-260, S. 75.)
History: 1971 act referred simply to coercion rather than to "criminal" coercion in Subsec. (c); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
Cited. 240 C. 766.
Cited. 8 CA 351, 352. Cited. 40 CA 1, 2, 16.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (4) cited. 18 CA 694, 695. Subdiv. (1) cited. 40 CA 1, 16.
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PART XX*
OBSCENITY AND RELATED OFFENSES

*Annotations to former section 53-243:
Cited. 126 C. 418, 434; 150 C. 248; 152 C. 702. Defendant must have possession of films with specific intent to use them for one of purposes prohibited. Intent cannot be established by mere fact of possession. 138 C. 485. Constitutionality upheld. 146 C. 78. Proof of knowledge that the proscribed material is obscene or indecent is requisite to a conviction. Id. Since this statute has been construed as including a scienter requirement by implication, the constitutionality of the statute is not open to attack on the ground that it lacks such a requirement. The test of whether material can be adjudged obscene is whether, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. The question of suppressibility under constitutional standards is one of law. Knowledge by a bookseller of the obscene character of magazines possessed by him can ordinarily be proved only by circumstantial evidence. 150 C. 92.
No necessity for the existence of any specific intent or motive to constitute this crime. Test of obscenity stated. 6 CS 427. Conviction under this statute is caused for revocation of license to practice medicine and surgery. 13 CS 144.
Appellate court must make independent appraisal of whether dominant theme of material "appeals to prurient interests." 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 144. Cumulative independent facts may prove scienter. Id. Elements constituting requisite scienter discussed. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 428. History discussed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 355. Obscenity not protected by language of first amendment to federal constitution or article first, section 5, of Connecticut constitution. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 441. Criteria for determining obscenity discussed. Id. Not essential for state to show defendant had manual or physical possession of obscene films; sufficient if they were in actual possession of person over whom defendant had control so they would be forthcoming if he ordered them. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 506. Cited. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 313. Intent "to sell, lend, give, offer or show" cannot be inferred from possession of pornographic material by defendant or his disposal of it while in police custody. Id., 551.
Annotations to former section 53-244:
Cited. 150 C. 94.
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 442.
Annotations to former section 53-244a:
Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 310 (fn. 3). History discussed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 355, 356. Whether given work is obscene and therefore beyond scope of constitutional protection is ultimately for court to determine as matter of law. Id., 360. This section must be construed in light of free press guarantee and due process clause of federal constitution. Id., 362.
Annotations to former section 53-244b:
History discussed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 355, 356.
Annotations to former section 53-245:
Movie held not obscene since, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal was not to the prurient interest of the average person, applying contemporary community standards on a national basis. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 429. In cases involving indecency and obscenity, appellate court is required to make its own independent constitutional judgment on evidence introduced in trial court as to obscenity of motion picture in question. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 605, 606. Lascivious or indecent actions and material are included in and are synonymous with obscenity so that rules and standards set forth under heading "obscenity" and covering literature, motion pictures and all other arts provide basis and precedent for interpretation of this statute. Id. Constitutional status of material may not be made to turn on a "weighing" of its social importance against its prurient appeal, for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is "utterly" without social importance. Id.

Sec. 53a-193. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this section and sections 53a-194 to 53a-210, inclusive:
(1) Any material or performance is "obscene" if, (A) taken as a whole, it predominantly appeals to the prurient interest, (B) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way a prohibited sexual act, and (C) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value. Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or performance or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for some other specially susceptible audience. Whether a material or performance is obscene shall be judged by ordinary adults applying contemporary community standards. In applying contemporary community standards, the state of Connecticut is deemed to be the community.
(2) Material or a performance is "obscene as to minors" if it depicts a prohibited sexual act and, taken as a whole, it is harmful to minors. For purposes of this subsection: (A) "Minor" means any person less than seventeen years old as used in section 53a-196 and less than sixteen years old as used in sections 53a-196a, 53a-196b and 53a-196c and (B) "harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of a prohibited sexual act, when (i) it predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, (ii) it is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value for minors.
(3) "Prohibited sexual act" means erotic fondling, nude performance, sexual excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, masturbation or sexual intercourse.
(4) "Nude performance" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state in any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.
(5) "Erotic fondling" means touching a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.
(6) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.
(7) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
(8) "Masturbation" means the real or simulated touching, rubbing or otherwise stimulating a person's own clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is female, breast, either by manual manipulation or with an artificial instrument.
(9) "Sexual intercourse" means intercourse, real or simulated, whether genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex or between a human and an animal, or with an artificial genital.
(10) "Material" means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted to arouse prurient, shameful or morbid interest, whether through the medium of reading, observation, sound or in any other manner. Undeveloped photographs, molds, printing plates, and the like, may be deemed obscene notwithstanding that processing or other acts may be required to make the obscenity patent or to disseminate it.
(11) "Performance" means any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.
(12) "Promote" means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise, produce, direct or participate in.
(13) "Child pornography" means any material involving a live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of a live performance which depicts a minor in a prohibited sexual act.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 195; P.A. 74-124; P.A. 78-331, S. 21, 58; 78-345, S. 1, 4; P.A. 83-507; P.A. 85-496, S. 4; P.A. 92- 260, S. 76.)
History: P.A. 74-124 added provision re application of contemporary community standards in judgments concerning obscenity; P.A. 78-331 extended applicability of definitions to encompass Sec. 53a-196a; P.A. 78-345 amended Subsec. (b) to replace "nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse" with reference to prohibited sexual acts, to redefine "minor" re sixteen-year-olds, to replace definition of "nudity" with definition of "nude performance", to delete definition of "sexual conduct", to define "prohibited sexual act", "erotic fondling", "masturbation", and "sexual intercourse" and to redefine "harmful to minors" as description or representation which lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value for minors rather than as something "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors" and redefined "material" in Subsec. (c) to specify something used or adapted to arouse "prurient, shameful or morbid" interest; P.A. 83-507 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine "obscene" by replacing (1) "its predominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion, sadism or masochism" with "it predominantly appeals to the prurient interest", (2) "it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters" with "it depicts or describes in a patently offensive way a prohibited sexual act" and (3) "it is utterly without redeeming social value" with "taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value", and reordered and redesignated the other definitions; P.A. 85-496 included reference to section 53a-196c and added definition of "child pornography"; P.A. 92-260 made definitions applicable to "this section and sections 53a-194 to 53a-210, inclusive" rather than to "sections 53a-193 to 53a-196a, inclusive and section 53a-196c", replaced alphabetic Subsec. indicators with numeric indicators, amended Subsec. (1) to replace numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators and add "or performance" in provisions re judging predominant appeal and applying community standards, and amended Subsec. (2) to replace numeric Subdiv. indicators with alphabetic indicators and alphabetic Subpara. indicators with numeric indicators.
Cited. 193 C. 612, 618.
The definition of obscenity is sufficiently explicit to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of what material would be in violation of the law. 32 CS 639.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 193 C. 612, 623.
Cited. 3 CA 80, 90. Cited. 28 CA 91, 103.
The definition of "obscene" contained in this section is presently immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness or over breadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639, 646.
Subsec. (b):
Subdiv. (2)(A) cited. 28 CA 91, 101, 103. Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2)(C) cited. Id. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id., 91, 102. Cited. Id., 91, 103.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 101.
Subsec. (d):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 101.
Cited. 38 CS 570, 574.
Subsec. (e):
Cited. 193 C. 612, 623.
Subsec. (h):
Cited. 29 CA 591, 595.
Subsec. (l):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 101.

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Sec. 53a-194. Obscenity: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of obscenity when, knowing its content and character, he promotes, or possesses with intent to promote, any obscene material or performance.
(b) Obscenity is a class B misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 196.)
State has burden of presenting evidence of contemporary community standards in prosecution for obscenity, except where performance is so offensive that no conceivable community standard would permit it. 174 C. 46. Cited. 193 C. 612, 614, 618, 623.
Cited. 28 CA 91, 102.
Connecticut's obscenity statute is not so vague or overly broad as to violate federal standards. This section is presently immune from attack upon the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth at the federal level. 32 CS 639, 646. Cited. 33 CS 681. Cited. 38 CS 570.
Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 656.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 193 C. 612, 616.
Cited. 38 CS 570, 572.

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Sec. 53a-195. Defense. In any prosecution for obscenity it is a defense that the persons to whom allegedly obscene material was disseminated, or the audience to an allegedly obscene performance, consisted of persons or institutions having scientific, educational or governmental justification for possessing or viewing the same.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 197; P.A. 92-260, S. 77.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
Cited. 200 C. 664, 675.

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Sec. 53a-196. Obscenity as to minors: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of obscenity as to minors when he knowingly promotes to a minor, for monetary consideration, any material or performance which is obscene as to minors.
(b) For purposes of this section, "knowingly" means having general knowledge of or reason to know or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry as to (1) the character and content of any material or performance which is reasonably susceptible of examination by such person and (2) the age of the minor.
(c) In any prosecution for obscenity as to minors, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant made (1) a reasonable mistake as to age, and (2) a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of such minor, by examining a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document, exhibited by such minor, purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years of age or older.
(d) Obscenity as to minors is a class D felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 198; P.A. 85-496, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 78.)
History: P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class A misdemeanor to class D felony; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 36 CS 352, 357.

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Sec. 53a-196a. Employing a minor in an obscene performance: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of employing a minor in an obscene performance when (1) he employs any minor, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, for the purpose of promoting any material or performance which is obscene as to minors, notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience, or (2) he permits any such minor to be employed, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, in the promotion of any material or performance which is obscene as to minors, notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience, and he is the parent or guardian of such minor or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such minor's welfare.
(b) Employing a minor in an obscene performance is a class A felony.
(P.A. 77-577, S. 2; P.A. 78-345, S. 2, 4; P.A. 85-496, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 79.)
History: P.A. 78-345 restated provisions for conformity with Sec. 53a-193 as amended; P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class B felony to class A felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.
See Sec. 17a-47 re legal division within Department of Children and Families.
Cited. 227 C. 207, 209, 210.

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Sec. 53a-196b. Promoting a minor in an obscene performance: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of promoting a minor in an obscene performance when he knowingly promotes any material or performance in which a minor is employed, whether or not such minor receives any consideration, and such material or performance is obscene as to minors notwithstanding that such material or performance is intended for an adult audience.
(b) For purposes of this section, "knowingly" means having general knowledge of or reason to know or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry as to (1) the character and content of any material or performance which is reasonably susceptible of examination by such person and (2) the age of the minor employed.
(c) Promoting a minor in an obscene performance is a class B felony.
(P.A. 78-345, S. 3, 4; P.A. 85-496, S. 3; P.A. 92-260, S. 80.)
History: P.A. 85-496 increased penalty from class C felony to class B felony; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 28 CA 91, 95−97, 100.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 92, 100.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 28 CA 91, 96.

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Sec. 53a-196c. Importing child pornography: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of importing child pornography when, with intent to promote child pornography, he knowingly imports or causes to be imported into the state any child pornography of known content and character.
(b) Importation of two or more copies of any publication containing child pornography shall be prima facie evidence that such publications were imported with intent to promote child pornography.
(c) Importing child pornography is a class C felony.
(P.A. 85-496, S. 5.)

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Sec. 53a-196d. Possessing child pornography: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possessing child pornography when he knowingly possesses child pornography, as defined in subdivision (13) of section 53a-193. Possession of a photographic or other visual reproduction of a nude minor for a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental or judicial purpose shall not be a violation of this subsection.
(b) Possessing child pornography is a class D felony.
(P.A. 95-143, S. 3.)

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Sec. 53a-197. Disseminating indecent comic books: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of disseminating indecent comic books when he publishes or distributes for resale any book, pamphlet or magazine consisting of narrative material in pictorial form, colored or uncolored, and commonly known as comic books, which are devoted to or principally made up of pictures of accounts of physical torture or brutality, horror or terror.
(b) Disseminating indecent comic books is a class A misdemeanor.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 199.)

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Sec. 53a-198. Failing to identify a comic book publication: Violation. (a) A person is guilty of failing to identify a comic book publication when he publishes or prints any book, pamphlet or magazine consisting of narrative material in pictorial form, colored or uncolored, and commonly known as comic books, and fails to have his name and address imprinted on such book, pamphlet or magazine.
(b) Failing to identify a comic book publication is a violation.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 200; P.A. 92-260, S. 81.)
History: P.A. 92-260 combined former Subsecs. (a) and (b) and rephrased language, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b).

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Sec. 53a-199. Injunction against promoting any obscene material or performance. An injunction may be granted against the promoting of any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors or the possessing with intent to promote any such material.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 201.)

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Sec. 53a-200. Institution of action for adjudication of obscenity. Whenever any state's attorney or assistant state's attorney has reasonable cause to believe that any person is knowingly promoting any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors, he shall institute an action for an adjudication of the obscenity of such material or performance. Such action shall commence with the filing of an application for an injunction with a judge of the superior court for the judicial district wherein is located such material or performance. The complaint shall: (1) Be directed against the promoting of the material or performance; (2) designate as defendants and list the names and addresses, if known, of its promoters, or any person possessing it with intent to promote it; (3) allege its obscene nature; (4) seek an adjudication that it is obscene or obscene as to minors and an injunction against any promoting or possessing with intent to promote; (5) seek its surrender, seizure, destruction or termination.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 202; P.A. 74-183, S. 124, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 514, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 92-260, S. 82.)
History: P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas and "circuit" with "county or judicial district", reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas in reorganization of judicial system, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced prosecuting attorneys with state's attorneys and assistant state's attorneys and court of common pleas with superior court, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing alphabetic with numeric Subdiv. indicators.

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Sec. 53a-201. Presentation of material or evidence depicting performance. Probable cause determination. Time for trial and decision. The prosecuting attorney, at the time of presenting the complaint and application to the court, shall also present the material or a witness or other evidence describing or depicting the performance. If, after examination, the court finds no probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall dismiss the action. If, after examination, the court finds probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall then proceed as in other applications for an injunction. The person sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues, commencing within one day after the close of all pleadings, and any decision by the court shall be rendered within two days of the conclusion of the trial.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 203; P.A. 92-260, S. 83.)
History: P.A. 92-260 added provisions requiring that the court "dismiss the action" if it fails to find probable cause and that the court proceed as in other applications for an injunction "if, after examination, the court finds probable cause to believe such material or performance obscene or obscene as to minors", provisions which were contained in former Sec. 53-244d which was repealed by 1969 P.A. 828, S. 214, the same act which enacted the penal code.

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Sec. 53a-202. Third party may be made a party. On or before the date set for trial, any person who promotes, or who possesses with intent to promote, the material or performance complained of in the application for an injunction may file an appearance and be made a party to the proceedings.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 204.)

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Sec. 53a-203. Jury trial. Every person appearing shall be entitled, upon request, to a trial by jury and the court may order a trial of any issue to the jury.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 205; P.A. 92-260, S. 84.)
History: P.A. 92-260 deleted an obsolete reference to "the criminal sessions of such court".
Cited. 17 CA 326, 327. Cited. 40 CA 515, 517.

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Sec. 53a-204. Evidence. At the trial, all parties shall be permitted to submit evidence, including the testimony of experts, pertaining but not limited to the following: (1) The elements or standards specified in the definitions of obscene and obscene as to minors; (2) the artistic, literary, scientific, educational or governmental merits of the material or performance; (3) the intent and knowledge of any defendant.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 206; P.A. 92-260, S. 85.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing alphabetic with numeric Subdiv. indicators.

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Sec. 53a-205. Judgment. If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds the material or performance not to be obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall enter judgment accordingly. If the court or jury, as the case may be, finds the material or performance to be obscene or obscene as to minors, the court shall enter judgment to such effect and may, in such judgment or in subsequent orders of enforcement thereof: (1) Enter an injunction against any defendant prohibiting him from promoting or possessing such material or performance, under such conditions and within such time as the court may order; (2) direct any resident defendant to dispose of all such material in his possession or under his control under such conditions and within such time as the court may order; or (3) if any defendant fails fully to comply with the judgment or order of the court, direct the state police or any organized local police department to seize and destroy all such material in the possession or under the control of such defendant wherever the same may be found within their jurisdiction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 207; P.A. 77-614, S. 486, 587, 610; P.A. 78-303, S. 85, 136.)
History: P.A. 77-614 made state police department a division within the department of public safety, effective January 1, 1979, but under authority of P.A. 78-303 existing reference to state police was retained.

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Sec. 53a-206. Injunction and restraining order. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance and shall describe in reasonable detail the obscene material or performance and the promoting or possessing sought to be restrained, and is binding only upon the defendants to the action and their officers, agents, servants and employees and upon those persons in active concert or participating by contract or arrangement with them, who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 208; P.A. 92-260, S. 86.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change.
Cited. 16 CA 601, 602.

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Sec. 53a-207. Service of process on nonresidents. Every nonresident person, whether acting personally or by an agent, salesman, employee, officer or another, who promotes any material or performance that is obscene or obscene as to minors in this state shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of the State as his attorney and to have agreed that any process in any action arising under sections 53a-199 to 53a- 206, inclusive, brought against or naming such nonresident as a defendant, may be served upon said secretary and shall have the same validity as if served upon such nonresident personally. Such process shall be served by the officer to whom the same is directed upon said secretary by leaving with or at the office of said secretary a true and attested copy thereof and by sending to the defendant, by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, a like true and attested copy with an endorsement thereon of the service upon said secretary addressed to such defendant at his last-known address. The Secretary of the State shall keep a record of each such process and the day and hour of service.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 209; P.A. 92-260, S. 87.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

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Sec. 53a-208. Extradition. In all cases in which a court has entered its judgment pursuant to section 53a-205 that the material or performance in question is obscene or obscene as to minors, and a charge of a violation of the injunction or restraining order is thereafter brought against a person who, being a defendant to such judgment, cannot be found in this state, the Governor, or anyone performing the functions of Governor by authority of a law of this state, shall, unless such person has appealed from such judgment and such appeal is not finally determined, demand his extradition from the executive authority of the state in which such person may be found, pursuant to the laws of this state.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 210; P.A. 92-260, S. 88.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to "sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive," with "section 53a-205".

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Sec. 53a-209. Penalties. Any defendant, or any officer, agent, servant or employee of such defendant, or any person in active concert or participation by contract or arrangement with such defendant, who receives actual notice, by personal service or otherwise, of any injunction or restraining order entered pursuant to section 53a-205 and who disobeys any of the provisions thereof shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than two years or both.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 211; P.A. 92-260, S. 89.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to "sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive," with "section 53a-205".

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Sec. 53a-210. Levy of fine against property. Any fine against any person under section 53a-209 may be levied against any of his real property, personal property, tangible or intangible, choses in action or property of any kind or nature, including debts owing to him, which may be situated or found in this state.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 212; P.A. 92-260, S. 90.)
History: P.A. 92-260 replaced reference to "any of sections 53a-199 to 53a-206, inclusive," with "section 53a-209".

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PART XXI
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-211. Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or silencer: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a silencer when he owns, controls or possesses any sawed-off shotgun that has a barrel of less than eighteen inches or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches or when he owns, controls or possesses any silencer designed to muffle the noise of a firearm during discharge.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to persons, firms, corporations or museums licensed or otherwise permitted by federal or state law to possess, control or own sawed-off shotguns or silencers.
(c) Possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a silencer is a class D felony.
(P.A. 76-45; P.A. 80-244.)
History: P.A. 80-244 deleted phrase "of any caliber" following reference to sawed-off shot guns in Subsec. (a).
See Secs. 29-35 to 29-38a, inclusive, and 53-202 to 53-206d, inclusive, re regulation of firearms and penalties imposed for firearms violations.
Cited. 190 C. 715, 717. Cited. 207 C. 323, 324. Cited. 233 C. 215, 218.
Cited. 1 CA 697, 698. Cited. 7 CA 550. Cited. 11 CA 397, 398, 402. Cited. 14 CA 67, 68, 75. Cited. 15 CA 539, 540. Cited. 17 CA 490, 491, 498, 500. Cited. 30 CA 9, 10.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 190 C. 715, 719, 722, 723. Cited. 198 C. 68, 69. Cited. 201 C. 505, 506, 513, 514. Cited. 224 C. 163, 164.
Cited. 11 CA 397, 402. Cited. 13 CA 76, 77, 86. Cited. 26 CA 698, 699. Cited. 28 CA 474, 475.

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Sec. 53a-212. Stealing a firearm. Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of stealing a firearm when, with intent to deprive another of his firearm or to appropriate the same to himself or a third party, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds a firearm, as defined in subdivision (l9) of section 53a-3.
(b) Stealing a firearm is a class D felony.
(P.A. 77-217.)
Cited. 189 C. 461, 462. Cited. 190 C. 715, 716. Cited. 197 C. 201, 203. Cited. 199 C. 591, 593. Cited. 241 C. 702.
Cited. 9 CA 349, 350. Cited. 19 CA 48, 51, 52, 59, 64. Cited. 20 CA 521, 522. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753, 766, 770, 771; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 750, 752.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 190 C. 715, 720, 721. Cited. 196 C. 157, 158. Cited. 198 C. 405, 406.
Cited. 7 CA 367, 370. Cited. 8 CA 631, 632. Cited. Id., 667. Cited. 34 CA 751, 753, 769; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211 et seq. Cited. 35 CA 740, 743. Cited. 38 CA 481, 483. Cited. Id., 643, 645, 653.

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Sec. 53a-213. Drinking while operating motor vehicle: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of drinking while operating a motor vehicle when he drinks any alcoholic liquor while operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state or upon any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more, or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a or upon any school property. As used in this section, "alcoholic liquor" shall have the same meaning as in section 30-1.
(b) Drinking while operating a motor vehicle is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 79-368.)

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Sec. 53a-214. Criminal lockout: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A landlord of a dwelling unit subject to the provisions of chapter 830, an owner of such a unit, or the agent of such landlord or owner is guilty of criminal lockout when, without benefit of a court order, he deprives a tenant, as defined in subsection (l) of section 47a-1, of access to his dwelling unit or his personal possessions.
(b) Criminal lockout is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 81-24.)

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Sec. 53a-215. Insurance fraud: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of insurance fraud when the person, with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurance company: (1) Presents or causes to be presented to any insurance company, any written or oral statement including computer-generated documents as part of, or in support of, any application for any policy of insurance or a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to such policy of insurance, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such application or claim; or (2) assists, abets, solicits, or conspires with another to prepare or make any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurance company in connection with, or in support of, any application for any policy of insurance or any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to such policy of insurance, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such application or claim for the purposes of defrauding such insurance company.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "statement" includes, but is not limited to, any notice, statement, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bill for services, test result, or other evidence of loss, injury, or expense.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "insurance company" means "insurance company" as defined in section 38a-1.
(d) Insurance fraud is a class D felony.
(P.A. 81-113; P.A. 00-211, S. 6.)
History: P.A. 00-211 amended Subsec. (a) to delete "providing coverage for loss or damage to real or personal property caused by fire" re insurance policies and to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality and amended Subsec. (c) to redefine "insurance company".
See Secs. 53-440 to 53-443, inclusive, re health insurance fraud and abuse.
Cited. 28 CA 9, 28, 30, 31.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (2) cited. 227 C. 1, 3.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 28 CA 9, 11. Subdiv. (1) cited. 44 CA 294. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id.

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Sec. 53a-216. Criminal use of firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon when he commits any class A, B or C or unclassified felony as defined in section 53a- 25 and in the commission of such felony he uses or threatens the use of a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm or electronic defense weapon. No person shall be convicted of criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon and the underlying felony upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.
(b) Criminal use of a firearm or electronic defense weapon is a class D felony for which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 81-342, S. 1; P.A. 86-287, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 86-287 added reference to electronic defense weapons.
Cited. 226 C. 497, 499. Cited. 240 C. 743. Cited. 242 C. 143.
Cited. 24 CA 330, 331.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 195 C. 651, 652.

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Sec. 53a-217. Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon when such person possesses a firearm or electronic defense weapon and (1) has been convicted of a felony, or (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120. For the purposes of this section, "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Criminal possession of a firearm or electronic defense weapon is a class D felony, for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 82-464, S. 1; P.A. 86-287, S. 5; P.A. 91-212; P.A. 98-129, S. 12; P.A. 99-212, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 86-287 added reference to electronic defense weapons; P.A. 91-212 replaced "pistol, revolver" with "firearm" and made technical changes; P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec.(a) to add Subdiv. (2) prohibiting possession by a person who has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense; P.A. 99-212 made provisions applicable to a person convicted of any felony rather than only of a capital felony and specified class A, B, C and D felonies.
Cited. 200 C. 453, 458. Cited. 221 C. 915. Cited. 227 C. 363, 365, 368. Cited. 229 C. 164, 166. Cited. Id., 385, 388, 390, 395. Cited. 231 C. 235, 250−252. Cited. 234 C. 324, 330, 335, 338, 339. Cited. Id., 455, 464. Cited. 235 C. 274, 276. Cited. Id., 402−404. Cited. 238 C. 389. Cited. 242 C. 143. Cited. Id., 648. Cited. 247 C. 318.
Cited. 6 CA 189, 190. Cited. 11 CA 11, 12, 15. Cited. 15 CA 161, 166, 173, 174, 180, 181, 184, 185. Cited. Id., 342− 344, 355. Cited. 19 CA 48, 51, 59. Cited. 26 CA 367, 368, 375, 377. Cited. 29 CA 207, 209, 212. Cited. 30 CA 249, 250, 259. Cited. Id., 340, 341, 343. Cited. 33 CA 521−523. Cited. 34 CA 236, 238. Cited. 35 CA 781−783. Cited. 36 CA 805, 821. Cited. 37 CA 276, 277, 287, 290. Cited. 39 CA 82, 90. Cited. 40 CA 151, 153. Cited. 45 CA 584.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 228 C. 384, 385. Cited. 229 C. 164, 166. Cited. 231 C. 235, 237. Cited. 241 C. 413.
Cited. 15 CA 161, 163. Cited. Id., 330, 331. Cited. Id., 749−751. Cited. 19 CA 48, 61. Cited. Id., 576, 577. Cited. 20 CA 137, 138. Cited. 24 CA 685, 686. Cited. 30 CA 26, 28. Cited. 33 CA 521, 522. Cited. 39 CA 82, 84. Cited. 40 CA 151, 153. Cited. 42 CA 768. Cited. 45 CA 390.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 19 CA 48, 51. Cited. 33 CA 521, 531, 532.

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Sec. 53a-217a. Criminally negligent storage of a firearm: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminally negligent storage of a firearm when he violates the provisions of section 29-37i and a minor obtains the firearm and causes the injury or death of himself or any other person. For the purposes of this section, "minor" means any person under the age of sixteen years.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply if the minor obtains the firearm as a result of an unlawful entry to any premises by any person.
(c) Criminally negligent storage of a firearm is a class D felony.
(P.A. 90-144, S. 2.)
History: (Revisor's note: The internal reference in Subsec. (a) to "section 29-37c" was corrected editorially by the Revisors to "section 29-37i").
Section not vague as applied to defendant's conduct; he cannot mount a facial challenge to the statute. 242 C. 211.

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Sec. 53a-217b. Possession of a weapon on school grounds: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of possession of a weapon on school grounds when, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he possesses a firearm or deadly weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, (1) in or on the real property comprising a public or private elementary or secondary school or (2) at a school-sponsored activity as defined in subsection (h) of section 10-233a.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the otherwise lawful possession of a firearm (1) by a person for use in a program approved by school officials in or on such school property, (2) by a person in accordance with an agreement entered into between school officials and such person or such person's employer, (3) by a peace officer, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3, while engaged in the performance of his official duties, or (4) by a person while traversing such school property for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting or for other lawful purposes, provided such firearm is not loaded and the entry on such school property is permitted by the local or regional board of education.
(c) Possession of a weapon on school grounds is a class D felony.
(June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-1, S. 1; P.A. 93-416, S. 7; P.A. 94-221, S. 1; P.A. 98-129, S. 15.)
History: P.A. 93-416 amended Subsecs. (a) and (c) to replace reference to offense of "possession of a firearm on school grounds" with revised name of "possession of a weapon on school grounds" due to inclusion of deadly weapon in offense in Subsec. (a); P.A. 94-221 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (2) re school-sponsored activities and amended Subdiv. (5) of Subsec. (b) to substitute "permitted by" the board of education for "not prohibited by school officials" and, notwithstanding the provisions of Subsec. (b), provided for the prohibition by boards of education of the possession of firearms by students in or on school property or at a school-sponsored activity; P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec. (a) to add element that the person know that he is not licensed or privileged to possess a weapon on school grounds and amended Subsec. (b) to delete former Subdiv. (1) that had made provisions of Subsec. (a) inapplicable to the lawful possession of a firearm by a person holding a valid state or local permit to carry such firearm, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and deleted provision that had authorized boards of education and supervisory agents of private schools to prohibit the possession of firearms by students in or on school property or at a school-sponsored activity.

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Sec. 53a-217c. Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver when such person possesses a pistol or revolver, as defined in section 29-27, and (1) has been convicted of a felony or of a violation of subsection (c) of section 21a-279, section 53a-58, 53a-61, 53a-61a, 53a-62, 53a-63, 53a-96, 53a-175, 53a-176, 53a-178 or 53a-181d, (2) has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120, (3) has been discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, (4) has been confined in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities, as defined in section 17a-495, within the preceding twelve months by order of a probate court, (5) knows that such person is subject to a restraining or protective order issued by a court, after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person, (6) knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to subsection (d) of section 29-38c after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, or (7) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States. For the purposes of this section, "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(b) Criminal possession of a pistol or revolver is a class D felony.
(July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 3; P.A. 98-129, S. 13; P.A. 99-212, S. 21.)
History: P.A. 98-129 amended Subsec. (a) to add new Subdiv. (2) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver by a person who has been convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, renumbering the remaining Subdivs. accordingly, and replaced in Subdiv. (4) "hospital for mental illness" with "hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities"; P.A. 99-212 amended Subsec. (a) to add new Subdiv. (6) prohibiting the possession of a pistol or revolver by a person who knows that such person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to Sec. 29-38c(d) after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person, renumbering the remaining Subdiv. accordingly, and made provisions gender neutral.

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Sec. 53a-217d. Criminal possession of body armor: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal possession of body armor when he possesses body armor and has been (1) convicted of a capital felony, a class A felony, except a conviction under section 53a-196a, a class B felony, except a conviction under section 53a-86, 53a- 122 or 53a-196b, a class C felony, except a conviction under section 53a-87, 53a-152 or 53a-153 or a class D felony under sections 53a-60 to 53a-60c, inclusive, 53a-72a, 53a-72b, 53a-95, 53a-103, 53a-103a, 53a-114, 53a-136 or 53a-216, or (2) convicted as delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, as defined in section 46b-120.
(b) For the purposes of this section, "body armor" means any material designed to be worn on the body and to provide bullet penetration resistance and "convicted" means having a judgment of conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) Criminal possession of body armor is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-127, S. 1.)
See Sec. 53-341b re restriction on sale or delivery of body armor.

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Sec. 53a-217e. Negligent hunting. Penalties. Fines deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and the Conservation Fund. Suspension of hunting license. Forfeiture of hunting weapon. Prima facie evidence of hunting. (a) As used in this section:
(1) "Criminal negligence" shall have the same meaning as "criminal negligence", as defined in section 53a-3;
(2) "Hunting" shall have the same meaning as "hunting", as defined in section 26-1;
(3) "Loaded hunting implement" means (A) a rifle or shotgun with a live round in the chamber or in a magazine which is attached to such rifle or shotgun, a muzzle-loaded firearm with the percussion cap in place, or a flintlock firearm with powder in the pan, (B) a bow and arrow with an arrow notched on the bow, (C) a drawn crossbow with a bolt in place, or (D) a high velocity air gun that is charged with a projectile in the chamber or in a magazine that is attached to such air gun; and
(4) "Serious physical injury" shall have the same meaning as "serious physical injury, as defined in section 53a-3.
(b) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the first degree when, with criminal negligence while hunting, such person discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the death of another person.
(2) Negligent hunting in the first degree is a class D felony.
(c) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the second degree when, with criminal negligence while hunting, such person violates any provision of section 26-85 or discharges a loaded hunting implement and thereby causes the serious physical injury of another person.
(2) Negligent hunting in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than four hundred dollars.
(d) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the third degree when such person, while hunting, (A) discharges a firearm at a time of day when hunting is not permitted, (B) discharges a firearm from a vehicle, (C) hunts while the person's license to hunt is suspended, (D) hunts out of season or on a Sunday, or (E) discharges a firearm so as to cause the projectile to strike or enter into any building occupied by people or domestic animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials.
(2) Negligent hunting in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor and any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be fined not less than two hundred dollars.
(e) (1) A person is guilty of negligent hunting in the fourth degree when such person, while hunting, (A) hunts without purchasing a license, permit or stamp or other permission required by law, (B) is in possession of a loaded hunting implement at a time of day when hunting is not allowed, (C) hunts with or discharges a firearm less than two hundred fifty feet from any building occupied by people or domestic animals or used for storage of flammable or combustible materials, or less than one hundred twenty-five feet from any such building while hunting in tidal water areas, unless written permission of the owner of such building has been obtained, or (D) hunts from or discharges a hunting implement from or across a public highway.
(2) Negligent hunting in the fourth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(f) Any person who is convicted of a violation of any provision of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d within five years of a previous conviction for violation of this section shall be considered a persistent negligent hunter. Upon such second conviction within five years, a persistent negligent hunter shall be fined an amount that is not less than twice the minimum fine provided for the second violation and shall be subject to penalties provided for the next more serious degree of negligent hunting under subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d.
(g) Any fine imposed for a conviction under subsection (b) or (c) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d shall be deposited in the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215. Any fine imposed for a conviction under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be deposited in the Conservation Fund established under section 22a-27h for land management or acquisition of hunting easements.
(h) (1) The Commissioner of Environmental Protection may suspend the hunting license of any person convicted under subsection (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d for: (A) Indefinitely upon conviction of negligent hunting in the first degree or upon conviction of any violation of subsection (b) of section 53-206d; (B) up to ten years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the second degree; (C) up to five years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the third degree; and (D) up to three years upon conviction of negligent hunting in the fourth degree.
(2) Any person arrested for a violation of subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section or subsection (b) of section 53-206d, except as provided in section 26-85 shall surrender any firearm, bow, crossbow, bolt or high velocity air gun in the person's possession while hunting at the time of the alleged violation. Such property shall be confiscated at the time of arrest by a police officer or conservation officer. Upon nolle or dismissal of charges or acquittal of such person of such violation, such property shall be returned to the person within five business days and in the same condition as when the firearm, bow, crossbow or high velocity air gun was surrendered. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 54-33g and 54-36a, the property shall be turned over to the Commissioner of Environmental Protection upon conviction of such person for such violation. Said commissioner shall (A) retain the property for use by personnel of the Department of Environmental Protection, (B) convey the property to the Commissioner of Administrative Services for sale at public auction, the proceeds of which shall be credited to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund established pursuant to section 54-215, or (C) destroy the property.
(i) Possession by any person of a loaded hunting implement while at or entering or leaving an area where a reasonable person would believe the objective was to take wildlife shall be prima facie evidence of hunting, except that a person may, one hour before sunrise during the regulated deer and turkey firearms hunting seasons, be in possession of a loaded rifle or shotgun, as defined in subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section, provided a live round is not in the chamber of the rifle or shotgun.
(P.A. 00-142, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-218. Interference with a cemetery or burial ground: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of interference with a cemetery or burial ground when he, without authorization of the owner of the burial lot, or a lineal descendant of the deceased, or of the municipality, cemetery association or person or authority responsible for the control or management of the cemetery or burial ground: (1) Intentionally destroys, mutilates, defaces, injures or removes any tomb, monument, gravestone or other structure placed or designed for a memorial of the dead, or any portion or fragment thereof, or any fence, railing, curb or other enclosure for the burial of the dead, in or from any cemetery or burial ground; or (2) wantonly or maliciously disturbs the contents of any tomb or grave in any cemetery or burial ground.
(b) Interference with a cemetery or burial ground is a class C felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars.
(P.A. 84-280, S. 4; P.A. 89-109; P.A. 96-209, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 89-109 established a minimum fine of five hundred dollars; P.A. 96-209 amended Subsec. (b) by changing penalty from class D to class C felony.

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Sec. 53a-219. Unlawful possession or sale of gravestones: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of the unlawful possession or sale of gravestones when he possesses or sells, offers for sale or attempts to sell or transfers or disposes of any monument, gravestone or other structure placed or designed for a memorial of the dead, or any portion or fragment thereof, knowing that it has been unlawfully removed from a cemetery or burial ground.
(b) Unlawful possession or sale of gravestones is a class D felony.
(P.A. 84-280, S. 5.)

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Sec. 53a-220. Interference with a memorial plaque: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of interference with a memorial plaque when he, without authorization of the governmental body responsible for the placement, control or maintenance of a memorial plaque, intentionally defaces, mutilates or destroys a plaque commemorating a person or an event, or removes such a plaque from its official location.
(b) Interference with a memorial plaque is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 91-173, S. 1.)

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Sec. 53a-221. Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of the unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque when he possesses or purchases or attempts to purchase or sells, offers for sale or attempts to sell or transfers or disposes of a plaque commemorating a person or an event knowing that it has been unlawfully removed from its official location.
(b) Unlawful possession, purchase or sale of a memorial plaque is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 91-173, S. 2.)

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Sec. 53a-222. Violation of conditions of release: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of violation of conditions of release when, while charged with the commission of a felony, misdemeanor or motor vehicle violation for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment may be imposed, such person is released pursuant to subsection (c) of section 54-63d or subsection (c) of section 54-64a on the condition that such person (1) avoid all contact with the alleged victim or (2) not use or possess a dangerous weapon, and such person intentionally violates that condition.
(b) Violation of conditions of release is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 98-90, S. 1; P.A. 99-186, S. 10.)
History: P.A. 99-186 amended Subsec. (a) to revise a statutory reference and make provisions gender neutral.

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Sec. 53a-223. (Formerly Sec. 53a-110b). Criminal violation of a protective order: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant to subsection (e) of section 46b-38c, or section 54- 1k or 54-82r has been issued against such person, and such person violates such order.
(b) Criminal violation of a protective order is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 91-381, S. 1; P.A. 95-214, S. 5; P.A. 99-240, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 95-214 amended Subsec. (a) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (a) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r; Sec. 53a-110b transferred to Sec. 53a- 223 in 2001.
Annotation to former section 53a-110b:
Cited. 46 CA 661.

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Sec. 53a-223a. (Formerly Sec. 53a-110c). Criminal violation of a standing criminal restraining order: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of criminal violation of a standing criminal restraining order when an order issued pursuant to subsection (a) of section 53a-40e has been issued against such person, and such person violates such order.
(b) Criminal violation of a standing criminal restraining order is a class D felony.
(P.A. 96-228, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1, S. 37, 121.)
History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 98-1 made a technical change in Subsec. (a), effective June 24, 1998; Sec. 53a-110c transferred to Sec. 53a-223a in 2001.

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PART XXII
COMPUTER-RELATED OFFENSES

Sec. 53a-250. Definitions. For the purposes of this part and section 52-570b:
(1) "Access" means to instruct, communicate with, store data in or retrieve data from a computer, computer system or computer network.
(2) "Computer" means a programmable, electronic device capable of accepting and processing data.
(3) "Computer network" means (A) a set of related devices connected to a computer by communications facilities, or (B) a complex of two or more computers, including related devices, connected by communications facilities.
(4) "Computer program" means a set of instructions, statements or related data that, in actual or modified form, is capable of causing a computer or computer system to perform specified functions.
(5) "Computer services" includes, but is not limited to, computer access, data processing and data storage.
(6) "Computer software" means one or more computer programs, existing in any form, or any associated operational procedures, manuals or other documentation.
(7) "Computer system" means a computer, its software, related equipment, communications facilities, if any, and includes computer networks.
(8) "Data" means information of any kind in any form, including computer software.
(9) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, limited liability company, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association and any other legal or governmental entity, including any state or municipal entity or public official.
(10) "Private personal data" means data concerning a natural person which a reasonable person would want to keep private and which is protectable under law.
(11) "Property" means anything of value, including data.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 1; P.A. 95-79, S. 183, 189.)
History: P.A. 95-79 redefined "person" to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995.

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Sec. 53a-251. Computer crime. (a) Defined. A person commits computer crime when he violates any of the provisions of this section.
(b) Unauthorized access to a computer system. (1) A person is guilty of the computer crime of unauthorized access to a computer system when, knowing that he is not authorized to do so, he accesses or causes to be accessed any computer system without authorization.
(2) It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution for unauthorized access to a computer system that: (A) The person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or a person empowered to license access thereto, had authorized him to access; (B) the person reasonably believed that the owner of the computer system, or a person empowered to license access thereto, would have authorized him to access without payment of any consideration; or (C) the person reasonably could not have known that his access was unauthorized.
(c) Theft of computer services. A person is guilty of the computer crime of theft of computer services when he accesses or causes to be accessed or otherwise uses or causes to be used a computer system with the intent to obtain unauthorized computer services.
(d) Interruption of computer services. A person is guilty of the computer crime of interruption of computer services when he, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly disrupts or degrades or causes the disruption or degradation of computer services or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized user of a computer system.
(e) Misuse of computer system information. A person is guilty of the computer crime of misuse of computer system information when: (1) As a result of his accessing or causing to be accessed a computer system, he intentionally makes or causes to be made an unauthorized display, use, disclosure or copy, in any form, of data residing in, communicated by or produced by a computer system; or (2) he intentionally or recklessly and without authorization (A) alters, deletes, tampers with, damages, destroys or takes data intended for use by a computer system, whether residing within or external to a computer system, or (B) intercepts or adds data to data residing within a computer system; or (3) he knowingly receives or retains data obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection; or (4) he uses or discloses any data he knows or believes was obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection.
(f) Destruction of computer equipment. A person is guilty of the computer crime of destruction of computer equipment when he, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly tampers with, takes, transfers, conceals, alters, damages or destroys any equipment used in a computer system or intentionally or recklessly causes any of the foregoing to occur.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 2.)
Cited. 49 CA 582.

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Sec. 53a-252. Computer crime in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the first degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds ten thousand dollars.
(b) Computer crime in the first degree is a class B felony.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 3.)

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Sec. 53a-253. Computer crime in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the second degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds five thousand dollars.
(b) Computer crime in the second degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 4.)

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Sec. 53a-254. Computer crime in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the third degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and (1) the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds one thousand dollars or (2) he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.
(b) Computer crime in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 5.)

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Sec. 53a-255. Computer crime in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the fourth degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services exceeds five hundred dollars.
(b) Computer crime in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 6.)

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Sec. 53a-256. Computer crime in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of computer crime in the fifth degree when he commits computer crime as defined in section 53a-251 and the damage to or the value of the property or computer services, if any, is five hundred dollars or less.
(b) Computer crime in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 7.)

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Sec. 53a-257. Alternative fine based on defendant's gain. If a person has gained money, property or services or other consideration through the commission of any offense under section 53a-251, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing a fine, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of such offense. In such case the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the offense and, if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For the purpose of this section, "gain" means the amount of money or the value of property or computer services or other consideration derived.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 8.)

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Sec. 53a-258. Determination of degree of crime. Amounts included in violations of section 53a-251 committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the degree of the crime.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 9.)

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Sec. 53a-259. Value of property or computer services. (a) For the purposes of this part and section 52-570b, the value of property or computer services shall be: (1) The market value of the property or computer services at the time of the violation; or (2) if the property or computer services are unrecoverable, damaged or destroyed as a result of a violation of section 53a-251, the cost of reproducing or replacing the property or computer services at the time of the violation.
(b) When the value of the property or computer services or damage thereto cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the value shall be deemed to be two hundred fifty dollars.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the value of private personal data shall be deemed to be one thousand five hundred dollars.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 10.)

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Sec. 53a-260. Location of offense. (a) In any prosecution for a violation of section 53a-251, the offense shall be deemed to have been committed in the town in which the act occurred or in which the computer system or part thereof involved in the violation was located.
(b) In any prosecution for a violation of section 53a-251 based upon more than one act in violation thereof, the offense shall be deemed to have been committed in any of the towns in which any of the acts occurred or in which a computer system or part thereof involved in a violation was located.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 11.)

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Sec. 53a-261. Jurisdiction. If any act performed in furtherance of the offenses set out in section 53a-251 occurs in this state or if any computer system or part thereof accessed in violation of section 53a-251 is located in this state, the offense shall be deemed to have occurred in this state.
(P.A. 84-206, S. 12.)

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Secs. 53a-262 to 53a-274. Reserved for future use.

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PART XXIII
MONEY LAUNDERING

Sec. 53a-275. Money laundering. Definitions. For the purposes of this section and sections 53a-276 to 53a-282, inclusive:
(1) "Monetary instrument" means coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal checks, bank checks, money orders, negotiable investment securities or negotiable instruments in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.
(2) "Equivalent property" means property that may be readily converted into, or exchanged for, United States or foreign currency or coin, including gold, silver or platinum bullion or coins, diamonds, emeralds, rubies, sapphires or other precious stones, stamps or airline tickets, or any other property that is intended to be so converted or exchanged.
(3) "Felony" means a felony under the laws of this state or a criminal offense committed in another jurisdiction punishable under the laws of that jurisdiction by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.
(4) "Exchange", in addition to its ordinary meaning, means purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, deposit, withdrawal or extension of credit.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 5.)

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Sec. 53a-276. Money laundering in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the first degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony and of a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars, for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with the intent to conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived in whole or in part from the criminal sale of a controlled substance or with the intent that the exchange aid a person in the criminal sale of a controlled substance or to profit or benefit from the criminal sale of a controlled substance.
(b) Money laundering in the first degree is a class B felony.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 6.)

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Sec. 53a-277. Money laundering in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the second degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony and of a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars, for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with intent to conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived from any criminal activity or with intent that the exchange aid a person to commit criminal conduct or to profit or benefit from the commission of a crime.
(b) Money laundering in the second degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 7.)

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Sec. 53a-278. Money laundering in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the third degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony and of a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars, for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with knowledge that the exchange will conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived from any criminal activity, or with knowledge that the exchange will aid a person to engage in or to profit or benefit from any criminal activity.
(b) Money laundering in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 8.)

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Sec. 53a-279. Money laundering in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of money laundering in the fourth degree when he exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more monetary instruments derived from criminal conduct constituting a felony for one or more other monetary instruments or equivalent property, with knowledge that the exchange will conceal that the exchanged monetary instrument or instruments or equivalent property is derived from any criminal activity, or with knowledge that the exchange will aid a person to engage in or to profit or benefit from criminal activity.
(b) Money laundering in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 9.)

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Sec. 53a-280. Money laundering. Alternative fine. In lieu of the fine authorized under section 53a-41 or 53a-42, and in addition to any fine authorized by section 53a- 44, any person who violates section 53a-276, 53a-277 or 53a-278 shall be fined, for a first offense, not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or twice the value of the criminally derived monetary instrument or instruments, whichever is greater, and for a second or subsequent offense, not more than five hundred thousand dollars or five times the value of the criminally derived monetary instruments, whichever is greater.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 10.)

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Sec. 53a-281. Money laundering. Corporate fines. Any corporation which violates section 53a-276, 53a-277 or 53a-278 shall be fined, for a first offense, not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars or twice the value of the criminally derived monetary instrument or instruments, whichever is greater, and for a second or subsequent offense, not more than five hundred thousand dollars or five times the value of the criminally derived monetary instruments, whichever is greater.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 11.)

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Sec. 53a-282. Money laundering. Presumptions. (a) A person who pays or receives substantially less than face value for one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments are derived from criminal activity.
(b) A person who engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, knowing or believing that such instrument or instruments, or the instrument or instruments or equivalent property exchanged for such criminally derived instruments, bear fictitious names, is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments derived from criminal activity are in fact so derived.
(c) A person who fails to record or report a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, in circumstances under which such recording or reporting is either required by law or is in the ordinary course of business, is presumed to know that the monetary instrument or instruments are derived from criminal activity.
(d) A person who engages in a transaction involving one or more monetary instruments that are in fact derived from criminal activity, knowing that the physical condition or form of the monetary instrument or instruments makes it apparent that they are not the product of bona fide business or financial transactions, is presumed to know that they are derived from criminal activity.
(P.A. 87-373, S. 12.)

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Secs. 53a-283 to 53a-289. Reserved for future use.

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PART XXIV
VENDOR FRAUD

Sec. 53a-290. "Vendor fraud" defined. A person commits vendor fraud when, with intent to defraud and acting on such person's own behalf or on behalf of an entity, such person provides goods or services to a beneficiary under sections 17b-22, 17b-75 to 17b-77, inclusive, 17b-79 to 17b-103, inclusive, 17b-180a, 17b-183, 17b-260 to 17b- 262, inclusive, 17b-264 to 17b-285, inclusive, 17b-357 to 17b-362, inclusive, 17b-600 to 17b-604, inclusive, 17b-749, 17b-807 and 17b-808 or provides services to a recipient under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as amended, and, (1) presents for payment any false claim for goods or services performed; (2) accepts payment for goods or services performed, which exceeds either the amounts due for goods or services performed, or the amounts authorized by law for the cost of such goods or services; (3) solicits to perform services for or sell goods to any such beneficiary, knowing that such beneficiary is not in need of such goods or services; (4) sells goods to or performs services for any such beneficiary without prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, when prior authorization is required by said department for the buying of such goods or the performance of any service; or (5) accepts from any person or source other than the state an additional compensation in excess of the amount authorized by law.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 3; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 00-2, S. 25, 53.)
History: (Revisor's note: In 1997, the phrase "17b-180 to 17b-183, inclusive," was replaced editorially by the Revisors with "17b-180a, 17b-183," to reflect the repeal of Secs. 17b-180, 17b-181 and 17b-182); June Sp. Sess. P.A. 00-2 deleted reference to Sec. 17b-114, added reference to Sec. 17b-749 and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2000.

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Sec. 53a-291. Vendor fraud in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the first degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of ten thousand dollars.
(b) Vendor fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 4.)

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Sec. 53a-292. Vendor fraud in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the second degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of five thousand dollars.
(b) Vendor fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 5.)

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Sec. 53a-293. Vendor fraud in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the third degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of one thousand dollars.
(b) Vendor fraud in the third degree is a class D felony.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 6.)

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Sec. 53a-294. Vendor fraud in the fourth degree: Class A misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the fourth degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of five hundred dollars.
(b) Vendor fraud in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 7.)

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Sec. 53a-295. Vendor fraud in the fifth degree: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the fifth degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in excess of two hundred fifty dollars.
(b) Vendor fraud in the fifth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 8.)

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Sec. 53a-296. Vendor fraud in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of vendor fraud in the sixth degree when he commits vendor fraud, as defined in section 53a-290, and receives payment for goods or services fraudulently provided in an amount of two hundred fifty dollars or less.
(b) Vendor fraud in the sixth degree is a class C misdemeanor.
(P.A. 96-169, S. 9.)

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